RUSSIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

■ ANALYSIS
  Medvedev’s Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment
  By Marcel de Haas, The Hague 2

■ ANALYSIS
  Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020
  By Henning Schröder, Berlin 6
Medvedev’s Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment

By Marcel de Haas, The Hague

Abstract
President Dmitry Medvedev has been in office for more than a year, making this a suitable moment to offer a provisional assessment of his external security policy by analyzing his major security documents and statements. In July 2008, several months after his inauguration as president, Medvedev launched his first major security document, the Foreign Policy Concept. Shortly after the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008, Medvedev introduced a second security policy initiative, this time in the form of a statement on major policy principles. The next month, in September 2008, Putin’s successor approved a specific strategy for the Arctic region. And in May 2009 President Medvedev ratified Russia’s first National Security Strategy. Russia’s military doctrine, the third pillar of the “troika” of the country’s security policy hierarchy after the strategy and the foreign policy concept is expected to appear in a new edition during the course of 2009.

Foreign Policy Concept (July 2008)
On 12 July 2008, Medvedev signed a new edition of the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC), promulgating his first security document as president. The most salient entries in the document dealt with Russia’s international status, Euro-Atlantic security structures and (security) cooperation with Eastern actors. As to its position in the international arena, the FPC described Russia as a great power with a full-fledged role in global affairs and as one of the influential centers in the modern world. Because of its status as a resurgent “great” or “super” power, Russia claimed to exert a substantial influence on international developments. In line with its strong international position, the FPC made it clear that Russia would protect the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad.

With regard to Euro-Atlantic security, the FPC described Moscow’s desire to create a different regional collective security and cooperation system than the one currently employed by the West, thereby ensuring the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region. Furthermore, the FPC rejected further expansion of NATO, especially concerning Ukraine and Georgia. The document also reiterated Moscow’s opposition to the planned US missile defense shield in Europe.

The Concept heavily emphasized the East, asserting deepened engagement in the format of the Russia-India-China Troika, with China and India bilaterally and in the Russian–Chinese strategic partnership. In addition to this, the FPC explicitly mentioned the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – a Russian-led military alliance of seven states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – as a key instrument for maintaining stability and ensuring security in the CIS. The foreign policy paper also referred to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – a political, economic and security grouping of Russia, China and four Central Asian CIS states – for its role in creating a network of partners in the Asia–Pacific Region.

The FPC clearly reflected Moscow’s policy priorities of the time. The document stressed that Russia had restored its international standing and was pursuing its own national interests instead of being influenced by the desires of other actors. This stance repeated policy statements from Putin’s 2007 and 2008 security documents. The August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict might also be considered as a policy action reflecting these views. The rejection of Western security actions – such as the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture, NATO expansion and the US missile shield – had been incorporated into Russia’s security policy during the latter part of Putin’s second term, whereas Medvedev launched the proposal for a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture in June 2008. The emphasis on partners – states and organizations – in the East coincided with Moscow’s closer ties to China and the upgrading of CSTO and SCO from, respectively, a treaty and a grouping into full-fledged organizations in recent years.

The FPC devoted considerable attention to energy, both in terms of security issues and resources. This approach was also in line with Putin’s 2007 and 2008 statements. Energy became a consistent part of Moscow’s security thinking due to its ability to produce high revenues and its use as an instrument of power, particularly during the gas conflicts with Ukraine.

Another structural aspect of the Kremlin’s security mindset included in the FPC was the importance of being a nuclear power. The document repeatedly mentioned the importance of the strategic nuclear deterrent,
but also noted the option of negotiations aimed at reducing the number of nuclear weapons.

Overall, the emphasis in this document on strengthening ties with India and China and with CSTO and SCO, in combination with its opposition towards the current (Western-orientated) European security structure, gave the impression that Russia’s interest in seeking security arrangements was moving from West to East.

