POLICE REFORM

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Abstract
Most Russians have little confidence in their police. The force faces a number of problems: militarization, a lack of transparency, and marketization. The authorities have carried out repeated police reforms, but none were aimed at providing better security for the general population. Rather, the leadership sought to gain more extensive control over the police. True reform will require addressing the deeply rooted issues of militarization, opaqueness, and marketization.

Russians Are Unhappy with Their Police
Russians’ trust in their police is significantly lower than levels recorded in Europe in general, though the Russian police perform better than their counterparts in Bulgaria and Ukraine (See Figure 1 on p. 6). Behind this low score in Russia is the negative experience many Russians have when they contact the police: people are reluctant to call the police for help even when they are the victims of a crime. According to public opinion polls, less than 40 percent of crime victims contact the police to register a crime, to request that they open a criminal case, or to seek compensation for damages that they have suffered. Most people report that they were unhappy with the police reaction to their inquiry, and only slightly more than a quarter expressed satisfaction (nearly one third claimed that the police did nothing at all in response to their request for help). Victims who contacted the police seeking assistance evaluate police activity more negatively than those who have no personal contact with them.

Victims who did not report crimes to the police cited a variety of reasons for their reluctance to seek help. Two percent said that they had suffered from police criminality. While 2 percent seems like a small number, taking into account that 2.3 million people filed official complaints (2008 Rosstat data, www.gks.ru), nearly 70,000 Russians suffered from the unreported crimes committed by policemen (according to my calculations).

Police-phobia and distrust in the police are so high in Russia that more than a tenth of the victims polled do not report crimes to the police and try to take care of the problem on their own. If these numbers are accurate, more than 200,000 people annually go around the police system to seek their own form of justice. As a result, some cases reported as crimes are in fact efforts by citizens to take revenge on criminals and corrupt policemen. One of the most extreme cases in which ordinary citizens sought vengeance against policemen occurred in Primorsky Krai during the summer of 2010 (see Russian Analytical Digest No 82, http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/ad/details.cfm?lng=en&id=118673).

Institutional Imperfections
All the issues mentioned above are indicators that the police system in Russia is dysfunctional for a variety of institutional reasons. These problems include:

Militarization. The current Russian police system is a high militarized hierarchy where the command of one’s superior is much more important than the law or the public interest. This centralized system is the legacy of the Stalinist NKVD, which was used as a tool for mass repressions and a means of totalitarian control over daily human behavior. There is no totalitarianism in Russia at the moment but the “militia” remains partially a weapon in the hands of the authorities who seek to destroy any business, political group, or gathering of “people who disagree.”

Opaqueness. There is no publically-accessible and reliable data on the number, structure and operations of the Russian police at the moment. The last official data about the number of police officers in Russia were reported to the UN in 1994 as part of the United Nations’ Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, http://www.uncjin.org/stats/Swcs/Sbpolice.zip. (Until 2000, Russia provided data on crimes, but after 2000, the first year of Putin’s presidency, it stopped taking part in this survey). According to this data, the number of Russian police increased during the period 1990–1994 from 1.5 to 1.8 million people. After the mid-1990s, high-ranking officers occasionally gave interviews to the media in which they provided select figures, but no official statistics were reported. For example, the last figures reported by police representatives claimed that there were 1.4 million officers in 2009. Meantime, there is no data on regional breakdowns, the number of police stations overall or in various regions and cities, or for a variety of other important topics. All police statistics and data gathered through sociological surveys done in-house or by external research centers are classified and only

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1 This study was supported by the Center for Basic Research, Higher School of Economics
a few facts and figures are provided to the public after police approval.

There are strict restrictions limiting contact by police officers with the public and journalists even in the case of official public discussions regarding important police matters. For example, there was a classified instruction ordering police officers to avoid participating in the official public discussions about the recent draft of the new Law on the Police. Police officials ignored the REN-TV program that featured this discussion, particularly the Law on the Police. Police officials ignored the REN-TV program.

