



russian analytical digest

www.res.ethz.ch
www.laender-analysen.de

THE ROLE OF RUSSIA IN EUROPE'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

■ ANALYSIS

- Europe Needs a New Security Architecture 2
By Fyodor Lukyanov, Moscow

■ ANALYSIS

- Russia's Plan for a New Pan-European Security Regime: A Serious Proposal or
an Attempt at Division? 6
By Margarete Klein, Berlin

■ OPINION

- Hitting the Reset Button in Russian-US Relations 10
By Hans-Henning Schröder, Bremen/Berlin

■ OPINION POLL

- Russia's Role in the World ... 13
... as Reflected in Polls of the "Public Opinion Foundation" 13
... as Reflected in Polls of VTsIOM 15
World Opinion on Russia's Foreign Policy 16

■ DOCUMENTATION

- Ceilings on Conventional Arms and Equipment Limited by the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) 17
International Organizations in Europe 19

Analysis

Europe Needs a New Security Architecture

By Fyodor Lukyanov, Moscow

Abstract

It is time to renew Europe's security architecture. Current security policy institutions all stem from the 1970s and were created to face a different reality. After the end of the Cold War, instead of creating new institutional structures which would be able to cope with the new world order, the West extended the influence of the existing ones. Moscow's proposal for a Helsinki-2 comes at the right moment and is worth discussing. Europe once again needs to reach a fundamental agreement on a conceptual framework similar to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which comprised several "baskets". If Russia and the EU intend to play an important role in the 21st century, they will have no choice but to cooperate with each other closely. Creating a model of interaction requires developing new intellectual approaches and overcoming old stereotypes and threat perceptions inherited from past centuries.

An Outdated Security Model

A characteristic of the current international situation is that the obvious growth of different forms of competition is combined with increasing economic interdependence among the competitors. This circumstance makes nonsense of the fashionable comparisons with the "Great Game" of the 19th century, the run-up to the First World War or the Cold War period.

The financial crisis, which has affected all countries, has at least one positive side: discussions about the need to modernize global governance have been revitalized since everybody understands that the present framework is unable to cope with coming challenges. Not only economic, but security ones as well.

All institutions dealing with security have their roots in the previous epoch; that is, they were established for an entirely different reality. After the Cold War, the West focused efforts on spreading the influence of its institutions, which had proved their efficacy in the years of ideological confrontation, rather than on creating structures for a new world order.

But the West's peaceful expansion, which was perceived as natural and almost automatic, was in fact only possible because that period of time was unique. Russia was in a geopolitical coma and unable to resist while China concentrated on its own development and had not yet focused on assuming a global role. As soon as Russia woke up and China became a powerful force, what had been taken for granted in the 1990s became an acute problem. Now some organizations are not only failing to reinforce stability, but actually weakening it. Thus, NATO expansion has transformed from a means to export security into a catalyst for serious conflict, which we recently faced in Caucasus.

Developments in recent months demonstrated that European politics is a complex phenomenon. There is a

close interconnection between all aspects of European life – for example, talk about economic integration is impossible in isolation from security issues. Fears are graphically manifest in the energy sector. The politicization of any discussion about Russian gas supplies stems from the fact that the pan-European security architecture does not instill confidence in some countries.

Such things happen on both sides. It is very difficult for Russia to conduct a normal business dialogue with Ukraine because NATO and the entire range of related problems and emotions are looming in the background all the time. Meanwhile, countries like Poland and the Baltic states, which deep in their hearts do not trust the guarantees that NATO and the European Union have given them, see an emerging Russian expansionism and the specter of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in everything.

In the first weeks of 2009, we witnessed how damaging this mutual politicization might be for energy security. Ukraine, suffering from the economic crisis and the long mismanagement of its leadership, decided to turn difficult negotiations into a major European crisis by endangering gas transit to the EU. The Ukrainian calculation was that EU customers would blame Russia and afterwards help Kyiv to secure better conditions. Russia, caught by surprise, responded by cutting supplies entirely. Two weeks of muscle flexing in Kyiv and Moscow considerably damaged the reputations of both sides as the combatants terrified Europe with their irresponsibility.

The causes for this conflict between the two neighbors were both political and economic. Political tensions are especially high since the Ukrainian president overwhelmingly supported Georgia in the August war, including with military means. This background angers Russia and inspires Russia to respond harshly to

everything Kyiv does, provoking Ukraine to use this situation for its political purposes. Economically, the energy relationship between Russia and Ukraine was never built on transparent rules. Ukraine never paid market prices for natural gas, while Russia never paid market-based transit fees. Deals were based on a variety of other factors – political interest, personal relations, corrupt schemes, and both sides benefited a lot. Now we see that this model is exhausted and hopefully the new pricing formula will bring stability to the European energy complex.

The Idea of Helsinki-2

Without creating a security system that all the participants trust, an economic breakthrough is most likely impossible. That's why Moscow's proposal for a Helsinki-2 is right on time and worth discussing. It is difficult to deny that so far this proposal lacks "meat" – concrete substance which could serve as a starting point for consultation. But when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko first introduced the idea of an all-European process in 1966, it also lacked everything but the Kremlin's wish to finally legitimize the geopolitical results of WWII. The result of a process, which continued for nine years, was the establishment of important principles suitable for all parties at that time.

Europe again needs a basic agreement on a conceptual framework, which like the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 would include different baskets. Areas that need work include: military guarantees, borders (particularly acute since none of the post-Soviet countries can claim that its borders are fully and finally secure), the economy, energy, humanitarian guidelines and even the democracy question. Of course, it is impossible to formalize democracy in one document, but it might be possible to remove this notion from use as a geopolitical instrument as we saw during the "democracy promotion" campaign of the previous US administration.

Russian Foreign Policy: The Impact of the Georgian War and the Financial Crisis

What is the current mood shaping Russia's foreign policy? Two crises that have occurred in recent months, one after the other, have had a huge impact on it. The Russian-Georgian war in August and the upheavals on the global financial markets are not related. Yet, both events, each in its own way, have contributed to Russia's formulation of its national interests. One can say that the two crises have established a conceptual framework of interests, defining a vector for the indispensable and boundaries for the possible.