**Foreign and Security Policy Principles (August 2008)**

Soon after the Russo-Georgian conflict, in a 31 August television interview, President Medvedev further elaborated his views on foreign and security policy by announcing five principles that would presumably guide Russian action:

1. International law must have primacy;
2. Multi-polarity should replace the US-dominated unipolar system;
3. Russia has no intention of isolating itself, seeking friendly relations even with the West;
4. Russia considers it a priority to protect Russians wherever they may be. Russia responds to any aggressive act against its citizens or Russia;
5. Russia has privileged interests in certain regions. Russia’s military actions in Georgia colored the Western reaction to Medvedev’s principles. Because Russia had just invaded not only the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also Georgia proper, critics questioned Russia’s commitment to the primacy of international law. Russia’s unhappiness with the unipolar system and US policies, along with its declarations protecting Russians abroad represented traditional state connotation. Russia justified its use of military force in Georgia’s separatist regions as necessary to protect the Russian minority in South Ossetia. Estonia and Latvia accordingly viewed Medvedev’s statements as threats, considering the presence of Russian minorities on their territory. Particularly controversial was Russia’s assertion of its “privileged interests,” especially regarding Georgia and Ukraine; this declaration emphasized the Russian view that the former Soviet space was its sphere of influence from which the West should stay out.

**National Security Strategy until 2020 (May 2009)**

On 12 May 2009 Medvedev signed a decree approving the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 (NSS).” The NSS replaced the National Security Concepts of 1997 (Yeltsin) and 2000 (Putin). The document took a wide view of security and included chapters on developments in international security, national interests, priorities and threats, ensuring national security in the field of military security and defense, social security, the welfare of citizens, the economy, science-technology-education, health care, culture, and the environment.

Concerning national interests and priorities, the document listed defence and state and societal security as the first priorities for Russia’s national security, followed by social-economic concerns, such as increasing the quality of life and economic growth. According to the NSS, Russia’s ability to defend its national security depended above all on the country’s economic potential.

In the military sphere, the paper stressed that parity with the USA in strategic nuclear weapons should be gained or maintained. Furthermore, the strategy asserted that Russia should develop into a global power, since it was already one of the leading powers influencing world processes. Another interest was the protection of Russian citizens in the so-called “near abroad”.

The NSS emphasized the interdependence between civil stability and national security, stating that socioeconomic development was as important as military security. A highly ambitious economic objective in the NSS is to become the world’s fifth largest economy in terms of GDP (Russia ranked eighth in 2008 according to the International Monetary Fund and the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook).

Traditionally, a crucial element of Russian strategic policy papers has been threat perception. As to threats, Medvedev’s strategy pointed out the policy of a number of leading countries, which seek military supremacy by building up nuclear, as well as conventional, strategic arms, unilaterally developing anti-ballistic missile defences and militarizing space, which may trigger a new arms race. Another threat is NATO’s expansion near Russia’s borders and attempts to grant the military alliance a global role. Non-compliance with international arms control agreements represents another threat. Energy security was now also brought in as a threat, backed by the claim that competition for energy resources might create tension, which could escalate into the use of military force near Russian borders and those of its allies. In addition to external threats, the document also listed domestic perils, such as demographic problems, poverty, insufficient health care, terrorism, separatism, radicalism, extremism, organized
crime, corruption, and the danger of worldwide pandemics.

Overall the NSS demonstrated a balanced approach to the full scope of security dimensions. The foreign and military security dimension comprised seven out of the 16 pages of the NSS. The remaining pages dealt with other, especially domestic, security concerns. Thus, the NSS was more than simply a military-oriented document. However, when it came to external security threats, an overload of (military) threats from the West demonstrated the traditional approach of Russian security thinking, reflecting Russian fears that the country is encircled by enemies, creating a need to seek allies and create buffer zones against such dangers.

The NSS mentioned a large number of objectives to be reached in all security dimensions, but it remains to be seen whether these can be achieved. However, for the first time in a strategic security document, the NSS concluded with a number of indicators, such as economic growth, the unemployment rate and the level of military modernization. If these indicators are monitored and policy is adjusted accordingly, then the chances of successfully reaching the targets will be better than if no benchmarks had been provided.

