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Preface

In 1997 the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research at the ETH Zürich and the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn/Berlin began a project aimed at facilitating an international approach to understanding and analyzing international and regional problems beyond merely national perspectives. It is a specific goal of the project to involve young scholars and new elites in debates on international foreign policy subjects.

In considering the concept of New Faces Conferences, an idea pursued for many years by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the editors invited young and promising scholars from European countries, North America, Asia, Australia and Russia to participate in two such New Faces Conferences organized in Bonn (in October 1997) and in Chexbres near Lausanne (in October 1998). Unlike the traditional IISS concept, these New Faces Conferences were not only intended to bring together new and promising scholars and to let them practice their skills in an international conference, but also to have an impact in terms of substance, of creativity and innovation. It was for this reason, that we looked for candidates with expertise in specific areas and for candidates who promised to bring in innovative thinking. This book gives a selection of papers presented during these two conferences.

The editors would like to thank the Robert Bosch Stiftung (Stuttgart) and the German Marshall Fund of the United States for their support of these conferences.

The editors also thank all the conference participants for their contributions. They particularly appreciate the efforts of the speakers in revising and updating their papers. For the organization of the conference, their many thanks go to their staff, particularly to Bernhard May, Claude Nicolet, Béatrice Eigenmann, and Erika Girod.
With regard to the organization and scope of this book, Claude Nicolet merits special mention and gratitude. The editors would also like to thank Iona D'Souza for her help with the manuscript.

The views expressed in these conference papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the institutions and individuals they are associated with.
General Introduction
During the past decade, the nature of world affairs has undergone significant changes unparalleled since the end of World War II. The old order of the East-West-conflict has not been superseded by a new “World Order.” There simply is no such thing as a new order. Unlike many predictions that were voiced immediately after the end of the Cold War, there was no repetition of the traditional balance of power politics, neither was there widespread international anarchy and barbarism. What we are going through since 1990, however, is a far cry from any “end of history.” The new world could rather be characterized as one in which we can find a juxtaposition of order and disorder, of structure building and of the unraveling of international structures, or of peace and (mainly intra-state) war. Under such conditions, international security and the scholarly analysis of international strategic affairs surely have to be looked at in a different manner. The traditional subjects of strategic studies have been exhausted. There is no point in pondering over the strategic rationale of Theater Nuclear Forces, to measure the impact of specific arms control measures on the military balance or to assess the reliability of certain armed forces under conditions of war.

Yet, it would be too easy simply to state that contradictory developments were existing and that there was no more room for traditional strategic analysis. In fact, there are some salient features of world affairs that can be singled out, almost all of them have tangible strategic implications and open up a whole gamut of subjects for strategic studies.

The first feature is the absence of strategic competition between two or more major actors – a strategic competition that was so severe that it was able to put its imprint on the way international politics is being structured. During the 18th and 19th centuries competition between the major European powers was a dominant feature. The Cold War showed us another example of how far a strategic competition between major powers can structure the international order. Although there are signs of Russian and Chinese grievances about too much American “leadership” in today’s world, we are still a long way from entering a new era of Sino-Western or Russian-Western strategic competition.

The second feature is, as a corollary of the retreat of global strategic
competition, the growing relevance of regional balances and constellations in setting the stage for the development of international order (or disorder). Most developments towards international order in the security field today are more or less confined to regions. Europe, for instance, seems to take a very different path from that of East Asia, the Middle East or Africa, while there are signs that Latin America might follow the European model to a certain degree.

The third feature is the process of globalization. Globalization is a multidimensional and multifaceted process that involves at least six different, albeit interdependent, processes and that seems to transcend the traditional way of understanding international affairs:

1. The liberalization of international trade as a consequence of dedicated international efforts over several decades within GATT and recently WTO.

2. The liberalization of sectoral markets in more and more countries of the world and the concomitant retreat of the state from many activities in the economic field.

3. The growing internationalization of production and services brought about by multinational enterprises and the growing relevance of multinational enterprises as international actors.

4. The liberalization of finance markets to a degree that their control is no longer possible for individual governments.

5. The process of technical progress in certain key-technologies, especially in the fields of communication technologies, transport technologies and in modern production technologies.

6. Social and cultural processes on a global scale through which the mobility of population is being increased, while the cultural and linguistic dominance of the Anglo-Saxon world is growing and is overlapping national cultural features.

Globalization in this respect is unfolding a dynamic that is unprecedented in world history. It means free capitalism and market orientation and gives a premium to those societies which are better equipped than others in terms of high technology, social flexibility, openness and
adaptability and which are ready to accept interdependence as a boon. Globalization is the absolute opposite to an international world, where states which are in control of national economies and that strive for as much national autonomy and independence as possible vie for territory and control. In fact, globalization entails the realization of the vision of liberal peace – a peace that is kept because the states and their respective governments are more interested in trade and economic earnings than in enlarging or securing their territory. However, globalization is not really global: there is a core of globalization that is confined to Western and Central Europe, North America and parts of East Asia. The rest of the world is to a lesser degree involved in the processes that characterize globalization. As a consequence, a zone comprising those states intensively participating in globalization, usually functioning market economies and democracies, is slowly separating itself from the rest of the world, which is comprised of failed or only partially established states, of states that still cling to models of communist or nationalist authoritarian leadership, of states that are ruled by religious zealots and of states that are still uncertain whether or not they should make it into the club of interdependent, open market societies.

The juxtaposition of order and disorder thus actually means the existence of a relatively well-organized and peaceful Western world with a post-modern, liberal vision on the one side, and some areas of atavistic heated conflicts over territory, ethnic purity and dominance (such as most parts of the former Yugoslavia and parts of the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq), on the other, where it is often hard to differentiate between a political leader and a criminal. Moreover, there are certain parts of the world, where there is still a good chance that societies are developing in a direction where they accept globalization and interdependence as well as democracy and free markets as a boon: these are the larger parts of the world, comprising Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, China, India, some Arab and African states, most Latin American states and most East Asian states. However, whether or not these states will join the Western zone of peace, co-operation and free market economies will – in the longer term – be of much more relevance than the current Balkan crisis.
It is against this backdrop that we question the future of strategic studies. In principle there are four areas of studies:

- the analysis of the possibilities and opportunities of enlarging the Western zone of co-operatively organized international affairs by including others;
- the analysis of regional security problems and dynamics;
- the research into new challenges to security; and
- analysis of future instruments and dimensions of security policy.

This book is an attempt to encourage strategic studies in each of these four areas. It starts with two papers dealing with the difficult process of enlarging the most successful and attractive military alliance in history – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The paper by Ann Fitz-Gerald is an account of the difficulties that have to be met during the current process of enlarging NATO by three states. It focuses on those problems that started after the invitation to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO. The paper by Barna Zsigmond examines, from a Central Eastern European perspective the probably much more delicate process of further enlarging NATO to the East, predicting a postponement of a second round of enlargement at the Washington summit.

The second part deals with regional security issues. We start with three papers on the Mediterranean. The paper by Astrid Scharf provides an overview of the Arab-Israeli peace process, its purpose, its goal and the current difficulties. Another traditional conflict in the Mediterranean is the conflict over Cyprus. Claude Nicolet concludes that a bold new proposal – based on a genuine compromise along the formula of land versus recognition of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” – is needed to change the unhappy status quo. The paper by Carlo Masala on demographic pressure and social differences in the Mediterranean region concludes with specific recommendations of how to deal with the ecological degradation and the migration flow caused by developments in the southern-rim states.

The next regional paper deals with the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin, a region that is gaining international attention as more
information becomes available about oil and gas reserves believed to be present under the soil. The paper by Mustafa Aydin is an attempt to sort out the different layers of these conflicts. The paper by Maree Reid gives a clear account of where we stand with regard to East-Asia/Asia Pacific – the area that will be most important for peace and stability in the coming decades. The paper demonstrates how much the uncertainty over the future policy of China and about the future of the US engagement in the region is creating a situation that might usher in unstable times.

The third part is addressing new sources and dimensions of conflict. It starts with a paper by Richard A. Falkenrath dealing with the perils of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons terrorism. He points out that today access to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons materials and technologies is easier than ever before and that terrorist groups or substate actors might feel tempted to make use of it. Jeffrey Bradford and Elisabeth Hauschild take up the issue of information vulnerabilities and information warfare. Both papers provide the reader with an account of the risks modern information societies are confronted with as well as of the opportunities rendered by new information technologies.

The papers by Leif Ohlsson and Gideon Rose address water scarcity and energy security as sources of conflicts. At least in the Middle East, water scarcity already is a highly controversial issue and seems to grow in importance. The link between water scarcity and conflict – international as well as within countries – is being drawn. Energy security with regard to oil and gas is currently not a major issue, however, in the coming years the supply situation in the field of oil will at least change owing to the increased demand on the side of Asian economies and because of the decline of oil production in the North Sea by the year 2010. This will let the Middle East again become the strategically most important region in terms of energy security and will lead us to look more into the complex fabric of Gulf security than ever before. Rose concludes that the best long-term response to energy security must be to reduce the global consequences that any regional disruption of supply might have.
Part four of this book addresses the new dimensions of security policy. The contribution by Sonia Lucarelli analyzes the instruments of preventive diplomacy from an European perspective. She describes the conditions for success and failure and develops some lessons for future preventive policy. Kori Schake, in her contribution, deals with the Dayton Peace Accords as a model of restoring peace and order in a war-raged area such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. She concludes that the accords have a mixed record of success in their first three years of implementation, that the civil aspects have been much slower than the military aspects to gain traction in Bosnia. Gilles Carbonnier takes up the issue of war-raged areas from the perspective of an economist. He describes the difficulties in rebuilding war-torn economies, whereby Bosnia-Herzegovina can serve as a rather depressive example. The challenges of economic rebuilding, Carbonnier concludes, calls for multidisciplinary research that goes far beyond mere contributions from experts in different disciplines. The final paper by Anthony Forster takes a more theoretical, conceptual look at the chances for furthering and improving the cooperative security structures the Western world has developed over the past 50 years. It shows how different perceptions about the nature of international affairs (and the role of international structures as well as of human beings) are shaping the way decisions about the nature of the international order are eventually being made.

Taken together, these contributions provide a good overview of contemporary issues and challenges in the field of security and defense issues and they give excellent examples of where strategic studies should aim.
Problems and Prospects in Implementing the Initial Enlargement Round

The July 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid formalized the Atlantic Alliance’s plans to enlarge its membership. After extensive discussions, Heads of State from the sixteen nations announced that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic would be issued official invitations to join the Alliance in 1999. These announcements have had, and will continue to have, a significant impact on NATO’s political and military decision-making organs. In addition, appropriate structural changes will be required to accommodate not only the physical presence of new members, but also the political and military agendas they bring to the table.

In the past, NATO has been a rather closed club. It maintains distinct comparative advantages over global security arrangements such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU). These advantages include the Alliance’s unique integrated military structure and the membership of the United States, its leader and largest contributor. Whether or not opening its doors to new democracies in NATO’s close geographic vicinity will dilute the potency and credibility of these unique elements, is yet to be determined as the Alliance enters a whole new phase in its development.

For those associate, or ‘partner’ nations, which were not brought into the fold at Madrid, concessions and provisions will have to be made to accommodate their exclusion. Many of these potential problems already surfaced in Madrid and will continue to reappear as long as these countries have only a marginal role in NATO’s primary decision-making forums. Russia, in particular will be the most delicate partner to manage.
This paper will go one step beyond the abundance of literature already produced on the first round of NATO Enlargement. It will acknowledge that enlargement is now a fait accompli and examine the problems and prospects of the implementation process. The suggestion will be made that, having made these far-reaching decisions, the Alliance should now draw back from its Enlargement drive and analyze the political, military and internal impacts this move will have on its existing structures and identity. The analysis will also assess the effectiveness of these changes in preparing NATO for future conflict.

Enlargement Foreseen

As NATO entered the post–Cold War period without a raison d’être or potential adversary, it found very little to place on the agendas of foreign and defense ministerial meetings. These biannual meetings are held to plan and endorse new initiatives and to justify the continued contribution from the national budgets of the sixteen members.

During the first few years that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO was occupied with framing its New Strategic Concept. In the past, this concept had been geared more towards Cold War contingencies when the Alliance faced an opponent with large conventional and nuclear capabilities. In 1991, the Alliance leaders agreed on a new strategy that enhanced dialogue and cooperation. The strategy also required that NATO’s nuclear warheads be downsized considerably and pointed away from the former Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union.

The January 1994 Brussels Summit heralded the birth of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Model and a Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program for the new Central and East European democracies. Although CJTF has enjoyed rapid development since its inception, it is the PfP program that has become so intimately connected to Enlargement.
PfP was well received by NATO’s sixteen delegations but with some skepticism by some eastern countries that saw it as a poor substitute for early NATO membership. All members of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), (now referred to as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council following a decision in Madrid) were invited to participate in PfP.

In order to achieve full ‘partner’ status members were required to submit Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs), outlining changes they would make in order to adapt to NATO standards and increase compatibility. This indoctrination would also come with a commitment from NATO to include the candidate in all PfP political and military programs and provide them with transitional assistance. The enhanced membership took place in a new bloc of offices that now house partner representatives at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, as well as office space for their military personnel at the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium.

PfP has been an effective stepping stone and has provided valuable assistance for the partners in many areas. The program makes a positive contribution in facilitating the democratic transitions required by Central and East European countries to reform their security structures. National representatives gain valuable experience from observing democratic planning and civilian control of the military as practiced by

1  The NACC was established to oversee the further development of dialogue, cooperation and consultation between NATO and its Cooperation partners – an integral part of NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept. Twenty-five countries participated in the NACC’s inaugural meeting. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which took place the same day, participation in the NACC was expanded to include all the member states of the CIS. Georgia and Albania joined the process in April and June 1992 respectively, and Finland joined soon after as an observer. The committee has grown to include members as far East as Kazakhstan.

2  SHAPE is based in Mons, Belgium, approximately 50 miles from the headquarters in Brussels. The building is home to much of NATO operational training and planning. Most importantly, the Alliance’s most powerful military leader, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, commonly known as SACEUR heads it.
western governments. This exposure has proven to catalyze change and allow new ideas to be implemented within these countries.

PfP’s economic impact is equally important. The ability of partner countries to contribute constructively to the plans outlined in their IPPs has required substantial changes to transform their centrally planned economies and embrace free market practice. Although PfP’s primary purpose is to provide an appropriate forum to discuss security issues, informal opportunities also arise for economic dialogue. For example, ideas for cooperation and collaboration on defense matters offer ways to stimulate economic growth and direct foreign investment. Arguably, these hybrid benefits can only strengthen the position of these countries as aspiring full members of the European Union (EU).

The trouble with PfP lies in the way it was ‘sold’ to the partners. The main impetus behind the fulfillment of interim commitments and the submission of IPPs, has been the expectation of eventual full membership. Now that the three new invitees have been announced and NATO’s words have been backed by action, these expectations will persist, particularly from those excluded from this round of accession talks. The greater challenge lies with sustaining the enthusiasm towards the PfP program among those countries with which NATO has no short-term interest in including in accession talks.

**Unsettled Partners**

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the problems and prospects of a NATO Enlargement Round II, it is worth discussing the problems which already loom amongst some unsettled partners. Romania and Slovenia, for example, were both nominated by France and Italy to be considered for accession in Madrid. In the end, American

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3 The Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) in the UK are now actively engaged in defense collaborative work in these countries.
and British reservations about a more extensive enlargement led to a compromise which granted honorable mention to these candidates and indicated their strong position for a possible second round. Specifically, the communiqué read:

We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999. With regard to the aspiring members, we recognize with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia.4

These words have undoubtedly provided an element of hope for these two nations, and will certainly give Romania every incentive to continue its much needed reform process. Slovenia, on the other hand, would seem as good a candidate as the three current invitees. The economy is thriving due to successful free market reforms and an increase in foreign investment. Despite the small size of its armed forces, Slovenia has made effective transitions from military to civilian control within its Defense Ministry. Many assumed that its proximity to the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia was its only black mark to the first-round accession talks. Others, however, have indicated that extending an invitation to Slovenia and, therefore, catering to Italy ahead of the French bid for Romania, would have upset the internal cohesion of the Alliance.

Bulgaria has a similar axe to grind and has based much of its argument on the geopolitical needs that enlargement seemingly fails to address. Their view is that if NATO Enlargement were responding to the new geopolitical and geostrategic challenges, NATO should consider access to the Black Sea as critical to its expansion. At the moment, it seems like a simple shift of the old Iron curtain to cut off the buffer zone between the west and Russia. The Baltic nations could argue on the same basis. Their exposure to the northern flank, their proximity to the Baltic Sea, and their similar position as a buffer between the Scandinavian full NATO members and Russia all serve as acceptable

4 See the NATO Communiqué issued in Madrid, NATO Information and Press Office, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 8 July 1997.
arguments.

The Five Criteria

The Study on Enlargement of 1995 outlined five unofficial criteria that potential invitees would have to meet before being considered for full membership. These criteria were:

- democratic system of government
- free market economy
- resolution of disputes with neighbors
- democratic and civil control of the military
- contribution to NATO’s military effectiveness

According to these criteria, Poland appears to be the strongest contributor. Stable democratic institutions are in place and have been facilitated by smooth transitions. The country’s free market reforms have been instituted with great success and have encouraged the fastest GDP growth in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland has resolved most of its border and minority problems with Germany, Ukraine and Lithuania and has legislated new laws and a new constitution that assures civil control of the armed forces. Standing as the most important military invitee, its contribution to collective defense, peace support operations and a growing defense budget, stands well ahead of the other invitees.

The Czech Republic’s democratic performance was quite commendable until the recent government crisis over corruption and economic problems. Their free market economy has made good progress, but still has quite a way to go before achieving sound results. Most of the problems and bitterness surrounding the January 1993 separation of the former Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia have been overcome. Minority groups that still coexist in the shared border region have required this tranquility. A new inexperienced Defense
Minister and a recent neglect of the armed forces have posed challenges to the civil control criterion. The good relationship between the Defense Ministry and the General Staff, however, indicates that this obstacle is not insurmountable. Lastly, the problem of waning public support and apathy towards NATO membership has cautioned many of the western leaders to monitor movements in the Czech Republic more closely.\(^5\)

Hungary’s most notable achievements have been with the revolution of the question of powers under the constitution between the President and the Government. Although Hungary’s economy and free markets enjoyed early growth, the momentum has now slowed down. Minority problems still exist with Hungarians in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine despite the bilateral treaties and agreements pursued for greater stability. Although Hungary’s President and Government have almost resolved their differences, some problems still remain. The fact that the Defense Minister and senior defense officials are ex-military is also worrying. The existing Hungarian army is quite small and suffers from a lack of public support and financial stability that adversely impacts on the army’s efforts to westernize. For this reason, the future contribution of the Hungarian armed forces is likely to be primarily in the area of peace support operations. This observation has led to ‘free rider’ suspicions and whether or not Hungary will in fact be a ‘net user’ of security and not a ‘net contributor’.

**Military Difficulties**

The three new invitees all suffer from common defense problems. One serious concern has been the absence of any national defense policies or military strategies. Western leaders and analysts have tended to think strategically and according to doctrine and policy shaped by national

\(^5\) However, recent reports indicate that public support has turned, that 60 percent of the population now support NATO and that much of this indifference was galvanized by the perceived inattention given to domestic problems.
and economic interests. Strategic plans are constantly redrafted to reflect global changes and new security challenges. Former Warsaw Pact members have been molded to the Soviet system in which strategic planning was carried out in Moscow. Since the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact forces, these countries have yet to introduce any newly crafted national strategies and policies. Such obsolete arrangements will require massive upheavals before military operational compatibility can be realized.