Georgia's attack on South Ossetia and the world's reaction to Russia's response have created a new situation in Russian politics and public opinion. Perhaps, for the first time since the Soviet Union's break-up, Moscow found itself in a situation where it had to act without regard to the possible costs of the world's reaction. Conflicts had taken place earlier, too, but, as a rule, decisions had been made depending on how they could affect relations with "strategic partners". Russia came out of the Georgian war ready to defend its vital interests, regardless of foreign partners' reaction and of how much support Russia could expect from them in the future. But there must be clear criteria for judging what interests are vital and should be upheld, whatever the cost. The second, financial crisis has played an important role in this regard.

The financial instability that has rapidly spread throughout the world has shown the degree of global interdependence and the limits of economic and, as a consequence, geopolitical capabilities. It turned out, for example, that the huge financial resources accumulated over the years of sustained economic growth may be enough to alleviate the consequences of national crises. Yet, they are not enough for implementing the major geopolitical projects planned in recent years.

The Need for Enhanced International Cooperation

The reality of the crisis will cause countries to set priorities, rank their intentions, and give up secondary tasks in favor of more important ones.

There are a few major areas we need to work on.

As mentioned, a conceptual framework should be reinstated. The world needs a broader agreement on how to define key notions of international relations, including sovereignty, criteria for the use of force, territorial integrity and rights for self-determination, and conflict resolution. Many principles have been undermined in recent years. Of course, one can say that all such concepts were already laid out in several documents adopted during the late 20th century. But all agreements need to be refreshed and readjusted from time to time, especially since the entire environment around them has changed.

The level of security has decreased since the late 1990s, when the first full-scale war of the new era broke out in Yugoslavia. We need to return to a strategic agenda and address the different aspects of it in a comprehensive manner, rather than piece-by-piece. Such issues as non-proliferation (including Iran), arms control and missile defense should be discussed in the same basket,

where Russia and the U.S. would be leading counterparts, but other important actors, including first of all the EU, but also China and India, should be included. Europe's unwillingness to participate in strategic debate, leaving it to the US and Russia, turned out to be counterproductive. Europe has grown too strong economically and too important internationally to remain silent about vital matters on the international security agenda.

Changing Foundations for Russia-EU Relations

European institutions are not appropriate for the goal of strengthening peace. The OSCE has been heavily criticized before, but the Georgian crisis demonstrated that this body unfortunately is dysfunctional. Whether the OSCE should be reformed or replaced is a decision for a new all-European process. If participants come to the conclusion that this organization can be improved, the military basket should be restored in full format in order to discuss issues such as the future of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

NATO should not be considered as a universal security body, which can automatically expand eastwards. Unlike in the 1990s, when the European geopolitical situation was unique, now the alliance is not an instrument for spreading stability, but promotes instability. Countries outside NATO, which are concerned for their security, should be given the strongest-possible security guaranties from all great powers involved, so that all of them are equal guarantors with clear responsibilities.

The links between the economy and politics are evident as never before. Interdependence *per se* is no guaranty for sustainable development since it frequently turns into a source of mutual insecurity and mistrust. The relationship between Russia and the EU, especially in the energy sector, is a glaring example of that. Similar problems are visible in the relationship between the U.S. and China.

The principles that served as a foundation for the Russian-European rapprochement in the early 1990s have been exhausted as the circumstances have changed. In those years, many believed that Russia would integrate into the existing system of United Europe, accepting its norms and rules without claiming membership in the European Union. Later, Russia's priorities changed, and the EU found itself in an awkward position from the conceptual point of view.

The EU viewed Russia as a civilizationally-close partner and an immediate neighbor. The format of the

European Union's relations with such countries provides for an integration paradigm – in other words, their smooth involvement into the political, legal and economic space of the European Union, with the prospect for full membership (for candidate countries) or close dependence and special preferences.

Moscow has declined these options, while the EU has been unable to offer anything else. Russia also does not want to have purely mercantile relations with the EU, like those between the EU and China, because it claims a unique status – and not without grounds, considering the cultural closeness and economic intertwining of Russia and Europe.

The discussions on a new agreement to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which were restarted after the Nice summit, will be long and painful, as mutual understanding is at a very low level, while the parties' interest in the final result also leaves much to be desired. In any case, one should not expect the parties to work out a basic treaty in the years and decades ahead. The parties would rather produce an interim document that will set up a situational compromise and make interaction between them more effective.

The processes of geopolitical self-identification are continuing both in Russia and the European Union. Moscow is groping for its role in world politics. It would like to be a powerful independent pole of influence, but it does not have enough strength for that. At the same time, Russia cannot integrate anywhere, as it is too large and independent.

There is no clarity about the European Union, either. The institutional reforms, intended as one more step toward making the EU into a consolidated political alliance, have once again stalled. Even if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, nothing would basically change. Meanwhile, at least some of the EU members seek to enhance the union's political role and independence. The role that France played in the political settlement of the Caucasus crisis on behalf of the European Union has encouraged many people in Europe. At the same time, it is not difficult to imagine the position in which the EU would have found itself if the conflict had occurred during the EU presidency of Poland or Estonia.

The contradiction faced by the EU is the contrast between the Union's economic might and its relatively modest political role, not only in the world, but even in Europe. For the European Union as a political actor, there are various possibilities. Such issues as the deployment of U.S. strategic facilities in Europe, the solution of problems with energy transit countries (above all Ukraine), or peacekeeping and observer missions in lo-

cal conflicts should be resolved first and foremost with the participation of the EU, because all these issues directly affect the interests of the European Union. For the time being, with rare exception, the EU avoids interfering in conflict situations, leaving it for the United States, Russia or its individual member states to settle them.

Interdependent Interests Make for Close Partners

The changes in the international arena are creating new conditions for all. Europe may quite soon discover that it is losing its position as the US's main partner, while Asia replaces it. It will be an unpleasant realization, undermining the traditional horizon of European politics. At the same time, possible US attempts to gain European aid in strengthening American dominance over all the world (which in Washington's eyes is what the new era of trans-Atlantic solidarity should mean), may make Europe resilient on its own. Russia meanwhile will need to face the reality of a gloomy demographic situation, the lack of promising opportunities to diversify its economy, and its real influence in the future world.