Just as Putin’s National Security Concept of 2000 reflected concerns raised by the Kosovo conflict of 1999, the NSS also exhibited present-day policy priorities. Most important was the desire that Russia should develop into a global power. This aspiration was a clear continuation of the thinking in the latter years of Putin’s presidency. Then Russian leaders claimed that other countries could no longer ignore Russian interests since Russia had restored much of its lost status. Other current and continuing Russian policy positions in the strategy were rejections of further NATO enlargement and the US missile defence shield in Europe, efforts to promote a new European security architecture, and an emphasis on the need to modernize Russia’s armed forces. Another vital and recurring policy point was the promotion of Russia’s nuclear citizens in the “near abroad”, since this issue was used by Moscow to legitimize its invasion of Georgia in August 2008. The reference in the NSS to the role of Russian military contingents in conflict areas promoting international stability was probably also related to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Energy has been gaining weight in Russian security thinking since Putin’s second presidential term. Indicative of the crucial importance given to energy (resources and security) was that the NSS mentioned this item more than five times, respectively in the chapters dealing with “Russia in the world community”, “National defence”, “Raising the quality of life” and “Economic growth”. The strategy described energy as a power instrument, strengthening Moscow’s influence in the international arena and providing a resource to use as strategic deterrence. The latter was possibly a hint to the policy of cutting-off energy supplies for economic, but also for political, purposes, respectively to Belarus and Ukraine, as was again demonstrated in January 2009. In addition to describing energy as a tool of power, the NSS defined it as a strategic security asset, asserting that increasingly scarce energy resources can create a threat if energy-poor states attempted to gain control of assets held by energy-rich states, such as Russia, which could cause armed conflicts. In addition to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, the Arctic region was mentioned as a prime source of energy resources. This approach corresponded with the Kremlin’s 2020 and beyond strategy on the Arctic, endorsed by Medvedev in September 2008.

According to the NSS, the main military threats came from the West, i.e. the USA and NATO. The reference to non-compliance with international arms control agreements probably referred to the USA’s unilateral annulment of the Ant-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, as well as to the refusal of the NATO member states to ratify the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1999, which caused Russia to suspend this treaty in December 2007.

The statements on nuclear arms in the NSS were ambiguous. On the one hand, Russia stressed modernization of its strategic nuclear deterrent, probably to counterbalance its weak conventional forces and to underline its position as a superpower. Hence, the strategy focused on maintaining nuclear parity with the USA in reply to its European missile shield and an assumed US nuclear strike doctrine. On the other hand, the NSS also proposed nuclear disarmament. Since a large part of Russia’s nuclear deterrent was out of date, the talks with the USA on nuclear reductions, started in May 2009, were most likely aimed at destroying the obsolete weapons and maintaining Moscow’s modern nuclear arms.

Conclusion
In the course of his first year in office President Dmitry Medvedev has presented three major security statements, namely the FPC, a statement on key policy principles, and the NSS. In comparing these three initiatives, a first conclusion is that they all were similar. First, they all emphasized a multipolar world, guided by international law, without unilateral domination, such as by the
USA. Second, the three statements mentioned Russia’s desire to cooperate and maintain friendly relations with all countries, including the West. Third, every security scheme underlined the protection of Russians abroad as a policy priority. And fourth, all plans – whether openly or concealed in other entries – asserted that Russia had privileged interests in certain regions, such as the former Soviet space.

Whereas Medvedev’s statement of August 2008 was limited to enumerating policy principles, the FPC and the NSS explained policy platforms in detail. Additional policy priorities shared by the FPC and the NSS were: Russia’s return to a great power status capable of influencing international developments; interests as the starting point for foreign and security policy; rejection of the West’s security programs, such as the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture, NATO expansion and the US missile shield; emphasis on partners in the East (China, India, CSTO and SCO); energy as a power tool and strategic asset; and nuclear arms as confirmation of Russia’s great power status.