The criterion calling for more civilian control within government offices and particularly within Defense Ministries may have a negative impact on public support for the alliance in the short to medium term. Offering parliamentary officials greater control of the budgets might not lead to increased support for defense spending especially when other domestic problems require attention. A lack of military presence and leadership within the defense ministries, therefore, could cause two of the Enlargement criteria to work against each other. The push for these countries to gain full EU membership, for example, is no doubt encouraging spending on economic and social reforms. A lack of trained civil service staff and an absence of civilian expertise in governments and parliaments will also complicate these factors.

The ability of the three invitees to offer the Alliance an effective military contribution is impeded by the scarce resources available for modernization. Their obsolete air defense systems, command and control functions and lack of language skills requires a bottom-up reform and restructuring process which will take time and a considerable financial outlay. These issues could affect other NATO reforms agreed upon before Enlargement, but whose implementation has evolved over recent years. Under the CJTF concept, for example, NATO could provide its assets for European-led operations under the leadership of the Western European Union, which is increasingly

6 For example, there has been a great push on privatization, particularly in the banking sector to encourage entrepreneurialship and small- to medium-size enterprise (SME) growth. In order to facilitate this, social reforms such as the push to adapt to participatory, consumer-oriented markets are also required.
thought of as the military pillar of the European Union. Most of the larger assets and logistics support is provided by the United States, who might show understandable reluctance to deploy assets to these outmoded forces.

Political Difficulties

Politically, the greatest challenge to the Alliance’s enlargement plans will be in preserving tranquil relations with Russia. Although Russian leaders have not voiced a desire to join the Alliance, they are keen to have an input into NATO decision-making. Anticipating that the announcement of more formal enlargement plans in Madrid would arouse fears in Moscow, NATO offered the further concession in Madrid of a NATO-Russia Founding Act – a special agreement that would enhance dialogue and encourage greater transparency between the two sides. The agreement is not a treaty and does not offer Russia any veto power over NATO decisions. It does offer a forum for NATO

7 The CJTF idea was originally developed at the United States Department of Defense. It was thought that the ‘lend/lease’ arrangement of NATO assets might encourage the European members to resolve some of the smaller security problems without depending on US support. The program is to be supported by permanent operational ‘nuclei’ established in strategically deployable areas.

8 The Alliance’s policy toward the Russian Federation became more defined thanks to the ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation’ in Paris on 25 May 1997. The signing followed NATO’s preferences for a non-ratified agreement. The document also contained some institutional schemes in the form of the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The Council will provide a mechanism for consultation and coordination and, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. The consultations will not extend to internal matters of NATO, NATO member states or Russia.

9 Nor, as President Yeltsin has quite pointedly remarked, does the agreement offer NATO any veto over Russian policy.
members to meet regularly with Russians to discuss a wide range of issues such as scientific development, intelligence, military capability, peace support operations and nuclear programs.

Unfortunately, this major concession has not put many of Russia’s fears to rest. After all, much of the enthusiasm surrounding relations between NATO and Russia has been NATO-led. Recent discussions with the Baltic States, for example, have unearthed the thorny issue of the Kaliningrad corridor, over which Russia has always laid historical claim. Lithuania’s recent state policy on Kaliningrad – “to encourage Kaliningrad to become more open and more ready to cooperate with neighboring states, progressively turning the enclave, economically and politically, into an integral part of the Baltic region” – can only arouse Russia’s deepest fears about its intentions there.\(^\text{10}\) Russia has shown nervous discomfort towards more frequent discussions between NATO and the Baltic States, as well as the bilateral agreements recently forged between the Baltics and the United States.\(^\text{11}\)

Almost unnoticed at the Madrid Summit was the signature of the Charter between NATO and Ukraine on 9 May. Overshadowed by Enlargement and the Founding Act, the most accurate interpretation of this document could be described as an effort to underscore Ukraine’s independence while at the same time avoiding offending Russia by stretching NATO influence so far east. Russia’s biggest concern with this relationship is Ukraine’s longer-term intentions with respect to NATO membership. Despite the recent agreements on the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the feud over the Crimea, the relationship is still rather delicate. Many members of the Russian elite have still not accepted Ukraine’s permanent separation from “the Mother country.”

In Russia’s political arena, many realities exist which should not be


\(^{11}\) The Baltic Security Pact with the United States was signed in January 1998. For more details, see Rhodes, Tom and Robin Lodge. “Clinton Backs NATO Expansion to the Baltics.” The Times (London), 13 January 1998.
taken lightly. During his term as Russian foreign minister, Yevgeniy Primakov’s popularity and broadly shared opposition to NATO Enlargement combined to have a unifying effect on Russian foreign policies towards NATO. Other opponents include financial and economic groups within the Russian government who condemn enlargement on the grounds that it prevents a strong Russian presence in the world markets.\[^{12}\]

The return of General Alexander Lebed in the political arena, after being sacked from his position as National Security Advisor by President Yeltsin, could be cause for future concern. Heralded for his military planning and force commanding ability, should Lebed follow his political aspirations and become a possible successor to Yeltsin, he will undoubtedly be committed to law, order and military reforms. The Black Sea Fleet issue could become sour once again; peacekeepers in some of the former Soviet republics could adopt a more aggressive stance,\[^{13}\] or massive internal strife could break out between the different political factions.

The counter-argument to the Lebed scenario is that his charisma and proven track record in diplomacy could limit these types of problems. In this case, other presidential candidates committed to more nationalist programs and rebuilding the Russian Empire should be carefully considered. Following a successful bid by one of the contestants for the Russian leadership, any post-election agreement between Yeltsin’s Russia and the NATO Alliance might well be considered null and void. Ongoing rumors have indicated that, in this case, one further concern might be the potential relationship that could develop between Moscow and Beijing – an alliance that could create difficulties for future decisions in the UN Security Council.\[^{14}\]

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\(^{13}\) This happened in the case of the Transdneistr region of Moldova.

\(^{14}\) This is particularly important for future UN/NATO conflict intervention. The ‘dual key’ arrangement that was observed in Bosnia when the execution of NATO air strikes required prior approval of the UNSC, was subject to the
Effective Preparation for the Future?

Military strategists have claimed that future wars can never be predicted, just as the future itself cannot be predicted. As NATO pursues its plans to expand the Alliance, retrain and standardize the armed forces of the soon-to-be members, and make Central and Eastern Europe a more stable place, is the world’s most effective collective defense machine addressing future inevitabilities?

Lurking in the distance are two types of conflicts: increasingly complex internal conflicts based on a combination of political, economic and security complexities, and a larger-scale war requiring a greater response. The ‘new’ internal conflict has already been observed in the Horn of Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia, Haiti and Somalia. Animosities based on cultural, religious, political and ethnic divisions result in internal problems that can spread to fierce levels without intervention. The 1997 SIPRI Yearbook reported that out of 27 major armed conflicts in 24 locations around the world in 1996, all but one of the recorded conflicts were internal – that is, the sources of conflict concerned control over the government or of territory within a state.

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agreement of Britain, France, the United States, Russia and China. A link between Russia and China could present many problems for decision-making during military intervention.

15 A ‘major armed conflict’ is defined as a prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one other organized group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people for the duration of that conflict: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ed. SIPRI Yearbook 1997: World Armaments and Disarmament. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 17.

16 The sole interstate conflict was that between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue.

17 It should also be noted that although several other conflicts received much publicity during the year, this does not necessarily indicate that they fulfilled the
Population movements, new democracies that offer more power to the people, intermarriages and minority enclaves will continue to complicate local configurations. In failing or collapsed states that lack the political and social strength to cap irredentist behavior and secessionist aspirations, these problems are most acute. This poses great challenges for intervention forces accustomed to operating under conventional principles.

The trends described above indicate that an increase in future intrastate conflicts is foreseeable. In recognition of this, NATO has taken measures, under the PIP program, to prepare Central and East European armies for peace support roles in these conflicts. Some of these forces have already proved their military capability alongside the UN and NATO forces operating in the former Yugoslavia.

Arguably, however, the military techniques required for conflicts like Bosnia and even Somalia are already outmoded. Lessons learned have shown that deploying multinational peace-keeping troops mandated with the ability to use force only when necessary is considered futile. The key event that finally diluted the fighting in Bosnia was the American-led NATO display of firepower that proved the political will

18 Karin von Hippel describes collapsed states as occurring when “public institutions, legitimate authority, law and political order disintegrate (including the police and judiciary), and most assets are either destroyed or stolen. This happens when states are unable to accommodate the disruptive authorities that contribute to the deterioration of central authority, such as corruption, ethnic and territorial disputes, humanitarian disasters (which are often man-made), international interference, and overexpenditure on defense and refugee flows.” Taken from von Hippel, Karin. “State Collapse and State Building: The Case of Somalia.” Paper presented at a conference on Defence – Disaster – Development: Security in the Third Millenium held in Prague on 15-16 December, 1997: 2.

19 British and US sources have reported particularly on the performance of the Czech battalion which contributed to Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia.
of the international community. Effective deterrence in peace support operations can only be executed with the utmost precision and coherence of strategy. The contribution that Central and east European armed forces, with the notable exception of Poland, make to the Alliance’s integrated military structure will not enhance this capability in the short to medium term.

The current situation in Kosovo underscores the dilemma concerning military capability and standardization. Recent ethnic cleansing in the Serbian autonomous province, and refusals by the Serbian leadership to remove its troops from the area, have prompted calls for an international military response. At the moment, NATO has two options. It can launch airstrikes that would have to target Serbian air defense systems and therefore incur significant collateral damage, or send in a ground force under a Chapter VII mandate which authorizes the use of force.

Both options place NATO in a rather dubious position. On the one hand, airstrikes would lead to horrifying television images of human tragedy while Belgrade, home of the main perpetrators, remained unscathed. On the other hand, deploying a ground force to the Serbian-Kosovo border area would require immediate commitment on national contributions from those capable of carrying out the task. The chances of the US Congress supporting such a decision are highly unlikely. Other western armies committed to ‘softer’ peace-keeping duties, a shift in policy caused by disastrous events of past interventions, would steer clear of such missions. Furthermore, nations would consider the volatility of this area, the capabilities of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serb forces, and the strategic positions already occupied by the factions. Should failure to comply with the ground forces lead to the threat of air strikes, NATO troops would have to be removed, and planners would have to reconsider the consequences associated with airstrikes.

Military operations required for conflicts such as Kosovo require

20 This could include countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium.
careful strategic planning and intervention skills. Conflicts like these have proven their capability to unfold even during what was anticipated to be a fairly peaceful period. Deploying forces that have a long way to progress before reaching full compatibility with NATO forces would be a fatal move. At the same time, rallying support for ground or air-based intervention will also prove difficult.

NATO must balance all these intervention options with their already fragile relations with Russia. Following talks in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, Russia expressed complete dissatisfaction with NATO’s activation warning for airstrikes on Kosovo. They warned that the Alliance was endangering their relations with Russia and that Russia would condemn the execution of airstrikes.

Conclusions

Although this paper has highlighted many areas of concern and potential difficulty with implementing the first round of enlargement, NATO must be commended for the diplomacy it has demonstrated so far. Its delicate position with Russia has required careful handling of the whole Enlargement issue, particularly where it concerns Russia’s peripheral areas. Similarly, its gestures to Ukraine and the Baltic States have protected the Alliance from being accused of catering to Russia at the expense of the security of these states.

The game of maintaining a ‘careful balance’ must also extend to NATO’s exceptional PfP program to sustain enthusiasm amongst those countries excluded from the first round of enlargement. Active partner participation must not only be seen as an automatic but also necessary step toward NATO membership.

NATO’s future identity remains the biggest concern. Despite the

21 Discussions with a NATO Spokesperson, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 1 October 1998.
development of an enhanced dialogue and smooth relations, NATO runs the risk of offering a similar service than that already provided by other institutions. NATO supporters would immediately suggest that this is not the case, due entirely to the unique integrated military structure and the United States’ military contribution, an element to which no other organization can lay claim.

NATO’s role in future conflicts must be carefully considered in impending enlargement decisions. The alliance’s dubious position in Kosovo has already shown that strategic and forward planning is a key to diffusing these problems at an early stage. Any new military contributors must enhance the Alliance’s ability to provide collective defense to its members and not dilute it. Spreading into spheres of uncertainty, particularly in the direction of Russia, has proven to be a risky game. NATO’s success at playing it will depend very much on the approach it takes towards future Enlargement decisions.

The decision to enlarge has been taken. At the moment, the best course of action for NATO is to tread carefully and set an effective precedent for future Enlargement rounds. The Alliance must consider ways to preserve and not dilute its distinct characteristics that have facilitated success in the past. NATO must develop its military capability to operate ‘out of area’ in peace support operations without compromising its faculty to provide collective defense to its members. Enthusiasm for the PfP program must be sustained, to reassure those excluded from the first round of the importance of their ‘partner’ status. Lastly, NATO must use its international resources to build political stability in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This will set a realistic and critical standard that must be met prior to further accession.
Barna Zsigmond

Prospects and Problems for the Further Enlargement of NATO

Introduction

There is no doubt that NATO has committed itself to a further enlargement process. The structure itself allows further enlargement and besides NATO has also expressed very clearly that enlargement will not stop at the first round. Moreover according to the Madrid summit declaration the time of decision is also set as NATO’s heads of state and government will review the process at their next meeting in 1999. Furthermore, this declaration contains the name of two countries: Romania and Slovenia and one region: the Baltic region as future potential membership candidates.

After the dissolution of the Warsaw pact, NATO remained the sole international organization capable of providing security for Europe. By 1993 the idea of redefining NATO’s role by allowing new states to join the organization was being considered. But immediately there were many problems. How is a 16-member organization that has accepted only four new members in the past years able to continue to maintain its identity if in a short time it accepts more than ten members? The main idea of NATO is the unanimity principle, which is rather difficult to achieve even with 16 members. By absorbing too many new members NATO may become a simple talking club. The solution was found in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. But this proved to serve only for a very short time as the candidate states expressed their will to become full members and as the Alliance expressed its receptivity. PfP was degraded into a parking site for the candidate states.
There was a growing support in the United States for the idea that NATO should extend European stability eastwards by taking in Eastern and Central European states. Very soon after the idea of enlargement became political reality, every state in the region formulated its will to join the organization. From the perspective of these states NATO Enlargement was an unanimous desire. On the part of NATO the question was delicate and problematic. It was in 1997 in Madrid when the decision was made. One may analyze whatever he wants from the declaration in connection with the second round and can freely interpret the words. Notwithstanding, the fact is that NATO wanted three new members and possibly other enlargement rounds.

In the main, the NATO Enlargement debate focused on the countries to be accepted in the first round and on the relationship which needs to be developed with Russia. It is equally important, however, for the stability of Europe and for the future of NATO to formulate a clear strategy for the second round. It is certain that such a strategy does not exist at the moment.

The enlargement debate depends on the security strategy NATO will adopt in the future. If NATO intends in the short term to be a collective security institution similar to OSCE then the enlargement process will not stop and even the membership of Russia can be conceived. This alternative can lead in the long run to a collective defense organization in light of a conflict with China or the Islamic world. But in the foreseeable future the character of NATO will change considerably.

The other strategy, which is compatible with the Madrid decision, is built on an alliance which is cohesive and is an organization of collective defense for states sharing common democratic values.

I will elaborate my theme in two main parts: the first part comprises a discussion on the problems of future enlargement and a second part tries to present some possible scenarios for further enlargement.

I. The Alliance is now in the 12th hour of the enlargement process. The direct reference in the Madrid decision to round two commits the Alliance to further enlargement. To step back and to reverse the decision will be a drawback to the stability of the region. The reasoning for this must continue and debate should be initiated for a new list of the
countries invited to join the Alliance. Taking into consideration the main problems and arguments against enlargement this list has to be compiled in such a way that the advantages of enlargement outweigh the disadvantages. Hence a second round enlargement is not a must, the key element being the preservation of the collective defense character of NATO.

II. In the seven-year history of NATO Enlargement debates many scenarios have come into being. Basically the Madrid decision set the stage for Romania and Slovenia and also invited the Baltic countries. When we talk about the second round of NATO Enlargement, however, we can and have to talk about the following states: Slovakia, Bulgaria, Austria, and Sweden, which might become members in the future. Certainly, theoretically, the admission of Ukraine and Russia has come up and one can also talk about the membership of Albania and the new states formed within the territory of former Yugoslavia. But these speculations would lead us too far away from reality.

Problems

Different positions within the Alliance

There is a disagreement among the NATO members on which states are ready to join the Alliance. More particularly, France and Italy have on several occasions expressed the fact that they strongly support Romania and Slovenia to be included in the group of future and possible NATO members. On the other side the US was firm in limiting the number of candidate states to three. Looking behind the scenes set up by the governments, a second important step is to convince the decision-makers in the legislative power to ratify the new members. If one looks at the debate on NATO Enlargement in the US Senate there appears little chance for a future candidate. Parliamentary debates will generate public debates and publicity related to the problematic states of the east will inevitably give a negative perception, and it is no longer possible for the enlightened political leadership to resolve the issues in
a quiet parliamentary session. France, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Portugal, and Spain are promoting wider enlargement focused on a southern enlargement and are therefore campaigning for the membership of Romania and Slovenia. The Mediterranean orientation of these countries, the reluctant attitude of the US Senate for reasons of lowering the costs, and a possible neutral German attitude which has accomplished its primary goals, seems to me an irreconcilable antagonism. It is hard to predict that given the fact of these differences – which exist without taking into consideration the other factors with possible influences on the decision (for example the Russian attitude) – will make it possible for a common decision on the second round. Members of the Alliance are also concerned with the institutional reform of the organization and some of them argue that first and foremost the institutional reform should be carried out.

**Russia**

When the idea of NATO Enlargement was debated for the first time at the highest political level in 1993, the Russian reaction was rather relaxed. It seemed that Russia would not object to the expansion of NATO towards the east. This favorable attitude rapidly changed, however. Together with the domestic crisis in Russia and with the weakening position of Yeltsin vis-à-vis the Duma, the issue of NATO immediately became the focus of Russian politics. As a consequence, in Western security thinking, the Russian factor became a top priority and Russian security concerns since then have been taken into account. Although Russia gradually accepted the admission to NATO of three Central European states, it made it very clear that in no way would it accept the membership of the Baltic States and other former Soviet republics.

Russia has a long-standing historically rooted fear of foreign western invasion. The glory of the Soviet era has gone and Russia stands alone weak with a ruined economy. Russia, forced by these factors, acknowledged that Central Europe is no longer its sphere of influence, but made it very clear that the former Soviet republics and the Black Sea region is of particular importance for Russia’s security. If
enlargement will go further Russia will have to rely on its single remaining power and will have to increase its security based on nuclear weapons. Enlargement may also increase Russian hostility towards the Alliance and this will cause considerable change within Russian domestic policies, having the effect of bringing extreme forces to power.

Today, Russia does not look like an expansionist state and does not seem to be an immediate threat for its near abroad. But if Russia does start to gain power it may act aggressively towards the neighboring countries. If the countries threatened are NATO members, protection is offered to them which can deter the aggressiveness of Russia.

**History**

Drawing on extensive statistical material and making use of concrete state descriptions numerous arguments have been found on why only three states had been invited to join NATO. Similarly, the following question arises: is there any historical determinism on the issue? From a Western perspective, all the former eastern block countries were regarded as East Europe. However, in the region labeled East Europe in fact two main subregions exist: one regarded as Central Europe and the other named East Europe. Much has been written on this issue which in fact has always generated debates focused especially on the location of the dividing line between these two.

One of the most important chapters in terms of history and culture in post–Cold War Central Eastern Europe is the new geopolitical development of the region. Recent political, economic, and social developments make it very clear that the region defined under the Cold War as the Eastern Bloc is in fact composed of two subregions, each of which has distinct characteristics. The Central European identity has been reflected in some forms of regional cooperation namely the Visegrad group and the Central European Initiative. Consideration was also given to the perception of Westerners that the Central European countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland – are the most developed countries of the eastern block and are the most likely candidates to the European Union and NATO. Whereas the other
countries of the former eastern bloc have confronted violent economies, social and political difficulties, the countries of Central Europe have been successful from the very beginning in achieving a relatively stable political system and have not hesitated in implementing new economic reforms.

