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digest

RUSSIAN REGIONAL ELECTIONS

ANALYSIS

Protest and Regional Elections

Yana Gorokhovskaia

Abstract

This year, the usually predictable regional elections sparked a conflict over which actors are allowed to participate in organized politics in Russia and which are not. Both the opposition's campaign strategies and the social response they elicited suggest that future elections in the country will be more hotly contested.

Status Quo or Change on the Horizon?

Regional and municipal elections in Russia have traditionally attracted little interest from either voters or the media. This year, however, conflict over the disqualification of candidates running for seats in Moscow's city duma drew greater attention to these contests. The controversy in Moscow began in early July when the city's electoral commissions disqualified opposition candidates, including former Duma member Dimitry Gudkov, opposition activist Ilya Yashin, Anti-Corruption Fund lawyer Lyubov Sobol, and a number of other well-known local activists, from participating in the election. In addition to challenging their disqualifications at higher standing electoral commissions and in the courts, the excluded candidates began organizing demonstrations that quickly grew into large protests. The protests gained traction in late July and early August after some of the disqualified candidates were sentenced to administrative detention and riot police used force against peaceful protesters. In the middle of August, Alexei Navalny announced the launch of the "Smart Vote" initiative: a website that helped coordinate opposition votes against United Russia candidates across the country.

Despite the fact that none of the disqualified candidates in Moscow were restored to the ballot, United Russia's share of seats on the city duma was cut from 38 to 25. The party of power also failed to win any seats in the Khabarovsk city duma and suffered losses in legislative and municipal elections in other regions as well. Meanwhile, gubernatorial contests across the country ended predictably. All incumbent governors won with comfortable leads over their challengers in contests that produced little controversy. The mixed performance of United Russia has brought into question the durability of Russia's existing political system as it struggles to deal with growing pressure exerted by previously marginalized opposition forces.

The Limits of the Manipulation Toolkit

Elections under competitive authoritarianism are free but unfair as the autocrat works to mitigate her risk of loss while maintaining the appearance of electoral legitimacy. In Russia, ballot-stuffing, carousel voting, and falsification are regular features of elections. However, these types of electoral malpractice are dangerous because they can spark widespread protest. By contrast, tactics to control the outcome of elections that are applied before voting day are effective and far less risky.

One such strategy that has been a popular method of electoral manipulation in Russia is to limit the political choices available to voters. System-wide, this has been accomplished through institutional engineering. A series of changes to laws governing party membership has led to a decrease in the number of parties able to compete in elections, from over 60 in 2001 to just seven in 2009 (Golosov 2012). An April 2012 law relaxing the rules on party registration allowed many more parties to appear, but the resulting confusion worked to undermine the opposition. At the local level, authorities use electoral commissions to limit voter choice by manipulating who is allowed to appear on the ballot (Smyth and Turovsky 2018). One strategy is to pack the ballot with spoiler candidates in order to confuse voters and to give the impression of competition. Ballots can also be stripped by disqualifying undesirable candidates. These strategies have the advantage of taking place long before election day, being performed by formally non-partisan electoral commissions, and appearing technically procedural.

Manipulation of voter choice through both ballot packing and ballot stripping was evident in Moscow and other regions this year. First, the Moscow branch of United Russia made the decision not to nominate any candidates to the city duma election. Instead, all of their candidates ran as "self-nominated", allowing them to mask their partisan affiliation on the ballot in hopes of avoiding falling victim to a protest vote. In 2012's municipal election in the capital, the local branch of United Russia also shed the party label in order to confuse voters trying to adhere to Alexei Navalny's "Anyone but United Russia" strategy. Outside of Moscow, half of the gubernatorial incum-

bents decided not to run using the United Russia label, hoping to avoid the protest vote that brought down three governors last year.[1] Second, spoiler candidates were added to the ballots to give the impression of competition. In one bizarre case, a spoiler candidate, Aleksander Solovyov from Just Russia—who was put on the ballot when the opposition candidate Aleksander Solovyov was disqualified—actually defeated the incumbent pro-regime candidate in his district.[2] Third, genuine opposition candidates were denied registration by Moscow's electoral commissions. The commissions found fault with the nomination signatures collected by the candidates, claiming that some of the signatures belonged to fictitious individuals and used handwriting experts to deem other signatures to be forgeries.[3] The competitiveness of gubernatorial elections was also kept low through the exclusion of popular challengers.[4]

