

CSS CYBER DEFENSE PROJECT

Hotspot Analysis:

Cyber and Information warfare in
the Ukrainian conflict

Zürich, June 2017

Version 1

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Executive Summary

Targets:	Ukrainian and Russian institutions, and media outlets.
Tools:	Distributed Denial of Service ¹ , website defacement, malware (BlackEnergy, Snake, Operation Armageddon and X-Agent), propaganda, and misinformation.
Effects:	Unavailability of targeted websites, information stolen from infected networks, electricity outage for several hours in Ukraine due to an attack on several power plants, propaganda and misinformation campaigns.
Timeframe	November 2013 and still ongoing

Russia's cyber capabilities gained visibility with intrusions into US computer networks during the 2016 election campaign. However, Russia has been building up and improving its cyber capabilities over the past ten years, as first evidenced in the form of cyberattacks in Estonia in 2007 and continued during the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. In the Ukrainian conflict, Russia demonstrated its capacity to combine cyber capabilities with electronic warfare, intelligence and kinetic capabilities.

This hotspot analysis examines the specific case of the cyber dimension in the Ukrainian conflict. A "hotspot" is understood as the cyber aspect in a particular conflict and relates to the series of actions taken in that context by states or non-state actors in cyberspace.

The main objective of this analysis is to better understand the events and cyber-activities taking place during the Ukrainian conflict and their effects. An additional aim of this document is to evaluate victims' responses to the cyberattacks in order to learn from their actions.

Description

At the end of 2013, the Ukrainian President abandoned an association agreement with the European Union, triggering public demonstrations. A few months later, he fled to Russia, and the Ukrainian conflict started with Russia invading the Crimean Peninsula. Throughout the Euromaidan protests and the conflict, institutions and media outlets in Ukraine and Russia fell victim to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)² attacks, website defacement and Remote Administration Tools delivered by spear phishing emails. These cyberattacks were used to either disrupt, spy on

or cause damage to the enemy, and since the warring parties used non-state actors as proxy forces to conduct these attacks, it also gave them plausible deniability.

Effects

The analysis found that the cyber-activities conducted in the context of the Ukrainian conflict not only affected Ukraine at the domestic level, but also had repercussions at the international level. Social and political effects in Ukraine are characterized by Crimea not having access to non-Russian sources of information, the Ukrainian government's credibility being eroded, and the Ukrainian population losing trust in their government as a result. Economic effects are marked by the costs of the damage caused by the various DDoS attacks and website defacements and the expenses incurred by the need to replace equipment following cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power grid. Technological effects comprise the risks of depending on foreign technology, having troops physically tamper with telecommunications infrastructures, damage caused by cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power grid, and the development of new malware.

At the international level, effects are marked by a low-intensity tit-for-tat logic between the warring parties in cyberspace, limited support for Ukraine from the international community, and the implementation of economic sanctions against Russia.

Consequences

A range of consequences can be derived from the effects of the cyber-activities that occurred in the context of the Ukrainian conflict and Russian information warfare. States may try to limit the impact of the Ukrainian conflict by raising public awareness of propaganda campaigns and misinformation. They should lead by example and enhance their cybersecurity against Distributed Denial of Service attacks and website defacement for online state infrastructures. Also, they may wish to improve their cybersecurity by limiting their dependency on foreign technology and providing guidance for the private sector to follow in case of cyberattacks. States should closely monitor how the Ukrainian conflict continues to evolve, and promote Confidence Building Measures at the international level.

¹ Technical terms are explained in a glossary in section 7 at the end of the document.

² Abbreviations are listed in section 8 at the end of the document.

1 Introduction

Throughout the past ten years, Russia has shown repeatedly that it is capable of developing its cyber capabilities and integrating them with its other military capabilities (e.g. kinetic, intelligence and electronic warfare (EW)³). Relevant Russian activities began in 2007 with the use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)⁴ on Estonian institutions' websites. By 2008, during the conflict between Russia and Georgia, Russian capabilities had improved to the extent that cyber tools were successfully combined with kinetic forces. This hotspot analysis examines specific cases to support a better understanding of the theoretical and abstract concepts of cyber-defense. The goal of this report is to analyze how victims were affected by cyberattacks and how they responded. This paper also serves as a basis for a broader comparative study of various hotspots that can also inform states on how to improve their actions if faced with similar situations.

This hotspot analysis report will be regularly updated as new details are released or new important events occur. The aim is to keep the document as up-to-date as possible.

This report analyzes the specific case of cyber activities in the Ukrainian conflict. Relations between Ukraine and Russia have been tense ever since Vladimir Putin was first elected president. This strained relationship was punctuated by disputes in 2004 during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and again regularly over natural gas supplies. Tensions reached new heights when Ukraine started to develop closer relationships with the European Union (EU) and Ukraine's Russia-friendly president Viktor Yanukovich was ousted following the Euromaidan protests. They finally erupted into an open conflict when Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula.

This case warrants close examination because it concerns an ongoing conflict that is characterized by an intense cyber-dimension. While the intensity of this conflict has decreased in both the physical and the cyber-realms, it remains significant in world politics and may also impact on events in Syria, where Russia is also involved.

This hotspot analysis is divided into the following five sections: Section 2 describes the historical background and chronology of the events from Ukrainian independence in 1990 to the renewed violence in the Donbass region in January 2017. It records the events that have shaped the tense relationship between Russia and Ukraine and explains the conflict context in which the cyberattacks have unfolded.

In section 3, the report explains the various cyber-tools and techniques used during the Euromaidan protests and the Ukrainian conflict as well as the various targets and perpetrators. It demonstrates that the tools and techniques used in this conflict display different degrees of sophistication and serve different purposes. The reported cyberattacks included DDoS, website defacement – mainly aimed at disrupting proper website function – and several malware families, used to steal information. The victims of cyberattacks were mostly state institutions and media outlets in both Ukraine and Russia, but also warring groups and third parties, such as international organizations and other states. The perpetrators are categorized into two groups based on their affiliations rather than their geographic locations. These two groups are pro-Ukrainian hacker groups and pro-Russian hacker groups. Both Ukraine and Russia fight through proxies, which enables both governments to deny any involvement.

Section 4 examines the diverse effects of the cyber-aspects of the Ukrainian conflict on the domestic and international level. On the domestic Ukrainian level, the effects were mainly felt in the social, political, economic and technological domains. Social and political effects in Ukraine were marked by a denial of access to non-Russian information on the Crimean Peninsula and a loss in trust in Ukrainian institutions' ability to protect society. Economically the effects were characterized by the high costs of DDoS and website defacement as well as the costs of replacing damaged equipment in the power plant targeted by cyberattacks. Technological effects consist of Russian troops physically tampering with telecommunications infrastructures in Ukraine – an aspect that clearly illustrates the dangers of relying on foreign technology; of the physical damage in power plants due to the cyberattacks, and the discovery of new malware. Effects on the international level can be summarized as a low-intensity tit-for-tat logic between the warring parties, even where critical infrastructure such as power plants was targeted; the limited support that Ukraine received from the international community, and the implementation of economic sanctions against Russia.

Finally, section 5 proposes some conclusions that may be drawn from this hotspot analysis and that state actors can apply to reduce the risk of being impacted by cyber-activities resulting from the conflict or of finding themselves in a similar situation. It suggests improving cybersecurity by raising public awareness of the issues of propaganda and misinformation; leading by example with better protection of online state infrastructures against DDoS and website defacement; and limiting dependency on foreign technology. It also recommends closely monitoring the development of the Ukrainian

³ Abbreviations are listed in section 8 at the end of the document.

⁴ Technical terms are explained in a glossary in section 7 at the end of the document.

conflict and promoting Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in cyberspace to reduce mistrust among states.

2 Background and chronology

Both the historical background and chronology of the Ukrainian conflict are important in understanding the context in which it developed.