This theory is known in modern political science owing to the famous work of Samuel Huntington about the clash of civilizations.\textsuperscript{1} Interestingly enough, the EU considered the Central European countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) to have the highest degree of ability and readiness to join the EU. The present eastern borders of these countries are at the same time the borders between eastern and western Christianity. To the west of these borders societies have experienced feudalism, the renaissance, the enlightening, the French revolution, the industrial revolution, and a late process of urbanization with the formation of a middle-class bourgeoisie. This theory does not grasp the substance of the developments in the region, yet the latest integration phenomenon follows this pattern.

\textit{Dividing line in Europe}

Despite NATO and EU members’ denial, the enlargement of NATO and EU will create new dividing lines in the Continent. These new borders will determine who is in and who is out. What is uncontested is that at least institutional dividing lines will evolve. First of all this dividing line in terms of NATO membership will mean security guarantees for those in and dilemmas for those left out. A certain level of security is provided by the PfP regime, but the guarantees cannot be compared with that offered by membership.

One should not forget that dividing lines exist today. It was in 1990 when everybody thought that dividing lines should and can be erased. Theory has not stepped back but reality very soon demonstrated that there are considerable differences between the eastern and western

\textsuperscript{1} Huntington, Samuel P. \textit{The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order}. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
parts of the Continent. In the past ten years it has turned out that the three invited countries have no major difficulties in lining up with the west. But even today the same dividing lines (institutional, economic and military) exist, the only thing that has been achieved in these countries is full political liberty. With the enlargement of NATO and EU a chance is offered for the selected countries to join the club of Western countries in every other sphere of life. The harmonization of these countries supposes a lot of support for the West and the resources allocated for these aims are not enough for every country in the region. The idea was to move step by step eastwards and to offer membership step by step for countries which have fulfilled the basic criteria. As a consequence the issue is not about the drawing of a new dividing line in Europe but about moving the dividing line eastward and offering the opportunity of joining the developed world for the countries which fulfill the basic requirements.

The problem arises when one regards the Euro-Atlantic structures as a long lasting block. From this perspective the dividing lines defined by EU and NATO will influence the life of future generations in the continent, which will mean for those left out lower security and standards of life than for those inside.

_Ukraine_

The orientation of Ukraine in the future will influence the process of NATO Enlargement. Ukraine depends very much on the financial aid coming from the US and the economy of the country is strongly connected with the Russian market and the supply of raw materials coming from Russia. The country has had a delicate historical relationship with Russia and the existence of a twelve-million Russian minority in the country has a major impact on the foreign policy of Ukraine. Among the new nominated and possible members Hungary, Poland, and Romania have common borders with Ukraine. As a consequence of the NATO borders moving eastwards Russia may be tempted to broaden its sphere of influence even in security issues. This endeavor might limit the independent foreign policy of Ukraine and may hinder its membership in NATO.
Ukraine, like other non-invited countries, does not want to be left in a position of a forgotten gray zone, therefore the country has declared several times that it is interested in joining NATO. The symbolic reunification of Belarus and Russia outlines a dangerous future for Ukraine. If in Ukraine Western orientation and the desire to join NATO will prevail it will be difficult to conceal the different interests: the interest of Russia in a non-member Ukraine and the interest of decision-makers in Kiev who want to be accepted in NATO.

Prospects

NATO has been an open organization from the beginning. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty permits NATO members to invite by unanimous agreement any other European state to accede to this treaty. The category “European” can be interpreted very broadly in a way that it would comprise all the countries to the Ural, which are geographically situated in the continent. As in Madrid the new expansion of the Alliance will resemble very much a diplomatic version of the Oscar awards. The process and the verdict of Madrid looked very much like a ceremony where the winners celebrated.

The future is hard to forecast. We do not know which states are the candidates for NATO membership and there is no list as yet. As time goes by some countries are moving up and others are moving down on the board of the candidates. There can also be formulated allegations about which states are more probable to become members. The following are possibilities for the Second Enlargement Round.

Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia

If we take a look at the map we realize that apart from the three invited countries these three countries are geographically closest to the heart of Europe. None of these countries was a former Soviet Republic, still none of them was invited. Reiterating again the historical factor, the
membership of these countries seems realistic, therefore in the case of every country there are serious pro and contra arguments.

Slovakia as a member of the Visegrad countries was among the favorite candidates, but later a Slovakia lead by the paternalistic, antidemocratic Meciar regime ruled itself out from the accession process. The reason is clearly the authoritarian character of the regime. The economic situation of the country is not worse than the average situation of the other Central European states and the other important military indicators are satisfactory. Still there are warning signs that the reforms have been delayed and an economic crisis is knocking at the back door. If after the 1998 September parliamentary election the former democratic opposition parties will form a governmental coalition Slovakia will emerge again as a strong contender.

Romania and Slovenia were regarded for a long time as ranked outsiders in the race to join NATO but in the final lap emerged as possible members. Romania was the first country to sign up for Partnership for Peace. The military reform in Romania has been carried out with success. But the process of democratization started very late. After the fall of the Ceausescu regime the old structures were preserved by the newly established post-communist power. Until 1996 the leading Romanian elite could not decide on the orientation of Romania. Geographically the country is situated at the border of Europe at the place where Central Europe meets the Balkans. Romania is considered to be particularly important because of its direct access to the Black Sea. This can help the Alliance to protect Europe from military and non-military threats from the east.

Slovenia has appeared as a surprise candidate and later it seemed to be the candidate with the best chances. The main argument for supporting the application of Slovenia was to unite Hungary physically with the rest of NATO. By accepting it the Alliance will have a window on the republics of former Yugoslavia. Slovenia, as a small and stable country, will not cause any problems within NATO structures. Among these three countries only the Slovenian membership can be conceived as an option, when choosing just one country for the second run.
The Baltic States

The membership of the Baltic States is a delicate issue. Russia was very firm on saying that accepting the Baltic States would endanger its relationship with NATO. In 1995 the US offered the three Baltic states the US-Baltic Charter which aims to deepen collaboration among the countries. The pressure on the Baltic States from the side of Russia is high and there is a high degree of anxiety in the region as in the light of a Russian crisis the population is worried about retaining the independence of these countries.

The Baltic membership in the Alliance depends exclusively on the position occupied by Russia. There is no doubt that Russia will state its position and that nobody will contest this attitude.

Bulgaria

Similarly to Slovakia the political and economic processes in Bulgaria created a reluctant attitude from NATO, and the Alliance manifested silence to the requests from these countries to consolidate their situation. If Bulgaria will succeed with the reforms it has the opportunity of becoming a NATO member. The arguments for are first of all connected with the geographical location of the country, which would permit the direct geographical link between Turkey and Romania. Bulgaria is strategically important because of its location in the Balkans, which can help to bring stability and peace to the Balkans. A question mark may arise as regards the Russian position on Bulgaria’s membership taking into account that the two countries have had long-standing good relations.

Sweden and Austria

These two highly developed countries fulfill every requirement for membership and their membership does not depend on any external factor. If decision-makers and the public opinion in Austria and Sweden will formulate an application for membership the decision could be reached easily. However to take the edge of an enlargement comprising
only Eastern European states it will make the process smoother if this can be connected with one of these countries.

The acceptance of every European state

One can imagine a united Europe where every state from the Ural to the Atlantic Ocean including the Balkans and Russia is composed of stable democracies, sharing common values with the American continent, but having prejudices and fears of an expansionist Islamic or Asian alliance. This alternative leads us too far.

Conclusion

The political debate around NATO Enlargement has just begun. We do not know today what will be the consequences of the integration of the three new members. However, there is an immense danger of politicization of the membership issue. Today, as there is still time until the Washington meeting, politicians in every country succeed in avoiding public debates on the second round. But beyond political debates the decision has an important aftermath as it can influence domestic political debates and the economic situation of each country, as NATO membership can be linked with EU membership. There are no insurmountable difficulties in trying to suit the structure of the Alliance to the new members, but the financial side of the story offers themes to be debated in the media and by this the membership issue finds itself in the middle of public and political debate.

In East and Central Europe, NATO is associated with democracy, stability, and market economy. Membership is also perceived as drawing the nations closer to European culture and offers in fact security, which is understood in a very broad sense. NATO, in the view of the Eastern and Central European elite, is not any more an alliance against something, it is more an entity for certain norms and values. In the short term as Russia is in crisis and there is no direct danger for conflict in the region apart from the Balkans, EU membership is
conceived as more valuable than NATO membership, as it offers concrete economic advantages even in the short run. EU matters regulate almost every aspect of every-day life, and in times of peace nobody thinks about war. Therefore, EU enlargement will influence greatly the NATO strategy. If the EU will stop at the border of Hungary, Czech Republic, and Poland, it will be very difficult for NATO to move eastwards. If not, NATO membership is almost guaranteed for those who are let into the EU.

In the coming years a new dividing line will be drawn in Europe. The EU factor is a key element. The open-door enlargement doctrine of NATO has certain limits. NATO will have to declare eventually what is acceptable for the Alliance or, in other words, who is acceptable and when. NATO is not able to resolve all the challenges, which will arise with the concrete nomination of other new members. If the EU will resolve some of the problems and will not stop at the borders of the three nominated countries then NATO will follow the decision, with the exception of the Baltic countries.

At the Washington summit when everybody will celebrate, the decision on further enlargement will probably be postponed. This kind of decision would involve losers, and nobody wants distress at the anniversary ceremony. Therefore, the most comfortable scenario is to celebrate the three new members and to postpone the decision on further enlargement.

There is a probability that in the near future – not necessarily in Washington – a decision on a second round will be reached. The states nominated in the second round will be Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania. This process will take long but no further enlargement round will follow in the foreseeable future.
For more than fifty years the Arab-Israeli conflict is dominating one of the most important regions in the Middle East. It is the privileged situation of Israel and its neighbors at the eastern border of the Mediterranean that makes the region a neighbor of Europe and, at the same time, establishes a link between the rich north and the poor south. The impacts of this complex conflict, which is caused by a variety of factors (ethno-national-religious conflicts, remains of western colonialism and problems of state-building, the impact of the Cold War, internal struggles for power, and conflicting economic interests) do not only refer to regional security interests but also turn this conflict into an issue of security for the Mediterranean, Europe and the United States.

This paper wants to analyze the question of regional security in the light of its impact on the states involved and on the region. The core of the Arab-Israeli security relations is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite the peace process, which started at the end of the Cold War, many problems remain unresolved. The first part analyzes the path and the mechanism of the peace process from the peace conference in Madrid in 1991 to the negotiations of Oslo in 1993 and beyond, and deals with the persisting requirements and challenges for the peace process. A second part examines the impact of bilateral relations between Israel and its neighbors for the peace process. Despite the peace treaties signed between Israel and Egypt in 1979 as well as between Israel and Jordan in 1994, different perceptions of security remain without any foreseeable solution for the resulting problems. The relation with Syria and Lebanon still remains open and contradictory. Actually a multilateral peace agreement to establish a lasting and comprehensive peace in the region is still lacking.

Especially within the second part, comprehensive problems are dealt
with: the issue of arms control and regional security is closely linked to the Israeli potential as a nuclear power which in the perception of its neighbors represents a source of conflict in the region. The settlement of disputes on the distribution of water and the challenge of developing new water supplies are further requirements for achieving comprehensive peace in the region.

The third part finally analyses the influence that extra-regional actors have on the current peace process. Regarding the role of the United States and the influence of the European Union, the question arises of which measures are to be taken to face the challenges and which contribution the US and the EU can make to support the peace process and to increase security and peace in the future.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as a Core Problem

Three circles of interrelated levels determine the Arab-Israeli conflict: the core is formed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which expanded into a territorial conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Besides the local and regional level the Arab-Israeli conflict reveals a global dimension at a third level: during the Cold War the contrast between the two superpowers was transferred to the region and manifested itself in the region’s militarization. With the end of the Cold War major factors of the former structure in the Middle East have changed and gave a new impact to the situation.¹

Since the proclamation of the Israeli State in 1948, five wars in the Middle East shattered the region confronting Israel with the Arab

World. The original conflict between Israel and Palestinians confronting two ethnic groups who are claiming the same territory expanded into an Arab-Israeli conflict because of the Israeli policy of conquering territory in order to assure its own existence. Israel’s legitimacy was not accepted by the Arab neighbors, the existence of the state was threatened, it had vulnerable borders, and it was surrounded by larger and far more populous countries. In the follow-up Israel tried to gain more territory to provide itself with more strategic depth and thus a favorable position for negotiation (principle “land for peace” to achieve the recognition of its existence. Apart from these territorial conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflict of nations. The settlement of Zionist Jews in Palestine since the end of the last century, the following annexation of Palestinian territory and the expulsion of Palestinians, thus creating the problem of the refugees’ right of return, was rejected and condemned by the Arab World. While they would have accepted the transformation of the 1947 United Nations’ Security Council resolution to establish a plan to divide the territory between the two nations, to recognize the Israeli state and to internationalize Jerusalem, Israel rejected this possible solution.

The first steps for peace were taken at the negotiations in Camp David

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2 The war of 1973 can be considered as the last great war in the Middle East. The following wars, as the war in Lebanon in 1982, were fragmented within the region. During the previous wars Israel confronted an Arab coalition in 1948, 1956, 1967 (Israel occupied the whole Palestine territory up to the Jordan river, conquered the peninsula of Sinai as well as the Gaza-strip and the Golan Heights), 1968-71, and 1973.

3 See the part on “Asymmetric perceptions of security in bilateral issues” below.

4 Further analysis of the principle “land for peace,” which was established by Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council on November 22, 1967, after the war of 1967 and which became widely accepted as the framework for settling the conflict, can be found in Mandelbaum, Michael. The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge: University Press, 1988, 275.

in 1978 and the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. The Camp David negotiations took place under the patronage of the United States and were preceded by the historical initiative of Egypt’s erstwhile President Anwar el-Sadat. Besides the first formal acceptance and recognition of the legitimacy of Israel by an Arab State, the demilitarization of the Sinai was concluded. Though the principle “land for peace” could be translated into action for the first time and the territorial conflict between the two states has been resolved, a comprehensive peace settlement could not be achieved. Like the later peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994 the Egypt-Israeli relations based on the 1979 peace treaty can be described as a “cold peace,” as Arab interests are negotiated separately from the Palestinian ones.

**Madrid 1991: a bilateral and multilateral setting for the peace process**

Two essential events created a new international and regional environment to facilitate broader Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. Whilst during the past, major powers as Europe on the one hand, and the US and the Soviet Union on the other hand have had a great influence in the region, the changes in the international system brought a new situation to the surface. The Second Gulf War and the defeat of Iraq by an international coalition caused a change in Israel’s security concerns and weakened the position of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as well as Jordan who had declined to join the international front against Iraq. In addition, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union accelerated the peace process in the Middle East. On the one hand, options to withdraw from the participation in launching a peace initiative as sought for by the US were limited for the PLO and those Arab states, which had maintained close connections to the Soviet Union by losing an important diplomatic, political and military ally.

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7 Monem Said Aly, Abdel. “The Road to Oslo and Beyond.” *Security Dialogue*
On the other hand, the end of the bipolar balance of power and the containment process towards Iraq in the Second Gulf war, caused the strengthening of the leading role of the US as an “honest broker” in the Arab-Israeli peace process.\(^8\)

Another factor creating conditions for peace negotiations was the change of the parties’ position to the conflict: first the Palestinian uprising (*Intifadah*) against the Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank, started in December 1987, facilitated a moderation of the PLO’s positions. The *Intifadah*’s success led to an increase in the international value, the proclamation of a Palestinian state in November 1988 by the PLO-leadership, then exiled in Algier, and thus recognizing implicitly Israel in its borders of 1967. On the Israeli side the *Intifadah* showed how costly the occupation was, and Israel’s public opinion underlay a gradual shift favoring to resolve the problems.\(^9\)


\(^9\) Monem Said Aly, “The Road to Oslo and Beyond.” 40.

\(^10\) The bilateral track convenes meetings between Israel on the one part and Syria, Lebanon and a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation on the other. The second track, initiated in Moscow in 1992, addresses regional issues in multilateral meetings. They consist of representatives of each of the principle countries and the Palestinians, as well as representatives from a host of other Arab and European states, China, Japan, Russia, the US, Canada and Australia.
including direct talks between the confronted parties, provided above all an institutional setting for further cooperation between Israel and the Arab states which did not exist before. The bilateral negotiations aimed at resolving the conflicts between Israel and its neighbors by achieving peace treaties based on the principle “land for peace,” as well as to arrange a five-year interim self-government, to be followed by negotiations on the permanent status issues between Israel and the Palestinians. The multilateral talks complete the bilateral ones by going deeper into some issues which are of common interest to the peoples of the region. They provide an opportunity for outside powers to help foster an atmosphere for the development of peace, and serve as a confidence-building measure (CBM) in order to promote the development of normalized relations among the nations in the Middle East. From the start Syria and Lebanon boycotted the multilateral meetings as they were not willing to negotiate with Israel about “secondary matters” until bilateral issues, like the restitution of Arab territories, would not be resolved.

Oslo I, II and beyond: negotiating peace between Israel and the Palestinians

The bilateral and multilateral talks held until 1993 had served to identify areas of differences between the parties, but had produced no tangible results. A significant breakthrough to the stagnant situation could be achieved by secret talks between Israel and the PLO held over

11 A detailed analysis of all the issues addressed in the working groups is beyond the scope of this paper. For a further analysis of the issues of arms control and water, see the chapter on “The impact of security issues on the multilateral talks” below. Actually only the Economic Development Working Group reveals tangible results by the continuing Middle East/North Africa conferences concerning economic cooperation within the region. See “The Middle East Peace Process: An Overview,” edited and continuously updated by the Information Division of the Israel Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, gopher://israel-info.gov.il/0R0-109541-/new/pprocess1.

the course of eight months in Norway. They ended up in the joint
Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP, also known as Oslo
I) signed in Washington on 13 September 1993, and based on the
agreements worked out in Oslo until the end of August, 1993, which
contained mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. Thus for the
first time Israel and the PLO had the status of equal partners in the
negotiations which had not been recognized ever before. The suc-
cessful outcome of the negotiations taking place in Oslo was presup-
posed on the local level by a change in the Israeli government: the
Israeli Labor party won the June 1992 election and formed a coalition
government. One of Yitzhak Rabin’s campaign promises was to settle
the Palestinian question within nine months. On the international level
the stage for a successful outcome was set without the involvement of
third-party interests of a superpower such as the US.

While the Madrid talks between Israel and the Palestinians had only
achieved the agreement on pursuing a two-level path to resolve the
conflict of nationality (a five-year-interim self-government followed by
a permanent status for the Palestinians), the secret Oslo peace talks
came to a first, fragmentary formula to specify objects to be negotiated
in order to achieve the first stage. The DOP outlines interim self-
government arrangements and includes immediate Palestinian self-rule
in Gaza and Jericho, early empowerment for the Palestinians in West
Bank, an agreement on self-government and the election of a
Palestinian council. Additionally, extensive economic cooperation
between Israel and the Palestinians was settled. Another criteria fixed
in the DOP is the agreement to set aside all contentious questions and
to resolve them later by mutual consent.

The framework established to resolve problematic items between Israel

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13 The unblocking of direct negotiations is especially noteworthy as until January
1993 contacts between representatives of the Israeli government and members
of the PLO were forbidden by law. Groll/Meyer, “Still a Chance for Negotiated
Peace,” 21.