The strategy of using electoral commissions to limit voter choice long before voting day did not insulate the authorities from criticism in Moscow as it had in the past. Thirteen prominent opposition candidates—including several sitting municipal deputies—spent weeks in June and July collecting the approximately 5,000 signatures needed to register in the election. Their campaigns, promoted actively on social media, had already attracted attention around the city before the electoral commission disqualified them. The method of disqualification, especially the claims that nomination signatures belonged to nonexistent people or "dead souls", sparked an immediate online response and mobilized supporters to come out to the streets to demand the restoration of these candidates.

A Summer of Unrest in Moscow
On August 10, 2019, the biggest protest of the last seven years took place in central Moscow. More than 50,000 people came out in the rainy weather to show their support for disqualified opposition candidates. Despite popular narratives about the passivity of Russian citizens, protests are not infrequent in the country. The Lankina Russian Protest-Event Dataset recorded over 5,700 protests taking place between 2007 and 2016. Willingness

to protest is also on the rise. According to a May 2019 survey from the Levada Center, 22 percent of respondents said that they "most likely would" participate in large-scale political protests, up from just 8 percent a year earlier.[5] This figure is surprising considering the very real dangers faced by protesters with one in four political protests in Russia experiencing police-led violence (Lankina and Tertytchnaya 2019, p. 9). Indeed, the summer protests in Moscow were not only notable for their size but also for the harshness that characterized the authorities' response to them. Over 2,500 people were detained and videos of riot police using considerable force against protesters were widely circulated. Strikingly, serious criminal charges of mass rioting and injuring police officers were subsequently brought against some of the detained protesters. The charges are similar to those leveled at defendants in the Bolotnaya Square case from 2012. However, while it took months and sometimes years to prosecute cases against the Bolotnaya defendants, many cases stemming from the arrests in July and August have already been heard by the courts.

The timing and demands of the Moscow protests also make them unique. Most political protests are reactive and staged in response to problems that happen during an election (McAdam and Tarrow 2010). For example, For Free Elections mass protests followed accusations of fraud in the 2011 Duma election and began the day after the vote took place. This is the reason election fraud is a risky tactic for an autocrat. However, recently some election protests in Russia are becoming proactive and taking place before voters go to the polls. This was the case with the "voters' strike" protests of January 2018, which called for a boycott of the March presidential election after Alexei Navalny was disqualified from the race. The protests this summer in Moscow were ten times the size of previous proactive protests and began almost two months before election day.

Related to the proactive nature of the mobilizations, the demands issued by the protesters were procedural rather than abstract. The demands crystalized in the dual slogans of "Допускай/Отпускай", "Let them run! Let them out!" referring to both the disqualified candidates and the detained protesters. Unlike many other

1   Andrey Pertsev. "Kremlin's Rejection of United Russia Is Rejection of Politics Itself" Carnegie Moscow Center. 16 July 2019. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79505

2   "YA illyuzoren so vsekh storon. Kandidata Solov'yova pochti nikto ne videl, on ne vol kampaniyu — no popal v Mosgordumu" Otkritaya Media. 10 September 2019 https://openmedia.io/news/ya-illyuzoren-so-vsex-storon-kandidata-solovyova-pochti-nikto-ne-videl-on-ne-vyol-kampaniyu-no-popal-v-mosgordumu/

3   Stanislav Andreychuk. "Zaregistrirovat' nel'zya otkazat': kto prav v spore kandidatov s izbirkomami?" Riddle. 26 July 2019. https://www.ridl.io/ru/zaregistrirovat-nelzja-otkazat-kto-prav-v-spore-kandidatov-s-izbirkomami/