A further conclusion is that the main features of Medvedev’s security initiatives reflect to a large extent Putin’s security policy documents of 2007 and 2008. Hence, Medvedev’s foreign security policy so far does not introduce a new course in Russian security thinking, but merely extends that of his predecessor Putin.

What should the West do in response to Moscow’s policies? In order to effectively “press the reset button” between the West and Russia, the USA and Europe need to enhance their talks with the Kremlin and discuss with Russian officials in public the alleged Western threats to Russia. Convincing the Kremlin to drop its zero-sum security policy of the 19th century and to enter the realities of the 21st century is the main challenge that lies ahead for Western policy makers.

Table: Chronology of major security documents and statements (2008–2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Policy document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 July 2008</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Concept approved by RF President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August 2008</td>
<td>Statement by Medvedev on principles of foreign/security policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May 2009</td>
<td>National Security Strategy until 2020 ratified by presidential decree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected 2009</td>
<td>Revised Military Doctrine</td>
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</tbody>
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About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Marcel de Haas is Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael in The Hague. This article is partly derived from Russia’s Foreign Security Policy of Putin, Medvedev and Beyond, which will be published by Routledge around February 2010.

Literature

Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020
By Henning Schröder, Berlin

Abstract
The Russian leadership presented a new national security strategy in May 2009. This document is intended to define an officially recognized system of strategic priorities and measures in the area of domestic and foreign policy that will ensure long-term national security and guarantee the sustainable development of the state. The role of Russia as a major power is defined confidently in the new strategy paper. As a “key subject in the evolving multipolar system of international relations”, Russia aims to play a dominant role together with the US, China, and other great powers. On the other hand, the authors of the “Strategy 2020” have failed to formulate a convincing threat picture. Classic Soviet-era threat perceptions are loosely juxtaposed with notions relating to the risks associated with globalization. From this, certain inferences may be drawn as to the assertiveness of President Dmitry Medvedev’s administration. The president and his team have not managed to maintain control of the discussion on the security policy concept and to integrate the positions of the agencies involved into a coherent line of argumentation. Nevertheless, the “Strategy 2020” assigns a high priority to economic development – evidence that Medvedev and Vladimir Putin are realistic in their assessment of the status quo in Russia. Only an increase in economic output will give Russia the means to substantiate its claim to great power status. Medvedev succinctly summarized this approach in his presentation of the “Strategy 2020” by summing it up with the formula “Security Through Development”.

The Dilemma of Russian Foreign Policy
The Russian Federation is certainly not in an enviable situation when it comes to foreign or security policy. Devoid of significant alliances, with an economic output comparable to that of France, and a standard of living that is far below that in Europe at large, it must find the means to secure a huge territory and overextended borders, end the violent conflicts in the Northern Caucasus, and maintain the strategic nuclear balance with the US. At the same time, the Russian leadership is laying claim to act as a hegemon in the post-Soviet space and as a great power on the international stage. The question is whether Russia has the economic, military, and political potential to resolve security issues successfully and to back up its international ambitions. The fundamental problem to be resolved by the country’s foreign and security policy is the disparity between aspirations and resources. That dilemma is further aggravated by the international financial crisis and plummeting energy prices, which have hit the Russian economy hard.

The “Strategy for Russia’s National Security to 2020”, which Russian President Medvedev signed on 12 May 2009, must deal with this state of affairs; it must single out the domestic and foreign threats and indicate ways of extracting the country from this difficult situation. At the same time, the document also sheds light on the extent to which the president and his administration are able to coordinate the various agencies and disparate forces within the political leadership, with their highly divergent conceptions of security, and ensure their commitment to a common policy.