Such activities concentrate on earning money beyond official income. According to a survey of “corruption matters. For example, there was a classified instruction ordering police officers to avoid participating in the official public discussions about the recent draft of the new Law on the Police. Police officials ignored the REN-TV program that featured this discussion, particularly after the Presidential Administration forbid such public appearances following lobbying by the Interior Ministry.

Marketization. Marketization refers to the development of large-scale informal economic activities by police officers. In particular, it includes engagement by members of the police in private business activities. Such activities concentrate on earning money beyond official compensation, e.g., by providing services on the private security market, helping to implement the takeover of companies, accepting bribes, and similarly using one’s official position for personal gain. In many countries such activities are considered to be acts of corruption and violations of the law, making the perpetrators liable to prosecution by the state.

However, in Russia (as in many other transformational and developing countries), the economic activity of policemen can be considered “more than corruption”. The behavior of the police officers is embedded in other economic activities, including the typical behavior of numerous officials and rank-and-file employees from the district to the federal levels. In a study financed by the Open Society Institute, we found that approximately 49 percent of police officers reported engaging in after hours work, while 18 percent reported engaging in some type of additional income-producing activity during their regular work hours in 2001. Officers engaged in many kinds of such activities during their spare time as well as during working hours (Figure 2 on p. 7). At a minimum, we estimate that the total income earned in Russia by police officers during the beginning of the 2000s was approximately $1–3 billion annually (for details see Kolennikova et al. 2008).

A study done by the Levada-Center (an independent Russian public opinion and market research center) among police officers in 2005 confirmed these findings: nearly 60 percent of interviewed police officials had additional jobs and nearly 20 percent gained additional income during regular working hours (see: Gudkov and Dubin 2006). At that time income earned by police officers working in the market dramatically increased: according to a survey of “corruption markets” conducted by the INDEM Foundation in 2005, this income reached nearly $30 billion a year, growing more than ten-fold compared with the beginning of the 2000s (http://www.indem.ru/corrupt/2005diag_press.htm).

Of course, this outside employment is not a unique Russian peculiarity. Even in well-established democracies and market economies, such as the United States, “private employment of the public police” has been commonplace for several decades and has gradually increased in recent years. According to J. R. Brunet’s studies in some US cities, 20 to 90 percent of officers have off-duty jobs. However, these off-duty jobs are under the police authorities’ control. The police are not simply working on their own in a “free market,” as the Russian officers are doing, and the consequences of the off-duty jobs are approximately the same in comparison with other sectors of employment.

In contrast to well-established democracies, in Russia and in many other transitional countries, the state does not monitor the private business activities of the police. Officers only face restrictions when they come into conflict with other powerful groups, for instance, politicians, oligarchs, members of special services, or the military.

In the police’s daily operations, the process of marketization has resulted in the institutionalization of bribery between police officers. For example, if a traffic officer wants to patrol in a lucrative area (for example, where he potentially can collect personal payments in lieu of fines), he has to pay his direct boss for this privilege; if an inquiry officer wants to meet his arrest quota, but there are no true crimes in the region that he patrols, he has to pay an investigator to avoid punishment, and so on. Another important area of marketization is one’s personal career. In some cases, officers must pay to win promotion to a higher post (especially, if this post opens the path to informal earnings). Sometimes these fees can be as high as hundreds of thousands of dollars. Of course, then the newly-promoted officer must develop large-scale business activities to recoup his investments.

In light of the above, we can classify all police positions into three types. First, “golden posts,” where someone potentially can become extremely wealthy. These posts are sold relatively often; positions of the second type are sometimes sold; and the posts that offer no additional income are under-staffed.

There are two major consequences of marketization. First, the police enjoy a considerable degree of de facto
Transforming the Russian Police: Quasi-Reforms

During the early 1990s, when Russia’s economic transformation had just begun, nobody cared about police restructuring: the authorities and emerging entrepreneurial class were interested in privatization and providing stability for the economic system (financial stabilization and control over inflation). Accordingly, the Soviet militia (with its NKVD legacy) initiated marketization from below. At that time, they competed on the market to provide security services with organized criminal gangs racketeering newly established business entities. The authorities, concerned about the rise of organized crime, maintained the strength of the law enforcers and expanded the number of police officers (the growth reported to the UN moved from 1.5 to 1.8 million police staff).