The interdependence between Russia and the EU stems from the late Soviet period, when Europe be-

came the main market for Siberian hydrocarbons. The infrastructure built in the period from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s (particularly, the system of gas pipelines), predetermined the geo-economic interdependence of Europe and Eurasia for decades to come. There is no reason to believe that energy flows in this part of the world will basically change their direction in the foreseeable future, so Russia and the EU are destined to maintain a close partnership. The recent crisis over Ukrainian gas transit is just another proof of a shared interest in common solutions, but there is still no readiness to find them.

During the next few decades, Russia and the European Union are destined to closely interact with each other if they want to play important roles in the 21st century. However, the creation of a model for such interaction requires novel intellectual approaches and the renunciation of numerous stereotypes inherited from the past century. The construction of a new "Greater Europe" on the basis of Russia and the EU is a task comparable in scale to that which the architects of European integration set themselves after World War II. In those years, almost no one believed in its success either.

About the author

Fyodor Lukyanov is editor-in-chief of the journal *Russia in Global Affairs*.

Analysis

Russia's Plan for a New Pan-European Security Regime: A Serious Proposal or an Attempt at Division?

By Margarete Klein, Berlin

Summary

In June 2008, Russia tabled a proposal for a new pan-European security architecture. It calls for a legally binding treaty under international law for all states “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”. In view of unresolved security issues on the continent, there is certainly a need for debate over possible improvements in Europe's security architecture. The Russian proposal pursues two aims. The first is to address Russia's security concerns and make the Europeans and the USA listen to them. The second is to strengthen Russia's position in European security policy and to weaken the influence of Western institutions such as NATO. Therefore, Medvedev's idea of a “Helsinki 2” process should not, serve as the sole basis for such a debate. The European states would do better to develop proposals and demands of their own and to test Moscow's interest and willingness to compromise against these.

Medvedev's proposal

In his speech in Berlin on 5 June 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed his idea for a new pan-European security architecture for the first time. He returned to it in his foreign-policy concept of July 2008 and provided more details in his speech to the World Policy Conference on 8 October 2008 in Evian, France. At its core lies the demand for a summit meeting of all states “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”, which would produce a security treaty that is binding under international law. Whereas the initial international response to this proposal was muted, his idea has increasingly gained attention since the war in Georgia. What exactly does Medvedev's proposal include? Where are the potential starting points for a useful debate, and where are the stumbling blocks? Finally, what motives is Russia pursuing with this proposal?

The Russian president has justified his plan by pointing out that the existing security architecture in Europe has failed to achieve the goal of the Paris Charter – namely, to create a Europe that is united, free, and secure. To remedy this situation, he proposes that the security treaty elaborated by a pan-European summit meeting should be based on five principles, which he specified in Evian: First of all, the “basic principles of security and cooperation” in the Euro-Atlantic space must be affirmed. Second, all participating states should pledge neither to use violence against one another, nor to threaten the use of violence. Third, the treaty must guarantee “equal security” for all. Fourth, no state or international organization would have the “exclusive rights” to protect peace and stability in Europe. Furthermore, as a fifth principle, the treaty should stipulate “basic parameters for arms control” and establish

new cooperation mechanisms for combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and drug trafficking.

Unresolved security issues in Europe

When considering Medvedev's proposal for a common European security architecture, one can only agree with his fundamental diagnosis – that the goals of the Paris Charter have not been realized completely and that Europe suffers from security deficits. This became evident once again during the conflict in Georgia. The OSCE, NATO, NATO-Russia Council (NRC), EU, CIS, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO), and the efforts of individual states all failed to prevent border skirmishes from escalating into interstate war and an international crisis. This is all the more reason for concern since Europe has a number of similar “frozen conflicts” with a comparable potential for escalation: Transnistria, Kosovo, Crimea, and Nagorno-Karabakh. There are no commonly accepted and effective mechanisms for resolving these conflicts, so the frozen status is in fact frequently regarded as the maximum level of security attainable. However, in view of the high armaments growth rates, especially in Russia and the Caucasus countries, it is dangerous to rely on this state of affairs continuing.

Besides the regional conflicts, the crisis of arms control and disarmament is one of the most important unresolved security issues on the continent. In protest against the failure of NATO states to ratify the adapted treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) – for which Russia has to a great deal itself to blame – Moscow suspended its participation in December 2007. Ever since, it has refused to report on military exercises

or troop movements or to admit arms inspectors into the country. Although the European states are not directly involved, they are also affected by the crisis over nuclear arms control and disarmament between the US and Russia. In the dispute over the installation of the third pillar of the US missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, the leadership in Moscow had already threatened to abrogate the INF Treaty and to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. An additional danger will arise once the START I Treaty expires in December 2009, after which date no verification regime will exist in the field of strategic nuclear weapons. The SORT treaty, which will remain in force until 2012, does not stipulate any detailed monitoring procedures. Against this background, many observers worry that the crisis of confidence between Russia and the Western states, which has already become aggravated in recent years, will further deteriorate. A peaceful resolution of existing points of contention (such as NATO's eastward expansion or the US missile defense system) or cooperative resolution of common security challenges (such as combating international terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) would thus become even more difficult in the future.

There is therefore a definite need for discussion on the shortcomings of the European security system. The idea of doing so within the framework of a pan-European summit conference seems, in principle, to be a reasonable one. Whether such a meeting produces an informal agreement or a legally-binding security treaty is of secondary importance. The decisive factor will be the contents of the discussions. Does the Russian proposal provide starting points for resolving security issues, or would such issues be aggravated if the treaty were adopted and implemented? A review of the generally still quite vague Russian proposals indicates a large number of stumbling blocks and areas that are still under construction.

Construction Site I: Legal Principles and their Enforcement

Medvedev has suggested that the pan-European treaty be used to reaffirm the "basic principles of security and cooperation," such as territorial integrity, political sovereignty, and the other principles of the UN Charter. This is a reasonable proposal, but is not sufficient on its own to ensure that the principles are enforced. After all, they have already been enshrined in many documents and nevertheless been violated – including by Russia itself. For example, Moscow decried the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state by

Western countries as "immoral and illegitimate", but itself violated the principle of territorial integrity when it extended unilateral recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia – what is more, it did so following the use of military force. In the framework of a regional security agreement, the main requirement would be not so much the mere codification of principles of international law, but rather the creation of binding mechanisms for resolving conflicts and efficient mechanisms to penalize violations of the treaty.