4   Anastasiya Kornya, Yelena Mukhametshina and Svetlana Bocharova. "Vlasti ne pustili na vybory ser'yeznykh protivnikov deystvuyushchikh gubernatorov" 13 August 2019. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2019/08/12/808642-vlasti-ne-pustili#galleries%2F140737494544253%2Fnormal%2F1

5   "Protests." 7 August 2019.https://www.levada.ru/en/2019/08/07/protests-3/

political protests in Russia, which are usually characterized by demands for less corruption, more political rights, and freer elections, demands for procedural fairness and an appeal to the rule of law were at the heart of these mobilizations. In some regards, these demands—that the authorities follow their own laws by allowing candidates who have met the requirements for registration to run and releasing people assembling peacefully—mirror the rule of law appeals made to the state by Soviet dissidents in the 1980s.

Building Political Capacity from Below

Although the outbreak of electoral protests in Moscow surprised many this summer, the recent history of local politics in the capital suggests that this conflict has been on the horizon for some time. Five of the opposition candidates disqualified from standing in the election—Elena Rusakova, Yulia Galyamina, Ilya Yashin, Konstantin Yankauskus and Anastasia Bryukhanova—are sitting municipal deputies in Moscow, elected to municipal councils in September of 2017. Rusakova and Yankauskus have been municipal deputies since 2012. Their political careers exemplify a new approach to organized politics by the opposition (Gorokhovskaia 2019).

This new approach focuses on funneling opposition-minded individuals into organized politics at the local level by providing them with training and campaign support. The first iteration of this approach was the "Our City" initiative launched by two municipal deputies in December of 2011 to recruit would-be candidates for the city's municipal election from among the ranks of For Free Elections protest participants. To help educate opposition candidates, "Our City" held a series of weekend Schools for Deputies, which provided training for some 200 participants. In March of 2012, 70 opposition candidates won seats on municipal councils around the city. In the summer of 2017, another opposition initiative called "United Democrats" recruited and trained over a thousand opposition-minded individuals, helping 267 win seats on municipal councils. Building on the ad hoc training provided by the Schools for Deputies, "United Democrats" devised a comprehensive campaign infrastructure, including help with registration, fundraising, the production and distribution of campaign literature, and canvassing. Their ability to capture one quarter of all seats on municipal councils in Moscow was a historic electoral victory for the opposition.

Both initiatives targeted the barriers that have traditionally prevented opposition candidates from participating in elections. In so doing, the initiatives helped to build grassroots political networks of opposition politicians, activists, and supporters in Moscow. This summer, those networks were activated when the opposition candidates began their campaigns and when those campaigns were attacked by the authorities. Schools for Deputies have spread across the country since 2011 and "United Democrats" ran a municipal campaign in St. Petersburg this year that was similar to the one undertaken in Moscow in 2017. In the future, as more opposition-minded people turn from activism to organized politics armed with campaign infrastructure and support, conflict with authorities during elections may increase. More broadly, the development of greater political capacity by opposition actors is putting pressure on the existing political system, which can no longer rely on pre-election electoral manipulation to limit voter choice without creating controversy.

About the Author
Yana Gorokhovskaia is a political scientist studying civil society and activism in Russia. Her research has been published in Post-Soviet Affairs, Democratization, and Russian Politics. From 2016 to 2019, she was the Russian Politics post-doctoral fellow at the Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian and Eastern European Studies at Columbia University.

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Outsmarting Electoral Authoritarianism?
Alexey Navalny's "Smart Voting" in Moscow and Beyond

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Abstract

The regional and municipal elections on September 8, 2019, unexpectedly strengthened the parliamentary opposition in several regions and municipalities. The opposition politician Alexey Navalny attributed this success to his negative-coalition strategy of "smart voting". While its exact effects are difficult to assess, it innovatively exploits the rules and practices of Russia's electoral authoritarian regime. The Kremlin, meanwhile, has already reacted with repression.