The Run-Up to “Strategy 2020”
As understood in Russian politics, a national security strategy should define the officially recognized system of strategic priorities and measures in the fields of domestic and foreign policies that guarantees the long-term national security and sustainable development of the state. Similar documents have been published in the past. The May 2009 “Strategy 2020” replaced a national security conception that had been passed on 17 December 1997. A revised version of that document was confirmed by then president Putin in May 2000. Since then, however, the international state of affairs has changed considerably. The attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001 and the weakening of the US in the wake of its attack on Iraq, the Eastern expansion of the EU and NATO in 2004, the rising energy prices, the “color revolutions” in the CIS of 2003–4, the South Ossetian conflict in 2008, the international financial crisis, and the plummeting oil price in 2008 – all of these factors affected the international standing of Russia both positively and negatively.

The national security strategy had to be adapted to the changing international situation. Preparations began in 2004 on Putin’s instructions. But the work was
slow to get off the ground, for reasons that remain unclear. The Security Council may have lost influence during the tenure of former foreign minister Igor Ivanov, who acted as secretary of the Security Council from April 2004 to July 2007, and may therefore have been unable to assert itself against the “power structures” – the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior, and the intelligence services. After Ivanov’s resignation in July 2007, the position was not immediately filled – another sign of the Council’s declining relevance during Putin’s second term in office. Ivanov’s ongoing obligations were taken on by his deputy, Valentin Sobolev. It was not until May 2008, after Medvedev’s election as president, that the latter appointed a new secretary of the Security Council, namely Nikolai Patrushev, who had served as head of the domestic intelligence service, Federal Security Service (FSB), until the government reshuffle.

Medvedev’s New Start
In June 2008, President Medvedev ordered that work on the security strategy be resumed. The task was handed to an interministerial working group at the Security Council that included representatives of the government, the presidential staff, the president’s plenipotentiary representatives to the federal districts, the Academy of Sciences, and major corporations as well as individual experts. The work wore on until 2009. Meanwhile, the government, which was separately elaborating a “concept for long-term socio-economic development to the year 2020”, was quicker to reach a result. Its paper, which deals with issues of economic and social development, was completed in autumn 2008 and enacted by Prime Minister Putin’s decree on 17 November.

Meanwhile, the draft security strategy passed through several levels of scrutiny. The scientific advisory board of the Security Council discussed the paper’s approach and methods, which were then approved by the president. The draft was subsequently discussed in all federal districts. The governors and the speakers of the regional parliaments participated in these regional debates. Furthermore, the presidium of the Academy of Sciences discussed the paper and its content was coordinated with all of the members of the Security Council, i.e., the prime minister, the head of the presidential administration, the ministers of defense, interior, and foreign affairs, the representatives of both chambers of parliament, and the heads of the domestic and foreign intelligence services.

In early February 2009, the Russian media announced that the concept was “nearly done”. The Security Council was presented with a draft on 24 March; however, it was agreed that the final decision would be delayed by a month. The official reason given was that of a “purely technical” revision. However, Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Security Council, declared that a number of new and partially contradictory suggestions for changes had been made. Some in the Defense Ministry, for example, reportedly wanted the immigration of Chinese people to the Far Eastern part of Russia to be framed as a threat – a demand that was not taken up by the reviewers. Colonel General Georgii Shpak, a former commander of the airborne forces and now assistant to the head of the presidential administration, explained that the delay was needed to reassess whether any additional risks for Russia might arise from the international financial crisis. Russian media outlets touted another reason, according to which President Medvedev was deliberately holding back the strategy until after his meeting with US President Barack Obama in mid-April in order to gain a clearer picture as to the future course of relations with the US. These contradictory announcements reflect the many voices involved in the editorial process and their lack of coordination. Apparently, as of March 2009, the divergent departmental interests had not been resolved and the parties involved had not been brought to agreement on a concept.

