# CRN-Workshop Report

# Oslo, Norway, 2003

# Risk and Crisis Communication

## Creating a Research Agenda from a Security-Policy Perspective


**Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, Norway (DSB)**

**in cooperation with the Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN)**


dsb
Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap

CRN

ETH
Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich

This report is also available on the Internet: www.isn.ethz.ch/crn or www.dsb.no



Authors: Steen, Roger; Sørli, Kjetil; Sandve, Arve; Wale, Erik; Christoffersen, Carl-Erik

Postal address:
Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB)
P.O. Box 2014
3103 TØNSBERG
NORWAY
Tel. +47 3341 2500
Fax +47 3331 0660
www.dsb.no
postmottak@dsb.no

Center for Security Studies of the ETH Zurich
ETH Zentrum SEI,
CH-8092 Zuerich
SWITZERLAND
Tel. +41 1 632 40 25
Fax +41 1 632 19 41
www.isn.ethz.ch/crn
crn@sipo.gess.ethz.ch

# Preface

Communication about risk and communication during a crisis is a highly demanding process. The challenge inherent in communication itself becomes particularly clear when communication concerns issues where the aspect of risk is very complex, or when the crisis is severe.

One of the main intentions in holding this expert workshop was to focus on the many challenges when it comes to active use of risk communication and crisis communication. Good and well-developed communication skills are necessary to deliver a message that will be noticed and understood.

For the sender of information about a risk or a crisis situation, the challenge lies in communicating an image, which hopefully the recipient of the information will also "see" and perceive in the same way as the sender.

A major problem in risk communication and crisis communication is that individuals may perceive the same risk / crisis image completely differently. This is something risk experts, researchers, decision makers and communicators should be aware of before trying to communicate risk or during a crisis situation.

This report is an abstract of the conclusions of a workshop held in Oslo in 2003. The workshop was arranged by the Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning (DCDEP), which from 1 September 2003 was reorganized and given the name the *Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning* (DSB).

The workshop ended up with several suggestions for future research is presented here in this report. And hopefully some of the approximately 50 participants, or some of the readers of this report, will feel called upon to do some work in this field.

CRN-workshop steering group: (from left: Mr. R. Steen (Norway), Mr. J. Lundberg (Sweden), Dr. J. Metzger (Switzerland) and Capt.Mag E. Felberbauer (Austria)

**Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning – Norway (DSB)**
2003

# Table of contents

# 1 Summary

The workshop introduced a clear distinction between risk communication and crisis communication. While risk communication deals with long-term, strategic messages, crisis communication deals with the short term, becoming relevant only in the event of a hazard.

Risk communicators face several issues: Should governmental institutions inform the public about present or future risks, and if so, when and how should they do this? In addition, Risks communicators are confronted with the fact that the public rarely perceives risks in terms of the danger they present. Also, various socio-economic groups and cultures require distinct forms of risk communication.

Once a risk becomes a crisis, crisis communication becomes essential. Professional crisis communicators should ideally be prepared to interact with the public before a crisis occurs. When the crisis materializes, expert handling of communication with the media is imperative. Guidelines on who is authorized to communicate with the media and other stakeholders have to be observed.

Systematic risk communication and crisis communication help increase the level of safety and security in society. To improve risk communication and crisis communication, an awareness of current theories and future research topics is necessary.

Please see chapter 5 and 6 for an extended summary of the workshop findings.

Lectures given during session 1 about Risk Communication (Strategic Planning Perspective)

# 2 Background for the workshop

## 2.1 Determining workshop topics and goals

In an increasingly sectorised society, where there are differences between the public understanding of the topic and its definition under the terminology of the discipline, it is important to know how to communicate. Without proper communication, the result is often lack of proper action and proper follow-up. The purpose of this workshop was to gather researchers, analysts and others working with information to discuss the process of communication, and how to handle and communicate information about risks

The detailed workshop questions and the corresponding answers are listed in chapters 5 and 6.

## 2.2 About Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN)

The «Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network» (CRN) is a future-oriented initiative originally launched by Switzerland (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich) and Sweden (SEMA, The Swedish Emergency Management Agency) to cope with the complexity and multidimensionality of the threats we are facing in this age of uncertainty. As a sub-network of the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), the CRN works on methodologies, procedures, tools and case studies for the risk profiling process at the national, sub-national (cantonal) and local levels. It provides open and free-of-charge access to information covering the full range of existential risks for modern societies. The project is supported by the Swiss government as an official part of Switzerland's participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP).

The CRN deals more with prevention and preparedness than with crisis response, relief and recovery. How can we deal with the challenges we are facing?

- Knowledge is becoming a basic commodity in modern society – shift from «owning» to «knowing»
- New or newly recognized vulnerabilities
- Growing relevance of transnational and non-military threats
- Small-scale violence is on the rise, major war is on the decline
- Death of distance and time
- Decline of hierarchical authorities – civilian and non-governmental actors are becoming more relevant
- Rising complexity of causal circles involving various kinds of risks – interdependence within and between critical infrastructures
- Lack of data and the problem of dynamic change

*The current project partners of CRN are listed down below*

- Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland (has the leadership of the network operates the secretariat)
- Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), Sweden
- Swiss Federal Department of Defence , Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS), Switzerland
- Directorate General for Security Policy at the Federal Ministry of Defence, Austria
- Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning – Norway (DSB)
- Federal Office for National Economic Supply (NES), Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Switzerland

The CRN website can be found at: www.isn.ethz.ch/crn/

## 2.3 About The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning – Norway (DSB)

*The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB) was established on 1 September 2003, thus incorporating the functions of the former Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning (DCDEP) and the Directorate for Fire and Electrical Safety into a single new entity, DSB.*

DSB shall work to prevent loss of life and to protect health, the environment and essential public functions and material assets in connection with accidents, disasters and other undesired occurrences in times of peace, crisis and war. The Directorate shall have a full overview over developing vulnerable situations and looming perils which threaten society, regardless of whether they are related to accidents, disasters or other undesired occurrences. DSB shall take initiatives to prevent such incidents from occurring, ensure that the necessary preventive measures have been taken, as well as that adequate preparedness is established so as to minimize the consequences of any undesired situations that may arise. In the event of inadequate safety and preparedness measures, DSB shall take the initiative to follow up with the responsible authorities.

DSB is the national public authority for municipal and inter-municipal fire services, the local electrical safety inspection authorities and the county governors' emergency preparedness and response work. DSB is also responsible for professional and administrative follow-up of the Norwegian Civil Defence, the Emergency Planning College, the Norwegian Fire Academy and the Civil Defence 's three regional schools.

**DSB is responsible for matters which are covered by the following legislation:**
The Act relating to Prevention of Fire, Explosion and Accidents involving Hazardous Substances and the Fire Services' Duties connected with Rescue Operations
The Act relating to Inspection and Control of Electrical Plants and Equipment
The Act on the Control of Products and Consumer Services
The Act on Civil Defence

DSB reports to the Ministry of Justice and the Police. Its activities are organized around head offices in Tønsberg and Oslo, 20 civil Defence districts, five civil De-

fence camps, five schools and five regional inspectorates for inspection and control of electrical safety. The Directorate will comprise approximately 700 employees, 240 of which are stationed at the head offices. DSB will be permanently co-located in Tønsberg from 2005.

**Operational Concept**
The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning shall:
Have full overview over developing vulnerable situations and looming perils which threaten society – in peacetime and war
Take initiatives to prevent accidents, disasters and other undesired occurrences
Ensure that preparedness measures are adequate
In the event of inadequate safety and preparedness measures, take the initiative to follow-up with the responsible authorities

**Vision**
*A safe and robust society – where everyone shares the responsibility to safeguard life, health, the environment, vital public functions and material assets*

**Renew, reinforce and unite**
DSB shall renew, reinforce and unite the safety and emergency preparedness and response work. DSB shall also contribute to ensuring that the risk associated with private and public activities is continuously reduced through good health, environment and safety work. The objective is to reduce the vulnerability of the Norwegian society.

**Benefits gained from the establishment of DSB:**
- One joint line of authority from central to local level within the areas of fire, rescue and general preparedness.
- A common professional sphere covering prevention and preparedness for incidents at central, regional and local levels.