Construction Site II: Institutional Foundations (OSCE and NATO)

Principles and rules require institutions that help to enforce them. Which are the institutions that can take on this task in Europe? When considering the Russian proposal, it is noticeable that the OSCE is not envisaged as having a special role to play in this context. Medvedev justified this during his visit to Berlin by stating that the institutional structure of the OSCE is "incomplete" and that efforts to develop it further were doomed due to the "bloc policies" of the Western states. This is a reiteration of longstanding Russian criticism against the OSCE, which Moscow accuses of being insufficiently attentive to security policy issues and concentrating too much on the "human dimension", particularly election monitoring. Indeed, there is a notable imbalance between the three "baskets", and it would make sense to give more weight to the security policy basket. After all, the OSCE is the only real pan-European institution that includes all states as members with equal rights and thus represents a quasi-natural forum for discussing matters of European security. It is also conceivable without great difficulties to give up the economic basket. After all, economic issues have long been discussed predominantly in the formats of the EU and of the European Neighborhood Policy. Giving up the "human dimension" of the OSCE, as the Russian proposal implicitly demands, would be wrong, however. First of all, Europe should not be conceived solely as a community of interests, but also as a community of values. Second, empirical investigations confirm at least one thesis of "democratic peace": Democracies rarely wage war against other democracies. The rule of law, political responsibility of rulers towards their citizens, and transparent decisionmaking processes are therefore also relevant in terms of security policy.

Revitalizing the OSCE as a security-policy actor without jeopardizing its human dimension will be difficult in view of the Russian position. This path is more sensible, however, than Medvedev's alternative proposal.

He had urged that the EU, the US, and Russia as the “three pillars of European civilization” should form the mainstays of the new European security system. While this proposal is in line with the Russian desire to be on equal terms with the US, it cannot be an acceptable proposal for the European states. First of all, it leaves unanswered what role will be played by the neutral states and those that are only NATO, but not EU, members. Second, this course would significantly weaken the security policy weight of the European states compared to the US and Russia. After all, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are still insufficiently developed. Third – and most importantly – this proposal envisages no role for NATO.

This goes to the heart of the problem with Medvedev’s proposal. It appears to be mainly aimed at weakening the role of NATO within European security policy. This becomes obvious from a closer analysis of the Russian president’s statements on the “principle of equal security”, which he linked with three “No’s” in his Evian speech: First of all, nobody should be permitted to guarantee their own security at the expense of others. Second, military alliances or coalitions should not conduct any operations that undermine the unity of the common security space. Third, military alliances should not develop in such a way as to threaten the security of other treaty partners. These principles are formulated in a highly subjective manner and ultimately amount to a Russian veto against almost all NATO operations. They would thus not serve “equal security”, but primarily lead to a unilateral improvement of Russia’s security. This would be unacceptable for NATO countries. After all, the alliance constitutes the most important security institution in Europe and will remain as such, despite all Russian criticism. It not only binds the US to Europe and provides its members with the instruments they require as security policy actors, but the decades of cooperation have also generated trust among participating countries, so that an armed conflict between NATO states seems practically inconceivable today. Without NATO, Europe could face a relapse into the era of nation-state power politics of the 19th century – a scenario that is not entirely unattractive for many Russian observers.

However, insisting on the preservation of NATO does not mean that there should be no debate over ways of improving cooperation between the alliance and Moscow. In addition to a revitalization of the OSCE in terms of security policy, an enhancement of institutionalized cooperation between Moscow and Brussels

would be a major step forward for European security. Such cooperation, however, has hitherto suffered from problems that are not easy to overcome. First of all, Russia’s willingness to cooperate with an institution whose very existence it castigates as a “relic of the past” has always been limited. Second, the NRC is merely a consultative body that can only agree upon joint activities in cases where consensus has been established. The integration of Russia into this framework will always remain limited. That could only change if real decision-making authority were conceded to Russia. However, there are no prospects for Russia to gain full membership in NATO in the mid-term future. The transatlantic alliance is not interested in such an outcome and Russia is not willing to undertake the necessary reforms. Furthermore, the idea of integrating Russia into NATO is contrary to Russia’s identity as a great power. After September 11, 2001, the British prime minister at the time, Tony Blair, suggested giving Russia a semi-membership: Russia would wield a veto in matters where solutions would be hard to come by without Moscow’s cooperation, such as in combating proliferation or international terrorism. However, the third problem is that it would be difficult to prevent Russia from abusing such a partial membership for blocking other alliance decisions. It would therefore only make sense to change the institutional format of NATO-Russia relations after both sides improve their attitudes towards one another significantly.

Construction Site III: Mutual Security Guarantees

Insistence on preserving NATO does not mean that Russia’s legitimate security interests with respect to the alliance’s eastward expansion or the deployment of missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic should not be discussed as part of a negotiation process. In the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation of 1997, Moscow already received assurances that no nuclear weapons or “substantial combat forces” would be stationed on the territory of the new member states. However, this Founding Act only constitutes a statement of political intent, not a legally-binding treaty under international law. A clear definition of “substantial combat forces” could, however, be elaborated and codified in the framework of the CFE negotiations or the meeting of a pan-European summit. Security guarantees for Russia concerning the missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic (e.g., in the form of verification measures) could also be addressed at such a meeting.

However, one precondition would be for Russia to agree to guarantee the security of the smaller states of Eastern Europe. The latter feel threatened by their heavyweight neighbor to the east – partially due to historical experiences, partially in reaction to current Russian foreign policy. For instance, the five foreign-policy principles announced by President Medvedev only weeks after the war in Georgia on 31 August 2008 made a strong impression. Among these were the protection of Russian citizens abroad and the announcement that Russia would pursue “privileged interests” in its neighborhood. In principle, it is undeniable that states have greater interests in some regions than in others. In Russia, however, this concept is all too often interpreted as referring to an exclusive zone of influence, implying limited foreign-policy sovereignty on the part of the countries concerned. Therefore, no negotiation process should be undertaken before Russia has acknowledged the rights of these countries to choose alliances freely and before it has agreed to provide security guarantees. This very point can serve as a test bed for the earnestness of Russian proposals.

