The Impact of Sanctions on Russia
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Abstract
This article provides a concise overview of the sanctions that the Western countries imposed on Russia as a result of its aggression in Ukraine. The sanctions are having a more serious impact than President Vladimir Putin anticipated, but have yet to induce Russia to engage in more cooperative behavior.

An Unexpected Invasion
Vladimir Putin’s decision to annex the Crimea in March 2014 caught the international community by surprise. Recognition of national sovereignty and the inviolability of borders are central to the international state system, and since 1991 the Russian Federation (like the Soviet Union before) had been an ardent defender of these principles.

Russia was incensed by the Western recognition of the independence of Kosovo in February 2008, and responded by granting recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. Still, Crimea was assumed to be immune to irredentist claims from Russia, not least because Russia had signed the 1994 Budapest Memorandum guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Ukraine, in return for the latter giving up its nuclear weapons.

Putin’s action demanded a response. Since military action by the West was off the table, given Russia’s nuclear arsenal, economic sanctions were the tool of choice. Sanctions have become an increasingly popular instrument over the past two decades: they apply pressure on intransigent governments without risking the destruction that military action entails.

Their record has been mixed. They are most effective when they are multi-lateral, and they succeed about one third of the time—though skeptics question whether the desired changes in government behavior can be attributed to sanctions alone.1 Sanctions helped bring about the end of apartheid in South Africa, but have failed to halt the nuclear ambitions of North Korea or Iran. They are a blunt instrument, harming the economies of the countries applying the sanctions along with the target nation. Sometimes they trigger an aggressive response by the offending country, deepening the crisis. Critics argue that sanctions are a demonstrative act that allows leaders to make a moral statement, without actually influencing developments on the ground.

Typically the costs of sanctions are borne by the common people and not the leaders making the decisions. Hence there arose the idea of “smart” sanctions that impose travel bans and asset freezes on individual members of the elite.2 In 2012 the US Congress passed the Magnitsky Act, under which in April 2013 18 named Russian officials were sanctioned for participation in the 2009 death of corporate lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. Russia retaliated against the Magnitsky Act with the “Dima Yakovlev” law banning U.S. adoptions, and a list of 18 Americans sanctioned for involvement in the Guantánamo Bay detention center and the arrest of Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout. The Magnitsky Act was a precedent for the sanctions that were introduced on Russia in the wake of the annexation of Crimea.3

The West Responds to Russian Aggression
Less than a week after President Viktor Yanukovich fled Ukraine on February 22, unidentified pro-Russian gunmen were seizing public buildings in Crimea. Separatist rallies took place in many cities of eastern Ukraine; Russian troops were deployed to the Ukrainian border; and on March 1 the State Duma passed a resolution authorizing the use of Russian troops in Ukraine.

On March 16 Crimeans voted in a hastily organized referendum to join the Russian Federation. The next day the US and EU imposed asset freezes and travel bans on 21 individuals deemed to be directly involved in the occupation of Crimea. Nevertheless on March 18 Putin signed into law a bill adding Crimea to Russia, and delivered a remarkable speech in which he embraced the rhetoric of Russian ethno-nationalism, including ominous language condemning “national traitors.”4 Two days later President Barack Obama added several more names to the sanctions list, including what one administration official described as “Putin’s cronies, his money people,” such as Gennady Timchenko, Yuri Kovalchuk, and Arkady and Boris Rotenberg.5 The theory was, in

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2 Uri Friedman, “Smart sanctions: a short history,” Foreign Policy, April 23, 2012. The first individually targeted sanctions were against Haiti in 1993.
5 Mark Landler, “Obama steps up Russia sanctions,” New York Times, March 20, 2014. Kovalchuk’s Bank Rossiya was also
President Obama’s words, that “we can calibrate our response based on whether Russia chooses to escalate or to de-escalate the situation.” Russia responded by banning nine U.S. officials from visiting Russia, including Senator John McCain, who joked that “I guess this means my spring break in Siberia is off.” On March 24, meeting on the sidelines of a nuclear security summit in The Hague, leaders of the G7 group of advanced economies announced that it was suspending Russia’s membership (Russia had joined in 1998, making it the G8) and cancelling the summit that was scheduled to meet in Sochi in June 2014.