At the same time, the police who were essentially competing with the criminals reached a kind of symbiosis with the mob. Ultimately, they began “racketeering the racketeers” and captured their criminal business. Step by step they accumulated economic wealth, initially spending their money on consumer goods (luxury vehicles, dachas, real estate abroad, etc.). Then, during the second part of the 1990s, they started to invest, first in the retail trade (open markets, small shops, etc.) and other sectors. This was potentially damaging to the authorities’ efforts to maintain control over the police.

And, indeed eventually the political leaders sought to weaken this extra-powerful ministry, in part by increasing official wages. The major milestones of this policy are as follows:

• moving the penitentiary system from the Interior Ministry to the Justice Ministry (1998, 350,000 employees);
• moving fire fighters to the Ministry of Emergency Situations (2001, 275,000 employees);
• launching a political campaign and criminal prosecution of “werewolves in uniform” (2003–2006 and sporadically afterwards; hundreds of thousands of officers were punished, though it is difficult to estimate the exact figures);
• launching a political drive against corruption in the police with a plan to cut the number of police officers by 200,000 employees during two years, and to remove some profit-making functions from the Interior Ministry, such as technical control over vehicles, etc. (end of 2009 through the present).

All these actions were not reforms aimed to provide better security services to the public and to cut criminality. The main content of these measures were, and remain, organizational restructuring, criticizing corrupt officers in the media, and punishing select individuals according to various political needs. During the 2000s the police did not provide better security services to the public or change the bad habits developed by officers. The police force remains a militarized, opaque system focused on making money while ignoring the needs of the public.

The government’s most important desire was to expand administrative control over the police and to restrict its autonomy so that it could better deliver services to the authorities, including security, direct violence against political opponents (liberals, communists, nationalists and fascists), and take over businesses. The police only work diligently under special pressure from the top in politically sensitive cases. But even in such instances, they often do not work effectively, punishing innocent people simply to claim that they have done their job.

These transformations within the police took place in the framework of the informal social contract at the end of the 1990s to the beginning of 2000s between
the authorities, police and business community in Russia (the public was not involved). The police, using their posts and other resources, can make money on the market, but only on a limited scale. These limits are informally established during the clashes between the authorities and the police (typically, these are political campaigns and prosecutions of egregious crimes). In exchange, the police have to provide services to the authorities. Businesspeople have to pay the police to enter some markets and to have security services, but in some cases of police abuse, they can apply to the authorities for protection.

The public is not an actor in this game and all these quasi-reforms are attempts to expand administrative control over the police without making law enforcement a true public servant. The current measures, which take into account the 2012 presidential elections, are indicative in this sense. The top authorities took two major initiatives. The first was the Presidential Decree on measures to improve police activities (No 1468, December 24, 2009, http://mvd.consultant.ru/doc.asp?ID=56450). The most important measures were to cut police staff by 20 percent, centralize the funding of the police (salaries should only come from the federal budget while local budgets are prohibited from providing funding to ensure that the police remain loyal to federal officials rather than local politicians), and to implement organizational restructuring (closing and merging some departments).

The second was the draft Law on the Police, with discussions and revisions currently underway. The main content of this draft is new bureaucratic restrictions on the police in their daily operations and new rights vis-à-vis the public (including the right to enter private dwellings).

We can expect that in response the Interior Ministry will try to shape the business restructuring of Police, Inc. The first line will be to eliminate posts which only serve the public interest and do not provide other opportunities to make money. The second will be investing in local elections (mayors and lower) to create a favorable climate for their business activities. The third will be attempts to expand capital flows and foreign investments.