Construction Site IV: New Spurs in Arms Control

A pan-European summit would also need to give new impulses in conventional arms control and disarmament as a matter of urgency. That will not be easy to achieve, independently of whether ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty remains a target, or whether a new treaty system – a CFE III Treaty of sorts – is negotiated. For Russia’s unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the announcement of its intention to station 3,800 Russian troops in each of these territories means that the issue of the “host nation” will complicate things more. After all, the CFE Treaty stipulates that foreign troops can only be stationed in a country with the explicit assent of the host nation. In the course of future negotiations, it will therefore be important to ensure that Russia does not attempt to shirk its older duties through a new negotiation mandate.

Conclusion

While the international response to Medvedev’s proposal was initially muted, it has attracted additional attention in recent weeks. Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Germany, and in particular France have at least indicated their willingness to negotiate. NATO, too, has stated its openness to a debate at the foreign ministers’ meeting on 3 December 2008. Although there was no majority at the meeting of OSCE heads of state and government on 5 December 2008 for the proposal of President Nicholas Sarkozy to hold a special summit on this issue in mid-2009, the issue will remain on the European agenda, since it resonates with a need for discussion in view of the unresolved security questions on the continent.

There are two fundamental problems with Medvedev’s proposal. The first is a matter of timing: Efforts should be made to prevent Moscow from misinterpreting a rapid willingness by Europe and the US to negotiate as a signal indicating that a policy of strength leads to concessions on the part of the West. A review of statements by Russian politicians following the last NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, when Georgia and Ukraine were not accepted into the Membership Action Plan, gives the impression that the alliance’s decision could be primarily attributed to Moscow’s warnings, credibly supported by its use of military force in Georgia. The second basic problem is found in the substance of Medvedev’s proposal. Much of it is vague, and in addition to some promising ideas, it also includes quite a few unacceptable elements that seem to be aimed primarily at dividing Europeans or creating a wedge between them and the US. There is only one solution for both of these problems: The Western countries cannot afford to wear themselves out working on Medvedev’s proposals; instead, they should develop an agenda of their own for joint discussions with Russia. This would require a debate over legitimate Russian security interests as well as the formulation of clear demands towards Moscow. It is essential that this process be closely coordinated between the European states in order to minimize Moscow’s attempts to divide them.

Translated from German by Christopher Findlay

About the author

Dr. Margarete Klein is a researcher with the Russian Federation/CIS Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin.

Further reading

- Marcin Kaczmarek: The Russian proposal for a new European security system, in: Center for Eastern Studies Commentary, Issue 11, 16 October 2008 <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/epub/ecomment/2008/081016/Commentary11.htm>
- Medvedev’s Berlin speech, 5 June 2008: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml
- Medvedev’s speech to the World Policy Conference in Evian on 8 October 2008: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml

Opinion**Hitting the Reset Button in Russian-US Relations**

By Hans-Henning Schröder, Bremen/Berlin

Little Sympathy for Bush

Among the Russian public, skepticism towards the US is widespread. During the crisis in South Ossetia, approval rates for the US reached even lower levels than on the occasion of the US invasion in Iraq in 2003. Not even a quarter of those surveyed described their feelings towards the US as “good” or “mainly good”. More than two-thirds stated flatly that their sentiments towards the US were “bad”. This was a reversal for Russia, where the US has traditionally been regarded in a favorable light. Despite (or maybe because of) decades of Soviet propaganda depicting the US as an implacable enemy, the overwhelming majority of Russians was favorably disposed towards America. As a rule, between 60 and 70 per cent of the Russian population had a positive image of the US. But that esteem eroded during the Bush presidency. The Iraq war, the efforts to expand NATO to the borders of Russia, the intention of establishing a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and finally the aggressive statements of US politicians during the South Ossetia conflict did not go down well among the Russian public.

The political leaders had always regarded the US as a competitor and opponent. Although there were occasional phases during which Russian foreign policy consciously strove for cooperation with “the West” – for example, under President Boris Yeltsin at the beginning of the 1990s and under President Vladimir Putin after 11 September 2001, this conciliatory policy repeatedly ended in frustration. When Putin acquiesced to the establishment of US military bases in Central Asia in autumn 2001, he assumed that this concession would be rewarded by the US politically and that Russia would play a significant role in a coalition against terrorism.

However, in December 2001, Bush abrogated the ABM treaty and thus made clear that the US government was not interested in constructive cooperation with Russia. One year later, in November 2002, seven countries, including the three Baltic republics, were invited at the NATO summit in Prague to join the alliance. Their accession was completed in April 2004, with NATO advancing up to the borders of Russia. Russia’s foreign policy-makers regarded this move as threatening. Accordingly, they no longer aimed for cooperation with the US, but looked for ways to obstruct Washington’s policies.

For a “Just and Democratic World Order”

The key terms in the policy that Russia developed as a counterweight to US strategy were “equality” and “multipolarity”. The Russian Federation’s 12 July 2008 foreign policy statement designated as the main goals of Russian foreign policy “influencing global processes with the aim of creating a just and democratic world order based on collective resolution of international issues and on international law [...]”. This phrase targeted the US, whose “strategy of unilateral action” and “ignoring [...] the basic principles of international law” were sharply condemned. As late as October 2008, speaking at the World Policy Conference in Evian, Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev defined US economic egoism and efforts for a “unipolar world” as key causes of the global financial crisis.

In the final years of the Bush administration, there were two proposals in particular that disconcerted the Russian leadership: The first was the plan to station elements of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, while the other was the determined effort to prepare the way for Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO via a Membership Action Plan. Russian security policy experts regarded these moves as elements of an encirclement strategy. As far as Russian observers were concerned, US support for Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili was only the capstone of a policy seeking confrontation with Russia.