Fighting broke out in eastern Ukraine in April, culminating in a May 11 referendum in which Donetsk and Lugansk allegedly voted for independence. Unlike in Crimea, Russia did not act on the results of these referenda. Fighting intensified as the summer progressed, though Russia seemed to be signaling that it was interested in a compromise solution.

On April 28 the U.S. added seven more individuals and 17 related companies to the sanctions list. But with the EU economy stagnating, the powerful Ostauschuss group of German industrialists doing business with Russia urged Chancellor Angela Merkel not to bow to U.S. pressure to introduce broader sanctions. On July 16 the U.S. moved beyond “smart” sanctions on individuals to introduce “sectoral” sanctions on strategic corporations. Two energy firms (Rosneft and Novatek) and two banks (Gazprombank and Vneshekonombank) were banned from all but short-term borrowing (more than 30 days) on U.S. markets, and eight Russian arms firms were embargoed.

Then on July 17 separatists shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, killing all 298 on board. This atrocity, and Russia’s response based on whether Russia chooses to escalate or to de-escalate the situation, followed by an additional eight individuals and three entities on July 30.

Putin responded by doubling down: on August 6 he announced counter-sanctions in the form of a one-year ban on imports of fruits and vegetables, dairy products and meat from countries that had imposed sanctions on Russia. Russia is the EU’s second biggest food market after the U.S., and EU imports accounted for 25–30 percent of the food consumed in Russia. In 2013 Russia imported $16 billion of food from the EU and $1.6 billion from the U.S.

Meanwhile, many Western companies with long-term commitments in Russia assumed the sanctions would soon blow over. Exxon continued its work with Rosneft in the exploration of the Arctic shelf, under a 2011 partnership agreement. In defiance of pressure from the U.S. government, they started drilling with their West Alpha rig on August 9.

During August intensified attacks by Ukrainian forces were closing in on the rebel-held cities of Donetsk and Lugansk, but increased action by Russian military units (whose presence Moscow either denied or described as “volunteers”) forced the Ukrainian government to sign a cease-fire on September 5. The cease-fire brought an end to major military operations but sporadic fighting continued, with the death toll climbing to some 4,700 by the end of the year.

On September 12, 2014, the U.S. and EU imposed additional penalties. The U.S. Treasury barred the banks Sherbank, Bank Moskvy, Gazprombank, Rossekhbank, and VTB, and defense industry conglomerate Rosnropstec, raising funds of more than 30 days maturity; for Transneft, Gazpromneft, Novatek and Rosneft the limit was 90 days. Meanwhile, many Western companies with long-term commitments in Russia assumed the sanctions would soon blow over. Exxon continued its work with Rosneft in the exploration of the Arctic shelf, under a 2011 partnership agreement. In defiance of pressure from the U.S. government, they started drilling with their West Alpha rig on August 9.

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15 <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/22780>
cutting Russia off from the SWIFT inter-bank clearing system (something that was done to Iran in 2012), was not adopted.

Other countries joined the sanctions regime at various points over the spring and summer—including Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and Ukraine. However, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus refused to embargo Russia—and as a result they experienced a surge in exports and Russian tourists.

The E.U. sanctions will stay in place for a calendar year, until July 2015. It is an open question whether they will be renewed at that stage. On December 13, 2014 the U.S. Congress passed a bill authorizing $350 million of military aid for Ukraine and adding more Russian companies to the sanctions list. It also opened the door to third-party sanctions on foreign companies doing business with Russian companies under the embargo.

The sanctions tit-for-tat was a strange kind of limited economic warfare. Each side imposed real costs on each other—and on themselves. But they both stayed away from the elephant in the room—the flow of oil and gas from Russia to Europe. With Russia providing 39 percent of Europe’s natural gas in 2013, and with oil and gas covering 50 percent of the Russian budget, it would have been severely disruptive to interrupt that trade. In June Russia did suspend gas deliveries to Ukraine pending resolution of $3 billion in unpaid bills. This was not an urgent problem since it was summer and demand was low, and Ukraine had ample gas reserves in storage. (Also Poland, Hungary and Slovakia were willing to pump gas to Ukraine.) But winter was coming. After protracted negotiations over the next three months, a deal was struck in Brussels on October 29, under which the EU and IMF will lend Ukraine the money to cover its $3 billion debt to Gazprom and prepay $1.5 billion for supplies during the coming winter.\(^\text{15}\)

The Economic Impact of the Sanctions

On November 24, Finance Minister Anatolii Siluanov estimated that the sanctions would cost the Russian economy $40 billion over the course of a year—and the falling oil price another $100 billion.\(^\text{16}\) Perhaps more damaging than the sanctions themselves was the general atmosphere of uncertainty created by Putin’s seemingly reckless actions in Ukraine, and his reaction to Western sanctions. The market response to the annexation of Crimea was swift, and more immediately damaging than the official sanctions. Russian share prices plummeted, the ruble fell, interest rates rose and capital flight accelerated, reaching $130 billion by December (more than double the typical annual outflow).