14 Schmid, “Frieden auf Raten.” 73.

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and the Palestinians included an ambitious time-table\textsuperscript{15} which was partly put off until today in the aftermath of the signing of the DOP. One reason for partial delays is the opposition to the DOP cited by Palestinians as well as by Israelis and too often expressed by confrontation and terror.\textsuperscript{16}

The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994 signified the beginning of the first withdrawal of Israeli troops from any part of the West Bank or Gaza. A Palestinian police force was established and partial authority was transferred to a 24-member ‘Palestine Interim Self-Government Authority’ (PA), which was headed by Yasser Arafat as its president. It represents the prototype of a future Palestinian government. At the end of August 1994, the so-called Early Empowerment Agreement was signed, providing Palestinian control of authority and responsibilities in specific government functions in the West Bank.

The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (also known as Oslo II and signed in Taba on 28 September 1995), extended autonomy to further parts of the West Bank areas, and led to the Palestinian elections of 20 January 1996, won by Arafat. According to the Interim Agreement the West Bank was divided into three different types of areas, in which (A) the Palestinian Council has full responsibility, (B) the Palestinians are granted full civil authority while Israel has the overriding authority to maintain security, and (C) Israel retains full responsibility for security and public order, e.g. for the Jewish settlements. Even if the further 13 percent of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, as agreed upon in the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998, will be implemented, the area under full Israeli control still represents 60 percent of the total territory of the


Permanent status negotiations formally began in May 1996, prior to the Israeli elections. After the victory of the Likud party under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, the final status talks did not resume. They include such critical issues as the status of the Palestinian Government, Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders, security arrangements and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Netanyahu imposed preconditions as he stated that the principle “peace for land” would not be the basis of his government’s approach to the peace process.” Therefore the Israeli withdrawal from Hebron was in dispute until the signing of the protocol concerning the redeployment on 17 January 1997. Within a stalemate situation only the political weight of the US brought the Israeli side back to the negotiating table. The deadline for the first phase of interim-agreements (4 May 1999) was moving closer without having reached any agreements on the final status and thus creating new tensions. When Arafat announced that he would unilaterally proclaim a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital by the end of the interim period, Israel showed its readiness to invade the autonomous territories, thus giving rise to a new war in the Middle East. The Wye River Memorandum, signed under the auspices of the US on 23 October 1998 put an end to the stalemate but did not yet resolve the remaining problems. The Memorandum is meant to implement the outstanding interim period issues and to enable the two sides to go on to tackle the issues of permanent status negotiations. Additionally the formula “security for land” was introduced, establishing a close link between Israeli security interests and Palestinian striving for autonomy: as long as the Palestinian side is not able to

18 The annexation of the Arab eastern part of Jerusalem by Israel during the war of 1967 created one of the most difficult items within the Arab-Israeli conflict. By enforcing Jewish settlements around an outer circle of Jerusalem, Israel is undoubtedly also using demographic means to ensure its predominance and to strengthen its claims for future negotiations on the status of Jerusalem.
combat and restrain terrorism, Israel reserves the right to stop implementa-
tion of the agreed redeployments.

Nevertheless the acceptance of the right of Palestinian self-determi-
nation has increased internationally. But it can be doubted that within
the current situation a unilateral proclamation would serve Palestinian
interests, especially as early elections in Israel, originally scheduled to
take place in October 2000, are to be held a few days after the deadline,
on 17 May 1999.

Although Oslo can be considered a diplomatic success, this evaluation
has to be qualified: Palestinian autonomy achieved until now, is frag-
mented in time (to be ended in May 1999), space and according to
policy sections. The areas under Palestinian Authority are not only
divided in the Gaza-Strip and West Bank, but these regions are also
dotted with Israeli security areas and Jewish settlements. The autono-
mous areas are still occupied by Israeli armed forces. Furthermore,
Israel is keeping the departments of Security, Foreign Trade and For-
eign Economic Policy, which means an effective control. Israel has the
possibility of blocking off areas that are still occupied, a measure Israel
is falling back on in case of high tension or as a countermeasure to ter-
rorist assaults.

The DOP’s underlying principle of mutual recognition and PLO’s
willingness to enter into negotiations accepting the treatment of three
principle issues (the status of Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees
and the problem of continuing Israeli settlements) have to be qualified a
success and a base to work from. However the process of negotiating
the interim arrangements is clearly designed according to Israeli
perceptions of security and to what it considers to be the kind and
substance of the conflict. While Israel is only willing to discuss
problems resulting from the war of 1967, the Palestinian perception of

20 By 7 July 1998, the Palestinian status as observer at the United Nations has
been increased, see Johannsen, “Wye Plantation ist nicht Camp David,” 1428.

21 Bremer, Jörg. “Arafat will abwarten: Das Recht auf den Staat Palästina – aber
nicht unbedingt Proklamation am 4. Mai.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(FAZ), 4 January 1999.
the conflict and the remaining problem of uprooted Palestinians in 1948 are not negotiable.

Further problems for the negotiation process arise from the fact that within Israel and the Palestinian communities there are elements of both opposition to and support for the DOP.22 Within Israel’s society tensions have come to light openly since the beginning of the peace process.23 On the Palestinian side Arafat’s political leadership and the arrangements signed under his responsibility are criticized. The economic situation in the Palestinian areas has not improved, and Palestinians cannot move freely within or outside the West Bank or Gaza.24 Terrorism of Palestinian as well as of Israeli origin25 clearly shows that the path to peace is still a long way off. With continued terrorism the peace process is likely to slow down, as the DOP and subsequent agreements established a link between continued Israeli withdrawal and the ability of the PA to prevent terrorism.26

24 Critics speak even of a kind of prison to describe the situation the arrangements on the occupied territories created. See Pappe, “Von Lausanne nach Oslo,” 35.
25 One of the main promoters of the peace process of Oslo, Israel’s then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated by an Israeli extremist in November 1995.
Bilateral and Multilateral Security Issues as an Obstacle to the Peace Process

Asymmetric perceptions of security in bilateral issues

Conflict areas of the Arab-Israeli peace process at the local (Israel-Palestinian) and regional level (Israel and its neighbors) are dependent on each other. The 1991 Madrid framework established bilateral talks to resolve the territory conflicts between Israel and its neighbors and to establish diplomatic and economic relations. However, problems of establishing long-term regional security arise from asymmetric perceptions of security. Early in its history Israel formulated a set of defense-policy principles in order to address a variety of threats: Israel is a state small in a territory lacking strategic depth, and surrounded by enemies committed to its destruction. Military power served Israel as a provision in order to guarantee its own survival. Nevertheless a change in Israel’s traditional national-security concept can be stated: “[t]echnological, strategic, economic and social forces are combining to render Israel’s traditional approach to national security obsolete.”

On the other hand the Arab World is divided and lacks a common position regarding several interests within the region. Distrust, mutual suspicion, tensions and misperceptions continue to separate many of the states in the Arab-Israeli zone. Both sides maintain a perception that leads to increased defense and deterrence. Although in the past two decades the nature of the region and the conflicts changed significantly, the challenge is to develop regional confidence-building measures (CBMs) to reduce the fragility of the relationship between the Arab parties and Israel by pursuing common interests, prevention of war and terrorism, cooperation in economic endeavors, water resource


28 Ibid., 48.

development, and environmental issues.

The first step in establishing regional security was the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979. Egypt’s role in the peace process has to be stressed as it was the first Arab state to break the Arab consensus laid down at Khartoum after the war in 1967. Because of Egypt’s political weight within the Arab world, Anwar el Sadat was convinced that other Arab states would follow.\(^{30}\) The 1979 peace treaty thus signified a fundamental change in the security environment and helped to reduce the fear of Israeli expansionism and thus the perceived military threat. The peace treaty defined the Egyptian-Israeli borders and reduced the possibility of surprise attacks for both sides as the demilitarization of the Sinai provided a critical buffer zone. Besides these security arrangements between the two states, the treaty involved an extraregional power as its promoter: as the treaty was concluded after signing the agreements of Camp David, which took place under the auspices of the United States, this country hence became the guarantor of peaceful Egyptian-Israeli relations.\(^{31}\)

Nevertheless relations between the two states remains fragile. The main point which dominates the perception of threat and deterrence can be found in the military field: Israel’s ambiguous nuclear policy and the concern about nuclear weapons represents an obstacle to regional security.\(^{32}\)

The Jordan-Israeli peace treaty, signed on 26 October 1994 provided additional elements in the development of regional security. As a result of the bilateral talks between Jordan and Israel, the peace treaty put an end to the state of belligerency between the two states and established political and economic relations. Although during the past non-official relations proved Jordan’s will to settle the conflict, the conditions for direct negotiations emerged first with the signing of the DOP in 1993.\(^{33}\)

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32 See for details the chapter on “The Impact of Security Issues on the Multilateral Talks” below.
33 Ibrahim, Ferhad. “Jordanien nach dem Friedensschluß mit Israel.” *Aus Politik*
The dispute on the Israeli-Jordanian border was settled. Israel agreed to return occupied areas along the border and to acknowledge Jordanian sovereignty. A point that could create future problems within the relationship of Jordan and the Palestinians is the treaty’s agreement to respect the special role of the Hashemite Kingdom over Muslim shrines in Jerusalem.

With regard to security arrangements, both sides pledged that third parties were not allowed to use their territory for military purposes against each other. Although Jordan has not posed directly a major military threat to Israel, the possibility that a third party could use Jordanian territory as a staging ground for assaults against Israel, was of high concern to Israel’s security.  

Another central issue of differences, the distribution of water of the Jordan River, was partly settled by the treaty.  

While a peace settlement with Jordan could be achieved within a bilateral frame, any peace arrangement with Syria and Lebanon still remains a challenge for the Arab-Israeli peace process. The relations between Israel and these two neighbors are partly mutually interrelated for Israel is still occupying the southern part of Lebanon, and Syria controls Lebanon’s policies and decision-making process. Lebanon committed itself to following the Syrian position of negotiation. Therefore a peace settlement with Lebanon, which could also include the solution of the terrorist problem caused by the Lebanese Hizballah, requires prior settlement between Syria and Israel. For Syria, the key to pacify southern Lebanon is Israeli willingness to withdraw its troops.

_Further reading_:


35 For a further analysis of the water issue, see the chapter on “The impact of security issues on the multilateral talks” below.

and to give back the territory of the Golan Heights.\footnote{Lerch, Wolf Günter. “Syriens Schlüsselrolle im Libanon.” \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)}, 1 December 1998.}

The Syrian readiness to enter bilateral talks within the framework of Madrid signified a partial change in the Syrian position: As a condition for negotiations, Syria had for long insisted on a prior Israeli commitment to full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.\footnote{Hinnebusch, Raymond A. “Does Syria want Peace? Syrian Policy in the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations.” \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies} 26, no. 1/101 (1996): 48.} With the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Union, Syria not only lost an important ally, but also missed the opportunity for an international conference under the patronage of the United Nations – Syria prefers not to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict as it does not want to give Israel the possibility of dividing a united Arab delegation and marginalizing Arab parties.\footnote{For further reasons for Syria’s shift from seeking strategic parity to looking for peace with Israel, see Ma’oz, Moshe. \textit{Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking}. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.}

The talks between the Israeli and Syrian delegations, established by the Madrid framework, allowed the identification of the outlines for a possible peace agreement. Nevertheless, since March 1996, the negotiations were suspended in anticipation of the results of the Israeli elections held in May 1996 and have not been resumed under the current government of Netanyahu. The negotiations, held for the Israeli side under the government of Yitzhak Rabin since 1992 and under Shimon Peres since 1995, essentially proved Israel’s willingness to accept a withdrawal from the Golan Heights in the context of a security arrangement that at the same time would address essential Israeli requirements. As the area of the Golan, less than 40 km wide, is a strategic asset for both sides, the Israeli position of negotiation included the demilitarization of the Golan: early warning stations on both sides in order to insure against assaults surprisingly mounted from beyond the demilitarized region, significant reductions to a size of the Syrian
standing army to reach parity with the Israeli capability, and
prenotification of military exercises. Furthermore the treaty contained a
Syrian guarantee for further inflow of water that runs from the Golan
to the Jordan basin. Thus important Israeli security concerns would
have been recognized by Syria.  

Nevertheless, with Benjamin Netanyahu taking over Israel’s leadership
in 1996 and his repudiation of the principle “land for peace,” the
negotiations will not continue in the foreseeable future. 41 He refuses to
accept the negotiation positions already reached, arguing that the
conceded outlines do not represent contractual commitments officially
accepted, and proposes negotiations without any preconditions. 42

*The impact of security issues on multilateral talks*

Asymmetric perceptions of security do not only have an impact on the
bilateral relations between Israel and its neighbors. Also within the
multilateral frame, security issues such as arms control and regional
security as well as water, have a great impact on the situation and the
forthcoming Arab-Israeli peace process.

Security threats arising from the capability of various states in the
Middle East to employ weapons of mass destruction 43 are highly

42 Perthes, Volker. “Hört jemand die Signale? Wie es um die Chancen für neue
43 Though Israel’s nuclear capabilities represent a monopoly in the region, Egypt,
Iran, Israel, Libya, and Syria have the capability of producing chemical
weapons. Iran, Israel and Syria conduct research in the field of biological
weapons. Before the Second Gulf War Iraq’s arsenal of chemical and biological
weapons was large, its nuclear capabilities had progressed dangerously. See
Johannsen, Margret. “Rüstung, Rüstungskontrolle und Vertrauensbildung im
Nahen Osten.” In *Wege aus dem Labyrinth? Friedenssuche in Nahost, Stationen, Akteure, Problem des nahöstlichen Friedensprozesses*, eds. Margret
Johannsen and Claudia Schmid, 209-211. Baden Baden: Nomos Verlags-
destabilizing the region. The multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) provides the only dedicated regional forum focusing on security issues, military potentials and their consequences for threat perceptions.\textsuperscript{44} An overview shows an asymmetric balance of power between the Arab and the Israeli side, either in quantity or in quality. Compared to Israel, the Arab states maintain highly operative armies. On the other hand most experts agree that Israel does not only possess a nuclear capability but also nuclear warheads and their delivery systems.\textsuperscript{45}

Asymmetric perceptions of security as described above have an important impact on the situation. The threat perceptions do not divide the conflicting parties into two camps, but establish a multiple and complex web of threats. The author Peters explains that “[n]ational security has been perceived as a zero-sum-game, wherein gains for one side have been seen as constituting a potential threat to the other.”\textsuperscript{46} However, measures of arms control have not been perceived as a factor for increasing security but weakening it.

During the meetings of the ACRS working-group the persisting differences focused on the need to address the problem of weapons of mass destruction in the region. The Arab States, led by Egypt, have sought to place the question of Israel’s nuclear capability on the agenda of the ACRS. Until the dispute between Israel and Egypt prior to the NPT’s renewal in May 1995, provoked by Israel’s policy towards the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the group had been making progress on the elaboration of regional confidence-building measures. The last plenary meeting at the formal track was held in December 1994.\textsuperscript{47}

The dispute reveals a dilemma of diametrically opposing positions and


\textsuperscript{45} Monem Said Aly, “The Road to Oslo and Beyond,” 25.


\textsuperscript{47} Jones, “The Middle East Peace Process” (1997), 98.
priorities. While the Arab side regards the possible existence of weapons of mass destruction in the region as a priority issue for immediate discussion and action, the Israeli side states that it will only sign the NPT after having achieved peace in the region. The Arab parties regard Israel’s commitment to the NPT as a precondition to taking further steps in the field of arms control and want to use the ACRS to address this situation. Israel, however, wants to foster the development of mutual confidence-building measures implementing arms control and security agreements on Arab conventional forces before renouncing its nuclear deterrent option. It refuses the Egyptian approach that favors a framework based on the existing International Atomic-Energy Agency (IAEA) verification system and includes an active role for the UN. Egypt is also one of the main promoters of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. On the other hand, Israel puts forward an independent and dedicated regional institution for inspection and verification, as it doubts the ability of the existing nuclear regime.

The linkage between conventional and nuclear arms limitations and the emerging differences make arms control and regional security complex and partially difficult. Although some progress could be stated in the field of confidence-building measures, the working group had yet to produce any tangible outcomes. Substantive negotiations on arms control did not take place, and key regional actors such as Syria and Lebanon, or Iraq, Iran and Libya who have not been invited to participate, are absent. Nevertheless it can positively be stated that the ACRS working group itself represents a confidence-building measure.


and institutionalizes a framework for the exchange on the formal and the informal track.\textsuperscript{51}

Another important dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict with great impact on the peace process is the distribution and future development of new water supplies.\textsuperscript{52} The simultaneity of scarcity and dependence on water, a situation which will be aggravated by future demographic developments, over-exploitation and pollution, are subjects of bilateral as well as multilateral tracks of the peace process. Within the Jordan basin, Israel on the one hand, and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians on the other are disputing water resources, most of which are transboundary.

The 1994 Israeli-Jordan peace treaty is an outstanding example of settling the dispute bilaterally. Apart from settling water allocations from existing water sources, the treaty provided a frame for cooperation in water management and development thus combining partial redistribution of existing water and gaining extra resources by establishing common projects.\textsuperscript{53} Though the arrangements remain bilateral and thus conditional upon behavior of the other riparians,\textsuperscript{54} the treaty’s mechanism could function as a blueprint to settle other bilateral disputes. In the case of Syria the negotiations held until 1996 to settle the territorial dispute, focused on the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the boundaries prior to the war of 1967, and thus the access


\textsuperscript{53} Libiszewski, Water Disputes in the Jordan Basin Region and Their Role in the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 76.

\textsuperscript{54} The river Yarmouk, which flows into the Jordan river, forms a border between Syria and Jordan.
for Syria to the Lake Tiberias which is one of the most important reservoirs for freshwater in the region. The linkage between territorial arrangements, water distribution, and common management of water resources shows that water is becoming an economic asset.

While the redistribution of water resources represents an important subject in peace agreements with Jordan and Syria, the Israel-Palestinian negotiations did not address the question of water allocation. Actually only about a quarter of the quantity extracted from the water resources in the West Bank and Gaza is at the Palestinians’ disposal. While Palestinians demand a resettlement of the distribution of water, Israel refuses to negotiate on water rights although benefiting tremendously from the situation, above all for agriculture purposes.

Although Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians initialed a Declaration on Principles for Cooperation on Water-Related Matters in Oslo in February 1996 within the multilateral track of the peace process, the outcome of the Working Group on Water Resources is still limited until today. Most of all, the absence of Syria and Lebanon has limited the number of areas of potential cooperation and prevents an integrated management system among the riparian states of the Jordan basin dealing with the basin as a unit.

The Role of Extra-regional Actors for the Peace Process

55 Perthes, “Hört jemand die Signale?”
56 Another factor in this calculation is the future production of water, for example by desalinating sea water, see Bravermann, Avishay. “Wasser: Element des Friedens und des Konflikts.” Internationale Politik 50, no. 7 (1995).
59 Peters, Pathways to Peace, 17.
Since the 1991 Peace Conference in Madrid the United States plays an active role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. As described above, the efforts to get the peace process on the way are linked to the role of the US in the Second Gulf War in defeating Iraq. The international coalition against Iraq was a result of diplomatic efforts of the US, which sought to mediate between the Arab states and Israel.\(^{60}\)

Indeed, diplomatic success in moving the peace process, when it had slowed down, often can only be reached under the patronage of the US. Nevertheless, the role of the US in the peace process can be viewed under a double angle: critics argue that since the end of the Cold War the US strove for a policy providing a framework for peace negotiations without taking part in negotiations on critical issues like settlements, Jerusalem, or refugees.\(^{61}\) But the US interest in promoting peace in the region cannot be doubted. Its strategic goals of influencing oil resources, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and thus looking for strong and stable partners in the region, can only be achieved when maintaining a balance and regional security in the broader Middle East.\(^{62}\) The challenge for the American approach to the peace process is therefore to maintain a conducive environment for negotiations while at the same time promoting deal-making among the parties in order to achieve common interests.\(^{63}\)

While the United States are expected to play a decisive role in the peace process as a promoter of a diplomatic frame, the role of the European


Union first was limited to economic support. After the end of the Cold War, the EU was still lacking the appropriate apparatus for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and above all Israel refused to give the EU a political role because of its assumed positive attitude to the Arab world. However, close economic relations between Israel and the EU had been sought since the building of the erstwhile European Community in 1958 and have been established in 1975 with a Free Trade Zone between Israel and the EU.

While Oslo I was in progress and administrative and economic aspects to the agreements between Israel and the Palestinians were being implemented, the EU’s role increased by providing the basic economic structures for development and cooperation in the region. The EU supports the rising Palestinian institutions, and even the Palestinian elections in 1996 were monitored by the EU. The economic support and practical advice thus help establish regional security in a broader sense. The same goal is achieved by the multilateral process of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which started in Barcelona in 1995. Although this framework has no direct implication for the Arab-Israeli peace process, it can nevertheless provide a forum bringing the different parties more in line and fostering regional cooperation and stability. By establishing economic relations between the EU and states of the Arab-Israeli zone, the political role of the EU will increase in the medium term.

Since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli peace process, established by

64 Hoch, “USA, Sowjetunion/Rußland und die Europäische Union im arabisch-israelischen Friedensprozeß,” 69-70.


the Madrid framework in 1991, and its dual approach of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, regional security has undoubtedly increased since the process has passed the point of no return. Disputes settled as the question of mutual recognition of the parties in the case of Israel and the PLO, and bilaterally agreed security arrangements as in the case of Israel on the one side and Jordan as well as Egypt on the other side, will certainly not be doubted in the future and will create broad contacts between Israel and the Arab states. The principle of “land for peace” applied to achieve these agreements, will continue to be the base for further treaties which remain to be concluded with Syria and Lebanon.

The steps of Oslo I and II meant a diplomatic success in order to address the core conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and provide a two-step approach to realize Palestinian autonomy in an interim stage and a further Palestinian state as the final status. The current stalemate of the process shows that problems related to the final status, like the status of a Palestinian state, the status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the occupied areas and the right of return for refugees still contain many conflicting potential, but the arrangement’s mechanism as such is beyond any doubt. Only peace-agreements that are useful for both parties are able to create stability. This may remain the crux of the Israel-Palestinian conflict: However, the Palestinian side is too weak to address the peace arrangements, which are meant to work for equal partners. As long as Israeli security interests are threatened, the peace process is likely to slow down. Reconciliation is therefore still too far away.

On the regional level the notion of security still concentrates for the most part on military threats. As shown by the question of weapons of mass destruction and Israel’s nuclear monopoly, security perceptions of the Arab world and Israel remain diametrically opposing. The challenge

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for the multilateral framework of the working group on ACRS remains in a medium term to involve all the conflicting parties in the region, to enforce an environment for confidence- and security-building measures and, in the long term, to establish a regime of arms control and verification.

A broader notion of security is revealed by the problems arising from scarcity of water. While the 1994 Israeli-Jordan peace treaty provides a framework for settling bilateral disputes on water distribution, a regional framework still has to be established in order to address future challenges like the development of new water supplies.

At the international level the political and economic support of extra-regional powers can strengthen and foster the peace process, and thus provide the possibility of influencing regional security positively. The US, as well as the European Union, are taking part in multilateral talks, and both have become integrated parts of the peace process.

The settlements on territory, different security perceptions and natural resources show one common mechanism: once bilateral agreements are found, problems can be dealt with within a broader regional sense. Regional security can be strengthened with bilateral agreements but remains fragmented without broader mutual agreements. The double approach of bilateral and multilateral settlements is a mechanism to create interdependencies that could facilitate broader cooperation. Nevertheless, until today, the trend was the reverse. Without progress in a bilateral negotiating forum, multilateral talks also tend to stagnate, at least in those areas where the same issues are being dealt with.68 Regional security has not been achieved as yet. Here it comes full circle: the core of the conflict remains the Israeli-Palestinian one.

Demographic Pressure and Ecological Restraints:
The Case of the Mediterranean

Introduction

New sources of conflict, like environmental and demographic factors with regard to security issues have become hotly disputed since the end of the East-West-Conflict.¹

The central question is: do these developments pose a security threat for nation-states and if so, how do they threaten the security, and what appropriate measures are there to meet these kinds of security threats?

These questions are especially salient in the light of the changes that have recently swept the Mediterranean landscape.² During the East-


² The Mediterranean countries are Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
West-Conflict, the Mediterranean was regarded as the weak flank of NATO and the main aim of the western alliances was to balance the Soviet naval presence in this area.³

For the past seven to eight years the countries south of the Mediterranean have been undergoing a profound crisis. This crisis is manifest to western countries and, caused by the increasing importance of the Muslim world and migration from the southern to the northern rim states, it is making its presence felt in the European states.⁴

Another major nonmilitary problem in the Mediterranean is that of environmental degradation. The environmental degradation of the Mediterranean basin is – according to the World Bank – severe and is worsening in many areas. The ecosystems are fragile, wrought by a lack of rainfall during the growing season and sometimes heavy showers in the winter when the soil is bare and prone to erosion.

However, the possible consequences of such problems and crises in terms of nation-state security are not very clear to western politicians and the public. This paper seeks to narrow the gap, by exploring two closely related questions. Firstly, are nonmilitary factors, like demographic and environmental factors, security threats? What are the possible connections between the classical concepts of security and a broader definition of security? Is it useful to broaden the traditional security definition, which primarily focuses on military factors? Secondly, are the demographic and environmental factors in the Mediterranean a potential source of threat to the northern rim states? How can the northern states (the European Union) deal with this development in the Mediterranean? Is cooperation between the northern and the southern rim states crucial in order to achieve security?


The paper is organized as follows: the first part offers a review of the discussion on nonmilitary factors and their importance to national security. The second part examines the demographic and environmental situation in the Mediterranean basin, while the third part analyzes existing policies to deal with the situation. Are there conditions under which these factors promote cooperation among nation-states and between nation-states and transnational actors? What are the possible recommendations for politicians to deal with the existing situation?

Security Threats from Nonmilitary Factors

Among the scholars of International Politics there is a controversial debate whether nonmilitary factors are a threat to national security or not and thus, if there is a need for a much broader definition of security in the post-bipolar world. The most articulated arguments were advanced by Lester Brown, Richard Ullmann and Jessica Tuchmann Mathews. According to Brown/Ullmann the concept of extended security includes “non-military threats to a state range of policy options or the quality of life of its citizens and other problems that threaten directly or indirectly, to degrade the quality of life for the national community.” Jennifer Mathews endorses “broadening [the] definition of national security to include resources, environmental and


Pointing to the interrelated impact of population growth and resource security she imagines a bleak future of “human suffering and turmoil,” conditions ripe for “authoritarian governments” and refugees “spreading the environmental stress that originally forced them from their homes.” Other scholars, like Gray and Rivkin, have expressed skepticism about any relationship between environmental change and demographic pressure on the one hand and national security on the other.

Expanding the concept of national security to include non-military issues has been underway for some time. The recognition that the stability and safety of nations is shaped by multi-dimensional factors led to the argument for an expanded definition of security. A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that: 1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for inhabitants of a state, or 2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within a state.

Many issues, such as ethnic differences, economic activity and trade barriers, political positioning, and environmental degradation affect the relationships between states; only when these issues drastically threaten national conduct over a recognizable time span do they become security issues. Thus, under Ullman’s definition, the vast majority of environmental issues are not security issues, because they generally do not fall in the appropriate time frame or often limit the ability of a government to respond. For example, the effects from many significant environmental problems – global climate change, ozone depletion, and population growth – do not occur over a “brief period of time” and their effects are rarely perceived to have an impact on traditional

8 Ibid.
concerns of the security community. Nonetheless, there are some environmental resource issues which can and do fulfill these requirements. These determine which, and in what context, environmental issues are security issues.

The academic community has recently been debating the relationship between non-military issues and the cause of conflict. It is becoming evident that environmental compromise is contextual; the significance of an environmental or demographic problem depends on the relationship between countries. Thus, a water problem between Israel and Jordan takes on decidedly different implications than a similar dispute between Italy and France. While the importance of environmental and demographic problems is no less, the impact on policy options for the affected states is considerably different. Thus, it partly becomes extremely difficult to establish a direct causality function between a generic environmental problem or demographic development and the generation of violent conflict, because the context of each region is unique.

Just as in traditional political and military analyses of the developments of conflicts, it is the interaction of numerous significant issues between states that leads to mobilization and eventually to armed action. The need for environmental resources can play a significant role in this process of escalation. Environmental factors or demographic pressure alone will not cause conflict, just as cultural differences, arms buildups or economic sanctions do not lead to conflict by themselves.

A realistic assessment of shared environmental resources or demographic pressure as contributing factors is just as necessary as assessing already established variables that lead to conflict. The practical outcome of establishing such an initial requirement is a clear assessment of the impact of non-military factors like environment and demography on a specific security issue. In order to achieve the im-

10 See: Matthew, “Environmental Security.”
plementation of policy, government leaders must be able to differentiate between consequential actions requiring immediate political or military response and long-term consequences that require measured diplomatic response.

The Situation in the Mediterranean Basin: 
Actual Trends and Future Developments

*Environmental degradation*

Pollution threatens the Mediterranean’s water, land, and air – and consequently, its people. Sources of marine pollution include municipal and industrial wastewater, agricultural runoff, discharges from ships, and inadequate disposal of solid wastes. In addition, many contaminants are transported to the sea through the atmosphere. Pollution is creating serious health problems in many places. For example, a 1988 (nota bene) sampling of 150 beaches in France, Greece, Italy, and Spain showed that 25 percent of them had pathogens exceeding safe levels. Of the chemical pollutants, tar, persistent organic chemicals, and heavy metals are of most concern.¹² Large rivers transport the nutrients that are causing massive eutrophication in the northern Adriatic Sea and growing problems in other locations. The deliberate discharge of bilge and ballast water from ships accounts for about 75 percent of oil pollution in the Mediterranean. Floating plastic and solid wastes from ships and coastal dumps also threaten coastal zones and wildlife.

Pollution and overexploitation have reduced fish yields, and fish stocks are down to 20 percent of natural levels in many areas. The curious fact is, that the northern region of the Mediterranean has been a net

importer of fish for approximately 12 years.\textsuperscript{13}

The depletion and degradation of fresh water threaten future developments in several countries of the southern rim. With prices down below marginal costs, the demand for water is expected to grow beyond the ability of governments to supply it. Some countries are using up their groundwater resources faster than they are being naturally replenished. Moreover, three quarters of the increasing demand for fresh water will be from the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, where resources are very limited.

Another major environmental problem is that of arable land. Arable land is under intense pressure, especially in the South. Rich agricultural coastal lands are being rapidly urbanized, and the increasing use of water, fertilizers and pesticides poses dangers to aquifers and to health. Each year, it is estimated, that about 600 tons of pesticides are discharged into the Mediterranean Basin.\textsuperscript{14}

Salinization, often accompanied by waterlogging, affects 5 percent of the irrigated surface area of the Basin. The region’s forests are among the most degraded in the world, and what remains is concentrated in the northern region of the Mediterranean. Inadequate solid waste management is also widespread throughout the region, as evidenced by floating refuse at sea, soiled beaches, open dumps, littered city streets, and clogged sewers. Every day about half a million cubic meters of waste are collected in the coastal cities. And, as Grenon/ Batisse analyzed, many waste sites are poorly designed, and uncontrolled leachate could contaminate groundwater.\textsuperscript{15} An increasing number of coastal pollution areas are subject to significant levels of air pollution. Chromium and mercury enter the sea from the atmosphere in nearly the same quantity as from rivers, and up to 90 percent of the lead in the western Mediterranean Sea is obtained from the atmosphere.


\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Environment} 12, no. 7 (1996): 45.

To sum up: natural as well as urbanized coastlines are undergoing a process of rapid degradation. In the future unique natural and historical sites will be under enormous pressure, due to urbanization as well as industrialization and the building of tourist facilities. This rapid and often uncontrolled growth will lead to intensified land use conflicts and, in many cases, to a reduction of environmental quality, which will have an impact on public health. If the urbanization of the coastlines, especially the southern ones, cannot be slowed down, environmentally sounder ways of developing the coastline must be devised. On the other hand, agriculture policy must intensify its efforts to reduce massive food imports. But the intensification will demand an increase in the use of pesticides, fertilizers and mechanical tools. In the long run, this will cause problems for groundwater and therefore for public health.

Today’s difficult economic situation of most of the southern coastal states is likely to keep environmental action at a low level. Most of the southern rim states are highly indebted and this hinders the adoption of environmental programs. In the perception of most of the Islamic elite environmental programs are not high on their priority lists. But nonetheless, there are some actions that have to be taken in the coming years to avoid an increase in environmental degradation.

**Demographic pressure**

In the northern rim states, most of the Mediterranean observers are seriously concerned about demographic developments in the southern rim states. Important changes are taking place in the demographic structure of the coastal states. In the northern rim states, the combination of low fertility and mortality rates means that population growth is slowing down and there is going to be a substantial increase in the proportion of elderly people – an “aging” of the population.

The situation in the southern rim states is completely different. The age structures – especially in the Maghrebian states – are still quite young and thus embody large potential growth. While the European population is expected almost to double during this century (from 295 million in 1900 to 510 million in 2000), the estimation of the growth of the Maghreb population, exhibits a growth factor of slightly less than
seven within the same time (from twelve million in 1900, it has grown to the size of sixty-seven million in 1985 and is expected to be eighty million by the year 2000). The second regional grouping of the southern Mediterranean bank is made up of Egypt and Sudan – with twenty nine million inhabitants in 1950, eighty two million in 1985, ninety-eight million predicted for 2000, and approximately 150 million expected by the year 2025. The countries of the Arabian Peninsula have a population comparable to that of the Maghreb, but their growth potential is even higher.\textsuperscript{16}

There are some tendencies to be observed especially in Northern Africa that indicates an ongoing moral transformation with demographic ramifications. The most important is the tendency to delay marriage. Related to this trend is a narrowing of the age difference between partners. In addition the fertility rate in Northern Africa has decreased, reaching an average of four compared to seven children in 1960. In Egypt, however, the situation is completely different. The birthrate today is higher than in all the neighboring North African countries. The present population growth is the highest in the region. By the end of 1997, Egypt’s population exceeded that of the UK and there is no indication for a slowdown.\textsuperscript{17} And even in Turkey, where the fertility rate is decreasing, 35-40 percent of the population is under the age of fifteen.

In 1989, the Mediterranean Blue Plan\textsuperscript{18} offered five possible scenarios for future demographic trends in the Mediterranean. Taking 1985 as the reference year, all scenarios show that the Mediterranean system will be highly dynamic, with rapidly changing patterns for economic sectors and the physical geography until 2025. Most of the problems of development, natural resources management, and environmental protection arise and are viewed in substantially different ways. The


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{International Herald Tribune (IHT)}, 14 June 1997.

\textsuperscript{18} Grenon/Batisse, \textit{The Blue Plan}. 

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dominant factors in all these scenarios are the characteristics and dynamics of population in the economic and environmental evolution of the region. The scenarios indicate that the total population of the Mediterranean countries, which amounted to 356 million in 1985, will grow from about 520 to 570 million in 2025. The lower number is a product of the reference alternative scenario, while the higher population would result from the worse trend scenario. The difference of 50 million corresponds to the present population of Egypt or Turkey. Striking as they appear, these figures show only half of the picture, for this overthrow of the north by the south is accompanied by a major qualitative change. As mentioned above, there is a decreasing fertility rate in the north and an increasing in the south. This could have serious consequences for the management of natural resources and the protection of the environment. The socio-economic situation is expected to be aggravated by rapid urbanization in which population and economic activities are concentrated, particularly along the coast. This process which might be called “littoralization” would cause enormous ecological problems. The urban population of coastal regions may grow to about 144 to 171 million in 2025. Next, one has to analyze the possible linkages between ecological degradation, demographic trends and economic development.

Demographic developments, ecological degradation and potential future migration flows

First, let us turn to the younger age groups (15-20 year-olds), which constitute the potential future labor forces as well as migrants. The size of this age group in Europe will decrease to about sixty-six million by the year 2000 and fifty-six million by the year 2010 (in comparison to seventy-five million during the time period 1975-1990). On the African continent, the trends are more dramatic. The age group of 15-20 years will be, according to the medium trend of the Blue Plan scenario, six times as large as that of Europe. It is nearly impossible to imagine that the fragile and highly inefficient economies are capable of absorbing such huge demographic waves. Most of the southern Mediterranean rim states face high unemployment rates and – even with a decreasing fertility rate in North Africa – labor market tensions in the rim states
will not be alleviated before the next century. It is easy to imagine that in the near future there will be — under the conditions of a high unemployment rate, a chaotic and uncontrollable growth of the cities and a continuous unstable political situation (especially in Algeria and Albania) — a massive migration flow of young unskilled workers from the African States and also from the Balkans to the member states of the European Union.

What are the possible consequences of these migration flows for the European states? First of all, there is the danger of an Islamization of certain member states (especially of France and Germany). By the year 2010 France will have nearly 8 million Arab immigrants and Germany about 9 million immigrants (3 to 4 million from Turkey).

Most of the Southern European States which were themselves emigration countries are now facing the problem of massive immigration from the southern Mediterranean rim states. Italy has nearly one million legal immigrants and an estimated two million illegal immigrants from the Maghreb countries and Africa. Since the “revolution” in Albania the Italian government has had to face the problem of massive illegal migration from Albania to Italy. And also Spain is, since the end of the eighties, host-country to more than half a million legal migrants from the Maghreb, especially from Morocco.

The security problems that will arise from these migration flows (which are caused by demographic and environmental factors) affect primarily the internal security and stability of the European Union member states. Competition between the various immigration groups may arise. The militant conflict between nationalistic Turks and the more communistic oriented Kurds in Germany is the most revealing example for such a scenario. But also possible tensions between various religious groups or between fundamentalist and laic groups are imaginable. All kinds of conflicts in the southern rim and in the Balkan states will become

increasingly important for the public security and political stability of the host-countries, the European member states. An instrumentalization of migration groups is highly possible\(^{21}\) and the metro bombing in Paris by FIS-activists based in France is a bloody verification of this hypothesis. All these possible and partly existing political problems with immigration groups could lead to public hostility against Non-European immigrants and may feed nationalistic groups within the host countries. (“Front National” in France, the “Republikaner” in Germany and “Alleanza Nazionale” in Italy).

Finally, all the problems mentioned above, caused by migration may also have repercussions for the relations between states. They have the potential to develop into traditional security problems. In the end, this “spill over” could also lead to war (under the conditions of system-wide anarchy). Communal strife thus has a certain inherent propensity for internationalization, especially in those cases where an ethnic or racial minority has a paternal state.