"We've Won."

The first video that Alexey Navalny posted on his Youtube channel after the regional elections of September 8 was entitled "we've won." Given that the Kremlin's candidates succeeded in the first round of all 13 gubernatorial elections, including St. Petersburg, and that the governing party United Russia (UR) will again control a majority in Moscow's new regional parliament, one might be surprised to hear an opposition politician boasting about victory. However, taken together, the opposition has significantly improved its standing: In several regional parliaments, UR has suffered serious setbacks, losing its absolute majority in six of 31 cases. In Moscow, Yabloko received four mandates (up from zero in the previous two convocations), while several symbolic victories were achieved against high-profile candidates such as United Russia's Moscow leader Andrey Metelskiy.

Alexey Navalny attributed these advances to a strategy termed "smart voting" that he had presented in late 2018 and now brought to bear for the first time. Its basic idea is to concentrate all protest votes on the oppositional candidate that, on the basis of opinion polls and earlier election results, Navalny's team deemed to be the most promising in each single-member district (SMD). To find out whom to vote for, citizens could type in their registration address in an online search mask and were delivered the name and party affiliation of the endorsed candidate. This strategy takes into account that in SMDs on the regional and municipal level, UR's candidates tend to win with a plurality rather than an absolute majority, so that coordinated strategic voting has a credible chance of tipping the scales. While no single instance of an oppositional majority can be attributed to "smart voting" with certainty, the overall results do point to its efficacy and thus call for closer analysis.

Electoral Backfire

The elections in Moscow were preceded by a campaign of opposition candidates that was carried out with an unusual degree of coordination. The group comprised members of Navalny's team—among them Lyubov Sobol and Ivan Zhdanov, two lawyers of his Anti-Corruption Foundation—but also Yabloko politicians like Yulia Galyamina and other opposition actors such as Dmitry Gudkov and Ilya Yashin. According to opinion polls, some of them, like Yashin, had realistic chances of winning their SMD. As a result, authorities declined to register most of them, usually claiming that a large share of the collected signatures were invalid or belonged to nonexistent individuals.

Manipulation of such kind is common practice in Russia's electoral authoritarianism. However, this time candidates were well-prepared, their campaigns were tightly connected to each other and to the thousands of citizens who had put down signatures for their registration. This facilitated the comparatively strong and horizontal mobilization of street protests, which gradually intensified following the repressive measures against protesters and candidates: over 2000 people were detained during the early rallies, several criminal cases were pursued with high speed and in violation of procedural rules, while numerous candidates received high monetary fines and were put under arrest for calling for unauthorized rallies. The protests culminated in a demonstration on 10 August that drew over 50,000 participants and was supported by several young cultural figures who had not engaged in politics before.

It soon became evident, however, that the mobilization would not resolve the electoral blockade jointly erected by electoral commissions and courts (only Yabloko's Sergey Mitrokhin succeeded in appealing his non-registration and was reinstated). In August, therefore, Navalny pulled out "smart voting" and called for concentrating all oppositional votes on the strongest contenders among the non-United Russia candidates. In most cases these belonged to the Communist Party (KPRF), which traditionally performs best among the tolerated, semi-loyal opposition—but some also came from Yabloko and the social democratic Just Russia (JR).

So, although smart voting generally strengthened the so called "systemic" opposition, which has representation in the parliament and often sides with the Kremlin, it is quite possible that without the campaign of independent candidates, their non-registration and the subsequent protests, the strategy would have had a lower effect. Conversely, the regime's manipulations and open repression contributed to the outcome—at least in Moscow.

Nevertheless, opportunities like these must be created and seized when they open up. The relative victory for the opposition demonstrates that Navalny and his strategists are becoming better at targeting the built-in weaknesses of Russia's version of electoral authoritarianism. In general, this system relies on manipulations of formally democratic procedures. In Russia, these often follow top–down decisions but sometimes come about through intuitive, unplanned reactions of lower-tier state agents. In such cases especially, they can produce incoherence and tensions that can be exploited by a quickly and strategically acting opposition.