DSB's focus is on major accidents and other extraordinary situations, both accidental and deliberate. Examples of such situations are incidents where there is the potential of many lives being lost, natural disasters, major industrial accidents, loss of irreplaceable national cultural heritage properties, technical collapse of critical infrastructure, sabotage, terrorism and acts of war. A modern and functional set of statutes and regulations shall provide the foundation for positive damage control.

**DSB shall:**
Facilitate effective municipal and inter-municipal fire services, lead and develop the Norwegian Civil Defence as a national reinforcement resource, and take the initiative to pursue coordinated action and training as regards rescue resources
Work to ensure that the risk associated with equipment and activities covered under the fire and explosion legislation, for electrical facilities and equipment, and for products and consumer services, is reduced to the lowest possible level.

**Wide scope**

DSB's work tasks encompass a wide scope of activities – from national preparedness to fire protection, electrical safety and individual product safety. In the area of national preparedness, the Directorate is to support the Ministry of Justice and the Police in its coordinating role, develop and maintain national emergency preparedness and response plans, as well as provide advice and report to the Ministry and the Government in connection with national crisis management.

DSB provides information and advice, and carries out supervision of ministries, county governors and municipalities. Research, studies and documentation related to development of national vulnerability and the changing threat scenario make up an important part of the Directorate's work, as a basis for planning emergency preparedness, response and priorities. The Directorate plans and conducts exercises in crisis management and crisis communication for strategic management on the national, regional and local levels.

DSB is responsible in connection with emergency preparedness arrangements in the fields of rationing, buildings and construction, chemical protection, forest fires, rescue efforts at sea, and for coordinating and following up the Regulations relating to Major Accidents (the Norwegian version of the EU's Seveso II Directive).

DSB studies and follows up requirements for fire prevention measures, and has a wide array of efforts aimed at fire protection, electrical safety, product safety and use of gas. This work also includes mapping and implementing safety measures aimed at irreplaceable national cultural heritage properties. The Directorate works to simplify and streamline regulations and administration in connection with the transport and handling of hazardous goods.

DSB exerts its influence on manufacturers and suppliers to emphasize consumer safety in the development of goods and services. The Directorate carries out market inspections and supervision of manufacturers, importers and other enterprises which deal with or offer products or consumer services.

DSB carries out extensive information activities and conducts campaigns aimed at the public with the objective of ensuring that individuals are better equipped to look after their own safety.
DSB is an active participant in the international work on regulatory development and civil crisis management, mainly through the UN, NATO, EU and in a Scandinavian context. The Directorate works to further develop the competence of the Norwegian Civil Defence to carry out operational humanitarian efforts abroad, and cooperates with various UN bodies in the areas of crisis management and emergency aid.

DSB Internet web page: www.dsb.no

# 3 Workshop programme

***Friday, 23 May 2003***

**08:30–08:40 Opening of the Workshop**
Official opening of the workshop by **Mr. Arthur Gjengstø**, Director, Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning – Norway (DCDEP).

**08:40–08:50 Administrative Information**
Workshop chairman, **Mr. Roger Steen**, Senior Adviser, Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning – Norway (DCDEP)

**08:50–09:00 CRN Introduction**
**Dr. Jan Metzger**, Switzerland

**09:00–09:45 Keynote Speech**
*"Re-arranging the Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Use and Abuse of Crisis Simulations."*
**Dr. Edward P. Borodzicz**, University of Southampton, UK

***09:45–10:15 Coffee Break***

**10:15–10:45 Introduction to Risk Communication**
*"Current trends in risk communication: theory and practice"*
**Professor Dr. Britt-Marie Drottz Sjöberg**, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

**10:45–12:00 Session 1: Risk Communication (Strategic Planning Perspective)**
Moderator: **Capt Ernst Felberbauer**, Austria
Presentations (15 min presentations)

- Austria: "*From Security and Defence Doctrine to a Strategy of Institutional Link in Risk Communication*" **Dr. Thomas Pankratz**, Austrian Civil Protection Organization/Bureau for Security Policy, Austria
- Switzerland: "*Risk Perception, Trust and Confidence"* **Professor Dr. Michael Siegrist,** Institute for Social Psychology, University of Zurich, Switzerland.
- Sweden: "*TBD*" **Dr. Ann Enander**, National Defence College, Stockholm
- Norway: "R*isk perception, expert knowledge and the public*" **Dr. Marit Boyesen**, Stavanger University College, Norway

**12:00–13:00 Lunch**

**13:00–13:45 Discussion on Risk Communication**
Moderator: **Capt Ernst Felberbauer**, Austria

**13:45–15:00 Working Groups**
**4 groups**
Moderator: **Capt Ernst Felberbauer**, Austria

**15:00–15:30** ***Coffee Break***

**15:30–16:15 Working Groups (presentation 10 min from each group)**
by rapporteurs

**16:15–16:45 Introduction to Crisis Communication**
**- The Canadian Approach**
**Ms. Jo-Ann Schwartz, Director of Communications, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Canada**

**16:45–17:15 Round-up session**
Workshop chairman, **Mr. Roger Steen**, Norway

**18:00–18:15 Bus from the Hotel to the Harbour**

**18:15–23:00 Dinner hosted by DCDEP, Ms. Helen Bøsterud Director General**
Dinner and Fjord Cruise

***Saturday, 24 May 2003***

**07:00–0845 Breakfast**

**09:00–10:15 Session 2: Crisis Communication**
Moderator: **Mr. Jan Lundberg**, Sweden
Presentations (15 min presentations)

- Austria: "Armed Forces and Crisis Communication – from the Austrian National Crisis Management System to the National Security Council**" Capt Hermann Lampalzer**, Bureau for Security Policy, Austria
- Switzerland: "Experiences in Crisis Communication with a Focus on Nuclear Power Plants**" Dr. Felix Blumer**, National Emergency Operations Center, Switzerland
- Sweden: "*Crisis Communication Handbook"* **Ms. Birgitta Darrell**, SEMA, Sweden
- Norway: "*Exercise model based on Crisis Communication, an example*" **Ms. Anette Unneberg** and **Ms. Helen Christensen** DCDEP, Norway

**10:15–11:00 Discussion on Crisis Communication**
Moderator: **Mr. Jan Lundberg**, Sweden

***11:00–11:30 Coffee Break***

**11:30–12:45 Working Groups (presentation 10 min from each group)**
**4 groups**
Moderator: **Mr. Jan Lundberg**, Sweden

**12:45–13:45 Lunch**

**13:45–14:15 Working Groups Presentations**
by rapporteurs

**14:00–14:15 Final Remarks**
**Dr. Peter Stern Sweden and Dr. Jan Metzger Switzerland**

**14:15–14:30 Round-up session – what next? End of workshop**
Workshop chairman, **Mr. Roger Steen**

# 4 Abstracts

## 4.1 Re-arranging the Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Use and Abuse of Crisis Simulations.

*By Dr Edward P. Borodzicz*
*School of Management*
*University of Southampton*
*epb@socsci.soton.ac.uk*

One key argument to develop from this presentation is to question the assumption that risk, safety and security can ever be managed effectively. A number of the works cited will suggest that risk failure is an inherent property resulting from the operation of any social system over time. Many recent approaches to risk have been particularly important in deepening our understanding of the social and cultural complexity of risk in areas such as; communication, perception, systemic analysis, decision making and regulation. In terms of managing and responding to these concerns, social and cultural perspectives have been less effective. Risk identification is now a key issue of concern for virtually every organisation and government, dealing with the effects of risk remains analogous to a black box waiting to be opened.

A secondary theme to the presentation is to consider the how the effects of risk and security failures, in particular crisis events, can be responded to more effectively. The presentation will hence review approaches to crisis response through simulation training. It will be argued in the work that many organisations, largely as a response to regulatory pressure, apportion too much emphasis on risk identification and avoidance and too little on response. It is argued that there is considerable scope for knowledge transference from the areas of simulation and gaming to crisis management. The work will review contemporary developments in the area of simulation design, evaluation and scenario planning with potential utility for improving generic crisis management capability.