Ukraine gained its independence at the fall of the Soviet Union, but Russia still tried to maintain a certain control or influence over former Soviet Republics. The relations between Russia and Ukraine have been characterized by disputes, including the Orange Revolution during the Ukrainian elections in 2004 and disputes over natural gas supplies. Ukraine first initiated its rapprochement with the EU with an association agreement, but later turned back towards Russia instead. This decision precipitated the Euromaidan protests and provoked the departure of Ukrainian President Yanukovich. In parallel with the protests, DDoS and website defacement occurred on Ukrainian websites. A few months later, when Russia invaded Crimea, there was another increase in cyber-activities in Ukraine and Russia, but these then dropped again to a more or less constant low level. However, there were two spikes in the form of two attacks against the Ukrainian power grid.

Rows with gray background refer to cyber-related incidents.

Date	Event
05.12.1994	Ukraine becomes a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by returning its nuclear weapons to Russia. In the Budapest memorandum on Security Assurances, Ukraine is assured that its territorial integrity and political independence would not be threatened by Russia (Besemeres, 2014; United Nations, 1994).
03.2005-01.2006	In March 2005, Russia accuses Ukraine of diverting natural gas bound for EU states and not paying taxes on natural gas supplies. On January 1, 2006, Russia cuts off natural gas supplies to Ukraine, with effects on European states that depend on the gas supply transiting through Ukraine (BBC News, 2006).
08.2008	Russia invades Georgia following skirmishes between pro-Russian rebels and Georgian armed forces. The Russian military uses a combination of kinetic capabilities and cyberattacks on Georgian institutions' websites (Giles, 2016a, pp. 4–5).

12.2011	After Putin's victory in the legislative elections, the opposition organizes demonstrations to protest against the election results. During the protests, the Russian armed forces use automated DDoS to disrupt media and social media pages in order to stop discussions of the elections (Giles, 2012).
11.2013	The Ukrainian President Yanukovich rejects the Association Agreement with the EU. The pro-European Euromaidan movement subsequently organizes protests but is violently repressed. At the same time, Ukrainian institutions' websites are targeted by DDoS attacks ⁵ (Ukraine investigations, 2014).
18-21.02.2014	Violence against protesters intensifies causing the deaths of several demonstrators. DDoS attacks continue on Ukrainian websites and on Ukrainian members of Parliament's cell phones. The Ukrainian Parliament agrees to a change in constitutional law and to return to the setting before the 2004 constitution.
22.02.2014	Ukrainian President Yanukovich flees to Russia. The Ukrainian Parliament elects Oleksandr Turchynov as acting President until the planned presidential election of 25 th May 2014 (Pakharenko, 2015).
27-28.02.2014	Pro-Russian groups organize demonstrations in various Ukrainian cities, while non-uniformed soldiers seize airports and other strategic sites in Crimea. They cut off Crimean communications with the external world in a raid on the Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructures and tamper with its fiber optic cables (Gordon, 2014; Martin-Vegue, 2015).
01.03.2014	The Russian Parliament authorizes the use of force against Ukraine (Lally et al., 2014).
02.03.2014	Russian troops enter Crimea (Maurer, 2015).
07-14.03.2014	Various Russian websites are targeted by DDoS attacks in retaliation for the invasion (Ukraine investigations, 2014).

16.03.2014	The referendum on the annexation of Crimea by Russia is carried by the Crimean population (Geers, 2015, p. 10).
16-18.03.2014	Various DDoS attacks on Ukrainian and Russian websites are reported (Ukraine investigations, 2014).
17.03.2014	The USA and European states agree on a first round of sanctions against Russia (Geers, 2015, p. 10).
18.03.2014	President Putin signs a bill on the annexation of Crimea (White, 2014).
04.2014	The war in the Eastern Ukrainian region of Donbass starts between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian armed forces. At the same time, cyberattacks on Russian and Ukrainian websites continue. The USA and European states agree on a second round of sanctions against Russia (Shahani, 2015).
24.05.2014	A pro-Russian hacker named CyberBerkut hacks the servers of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and infects the election networks with malware. The Ukrainian cyber emergency response team manages to remove the malware from the network in time for the election (Weedon, 2015).
25.05.2014	Petro Poroshenko is elected as the new President of Ukraine (Geers, 2015, p. 10).
20.06.2014	President Poroshenko declares a seven-day ceasefire for the pro-Russian separatists to lay down their weapons. Cyberattacks from pro-Russian hacker groups also stop during this ceasefire (Shahani, 2015).
17.07.2014	Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur is shot down by combatants in Ukraine resulting in approximately 300 dead (Geers, 2015, p. 10).
07.2014	The USA and European states expand their sanctions against Russia (BBC News, 2014).
06.08.2014	Russia issues an embargo on agricultural goods from the countries that imposed sanctions against Russia (Walker and Rankin, 2014).

⁵ For a detailed table of the cyberattacks during this period and during the Ukrainian conflict, see Annex 1.

05.09.2014	The warring parties agree on a ceasefire in the Donbass region in the Minsk Protocol. The ceasefire collapses in January 2015.
25.10.2014	Poroshenko's political party wins the majority in the Ukrainian parliamentary elections. During the campaign, several DDoS attacks and hacks are observed against Ukrainian institutions (Martin-Vegue, 2015).
11.2014	Russia creates a new cyber warfare-specific military unit in Crimea (Pakharenko, 2015, p. 62).
12.2014	A new Russian military doctrine is published, which also details the concept of information warfare (Giles, 2016a, p. 27).
12.02.2015	The warring parties sign a new ceasefire agreement, the Minsk II Protocol. The protocol is violated shortly after it is signed (Weaver and Luhn, 2015).
03.2015	The EU creates a StratCom Task Force, whose goal is to identify and correct disinformation coming from Russian-speaking media (European Union, 2015).
23.12.2015	A cyberattack on the Ukrainian power grid leaves approximately 250,000 inhabitants without power for several hours (Zetter, 2016).
09.2016	An international investigation reports that flight MH17 was shot down by a Soviet-built BUK missile launched from the Donbass region (Harding, 2016).
25.10.2016	A Ukrainian hacker group leaks hacked emails from a key advisor of Vladimir Putin, Vladislav Surkov. His emails reveal that he was communicating with leaders of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine on a regular basis (Windrew, 2016).
16.11.2016	Russia withdraws from the International Criminal Court (Reuters, 2016a).
01.12.2016	Ukraine tests missiles in the Black Sea, west of Crimea, and is accused of violating Russian territorial waters (BBC News, 2016a).
06-14.12.2016	Several cyberattacks target Ukrainian banks, state agencies and ministries (Miller, 2016a).
17.12.2016	Power goes out for an hour in the region of Kiev after a new cyberattack on the Ukrainian power grid (Goodin, 2017).

29.01.2017	In Eastern Ukraine, clashes between Ukrainian forces and separatist groups intensify after several calmer months (BBC News, 2017).
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3 Description

This section describes the different tools and techniques used during the Euromaidan protests and the Ukrainian conflict to provide a better understanding of these tools and techniques, of how they work and the purposes they serve. It also explains who the targets of these cyberattacks were and who perpetrated them.

3.1 Tools and techniques

The cyberattacks in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia can be categorized by three types: DDoS attacks, website defacement and malware infection by spear phishing⁶. The first two tools are more accurately described as cyber-disruption, while the latter is oriented more strongly toward cyber-espionage for intelligence collection and battlefield preparation for further kinetic offensives or cyberattacks (Torruella, 2014, p. 121).