Who Is "We" and What Does "Winning" Mean?

The "we" in Navalny's victory message refers to a negative electoral coalition. The idea of such a coalition sparked considerable debate before the elections, especially in liberal circles, with many arguing that neither the KPRF nor JR (let alone the LDPR) could be trusted: once in office the new deputies would become fully loyal to UR. Moreover, liberals claimed that voting for some of the KPRF candidates was unethical. For instance, Mikhail Khodorkovsky declared that candidates should only receive a protest vote if they unequivocally condemned the repressions against protesters and were ready to take measures in their support. Others expressed discomfort about the idea that Navalny's strategists would determine the "most promising" candidates in hundreds of electoral districts, effectively channeling oppositional voters in their preferred direction. Navalny's answer was explicitly pragmatic: certainly, this strategy was not ideal, he argued in a blog post, but it was "the best of the realistic ones," making it possible to "hit the heads of the system's creators" with their own weapons. If defeating Putin and UR was the main goal, this was the way to go.

In fact, the coalition created through this strategy could hardly have been more negative: the leaders of the KPRF, JR and the LDPR, all of which increased their mandate shares across the country, distanced themselves from Navalny's support and denied the impact of "smart voting," pointing instead to their own campaigns. JR leader Sergey Mironov declared that "[Smart voting] was a PR move: seeing the strong candidates, those who had a very good chance at [receiving] the protest vote—these were taken and included in the list [of recommended candidates]."

On the one hand, in light of the situation in Moscow, this statement is rather comical: one of JR's three allegedly "strong" candidates who won their SMDs was Alexander Solovev, a 32-year-old engineer without any prior connections to politics. He had likely been registered only to split the vote for an oppositional contender with the same name. After the oppositional Solovev was eventually barred from the race,[1] Navalny called on protest voters to support JR's Solovev, simply to prevent the seat from going to UR. As a result, the completely unknown candidate won the race with 36.5% of the vote.

On the other hand, though, Mironov had a point. Except in absurd cases like the one described above, it is difficult to measure how much the candidate contributed to his or her victory or whether the success was due to Navalny's efforts. In a Facebook post cited by Navalny, political scientist and data analyst Boris Ovchinnikov attempted to solve this problem by estimating the strategy's *average* effect in Moscow, calculating the difference between the median share of each party's candidates who were supported by "smart voting" and the median share of those who were not. Averaging across the KPRF and JR, the net difference was 19 percentage points (see Table 1). However, even this aggregate measure cannot fully answer the question of attribution, because "smart voting" selected those candidates who were likely to receive higher vote shares in the first place. As Ovchinnikov remarked, in most districts none of the candidates was particularly promising, suggesting that "smart voting" in fact made the difference, but in principle the difficulty remains.

Overall, as Navalny posted on his blog, 145 of 776, or 18.6%, of the candidates endorsed by "smart voting" won their districts. But its effect clearly differed by region. Navalny's efforts likely had little impact in Khabarovsk despite a crushing defeat for UR. This region traditionally exhibits low support for UR and has been governed by the popular LDPR politician Sergey Furgal since 2018. In the election to the regional parliament, 19 of the 24 candidates endorsed by Navalny won their districts. 18 of these came from the LDPR. In all five SMDs where "smart voting" candidates ran *against* LDPR contenders, they lost. The only victorious non-LDPR candidate endorsed by Navalny competed

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1   In this case, registering the spoiler and excluding the real Alexander Solovev proved to be detrimental for the UR candidate. This is another example of poorly coordinated obstruction.

in an SMD without an LDPR contender. Therefore, rather than "smart voting," the decisive factor seems to have been the LDPR label and its tie to the incumbent governor.