The “Strategy 2020” and the New System of Strategic Planning
On 24 April, after the revision of the draft had been completed, it was adopted and passed on to the president. He enacted the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020” by decree on 12 May. The document is intended to constitute a framework of sorts for a series of further concepts, three more of which are to be presented in the course of 2009: a new military doctrine, which is being elaborated by a working group headed by former chief of the general staff Yuri Baluevsky; a doctrine for food security to 2020; and a conceptual document for state and national policy. The “Strategy” itself dovetails with the concept for long-term socio-economic development to 2020 that the government already adopted in November 2008.

Together with the “Strategy 2020” document, decisions were adopted on the “Foundations of Strategic Planning in Russia” together with a list of criteria and indicators for national security. Taken together, these documents are to create the basis for a system of strategic planning encompassing all state authorities. Each department must now present individual strategic plans for its portfolio. According to a list put together by the
Security Council, 135 strategies, concepts, and whitepapers are to be elaborated to cover all areas from banking to agricultural policy. As part of the new strategic planning system, these concepts are to be reviewed annually by the Security Council. If this system of strategic planning is put into practice, it will significantly boost the power of the Security Council. Its apparatus will then be authorized to intervene in the work of all portfolios.

A Profusion of Threat Perceptions
The “Strategy 2020” document itself is visibly more voluminous than its predecessor document. In 7,300 words (compared to the earlier paper’s 5,000 words) and 112 paragraphs, it deals with such diverse topics as national defense, economic growth, health policy, ecology, and culture as well as their significance for Russia’s national security. The document begins with the confident assertion that “Russia has overcome the results of the political and socio-economic systemic crisis at the end of the 20th century...” and defines Russia’s new role in the world from this starting point. It claims that the country has overcome nationalism, separatism, and terrorism, secured its territorial integrity, and restored the basis for enhancing its competitiveness and defending the interests of the nation as a “key subject in the emerging multipolar system of international relations”. Thus, the “Strategy 2020” depicts a Russia that has overcome its domestic crisis, has resurfaced economically, and demands to be accorded equal status with the other great powers.

The document identifies a qualitatively new geopolitical situation that has come about through the emergence of new centers of economic growth and political influence. Russia counts itself among these, regarding itself as a leading economy that is internationally competitive and features a strong arms sector, a huge store of natural resources, and pragmatic politics. The implication of this self-perception for Europe is that the region’s security architecture, based on NATO as its cornerstone, is outdated. Indeed, it is regarded in the “Strategy 2020” as a “threat to the provision of international security” that must be amended accordingly.

The chapters that follow, a broad range of perceived threats is developed. The authors of the chapter on “The Contemporary World and Russia: Current State and Developmental Tendencies” mainly take their cue from global risks. Threats to Russia’s national interests are seen as emanating from the unilateral use of force in international relations – an obvious reference to the US and NATO; the proliferation of mass casualty weapons, including the risk that such weapons might be acquired by violent political groups; illegal activities in the fields of cybernetics, life sciences, and high technology; global information warfare; and the destabilization of economic development and democratic institutions. Further threats identified include nationalism, xenophobia, separatism, demographic problems, the drug trade and human trafficking, organized crime, the spread of pandemics, and lack of water. These risk factors can also be found in threat analyses used by other European states. Notably, this list does not refer to any immediate military threat to Russia.

The chapter on “National Defense”, however, takes a different approach. It makes critical reference to the “policy of a number of leading foreign countries that are aiming to achieve a dominant military superiority, especially in the field of strategic nuclear forces...” This phrase is obviously directed against the US, which is also reproached for its intention to build up a global missile defense system and militarize outer space. In the chapter on “Security of State and Society” – a new term first introduced in this strategy paper – espionage by foreign services and individual persons is identified as the main threat, together with the activities of violent political groups. It is noticeable that foreign espionage is ranked as a higher threat than terrorism, even though attacks on security forces are on the rise in the Northern Caucasus and several republics are on the brink of civil war.

The chapter on “Raising Russian Citizens’ Standard of Living” defines a completely different kind of threat. It refers primarily to the international financial crisis, but also to the struggle for energy, water, and food as well as Russia’s lack of technological development. Raising the standard of living is regarded as an important instrument for combating corruption and organized crime. Ensuring a stable supply of food and affordable medicine is considered an important goal of a national security strategy.