A slap in the face of the president-elect

Concerns about US encirclement and irritation at a US foreign policy that ignored Russian apprehensions also help explain the statement of intent to station nuclear-tipped short-range missiles in Kaliningrad, which was announced by Medvedev in a move that took US president-elect Barack Obama by surprise. Medvedev said:

“I would add something about what we have had to face in recent years: what is it? It is the construction of a global missile defense system, the installation of military bases around Russia, the unbridled expansion of NATO and other similar ‘presents’ for Russia – we therefore have every reason to believe that they are simply testing our strength. [...] Therefore I will now announce some of the measures that will be taken. In particular, measures to effectively counter the persistent and consistent at-

tempts of the current American administration to install new elements of a global missile defense system in Europe. For example, we had planned to decommission three missile regiments of a missile division deployed in Kozelsk from combat readiness and to disband the division by 2010. I have decided to abstain from these plans. We will not disband anything. Moreover, we will deploy the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad Region to be able, if necessary, to neutralize the missile defense system. [...] And finally, electronic jamming of the new installations of the US missile defense system will be carried out from the territory of the same westernmost region, that is from Kaliningrad. [...] I want to emphasize that we have been forced to take these measures. We have repeatedly told our partners that we want to engage in positive cooperation. We want to act against common threats and to work together. But unfortunately, very unfortunately, they did not want to listen to us.”

It was surely no coincidence that the Russian president chose the day after Obama’s election for his show of strength against the policies pursued by Bush. The fact that the Obama camp regarded the missile defense project with a degree of reservation did not seem to matter much to Medvedev. Such a move can be seen as a diplomatic slap in the face. While it may have been a genuine mistake – the date of the speech had been moved several times due to internal disagreements over its domestic and economic policy sections – it could also have been intended as a deliberate snub. In any case, the timing is evidence of a surprising lack of diplomatic tact: Amid a general spirit of hope and optimism, the Russian leaders acted according to old habits that have been rightly regarded as antiquated for the past 20 years. At least, the statement also conveyed a positive message, since the Russian president concluded by signaling unequivocally his willingness to engage in negotiations.

Mixed signs

Two and a half months later, after Obama’s inauguration on 20 January 2009, the Russian reaction was much more positive. The Russian Foreign Ministry signaled optimism that there was an opportunity for a new start in Russian-US relations. Among the Russian public, skepticism towards the US continues to be significant, but according to surveys, the new US president has left a predominantly positive impression. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, too, voiced careful optimism in an interview with Bloomberg TV. In particular, he noted the changed US position concerning the station-

ing of ABM systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as in the matter of NATO expansion, which he regarded as positive steps. Putin indicated that he saw opportunities for collaboration in the area of disarmament and in combating the international financial crisis.

A week after Obama took office, the Russian leadership decided that it was appropriate to send a positive signal of its own to Washington. A representative of the Russian General Staff told the media that the Russian side had ceased its preparations to base Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. Thus, the Russian government retracted its threatening gesture and signaled a willingness to cooperate. With the new US president having declared in his first press conference that Russia and the US should resume nuclear disarmament talks, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also responded positively. He stated that Russia was prepared to resume negotiations immediately, as soon as the new US administration had appointed its disarmament team.

The Russian position was somewhat overshadowed by the Kyrgyz initiative to shut down the US airbase at Manas. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiy announced this decision in Moscow immediately after having been promised a US\$2.15 billion financial aid package by Russia. Western observers suspected – probably not altogether wrongly – that Russian interests were involved in this matter, too. In view of the Obama administration’s intention to strengthen its military engagement in Afghanistan, for which it requires supply bases in Central Asia, this move must be regarded as an unfriendly act. The signals coming from the Russian side were therefore mixed ones.

Biden and Ivanov in Munich

An initial meeting of leading politicians from both sides occurred on the occasion of the 45th Munich Security Policy Conference in early February, which was attended by First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov of the Russian Federation and US Vice President Joseph R. Biden. Ivanov, whose speech preceded that of Biden, used the opportunity to lay out the Russian position and indicated which areas Russia was interested in discussing with the US side. He highlighted the necessity of negotiating on strategic nuclear weapons with the goal of arriving at a new overall agreement. He pointed out that sensitive issues remain, such as the stationing of nuclear missiles on foreign territory and the matter of payload increases. He also reiterated his concerns about the US plans for a missile defense system. The latter, he claimed, was part of a global strategic infra-

structure directed against the Russian strategic nuclear capability.

At the same time, Ivanov joined the US administration in affirming the importance of non-proliferation policies. In this context, he also commented on the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The US and Russia had agreed in the INF Treaty to abolish and dismantle these weapons systems. However, in the meantime, they have seen North Korea, China, Pakistan, India, and Israel acquire weapons of this category. Ivanov therefore argued in favor of an expansion of the INF Treaty to these countries. In conclusion, he called on the countries of the West to change their stance on the matter of conventional disarmament in Europe.

Vice President Biden's speech did not immediately engage with the agenda proposed by Ivanov. While the latter's speech had dealt exclusively with issues to be negotiated between Russia and the US, the scope of Biden's remarks was broader, referring to change in Iraq and initiatives vis-à-vis Iran, and laying out a political concept for the US to combat poverty worldwide, to eradicate education shortfalls, and to promote sustainable agriculture. Only a small part of the speech was devoted to relations with Russia. In this section, the vice president suggested that it was "time to press the reset button" and rebuild the relationship.

He offered a policy of cooperation in numerous areas and proposed new START talks as well as a joint campaign against terrorism and against the Taliban. However, he also made clear that differences of interests remained. The US, he said, was not prepared to accept spheres of interests; nor was it willing to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states. But he concluded on a conciliatory note: "[...]he US and Russia can disagree and still work together where our interests coincide."

Limited Results of the "Reset"

The encounter in Munich illustrated the opportunities and difficulties of US-Russian relations. On the positive side, both the Obama administration and the government of Putin and Medvedev are seeking dialogue. But when the speeches of Biden and Ivanov are compared, the discrepancy between the respective international standing of the two countries becomes evident. In Biden's presentation, Russia did play a role; after all, the vice president devoted nearly half a page to relations with Russia. But it was only one topic among many others. Biden's agenda included global challenges such as climate change; global poverty, education, and hunger; the Middle East conflict; Iran's nuclear issues; Afghanistan; Pakistan; the future of NATO; and also Russia. Ivanov's speech was limited to a single topic: Russia's security policy relations with the US. His speech lacked a global scope. Russia's first deputy prime minister did not indicate a willingness on the part of Russia to take on international responsibility, but merely stated a claim for recognition by the US as a partner on equal terms. The comparison of the two speeches illustrates the discrepancy between Russia and the US in terms of the two countries' relative international influence: The one is a global actor and superpower, the other a regional power whose elites refuse to accept their declining importance.