In other cases, there were no similar single factors. In the city parliament of Yoshkar-Ola, for example, UR lost its absolute majority, with 12 out of 35 candidates supported by Navalny winning their SMDs. In contrast to Khabarovsk, these victors came from different parties (eight from the KPRF and two each from the LDPR and JR). However, isolating the aggregate effect of "smart voting" from the possibility that disaffected citizens might have voted strategically without consulting Navalny's recommendations would demand more complex analyses that take other factors into account—for instance regional differences in electoral fraud and in the pre-electoral agitation of Navalny's supporters and the opposition parties.

Conclusion

Like Navalny's previous campaigns, "smart voting" leverages digital technologies to circumvent coordination problems and to exploit the vulnerabilities of the hybrid political system. To the extent that it was successful, this was because it was well tailored to the current functioning principles of the regime—but this is also why it may soon be outdated. In the unlikely event of increasing competitiveness, the strategy will simply no longer be needed, and broad coalitions will increasingly be hampered by ideological differences. The more likely scenario is that the regime will enact measures to further decrease its vulnerability to such strategies.

Even assuming that multi-candidate elections will remain at the center of the political process (anything else would be devastating for a regime that to no small degree depends on real and fabricated popular consent), there are still several options available. For instance, the regime could further increase its attacks on Navalny's digital infrastructure to obstruct the smooth coordination of voters and activists. Also, candidates supported by "smart voting" or similar campaigns could simply be removed from the ballots shortly before the election. This time, the campaign published a list of supported candidates in Moscow only on 3rd September, when candidates could officially no longer withdraw.[2] But such rules could certainly be changed or undermined.

For now, the imminent reaction is an increase of repression against Navalny's regional network. In the days after the election, police and special forces across the country searched the homes of current and former activists (and even the residences of their relatives), froze bank accounts and confiscated technical equipment. Officially, these measures are linked to a criminal investigation targeting Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation on the grounds of allegedly laundered funds. The timing, however, suggests a link to the elections.

The direction, therefore, appears to be clear: The better Navalny and others target the system's weak spots, the more overtly authoritarian it will become. Over time, it might get more difficult for Putin's strategists to square increasing brutality with the need for high popularity. But as long as repression stays selective, this game of authoritarian and oppositional learning may well continue for a long time—albeit with rising stakes.

About the Author
Jan Matti Dollbaum is a PhD candidate at the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen, currently finalizing his thesis on trajectories of protest institutionalization in four Russian regions. This publication was produced as part of the research project "Comparing protest actions in Soviet and post-Soviet spaces," which was organized by the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen with financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation.

Further Reading:
- A blog post in which Navalny presents the strategy of "smart voting" in detail and argues against some points of criticism (in Russian): https://navalny.com/p/6194/
- A blog post by Navalny with some aggregate statistics on "smart voting" (in Russian): https://navalny.com/p/6231/
- A detailed analysis of the process of electoral manipulations in Moscow and St. Petersburg at the elections of September 8th (in Russian): https://www.proekt.media/narrative/vybory-mosgorduma-2019/
- On the strategy and the regional dimension of Navalny's presidential campaign of 2017/18: Dollbaum, Jan Matti, Andrey Semenov, and Elena Sirotkina (2018): A Top-down Movement with Grass-Roots Effects? Alexei Navalny's Electoral Campaign. In: Social Movement Studies 17(5), 618–25 https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2018.1483228.

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2   In the regions, no such lists were published at all; every voter (and researcher) had to type in their address in the provided online form to receive the name of the endorsed candidate.

Table 1:   **Candidates Supported and Not Supported By "Smart Voting" and Their Aggregate Results in Selected Regional and Municipal Parliamentary Elections of September 8th, 2019**