In the chapter on the economy, the authors mainly concentrate on the further development of industry, which they hope will reduce Russia’s dependence on exports of raw materials. A failure of this effort is regarded as a potential threat, as is the loss of control over the nation’s resources and the deteriorating state of its resource base. The stated goal is for Russia to ascend to become one of the world’s five most productive economies in the middle term. This is, however, an extremely ambitious target. According to the latest World Bank figures, which refer to the year 2007, Russia was ranked in eighth place – with economic power being rat-
ed in terms of purchasing power parity – or in eleventh place based on the World Bank’s Gross National Income framework (Atlas Method). Since the country owed this rank mainly to high income derived from energy exports, the decline of energy prices will make it difficult to catch up with the US, Japan, China, India, Germany, France, and the UK. Finally, the “Strategy 2020” also identifies risks in other areas: Discrepancies in the level of development between the various Russian regions, the backwardness of science and technology, and the shortcomings of the public health system. Additional threats identified include the falsification of Russian history and the danger of climate change.

**Metrics for Threats**

Overall, one gets the impression that the “Strategy 2020” paper was written by several authors whose threat perceptions diverge radically. Classic enemy perceptions of the Soviet age are loosely juxtaposed with notions linked to the risks of globalization. The lead editors have failed to homogenize these perceptions in the final version of the paper and to compile them into a single, concise threat perception. The “Strategy 2020” apparently constitutes a compromise paper that includes the competing views of several institutions without attempting to unify them. The editors themselves seem to have been aware of this inadequacy. Thus, in a brief conclusion, they listed a hierarchy of criteria for measuring the gravity of threats. This list of criteria identifies seven metrics against which the future state of national security should be measured:

1. The level of unemployment.
2. The level of social inequality (measured as the ratio of the top ten percent income bracket compared to the bottom ten percent income bracket).
3. The inflation rate.
4. National debt (internal and external) in relation to GDP.
5. Expenditures for health coverage, culture, education, and science in relation to GDP.
6. The annual modernization standard of weapons systems and military gear.
7. The availability of qualified staff in the military and engineering/technical fields.

This list is remarkable for listing priorities whose consistency with the rest of the text is limited. Some aspects, such as economic growth and investment, are not mentioned at all, while others, such as armament and the size of military capabilities, are only referred to in passing. Social security is clearly accorded priority over military security. National security is measured in terms of social stability, not in terms of economic power or military potential. There is no question that in this chapter, the experts in domestic and social policy have prevailed over the foreign policy, military, and intelligence communities. Whether this applies to security policy in general is a question that must remain unanswered.

**“Security Through Development”**

Overall, the “Strategy for Russia’s National Security to 2020” is an incomplete document that does not attempt to present a comprehensive risk analysis, but merely lists political threats. Thus, conservative expert Konstantin Sivkov, the first vice president of the Academy of Geopolitical Issues, regarded the document as “flippant”, since it does not even attempt to identify the causes of the global crisis, which he believes are to be found in the behavior of the US. Viktor Ilyukhin, a Communist who for many years presided over the Duma’s Security Committee, described the “Strategy 2020” as being “completely inadequate to the state of affairs”, since it made no reference to the shortcomings of Russian industry – underperformance in the areas of engineering, information technology, and machine tool manufacturing. Even a liberal publication such as Yezhednevny Zhurnal (“Daily Journal”) criticized the paper for being too vague: “The list of threats is a lobbyists’ list.” It claimed that each department had asserted its influence in order to ensure that its own interests were entrenched in the strategy document.