Therefore, the "resetting" of US-Russian relations as announced by US Vice President Biden will result in both sides entering into a dialogue on nuclear disarmament, reconsidering European security, and possibly engaging in selective cooperation over Iran and Afghanistan. But the fundamental dilemma – the Russian leadership's claims for a leading role that it cannot fulfill either politically, militarily, or economically – will not be resolved in the short term.

Translated from German by Christopher Findlay

About the author

Prof. Dr. Hans-Henning Schröder is a lecturer in Modern Eastern European History at the University of Bremen.

Further reading:


- Andrei S. Makarychev: Russia and its 'New Security Architecture' in Europe: A Critical Examination of the Concept. CEPS Working Documents, 5 February 2009 http://shop.ceps.be/download.php?item_id=1790, last accessed 10 February 2009.
- Biden, Joseph R.: Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2009 http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=238&, last accessed 8 February 2009.
- Ivanov, Sergei B.: Non-proliferation of WMD. The case for joint effort 02/06/2009 http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=232&, last accessed 8 February 2009.
- Dmitri Trenin: Thinking Strategically About Russia. Endowment for International Peace Carnegie, December 2008.
- Andrew Wood: Reflections on Russia and the West. Chatham House Programme Paper, November 2008.

Opinion Poll


Russia's Role in the World ...

... as Reflected in Polls of the "Public Opinion Foundation"

Is Russia's Influence in the World Growing in Recent Years?



Where Does Russia's Economy Rank in Comparison to Other Countries?




According to data of the World Bank, Russia ranks 8th (PPP) or 10th (GNI).


Source: opinion polls of the "Public Opinion Foundation" (FOM) conducted on 18th to 19th October 2008

<http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/projects/dominant/dom0842/d084227>

Is Russia Feared in the World?




What is the Status of the Relationship of the World to Russia?




Source: opinion polls of the "Public Opinion Foundation" (FOM) conducted on 18th to 19th October 2008
<http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/projects/dominant/dom0842/d084227>

... as Reflected in Polls of VTsIOM

Which Goals Should Russia Strive For in the 21st Century?




Can Russia Become a Great Power Within the Next 15 to 20 Years?



Source: opinion polls of the "Public Opinion Foundation" (FOM) conducted on 1st to 2nd November 2008
<http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/10954.html>

What Should Russia Achieve in Order to Be Considered a Great Power?




Source: opinion polls of the "Public Opinion Foundation" (FOM) conducted on 1st to 2nd November 2008

<http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/10954.html>

World Opinion on Russia's Foreign Policy

World Opinion on Russia's Influence. Share Of Respondents With a "Mainly Positive" View of Russia's Role in World Politics.



Source: BBC World Service poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and the international polling firm GlobeScan, November 2008 - January 2009, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb09/BBCVals_Feb09_rpt_emb.pdf

Documentation

Ceilings on Conventional Arms and Equipment Limited by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)

Treaty Limited Equipment, Treaty Adaptation of 17th November 1999 (Not Ratified)

Treaty members	Main battle tanks		Armored combat vehicles (ACVs)		Artillery pieces		Combat aircraft		Attack helicopters	
	Ceiling	Available	Ceiling	Available	Ceiling	Available	Ceiling	Available	Ceiling	Available
Armenia	220	110	220	140	285	229	100	16	50	10
Azerbaijan	220	220	220	595	285	223	100	47	50	15
Belarus	1,800	1,586	2,600	2343	1,615	1,499	294	175	80	50
Belgium	300	40	989	259	288	102	209	71	46	32
Bulgaria	1,475	1,474 ^a	2,000	1,460 ^c	1,750	1,666	235	80	67	18
Canada	77	86	263	289	32	301	90	107	13	0
Czech Republic	957	181	1,367	504	767	326	230	50	50	38
Denmark	335	231	336	242	446	510	82	48	18	12
France	1,226	968	3,700	4,413	1,992	787	800	316	374	42
Georgia	220	128	220	135	285	109	100	9	50	9
Germany	3,444	2,035	3,281	3,974	2,255	1,384	765	298	280	192
Greece	1,735	1,514	2,498	2,482	1,920	887	650	357	65	32
Hungary	835	238	1,700	636	840	523	180	28	108	12
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	1,267	320	3,172	1,711	1,818	1,100	618	250	142	60
Kazakhstan	50	980	200	1,800	100	1,075	15	163	20	40
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Moldova	210	0	210	210	250	96	50	0	50	0
The Netherlands	520	160	864	591	485	345	230	105	50	24
Norway	170	165	275	162	491	138	100	52	24	0
Poland	1,730	714	2,150	1,298	1,610	881	460	103	130	32
Portugal	300	224	430	313	450	232	160	25	26	18

(Continued overleaf)

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty Limited Equipment, Treaty Adaptation of 17th November 1999 (Not Ratified) (Continued from Previous Page)

Treaty members	Main battle tanks		Armored combat vehicles (ACVs)		Artillery pieces		Combat aircraft		Attack helicopters	
	Ceiling	Available	Ceiling	Available	Ceiling	Available	Ceiling	Available	Ceiling	Available
Rumania	1,375	366	2,100	1,106	1,475	833	430	74	120	7
Russian Federation (military areas: special region Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Moscow, Northern Caucasus)	6,350	4,411	11,280	8,699	6,315	3,235	3,416	838	855	113
Slovakia	478	245	683	497	383	284	100	46	40	16
Spain	750	323	1,588	1,481	1,276	370	310	181	80	0
Turkey	2,975	4,205 ^b	3,120	3,463	3,523	1,184	750	435	130	37
Ukraine	4,080	2,984	5,050	3,792	4,040	3,705	1,090	211	330	101
United Kingdom	843	386	3,017	1,346	583	407	855	341	350	67
USA	1,812	7,620	3,037	6,719	1,552	6,530	784	2,658	396	1,009

a) 199 in storage

b) 1300 are being placed in storage

e) 519 in storage

Sources:

Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, 19th November 1990

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/Themen/Abruestung/Downloads/KSE-Vertrag.pdf>, accessed on 10th December 2008

Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 19th November 1999

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/Themen/Abruestung/Downloads/KSE-UE-Anpassung.pdf>, accessed on 10th December 2008

Data on available weapons systems were compiled with the aid of "The Military Balance, Volume 108 Issue 1 2008". As it was not possible in a few particular cases to ascertain

whether a weapons system is subject to treaty regulations or not, data on available weapons systems should be taken merely as an approximate value.