DDoS

An increase in DDoS attacks against various websites was observed at the beginning of the Euromaidan protests and during the invasion of Crimea. In a DDoS attack, perpetrators overload targeted websites with requests causing disruption to the website services and preventing legitimate users from accessing these pages. This technique requires the use of multiple computers infected by botnets or the coordination of a large number of users. Attackers control such computers compromised by botnets to send requests to the target network without users of infected computers even being aware of this. This kind of cyberattack was used multiple times by both parties to the conflict; Ukrainian media websites were targeted by pro-Russian hackers in November 2013, for instance, and Russian media websites were attacked by pro-Ukrainian hackers in December 2013. DDoS attacks can also serve as a distraction to monopolize the attention of the emergency team of the targeted institution. While they are busy combating the DDoS attack, the perpetrator(s) are able to conduct other malicious activities on the relevant network such as installing a backdoor or malware in order to steal data (NSFocus Inc., 2016, p. 4).

Website defacement

Website defacement has also been observed as a tool used by both parties in the Ukrainian crisis. This technique, where a hacker breaches a web server using

an SQL injection to gain administrative access, is regarded as a cyber-version of vandalism. Once the system has been penetrated, the attacker changes the visual appearance of the website or replaces pages with their own materials. Hacktivists commonly use this technique to spread political messages. For instance, the website of the Russian media, RT, was defaced in March 2014, with attackers replacing the words “Russia”, “Russian” and “military” with the word “Nazi” (Perloth, 2014; Storm, 2014).

Malware

Various malware, believed to be linked to the Ukrainian conflict, has been observed throughout the conflict. The security firm FireEye reported that since the beginning of the war there has been an increase in the use of malware connected to Russian and Ukrainian servers (Geers, 2014). Four malware groups have been identified in this context: BlackEnergy, Snake⁷, Operation Armageddon and X-Agent.

BlackEnergy

BlackEnergy is a family of malware primarily used by cybercriminals. It was also employed in a campaign named Sandworm (Zetter, 2014). The first version of BlackEnergy was used to gain access to networks in order to launch DDoS attacks. The second version, BlackEnergy2, was updated with new functionalities enabling it to steal data. The last version, BlackEnergy3, was updated to target Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and added a new feature, KillDisk, which rendered the infected computers unusable. This version was used to attack the Ukrainian power grid system in December 2015 (E-ISAC, 2016; FireEye Inc., 2016). Attackers used spear phishing emails with a compromised attachment to infect computers. The malware would then install a backdoor to grant the attackers access to the network. The last two versions of the malware were deployed to gather information and were implanted in specific targets such as NATO, the Ukrainian government or the Ukrainian power grid system.

Snake

The Snake malware was discovered in 2014 but has been active since at least 2010 or 2011. It is similar to an older malware, Agent.btz, used to infiltrate the US military network in 2008. Victims got infected either by opening spear phishing emails or by visiting watering hole websites, i.e. webpages infected with malware in

⁶ Even though the use of trolls to spread propaganda and misinformation is a technique used in the Russian information warfare, this aspect will not be considered as a tool for cyberattacks in

this section. However, it will be examined in the section on attribution and actors.

⁷ This malware is also known as Urobouros or Turla.

the hope that targets would visit it and get infected. Once the malware has infected a machine, it waits until the user opens a web browser and then simultaneously opens a backdoor for communication with the attackers without the user's knowledge (InfoSecurity, 2014; Paganini, 2014a). It is designed to copy and delete files, connect to infected servers, and to load and execute other malware. The Snake malware is composed of two elements: a rootkit and a driver. The former takes control of the computer and hides its activities from the user in order to steal data and capture network traffic. The driver injects code into the web browser to hide the exchange of information with the attackers' servers and creates a hidden file for holding configuration and stolen data (Paganini, 2014b; Symantec Security Response, 2014). The number of computers infected by Snake increased in Ukraine after the start of the Euromaidan protests. There were only eight cases of Snake infection in Ukraine in 2013, as compared to 14 new cases between January 2014 and March 2014. A total of 32 cases have been observed since 2010 (Sanger and Erlanger, 2014).

Operation Armageddon

Operation Armageddon is a Remote Administration or Access Tool (RAT) that targeted Ukrainian government, law enforcement and military networks. It was discovered in September 2014 by the US security firm LookingGlass. Security experts and Ukrainian officials suspect Russia of creating and using this malware (Witty, 2015). Its purpose was to gather information about its victims, probably to gain the advantage on the battlefield in Eastern Ukraine (Weedon, 2015, p. 72). This practice demonstrates that cyberespionage can be used as a tool to support physical warfare. It is believed that this malware has been active since at least 2013, when Ukraine started discussing an Association Agreement with the EU. It infected machines through spear phishing emails with a compromised Microsoft Word attachment. It has been noted that some stolen documents were injected with the malware and sent to new targets of spear phishing emails (Hackett, 2015).

X-Agent

X-Agent is a malicious application found on Android and Apple smartphones. It was revealed to the public in December 2016 but has been active since 2013. The application was first created as a legitimate software by a Ukrainian artillery officer in order to prepare artillery targeting data faster. The legitimate application was used as a decoy for malware that intercepts communications and gives away users' locations without their knowledge. According to the cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike, this malicious

application was developed by the hacker group APT28 (CrowdStrike, 2016).

3.2 Targets

In this series of cyberattacks, there were various victims, but most were located in Ukraine and Russia. In this analysis, victims are categorized by activity and country of origin: Ukrainian institutions, Ukrainian media outlets, Russian institutions, Russian media outlets, Russian groups, and third parties.

Ukrainian institutions sustained various kinds of cyberattacks during the Euromaidan protests and during the war with Russia. During the invasion of Crimea, the government website was down for 72 hours because of a DDoS attack, and the cell phones of the members of Parliament were overwhelmed with SMS to prevent them from communicating to coordinate a response. The attacks were not limited to DDoS and defacement of websites. Government networks were also targeted by malware campaigns such as Snake and Sandworm. Ukrainian institutions were targeted by malware for intelligence gathering, protest or retaliation with DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014; Weedon, 2015).

Ukrainian media outlets, newspapers, TV channels, and news agencies suffered mostly from DDoS attacks and website defacement during the Euromaidan protests and during the early stages of the war. They were targeted to either prevent them from reporting events or as retaliation for the way they portrayed events (Ukraine investigations, 2014; Weedon, 2015).

Russian institutions sustained mostly DDoS attacks and website defacement from Ukrainian hacker groups. For example, at the beginning of the war, both the Kremlin website and the website of the lower parliamentary chamber fell victim to a DDoS attack. They were mainly targeted in retaliation for Russia's actions in Ukraine and Crimea. More recently, they suffered data theft by a Ukrainian hacker group, Cyber Hunta. This group stole emails from one of President Putin's advisors, revealing links between the Kremlin and separatists groups in Eastern Ukraine (Windrew, 2016).

Russian media outlets suffered mostly from DDoS and defacement attacks. The goal would have been to either disrupt websites through DDoS attacks, or to expose the media websites to ridicule by defacing them.

Third parties include NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and organizations and countries not directly involved in the conflict that were still victims of various cyberattacks related to the Ukrainian conflict. Various NATO websites were hit by DDoS attacks at the start of the war, and NATO servers were infected by the same malware that infected Ukrainian institutions, i.e. Snake and Sandworm. The former has also been found in Belgian, Lithuanian and British networks (Paganini, 2014a). NATO

was probably also targeted for intelligence collection. The DDoS attacks could additionally have been made in retaliation or as a signal for NATO to stop its enlargement (Giles, 2015). The OSCE, which discovered spying malware in its system in November 2016, was probably targeted to gather information on observers operating in Ukraine or elsewhere in the world (BBC News, 2016b). The Dutch Safety Board was targeted for several days as it released its report on the investigation of the crash of flight MH17 (Foxall, 2016). It might have been targeted to protest and disrupt the publication of the report.