party		Moscow city parliament	Khabarovsk regional parliament	Yoshkar-Ola municipal parliament	Murmansk municipal parliament	Republic of Tatarstan regional parliament
CPRF*	total number of candidates	42	15	32	13	45
	number of endorsed candidates	33	3	16	6	32
	number of endorsed candidates that were elected	13	1	8	0	0
	median vote share of endorsed candidates	36.2	24.6	30.9	21.6	11.9
	median vote share of not endorsed candidates	17.3	16.3	25.7	19.7	14.3
Just Russia	total number of candidates	39	17	35	15	40
	number of endorsed candidates	8	3	14	13	11
	number of endorsed candidates that were elected	3	0	2	1	0
	median vote share of endorsed candidates	27.1	17.9	19.2	15.9	7.6
	median vote share of not endorsed candidates	7.9	6.8	15.0	17.8	7.6
LDPR**	total number of candidates	45	22	35	14	41
	number of endorsed candidates	0	18	9	9	5
	number of endorsed candidates that were elected	-	18	2	0	1
	median vote share of endorsed candidates	-	54.1	20.9	21.0	10.0
	median vote share of not endorsed candidates	8.9	42.5	19.2	16.5	5.0
Yabloko	total number of candidates	3	0	0	1	1
	number of endorsed candidates	3	-	-	0	1
	number of endorsed candidates that were elected	3	-	-	-	0
	median vote share of endorsed candidates	40.6	-	-	-	18.4
	median vote share of not endorsed candidates	-	-	-	16.3	-
other parties	total number of candidates	33	26	2	14	6
	number of endorsed candidates	0	0	0	0	0
	number of endorsed candidates that were elected	-	-	-	-	-
	median vote share of endorsed candidates	-	-	-	-	-
	median vote share of not endorsed candidates	6.5	4.8	6.0	8.9	9.7
self-nomi-nated	total number of candidates	58	6	5	49	56
	number of endorsed candidates	1	0	2	2	1
	number of endorsed candidates that were elected	1	-	0	0	0
	median vote share of endorsed candidates	***				
	median vote share of not endorsed candidates					
total	**total number of candidates**	**220**	**86**	**109**	**105**	**188**
	number of candidates endorsed	**45**	**24**	**41**	**30**	**50**
	number of endorsed candidates that were elected	**20**	**19**	**12**	**1**	**1**
	median vote share of endorsed candidates****	**35.8**	**52.1**	**25.0**	**18.3**	**11.1**
	median vote share of not endorsed candidates****	**7.7**	**8.6**	**19.0**	**12.1**	**6.6**

Communist Party of the Russian Federation

**Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia*

*** not calculated since it was unclear how many of the self-nominated candidates were in fact candidates of UR*
**** the total shares do not refer to self-nominated candidates.*

Sources: Regional electoral commissions; https://vote2019.appspot.com; *regional media*

Results of the Regional Elections

Figure 1:   Regions in Which Gubernatorial Elections Were Held on September 8th 2019

1: Altai Republic, 2: Bashkortostan Republic, 3: Kalmykia Republic, 4: Zabaykalskiy Krai, 5: Stavropol Krai, 6: Astrakhan Oblast, 7: Volgograd Oblast, 8: Vologda Oblast, 9: Kurgan Oblast, 10: Kursk Oblast, 11: Lipetsk Oblast, 12: Murmansk Oblast, 13: Orenburg Oblast, 14: Sakhalin Oblast, 15: Chelyabinsk Oblast, 16: Saint Petersburg Federal City

Map created by the Research Centre for East European Studies in QGIS; sources for geodata: https://nominatim.openstreetmap.org, https://www.diva-gis.org/gdata, http://www.marineregions. org/gazetteer.php?p=details&id=4282, and Flanders Marine Institute (2018), IHO Sea Areas, version 3. Available online at http://www.marineregions.org/ https://doi.org/10.14284/323

Legend: *Gubernatorial elections won by candidate affiliated with United Russia* / *Gubernatorial elections won by candidate not affiliated with United Russia*

Figure 2:   Regions in Which Legislative Elections Were Held on September 8th 2019