3D Reforms of the Russian Police
To truly transform the Russian police, it is necessary to bring the public into the arena and to ensure real public control over law enforcement. A prerequisite for this would be destroying the current informal social contract between the authorities, police and business, and involves 3 Ds:

1. Demilitarize the police and turn it into a mostly civilian organization guided by the law and public interest;
2. Disclose the police structure and its activities: provide true information about the main aspects of the Interior Ministry activities as well as of the local police branches;
3. Demarketize police activities, dividing their services from the market.

These 3D reforms are only the first step in the bumpy road to establishing a profession police force in Russia.

About the Author
Leonid Kosals is a professor and Vice Dean for Research in the Faculty of Sociology at the Higher School of Economics (Moscow). He is an expert in economic sociology and the concept of clan capitalism in Russia. He is widely published in Russian, English and other languages.

Recommended Reading:
Trust in the Police and “Economic Activities”

Figure 1: Trust in the Police, Mean Score

Source: Data from the 2008 European Social Survey (www.europeansocialsurvey.org). Author’s calculation of mean score, answering the question: “Please tell me, on a score of 0–10, how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Trust in the police.”
A New Initiative

At the end of 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev manifested sufficient political will to announce the beginning of police reform in Russia. According to the president, the first steps of the reform were to overhaul the police force since, in its present form, it did not meet contemporary demands. Behind this announcement stood the growing number of conflicts between policemen and members of the public. Many police officers violate human rights because they do not feel accountable to the population. Recently, there have been several examples of such problems. In April 2009, the intoxicated police Major Denis...
Yevsyukov killed two shoppers and wounded seven others in a Moscow supermarket during a drunken shooting spree. Subsequently, there was the case of Sergei Magnitsky, the lawyer who apparently uncovered extensive corruption among public officials, and who was then himself arrested, and ultimately died in prison after being held for almost one year in pre-trial detention. Russia was also rocked by the Youtube videos of police Major Aleksey Dymovsky and several other officers who jeopardized their careers to appeal directly to the Russian president to end the lawlessness inside the police system.

According to Medvedev’s design, the police should reform themselves. He ordered them to develop a plan for reducing the number of policemen by 20 percent and to prepare the text of a draft law on the police. As part of this process, the police are supposed to identify which functions they currently perform are superfluous, so that the system can be streamlined and focused more effectively on core activities.

Nine months have now passed and it is possible to draw some initial conclusions. Is the reform actually being implemented or is it merely a virtual exercise designed to win higher ratings for the government leaders?

**Police Reform on the Federal Level**

For the reform to be implemented in society, it is necessary to lay out a clearly defined conception of what should take place. So far, neither the president who announced the reform, nor the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has a clear conception of what kind of police Russia should have as a result of these reforms. Accordingly, the reform has not proved satisfactory to either Russia’s leaders or its population. It is clear that the authorities are simply trying to give the impression that they are making progress and are actually in control of events. Accordingly, they claim that what is taking place is in fact what they desire.

From my point of view, what is happening is an optimization of the MVD, through a process of cutting unnecessary staff and functions. Simultaneously, there is a process of redistributing the freed-up budgetary funds within the system. The authorities are trying to convince society that these processes count for police reform.

After the president announced the police reform at the end of 2009, members of society began to discuss what kind of police force Russia should have once the reform process is complete. Several non-governmental groups drew up their recommendations for reform. However, the authorities only put forward one set of suggestions for public discussion. These proposals had been prepared by a working group to support police reform that consisted of 14 non-governmental human rights organizations which work in the area of rights violations by the police (http://www.publicverdict.org/topics/reform/8104.html). Today this is the reform plan that can be discussed in various arenas. It is clear that the authorities, including the president himself, are taking many ideas from this concept and presenting them as their own reform proposals. Thus, for example, the roadmap for reform presented here suggests that the police should no longer be in charge of drunk tanks, where inebriated citizens are taken to sober up overnight. Shortly after this proposal appeared, the president suggested that the drunk tanks be transferred from the MVD to the health ministry.