3.3 Attribution and actors

Attribution in cyberspace remains a complicated task. It normally follows the *cui bono* (to whose benefit) logic, but there will always be uncertainty regarding perpetrators. The sources used for this report are mainly academic journals, major Western media and cybersecurity firms. However, there is the possibility that technical evidence found may have been set up in a certain way by certain actors in order to incriminate others.

In the specific case of the Ukrainian conflict, the attribution issue is especially complicated because of the volume of attacks and the fact that both sides use proxies. The use of proxies gives states the advantage of plausible deniability: If attacks are successful, the state benefits from the results of the attacks. However, if they fail, or are compromised, the state can dissociate itself from these groups by declaring that they acted on their own initiative without any government support (Maurer, 2015, p. 81). The distinction between state actors and non-state actors is also unclear, as both tend to share tools. For instance, it was reported that the BlackEnergy toolkit was normally used by cybercriminals for DDoS attacks. However, the attack on the Ukrainian power plant showed that this tool can also be used for espionage and to gain access to political targets (F-Secure, 2014).

Actors come from both states and can be categorized into two groups: pro-Ukrainian hacker groups and pro-Russian hacker groups. The difference between the two categories is not geographical because some groups target their own country's institutions. Moreover, some pro-Russian hacker groups perpetrated their attacks from the Eastern Ukrainian territories to bypass territorial filters blocking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses coming from Russia (Ukraine investigations, 2014).

The following list is non-exhaustive and only details the main active groups on both sides. There is the possibility that some of these groups are in fact the same

but operate under different names and have therefore been categorized as two different groups.

Pro-Ukrainian hacker groups

- Cyber Hunta: A hacktivist group composed of several volunteers whose goal is to expose Moscow's involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. They claim not to be associated with the Ukrainian government (Miller, 2016b).
- Cyber Hundred⁸: This hacktivist group aims to remove pro-Russian trolls from Ukrainian websites and to protect Ukrainian websites from pro-Russian hackers. They teach the population about ways to fight trolls and help to retaliate against cyberattacks (Ukraine investigations, 2014). However, very little is known about their structure or their members.
- Null Sector: This hacker group was created after the fall of the former Ukrainian President Yanukovich in February 2014. They mostly use DDoS attacks against Russian websites and offer their services to fight back against cyberattacks (Ukraine investigations, 2014).
- Ukrainian Cyber Troops/Army: This hacker group, which was founded by Eugene Dukokin, a former cybersecurity consultant and programmer (Maheshwari, 2015), targets pro-Russian separatists and Russian troops in Ukraine. They report accounts of pro-Russian officials to various banking and payment websites or social media in order to get the accounts closed. These actions are legal and do not require them to hack any systems (Kerckänen and Kuronen, 2016).

Pro-Russian hacker groups

- CyberBerkut: This hacker group supports separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine, but it remains uncertain whether it is composed of pro-Russian Ukrainians or Russians. CyberBerkut has claimed to be behind several cyberattacks, ranging from DDoS of NATO websites to the implantation of malware into the CEC. Rumors have it that former members of the Ukrainian special police forces, Berkut, are behind CyberBerkut. Others claim that CyberBerkut is in reality the Russian hacker group APT28 (Miller, 2016b) or that they work together against common enemies (Ashok, 2016). It is said that CyberBerkut benefits from expertise and funding from the Russian government (Kerckänen and Kuronen, 2016).
- APT28⁹: This hacker group was first discovered in 2008 during the conflict between Russia and Georgia. The group is believed to have ties to the

⁸ This hacker group is also known as KiberSotnya or CyberMaidan.

⁹ This hacker group is also known under the names Sofacy, Fancy Bear, Pawn Storm, Strontium or Sednit.

- Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which is the foreign military intelligence office. They are highly professional and use malware developed on computers with Russian language settings. They are known to design their malware to fit their targets and to use spear phishing to infect their victims, as well as using zero-day vulnerabilities. They have infiltrated the networks of Russian dissidents, European security organizations, defense contractors, Western governmental institutions, and media outlets. They are one of the two groups who allegedly hacked into the US Democratic National Committee in 2016¹⁰. The choice of their targets seems to be the typical targets that a military intelligence service like the GRU would concentrate on. APT28's malware has been found in Ukrainian government networks and artillery troops' smartphones (Crowdstrike, 2016; Koval, 2015; Weedon, 2015). The security firm ThreatConnect believes that they are linked to CyberBerkut, as the two groups took turns in spear phishing campaigns against the investigative journalist group Bellingcat (Ashok, 2016).
- APT29¹¹: This hacker group was first seen in 2008 during a series of cyberattacks in Chechnya. They have also been accused of breaches of the US State Department and the US White House (Thielman and Ackerman, 2016). They are believed to have ties to the Russian Federal Security Services (FSB), the main Russian national security institution and successor to the KGB. They are known to use spear phishing techniques and often reuse stolen documents from previous hacks to lure and infect new victims. APT29 is believed to use a backdoor malware called Hammertoss to stealthily retrieve information; however, there is no information regarding the use of Hammertoss in the Ukrainian conflict (Standish, 2015; Weedon, 2015). They are considered to be highly professional and meticulous in their actions, constantly trying to reduce or eliminate any forensic evidence. This level of organization and the use of highly sophisticated software suggests that they are state-financed (FireEye Inc., 2015).
 - Anonymous Ukraine: This hacker group is the branch of the hacktivist movement Anonymous in Ukraine. It is, however, internally divided in its position regarding the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Some of its members are pro-Ukrainian and tend to be close to Cyber Hundred and Null Sector, while others are pro-Russian and close to CyberBerkut. The pro-Russian element is prominent, having claimed several attacks on NATO, US and EU governments' websites (Carr, 2014).
 - Quedagh: This name has been assigned to this group by analysts from the security firm F-Secure, after the group employed the BlackEnergy toolkit against political targets. F-Secure suspects that the group was also involved in the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. The hacker group has used different versions of the toolkit since 2010. The evolution of their version of the toolkit shows that they take a patient approach and closely observe their victims to fine-tune their malware to their targets (F-Secure, 2014, p. 4).
 - Trolls: Trolls are used by the Russian government to spread pro-Russian propaganda in social media, blogs and forums abroad and in Russia. They are organized in "troll farms or factories", i.e. institutions from which trolls post their messages, comments or posts. One of these troll farms was discovered in St. Petersburg, where trolls were arranged in sectors responsible for different media and given quotas for comments and posts to be written per day. The Ukrainian government and Ukrainian conflict are said to constitute the most prominent topics targeted by trolls (Volchek and Sindelar, 2015).
 - Nashi Youth Movement and Russian Patriotic Hackers: "Nashi" means "ours", and the Nashi Youth Movement was a political youth movement for young Russians aged between 17 and 25 years. The organization was created in 2005 in response to the activist movement of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The movement was openly pro-Putin and was reported to have harassed and spied on opposition activists (Shachtman, 2009). The movement was terminated after the resignation of its president following changes in the Russian government in 2012 (Hartog, 2016). The group claimed responsibility for the cyberattacks on Estonian institutions in 2007 and was also known to have organized pro-Russian protests in Finland and Estonia (Stratfor, 2012). Even though the movement was terminated in 2012, some of its members may continue to be involved in cyber-activities as patriotic hackers, individuals or groups of individuals perpetrating hacking activities on their own initiative against what they perceive to be enemies of Moscow (Denning, 2011, p. 178).

¹⁰ For more information about the Democratic National Committee hack, please see: Baezner, Marie; Robin, Patrice (2016): Hotspot Analysis: Cyber-conflict between the United States of America and Russia, December 2016, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich.

¹¹ This hacker group is also called Cozy Bear, The Dukes or CozyDuke.