Germany is Russia’s largest trading partner after China. German exports to Russia in August 2014 were 26 percent down on August 2013 (a yearly decline of over $6 billion).\(^\text{17}\) Although Russia only accounts for 3.3 percent of total German exports, the impact was felt in the engineering and auto industries, where Russia is the 4\(^{\text{th}}\) and 9\(^{\text{th}}\) largest customer. Russia only accounts for about 1 percent of U.S. exports, so the impact was confined to a small number of companies active in Russia including Boeing, GE (which sold $1.7 billion of turbines and other equipment in Russia in 2012),\(^\text{18}\) and Morgan Stanley, which had to cancel the planned sale of its oil trading division to Rosneft.

The impact of sanctions on Russia’s banking sector was buffered in the short term by the state’s large cash reserves. Even after spending $50 billion to slow the pace of ruble depreciation, which slid 25 percent between January and October, Russia still had $445 billion in reserves.\(^\text{19}\) However, the second half of the year saw the global oil price plummet from $115 a barrel in June to $60 in December, due to weak demand from China and the refusal of Saudi Arabia to cut supply to keep up the price. The Saudis may have had political goals in mind—wanting to increase the pressure on the Iranian and Russian governments and force them to negotiate over Ukraine and nuclear weapons respectively. But their motives were primarily economic—to retain market share, and to deter further expansion of tight oil and tar sands in North America (which become uneconomic when the oil price falls below $75 a barrel).

The falling oil price combined with the Western sanctions to put further downward pressure on the ruble. The depreciation accelerated in December, especially after a December 12 report that the Central Bank had accepted $11 billion in loans to Rosneft as collateral. By December 16 the ruble had lost a further 20 percent of its value, despite the Central Bank hiking the base interest rate to 17 percent.\(^\text{20}\) In the course of the year the ruble had lost 58 percent of its value, falling from 33 to 70 rubles to the dollar.

\(^{15}\) Charles Oliver, “Russia and Ukraine reach gas deal,” Financial Times, October 30, 2014.

\(^{16}\) Aleksei Kislits, “Otsenit’ ushcherb or sanktsii i snizhenie tsen na neft’ dostachno slozhno” (It is hard to estimate the impact of sanctions and the oil price fall), Kommersant, November 24, 2014.

\(^{17}\) Jeevan Vasagar, “German exports to Russia tumble,” Financial Times, October 30, 2014.


\(^{19}\) Ol’ga Kuzminova, “Valyutnye rezervy TsB” (The Central Bank’s currency reserves), Vedomosti, October 24, 2014. The ruble fell from 33/8 to 41/8.

Meanwhile, due to the sectoral sanctions Western oil and gas companies started winding down their new exploration projects in Russia, which remain crucially dependent on certain foreign technologies for deep offshore and fracking operations. In a bid to find new partners not subject to the sanctions regime, Rosneft bought the Swiss-based oil services company Weatherford for $400 million in June, and the next month signed a $4.2 billion contract for six rigs with Norway’s North Atlantic Drilling. In September Putin announced plans to create a national oil services company. Nevertheless, the consultancy IHS CERA estimates that the sanctions, if maintained, could cause a 25 percent drop in Russian oil output by 2025.  

The airline sector has also been affected. Aeroflot’s low-cost subsidiary Dobrolyot was hit by EU sanctions because it flies to Crimea; it suspended operations after losing leases for its Boeing and Airbus aircraft. The fear that Russia could close its airspace to European and U.S. carriers flying to Asia dented airline stock prices.

The most immediate impact on the Russian public was, ironically, Putin’s ban on food imports from the EU. Favorite brands disappeared from the shelves, and Russian customers found themselves buying fruit and vegetables from Macedonia and Iran. Food prices were up 13 percent by the end of the year. Smuggling of European food through Belarus led the Russian government to ban meat imports from Belarus in December, imposing strains on the Eurasian Economic Union (since neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan are subject to the sanctions).