In the absence of a clear concept of reform, the authorities are trying to start, or more precisely, wrap up the incipient reform with the help of the draft federal law on the police. The bill is badly written and has numerous references to directives that simply have not been developed yet. The bill does not define a police structure and many other important features that would allow future legislation to turn the police into an organization that effectively served the population.

The bill devotes considerable discussion to the level of popular trust in the police, but does not include a mechanism that can be used to evaluate how much trust the police are actually winning. However in an interview with Rossiiskaya gazeta, MVD State Secretary Sergei Bulavin said that the level of popular trust is one of the most important ways to evaluate the activity of the police.

Since many experts have criticized the bill and demanded that it be rewritten, it is clear that it will not come into force as law on January 1, 2011. Even though the authorities did not have a clear conception of how to reform the police when they launched this project, there is clearly a process taking place in which active civil society groups are pushing to be sure that the reform does not simply result in the modernization of the police, but that the police start to live up to the standards which the Russian Federation has committed itself to in the field of protecting human rights.

**Police Reform in the Russian Regions**

While on the federal level the president has the political will, backed by powerful institutional resources and media access, to periodically speak about the topic of police reform, the situation is completely different in the regions. As soon as the reforms were announced, the police at all levels tensed up and refused to engage in dialogue at the local level. There was an unwritten internal directive prohibiting discussion of police reform.
with members of the public. They essentially avoid any dialogue on this topic.

Confirmation of this situation is clearly visible in the way the Working Group to Conduct Police Reform organized round table discussions to solicit advice on how to carry out the reform. The Working Group conducted approximately 20 round table discussions in 20 regions. Only in Perm Krai did the city police chief personally participate in discussing the proposals presented by the human rights groups. In the other regions, the participants were either former policemen or representatives of the MVD who refused to make any comments or participated only as supernumeraries.

Despite the minimal police participation, the round table discussions in the regions made clear how the police reacted to the reform proposals. In all regions but two (Chuvashia and Zabaikal Krai), there was strong opposition to the idea of dividing the police into federal and regional components and decentralizing much of the power in the currently unitary agency. Even the president does not support this idea.

Accordingly, until August 9, 2010, the rank-and-file members of the MVD were practically excluded both from the actual reform process and the discussion of the draft police law. On August 9, President Medvedev visited the Republic of Marii El and met with policemen in the capital city of Ioshkar-Ola to discuss the draft law. Through his personal intervention, the president made clear to the officers that they should participate in both the reform and the discussion of the new law. Only such an intervention could change the situation in the regions.

In regions where the MVD has Societal Councils, meetings were held to discuss the draft law and gather recommendations for amending it. However, even these discussions did not change the fact that until now the entire discussion has been within the system. Most members of the public are not participating in discussions of police reform and they do not have any idea of what reforms are being discussed, as recent data from the independent Levada Center polling firm demonstrate (http://www.levada.ru/press/2010091303.html). According to this research, 52 percent of the population think that the process will lead to only decorative reforms, while just 19 percent think the reform will be successful. Of those who think that reforms will not take place, a majority thinks that the government measures are just an effort to release steam and reduce public anger about police abuses.

Additionally, it is important to note that since the reforms were announced, amendments to the Russian Criminal Code (article 286.1 as amended on July 22, 2010) now make it a criminal offence for policemen to criticize the decisions of their superiors. Undoubtedly, this norm appeared in response to Dymovsky’s Youtube video and the widespread public reaction to it. However, the effect is to paralyze any public discussion about the police by policemen because they will always be under the threat of criminal prosecution.

Despite the difficulties in implementing the reform and the greater centralization of the MVD, the regional police have some room to assert their independence. Each region now has the responsibility of developing its own system for training personnel. In some cases, the instructors are using western experience derived from their participation in exchange programs organized by non-governmental organizations. However, this is only a small opportunity for aid to local policemen who sincerely are interested in changing the system so that it observes human rights and provides useful services to the population.

Conclusion

Today there are many obstacles to organizing and conducting real police reform in Russia. Most important are corruption and the continuing presence of many cops who want to preserve their jobs.