*Dr Edward P. Borodzicz*, University of Southampton

## 4.2 Current Trends in Risk Communication: Theory and Practice

*By Professor Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjöberg*
*Department of Psychology,*
*Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU,*
*7491 Trondheim, Norway*
*brittds@svt.ntnu.no*

The large and growing area of risk communication research has sprung from the need to better understand what information people actually require and want in circumstances of danger, crisis or catastrophe. The studies also often deal with the prevention and the aftermath of such events. Risk communication is linked to risk perception research in that it is necessary to know how, when and why people perceive risk, and to the area of crisis communication, which deals with ongoing crises as well as follow-up evaluations. In addition, the field of risk communication has important connections to media studies and of organisational information processing. These links have practical as well as theoretical relevance to risk communication studies since the availability of various information strategies provide a basis for subsequent events, and media contents are spread quickly and widely. The recent availability of new technology for private use, e.g. cellular phones and the interchange of information through the Internet and by other communication devices, should also be included in considerations of the state-of-the-art of the risk communication field.

The presentation will highlight perspectives and implications of risk communication studies of the various fields and relate the findings to different levels of action or influence, e.g. local, national and global. It will distinguish between a) harmful events and accidents that belong to the area of "normal accidents", b) manifest accidents and catastrophes, c) events with potentially harmful or catastrophic effects. Furthermore, d) harmful and catastrophic events due to intended harm, and e) developments undermining or erasing the positive valuation of safety and safety standards. The difference between risk information and risk communication will be noted. It will be suggested that (international) society is moving away from the position of a "risk society" and towards a society of uncertainty. The current practice of bringing a broad range of representatives and interested parties into a preparatory phase of a decision making process, e.g. the "stakeholder" or public participation processes, will be discussed. Such processes are seen as means to highlight and discuss hazards and risks in a framework that strives for control of such events, and which in them-selves might contribute to the robustness of the democratic society.

Risk communication studies with relevance to local infrastructure or environmental conditions, i.e. at the municipality level, often focus on specific preventive action or evaluation of risk management activities. The most obvious uses of risk communication studies lie in this area. Such work usually deals with e.g. detailed investigations of previous accidents, preparations for organisational change, and reactions from victims or the general public. The studies usually include analyses of the content and the timing of various events and pieces of information, the expected or observed decision making strategies, and the direct or indirect social effects of the event or the information on the people or the environment at risk. They may point out necessary strategic or practical arrangements for preventing, or managing, hazards and catastrophes. Such events include e.g. fires, transport accidents, landslides, flooding, severe storms, industrial accidents, etc.

Some of the mentioned events may include hazards of a less perceptible character, such as releases of hazardous chemicals or radiation. Usually these events underline the importance of a swift and correct communication of risk to the local inhabitants or community to prepare for action, increase safety, or to manage a situation. Previous chemical accidents since the Seveso accident in 1976 in Italy have underlined the need for information on risks. Today the Seveso directives (82/501/EEG; 96/82/EEG) have implications for a wide range of hazardous substances, taking into account their management and the need for information to those at risk. In 1986, the Chernobyl accident displayed the international effects of an industrial accident in terms of radiation as well as the need for information. It resulted in far-reaching, international efforts at harmonization of standards and practices related to radioactive substances. Furthermore, it greatly highlighted the moral obligation in giving information to maintain credibility and trust. The chemical and radiological accidents challenged the risk communication field with the problems of invisible hazards with delayed health effects. How to understand and handle information about probabilities was put high on the agenda. The category of "statistical victims" obscured the information and confused and worried the public.

Hazards related to genetically modified crops and foodstuffs, and the potential of transmission of diseases to humans through the food chain, offered yet another angle of risk communication challenges. These hazards, hidden among everyday, high-quality products, are undetectable by the means of control available to an ordinary citizen or consumer, and involve considerable time delays before any health problem may appear. In addition, and with respect to genetically modified crops, there is an ongoing controversy as to whether there is any problem or not. Risk communication studies in this area deal with understanding the effects of information of phenomena that might cause severe damage if the worst case occurs. Thus, the challenges concern uncertainty as well as risk. Apart from the now well-known dimensions explaining risk perception, actors in risk communication must take into account such factors as, e.g. the relevance of peoples' implicitly or explicitly expressed basic moral values, views on nature and considerations of what hypothetical future scenarios or outcomes might be influencing the observed reactions.

Some of the mentioned hazards and events have involved mistakes and human errors, and bad management strategies or lack of information have sometimes influenced the outcomes towards the worse. But the mentioned events were not intended or planned to cause human suffering. Risk communication studies may, however, very well focus on actions and events caused by human malice. Criminal behavior, deceit, sabotage or terrorist activities are part of a sub-field where human motives, beliefs and values play significant roles. In order to tackle these issues adequately, an even broader range of expertise is required, but these studies nevertheless concern significant domains of the safety and security of our contemporary society. Work in this area involves uncertainties to a significant degree.

In all mentioned areas, the role of the media and the impact of information that is given or not given have been studied extensively. Debates have often highlighted, however, the inadequacy of the media in providing correct information in a comprehensive manner, especially during an ongoing crisis. Strategies of media actors may influence public reactions and evaluations of an event, as well as the credibility and trustworthiness of experts and authorities on all levels and areas. Information strategies, the fulfillment of various roles, and the interactions between central actors, be-

fore, during or after a significant event are of great interest to risk communication research. Among the central themes of study is to understand the complexity of what creates credibility and confidence in crisis situations. Risk communication studies have similarly focused on describing chains of events, pinpointing the problems or mistakes, and providing some form of models or rules-of-thumb to use in the management phase or in future risk prevention work. In a broader perspective, however, some factors of importance to the social fabric and societal robustness have largely been neglected. Information and communication technologies underlie or help establish order and power structures, and the distribution or the transfer of power. The protection of a society thus also includes the protection of values and life-styles. New technologies and novel communication routes are destined to alter the current society and maybe even the basics of societal value systems. It is well known that the verification of facts and the credibility of information not only depend on "the objective truth", but also on the communicators' abilities and willingness to process, understand and trust the information. Risk communication is always situation specific so that constraints and possibilities related to the situation and the people involved make up the result. Knowledge of new environments, communication channels and peoples' behaviour and attitudes in such circumstances therefore ought to be investigated. The gradual change of life conditions related to the blurring of borders, of what constitutes civil or military threats, and of the distinction between relevant or true information and events versus irrelevant or false ones also need to be analyzed more deeply. Protection against threats and risks is not sufficiently provided by geographic obstacles or standardised rules-of-thumb. If it is the case that the society is changing from a complex but analysable situation of risky technologies into an arena that is instead prone to unpredictable "socially driven attacks", then there would be an urgent need to review our working methods and standards. Or, in the longer run, the current perceptions of intensified individual vulnerability and an onslaught of incomprehensible threats to life and health might undermine societal robustness and progress more effectively than actual physical attacks. It might be that a major battlefield is already being defined, especially focusing on our minds. Interest, increased knowledge and participation in the development of society might lessen the impacts of such assaults.

## 4.3 From Security and Defence Doctrine to a Strategy of Institutional Link in Risk Communication

*By Dr. Thomas Pankratz, Austria*
*topol@direkt.at*

**Var01:**

The aim of this lecture is to give a brief overview of crisis communication structures using Civil Protection in Austria as an example.

Focal points of the lecture will be:

1. The new Security and Defence Doctrine (guideline of security and defence policy)/ the concept of "Comprehensive Security")

2. Aim of Civil Protection
Definition
Organisation (authorities, relief organisations, individual citizens)

3. Organisation of Civil Protection in Austria/ Governmental level
- Federal Ministry of the Interior
- Federal Alarm Center
- (Federal Chancellery)
- International Co- operation

4. Safety Information Centers (SIC)
- Idea/ Objectives
- Tasks/ Business
- Organisation of SIC

**Var02:**

The aim of this lecture is to give a brief overview of crisis communication structures using Civil Protection in Austria as an example. Starting with a short introduction to the new Security and Defence Doctrine and the Austrian concept of "Comprehensive Security", in which Civil Protection is embedded, the lecture will focus on two central points: First, on the organisation of Civil Protection in Austria at the governmental level. Secondly, it will explain the genuine Austrian concept of Safety Information Centers.

## 4.4 Risk Communication in a World of Distrust

*By Dr Michael Siegrist,*
*Department of Psychology, University of Zurich,*
*Plattenstrasse 14, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland,*
*siegrist@sozpsy.unizh.ch*
*Tel: +41 1 634 44 71*
*http://www.sozpsy.unizh.ch/personal/siegrist.html*

Most people do not possess elaborated knowledge of risks and benefits associated with technologies. Surveys in the US and in Europe have shown that a majority of the people are not able to answer correctly basic questions about general science questions. Lacking the knowledge, most people do not assess directly risks and benefits associated with a hazard. The public has to rely on information provided by experts. However, experts are not a homogeneous group, they differ in their assessments of a hazard. In the absence of sufficient knowledge, decisions and judgments are guided by social trust. The function of trust is the reduction of the complexity people are faced with.

There is a difference between having trust in one's spouse or trust that one's car won't break down. It is hard to understand, therefore, that some scientists use the same word trust for both situations. Based on a thorough review of the literature on trust, in a wide variety of domains, we have proposed a dual-mode model of cooperation based on social trust and confidence. Key to the model is the assumption that there are two pathways to cooperation, one via trust and the other via confidence. Trust is defined as the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another based on a judgment of similarity of intentions or values. We emphasize that trust is based on shared values, a judgment of similarity between one person and another (or between a person and an entity treated as a person). It is this judgment of similarity, rather than some behavioural criterion, that is central to trust. The second construct is confidence, defined as the belief, based on experience or on evidence, that certain future events will occur as expected. Trust and confidence may interact, but little is known about this interaction.

Based on the dual-mode model of social trust and confidence practical implications are clear-cut. The situation determines whether information about competence and past performance or value information should be presented in order to facilitate cooperation. After an incident, for example, public relations campaigns emphasizing competence and good track records may be useless. Several companies learned this lesson the hard way (e.g., Shell during the Brent Spar controversy or Coca-Cola in Belgium, when people complained about negative health effects). During a crisis, confidence, which, by definition, is lost, cannot be used to reduce uncertainty; therefore, it is crucial that companies attempt to generate social trust. They need to find ways to demonstrate that they care about their customers, share their values, and are interested in public dialogue.

Research guided by the dual-mode model of social trust and confidence could be used to determine whether a company is faced with a trust or a confidence problem. Based on the results of surveys, for example, appropriate measures could be developed for enhancing confidence or social trust, respectively. Companies would not waste resources on information campaigns that cannot provide the desired results, and the

public would not be faced with even more uncertainty due to bad communication strategies that fail to reduce uncertainty.

Picture from the plenary meeting

## 4.5 Different perspectives on taking precautions and feeling safe

*Dr. Ann Enander*
*Swedish National Defence College*

This paper discusses risk communication designed to promote safety measures and emergency preparedness among the public. It is suggested that communications of this kind aim both to promote certain behaviours and activities, and also to support a sense of security and personal control among members of the community. The relationship between the precautions people take and their sense of safety / security is, however, not always straightforward. This is illustrated by two examples from studies in Sweden.

The first concerns a questionnaire study of attitudes, beliefs and activities related to everyday risks in daily life (Enander & Johansson, 2002). Four patterns of perceptions and beliefs could be identified and related to different degrees of safety activity and feelings of security. These results demonstrate that people can take safety measures for rather different reasons, and also that taking such measures is not necessarily related to also feeling more safe.

The second example is taken from a study of attitudes and reactions regarding preparedness and warning systems among people living in the immediate vicinity of the Swedish nuclear power plants. The study was conducted in the context of problems experienced during the introduction of an RDS warning receiver in the homes (Enander and Johansson, 1995). Responses to a question concerning how people intended to act in the event of an alarm situation could be categorized into four patterns reflecting different beliefs about risk, trust in information and authorities, and sense of personal control.

These two examples illustrate firstly that the public is not a homogenous entity. Different actions and subjective reactions related to safety and preparedness behaviours can be related to differing beliefs and attitudes. Secondly, they illustrate that the relation between acting safely and feeling safe is complex. Thus risk and emergency communications need to address both these aspects.

## 4.6 Risk Perceptions, Expert Knowledge and the Public

*Dr. Marit Boyesen,*
*Stavanger University College,*
*Pb 8002 Ullandhaug,*
*4068 Stavanger, Norway*
*e-mail: marit.boyesen@oks.his.no*
*+47 51 83 15 00 or +47 51 83 16 71*

The aim of this presentation is to discuss the concept of risk perception as distinct from expert knowledge, and to make some reflections about how risk perception may influence the management of risks in society.

The concept of risk perception entered the field of technological risk in the early 1970s. Many advocates of new technological developments were confused by the active public opposition to technologies they thought to be safe, and even more important, also considered to be providers of essential benefits. Obviously the public perceived something differently than they did. Coincidentally, cognitive psychologists focused on the human limitations in handling probabilistic information, called cognitive limitations or biases. These shortcomings were seen as impediments to making good decisions. Both technologists and cognitive psychologists seemed to believe that people's perceptions were faulty, and that their non-technical views were irrational misperceptions. They also agreed on the need for public education to improve people's abilities to think probabilistically (Otway 1992).

Technical risk analysis has traditionally focused on the probability of an event and its associated magnitude of consequences. This approach derives from an engineering concept and ignores the role of social processes in the perception of risk. Risk perception research suggests that individual risk estimation is largely formed on the basis of contextual factors such as the ability to influence risks, familiarity with risks, and the catastrophic potential associated with a risk event (Slovic 1987, Renn 1990).

Rather than understanding public authorities as problem-solvers who apply objective, scientific, and value-free methods to handle risks, the approach of public authorities is also influenced by social processes. Their perception of risk is filtered through both cultural factors and social relations, and will influence their priorities in managing risks. The methodologies and results of technical risk assessments are often regarded as an expression of expert knowledge. Such analysis of risk provides society only with a narrow view and consequences is of limited use in understanding social orientation. Ball and Boehmer-Christiansen (2002) summarize that we live in a pluralistic society and therefore multiple perspectives need to be taken into account. Risk decisions, whether by experts or the layman, are driven by beliefs first and facts second. That leads to the need for more inclusive discourse about values and beliefs in the societal handling of risks. Social acceptability of hazards should not only be determined by professionals, but can only be achieved by facilitating an appropriate discourse with all stakeholder groups.

## 4.7 Introduction to Crisis Communication: The Canadian Approach

*By Jo-Ann Schwartz*
*Director, Public Affairs*
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness
*Department of National Defence*
*Government of Canada*
*Phone: 613-944-4877*
*e-mail: jo-ann.schwartz@ocipep-bpiepc.gc.ca*
*http://www.ocipep.gc.ca*

This presentation offers an overview of the Canadian emergency management system and the current approach to crisis and emergency communication in large-scale incidents. The presentation will outline the delineation of communication roles and responsibilities within the federal government and among key jurisdictions, private sector associations and non-government organizations.

Within the evolving threat environment, professional communicators are faced with specific challenges during the response phase of an incident. When faced with the possibility of multiple attacks of varying intensity and nature (eg. CBRN), communicators can reasonably expect to experience a "compression-expansion" dichotomy wherein increasing public demand for information on multiple topics can quickly overtake the operational pace of scientific and security investigations which would provide fact-based data. Some potential areas for further research will be identified.

1


2



3


## OCIPEP

- OCIPEP was created February 5, 2001

**Mandate**

- To provide national leadership in the establishment of an approach to protecting Canada's critical infrastructure; and
- To enhance Canada's emergency management framework

**Mission**

- To enhance the safety and security of Canadians in their physical and cyber environment

**Vision**

- A safer, more secure Canada

4


## OCIPEP

- All-hazards approach
  - Management of human and physical impacts similar regardless of origin (physical or cyber in nature, whether natural or human-induced)
- Full-spectrum approach
  - Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and Recovery
- Partnerships approach
  - Other Federal Departments and Agencies
  - Provincial and Territorial Emergency Measures Organizations
  - Industry and its Associations
  - Foreign Governments and International Organizations
  - NGOs and Others

5


## Emergency Management Principles

- Responsibility lies with the individual
- Governments respond progressively
  - Local response organizations
  - Province and territory manage any large scale emergencies
  - Government of Canada support as requested

6


## Government of Canada Approach

- Emergency Preparedness Act
  - Minister responsible for emergency preparedness
  - Currently the Minister of National Defence
- Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness
- The Canadian Forces

7


## Government of Canada Approach

- OCIPEP has a lead role in the following plans and policies:
  - National Support Plan
  - National Earthquake Support Plan
  - Counter-Terrorism Consequence Management Arrangements
  - Space Objects Contingency Plan
  - National Emergency Arrangements for Public Information
- OCIPEP supports other government departments/agencies in meeting their mandated roles and responsibilities for emergency management.
- OCIPEP operate the Government Emergency Operations Coordination Center (GEOCC) and support operations set up under the authority of the National Support Plan
  - Information collection/dissemination
  - Support/Coordinate GOC Response
  - Alerts, Advisories, Other Products

8


## Government of Canada Approach

- Provincial/territorial governments
  - Handling emergencies within their own mandate
  - Emergency management organization
  - Ministries and agencies

9


## Government of Canada Approach

- Key role for Lead Minister
  - Principal spokesperson for the Government
  - Regional Minister may lead
- Emergency Preparedness Act
- Federal Policy for Emergencies
- Possible role for Regional Ministers

10


## Government of Canada Approach

- Initially Lead Department; within hours PMO lead on communications supported by PCO
  - Strategy and key messages
  - Liaison with PMO
  - Identification of spokespersons
  - Additional communications support

11


## The New Threat Environment

- Public perceptions and expectations
- The risk variables
  - Continuing, expanding and new threats
  - Population and concentration
  - Dependencies and interdependencies

12


## Communications Challenges

- Public awareness vs complacency
- Public awareness vs panic
- Alert systems
- Consistent, coordination, targeted messaging

13


## Communications Challenges

| | Communicator | Time Pressure | Message/Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| Risk Communication | Non-participant, neutral about outcome | Anticipated, no time pressures | Empower decision making |
| Issue Management Communication | Participant | Anticipated | Explain and persuade |
| Crisis Communication | Participant | Urgent & unexpected | Explain and persuade |
| Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication | After event participant, interested in outcome | Urgent & unexpected | Explain, persuade and empower decision making |

Source: Barbara Reynolds (Centers for Disease Control)

14


## Communications Challenges

| | Emergency Management Process | Time Pressure | Message/Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| Risk Communication | Mitigation and preparedness | Anticipated, no time pressures | Empower decision making |
| Issue Management Communication | | Anticipated | Explain and persuade |
| Crisis Communication | Response | Urgent & unexpected | Explain and persuade |
| Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication | | Urgent & unexpected | Explain, persuade and empower decision making |
| | Recovery | Limited time pressures | ↑ Feedback to inform risk/issue communication component of mitigation and preparedness |

Source: Barbara Reynolds (Centers for Disease Control)

15




Canada

www.ocipep-bpiepc.gc.ca

*Jo-Ann Schwartz*
*Director, Public Affairs*
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection
and Emergency Preparedness

## 4.8 Armed Forces and Crisis Communication – from the Austrian National Crisis Management System to the National Security Council

*By Capt. Alexander Lampalzer, Austria*
*Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons*
*Senior Policy Officer*
*E-mail: mwb14@bmlv.gv.at*

*Presentation*
Based upon the practical and operational experience in delivering assistance operations by the Armed Forces to civil authorities during the Anthrax cases in Austria, the presentation will focus on two main issues:

- first, the role of armed forces in an overall National Crisis Management System, centring on operational issues.
- Secondly, the security-political aspect and its effect on crisis communication will be covered by introducing the recently established National Security Council.

## 4.9 Experiences in Crisis Communication with a Focus on Nuclear Power Plants

*By Dr. Felix Blumer,*
*National Emergency Operations Center, Zurich, Switzerland.*
*E-mail: fb@naz.ch*
*phone: (+41) 1 256 9435, fax: (+41) 1 256 9497*
*www.naz.ch*

The National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) with its headquarter in Zurich is the federal agency responsible for dealing with emergency situations such as increased radioactivity, large scale chemical accidents, dam bursts or reservoir overspill and satellite re-entry. In all these incidents, the NEOC is not only responsible for the emergency management, but also for information management in collaboration with the Swiss federal chancellery. The NEOC's information management is divided in two branches: Providing guidance for the authorities and information for the population.

*a) What is an extraordinary situation?*

In terms of information management, the main question is: What is an extraordinary situation? From the point of view of an information officer, the definition of an extraordinary situation is quite different from that used by an emergency manager. Information officers also speak of an extraordinary situation in the following cases:

- lack of facts about an event (accident)
- lack of responsibles for the event (accident) management
- a lot of rumors are spread by unqualified experts
- you are fighting against a looser image, because people look upon your organisation as the perpetrator of the event (accident)

In any kind of extraordinary situation:

- information providers must act quickly to establish themselves as an authority with a media presence from the very start
- facts about the extent and impact of the incident have to be given in due time
- information on the development of the situation, as far as it is predictable, and on planned activities to master the situation (prognosis) should be given
- offical information has to prevail over rumors and half-truths
- information should induce people to follow instructions and to behave according to the situation
- well-founded background information should be available
- suitable interview partners must be provided

*b) Orientation of the authorities*

By definition, the information management between authorities in a crisis situation is called "orientation". For this process, the NEOC has developed a tool called the "Electronic Situation Display". This tool abandons the typical supply-based philosophy of information dissemination. Instead it uses a "pull"-philosophy using

standard website technologies. The system allows an organization to post its informations on a single platform, from where a large number of partners are able to retrieve the information they need. Consequently, it relieves the stress on the organization to supply information to a large number of partners. Document transfers to different partners can be avoided. Organizations that play an active part in the emergency system will contribute their data to the platform thus making the information available for retrieval. Different partners are already participating actively not only in Switzerland, but also in some neighbour countries. Participating external organizations are able to retrieve this data with standard web-technology from a password-protected server.

*c) Information of the population*

In an emergency situation there are usually three target groups:

- those directly concerned, which have highest priority
- those indirectly concerned (time, location and intensity)
- those untouched, which are of the least priority (nice-to-know information)

Information and information management have to be adapted according to these target groups. It is probable, though, that in case of a major event the majority of the population has to be considered as at least indirectly concerned. Information will in most cases be provided by the media, since this is the only way to reach almost everybody. NEOC is working together with different kinds of media (news agencies, radio, stations, television, TV-text-information systems and newspapers) in order to achieve a good level of redundancy. A call centre for the whole public is not planned, because the manpower required to operate such a centre exceeds by far the resources.

*d) Summary*

Information is divided into two branches. Authorities get their orientation from an internet platform supported by scientific specialists. The population will only be informed through the media owing to low information capacities on the side of the emergency management organizations.

## 4.10. The Crises Communication Handbook

*By Birgitta Darrell*
*Head of Section for Crisis Communication*
*The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)*
*P.O. Box 599*
*SE-101 31 Stockholm*
*birgitta.darrell@krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se*
*http://www.krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se*

"The Crisis Communication Handbook – A tool for deepening the knowledge in the fields of information preparedness and crisis communications."

The Crisis Communication Handbook can be downloaded from the SEMA web page at this address:
http://www.krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se/verksamhet/internationellt/crisis_communication_handbook_2003.pdf

### 4.11 Exercise Model Based On Crisis Communication. An Example

*By Anette Unneberg, advisor and*
*Helen Christensen, senior executive officer*
*Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning – Norway (DCDEP).*
*E-mail: anette.unneberg@dsb.no , Phone: (+47) 2235 8573.*
*E-mail: helen.christensen@dsb.no , Phone: (+47) 2235 8589.*

Since 1998 The Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning – Norway (DCDEP) has used an exercise model based on crisis communication. We will give a short presentation of the exercise model and explain how we use it in Norway. The presentation will focus on crisis management and crisis communication. At the end we will give a short example of a scenario, and how we use it.

The model is a tabletop exercise, not a practical exercise, for decision-making at the level of leadership. To develop a crisis, we use media input which rises in intensity up to a credibility crisis. We cooperate with professional journalists in developing a scenario, and we use professional media experts in the exercises.

The model is a table top exercise. This is not a practical exercise but the leaders have to discuss what to do and decide which actions to make. To develop a crisis we use media inputs, which rise in intensity up to a credibility crisis. We cooperate with professional journalists in developing a scenario, and we use professional media experts in the exercises.