Putin responded by circling the wagons: the state would bail out companies hard-hit by the sanctions. The arrest of billionaire Vladimir Yevtushenkov in September and the reversal of his purchase of the Bashneft oil company (long coveted by Igor Sechin’s Rosneft) was another reminder of the vulnerability of Russian businesses to the whims of the Kremlin. The most politically risky step was the State Duma’s passage in October of a bill promising compensation to Russian citizens whose assets were frozen by foreign governments, possibly through seizing foreign assets in Russia. It was jokingly called the “Rotenberg law” after long-time Putin associate Arkady Rotenberg, who had $40 million of assets in Italy frozen.

The sanctions pushed the Putin administration decisively down the path of an autarchic development strategy. Conservatives argued that the depreciation of the ruble would help to cut imports and make Russian goods more competitive. The currency crisis of December was blamed on mismanagement by Central Bank head Elvira Nabiullina—one of the few remaining liberals in the Putin administration. As Aleksei Kudrin noted “There are forces in the country who have long wanted isolation, maybe a certain self-sufficiency. Today this has all fallen on fertile ground.” Conservative economists such as Sergei Glaziev have long been pushing for state-led industrialization, with protection against foreign imports and spending oil revenues on infrastructure and new technology. Their hour has now come.

For example, Russia is making some serious steps to try to build institutions independent of global financial markets. In March when Visa and MasterCard suspended processing payments at Russia’s SMP and Rosiya banks, it was decided to move ahead with creating a National Card Payment System under Russian control. Russia is looking to increase the proportion of its trade with China denominated in rubles and yuan: currently about 8 percent of Russian imports are settled in yuan. However, it is not clear whether the Russian state has the institutional capacity, or the deep pockets, to steer the nation’s economic development while disengaging from ties with Europe and the U.S. The sanctions came at a time when the Russian economy was already facing severe structural weaknesses. Even before the Ukraine crisis, economists were predicting very modest growth this year—less than 2 percent. Russia urgently needs to increase investment to overcome decades of under-spending on infrastructure and new technology. For example, they need a 50 percent, $6 billion increase in exploratory drilling to maintain current oil output levels.

22 Alexander Panin, “Western sanctions could damage one fifth of Russia’s oil production,” Moscow Times, September 21, 2014.
23 Karina Romanova, “Tseyzy rastut” (Prices are rising) gazeta.ru, December 13, 2014.
31 Petr Tret’jakov, “Rossiiskim neftryanikam nado v 1.5 raza uvelichit’ burenie” (Russian oil must increase drilling by 50%), Vedomosti, October 23, 2014.
The slump in the global oil price puts severe pressure on the Russian federal budget. The latter had planned to break-even in 2014 and 2015 with oil at $97 and $100 a barrel respectively; but as of December it was trading at $60.32 Every $1 fall in the oil price cuts federal tax revenue by about $1.4 billion. Maxim Oreshkin, a department head at the finance ministry, estimated that the fall in the price of oil will cost Russia 2 percent of GDP over the next year, and the sanctions another 2 percent.33 On December 15, the Central Bank forecast a GDP decline of 4.5 percent in 2015 if oil prices remain at $60 per barrel. Prime Minister Medvedev admitted that the economy was in “crisis.”34

On August 5 the government announced that $8 billion would be taken from the pension fund to cover budget spending (for the second year running). Deputy economic development minister Sergei Belyakov was fired after criticizing the decision on Facebook.

The Political Impact of the Sanctions
As Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes note,35 even though the sanctions may inflict pain on the Russian economy, they are unlikely to bring about a change in Putin’s political course. Putin’s grip on power is not so fragile for us to expect the Russian president to buckle any time soon. His strategy in response to the 2011–12 protest movement of shifting from “tightening the screws” on the opposition to “tightening the belts” of the Russian people seems to have struck a popular chord. After the Western reprisals, Putin’s approval rating soared to new heights, reaching 88 percent in October—up from 69 percent in February 2014, before the crisis began.36

It is hard to imagine any circumstances under which Putin would revoke the annexation of Crimea. In that sense, the initial Western sanctions were primarily aimed at deterring future aggression. Unfortunately they also failed in that regard, since Russia moved ahead with covert and then increasingly overt support for separatists in Donbas and Lugansk. It is possible that the sanctions did help deter Putin from annexing Donetsk and Lugansk, although other factors weighed in his decision—notably, fear of getting bogged down in a protracted guerrilla war, which would have been deeply unpopular with the Russian public.