Compiled by Katharina Hoffmann.

International Organizations in Europe

	OSCE	CFE Treaty	Council of Europe	EU	NATO	CDC	GUAM	CEFTA	BSEC	CIS / SNG	EurAsEC	CSTO / ODKB	SCO
Albania	x		x		from 2009			x	x				
Andorra	x		x						x	x	observer	x	
Armenia	x	x	x						observer				
Austria	x		x	x					x	x			
Azerbaijan	x	x	x				x		x				
Belarus	x	x							observer	x	x	x	
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x								
Bosnia and Herzegovina	x		x					x					
Bulgaria	x	x	x	x	x				x				
Canada	x	x			x								
China													x
Croatia	x		x		from 2009			x	observer				
Cyprus	x		x	x									
Czech Republic	x	x	x	x	x				observer				
Denmark	x	x	x	x	x								
Egypt									observer				
Estonia	x		x	x	x	x							
Finland	x		x	x									
France	x	x	x	x	x				observer				
Georgia	x	x	x			x	x		x				
Germany	x	x	x	x	x				observer				
Greece	x	x	x	x	x				x				

(Continued overleaf)

International Organizations in Europe (Continued From Previous Page)

	OSCE	CFE Treaty	Council of Europe	EU	NATO	CDC	GUAM	CEFTA	BSEC	CIS / SNG	EurAsEC	CSTO / ODKB	SCO
Hungary	x	x	x	x	x								
Ireland	x		x	x									
Iceland	x	x	x		x								
Israel									observer				
Italy	x	x	x	x	x				observer				
Kazakhstan	x	x								x	x	x	x
Kyrgyzstan	x									x	x	x	x
Kosovo								x					
Latvia	x		x	x	x	x							
Liechtenstein	x		x										
Lithuania	x		x	x	x	x							
Luxembourg	x	x	x	x	x								
Malta	x		x	x									
Macedonia	x		x			x		x					
Moldova	x	x	x			x	x	x	x	x	observer		
Monaco	x		x										
Montenegro	x		x					x					
Morocco													
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x								
Norway	x	x	x		x								
Poland	x	x	x	x	x				observer				
Portugal	x	x	x	x	x								
Rumania	x	x	x	x	x	x			x				
Russia	x	x	x						x	x	x	x	x

(Continued overleaf)

International Organizations in Europe (Continued From Previous Page)

	OSCE	CFE Treaty	Council of Europe	EU	NATO	CDC	GUAM	CEFTA	BSEC	CIS / SNG	EurAsEC	CSTO / ODKB	SCO
San Marino	x		x										
Serbia	x		x					x	x				
Slovakia	x	x	x	x	x				observer				
Slovenia	x		x	x	x	x							
Spain	x	x	x	x									
Sweden	x		x	x									
Switzerland	x												
Tajikistan	x									x	x	x	x
Tunisia									observer				
Turkey	x	x	x		x				x				
Turkmenistan	x									associated member			
Ukraine	x	x	x			x	x		x	associated member	observer		
USA	x	x			x				observer				
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x								
Uzbekistan	x				x					x		x	x
Vatican	x												

Compiled by Katharina Hoffmann.

Explanation of abbreviations overleaf

Abbreviations Used in the Table “International Organizations in Europe”

Abbreviation	Name	Founding date or renaming
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	1975 CSCE / 1995 OSCE
CFE Treaty	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty	1990
Council of Europe	Council of Europe	1949
EU	European Union	1993
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	1949
CDC	Community of Democratic Choice	2005
GUAM	Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM	1997 GUUAM / 2006 GUAM
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement	1993
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation	1999
GUS / SNG	Commonwealth of Independent States / Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimyykh Gosudarstv	1991
EurAsEC	Eurasian Economic Community	2001
CSTO / ODKB	Collective Security Treaty Organization / Organizatsiya Dogovora Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti	1992 Collective Security Treaty / 2002 ODKB
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	1996 Shanghai Five / 2001 SCO

Compiled by Katharina Hoffmann

About the Russian Analytical Digest

Editors: Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder

The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen (www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de) and the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich). It is supported by the German Association for East European Studies (DGO). The Digest draws on contributions to the German-language Russlandanalysen (www.laender-analysen.de/russland), the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia (www.res.ethz.ch), and the Russian Regional Report. The Russian Analytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia's role in international relations.

To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Russian Analytical Digest, please visit our web page at www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad

Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen

Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to socialist and post-socialist cultural and societal developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Research Centre possesses a unique collection of alternative culture and independent writings from the former socialist countries in its archive. In addition to extensive individual research on dissidence and society in socialist countries, since January 2007 a group of international research institutes is participating in a collaborative project on the theme "The other Eastern Europe – the 1960s to the 1980s, dissidence in politics and society, alternatives in culture. Contributions to comparative contemporary history", which is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

In the area of post-socialist societies, extensive research projects have been conducted in recent years with emphasis on political decision-making processes, economic culture and the integration of post-socialist countries into EU governance. One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. This includes regular email service with nearly 20,000 subscribers in politics, economics and the media.

With a collection of publications on Eastern Europe unique in Germany, the Research Centre is also a contact point for researchers as well as the interested public. The Research Centre has approximately 300 periodicals from Russia alone, which are available in the institute's library. News reports as well as academic literature is systematically processed and analyzed in data bases.

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public.

The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center's research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.

In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS), offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students, and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces.

The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.

Any opinions expressed in Russian Analytical Digest are exclusively those of the authors.

Reprint possible with permission by the editors.

Editors: Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder

Layout: Cengiz Kibaroglu, Matthias Neumann

ISSN 1863-0421 © 2009 by Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, Zürich

Research Centre for East European Studies • Publications Department • Klagenfurter Str. 3 • 28359 Bremen • Germany

Phone: +49 421-218-7891 • Telefax: +49 421-218-3269 • e-mail: fsopr@uni-bremen.de • Internet: www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad