Eurasian Economic Union

- **ANALYSIS**
  Market Integration in the Eurasian Economic Union
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- **ANALYSIS**
  The Collateral Damage of Russia’s Counter-Sanctions for the EAEU
  Maria Shagina, Center for Eastern European Studies (CEES), University of Zurich

- **DATA**
  The Eurasian Economic Union in Figures
Market Integration in the Eurasian Economic Union

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Abstract:
The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) marked a significant step in the development of regionalism in the post-Soviet area. The body implemented an unprecedented number of agreements in contrast to previous organizations, which mostly remained ink on paper. The EAEU continues implementing the goals of further, deeper integration in strategically important markets in line with the EAEU Treaty, as well as removing trade barriers. However, the integration milestones set in the treaty are frequently achieved at the cost of diluting the content of the subsequent integration steps, with countries accepting smaller obligations than originally envisioned. The situation is unlikely to change in the future.

A Strong Beginning

The signing of the EAEU Treaty in 2014 was accompanied by an ambitious program of market integration that the member countries intended to implement. At that moment in time, the Customs Union—the predecessor organization to the EAEU—had already achieved substantial progress in terms of economic integration, managing to establish a common external tariff and to abolish internal tariff barriers. The goals of integration included, for example, the establishment of a common market for energy and a common financial regulatory authority by 2025. Now, five years later, how much success did the EAEU achieve in implementing the objectives of the Treaty? Is the deeper economic integration in the EAEU still a real goal its member countries pursue?

The bureaucratic activity of the EAEU associated with the implementation of the EAEU Treaty is evident. The Eurasian Economic Commission (EAEC) diligently prepares new regulations, and the member countries sign new agreements and treaties. Thus, the Eurasian countries implemented the first advanced common market envisioned by the Treaty—the common market for medical products—in 2016. This common market, however, was the first to demonstrate a real problem that EAEU integration faces. In order to (roughly) comply with the time schedule set in the Treaty, the EAEU countries occasionally agree to weaken the specific requirements of the new regulatory framework. Thus, while a common market was established (and some integration achieved) on time, the actual level of integration remains lower than originally envisioned. On top of that, some systematic problems in the market integration of the EAEU persist over time, and the member countries face substantial difficulties in solving them. In what follows, we briefly review some of these problems, as well as progress toward a number of integration goals established by the Treaty.

Non-tariff Barriers

Non-tariff barriers (NTB) remain one of the major obstacles for market integration in the EAEU. Since 2017, the EAEC has monitored the main trade barriers in Eurasia; the list includes 69 barriers and obstacles to trade, with the majority of them in Russia and Kazakhstan.1 The process of removing barriers in Eurasia has been a painful one,2 partly because of the slow decision-making in the national bureaucracies, but also because influential domestic interest groups support the persistence of NTBs and the various countries mistrust each other, fearing that regulatory competition will weaken their economic positions. For example, the most protectionist states fear that competitors with the weakest regulations and most “friendly” regulatory agencies will both attract domestic capital and redirect foreign companies to see them as the best entry points to the broader market. When countries remove some of their barriers, they frequently simultaneously create new ones; this process does not necessarily reflect conscious policy choices of the national leadership and often is an outcome of opaque decision-making by individual bureaucracies and their interaction with national lobbyists.3 On top of that, political conflicts are an issue causing new trade barriers to emerge, at least temporarily—and Russia is not the only country using economic pressure against its partners. In 2017, Kazakhstan effectively blocked Kyrgyzstani imports by intensifying controls at border checkpoints. NTBs are likely to remain an important issue.

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1 https://barriers.eaeunion.org/ru-ru/Pages/obstacles.aspx
2 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3955200
3 https://informburo.kz/stati/chetyre-svobody-eaes-uspehi-i-problemi-integracii-.html
in the future, constraining the functioning of the common market for goods in the EAEU.

Energy
Integration of the energy markets is among the most politically sensitive issues for the EAEU. The key obstacle here is the unequal distribution of energy resources, with some countries being rich in oil, gas or hydropower, while others depend on energy supply from abroad. Second, the extent of energy market liberalization among Eurasian countries differs considerably, making the development of a common regulatory framework a rather complicated task.

For example, Russian–Belarusian energy relations have been particularly difficult in recent decades. Russia heavily subsidizes the Belarusian economy by providing cheap oil to Belarusian refineries which export petroleum products to Europe at much higher prices. Because of its reliance on Russian oil, Belarus is vulnerable not only to the political manipulation of prices and supply, but also to Russia’s domestic politics. For example, since the mid-2010s Russia has been reforming the way that it taxes the oil industry: it reduced oil export duties, while simultaneously increasing the natural resource extraction tax. What sounds like a technical issue, will, however, lead to a major increase in the price of crude oil for Belarus resulting in less revenue for the Belarusian budget.4 As for gas prices, after fierce negotiations in 2015–2016, Russia and Belarus set prices for 2017–2019. Belarus, however, still expects the price for Russian gas to drop over time, approximating the much lower domestic gas price for the adjacent Smolensk Oblast. As of January 2020, Belarus and Russia prolonged the 2019 contract for two additional months (January and February).5 Belarus expects the common market to ensure favorable access to Russian oil and gas in the long term—a solution, which is not necessarily favored by the Russian government.

Currently, integration efforts focus on the common market for electricity (since gas and oil are considered politically sensitive). The original plan was to start the common power market by mid-2019. Indeed, in May 2019 the member countries signed a protocol amending the EAEU Treaty and launching the common electricity market. However, in this case, again, the formal process was achieved at the expense of informal conces-

sions and setbacks. The protocol is but the first document required for the establishment of the common market. After all of these documents are signed, the market will start functioning in the “imitation mode”, allowing the countries to test and to adjust the infrastructure and the regulatory mechanisms.6 Until the establishment of the common gas market, however, the set of companies from individual countries allowed to participate in the common electricity market will be restricted by the national regulators. This measure allows individual countries to reduce competition and to avoid the growing supply of cheap energy from abroad (with price differences being driven by different modes of regulation existing in different countries); Russia, for example, anticipates that the revenues of domestic power plants will go down by about 2 bln EUR per year, according to the assessments by the Ministry of Energy.7 On top of that, vertically integrated companies (those possessing energy generating capacities and transportation and redistribution networks) will be excluded from the common market. This is relevant for Belarus: while Russia and Kazakhstan have already reformed their markets to separate production from transportation of electricity, Belarusian Belenergo remains a monopoly in both power production and transportation.8

Thus, the main progress in the integration of electricity markets is conditional upon the integration of the gas markets and the reforms of national energy regulation. Both tasks are, as mentioned, non-trivial from the political point of view, not only because of the diverging interests of the political leadership of the Eurasian countries, but also because of powerful business actors (state-owned and private companies), which will protect their privileges at any costs. Still, in 2018, the EAEU countries agreed on the roadmap for creating a common gas market and a common oil market; the specific designs of these institutions (which are supposed to start functioning in 2025, in spite of the willingness of Belarus to accelerate this process)9 have yet to be determined through negotiations among the member states.

Finance
The integration of the financial markets is an equally difficult goal for the EAEU. Here, the progress so far has been limited, with the main steps to be undertaken in the years to come. In October 2019, the member

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4 https://news.tut.by/economics/619082.html
5 https://www.rbc.ru/economics/03/01/2020/5e0f473d9a794781e9a67e21
7 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3984211
8 https://www.belyrnok.by/2019/06/20/obshhij-elektroenergeticheskij-rynom-eaes-bez-gaza-ne-zarabotaet/
9 https://ria.ru/20181221/1548401635.html
countries adopted a development concept for the common financial market. The Concept envisions two elements of further market integration: standardization of licenses for banks, insurance companies and other financial entities and partial harmonization of regulation. Further harmonization of the regulation has to take place after 2025; furthermore, after 2025, the countries plan to establish a mechanism allowing financial entities to enter the markets of other Eurasian countries without establishing a separate subsidiary (and thus receiving a new license, even a standardized one). The Concept envisions the creation of a common regulatory agency, but clearly states that licensing, regulation and sanctioning of financial entities remains in the purview of national regulators. In his speech in Kazakhstan’s Senate on 20 December 2019, National Bank Chairman Eszhan Birtanov went even further, announcing that national banks and regulatory agencies will “fully” implement financial supervision. According to the concept, the functions of the common regulatory agency should be determined through further negotiations, but its creation should not lead to a reduction of the importance of the national regulators; in fact, the functions of the common regulatory agency seem to be limited to research and consultations. This again fits the already described profile: while the implementation of the EAEU Treaty continues, the actual steps undertaken by the member countries are much smaller than one could have expected in 2015.

Transportation

In the transportation sphere, the EAEU’s main focus is not on infrastructural investments but on creating common regulatory frameworks removing obstacles for the movement of goods, capital and labor. From this point of view, the main contribution of the organization to increasing transportation connectivity in Eurasia is different from, for example, the Belt and Road Initiative, which focuses on creating common transportation corridors and facilitates the implementation of large infrastructural projects supporting this endeavor. In 2016, the EAEU members agreed upon a concept for a coordinated transportation policy, which has to be implemented by 2025. As in the case of other policies, however, the implementation of common decisions is occasionally flawed because of the poor quality of the bureaucracy and de-facto persisting protectionist measures. Thus, although the EAEU abandoned internal customs barriers and checks, the delays at the internal borders are still substantial; resolving these “technical” problems takes a lot of time.

Conclusion

There are three main problems with deeper integration in the EAEU. The first is the issue of the willingness of the member states to cede control over additional policies to the EAEU bodies. Power asymmetry in Eurasia—with Russia having greater economic and political potential than all other members combined—makes post-Soviet states extremely cautious about delegating authority to international institutions, where Russia could become the dominant power. From the very beginning, Eurasian countries insisted that EAEU integration should proceed within safe boundaries not jeopardizing their sovereignty. Any forms of political integration (even symbolic ones) or the introduction of a common currency were clearly outside these boundaries. The process of Eurasian integration is thus to a certain extent that of trial and error, with individual countries “discovering” their boundaries and putting on the brakes if new measures go too far. In some policy areas (like the role of the Court), the EAEU Treaty was already a step back from the Customs Union Treaty; further adjustments continue as new integration measures are negotiated.

Another problem is that there are differences in the economic systems of the EAEU member countries. It is difficult to reconcile the centralized economy of Belarus, where about 70% of the GDP is produced by state-owned companies, with market-oriented Kazakhstan. NTBs existing between Eurasian countries, as well as differences in regulatory frameworks in the more sensitive sectors, serve as safeguards for the national economic models that their regimes are unwilling and unable to abandon. On top of that, these economic models are not static and sometimes evolve in different directions—Kazakhstan’s experiment with the Astana International Financial Center, created in 2018 and based on common law principles, is hardly compatible with Russia’s protectionist aspirations, which grew stronger over the last five years.

Finally, an important question is how much political interest member countries have in pushing the EAEU project forward. The economic stagnation Russia is currently experiencing and the continuing tensions in Russia’s relations with the EU and the US, including the continuing threat of new sanctions, reduce the interest Eurasian countries have in cooperating with Russia. But, at the same time, Russia, which in 2010–2015 saw Eurasian regionalism as a focal point of its great power ambitions, is now distracted by numerous other challenges and endeavors, where its elites attempt to prove themselves as global players (such as the Libyan and

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10 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/finpol/dosip/Pages/conception.aspx
Syrian civil wars and the conflict around Ukraine). As a result, politicians are less included to pressure national bureaucracies to implement further integration measures. The EAEU bureaucracy by itself does not appear strong enough to push integration forward. As a result, bureaucracies, while generally complying with the schedule of the Treaty, have stronger incentives to reduce their effort and to pass more ambiguous regulations.

At the same time, it is important to avoid overly pessimistic conclusions. The goals set by the EAEU are, in the international comparison, highly ambitious—there are few regional integration blocs that put common energy or finance markets on their agenda. Even diluted and weakened regulations still allow for greater interconnections among countries. It would therefore be incorrect to treat the lack of deeper market integration in the EAEU as a failure; rather, one should carefully manage expectations and accept the limitations in the integration process, which are inevitable given the complexity of the topics at hand.

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Bibliography
The Collateral Damage of Russia’s Counter-Sanctions for the EAEU

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Abstract:
The crisis in Ukraine stunted the institutional development of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Having lost Ukraine as a potential member, the EAEU got caught in the tensions between Russia and the West. Moscow’s retaliatory measures against Western sanctions have backfired against the Union and have undermined its fundamental objective—the creation of free trade. Russia’s uncoordinated sanctions caused collateral damage and unleashed unintended consequences on its fellow members. Going beyond the economic realm, the unilateral measures have hampered the Union’s further integration. Given the current stalemate on a common sanctions policy, stricter customs control remains the only viable option in the long-term.

Russia’s Unilateral Measures and Growing Illicit Trade

In response to Western sanctions over Ukraine, Russia imposed an agricultural embargo, prohibiting the import of goods from the countries that initiated sanctions. Additionally, Russia enacted retaliatory sanctions against Kyiv, responding to Ukrainian special economic measures. It banned goods which originated or were supplied from Ukraine or have been in transit through Ukrainian territory. All counter-measures were implemented with little or no prior consultation with the Union’s founding members—Belarus and Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, Moscow truly hoped for political support from its fellow states, yet none of them sided with Russia’s unilateral measures. Having joined on the premise of economic integration—not a political union, Belarus and Kazakhstan strongly opposed Moscow’s politically driven measures. Russia’s efforts to punish its erstwhile Western partners were viewed as detrimental to the countries’ national interests and to their cordial relations with the West and Ukraine. Wary of Moscow’s retaliation, member states distanced themselves from the West—Russia tensions and focused on economic issues. However, Russia’s unilateral measures seriously undermined the EAEU’s economic objective—the creation of a common trade policy and the abolition of customs controls.

As both Belarus and Kazakhstan did not join Russia’s counter-sanctions, they gained remarkable economic profits from the illegal re-export of sanctioned products. With the absence of customs controls, Minsk and Nur-Sultan (former Astana) became the main gateways for channeling embargoed food products from the West into Russia. Using a system of double certificates, Belarus effectively became a re-export and transportation hub between Russia and the West. To conceal the products’ origin, fake certificates flourished, leading to anecdotal examples of seafood exports from land-locked Belarus or a sudden surge of peaches and cherries from Latin American and African countries to Belarus. In 2016, Belarusian exports of agricultural products to Russia almost tripled, channeling embargoed fruit, dairy and fish from Poland, the Baltic states and Norway. In 2014–2016, the total cost of Belarus’ re-export was an estimated $2.7 billion. Similarly, taking advantage of Russia’s embargoes on Moldova and Ukraine, Belarus profited from the re-export of Moldovan fruit and vegetables, and Ukrainian diary and coal from the Donbas to Russia. In return, Belarus supplied fuel and dual-use goods to Ukraine—items sanctioned under Russian legislation. Armenia was suspected of benefiting from channeling embargoed food products from Turkey. In 2016, Russia saw a 70% spike in the exports of tomatoes from its South Caucasian neighbor. The large scale of such illicit trade was possible due to the lack of comprehensive data exchange measuring mutual trade flows. Under the pretense of bilateral trade, states profited from the undocumented re-export of products, which were ‘lost’ in transit through Russia.

Mutual Retaliation and Stricter Border Control

The flourishing counterfeit trade undermined the effectiveness of the Russian measures and, more importantly, damaged Moscow’s public image. As it grew increasingly dissatisfied with sanctions evasion, the government decided to fix the problem and to stop its allies from benefiting. Moscow repeatedly accused Minsk of re-export-
ing banned goods to the Russian market. In a classic move, Rosselkhoznadzor, Russia’s food safety watchdog, barred the Belarusian products on the basis of unsatisfactory veterinary and phytosanitary standards—a measure that has repeatedly been used by Moscow to exert pressure on its neighbors. In a tit-for-tat action, Belarus announced the launch of criminal proceedings against Sergey Dankvert, the head of Rosselkhoznadzor. To de-escalate the tension, an interim solution was found: the EAEU members were welcome to replace the imports of agricultural products banned from the West, but were not allowed to profit from the re-exports. All countries acquiesced to this decision, preferring it to the establishment of a coordinated sanctions mechanism. Yet, with the lack of monitoring, the states were unable to stop fully the practices of sanctions circumvention through their territories.

After Belarus and Kazakhstan reportedly blocked Russia’s proposal on closer border cooperation, the Russian authorities reinstated customs controls and introduced limits on the transit of goods across their territory, including those destined to Union members. To curb the flow of sanctioned products, over 40 mobile groups were dispatched to the Russian–Belarusian and the Russian–Kazakh borders. The border-patrolling, however, proved to be largely ineffective—less than 1% of the actual volume of the re-export was detected. 3