Our scenarios show what consequences a crisis could have in the local community. We tailor every exercise. Examples of scenarios that we use include youth and drug problems in municipalities, terrorism against a Norwegian delegation abroad and food poisoning among heads of state. It is important that the scenario is adjusted to each particular leader and his or her responsibilities.

The main conclusion drawn from our exercises is that top leaders do not specify their own roles in a crisis situation. There is a significant lack of plans for crisis communication. The top leaders usually become motivated after an exercise and want us to come and train them regularly.

# 5 Workshop Day 1: Risk Communication (group 1–4)

### 5.1 Q&A Risk Communication (group 1–4)

**Group 1**
Chairman: Professor Dr. Britt-Marie Drottz Sjöberg (Norway)
Rapporteur: Kjetil Sørli (Norway)
Participants: Karin Viklund (Sweden), Michael Guery (Switzerland), Gunilla Derefeldt (Sweden), Doron Zimmermann (Switzerland), Marit Boyesen (Norway), Edward Borodzicz (UK), Oskar Hansson (Sweden).

*Q1. Discuss if there are any stakeholders in general (independent of topics) in the field of Risk Communication and identify who they are:*

Stakeholders a difficult concept

- Negative and positive stakeholders. From which point of view?
    - Government's point of view, terrorist point of view – both are stakeholders.
- Divide between the active and the passive side (e.g. terrorist/government)
- Civil Authorities
- Media
- Authorities: A symbiosis with the media
- Private industry, e.g. insurance companies, car companies as stakeholders
- Consumers as stakeholders
- Academia/academics as stakeholders
- The experts
- Analysts (government) as decision shapers
- NGO's as stakeholders
- "The Enemy"
- The public vs. the involved (them and us)
- Future generations
- Active vs. passive actors

*Q2.Try to identify competence centres in the field of Crisis Communication in your own counties (and internationally):*

- Federal Government
- Local
- NGO's / voluntary organisations
- Private industries
- Universities
- Government information capabilities
- Public utilities
- Call centres
- Centre of transport

*Q3. Make a suggestion over topics of future research within the field of Risk Communication and explain why this topic should be further developed*

- What are the criteria that determine when and how or whether to go public with risk information
- The gap between the public and the experts. The level of trust, how big is it? Identify what the real problems are, setting the priorities. Information overload, how to cope.
- Could/should risk communicators be held accountable
- How do you prepare the information in order to communicate it in the right way?
- Weaponisation of a communicable threat or risk

- Identifying basic structures in risk communications attempting to reduce the multitude of unique examples
- Using different types of media to enhance the message

**Group 2**
Chairman: Professor Roland Akselsson (Sweden)

Rapporteur: Carl-Erik Christoffersen (Norway)

Participants: Ann Enander (Sweden), Kerstin Kastenfors (Sweden), Ulrike Kastrup (Switzerland), John I. Nonseid (Norway), Jo-Ann Schwartz (Canada), Hans Siepel (Netherlands), Reto Wollenmann (Switzerland),

*Q1. What are the crucial patterns of understanding (and misunderstanding) and behaviour in risk management situations between different actors e.g.*

- *The risk experts/scientific society ("decision shapers" – the analyst);*
- *Decision makers (the head of a administrative unit or a politician);*
- *The media;*
- *Or the general public?*

We (the authorities) must translate information from the experts before it goes to the public. Experts can be "trained" before they see the journalists. The experts might have an interest of exaggerating while talking to the journalists. We also need to increase the journalists' knowledge to give them a better understanding of the information they receive and the situation see.

Media have their own interest in presenting "a good story".

Risk communication aims to give information to the public to build up their confidence in the authorities.

Media will always be there as a communication channel, but to reach all target groups other communication channels are also required.

A balance must be found between the twin dangers of exaggerating and holding back information.

The need for information among the general public should be identified beforehand.

*Q2. Try to identify competence centres in the field of Risk Communication in your own countries (and internationally).*

- Organisations working with "early warning" topics, food inspection agencies, universities, scientific institutes working with health and food.

*Q3. Make a suggestion over topics of future research within the field of Risk Communication and explain why this topic should be further developed.*

- There is a need to do more research within the general public, especially in the area of adapting the language of Risk Communication to cultural differences.

**Group 3**

Chairman: Dr. Patrick Smit (Switzerland)
Rapporteur: Arve Sandve (Norway)
Participants: Myriam Dunn (Switzerland), Michael Siegrist (Switzerland), Francois Maridor (Switzerland), Isabel Frommelt (Liechtenstein), Edward Deverell (Sweden).

*Q1. How to better communicate national security-policy risk issues? (e.g. terrorism, CIP, CIIP etc) To whom (different target groups – decision makers on national and local level, individual)?*

Six main focus points were identified to strengthen the work of risk communication:

- Focus on dialog.
- Focus on new (improved) long term strategies.
- Experts need to provide solutions – not only identify problems.
- Experts in general need to improve their individual/group communication skills (especially when presenting results). Challenge and/or develop multichannel strategies. Strategy depends on the risk and the perception of the key players.
- Focus on interdisciplinary coordination and cooperation. Involve the government in the "research" process. Is there a need for a central coordination body? Are there national preferences on this issue?
- Develop different (new long term) strategies for prevention and intervention (in particular). Communication in the framework of prevention and intervention is completely different.
- Drawing of optimal communication (figure 1).

*Q2. Try to identify competence centres in the field of Risk Communication in your own counties (and internationally)*

- No answer due to lack of time caused by Q1 discussion.

*Q3. Make a suggestion over topics of future research within the field of Risk Communication and explain why this topic should be further developed.*

- Overview of the structure and process for risk-perception, assessment and managing as well as crisis management and communication applied/implemented in the countries.
- Transboundary interaction, achievements, lesson learnt and improvements.

Experts Public

**Group 4**
Chairman: Eric Stern (Sweden)
Rapporteur: Erik Wale (Norway)
Participants: Alexander Lampalzer (Austria), Thomas Pankratz (Austria), Felix Blumer (Switzerland), Malin Modh (Sweden), Ivar Kristiansen (Norway), Ann-Kristin Larsen (Norway)

*Q1. Discuss: What are the dimensions that constitute the context of crisis communication on a national security-policy level? (institutional, cultural, value-based …)*

- media, not "space" for more than one "big story" at the time.
- complexity
- technology
- diversity
- social capital (trust)
- psychological, how serious are the crisis really compared to the public perception, ref Anthrax.
- temporal
- stability/institutions
- number of crises, information overload if too many crises

Also different depending on timeframe: before, during or after the crisis
Dimensions of space, distance (cultural, ideological, physical).
Cultural/regional distance. "Western world" is at risk,

*Q2. Try to identify competence centres in the field of Crisis Communication in your own counties (and internationally)*

- Austria: National Security Council, ACPA, National Crisis Management, Austrian Television Company, SIC, Alarm centres
- Sweden: University of Örebro, Stockholm School of Business, Swedish national Defence College, Gothenburg University

*Q3. Make a suggestion over topics of future research within the field of Crisis Communication and explain why this topic should be further developed.*

- diversity studies (groups), issue constellations
- coping with and using expert communication, how to adapt expert opinions for the benefit of politicians and the public
- comparative research, cases (differences or similarities in crisis management?)
- organizing for crisis communication
- rumours, propaganda, "monitoring", help journalist to be more critical and avoid exaggerated news reporting
- government response to media pressure. How to choose the right response?
- how can government build trust, (social capital)
- victims, how does who them victim is, influence the possibilities for crisis communication?
- national crisis – international relations

# 6 Workshop Day 2: Crisis Communication (group 1-4)

## 6.1 Q&A Crisis Communication (group 1–4)

**Group 1**
Chairman: Professor Dr. Britt-Marie Drottz Sjöberg
Rapporteur: Kjetil Sørli
Participants: Karin Viklund (Sweden), Michael Guery (Switzerland), Gunilla Derefeldt (Sweden), Doron Zimmermann (Switzerland), Marit Boyesen (Norway), Edward Borodzicz (UK), Oskar Hansson (Sweden).