To sum up: the combination of demographic pressure, ecological restraints and economic non-development have the potential to become an internal security problem for the northern rim states as well as for all European Union members. The resource depletion within the South will lead to tidal waves of migration to the northern rim states, importing all the inter-southern ethnical and political problems and tensions over the Mediterranean into the northern rim states.\(^{22}\)

**Policy Responses to the Mediterranean Challenge: Recommendations for the European Union**

A three-pronged policy is necessary to deal effectively with the ecological degradation and migration flow caused by developments in the

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southern rim states: a) an ecological policy, b) a population policy including a policy of cooperation and development, and c) a coordination of national policies regarding the regulation of migration flows.

a) Together with non-governmental or semigovernmental actors, like development banks, political foundations or ecological organizations, the northern rim states should develop an environmental protection policy, that does not hamper economic development. This means that every step taken by central, provincial and local authorities in the south (and east) of the Mediterranean Basin to develop tourism or infrastructure in the coastal region that gains financial support from the North should be linked to a minimum ecological standard. Protection of the coastlines could be achieved through coastline purchase for conservation or by establishing multifunctional biosphere reserves. At the same time, all industrial, urban, tourist or public works development projects should conform to the structures of an integrated coastal management plan for both, the terrestrial and the marine side. These kinds of approaches, that are easier to advocate than to implement, can mitigate the increasing degradation and ensure the protection of the Sea.

b) Especially in Northern Africa and the Balkans more efforts must be made to intensify family planning programs. The most important factor is to intensify female education in these countries by bringing them more in contact with “Western media” and values and deepening knowledge, especially of family planning. This could ensure that the decline of the fertility rate in North Africa would continue. Like in environmental policy this is a subject where non-governmental and semi-governmental actors could go ahead by initiating educational programs and supporting local and regional politicians and elite in their efforts towards a higher educational standard, especially for women. In combination with a development policy directed by the western states that presses harder for the implementation of pluralistic political systems, and regionalism, to develop an equal standard of education,

23 The same advice was given by: Batisse, Michel. “Probing the Future of the Mediterranean.” Environment 6, no. 5 (1990): 4-34; 33.
social healthcare and medical assistance, these measures may help to increase the percentage of “better educated” people. Because, as a matter of fact, the percentage of “better educated” immigrants from the southern rim states is low.\(^{24}\)

But all these recommendations in the field of environmental and population policy can prevent migration flows to Europe only in a long-term perspective. In a near- and middle-term perspective a massive migration flow from the South (and East) to the North is to be expected and this requires appropriate measures taken by the Northern rim states.

c) Following Chesnais’s arguments,\(^{25}\) I would recommend a more regulated and differentiated migration policy. To avoid an excessive Islamization or Africanization of certain countries (like France or probably Italy) it would be appropriate to have a regulation of immigrant flows. Nations with a huge number of homogenous immigration groups like France (Algerians) and Germany (Turks) need to regulate more the excessive in-flow of people belonging to those ethnic groups. It must be the aim of these countries to avoid the creation of new ethnic enclaves and for the other countries it will be necessary to prevent the development of such enclaves. Such ethnic enclaves are one of the most important factors of social tension.

All these measures cannot be taken without a stronger coordination among the EU member states. This does not require the creation of a supranational immigration policy of the European Union but a stronger intergovernmental coordination among its member states. This coordination has to go far beyond the existing Schengen-Agreement. The illusion of Schengen was that the Union members can control their borders effectively. But for countries with a large coastal area like Italy (more than 3,700 miles of coastal borders) it is nearly impossible to guarantee effective border control. Today, Schengen is not much more


than a Swiss cheese. To bring more efficiency into the Schengen-Agreement it could be helpful to integrate the southern rim states. A form of associate membership of Algeria, Albania, Egypt and Morocco, without the right of free movement and settlement for their population, to mention only some of the possible candidates, would be a great advantage for the European states, that the southern border of Schengen would move away from the northern Mediterranean rim to the sub-Saharan area of Africa. The control of the new borders could be ensured by the WEU in combination with troops from the associated states. This would facilitate the cooperation between Schengen members and the Southern rim states around the common problem of migration. This form of association combined with a controlled and conditional development policy could be the breakthrough out of the vicious circle of demographic pressure, ecological degradation and migration flows that characterize the present situation in the Mediterranean. The implementation of such policy is one of the important tasks for governments as well as for non-governmental organizations in the near future.
Admitting the Inevitable: A New Approach to the Cyprus Conflict

Introduction

The past few months had been anxiously awaited in Cyprus. Ever since President Glavkos Clerides announced in January 1997 that Russian missiles had been ordered to be stationed on the island in 1998, people in southeastern Europe were anxious to see whether the stationing would not be postponed after all, since Turkey had declared that it would not tolerate these missile systems on the island and would respond with appropriate measures. The United States, through its mediator Richard Holbrooke, tried its best to defuse the crisis. The fact that President Bill Clinton had sent his top mediator to Cyprus demonstrates the high priority that the U.S. attaches to the conflict. In fact, there is really a lot at stake, and the world shudders at the thought of war breaking out in Cyprus again. The conflict involves a large area of the unstable Balkan region. The island lies in a strategically vital area, given that three continents and three world religions intersect in the region; and a possible conflict between Greece and Turkey, which many fear would follow a war on the island, would threaten to disrupt NATO’s southeastern flank. But the recent missile crisis is only the climax of a process in which the Cyprus problem gradually worsened since January 1996.

1 The Turkish Defense Minister Turhan Tayan compared the controversy surrounding Greek Cypriot acquisitions to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, warning that all offensive weapons would be destroyed in a pre-emptive strike if deployed: Venter, Al J. “Walking the Tightrope: Tension Mounts Along Cyprus’ Green Line.” *Jane’s International Defense Review (IDR)* 30, no. 6 (1997): 63-68; 65.
The first incident in a series of quarrels between Greece and Turkey was a provocation, which in the beginning did not have anything to do with Cyprus at all. An accident turned into a political issue in early 1996 when a stranded Turkish vessel close to the Aegean island Imia/Kardak refused to accept help from Greek ships, thus disputing Greek sovereignty over the territorial waters around the island. The potential of the emotional conflict was proven when what seemed to be a minor quarrel escalated into real dangers of war between Greece and Turkey in a matter of days, after both countries had mobilized warships to cruise the Aegean Sea. The United States, realizing what was at stake, intervened at the highest level with personal phone calls to heads of states and ministers in Athens and Ankara.

The second incident was initiated by a provocative demonstration of motorcyclists in August of the same year, protesting against the de facto partition of Cyprus along the Green Line, the unofficial border between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot territories. A series of ensuing provocations – or overreactions from the counter side – ended with 3 Greek Cypriots and 1 Turkish Cypriot being killed in four separate incidents over a period of two months. Again, the statements on both sides following the shootings proved the bitterness and the deep split between the communities on the island as well as between Greece and Turkey. Both conflicts, about Imia/Kardak and on Cyprus, as well as further questionings of Greek sovereignty over the island Gavdos


3 Phone calls were made by President Bill Clinton, his Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and most of all by Undersecretary Holbrooke. See documentation entitled “Die griechisch-türkische Krise um die Felseninsel Imia Ende Januar 1996.” Südossteuropa 45, no. 9-10 (1996): 765-772; 766.

near Crete by a Turkish military officer, seemed to prove to Greece the aggressive stance of Turkey.

These incidents are only two examples of seven major disputes between Greece and Turkey. First, there is the dispute about the status of the Eastern Aegean islands, to which Imia/Kardak belongs. Some Turkish officials have talked of certain “gray areas” in reference to the islets, thus disputing Greek national territory. Greece, on the other side, points to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 as well as the Dodecanese Convention of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, which state Greek sovereignty over almost all of the Aegean islands.

The second dispute, the continental shelf issue, is directly connected to the first problem. Turkey claims that several islets along her coast do not have their own continental shelf but instead are situated on top of the larger, Anatolian shelf. Greece, on the other hand, is of the opinion that every islet, all of them belonging to Greece, possesses its own continental shelf, in which case the exploitation of the seabed lies to the greatest part under Greek sovereignty.

The third conflict about the territorial waters in the Aegean Sea is a dispute on whether international law should be applied, or whether the issue should be resolved politically. According to international law, Greece is allowed to extend the zone from 6 to 12 nautical miles around every island. This would result in Greek sovereignty over most of the Aegean waters, and all ships leaving Turkish Aegean ports for the Mediterranean would have to pass through Greek waters. Turkey has thus repeatedly declared the possible Greek action of extending the zone to 12 nautical miles a casus belli.

The fourth dispute about the limitation and control of the airspace is closely linked to the territorial waters issue. Since 1974 Turkey is no

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longer accepting the Greek stipulation of its limitation to 10 nautical miles, because, as Turkey claims, the airspace according to international law may only correspond to the limits of the territorial waters (currently 6 nautical miles). Furthermore, Greece is no longer involved in the NATO airspace control and commando structure in the Aegean Sea, because, after her reintegration into the military structure of the Alliance in 1978, an agreement on the rules previously valid could not be reached.

Fifth, the militarization of certain Aegean islands, forbidden by the Treaty of Lausanne, is a matter of security concern for the Greeks and Turks. The Greeks insist that the islands of Lemnos and Samothraki must be militarized, because, according to Greece, the territory is threatened by two divisions of the fourth Turkish army. These divisions were created in 1975, they are based in Izmir, and they are not subordinated to NATO.

Sixth, the minority problems involving Greeks in Istanbul and Turks in Thrace has been at least as old as the Cyprus conflict. Its climax was the riots against the Greek minority and the looting of their properties in Istanbul in the light of the first Cyprus conference in London in 1955 and various other curtailings of minority rights in both Istanbul and Thrace.

Seventh, the Cyprus conflict itself, though foremost a concern of the Cypriots themselves, i.e. the inhabitants of a sovereign country, has always been the subject of massive threats and thorough concerns of both communities’ “mother countries” Greece and Turkey. This can be seen in the latest crisis as well. The Greek Cypriot intention to install missiles on Cyprus had been justified by Greek Cypriots and Greeks alike as a reaction to Turkey’s expansionist tendency. They were meant to be installed in order to neutralize the air superiority Turkey has had in the region since 1974, and, more importantly, to raise the stakes and call further international attention to the divided island.\(^6\) Turkey herself had repeatedly announced that she would respond with appropriate

measures, including military action, to prevent the stationing of the missiles.7

This paper will deal with the Cyprus conflict. In its first part a short historical abstract and a presentation of the actors involved in Cyprus will demonstrate the complications in the conflict and will offer the reasons why a solution has not been found. The second part will concentrate on a new approach to a solution, in essence calling for restraints in further emotionalizing the conflict and for leaving the old, ever failing approach behind, in exchange for a bold surrender to certain facts by both communities.

The Dimensions of the Cyprus Problem

The former British colony of Cyprus had been drawn into the vortex of nationalist movements in the 1950s. The larger part of the Greek Cypriot majority on the island had fought for enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece, for decades. The Turkish minority, feeling much safer under British rather than Greek rule, reacted with a movement for taksim, the partition of Cyprus. As the movements on both sides became more extreme, threatening to escalate into civil war, the United Kingdom decided to keep a base on Cyprus instead of Cyprus as a base, and it happily agreed to the compromise of independence negotiated in 1959 between Greece and Turkey. The leaders of the two Cypriot communities put their signatures on the treaties which foresaw vast security guarantees for the Turkish Cypriot minority, providing for greater representation in political institutions and in the army than their percentage of population would have allowed.

The Greek Cypriot president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III, regarded independence merely as a first step to their higher goal of enosis. He pronounced the constitution unworkable only three years

7 “U.S. Tells Turkey to Avoid Force Amid Cyprus Crisis.” IHT, 10 January 1997.
after the independence and announced 13 proposals to amend it in November 1963, all of them designed to cut the minorities’ rights of the Turkish Cypriots substantially. The island’s minority thus rejected the proposals out of hand. When only a few weeks later civil war broke out as a consequence of this quarrel, the Turkish representatives felt too threatened to attend their duties in the mixed political bodies. They sought refuge by withdrawing into their communities and have not returned ever since.

Throughout the 1960s the United States and the United Nations had to intervene several times to prevent a renewed outbreak of war on the island and between Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a split started to become apparent between the Greek junta (1967-1974) and Makarios, because the Cypriot president had become increasingly disheartened by the idea of Cypriot union with a country ruled by a military dictatorship. When the Greek junta eventually staged a coup against Makarios in July 1974, the Turkish army intervened in order to protect its minority. In the eyes of most international observers and even of many Greeks, this unilateral Turkish action was legal according to the Treaties of 1959. It had only taken place after the United Kingdom had failed to live up to its duty according to the Treaties which called for joint intervention in order to restore the status quo ante, meaning the situation before the Greek coup. After a compromise between Greece and Turkey could not be reached during the following weeks, the Turkish army began its second invasion, followed by the conquest of 37 percent of the island. It is this second invasion which was clearly illegal. It is deplorable that rarely is a difference made between these two Turkish invasions today.

Various decisions by the communities over the following 24 years merely represent the hardening of the two positions. For the Turkish Cypriots the starting point of the Cyprus problem is the abolishment of the constitution in 1963 by the Greek Cypriot majority and their unilateral governing of the Republic ever since, whereas for the Greek Cypriots, the conflict only started in 1974 after the second Turkish invasion. The decision by the Turkish Cypriots in 1983 to establish the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC), recognized to this day only by Turkey, as well as the intention by the Greek Cypriots to
install the missile system in 1998, were mostly meant as a sign to the other side that there is no place for compromise. Similar decisions by their “mother countries” Greece and Turkey are meant to demonstrate the will to defend their own positions.

The international community, meanwhile, has not been able to do anything else but admonish the main actors not to precipitate an escalation of the conflict. Only in recent years has an international body become one of the main actors in the conflict: the European Union (EU), under massive pressure by Greece, decided in 1993 to start negotiations with Cyprus for a future admission of the island. While this had been a courageous experiment to accelerate the conflict resolution process, it was the EU’s fatal mistake to drop the provision that the conflict needs to be resolved prior to Cyprus’s admission (meaning in essence that the island is reunited into one single Republic of Cyprus again). Decisions of the European Council at Corfu, Essen, Cannes, and Madrid in 1994/95 confirmed that Cyprus would be included in the next phase of enlargement and accession negotiations would start six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference (“Maastricht II”).

This stance has not been helpful, but instead has contributed to a further hardening of positions. Greece is threatening that she will block the whole EU’s expansion process if the admission talks with Cyprus will be slowed down, while Turkey is threatening the annexation of the TRNC if the southern part of the island should be admitted into the EU.

The historical abstract above demonstrates that there are various dimensions in the Cyprus conflict. It is important to distinguish between three main levels: the local or intercommunal level, the regional level, and the international level. They all include actors with special interests in Cyprus.

The local, or intercommunal, dimension includes the island’s inhabitants, the two substantial groups of which include the Greek Cypriots, constituting an 80 percent majority, and the Turkish Cypriots, the minority of 18 percent of the island’s population. The Greek Cypriots accuse the Turkish Cypriots of having committed a breach of contract by occupying part of the island in 1974, thus affecting partition, which is forbidden according to the constitution, and forcing 160,000 Greek Cypriots to escape to the south. Therefore, the interests of the Greek Cypriots can be cut down to having the Turkish army reduced substantially in the TRNC and to having the refugees returned to their homes from which they were forced to escape during the second Turkish invasion. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, accuse the Greek Cypriots of having committed a breach of contract 11 years earlier, by pronouncing the constitution unworkable and forcing the Turkish Cypriots out of their political offices. They are thus mainly trying to reach a status of personal security for themselves, meaning in practical terms a refusal to mingle with the Greek Cypriots again.

On a regional level the two ethnic “mother countries” Greece and Turkey are involved for different reasons. Greece mostly wants to finally have their idea of justice restored on the island, which means a single Republic of Cyprus with a democratic government based on majority rule, including the guarantee of minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots. It is the aim of Greece to provide full backing to its people of Greek descent on the island. Turkey, on the other hand, aside from protecting its fellow Turks in Cyprus, has claimed strategic interests on the island lying only 40 miles off its own south coast.

Two other countries and three international organizations are involved in the Cyprus dispute on an international level. The United Kingdom is one of the Guaranteeing Powers according to the constitution of 1960, but her interests can be narrowed down to the two Sovereign Base Areas that she obtained out of the independence deal in 1960. The security of these bases, including the installations, homes, and its

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9 About 45,000 Turkish Cypriots fled their homes in areas controlled by Greek Cypriots and moved north at the same time.
British population, are the objects of concern to Great Britain, which for this reason is interested in a peaceful region in the eastern Mediterranean. The United States, on the other hand, does not have many installations on the island. Nevertheless, as the only remaining superpower after the Cold War, America is concerned about anything which could stir up trouble in this region. Troubles in the Suez region as well as the importance of the passage from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean, being the only gate admitting Russia to the open sea, have demonstrated the strategic importance of the region to the United States for many decades. The only consistent policy of the United States towards Cyprus since the 1950s has thus been to avoid a war between the two NATO-allies Greece and Turkey.\(^\text{10}\) It is also the United States which, in contrast to various other countries of the North Atlantic alliance, seems to recognize the strategic importance of Turkey and the need to tie her closer to Western interests.\(^\text{11}\)

NATO, always dominated by US interests, has equally been concerned about an unstable southeastern flank. The reason why the Alliance has not been directly involved in the conflict is that in contrast to Greece and Turkey, Cyprus itself has not been a NATO member. The United Nations have had troops stationed for the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) since 1964 on what has been one of the longest missions in United Nations history. Furthermore, the United Nations

\(^{10}\) The author is currently working on his Ph.D. dissertation on *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974*.

have been sponsoring various missions, none of which has been able to break the deadlock in resolving the impasse. The reason for their interest in the conflict is mostly the realization that the conflict bears internationally dangerous, explosive potential in the region. Furthermore, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have an interest in the continued presence of UNFICYP on the island, though for different reasons. While it has been the Greek policy to consciously internationalize the conflict in order to pressure Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots are content with the blue helmets stationed along the Green Line since they help seal the partition by their presence. The European Union, having been involved directly ever since Cyprus has handed in her application for admission talks in 1990, is on the verge of becoming the most important international body for a resolution to the Cyprus problem. Its involvement is characterized by diverging opinions of its member states regarding further negotiations with the island, as well as by a link of the admission of Cyprus to the paralyzing by Greece of other business in the Union, and the link to the relationship between the EU and Turkey. In general, the EU calls for a just and viable solution to the question of Cyprus in line with the United Nations Security Council resolutions.\textsuperscript{12}

Preconditions for a Solution of the Cyprus Impasse

There are several preconditions which, if fulfilled, would make the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem much easier. These preconditions range from social and psychological issues to the handling of the conflict regarding international organizations.

On a local and regional level, that is, concerning the two ethnic groups on the island as well as their mother countries Greece and Turkey, it is

of paramount importance that the relevant, serious propositions towards a solution are detached from historical references. Both Greek and Turkish arguments tend to recall the other side’s atrocities in the past and the injustice suffered in history. Cypriots as well as Greeks and Turks finally have to realize that such arguments are not being of any help to the process towards a solution. In a similar way, the images of the evil Turk in Greek and Greek Cypriot schoolbooks or of the evil Greek in Turkish or Turkish Cypriot schoolbooks have to disappear. Furthermore, there is a tendency on behalf of all sides in the region involved to plunge into propagandist denouncings of the counter side’s wrongdoings while concealing ones own injustices inflicted on the others. Also, both sides need to demonstrate more goodwill. Actions like the out-of-hand rejection by Clerides of Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash’s proposals, merely because the letter bore the seal of the TRNC and Denktash had signed it as President, as well as the repeated refusals by Denktash to negotiate until he is recognized on an equal footing as Clerides at the negotiating table, raise doubts in the international community about whether the parties are really trying to find a solution to the conflict. By a genuine effort to detach current problems from historical and all too emotional references a gradual dismantling of mutual hatred might be achieved, which in itself

13 The critical examination and improvement of the contents of school books regarding the presentation of the opposite community has been an important aspect for the confidence building measures UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali had been promoting during the time of his mediation: “Cyprus in Textbooks – Textbooks in Cyprus.” International conference of the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft and the Georg-Eckert-Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung in Braunschweig (28 April-1 May 1994), a résumé of which is printed in Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 34, no. 4 (1994): 356-361; 356.


constitutes a precondition for the diminution of mutual distrust and the opening of a path to a solution.

On the regional level the actors Greece and Turkey need to refrain from including the Cyprus problem into a package with other issues of discord between the two countries. The fact that Cyprus is still a country of its own is too often overlooked by politicians as well as scientists. Greece and Turkey made a step in the right direction during the economic forum in Davos in 1988, when they consented to the fact that a solution to the Cyprus impasse must be found foremost by the Cypriots themselves. Unfortunately, felt under pressure by combined Turkish and Turkish Cypriot power politics, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou made a deal in November 1993 with Cypriot President Clerides, in which the dogma that “Cyprus decides and Greece will follow” was dropped and a reinforced cooperation and tuning of decisions with the Greek government was decided. Nowadays, politicians on both sides are using the Cyprus issue as a domestic political football and tend to interweave the conflict with other questions regarding the Aegean Sea or even with the issue of minorities in Thrace or Istanbul. It would be unacceptable for the Cypriots if their interests were sacrificed in favor of some Aegean islets or conflicting Greek-Turkish issues.