Some Russians believe that the real purpose of the sanctions is to bring about regime change in Russia—arguing that the U.S. has given up on trying to find a modus vivendi with Putin, and is bent on orchestrating a color revolution in Moscow. While that is far-fetched, it is true that many U.S. policy makers are looking forward to dealing with a Russia without Putin. While some analysts believe that the contradictions of the Putin regime will bring about its downfall in two to five years,37 realistically, Putin seems politically impregnable for the foreseeable future.38

The Western sanctions inadvertently played into the anti-Western, conservative nationalist narrative which the Russian president embraced in the wake of the anti-Putin protests in the winter of 2011–12.39 Putin can point to the sanctions as evidence of the Western desire to punish and weaken Russia. He told the Valdai Club in October, referring to “Our American friends,” that “They are trying to hurt us through these sanctions, block our development and push us into political, economic and cultural isolation, force us into backwardness in other words. But let me stress that Russia is not going to get all worked up, get offended or come begging at anyone’s door.”40

The sanctions were also taken as proof of the wisdom of Putin’s policy of “nationalizing” the elite by barring senior officials from holding foreign bank accounts. Russian politicians took pride in being included on the sanctions list. For example, Putin’s Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov told the head of Gazprombank Andrei Akimov that “until your name is on the sanctions list you can consider yourself not part of our country’s elite.”41 The sanctions make it less likely that any powerful figure would challenge Putin, since they remove the option of emigrating to Europe, and makes them less important

34 Anazayya Bashkanova, “Dmitrii Medvedev ne ste-mdetsya ispol’zovat’ slovo ‘krizis’” (Dmitriy Medvedev is not afraid to use the word ‘crisis’), Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 11, 2014.
37 Peter Rutland, “How much longer can Putin’s system last?”, Moscow Times, October 27, 2014.
38 Mikhail Rostovskii, “Teflonovyi Putin” (Teflon Putin), Moskovskii komsomolets, December 16, 2014.
on state support for their businesses to survive. Aleksandr Morozov writes that "personalized sanctions create a hard form of loyalty: people have no alternative but to support any future actions of the leader." 42

Perhaps the main beneficiary of the sanctions regime is China. “The downturn in relations with the West may mean Russia’s ‘turn to the east’ is no longer an opportunity but a necessity.” 43 Although China abstained in the UN vote condemning the Crimean annexation, rather than support Russia, the Chinese leaders are happy to step up trade with Russia. After more than a decade of negotiations, on May 21 China signed a $400 billion, 30-year deal to buy natural gas from Russia. The price is not yet known, but was widely assumed to be unfavorable to Russia. Russia’s eastern “pivot” has added fuel to Russian strategists who warn against increasing dependency on China. 44 The Russian public seems accepting of the turn to Asia: in September 2014, 44 percent rated relations with China as good or friendly, and 35 percent as normal. 45 In the same survey, however, 66 percent said they thought it was time for Russia to repair its relations with the West.

An Interim Conclusion
If Putin was assuming that the sanctions were a passing fad, and that the Western powers did not have the stomach to stand up to his aggression, he was mistaken. But if the Western leaders assumed that Putin would respond to carefully calibrated incentives for cooperation, they were also mistaken.

The economic crisis which hit Russia in December 2014 massively increased the pressure on Putin to strike a deal over eastern Ukraine. However, the U.S. and EU are likely to insist on a full restoration of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian government over Donestk and Lugansk as a minimum condition for the lifting of sanctions, and it is not clear that Putin is willing to accept such a humiliating step-down. The U.S. may even hold out for renunciation of the annexation of Crimea—something which Putin would not contemplate.

If that is the case, then the current sanctions may be in place for some time, and the Russian economy faces a very difficult year.

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Poll: Has Your Family Had Any Problems Due To The Western Sanctions Against Russia?


44 Andrei Lipskii interview with Vyacheslav Inozemtsev, “Rossiya ischet, pod kogo zalezhat’” (Russia is looking for someone to crawl behind), Novaya gazeta, October 18, 2014.