Indeed, it appears that each chapter of the document was written by a different agency. The “Strategy 2020” does not even attempt to formulate a coherent, structured risk analysis. It simply assembles threat perceptions. It offers no clues as to which of the competing views out of this jumble of risk perceptions will determine the future course of politics – the FSB’s fear of foreign espionage, the military’s fear of NATO, the liberal economists’ concern for economic development, or the establishment’s fear of social unrest. This allows us to draw certain inferences as to the Medvedev administration’s ability to assert itself. The president and his team have not been able to control the discussion over the security policy concept and to integrate the positions of the government bodies involved into a coherent line of argumentation. Apparently, one year into his term of office, Medvedev has not yet managed to assert his authority across the entire administrative apparatus. It should not come as a surprise that the intelligence services and the military leadership have a worldview of their own, but the president must be capable of subordinating their activities to his own political goals.
This is not sufficiently apparent in the “Strategy 2020” document. It is possible that this is due to the personal involvement of the secretary of the Security Council. Nikolai Patrushev served for many years as the director of the FSB. His affinity to the work of the intelligence services and his desire to expand the security apparatus into an efficient instrument of control are reflected in the national strategy. It remains to be seen to what extent he can assert himself vis-à-vis the presidential administration and other agencies.

On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the “Strategy” identifies targets for foreign policy that already constitute policy guidelines today. One of these is Russia’s claim to be acknowledged as a great power, its determination to maintain control over the nation’s natural resources, and its intention of maintaining social stability in the country. It follows that Russia will oppose a liberalization of the energy market, “democracy promotion”, and the fostering of civil-society organizations by external actors with equal determination. An “orange scenario” – a development resembling that in Ukraine in 2004/5 – is just as unacceptable to the Medvedev administration as it was to Putin at the time.

The high priority accorded to economic development in the relevant chapters of the “Strategy 2020” shows that Medvedev and Putin alike are realistic in their assessment of the status quo in Russia. By banking on economic growth, they are pursuing the only possible course that can resolve the dilemma of Russian foreign policy. Only increasing economic output can ensure that Russia has the means to back up its claim to great power status. It can only gain international prestige and security by the further growth of its national economy, accelerated innovation, and fostering science and technology. This is succinctly summarized in the formula used by Medvedev while presenting the “Strategy 2020”: “Security Through Development”.

*Translated from German by Christopher Findlay*

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Reading Tip
For opinion polls on Russians’ view of Russia’s role in the world, for a documentation of ceilings on arms and equipment as stipulated by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and for an overview of international organizations in Europe please see Russian Analytical Digest 55/09, “The Role of Russia in Europe’s Security Architecture”, 18 February 2009, http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=RESSpecNet&fileid=A50453B9-9939-C477-F4B8-15D33BC0C0E9&lng=en or via the website of the Russian Analytical Digest http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/ rad/details.cfm?lng=en&id=96690
About the Russian Analytical Digest

The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen (www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de) and the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich). It is supported by the German Association for East European Studies (DGÖ). The Digest draws on contributions to the German-language Russlandanalysen (www.laender-analysen.de/russland), the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia (www.res.ethz.ch), and the Russian Regional Report. The Russian Analytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia’s role in international relations.

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Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen

Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to socialist and post-socialist cultural and societal developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Research Centre possesses a unique collection of alternative culture and independent writings from the former socialist countries in its archive. In addition to extensive individual research on dissidence and society in socialist countries, since January 2007 a group of international research institutes is participating in a collaborative project on the theme “The other Eastern Europe – the 1960s to the 1980s, dissidence in politics and society, alternatives in culture. Contributions to comparative contemporary history”, which is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

In the area of post-socialist societies, extensive research projects have been conducted in recent years with emphasis on political decision-making processes, economic culture and the integration of post-socialist countries into EU governance. One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public.

With a collection of publications on Eastern Europe unique in Germany, the Research Centre is also a contact point for researchers as well as the interested public. The Research Centre has approximately 300 periodicals from Russia alone, which are available in the institute’s library. News reports as well as academic literature is systematically processed and analyzed in the institute’s library.

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public.

The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center’s research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.

In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS), offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students, and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces.

The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.