Since 2018, Russia has altered its approach to the problem. On the one hand, it strongly advocated joint customs control. The idea of joint checkpoints was prompted after the Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan row over Bishkek’s alleged smuggling of Chinese and Turkish goods. During the negotiations, Nur-Sultan and Bishkek agreed to install joint customs control in order to compensate for Kyrgyzstan’s poor cross-border checks. This initiative was supported by Russian President Vladimir Putin and he encouraged the creation of joint customs control across the entire Union. The idea was met with reservations from member states, as they feared Russia’s interference into their internal affairs. On the other hand, a new digitalized control system was introduced. By tracking the transit traffic, the system envisaged that each cargo must be electronically sealed for the entire journey. To trace the transit goods from their entry point to their exit, it was equipped with an electronic identificication system based on the global navigation satellite technology GLONASS. After a successful test on the Kazakh border, the digital system proved its effectiveness in curbing illicit re-exports. This measure allowed Russia to abolish the ban on the transit of EU and Ukrainian sanctioned goods through the Russian territory. Last year, it was agreed to launch the system across the whole Union.

**Collateral Damage**

While the illicit re-export harmed Moscow’s cause, Western sanctions and Russia’s counter-sanctions inflicted substantial collateral damage on the EAEU members. The declining trade and foreign direct investments, exchange rate volatility, decimated labor migration and dwindling remittances were the main forms of this collateral damage. Western sanctions aggravated Russia’s economic slowdown which quickly spread across the post-Soviet space. The economic fallout negatively affected intra-union trade, curtailing flows by about $15 billion in 2015 from the previous year. The sharp devaluation of the Russian currency dampened local currencies and made exports from other post-Soviet states more expensive. Altogether, it wrecked Russia’s image as an ‘economic engine,’ making Eurasian integration less attractive. 4

Belarus and Kyrgyzstan endured the most economic costs, since they are the Eurasian states most reliant on the Russian market. For Belarus, whose total trade is approximately 50% linked to Russia, the economic recession translated to a decrease in revenues from exports. Roughly 30% of Belarus’ total exports come from the re-export of Russian oil and the drop in oil prices only exacerbated the situation. For Kyrgyzstan, the economic recession meant less Russian appetite for investments. Bishkek experienced the starkest capital outflow in the region. Prior to joining the EAEU, Kyrgyzstan was promised $1.2 billion in direct grants and contributions to a Kyrgyz–Russian Development Fund to cushion the adjustment costs resulting from EAEU membership as well as lavish investments in a Kyrgyz hydropower project. In 2016, due to the unfavorable economic situation, Russia withdrew its participation from the electricity plant, exposing Kyrgyzstan’s energy vulnerability. The sharp drop in personal remittances from Russia only added to Bishkek’s precarious situation.

The introduction of US secondary sanctions against Russia triggered unintended consequences across the EAEU. Due to technology-related restrictions, cooperation among Russia’s LUKOIL, Gazprom and Kazakhstan’s KazMunayGaz was halted. The development of an offshore oilfield in the Caspian Sea was impeded by a ban blocking the technology transfer of the required drilling equipment to Russian companies. Recently, the Kazakh subsidiary of ArcelorMittal terminated contracts with GazpromNeft, fearing reputational risks due to Western sanctions. Threatened by the US’s Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Armenia’s purchases of Russian military weapons were at risk. As Moscow remains Armenia’s largest supplier of military equipment,

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Yerevan was notified that it could be at sanctions risk if it continues to acquire military equipment from Russia.

In addition to Western sanctions, the crossfire of Russian–Ukrainian sanctions exacerbated the collateral damage. Thanks to the Russia–Ukraine mutual trade restrictions, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were negatively impacted by Russia’s transit bans on Ukrainian products. As 70% of Kazakh and Kyrgyz imports from Ukraine transit Russian territory, the restrictive measures increased costs for the Central Asian economies. In a similar vein, the Russian–Ukrainian spat spread to Moldova. The Russian transit ban against Ukraine hindered Moldovan exports destined to Russia, as Ukraine remains the major route for Moldovan products. After Ukraine imposed a travel ban on Russian Aeroflot and S7 Airlines, firms which had previously dominated Moldova’s aviation market, they were forced to reduce the number of flights to Chisinau.

**Prospects for a Common Sanctions Policy**

Despite the members’ resistance, Russia continues seeking support for its coordinated measures through the EAEU Intergovernmental Council. In June 2019, Veronika Nikishina, Minister of Trade of the Eurasian Economic Commission, discussed the possibility of introducing collective sanctions vis-à-vis third parties. The mechanism on collective sanctions envisioned that each member state is obliged to join the punitive measures if one of the members is targeted. Such unequivocal consensus within the EAEU will be hard to reach. The obstacles lay in the sheer nature of the EAEU as an autocratic institution and its members’ mixed track-record in their commitments to multilateral organizations.