On the international level the abuse of power in international organizations for interests in the Cyprus or the Aegean conflict need to be stopped. During the past two and a half years one case of such abuse

16 For one example of a proposal to link the Cyprus problem to other Aegean problems between Greece and Turkey, with which the author does not agree, see Mathiopoulos, Margarita. “Toward an Aegean Treaty: 2+4 for Turkey and Greece.” Mediterranean Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1997): 115-135; especially 123.


has been carried out and another two have been threatened. All three cases can be referred to as blackmailing an international organization. Firstly, ever since the Greek-Turkish dispute about the status of the Aegean islet Imia/Kardak in January 1996, the Greeks have blocked the European Union’s customs union money for Turkey, naming as a precondition for their cooperation a Turkish agreement to resolve the Aegean islands’ issue before the international court in The Hague. Secondly, Greece has threatened to veto the whole process of the EU’s eastern expansion if there should be a lack of progress for whatever reason in the Union’s admission talks with Cyprus. Thirdly, Turkey similarly threatened to veto NATO’s eastern enlargement, if Turkey was not given a concrete time horizon for her admission to EU. Although this last threat seems to have been dropped, lately, it is still Turkey’s view that Cyprus cannot be admitted to EU before Turkey is, because according to the Cypriot constitution the country may not be a member of any international organization to which Greece and Turkey do not both belong.

These entanglements demonstrate that the Cyprus issue should not be further internationalized. Of course Greece and Turkey will always have a say in the resolution process, but their role could be marginalized, since they will be likely to agree to any solution the Cypriots decide on. Also, the United Kingdom will still be concerned about the future of its Sovereign Base Areas. The United States and NATO will be concerned about the security of the eastern Mediterranean region as a whole and the United Nations will have to keep their UNFICYP mission going for years to come. However, there is not enough trust by the conflicting parties in the international organizations to call upon them to play a big role in the solution process. The blue helmets are still blamed by many for having been too passive when

19 Interview with Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis: “‘A Tremendous Step’: What Greece’s Simitis wants from Turkey.” Newsweek, 11 August 1997: 18.

riots occurred in 1996, or even in reference to the 1974 fiasco. The EU involvement has already backfired, having drawn the Union into the center of the conflict by the massive pressure on behalf of Greece to act in the Cyprus case. The United States seems to be the only country accepted as a mediator at the moment. This does not mean, however, that she enjoys full trust by Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus: in the spring of 1996 the mission of the American mediator, Holbrooke, was temporarily aborted by Greece after he had called for negotiations on the Imia/Kardak issue. This incident demonstrates that a further involvement of the international dimension would only complicate the issues and endanger them by becoming hostage to further blackmail.

A common desire on Cyprus is the change of the current state of affairs and a life of peace. The diverging, basic interests of the two communities, on the other hand, are very far apart. It is of paramount importance that both parties realize that they cannot cling to their maximum demands any longer. Both sides need to admit that today’s situation is unsatisfactory to either community and that they thus have to cut down their demands.

For the Greek Cypriots this means first of all to restrict their demands on other than merely emotional issues. If they keep calling for the reunification of Cyprus they need to accept that the ulterior motive of claiming Cyprus to be Greek needs to be dropped. Cyprus neither belongs to Greece nor does it belong to the Greek Cypriots. Cyprus belongs to the Cypriots, which include both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. If these two communities cannot manage to intermingle, maybe a reunification will not be possible on Greek terms.

21 For this reason a Cyprus desk officer of the U.S. Department of State has recommended that UNFICYP be substituted by a NATO force: Farr, Thomas F. “Overcoming the Cyprus Tragedy: Let Cypriots Be Cypriot.” Mediterranean Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1997): 32-62; 58-59.

22 The reason for this was that, according to Greece, there is nothing to negotiate but instead to solve by international law: Coufoudakis, Van. “Greek Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War era: Issues and Challenges.” Mediterranean Quarterly 7, no. 3 (1996): 26-41; 34-35. See also von Ohlen, Fritz. “Die Republik Nordzypern ‘mauert’ gegen Europa.” Das Parlament, 23 August 1996.
The Greek Cypriots insist on the three basic freedoms of unhindered movement, to own property, and to settle anywhere on the island.\textsuperscript{23} However, the main substantial desire, to which these demands can be cut down, is the return of the Greek Cypriot refugees of the 1974 war to their homes on the part of the island now occupied.

The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, need to realize that they cannot get away indefinitely with occupying a part of the island the size of which is twice the percentage of their population. Their main interest is to be able to live in a secure state and not feel threatened by the Greek Cypriots. In order to guarantee such an existence, the establishment of a zone of their own may be inevitable, but this zone does not need to comprise 37 percent of the island.

Since 1977 a basic agreement to the conflict has been on the table. The formula which both Greek and Turkish Cypriots could agree upon was a “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.” The reason why it has not been implemented is that while the Greek Cypriots opt for a strong, central power to the state, the Turkish Cypriots only accept a loose federation with great autonomy for both parts. It is not that negotiations have not brought forward new ideas. Former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s plans, which included concessions from the Turkish Cypriots to cut down their territory by about 10 percent, the reopening of the Nicosia airport, the return of Greek Cypriots to the city of Varosha, and more, have been helpful and farsighted ideas – but they have come to nothing.\textsuperscript{24} The fact that for more than 20 years the


discussions on the 1977 formula have been deadlocked forces us to admit that maybe a compromise cannot be found and that the formula is thus unworkable. The current tendency is symptomatic of this judgment. What we have observed on the island, especially during the past three years, is a hardening of the positions and with this an inevitable drifting towards a sealing of the partition of Cyprus.

A New Proposal for the Cyprus Conflict

The fact that the federation formula of 1977 has failed forces the Cypriot parties to look for other possible solutions. Only few scientists and virtually no politicians of Greek or Turkish descent have had the courage to propose a deal based on substantial concessions on behalf of their own interests. One exception is Nicholas Sambanis, a young scientist of Greek descent. He had the courage to admit that a Cyprus solution cannot be brought about by “legal” means as the Greek Cypriots demand. “Both sides must instead recognize their differences (which are both political-ideological and cultural), a solution they both find ‘just’ may be impossible to achieve.”

The author calls for a transition period, in which the symbols of ethnic polarization should be eliminated (i.e. the TRNC), but a functional, legal equivalent to the TRNC should guarantee the rights and freedoms of Turkish-Cypriots. That alternative body could be part of a UN-monitored, ecumenical Cypriot government. Military protection should be internationally guaranteed, excluding Greece and Turkey. Then the territorial settlement based on 28 to 29 percent of Cyprus as territory for the Turkish Cypriots can be taken into hand.

The transition period will not be brief. It will be a long process of confidence and state building (...). At the end of the transition Cypriots should be given the chance to decide by plebiscite if they are able and ready to

establish a federation. If federation seems undesirable at that point, partition should then be reexamined as the only feasible alternative. In that case, however, the territorial settlement should reflect more closely the percentage of land and property that the two populations occupied at the time of the invasion.26

Sambanis clearly asks for another opportunity in trying to make the federation formula work, but he recognizes that in the end the two communities might have to admit to final partition. “To date, federalism has wrongly been promoted as the framework in which to achieve political unity,” he writes, “instead political unity should be seen as a prerequisite for the establishment of federalism.” This process is based on the understanding that partition might be easier to negotiate than federation.27

Whether or not a transition period will be fruitful, the future of Cyprus, regarding current tendencies, will more probably lie in an eventual partition of the island. A solution to the Cyprus problem should thus be based on a deal between the communities, in which Greek Cypriots assent to the partition and an international recognition of a Turkish Cypriot state in the north, in exchange for substantial land concessions from the Turkish Cypriots. A deal along these lines would meet the basic requirements of the two communities, and it would correspond with the current tendency towards a sealing of the partition.

For the Greek Cypriots this proposal could open the gate to the EU (leaving the north behind at least temporarily). More importantly, it would mean the possibility for most of their refugees of 1974 to return to their former homes. The city of Varosha and the Morphou area might be within the territory to be given back to the Greek Cypriots, because neither would have to be a terrible sacrifice for the Turkish

26 Ibid., 139.
Cypriots. Varosha, 25 years ago the most blooming tourist center of the island, has been largely unpopulated and is now a decaying ghost city, but it would enable thousands of Greek Cypriots to return to their homes. The Morphou area is by a large part populated with settlers from Turkey. The Anatolian settlers, themselves foreign to the Cypriot culture and often in conflict with the Turkish Cypriots, should not be standing in the way of a settlement between the Cypriot population. However, they constitute a large part of the most faithful voters for the current Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash’s party. It can therefore be said at this point that it would probably help if Denktash were not the Turkish Cypriot leader at the time in question anymore, since he, contrary to most leaders of the northern Cypriot opposition parties, represents to a large part the interests of the Turkish mainland instead of the Turkish Cypriot community. The loss of the agricultural productiveness of the Morphou region, on the other hand, would gradually be compensated for with the lifting of all economic sanctions and the access of international tourism.

For the Turkish Cypriots the international recognition of their state would allow its population to gradually remove the massive numbers of Turkish soldiers, without needing to fear for their own security. For Turkey, the deal would mean a step-by-step withdrawal of their burdening economic support and costly military guarantees from northern Cyprus. Since Turkey has lately claimed that because of the closeness of Cyprus to her southern coast the island is important from a strategic point of view, a Turkish sovereign base area might have to be allowed, maybe in return for a Greek sovereign base area in the south. Such a deal may not necessarily mean a renewed arms race, since it is not the base areas but the political climate between two countries which

28 The Turkish Cypriot leadership has been willing to return Varosha and other villages, but they have refused to consider returning Morphou: Bahcheli/Rizopoulos, “The Cyprus Impasse,” 36.


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., 34-36.
determines whether armament is launched or not. With a comprehensive deal for Cyprus, the political climate may greatly improve. Furthermore, Turkey might even be able to remove the main obstacle towards her admission to the EU, if she consented to a comprehensive deal on Cyprus. The EU, having been drawn into a mess over Cyprus by yielding too much to Greek pressure, might this way find a way out of the debacle and reconcile with Turkey. But there are other obstacles towards an admission, like the Turkish human rights record and the war on the Kurds. As for Greece, she might in the longer run be pressured to give up her opposition to Turkey’s inclusion, if by an ease of tensions over Cyprus other Greek-Turkish problems, most of all in the Aegean sea, will appear to get the chance of being resolved.

Finally, for all Cypriots and their respective “mother countries,” the proposal of partition versus land concessions would mean the massive reduction of military equipment on the whole island, thus greatly reducing the risk of war. President Clerides has called for complete mutual demilitarization of Cyprus, but as long as the Turkish Cypriots do not have the incentives to do so, which means a guarantee for their security by an internationally recognized border to the south, Clerides’ proposal will stay unheeded. A comprehensive deal along these lines will enable both sides to disarm by degrees to a certain minimal level. Even though both communities would have to renounce several of their preconditions as they are now propagated, they both need to admit that today’s situation hurts them both, that nobody is content with the current state of affairs, and that such a solution would improve the situation in any case, once both communities will have taken a step back from their maximum demands.

32 Cypriot Foreign Minister Alocos Michaelidis claimed in 1997 that the Turkish soldiers could stay on the island if they became part of the UN troops. The same, he mentioned, would go for Greek troops: “Ein vielversprechendes Jahr” für Zypern.” FAZ, 11 March 1997.

33 Bahcheli/Rizopoulos rather optimistically believe that the Greek Cypriots “seem ready to come to terms with the geographic reality of having to share the island
It is to be wished that a proposal along these lines would not need to run into a permanent deal. The main obstacle to peace so far has been the lack of mutual trust, references to historical injustices, the dominance of fear, and the lack of goodwill. A solution other than partition can only be built on trust and goodwill, the very preconditions lacking today. On the other hand, if partition is sealed and the massively armed green line can be replaced by a normal, mutually guaranteed border further to the north, the mutual confidence building measures would finally stand a better chance. After years of peaceful coexistence, maybe it will be possible to negotiate without the guileful, suspicious climate dominating Cypriot politics today.

A German diplomat has drawn an interesting parallel to Willy Brandt’s *ostpolitik* of the 1960s, asserting that Cypriots could draw lessons from the German case.34 West Germany, the diplomat explained, started out in a restrictive way, not recognizing the German Democratic Republic (GDR). By the Hallstein doctrine, the Federal Republic even broke diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the GDR. It was Willy Brandt’s *ostpolitik* which finally recognized the positive aspects of letting people from both sides seek contact. Similarly, the Greek Cypriots should realize the opportunities of the *de facto* partition as a prerequisite to establishing contact over the Green Line in order to talk about a solution.

Maybe there could be a “German solution” for Cyprus, meaning acceptance of the status quo (i.e. the partition) in order to be able to live normally again. Maybe Brandt’s *ostpolitik* concept can – to a certain extent – be paralleled by a *nordpolitik* concept in Cyprus. And maybe there is no other chance for the Greek Cypriots because the Turkish Cypriots will hardly agree to anything less than formal parti-

with a Turkish Cypriot minority intent on remaining masters of their own house.” Similarly, the majority of the Turkish Cypriots, these authors believe, “have become increasingly pessimistic about their economic future and continued sense of isolation [and they] are therefore willing to endorse territorial compromises (...)” Bahcheli/Rizopoulos, “The Cyprus Impasse,” 39.

34 Telephone call on 17 September 1998 with a German Diplomat who prefers to remain anonymous.
tion, since it would deprive them of the single most important concession from the south.

“Concession” clearly is the key word to a solution to the Cyprus problem. Both sides need to draw closer in their positions in order to reestablish a basis of trust. Whether the two sides will ever be able to get as far as building the federation the United Nations Security Council has repeatedly called for is only for history to tell.35 This UN stance will not be an obstacle, though, since the world community will be happy to embrace any deal, whether complying with their resolutions or not, which is acceptable to the majority of both Cypriot communities.

Conclusion

The Cyprus crisis has been a dangerous trouble spot for many decades. Yet, never since the war of 1974 has the situation been as tense as in 1998. Too much emotion, impatience, and frustration has dominated politics on and around Cyprus and has tempted those responsible to introduce policies, threats, and actions which are difficult to undo. The political climate has thus hardened, and the gap between the positions of the Cypriot communities has grown wider.

35 The last of these security council resolutions was: “Resolution 1217 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3959th meeting, on 22 December 1998.” http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/since.cgi?dbname=eres&foryear=1998. The Turkish Cypriots have not complied with these resolutions, because they refuse to accept the remains of the Cyprus Republic as the official, recognized government of the whole island. Since the constitution had been unilaterally abolished by the Greek Cypriots, their argument runs, the Republic has been non-existent in its legal form since the end of 1963. They call upon the international bodies to admit Turkish Cypriots to have a public platform as well instead of just paying attention to Greek Cypriot arguments. See Denktas, Rauf R. “Zypern – Anklage und Verteidigung.” Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 28, no. 1 (1988): 14-21; 17.
For a medium-term solution, the only way out of the Cyprus impasse is to admit the inevitable and to start a new approach from a different angle. This paper’s title has three meanings. First, it should be admitted that today there is no basis for both Cypriot communities to mingle again. There is too much distrust and fear on both sides of the Green Line. Secondly, it should be admitted by all parties concerned that for the time being the federation approach has failed and that in the light of military threats and the enormous armament on the island it is of paramount importance for a new approach to be taken. Thirdly, the fact that at least a temporary partition is inevitable should be realized as well. The Turkish Cypriots will never accept anything less than autonomy coming close to partition, but they need to make substantial land concessions in order to gain this.

In the longer term, after partition has been sealed and practiced until a big part of the mistrust and fear between the communities has been reduced, a reassessment of the solution might be brought about automatically. However, this will only be possible if it will be in the interest of both communities, if Greek and Turkish Cypriots will be able to reappraise their common denominator of being first and foremost Cypriot instead of Greek or Turkish.

The present situation, however, calls for swift action before a proposal such as the above can be taken in hand. Fortunately the crisis about the Russian missiles has been defused momentarily. President Clerides, responding to massive international pressure on Greece and Cyprus, decided on 29 December, 1998, not to have the S-300 system delivered to Cyprus. Instead, a stationing of the missiles in Crete will be negotiated between Greece and Russia. As of February 1999 no further details about the missiles’ future are known. However, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, has already declared the Crete option as unacceptable, “because it would increase tension between NATO-members Greece and Turkey,” and because it would mean that “Russian technicians would have to be present on NATO soil.”

thermore, in early 1999 rumors are circulating that the Republic of Cyprus intends to buy and install Russian-made short-range Tor M-1 anti-aircraft missiles in place of the S-300s as a face-saving measure. The missile crisis, though less critical than in 1998, is thus far from over.

Moreover, the European Union will have to find a way out of the current impasse soon if she does not want to be blocked in her enlargement process. The present position of the Union has been brought about by Greek pressure. The United States and Turkey blame the EU for being driven by Greek blackmailing rather than following a concrete policy. The Greek Cypriots for their part should take seriously the Turkish threat to annex northern Cyprus if the south were to become an EU member. So if they really are horrified at the idea of a partitioned Cyprus without appropriate land concessions by the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots should now postpone the accession talks. On the other hand, as one author suggests, “[p]erhaps entering the EU without a solution, even if it means Turkey annexes the north, would be one way to end the problem without taking any blame.”


Regional Security Issues and Conflicts in the Caucasus and the Caspian Regions

Introduction

The emergence of the Central Asian and Caucasian states after the collapse of the Soviet system as independent international actors has changed the geopolitics of the region immensely. When the Soviet Union collapsed, what were, a short time earlier, internal affairs of the USSR suddenly became transformed into foreign policy questions for Soviet successor states. These countries, “some of which, in modern times, have never enjoyed the status of independent actors in international politics,”1 have started to define their geopolitical orientation. The outcome will fundamentally alter political and military equations throughout Eurasia.2

The boundaries of these newly independent states, drawn originally during the Stalin era to ensure Soviet domination in the region, are arbitrary and rarely coincide with any historic boundaries or with the linguistic and cultural affinities of the different groups within each of them. Moreover, the conquest and long-rule of the region by Russia created a relationship of strong dependency between the peoples of this region and the Russian State/Soviet Union that has changed only slightly since the collapse of Soviet rule.


Therefore, geopolitical domino theories for the region can easily suggest various scenarios of explosive instability. Given the unstable nature of the Caucasian region in general, the prospects for destabilization are very real indeed. Economic difficulties, contested borders, mixed national groups and peoples, competition of outsiders for influence, etc. pose risks to regional security. Other volatile and widespread elements, such as poverty and territorial claims, continuously threaten to undermine both the existing regimes and the equilibrium in the region. The consequences of such an event would be felt throughout Eurasia and would inevitably have a significant impact even on the remote powers of the North Atlantic as, to put it simply, “NATO has defense and security interests in the Caucasus region through Turkey as a member of the alliance.” Moreover, the West, especially the US, has important economic and commercial interests connected with the exploitation of hydrocarbon deposits in the Caspian Basin. They are also actively engaged in several vulnerable areas in the region through OSCE, trying to facilitate the settlement of disputes by peaceful means.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to identify challenges of change and possible threats to the future stability of the Caucasus region and the Caspian Basin brought about by the changing balance of power.

**Defining the Region**

The Caucasus region, encompassing the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia as well as the Caspian Basin, is today one of, if not the most, coveted pieces of territory in the World, thanks to its geostrategic significance not only between Central Asia and Europe, but more importantly on the historic invasion routes of Russia on the North-South axis. The land corridor of Transcaucasia fosters contact or con-
frontation between Russia on the north and Turkey and Iran on the south. On this same axis also, various forms of Christianity faces Sunni and Shi’ite branches of Islam. Furthermore, the fact that the area possesses large oil and gas deposits can be reason for further cooperation and/or competition and thus eventually conflict between regional powers and their external allies. These conditions make this area a unified, strategic and security complex as well as an embodiment of conflict.