4 Effects

This section analyzes the various effects of the cyber-aspect of the Ukrainian conflict on the Ukrainian domestic and international levels. At the Ukrainian domestic level, the report looks at the damage to society caused by cyber-activities in the context of the conflict. It also focuses on the economic costs of such cyberattacks for the private sector and governmental institutions. It further examines both the technological damage resulting from the conflict and technological innovations resulting from it.

At the international level, this section focuses on the international effects of the cyberattacks and the Ukrainian conflict on the international order and cooperation.

4.1 Social and political effects

On the social level, people from East Ukraine and Crimea, which are mostly Russian-speaking regions, are totally isolated from any outside information. They are only able to listen to Russian radio or watch Russian television and therefore have very limited access to other forms of media, effectively preventing them from forging other opinions than those promoted by Russian media. On the other hand, people from the Western part of Ukraine have limited access to Russian-speaking media (Lange-Ionatamishvili and Svetoka, 2015; Nocetti, 2015; Selhorst, 2016). Maintaining this isolation is an important part of Russian information warfare, where the goal is to control public opinion and indirectly shape decisions in favor of Russia (Lewis, 2015). Russian propaganda is judged to be highly effective. It broadcasts through a large number of channels, ranging from traditional television to social media and chat rooms. This enables propaganda to reach a larger number of people and publish news faster than traditional media channels limited by the need to check facts before publication (Paul and Matthews, 2016). Propagandists also try to increase the credibility and visibility of their news platforms by inviting experts or celebrity guests, such as Julian Assange and Larry King (Besemer, 2014).

The significant volume of cyberattacks on Ukrainian institutions most likely also strained people's faith in these institutions and intensified a general feeling of insecurity. DDoS attacks and defacement erode people's trust in their institutions and their ability to protect their own population. This is also the logic behind the creation of various hacker groups in Ukraine, including Dokukin's Ukrainian Cyber Troops/Army. At the beginning of the conflict, the Ukrainian authorities visibly lacked the capacity to deal with the various cyberattacks. As a consequence, private initiatives such as Dokukin's decided to support the government and the Ukrainian people against trolls and other Russian

cyber activities (Kerkkänen and Kuronen, 2016). Another good example of diminishing people's trust in their government was the distributed denial of telephone service attack launched on the call center of the Ukrainian power supplier during the blackout of December 2015. The call center was flooded with fake phone calls, rendering it unable to answer legitimate calls from customers experiencing power outages. This situation led Ukrainians to believe that Ukrainian energy suppliers are not prepared for incidents of this nature (Zetter, 2016).

4.2 Economic effects

The economic effects of the cyberattacks in the context of the Ukrainian conflict mostly concern the consequences of the DDoS and defacement attacks. DDoS attacks usually generate direct costs for businesses in the form of loss of revenue and loss of productivity. The average economic damage is estimated to be US\$22,000 per minute of website unavailability, and the average estimated duration of these attacks was 54 minutes (Kenig, 2013). Such attacks can therefore cost a substantial amount of money for the businesses they target. However, every business is affected differently by DDoS attacks, and other costs such as investigation, technical response, customer support and public relations costs further add to the bill. Indirect costs, including damage to reputation, theft of critical data and opportunity costs, also need to be taken into account and can also have serious consequences (NSFocus Inc., 2016). In the context of the Ukrainian conflict, the victims of such attacks were mostly media outlets, banks and governmental websites. For the first two types of victim, loss of revenue may be the most important concern, while for government institutions whose websites were targeted, reputational damage and the indirect costs incurred by such attacks constitute the most urgent issues. In their cases, people may begin to doubt the institutions' ability to perform their tasks or protect the public (especially where institutions were unable to protect their own websites from a cyberattack).

Website defacement has similar economic consequences to DDoS attacks. If defacement involves a redirection of visitors to another website, the targeted webpages may lose customers while the defacement persists. Defacement additionally causes a loss of trust in the owners of defaced websites. This type of attack exposes weaknesses in webpage security, which may suggest further vulnerabilities and thus render sites and site owners untrustworthy (Paladion Networks, 2015).

Malware infections can be just as economically damaging as DDoS attacks for victims. However, it seems that in the Ukrainian conflict malware was used for collecting information for intelligence purposes and not for enrichment or cybercriminal activities. These

intrusions cause similar costs to DDoS attacks because victims need to engage emergency teams to stop the interference and investigate the attack. They also impact on institutions' reputations for the same reasons as DDoS and defacement attacks (BanffCyber Technologies, 2016).

4.3 Technological effects

In the context of the conflict in Ukraine, there were physical attacks on telecommunications infrastructures as well as cyberattacks on critical infrastructures. In particular, when Ukraine was invaded in March 2014, the so-called "little green-men" raided the Crimean infrastructures of the Ukrainian telecommunications provider, UkrTelecom. They tampered with the Crimean internet exchange point in order to isolate the peninsula from the rest of the world and prevent it from communicating events. In this instance, the physical damage caused was not the result of a cyberattack, but rather of a material interference with the functioning of the internet in Crimea. Russia, which admitted that the "little-green-men" were in fact Russian troops in April 2014, did not try to shut down the internet in Ukraine entirely for two reasons (Karmanau and Isachenkov, 2014). First, it would have been too difficult because Ukraine has six internet access points, all of which go through Kiev. Second, Russia already owns the main telecommunications companies in Ukraine, which also rely mostly on Russian hardware for their telecommunications infrastructures (Libicki, 2015, p. 50; Tucker, 2014). Furthermore, many Ukrainians use Russian social media such as vKontakte and Russian internet resources such as email addresses, allowing the Russian authorities to intercept and read or listen to all conversations conducted via these platforms. Even some Ukrainian officials used email accounts provided by Russian companies, which allowed the Russian government to easily obtain the information it needed even without cyberattacks (Pakharenko, 2015; Poludenko-Young, 2015). This partly explains why there have been so few attacks on communications infrastructures in the physical and cyber realms and illustrates that technological dependence on another state can have significant consequences.

The first cyberattacks on critical infrastructures occurred in December 2015, when several Ukrainian power plants were shut down for several hours. The attacks involved the BlackEnergy3 malware. Investigators reported that the power plants targeted were still not back to full production levels even two months after the attacks. The attackers overwrote the firmware code for 16 substations, resulting in operators being unable to log into the substation systems remotely and needing to control them manually. Furthermore, the malware contained a payload named KillDisk, which erased and crashed infected computers. Infected

machines could not be restarted. All stored data and information was lost and needed to be replaced.

This particular attack on power plants may have been a response to the physical attack of a pro-Ukrainian group on power substations in Crimea. However, the forensic investigation showed that the infection already started in spring 2015. Investigators claimed that the attackers could have done significantly more damage than merely shutting down power for several hours. They assume that the attack was only a message to show off their capabilities (Zetter, 2016).

The second cyberattack on critical infrastructures occurred in December 2016 and was very similar to the one from the year before. It targeted a power plant near Kiev and caused a power outage for approximately one hour. The attack used both the same BlackEnergy malware and KillDisk payload. The malicious software was planted in the system via a spear phishing campaign. However, the incident caused less significant material damage than the one in 2015 (Goodin, 2017).

The techniques used in cyberspace in the Ukrainian conflict are not new and did not reach the same intensity as during the conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 (Perlroth, 2014; Weedon, 2015). The novel element in this conflict was the emergence of new malware, including Snake, Operation Armageddon and X-Agent, which also revealed the development of criminal malware such as BlackEnergy for intelligence and offensive operations. The discovery of malware targeting smartphones, i.e. X-Agent, was another significant technological development during the conflict. This represents a completely new element in the dimension of intelligence collection and communication on the battlefield. These new types of malware could trigger a cyber-arms race among states fearing cyberattacks from Russia. These states might build new cyber-defensive measures or offensive capabilities in order to defend themselves. There is also the risk that the malware used during the conflict may be deployed for criminal purposes.