The reform can only be implemented if two conditions are met. First there must be political will in the county’s leadership. Second, civil society must pressure the bureaucracy and police leadership to change the system. What the actual results will be depend heavily on the 2012 presidential elections.

About the Author

Sergei Poduzov is the co-chairman of the Man and Law organization in Marii El.
Reputation and Reform: Opinions on the Russian Militia

Figure 1: Do You Trust the Militia in Your Region?


Figure 2: How Would You Rate the Work of the Militia in Your Region?


Figure 3: What Are Your Main Complaints About the Work of Personnel of the Organs of the Ministry of the Interior?

Figure 4: In Your Opinion, Is Illegal Activity of Militia Personnel a Regular Occurrence, Or Are There Merely Isolated Cases of Illegal Activity?


Source: representative opinion poll by VTsIOM on 19–20 June 2010

Figure 5: Is A Reform of the Ministry of the Interior Necessary?

![Pie chart showing responses](http://old.wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/13654.html)

Source: representative opinion poll by VTsIOM on 19–20 June 2010

Figure 6: What Specific Elements Should be Contained in A Reform of the Ministry of the Interior?

![Bar graph showing responses](http://old.wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/13654.html)

Source: representative opinion poll by VTsIOM on 19–20 June 2010
Figure 7: Have you heard of the draft bill for a reform of the law enforcement organs submitted by Dmitri Medvedev for public discussion that includes the transformation of the militia into a police force?

Saw discussions about this reform on TV and heard them on the radio: 55%

Know about the reform, read the draft of the reform in the newspaper or on the Internet: 13%

Read comments and statements by experts analyzing the pros and cons of the draft proposed by the president: 7%

Read alternative drafts proposed by the opposition: 3%

Do not know anything about the proposed reform: 24%

Don’t know/no answer: 3%

Source: representative opinion poll by Levada-Center on 20–23 August 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010091303.html

Figure 8: What do you think: will a radical reform of the militia be implemented this time, or will everything boil down to decorative renamings and a reshuffle of the leadership of the militia?

- Everything will boil down to decorative renamings and a reshuffle of the leadership of the militia: 52%
- A radical reform of the militia will be implemented: 19%
- Don’t know/no answer: 29%

Source: representative opinion poll by Levada-Center on 20–23 August 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010091303.html
Figure 9: Why don’t you believe in a success of Medvedev’s proposed reform of the law enforcement organs? (percent of those who answered that there will be no radical reform, cf. Figure 8)

Source: representative opinion poll by Levada-Center on 20–23 August 2010 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010091303.html
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Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen
Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to socialist and post-socialist cultural and societal developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the area of post-socialist societies, extensive research projects have been conducted in recent years with emphasis on political decision-making processes, economic culture and the integration of post-socialist countries into EU governance. One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. This includes regular email services with nearly 20,000 subscribers in politics, economics and the media.

With a collection of publications on Eastern Europe unique in Germany, the Research Centre is also a contact point for researchers as well as the interested public. The Research Centre has approximately 300 periodicals from Russia alone, which are available in the institute’s library. News reports as well as academic literature is systematically processed and analyzed in data bases.

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich
The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public. The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center’s research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, area studies, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.

In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) in public policy degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS); offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students; and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces.

The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Crisis and Risk Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.

The Institute of History at the University of Basel
The Institute of History at the University of Basel was founded in 1887. It now consists of ten professors and employs some 80 researchers, teaching assistants and administrative staff. Research and teaching relate to the period from late antiquity to contemporary history. The Institute offers its 800 students a Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree in general history and various specialized subjects, including a comprehensive Master’s Program in Eastern European History (http://histsem.unibas.ch/bereiche/osteuropaiese-geschichte/).

Resource Security Institute
The Resource Security Institute (RSI) is a non-profit organization devoted to improving understanding about global energy security, particularly as it relates to Eurasia. We do this through collaborating on the publication of electronic newsletters, articles, books and public presentations.