The institutional logic of the EAEU stems from its members’ domestic systems, where personalized governing and centralized decision-making have been the key modus operandi. While there has been certain progress on the harmonization of trade policies, labor mobility and technical regulations, a common sanctions policy would be a step too far. It would require the development of the supranational level which, in turn, would necessitate the relinquishing of powers that are quintessential for domestic rule. With Russia at the forefront, the EAEU members have been reluctant to give up their political sovereignty and transfer certain competences to the supranational level. Until now, intergovernmental negotiations have been the core mode of decision-making.

This outcome is unsurprising given Russia’s main objective behind the EAEU’s launch. Beyond economic integration, Moscow sought to project its political power on the Eurasian continent and to constrain the influence of the West and to some extent China in the post-Soviet space. This reasoning is consistent with Moscow’s relationships with other multilateral organizations. Russia’s participation in multilateral initiatives—and the EAEU is no exception—is driven by the desire to advance its national interests rather than to genuinely abide by consensus-based rules and norms. By spearheading Eurasian integration, Moscow could punch above its weight and present itself as a great power. Such prestigious status gives Moscow much sought-after legitimacy and bolsters its claims for ‘privileged interests’ in Eurasia.

The Ukraine crisis became a litmus test for Russia’s compliance with the rules of its own organization. The off-and-on threats against the Union’s allies revived old concerns over Moscow’s hegemonic inclinations and revealed its selective compliance with rules-based decision-making. Acknowledging the unintended consequences of its unilateral actions, Russia refrained from imposing new retaliatory measures. Instead, it tried to assuage other members’ concerns and accommodate their desires. The limitations of coercion for further integration became fully evident. Russia showed readiness to concede on minor issues, such as allowing the transit of Ukrainian goods through Russian territory to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It helped to keep up the appearances of the Union as an attractive organization and to diminish the EAEU’s bad optics for being perceived a heavily Russia-dominated integration project.

However, for the EAEU to thrive, the strengthening of its institutional development is necessary. Given the grim prospects for enhancing the supranational level, intergovernmental coordination is a promising area. But the coordination of members’ sanctions policies will stand in the way and will be one of the thorniest issues to tackle. On the one hand, Russia will not lift its counter-measures against the West as it would contradict its own rhetoric; on the other hand, other EAEU members will not join the counter-sanctions as it would jeopardize their relations with the West and narrow their room for maneuver. The only feasible option that currently remains is to maintain a two-tier customs union, which would install more controls and monitors for the sanctioned goods. Although the stalemate over a coordinated sanctions policy damages the prospects for further integration, the solution to this problem will not be easy to find in the future.

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Dr. Maria Shagina is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Eastern European Studies (CEES) at the University of Zurich. She specializes in international sanctions and post-Soviet studies. She is affiliated with the Geneva International Sanctions Network at the Graduate Institute. Her publications have appeared in the *European Council on Foreign Relations*, *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, *Atlantic Council*, *New Eastern Europe*, and *Global Risk Insights*.

Bibliography

The Eurasian Economic Union in Figures

Figure 1: Economic Ties Between EAEU Members in 2017

**Figure 2: External and Internal Trade: The EU and the EAEU Compared (2017)**

- **EAEU**: 14.61% Internal Trade, 85.39% External Trade
- **EU-28**: 36.01% Internal Trade, 63.99% External Trade


**Figure 3: Public Attitude Towards the EAEU: What is your attitude towards the decision to create the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)?**

- Armenia*
- Belarus*
- Kazakhstan*
- Kyrgyzstan*
- Russia*
- Moldova
- Tajikistan


**Figure 4: Regional Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space (as of December 2018)**

- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
- Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
- Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
- Union State
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

* status disputed
** associated member

Sources: CSTO; CIS; Eurasian Economic Commission; SCO; Union State; chart first published in: Perović, Jeronim (2019). Russia’s Eurasian Strategy; Thompson, Jack, Thrainert, Oliver. Strategic Trends 2019. Key Developments in Global Affairs, Zürich, 45–63, here: 48; slightly adapted by the Russian Analytical Digest.
Figure 5: External Relations of the EAEU (as of 2018)

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