4.4 International effects

After the Euromaidan protests and subsequent annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the number of cyberattacks relating to Ukraine and Russia increased. Given this intensity, people were expecting to see the development of a cyberwar between the two states, but this scenario never eventuated. In reality, the conflict occurred simultaneously in cyberspace and the physical world: cyber-means were used in combination with, and in support of kinetic operations. In this instance, a possible pattern of escalation of activities in cyberspace and a spilling over into the physical realm did not occur because the conflict escalated in parallel in both spheres. Cyber-operations were used in advance in order to support kinetic operations through the

collection of intelligence and misinformation. Moreover, the cyberspace aspect of the conflict was significant at the beginning of the war, then settled down and has remained at a more or less constant level of intensity since. The cyberattacks were mainly limited to cyber-disruptive and enabling operations attacks such as DDoS, website defacement, and intelligence collection malware (Torruella, 2014, p. 121). Intensity seems to have picked up again since December 2015, but even in these cases damage was intentionally limited. The cyberattacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2015 and 2016 could have caused an escalation in the conflict; however, the attackers limited the damage they caused. A US Air Force expert who assisted the Ukrainian authorities with their investigations stated that the attackers could have done a lot more damage but stopped their attack after a few hours (Zetter, 2016). The expert suggested that both attacks were merely intended to show what the perpetrators were capable of. This self-limitation can also be understood as a way of avoiding further escalation of the conflict, which would risk a significant response from Ukraine or its allies. Critical infrastructures and human lives are considered as “red lines” not to be crossed if actors wish to contain a conflict (Lin, 2012).

The conflict in Ukraine has shown that Russia is ready to use military force as a foreign policy instrument, as it did in 2008 during the conflict between Georgia and Russia. At the same time, the use of cyber-means by Russia has developed since the 2008 conflict in the Caucasus. Following the conflict with Georgia, Russia created an “information platoon”, which was later transformed into troll farms (Giles, 2016a, pp. 29–30). However, the conflict in Georgia was different in that Russia had more trouble controlling the “information space” in 2008 and was perceived as having lost the information war (Nocetti, 2015, p. 26). On the other hand, Ukraine found itself completely isolated from outside information in 2014, and it was difficult for foreign media to obtain accurate information about what was happening in the country. The fact that Western media were unable to confirm the presence of Russian military in Ukraine essentially throughout 2014 proved that the Russian tactic of isolating Ukraine’s “information space” had become more effective compared to 2008. While Western countries judged Russian propaganda and misinformation to be too obvious and easily identifiable, Russians were able to pollute information feeds, causing confusion about the reliability of information coming from the region (Giles, 2015, pp. 25–27). Russia also made use of its proxy forces in the physical part of the conflict in Ukraine to complicate the situation. This gave Russia the ability to deny any physical involvement in the conflict. This method was also successfully deployed in cyberspace, as evidenced by the presence of CyberBerkut, which some sources claimed to be a pro-Russian hacker group from Ukraine, while others

asserted that it was in fact a Russian hacker group, APT28 (Koval, 2015, p. 57).

At the international level, Ukraine found itself isolated from any help and at the mercy of efficient Russian information warfare following the annexation of the Crimean. In December 1994, the USA, Great Britain, France and China promised Ukraine, in the Memorandum on Security Assurances, that they would seek assistance from the UN Security Council if there was any aggression from Russia (United Nations, 1994). In reality, the former Soviet Republic is geographically too close to Russia and too far from Western Europe to benefit from any significant military support from Western states. Apart from some material and educational help, Western countries’ armies have not done much to prevent Russia from annexing Crimea or to stop the conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Besemeres, 2014). Assistance from NATO came in the form of funding and expertise to protect Ukraine’s cyberspace, but no NATO troops were deployed. In September 2014, the NATO Summit agreed to create five funds to assist Ukraine, one of which is the Cyber Defense Trust Fund aimed at training personnel and advising Ukrainian authorities on cyber-policies (Fiscutean, 2015). NATO also conducts regular international military exercises in the Ukrainian region in order to demonstrate that the region has not been forgotten. The USA also assists Ukrainian forces by training troops and donating equipment such as radars, Humvees and medical supplies (Gould, 2015).

Western states did, however, impose economic sanctions on Russia after the annexation of Crimea. These sanctions were not forced on Russia specifically because of the cyberattacks in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the bans and embargos had some impact on the Russian economy. The goal of these sanctions was for Western states to put pressure on Russian markets over the long term to show their condemnation of the war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The sanctions restricted access to European and American capital markets by Russian financial, energy and defense businesses, an import and export ban on arms trading, an export ban on dual-use goods, restricted access to sensitive technologies, and a restriction on services linked to oil production (Gros and Mustilli, 2016). These sanctions had an impact on the Russian economy, causing it to contract by 1.5% in 2015, but their effect has in fact been limited. In reality, the fall in oil prices in 2015 had a stronger impact on the Russian economy than the sanctions (Emmott, 2016). Yet the sanctions have put pressure on the Russian economy, albeit without influencing Russian policy regarding Ukraine.

5 Consequences

This section proposes several measures that states can apply to decrease the potential impact of activities similar to the Ukrainian conflict occurring in cyberspace.

5.1 Raising awareness of propaganda and misinformation

Throughout the conflict, Russia has used a combination of cyber, EW, intelligence and kinetic capabilities to control communications within or from Ukraine (Giles, 2016b). This comprehensive approach needs to be acknowledged and understood in order to better counter it.

Based on this case, a primary danger was Russia's focus on information warfare using propaganda, systematic internet trolling and misinformation. It is important that states admit that such cyber-activities may be less sophisticated technically than direct cyberattacks on critical infrastructures but can also do a great deal of damage in society. This issue needs to be debated openly among the highest political circles in order to raise awareness among political leaders and society, as it is difficult for democracies to counter propaganda. Freedom of the press and free speech are core democratic principles, but they also provide a space in which propaganda and misinformation can easily spread. Russian media outlets such as RT or Sputniknews understand this vulnerability and readily exploit it.

In addition to an open debate on misinformation and propaganda, states can take other measures to mitigate the effects of these tactics. However, it is essential for democracies to truly understand the effects of propaganda and misinformation if they are to counter these tactics effectively and be able to develop effective awareness programs. Such programs should explain to the population the difficulties surrounding information warfare. While government agencies may wish to warn domestic audiences about disinformation campaigns and provide tips on how to detect and denounce them, they must also integrate other actors, including the media. They should also clarify what trolls are and what role they play in propaganda operations (Tatham, 2015). Education and awareness campaigns can be designed to help the population to discern propaganda materials more readily and take a more critical stance toward what they read or watch. It would also be important for democracies to reveal and correct misinformation and inconsistencies in news in order to limit the effects of propaganda (Paul and Matthews, 2016).

5.2 Limit dependence on foreign technology

The case of the Ukrainian conflict has shown that reliance on foreign technology in operating critical infrastructures could be fatal in case of conflicts. It is therefore important to restrict dependence on foreign companies for hardware or software to a minimum as far as possible. Relying on foreign technology is problematic for both security and logistic reasons. For example, a foreign supplier may need to travel to the country for maintenance or to update a product. This might provide them with an opportunity to collect intelligence on how the product is used and its purposes. They might also be tempted to sell information they collect to other states. In terms of state security, it is preferable to produce hardware and software domestically if a state has the relevant ability and capacity. Where this is not possible, states should prioritize the security aspects of such actions. Independent hardware and software checks should be performed regularly or inserted into foreign assets to detect any real and perceived vulnerabilities left (intentionally or accidentally) by the supplier.

The fact that a significant proportion of Ukrainians use email services provided by Russian companies also facilitated the collection of intelligence by Moscow. The fact that foreign email service providers are easily able to read and store email discussions and information needs to be highlighted and explained to users. Education and awareness campaigns may be helpful in raising awareness of this issue among the population. Governments could also suggest domestic alternatives or encourage companies to develop them.