*Q1. Media is perceived as a number one choice to pass on information between decision makers/risk experts and the general public. Discuss pros and cons of other types of communication (e.g. crisis web; distribute brochures, direct communication (eg. SMS/MMS) between the communicators and receivers of information etc. Describe which concept of communication is best in certain situations?, and what administrative preparations (and resources) will be needed to prepare to inform the general public by alternative channels than the media?*

- People tend to be more conservative in choosing the type of media in critical situations. The public will likely turn on the TV/radio in critical situations, not the new channels of information
- Technology requires robustness and redundancy
- TV, radio more robust than some of the new media channels
- TV/Radio are more accessible than the new channels
- All media channels should be used – not only TV and radio, but also SMS, the web, etc
- A trustworthy, well known voice/face can be important, but not always (e.g. Ari Fleischer)
- The use of a spokesperson vs. the leader
- The use of pagers / cell phones to summon critical personal (pagers are obsolete in Norway)
- Hotlines / call centres
- A structured system which is highly accessible makes it is easy to exploit for terrorist
- Using computers to spread the correct information to the informers
- A risk of using this computer network to send false information
- Information imbalance – The public gets the information before the decisions makers
- E.g. 9/11, live on the web and the TV
- Cars with megaphones

*Q2. Try to identify competence centres in the field of Crisis Communication in your own counties (and internationally)*

- Federal Government
- Local
- NGO's / voluntary organizations
- Private industries
- Universities
- Government information capabilities
- Public utilities
- Call centres
- Centres of Transport

*Q3. Make a suggestion over topics of future research within the field of Crisis Communication and explain why this topic should be further developed.*

- How the communications expert work with the experts
- Crisis communication and the media, and the media role in the crisis area
- To what extend should organisations be exposed to training
- How do people react to all these messages – a repetition of these questions
- How do the authorities think that people react
- A disciplinary base in this field – peer reviews etc
- Crisis management, can be drift off to a top down perspective. Imbalance in what is important

**Group 2**
Chairman: Professor Roland Akselsson (Sweden)
Rapporteur: Carl-Erik Christoffersen (Norway)
Participants: Ann Enander (Sweden), Kerstin Kastenfors (Sweden), Ulrike Kastrup (Switzerland), John I. Nonseid (Norway), Jo-Ann Schwartz (Canada), Hans Siepel (Netherlands), Reto Wollenmann (Switzerland),

*Q1. We lack knowledge about how people perceive Crisis Communication and often many are afraid of providing information due to risk/anxiety of creating panic. How to develop this knowledge and pass it on to decision makers; risk experts and communicators?*

- We know very little about new ethnic groups in our society with different cultural backgrounds.
- The problem is to get information to decision makers.
- We know a lot about peoples' reactions when they receive too little information.
- How can we use media?
- How can we persuade our superiors to give out as much information as possible?
- Do we need to counteract rumours information that can create panic? Panic in general occurs very rarely. Too little information can lead to increased anxiety.

- The authority might create systems that make it possible to the public to find/seek information.
- It is very difficult to establish a two-way communication channel in the middle of a crisis.
- The communication principle in the Norwegian information policy will ensure that politicians know about the information needs of the public.

*Q2. Try to identify competence centres in the field of Crisis Communication in your own countries?*

- Universities, institutions within sociology and psychology.

*Q3. Make a suggestion over topics of future research within the field of Crisis Communication and explain why this topic should be further developed.*

How can we make a learning organisation?
We have a lack of knowledge about:

- Panic-situations.
- What kind of influence do media have?
- How do politicians think?

How can we detect the need for information in the public?
How do politicians react during crises, and do they act differently in other countries.

**Group 3**
Chairman: Dr. Patrick Smit (Switzerland)
Rapporteur: Arve Sandve (Norway)
Participants: Myriam Dunn (Switzerland), Michael Siegrist (Switzerland), Francois Maridor (Switzerland), Isabel Frommelt (Liechtenstein), Edward Deverell (Sweden).

*Q1: Human beings are almost unique in having the ability to learn from the experience of others; what effect will providing "best practice" and "worst practice" have in explaining difficult perceivable risk to decision makers?. How can we share such "best practice" and "worst practice" between different countries?*

The discussion focused on the following points:

- Crisis communication is an indispensable element of crisis management.
- Crisis communication has to satisfy the public need for information. It should however not influence the crisis management.
- Crisis management is tasked to the organisation in charge to manage a crisis. The organisation however needs expert advise.
- Strong interaction/coordination between the organisations (nationally, internationally, regionally) required.
- Crisis communication starts as soon as a crisis arises. Problems include lack of information and a lacking perception of crisis. Perception of the risk can provide an early warning. It is important to avoid the "bunker effect".
- Provide clear and appropriate advice to the public.
- Train communication skills of personnel.
- Do not violate competence. Stay inside your competence.
- Four elements need to be considered:

- Public – need for information
- Experts – competence
- Operation – act moral authority
- Government – political backlog
- Important to build up a dialog with the media and the public.

*Q2: Try to identify competence centres in the field of Crisis Communication in your own counties (and internationally)*

- No answer due to lack of time caused by Q1 discussion.

*Q3: Make a suggestion over topics of future research within the field of Crisis Communication and explain why this topic should be further developed.*

- No answer due to lack of time caused by Q1 discussion.

**Group 4**
Chairman: Eric Stern (Sweden)
Rapporteur: Erik Wale (Norway)
Participants: Alexander Lampalzer (Austria), Thomas Pankratz (Austria), Felix Blumer (Switzerland), Malin Modh (Sweden), Ivar Kristiansen (Norway), Ann-Kristin Larsen (Norway)

*Q1..Dicuss: What are the dimensions that constitute the context of crisis communication on a national security-policy level? (institutional, cultural, value-based …)*

*Q2. Try to identify competence centres in the field of Crisis Communication in your own counties (and internationally)*

*Q3. Make a suggestion over topics of future research within the field of Crisis Communication and explain why this topic should be further developed.*

Since the group agreed that most of the questions had already been covered during the discussion on Friday, Saturdays session was used to discuss the following topics:

*Topic 1: Finding and training leaders.*

- Promotion and recruitment. Should "we" try to influence recruitment practices, so that crisis management capabilities becomes part of the qualifications? Or should "our" main objective be to train the leaders that already are?
- How do we attract leaders to crisis management exercises and get the top management involved?
  - Crisis communication is an attraction in it self
  - Make courses short and to the point to attract top leaders
  - Use experience from private sector.
- "On stage" leadership vs. "Off stage" leadership and the use and abuse of spokespersons

*Topic 2: "Victims". How to measure how the public respond to information in a crisis*

- Test the information on people during exercise – Mahlin Mohd refers to an exercise in Sweden where the information was tested on a separate group that only received the information from the crisis management
- Challenges to information management during crisis, how to tailor the message to the group, targeting and choosing the right technology for the right group:
- Language challenges.
- Cultural and religion questions (food, shelters, trust)
- Age (pensioners, youth, children)
- Geography, distance to the event. Differences in lifestyle

*Topic 3: Organization co-operation and conflict – "Bureaucratic warfare"*

- How to recognize and overcome human and institutional obstacles to learning
  - competition for money and attention
  - common projects
  - blaming
  - how to develop common goals and cope with conflicts within organisations
  - how to develop common goal between employees and the organisation

*Topic 4: Sharing skill and experience.*

- Business continuity network like "survive"
- Conferences like this one, NCR, ECMA
- Difficulty of critical reporting. Evaluating successes is a way to circumvent the problem of critical reporting, strike balance between failures and successes.
- Use "hired guns" to present the criticism.
- Increase the capacity for analysis by developing methodology enabling a junior researcher to do much of the work.
- E-mail lists and internet publishing – www.crismart.org (about 30 short case summaries published)

*Topic 5: Monitoring and warning*

- Early warning, how to make the government respond to emerging crisis.

# 7 List of participants

## Switzerland

| | Family name | First name | Title | Country | Organization | E-mail |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Kastrup | Ulrike | Dr. | Switzerland | Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich | kastrup@sipo.gess.ethz.ch |
| 2 | Metzger | Jan | Dr. | Switzerland | Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich | metzger@sipo.gess.ethz.ch |
| 3 | Guery | Michael | Dr. | Switzerland | Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich | guery@sipo.gess.ethz.ch |
| 4 | Zimmermann | Doron | Dr. | Switzerland | Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich | zimmermann@sipo.gess.ethz.ch |
| 5 | Dunn | Myriam | lic. phil | Switzerland | Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich | dunn@sipo.gess.ethz.ch |
| 6 | Wollenmann | Reto | -. | Switzerland | Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich | wollenmann@sipo.gess.ethz.ch |
| 7 | Balmer | Jürg | Ing. HTL | Switzerland | Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP) | Juerg.Balmer@babs.admin.ch |
| 8 | Sigrist | Michael | Dr. | Switzerland | University of Zurich | siegrist@sozpsy.unizh.ch |
| 9 | Smit | Patrick | Dr. | Switzerland | Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP), National Emergency Operations Centre | smp@naz.ch |
| 10 | Blumer | Felix | Dr. | Switzerland | Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP), National Emergency Operations Centre | fb@naz.ch |
| 11 | Maridor | François D. | | Switzerland | Directorate for Security Policy Risk Analysis | Francois.Maridor@dsp.admin.ch |

## Sweden

| | Family name | First name | Title | Country | Organization | E-mail |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | Stern | Peter | Dr. | Sweden | Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) | peter.stern@krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se |
| 13 | Lundberg | Jan | Principal Administrative Officer | Sweden | SEMA | jan.lundberg@krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se |
| 14 | Hansson | Oskar | Principal Administrative Officer | Sweden | SEMA | oskar.hansson@krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se |
| 15 | Darell | Birgitta | Head of section for Crisis Comm. | Sweden | SEMA | Birgitta.Darrell@krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se |
| 16 | Modh | Malin | Principal Administrative Officer | Sweden | SEMA | malin.modh@krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se |
| 17 | Stern | Eric | Dr. | Sweden | Swedish National Defence College | Eric.stern@fhs.mil.se |
| 18 | Deverell | Edward | | Sweden | Swedish National Defence College | edward.deverell@fhs.mil.se |
| 19 | Castenfors | Kerstin | Lic. | Sweden | Swedish Defence Research Agency | kercas@foi.se |
| 20 | Viklund | Karin | Press-Officer | Sweden | Swedish Rescue Services Agency | karin.viklund@srv.se |
| 21 | Akselsson | Roland | Prof. | Sweden | Lund Institute of Technology | Roland.Akselsson@design.lth.se |
| 22 | Derefeldt | Gunilla | Director of Research | Sweden | Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) | gunilla.derefeldt@foi.se |
| 23 | Enander | Ann | Dr. | Sweden | National Defence College | |

## Austria

| | Family name | First name | Title | Country | Organization | E-mail |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 24 | Felberbauer | Ernst M. | Capt | Austria | Ministry of Defence<br>Bureau for Security Policy<br>AG Stiftgasse<br>Stiftgasse 2a<br>1070 Vienna<br>AUSTRIA | mwb32@bmlv.gv.at |
| 25 | Pankratz | Thomas | Dr. | Austria | Austrian Civil Protection Service<br>Am Hof 4<br>1010 Vienna<br>AUSTRIA | topol@direkt.at |
| 26 | Lampalzer | Alexander | Capt | Austria | Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons<br>Senior Policy Officer<br>Johan de Wittlaaer 32<br>2517 JR<br>Den Haag<br>The Netherlands | mwb14@bmlv.gv.at |

## The Netherlands, UK, Liechtenstein and Canada

| | Family name | First name | Title | Country | Organization | E-mail |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 27 | Borodzicz | Edward P. | Dr. | United Kingdom | School of Management University of Southampton | epb@soton.ac.uk |
| 28 | Siepel | Hans | Head of unit | Netherlands | The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations | Hans.Siepel@minbzk.nl |
| 29 | Schwartz | Jo-Ann | Director of Communications | Canada | Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness | Jo-Ann.Schwartz@ocipep-bpiepc.gc.ca |
| 30 | Frommelt | Isabel | Research assistant | Liechtenstein | SIPRI – Sweden | frommelt@sipri.org |

## Norway

| | Family name | First name | Title | Country | Organization | E-mail |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 | Larsen | Nils Ivar | Assistant Director | Norway | DCDEP – Head of the Planning Unit | nils.larsen@dsb.no |
| 32 | Drottz Sjöberg, | Britt-Marie | Professor | Norway | Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) | Brittds@svt.ntnu.no |
| 33 | Boyesen, | Marit | Dr. | Norway | Stavanger University College | marit.boyesen@oks.his.no |
| 34 | Steen | Roger | Senior Adviser | Norway | DCDEP – Deputy Head of the Planning Unit | roger.steen@dsb.no<br><br>Workshop Chairman |
| 35 | Sørli | Kjetil | Adviser | Norway | DCDEP – The planning unit | kjetil.sorli@dsb.no |
| 36 | Unneberg | Anette | Adviser | Norway | DCDEP – the crisis management unit | Anette.unneberg@dsb.no |
| 37 | Christensen | Helen | Higher Executive Officer | Norway | DCDEP – the crisis management unit | Helen.christensen@dsb.no |
| 38 | Gjengstø | Arthur | Director | Norway | DCDEP – Head of the Planning and Supervision department | Arthur.gjengsto@dsb.no |
| 39 | Sandve | Arve | Adviser | Norway | DCDEP – the crisis management unit | Arve.sandve@dsb.no |
| 40 | Bøsterud | Helen | Director General | Norway | DCDEP – Director General | Helen.bosterud@dsb.no |
| 41 | Christoffersen | Carl-Erik | Senior Adviser | Norway | Directorate for Communication and Public Management | Carl-Erik.Christoffersen@statskonsult.dep.no |
| 42 | Christiansen | Ivar | Head of Information | Norway | Norwegian People's Aid, Head of Information unit | ich@npaid.org |
| 43 | Hasle | Melita Ringvold | Adviser | Norway | The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate | mrh@nve.no |
| 44 | Wale | Erik | Adviser | Norway | DCDEP – Deputy head of the | erik.wale@dsb.no |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | crisis management unit | |
| 45 | Larsen | Ann-Kristin | Adviser | Norway | DCDEP – Information unit | ann-kristin.Larsen@dsb.no |
| 46 | Hagen | Janne | Researcher | Norway | Norwegian Defence Research Establishment | Janne.Hagen@ffi.no |
| 47 | Nonseid | John Ingolv | Adviser | Norway | Directorate for Communication and Public Management | john.nonseid@statskonsult.dep.no |
| | | | | | | |

# 8 DSB publications

The following DSB publications concerning risk and/or crisis communication are available in English, and can be downloaded from www.dsb.no (publications)

- Current Trends in Risk Communication: Theory and Practice", by Professor Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjöberg (originally published by DCDEP Norway)

- "A Guide to Information Preparedness" (originally published by DCDEP Norway)
- "Risk Assessment in Europe" – A report based on the results and conclusions from a EU-workshop on «Risk Assessment» held in Oslo November 1999. (originally published by DCDEP Norway)

- "Guidelines for Emergency Planning", (originally published by DCDEP Norway)

***The Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN)***

The Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN) is an Internet and workshop initiative for international dialog on national-level security risks and vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and emergency preparedness. Originally launched as a Swiss-Swedish Initiative, the partner network today consists of partners from four different countries: the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), Sweden; the Directorate General for Security Policy at the Federal Ministry of Defence, Austria; the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB), Norway; the Federal Office for National Economic Supply (NES), Federal Departement of Economic Affairs, Switzerland and the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS), Switzerland.

As a complementary service to the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), the CRN is coordinated and developed by the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, Switzerland. (www.isn.ethz.ch/crn)

***Workshop Summary***

The workshop introduced a clear distinction between risk communication and crisis communication. While risk communication deals with long-term, strategic messages, crisis communication deals with the short term, becoming relevant only in the event of a hazard.

Risk communicators face several issues: Should governmental institutions inform the public about present or future risks, and if so, when and how should they do this? In addition, Risks communicators are confronted with the fact that the public rarely perceives risks in terms of the danger they present. Also, various socio-economic groups and cultures require distinct forms of risk communication.

Once a risk becomes a crisis, crisis communication becomes essential. Professional crisis communicators should ideally be prepared to interact with the public before a crisis occurs. When the crisis materializes, expert handling of communication with the media is imperative. Guidelines on who is authorized to communicate with the media and other stakeholders have to be observed.

Systematic risk communication and crisis communication help increase the level of safety and security in society. To improve risk communication and crisis communication, an awareness of current theories and future research topics is necessary.