Legislative elections won by United Russia

Legislative elections won party other than United Russia

Table 1: **Winners of the Gubernatorial Elections of September 8th 2019**

No.	Region	Winner	Percentage of votes obtained	Electoral turnout	Previous office	Party affiliation
1	Altai Republic	Khokhordin, Oleg	58.82%	49.87%	Acting Governor of Altai	United Russia
2	Bashkortostan Republic	Khabirov, Radiy	82.02%	71.74%	Acting Governor of Bashkortostan	United Russia
3	Kalmykia Republic	Khasikov, Batu	82.54%	55.16%	Acting Governor of Kalmykia	United Russia
4	Zabaykalskiy Krai	Osipov, Alekandr	89.61%	35.03%	Acting Governor of Zabaykalskiy Krai	self-nominated
5	Stavropol Krai	Vladimirov, Vladimir	82.48%	77.97%	Governor of Stavropol Krai	United Russia
6	Astrakhan Oblast	Babushkin, Igor	75.63%	33.49%	Acting governor of Astrakhan Oblast	self-nominated
7	Volgograd Oblast	Bocharov, Andrei	76.80%	41.16%	Governor of Volgograd Oblast	United Russia
8	Vologda Oblast	Kuvshinnikov, Oleg	60.79%	40.50%	Governor of Vologda Oblast	United Russia
9	Kurgan Oblast	Shumkov, Vadim	80.86%	42.58%	Acting Governor of Kurgan Oblast	self-nominated
10	Kursk Oblast	Starovoit, Roman	81.70%	41.54%	Acting Governor of Kursk Oblast	United Russia
11	Lipetsk Oblast	Artamonov, Igor	67.28%	47.10%	Acting Governor of Lipetsk Oblast	United Russia
12	Murmansk Oblast	Chibis, Andrei	60.07%	35.79%	Acting Governor of Murmansk Oblast	United Russia
13	Orenburg Oblast	Pasler, Denis	65.94%	39.55%	Acting Governor of Orenburg Oblast	United Russia
14	Sakhalin Oblast	Limarenko, Valeriy	56.14%	37.32%	Acting Governor of Sakhalin Oblast	self-nominated
15	Chelyabinsk Oblast	Teksler, Aleksei	69.30%	45.12%	Acting Governor of Chelyabinsk Oblast	self-nominated
16	Saint Petersburg Federal City	Beglov, Aleksandr	64.43%	29.90%	Acting Governor of St. Petersburg	self-nominated

Sources: http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom, *September 2nd 2019;* https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2019/09/09/810737-vse-kandidati-ot-vlasti, *September 9th 2019*

Table 2: **Results of the Legislative Elections of September 8th 2019**

No.	Region	Electoral Turnout	Just Russia	United Russia	CPRF**	LDPR***
1	Altai Republic	49.86%	5.31%	34.18%	29.50%	12.03%
2	Kabardino-Balkaria Republic	67.14%	10.35%	65.85%	12.84%	5.10%
3	Karachai-Cherkessia Republic	69.07%	6.19%	65.04%	12.17%	5.04%
4	Crimea Republic*	33.19%	3.95%	54.70%	8.22%	16.84%
5	Mari El Republic	35.00%	7.78%	37.49%	26.92%	15.78%
6	Tatarstan Republic	70.00%	3.96%	72.43%	10.74%	3.79%
7	Tuva Republic	74.59%	4.56%	80.13%	3.63%	7.75%
8	Khabarovsk Krai	34.73%	3.53%	12.51%	17.24%	56.12%
9	Bryansk Oblast	58.36%	5.12%	63.71%	12.27%	12.89%
10	Volgograd Oblast	41.16%	8.44%	48.15%	19.50%	14.85%
11	Tula Oblast	31.79%	7.09%	50.27%	14.49%	10.39%
12	Moscow Federal City	21.77%	12.85%	32.35%	32.62%	9.02%
13	Sevastopol Federal City*	29.12%	8.78%	38.50%	18.70%	18.55%

* Ukrainian territory annexed by Russia, annexation not recognized by a majority of UN member countries
** Communist Party of the Russian Federation
*** Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia
Sources: http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom, *September 2nd 2019,* http://www.moscow_city.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/moscow_city?action=show&root_a=774116010&vrn=27720002327736&region=77&global=null&type=0&sub_region=77&prver=0&pronetvd=null, *September 25th 2019*

ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST

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