The physical attack on the Ukrainian communications infrastructure in Crimea underlined the fact that the protection of such infrastructures needs to be addressed in combination with cyber strategies, especially since there have been reports that Russia showed interest in submarine internet cables, land telecommunication links and communications satellites. This type of attention could be aimed at collecting intelligence on infrastructure vulnerabilities or at obtaining access to the information carried via such infrastructures (Giles, 2016b, pp. 11–13).

5.3 Leading by example against DDoS and website defacement

DDoS attacks and website defacement were frequently used during the Ukrainian conflict. While these forms of attacks are only regarded as cyber-disruptions, they can still be expensive for victims. Governments should lead by example in terms of website security, thereby boosting their credibility and encouraging private actors to implement proper website

security. It is also important that states with relevant capabilities assist other actors that might be less capable of dealing successfully with attacks. A standard operating procedure could be created to guide businesses in case of DDoS or website defacement.

5.4 Monitoring of the evolution of the conflict

Western states are not direct victims of cyberattacks from either party of the conflict, but private companies and individuals may be indirectly affected. States that are active on the mediation scene in Ukraine through the OSCE might be specifically targeted. Their involvement increases the risk of falling victim to future cyberattacks. As a matter of fact, the OSCE was targeted by a cyberattack allegedly perpetrated by Fancy Bear in December 2016 (BBC News, 2016b; “What Effect Will U.S. Sanctions Have On Russia?,” 2016). States should closely monitor the cyber-activities in the Ukrainian region to evaluate if the risk of direct and indirect cyberattacks on their infrastructures, individuals or businesses increases.

5.5 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

The promotion of CBMs in cyberspace in times of peace and war could help to reduce uncertainties and misperceptions. So far, states have merely agreed that international law could apply to states’ activities in cyberspace, but CBMs could help to increase trust and transparency among states in cyberspace. The difficulty of attributing actions to actors in cyberspace can raise ambiguities that may lead to further international tension. Clearer international protocols, agreements or guidelines negotiated through bi-lateral processes or in regional/international forums may help to mitigate relevant issues. Stauffacher and Kavanagh (2013) proposed a series of CBMs in the context of cybersecurity consisting of:

- Communication and collaborative mechanisms (e.g. communication channels in case of escalation).
- Restraint measures (e.g. pledge to remove incentives for first strike offensive or retaliation actions, exclusion of cyber offensive operations on third parties countries).

Such measures would also enhance cooperation among states and result in greater dialog, which could also evolve into international norms or treaties. This in turn could improve security in both the cyber and the physical realms (Brake, 2015; Farrell, 2015; Stauffacher and Kavanagh, 2013).

- Transparency measures (dialog on cyber policies/strategies/doctrine, exchange of military personnel, joint simulation exercises, and so forth); compliance indicators and monitoring of transparency measures (e.g. agreement on prohibited targets such as hospitals, joint mechanisms in crisis management such as hotlines).
- Cooperative measures (e.g. development of common terminology, development of joint guidelines in case of incidents, joint threat assessments).

6 Annex 1

Non-exhaustive table of the various cyberattacks occurring during the Ukrainian Euromaidan protests and the conflict with Russia:

G = Government institutions, M = Media outlets, IO = Intergovernmental Organization, O = Others				
Date	Victim	Type of victim	Alleged perpetrator	Technique/Tool
07.11.2013	CCDOE website	IO	CyberBerkut or Anonymous Ukraine	DDoS (Carr, 2014)
15.11.2013	Ukraine Customs Services	G	Anonymous	Unspecified data breach (Kovacs, 2013a)
24-25.11.2013	Newspaper Ukraiska Pravda website	M	Pro-Russian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
26.11.2013	TV channel Hromadske website	M	Pro-Russian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
26.11.2013	News website censor.net	M	Pro-Russian actor	Wiped all information on the website (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
31.11.2013	Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs website	G	Protesters of the Euromaidan movement	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
04.12.2013	Pro-Russian news website of Ukrainskaya Pravda	M	Pro-Ukrainian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
10.12.2013	Ukraine Brovary region website	G	Anonymous affiliated group called Clash Hackerz	Unspecified data breach and defacement (Kovacs, 2013b)
28.12.2013	Emails from the Ukrainian Volyn regional state administration website	G	Anonymous	Credentials and passwords for email accounts obtained by a phishing campaign (Johnstone, 2013)
07.01.2014	Ukrainian TV 5 Channel News website	M	Pro-Russian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
09.01.2014	The webpage maidan.ua.org	O	Pro-Russian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
16.01.2014	Website of the Greek-Catholic Church in Ukraine	O	Pro-Russian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
28.01.2016	Ukrainian TV channel website espresso.tv	M	Pro-Russian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
31.01.2014	30 Ukrainian government and media websites	G/M	Ukrainian neo-fascist party Svoboda	Defacement (Waqas, 2014)
11.02.2014	A regional office of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform party	O	Anonymous	Unspecified data breach (Johnstone, 2014)

Date	Victim	Type of victim	Alleged perpetrator	Technique/Tool
18.02.2014	Ukrainian members of Parliament's cell phones	G	Unknown	Cell phones flooded by SMS to prevent members of Parliament from using their phones (Weedon, 2015)
27-28.02.2014	Ukrtelecom infrastructures in Crimea raided	O/G	Armed "little-green-men" (presumed Russian special forces troops)	Cutting cables (Martin-Vegue, 2015)
03.2014	Ukrainian government's website	G	Unknown	Shut down for 72 hours (Weedon, 2015)
03.2014	Ukrainian media outlets' websites	M	Unknown	DDoS (Weedon, 2015)
03.2014	Ukrainian government's network	G	Unknown	Snake malware (Sanger and Erlanger, 2014)
02.03.2014	Pro-Russian news website RT.com	M	Unknown	Defacement, replacing certain words by "Nazi" (Perlroth, 2014)
04.03.2014	Ruptly (a video website part of RT)	M	Unknown	DDoS (Kovacs, 2014)
07.03.2014	The Kremlin's website	G	Cyber Hundred or Null Sector or another pro-Ukrainian actor	DDoS (Maurer, 2015)
14.03.2014	Russian President's website and Bank of Russia's websites	G	Cyber Hundred or Null Sector or another pro-Ukrainian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
14.03.2014	Russian news portal lenta.ru	M	Cyber Hundred or Null Sector or another pro-Ukrainian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
16.03.2014	Several NATO websites	IO	CyberBerkut	DDoS (Bejtlich, 2015)
18.03.2014	Regional TV of Rivne in Western Ukraine	M	CyberBerkut	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
18.03.2014	Ukrainian news portal zik.ua	M	Pro-Russian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
24.03.2014	7 million credit cards	O	Anonymous	Data breach and leak (Passeri, 2014a)
03.04.2014	Website of the Coordination Council of Sevastopol	G	Pro-Ukrainian actor	Defacement and rerouting (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
04.04.2014	Websites of Ukrainian Main Prosecutor Office and of Ukrainian Ministry of internal Affairs	G	CyberBerkut	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
09.04.2014	Ukrainian Main Prosecutor's Office's webpage	G	CyberBerkut or another pro-Russian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
09.04.2014	Ukrainian blog RoadNews	M	Pro-Russian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
10.04.2014	The Russian Lower Parliament Chamber's (Duma) website	G	Pro-Ukrainian actor	DDoS (Ukraine investigations, 2014)
05.2014	Ukrainian Privatbank	O	CyberBerkut	Data theft (The Moscow Times, 2014)

Date	Victim	Type of victim	Alleged perpetrator	Technique/Tool
25.05.2014	Ukrainian Central Election Commission's website	G	CyberBerkut	Defacement and unspecified malware (Koval, 2015; Weedon, 2015)
26.07.2014	Email of the Ukrainian Colonel Pushenko	G	CyberBerkut	Data breach and leak (Passeri, 2014b)
09.08.2014	Regional department of the law enforcement in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine	G	CyberBerkut	Data breach and leak (Passeri, 2014c)
10.2014	Ukrainian Central Election Commission's website	G	Unknown	DDoS (Martin-Vegue, 2015)
24.10.2014	City billboard in Kiev	G/O	CyberBerkut	Depiction of Ukrainian members of Parliament as war criminals (Lange-Ionatamishvili and Svetoka, 2015)
20-21.11.2014	Several Ukrainian governmental websites	G	CyberBerkut	Defacement of the websites with a message on Joe Biden being a fascist (Shevchenko, 2014)
2015	Bellingcat	O	APT28	Spear phishing campaign (Ashok, 2016)
02.01.2015	Ukrainian law enforcement and justice organizations	G	Anonymous	Data breach and leak (Passeri, 2015a)
27.02.2015	US private military contractor involved in Ukraine, Green Group Defense Service	O	CyberBerkut	Access to information on phones (Passeri, 2015b)
25.04.2015	Ukrainian government network	G	Unknown	Operation Armageddon malware (Bejtlich, 2015)
04-05.2015	Ukrainian Ministry of Defense	G	Unknown	Targeted intrusions into the network (Crowdstrike, 2016, p. 5)
13.10.2015	The Dutch Safety Board (investigative body for the crash of flight MH17)	O	Allegedly APT28	Spear phishing and another unspecified type of cyberattack (Foxall, 2016)
18.08.2015	Several Ukrainian websites	O	CyberBerkut	DDoS (Passeri, 2015c)
23.12.2015	Ukrainian power grid	O/G	Unknown (probably Russian group)	BlackEnergy3 malware (Zetter, 2016)
01.2016	Kiev Boryspil Airport	O/G	Unknown (probably Russian group)	Similar to the malware from the power grid, probably BlackEnergy3 (Bolton, 2016; Polityuk and Prentice, 2016)
02.2016	Bellingcat website and email from a Bellingcat journalist	O	CyberBerkut	Defacement and leak of document stolen from the journalist's email account (Ashok, 2016; Crowdstrike, 2016, p. 5)
06.05.2016	Emails of Boris Dobrodeev, former boss of the Russian social network, vKontakte	O	Anonymous	Data breach and leak (Passeri, 2016)
05.2016	Alleged pro-Russian Ukrainian journalists	M	Myrotvorets a Ukrainian nationalist hacker group	Data breach and leak (Cimpanu, 2016)

Date	Victim	Type of victim	Alleged perpetrator	Technique/Tool
07.2016	20 Russian organizations (governmental, scientific and defense institutions)	G	Unknown	Unspecified malware (BBC News, 2016c)
07.2016	Ukrainian artillery	G	APT28	Malicious application for Android and Apple smartphones that intercepts communications and gives away user locations (CrowdStrike, 2016).
24.08.2016	Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Ukrainian National Guard's Twitter and Instagram accounts	G	Pro-Russian or Russian actor named SPRUT	Defacement of their Twitter and Instagram accounts (Starks, 2016).
08.2016	Alleged pro-Russian Ukrainian journalists	M	Myrotvorets a Ukrainian nationalist hacker group	Data breach and leak (Cimpanu, 2016)
25.10.2016	Surkov's emails	G	CyberHunta	"Special software" (Miller, 2016b)
11.2016	OSCE	IO	Allegedly APT28	Unspecified (BBC News, 2016b)
06-08.12.2016	Ukrainian Ministry of Finance	G	Unknown	DDoS attack simultaneous with a system breach (Zetter, 2017).
06-08.12.2016	Ukrainian State Treasury	G	Unknown	DDoS attack simultaneous with a system breach (Zetter, 2017)
13.12.2016	Ukraine Ministry of Defense	G	Unknown	DDoS (Reuters, 2016b)
14.12.2016	Ukrainian State Administration of Railway Transport	G	Unknown	DDoS attack simultaneous with a system breach (Zetter, 2017)
17.12.2016	Ukrainian power substation in Pivnichna near Kiev	O/G	Unknown	BlackEnergy3 malware (Goodin, 2017)

7 Glossary

- Backdoor:** Part of a software code allowing hackers to remotely access a computer without the user's knowledge (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 426).
- Botnet:** Network of infected computers which can be accessed remotely and controlled centrally in order to launch coordinated attacks (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 427).
- Confidence Building Measures (CBMs):** Various procedures that can be established to build trust and prevent escalation between state-actors (United Nations, n.d.).
- Data breach:** Event in which information of a sensitive nature is stolen from a network without the users' knowledge (TrendMicro, 2017).
- Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS):** Act of overwhelming a system with a large number of packets through the simultaneous use of infected computers (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 431).
- Euromaidan movement:** Literally "European Square"; a movement of protest in support of the European Union Association Treaty that was cancelled by former Ukrainian President Yanukovich (Chervonenko, 2013).
- Hactivism:** use of hacking techniques for political or social activism (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 433).
- Internet exchange point:** facility that interconnects two or more independent internet networks in order to facilitate internet traffic (Internet eXchange Federation, n.d.).
- Internet Protocol (IP) address:** A numerical address assigned to each device that uses the internet communications protocol allowing computers to communicate with one another (Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers, 2016).
- Firmware:** A software program programmed on a hardware device providing the instructions for communication between the device and other hardware. Firmware is stored in the flash read-only memory of the device (TechTerms, 2016).
- Malware:** Malicious software that can take the form of a virus, a worm or a Trojan horse (Collins and McCombie, 2012).
- Patriotic hacking:** Sometimes also referred to as nationalistic hacking. A group of individuals originating from a specific state engage in cyberattacks in defense against actors that they perceive to be enemies of their country (Denning, 2011, p. 178).
- Payload:** The part of malware that causes harmful results (PCmag, 2016).
- Proxy:** In computing, an intermediate server acting in place of end-users. This allows users to communicate without direct connections. This is often used for greater safety and anonymity in cyberspace (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 438).
- Remote Administration or Access Tool (RAT):** Software giving remote access and control to a computer without having physical access to it. RAT can be legitimate software, but also malicious (Siciliano, 2015).
- Rootkit:** Program downloading itself to an infected system and taking control of certain functions (Lindsay, 2013).
- Spear phishing:** A sophisticated phishing technique that not only imitates legitimate webpages, but also selects potential targets and adapts malicious emails to them. Emails often look like they come from a colleague or a legitimate company (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 440).
- SQL Injection:** A cyberattack technique in which malicious code to be executed by a SQL server is injected into code lines (Microsoft, 2016).
- Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA):** Computer programs used to control industrial processes (Langner, 2013, p. 9).
- Troll:** A person submitting provocative statements or articles to an internet discussion in order to create discord and drag more people into it (Williams, 2012).
- Troll farm or factory:** Place running round the clock to produce trolling messages and posts (Volchek and Sindelar, 2015).
- Watering hole attack:** Attack where a legitimate website is injected with malicious code that redirects users to a compromised website which infects users accessing it (TechTarget, 2015).
- Website defacement:** Cyberattack replacing website pages or elements by other pages or elements (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 442).
- Worm:** Standalone, self-replicating program infecting and spreading to other computers through networks (Collins and McCombie, 2012).

8 Abbreviations

CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CEC	Ukrainian Central Election Commission
CCDOE	NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
EU	European Union
EW	Electronic Warfare
FSB	Federal Security Service - Russia
GRU	Main Intelligence Directorate - Russia
ICT	Information and Communications Technologies
IP	Internet Protocol
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RAT	Remote Administration Tool
SCADA	Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SQL	Search Query Language

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