Moreover, the region remains a matter of profound interest and relevance to Turkey and Iran, and vital concern for Russia, which is ever sensitive to external influence in or the possibility of actual physical threats to the region. Thus there are areas of possible clashes of interest, which, if not checked, could easily develop into multi-sided armed conflicts.

Even a rudimentary study of Caucasian history reveals that the region has been full of complexities, mixture of peoples, nations and languages, but to an extent still suffering from the after-effects of earlier Tsarist conquest and colonial rule. The social fabric of the region was distorted earlier on by the mass deportation of peoples towards the end of the Second World War, and later on complicated yet more as a result of the return of exiles, whose rehabilitation created new territorial disputes that remain unresolved to this day. It remains a region where the implication of sudden independence and realization of ethnic identities by titular nationalities ensured the onset of severe ethnic strife, enforced migration, economic deprivation and large-scale unemployment.

In addition to various potentials for conflict in the Caucasus region in general, since the exploration of the Caspian Basin has revealed significant deposits of oil and gas, new strains on regional stability have emerged caused by the conflicting interests of a number of regional and extra-regional powers. The possibility of transferring large-scale oil and gas deposits to industrialized Western Europe raises hopes for regional economic development and prosperity. At the same time, however, “the belief that whoever secures the major share of the oil pipeline transit will gain enhanced influence not only throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia but also on a global political scale,” high-
lights concerns about the future stability of the region in general. Thus, in terms of regional geopolitics, “control of the Caspian Sea, or even freedom of movement on it, represents a prize of considerable value.” In connection with this, the competition for influence among regional states, with its ideological, religious and political dimensions, lowers the threshold of possible armed conflicts erupting in the region.

Threats to Security and Stability

As a working hypothesis we can project six interrelated and overlapping levels of threat to security and stability in the region, emanating both within and without. First of all, we have to mention the inability of Russia to reconsolidate its power and influence in the region. Secondly, there is the legal quandary over the definition of the status of the Caspian Sea and the inability to acquire agreement from all the five riparian states; and thirdly, the emergence of regional power rivalries between Russia, Turkey and Iran should be dealt with. Fourth is the extension of Western influence through investment and commercial activity against Russian will to maintain its supremacy. Fifth, rising fears of Islamic fundamentalism in Russia, coupled with the possible loss of the whole North Caucasus to an Islamic Republic, should be explored. And finally, the serious questions brought up with regard to environmental and ecological issues in connection with the oil exploration activities in the Caspian Sea need to be elucidated.

Weakening of Russian power

It is quite a well-known fact that the Kremlin, up until 1995, suffered from a lack of coherent foreign policy in general and sustainable regional policy in particular regarding North Caucasus. The idea, aired earlier on in Moscow, that Russia should immediately “withdraw” from the Caucasus without waiting to be kicked out by force was all the more dangerous for the existence of the whole state as it carried within the seeds of major upheavals. It became clear through the Chechnian unrest that Russia would not be able to cut off its mountainous regions in North Caucasus from itself without at the same time running the risk of losing some of the lowlands further north. Moreover, various analyses suggested that if Chechnya was lost, the unrest could have extended to North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Kabarda and more importantly to the Daghestan sub-regions. And “the disintegration of this multinational republic or its reorientation from Russia toward the possible Turkic-Islamic bloc would be a geopolitical catastrophe for the Russian Federation,” even threatening it with complete disintegration.

5 Following the collapse of the USSR, in connection with a debate regarding the future foreign policy stand of Russia, some analysts argued for a total Russian withdrawal from the North Caucasus. But this option, which would have reversed Russia’s traditional geo-strategic policy of retaining a buffer zone in the Caucasus, was disregarded, as it would have lead to a decline in Russian predominance. The Second option echoed Russia’s age-old policy of “divide and rule.” The weakness of this option in the post-Cold War era was that it could have in turn precipitated the growth of national movements and the elimination of the existing regimes in the Caucasus, which would have in the end detrimental effects for Russian influence in the region as a whole. In contrast with these, the third option envisaged a Russia that would maintain her influence in the Caucasus by co-operation on an equal basis. Blandy, “The Caucasus Region and Caspian Basin,” 7-8.

Despite these dire consequences, because of the competing power structures within the Russian Federation, including the military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the “Oil and Gas Lobby,” there are, perhaps not surprisingly, contradictory and uncoordinated actions towards the region.

One of the earlier examples that come to mind is the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K). Russia’s position in relation to the conflict was quite complicated and wavered in response to various inputs. But, in general, it could be said that the driving motivation of Russia was to preserve its influence with both Armenia and Azerbaijan and to demonstrate, as the legal successor of the USSR, its own ability to achieve the settlement of conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. 7

Moreover, it was also concerned with the continuing Azeri indecision regarding its membership in the CIS. Up until Elchibey’s election and following the withdrawal of Azerbaijan from the CIS, Russia, with its troops stationed in both Azerbaijan and Armenia, had a powerful card up its sleeve. Fearing that Azerbaijan’s withdrawal could start a chain reaction and result in the demise of the CIS, Moscow decided to keep Azerbaijan weak and on the defensive. It thus discreetly diverted weapons and military expertise to the Armenians through Russian-dominated CIS forces, thus enabling them to score military victories. However, only after Aliyev took Azerbaijan into the CIS again in 1993, did Moscow start to exert pressure on Armenia to stop the bloodshed and create an uneasy cease-fire in the region.

It became clear afterwards that the inconsistencies in Russian policy regarding the N-K crisis were mainly because of differences between the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, which had quite separate interests and mandates in the conflict and did not bother to consult with each other or coordinate their policies. It seemed that

the resources and capabilities of the Ministry of Defense played a more important role, with former [Defense Minister] Pavel Grachev, as a much more important instrument of Russian policy, than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\(^8\)

Moreover, as a result of Caspian oil opportunities the Russian position on this matter was also of great interest to powerful groups, especially Lukoil, which became instrumental in bringing the Russian line closer to that of Azerbaijan. As a result, after Yevgeny Primakov’s appointment as the Minister for Foreign Affairs with the support of Lukoil, the Ministry started to look for possibilities of “resolution of the N-K conflict on conditions and terms close to those of Azerbaijan.”\(^9\)

Consequently, Russia did not object to the Azeri formula for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict at the 1997 Lisbon meeting of the OSCE Minsk Group. Moreover, after the Lisbon meeting the Russian representatives in the negotiation process acted closely with the West, and they finally agreed on a settlement plan based on the principles of the \textit{status quo ante} which required the return of Shusha and Lachin to Azerbaijan. This clearly indicated Armenia’s isolation and the growing influence of the “Oil Lobby” in Moscow.

The lack of effective policy from Moscow was also demonstrated in the armed intervention of Federal Forces in Chechnya on 11 December 1994. It is difficult to refute the argument that, [had there been a well thought out, developed and effective policy in the North Caucasus, based on agreement, cooperation and participation by the peoples of the North Caucasus, instead of the badly flawed, ill-prepared and ineffective measures of dubious legality implemented by the security services in their attempt to overthrow the Dudayev regime, there would possibly have been no armed intervention and no Chechen conflict.\(^{10}\)


The various rival factions within the Kremlin in their bids to retain power and influence further complicated this situation. Thus,

as with the decision to intervene in Afghanistan in 1979, policy over Chechnya seems to have been the product of informal ‘kitchen cabinet’ deliberations by a handful of grandees driven above all by personal and institutional self-interests.¹¹

One of the results of Russian armed intervention in Chechnya has been the undeniable fact that this venture ended in an embarrassing defeat. The most important deficiencies were a total lack of political leadership regarding the country’s stand on the North Caucasus and also a lack of direction from military authorities for the day-to-day running of the operation. Put together, these shortages were instrumental in the agonizing destruction of the all-powerful Russian Army, which, during the crisis, proved to be quite inadequate and unreliable for the protection of Russian hegemony in the region.

Despite the official cessation of hostilities between Russia and the Chechens, the situation in the North Caucasus remains highly volatile with continuing instability because of political kidnappings and hostage takings on the one hand, and the lack of implementation of agreements by both sides, on the other. In addition, the failure to reach a final agreement on the future status of Chechnya creates an ambiguous and uncertain situation throughout the region. Since the present uncertainty, given that the existing parameters cannot be unraveled in the near future, it becomes all the more difficult for the republics surrounding Chechnya to come to some sort of understanding with the Chechen authorities regarding their future orientations.

In this context, one of the more serious consequences of the Chechen conflict has been the gradual breakdown of law and order in Daghestan, the political control of which is vital for Russian mastery of the

North Caucasus. Although the situation in the region has somewhat been stabilized after the Chechen cease-fire, there are various possibilities which can at any time ignite in Dagestan. One of the most important issues to watch is the power structure within Dagestan, which is equipped with checks and balances to provide a degree of stability and fairness amongst the fourteen titular nationalities. Any moves by politicians to alter this, however, could provoke further waves of violence and instability. The situation in Dagestan is important, because on a wider scale, the preservation of Russian influence in the Transcaucasus is dependent on complete control by the Russian authorities of the North Caucasus, including the maintenance of law and order throughout the region, which is, at present, not the case.

It is clear by now that even a partial Russian withdrawal from the North Caucasus would create a power vacuum, which could, in the short run, lead to chaos and instability in the region. In the meantime, however, the Russian position against the influences of regional powers, titular nationalism and Western economic penetration is increasingly pronounced, and sometimes gives the impression that she may over-react to the perceived threats to or the loss of her traditional sphere of influence, possibly even resorting to the use of armed forces.

Confusion over the legal status of the Caspian Sea

The undetermined status of the Caspian Sea not only prevents the potential earnings of regional countries in foreign direct investments for


13 In the first seven months of 1997, 164,000 crimes were registered in the North Caucasus region, out of which more than half (55.2 percent) were serious. Despite an overall-declining trend in crime rates in the Russian Federation, the growth of crime was noticeable in the North Caucasus. Besides, 80 percent of all the registered acts of terrorism on the territory of the Russian Federation took place in the North Caucasus. Figures are from *Schit i Mech*, 5 September 1997: 2, quoted in Blandy, “The Caucasus Region and Caspian Basin.” 12.
exploitation and transportation of the hydrocarbon deposits under the Caspian seabed, but also creates an unstable and explosive regional system. Although it is not difficult to see the urgent need for an explicit definition of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the ongoing discussion among the riparian states has tended to perpetuate over the issue of sea/lake controversy while the real problem appears to be that of sharing the profit.

In general, the choice in the question of the status of the Caspian Sea under International Law is between common ownership of the Caspian Sea, and thus subject to the joint sovereignty of all the littoral states, and delimitation based on some sort of formula to be agreed on later. However, there is no direct historical precedent, which can help to illuminate a solution to the status of the Caspian. There is, of course, the fact of an exclusive Russian naval and military presence for about 200 years and the signing of a number of treaties between Russia/Soviet Union and Persia/Iran concerning freedom of navigation, maritime activity and trade in the Caspian Sea. Russia on the one hand has been quick to use the 1921 and 1940 treaties to make its point, especially with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, that the Caspian Sea is an area of common use by the riparian states on an equal basis. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, on the other hand, particularly the latter, increasingly emphasized that these treaties are not applicable to the present problem of defining the status of the Caspian Sea, because they had only applied to navigation and fishing leaving the problem of the exploitation of mineral resources on and under the seabed out of their scope. Besides, these treaties were all agreed on when there were only two littoral states. The emergence of new states, at least, throws the validity of these treaties into question.

According to the original position adopted by Russia with regard to the status of the Caspian Sea, which was also supported by Iran and Turkmenistan, it was argued that the Law of the Sea could not apply to the Caspian Sea since it has no natural connection with other seas; that joint utilization was the only way forward; and that the legal regime of the Caspian cannot be changed unilaterally. Russia further advocated 20-mile territorial waters, plus an additional 20-mile exclusive economic zone leading to common ownership of the central area of the
Caspian by all riparian states. Russian claims were based on the argument that both the 1921 and 1940 treaties and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991 require the riparian states to respect the present status of the Caspian. This Russian position was delivered to the UN on 5 October 1994, accompanied with a very forceful note that unilateral action in respect of the Caspian Sea is unlawful and will not be recognized by the Russian Federation, which reserves the right to take such measures as it deems necessary and whenever it deems appropriate to restore the legal order and overcome the consequences of unilateral actions.\textsuperscript{14}

In contrast, the Azeri position was described as a “border lake” concept with sectors formed by the central median line and internal boundaries, which correspond to the international borders of the Caspian states. Accordingly, each riparian state in its own sector would have exclusive sovereignty over biological resources, water surface, navigation, exploitation of the sea bed and other activities in conformity with the legislation of the riparian state. At times, it also aired the “open sea” concept with 12-mile territorial waters and adjoining exclusive economic zones not exceeding 200 miles, in agreement with a central line principle. Azerbaijan’s position is generally supported by Kazakhstan, with a variation regarding the exclusive economic zones formed by a central line equidistant from points on the coastline. Accordingly, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in a unilateral manner already divided the Caspian to suit their own designs, though Iran, Russia and Turkmenistan object to such moves.

Recent negotiations between the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan have indicated that, perhaps as a result of pressure from Lukoil, there is a possibility that the previous stance taken by Russia on the common ownership issue may become less rigid, adjusting towards the Azeri position of the “border lake” concept, even though “the joint operation of an exploitation project in the central part of the Caspian is still, in

\textsuperscript{14} Quoted in Schofield/Pratt, “Claims to the Caspian Sea,” 76-77.
essence, a projection of the common usage approach.” Moreover, there are reports of an accommodation between Russia and Kazakhstan by which the bottom of the Caspian could reflect national sovereignty in accordance with the Kazakh and Azerbaijani view. The Russian approach to Azerbaijan could be further modified if the final pipeline route is to be agreed on from Baku to Novorossiysk. The points to watch in this regard are the negotiations involving Lukoil with regard to exploration and exploitation of the central part of the Caspian Sea. In the meantime, Iran’s approach toward Azerbaijan is also somewhat softened by exploration rights in Shah-Deniz and the hope for more.

Although Turkmenistan had earlier supported the Russian and Iranian positions on the Caspian, its position remained somewhat ambiguous since February 1997, when President Niyazov of Turkmenistan announced that the Azeri and Chirag oil deposits, which had been exploited unilaterally by Azerbaijan, were actually situated on Turkmenistan’s territory. A fierce disagreement ensued between the two countries, and since then Turkmenistan has claimed full rights to Azeri and Kyapaz oil deposits and partial rights to the Chirag oil deposits.

Behind all these controversies lies the fact that the yields from exploitation rights for individual states would greatly differ depending on the status of the Caspian Sea. Were the Caspian Sea divided among the littoral states, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan would have the largest share of proven oil deposit reserves and exploitation rights, and in particular under the “border lake” concept obtain more than twice the amount that Russia would enjoy under the same concept of allocation. Under the “enclosed sea” concept, however, the gap is somewhat reduced.

Moreover, underpinning the Russian position is the argument that it has certain “rights” in the newly independent states, because their

17 Calculations are based on the figures given by Blandy, “The Caucasus Region and Caspian Basin,” 16.
economies were developed only with Russian financial support and expertise. Other littoral states, however, are eager to realize their potential wealth from the Caspian in order to stabilize both their shaky economies and domestic politics and enable them to distance themselves from the Russian sphere of influence. In the final analysis, any Caspian compromise will require the agreement of five littoral states and at least half a dozen other regional players with conflicting political and economic goals. In the absence of an agreement, however, a worst-case scenario might even include the possibility of a military confrontation between the rival states.

**Regional rivalries: complication and challenge**

The power vacuum created in the region by the collapse of the Soviet Union has attracted most of the regional states into a dangerous power/influence game in the rapidly changing Caucasian scenery, and the competition has displayed images of the “Great Game.” Among the countries envisioning themselves as key players are the Russian Federation, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the US, the EU, Pakistan, China, Japan and Israel, and at least four of them had already been mentioned as a “model” worthy of emulation by the newly independent states. Obviously, each of these countries has specific objections, and the competition has economic, political, ideological and religious dimensions. As such, there exist various potentials for conflict among regional rivals.

18 Schofield/Pratt, “Claims to the Caspian Sea,” 77.
19 Ibid., 79.
21 For description of the new “Great Game” and the policies and aims of its players see Ahrari, M. E. “The Dynamics of the New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia.” Central Asian Survey 13, no. 4 (1994): 525-539.
From the Turkish perspective, the possibility of an armed clash with the Russian Federation is particularly disturbing. Since Russia is still the only great power in the region, Turkey, understandably, tries to avoid alienating or alarming Moscow with its careful rhetoric and activity as the Russians are acutely sensitive to any pan-Turkic, as well as Islamic, trends in the area. While Russia initially welcomed, for the first time, Turkish influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus as a counterweight against Iranian dominated pan-Islamism, those views by now have shifted as Turkey moved more aggressively than Iran to supplant Russian influence in the region. Accordingly, the fear that Turkey might have become an undeclared agent of the West in the region to dislodge and displace Russian influence took hold within various Russian circles.22

Thus Russia, getting increasingly edgy about Turkish intentions in the region, became itself more aggressive in asserting its “rights in its near abroad.”23 The main Russian fear is that the region might become a center for Islamic fundamentalism or pan-Turkish aggression that may create unrest among Russia’s own ethnic Turkish or Muslim minorities in Northern Caucasus. Hence, after a brief period of self-isolation, Russia eagerly moved to re-establish its place within its “near abroad” as a dominant actor. In this move, seen as legitimate not only by the Russians but also by the West at large, political, economic and military pressures were used extensively. Although Azerbaijan, unlike Georgia and Armenia, has not given in to pressures to allow Russian soldiers back on its soil, Russian pressures went as far as to argue that stability in the Caucasus would be threatened without a Russian presence in Azerbaijan, and to threaten implicitly that it could support Armenia if Azerbaijan did not accept Russian troops and grant oil concessions.24

22 For elaboration of this view see ibid., 531-533.
23 For exploration of Russia’s newly asserted interests in its near abroad see Blank, Stephan. “Russia, The Gulf and Central Asia in the New Middle East.” Central Asian Survey 13, no. 2 (1994).
Moreover, Turkey’s interest in the N-K issue has also put it further into a collision course with Russia. The dangers of Turkish involvement in the conflict were clearly reminded to Turkey by the then Russian Army Chief of Staff General Shaposhnikov, who warned that if Turkey entered militarily, the conflict could escalate into World War III. Despite the massive exaggeration, such a remark reflected Russian concerns for this conflict and the possibility of Turkish involvement.  

On the other hand, although the Karabakh conflict clearly demonstrated the manner in which Turkey is likely to behave in the future vis-à-vis regional conflicts, that is avoiding armed involvement, there exist various ethnic tensions within the Caucasus waiting to explode that, unlike Karabakh, might draw Turkey in.

A particular case in this regard was the Chechen crisis that rapidly became a sore point in Turkish-Russian relations as Russia claimed that the Chechens were obtaining assistance and volunteers from Turkey. In return, there were reports that the Russians were extending support to PKK, a secessionist Kurdish group in Turkey, in response to alleged Turkish involvement in Chechnya.

On the other hand, Turkey and Iran have themselves become rivals in trying to create spheres of influence in the southern parts of the former Soviet Empire. Turkey has been concerned that Iran may attempt to turn Moslem nationalities toward theocracy, while Iran is worried that Turkey’s active role in the region is aimed at forging Pan-Turkish hegemony on Iran’s northern and western frontiers. Thus, there ensued a competition for a while between the two opposing models of political

is actively seeking to destabilize the region by raking up the nationalities issues, thus trying to make an eventual “Pax Russicana” inevitable see Briefing (weekly magazine on Turkish politics, economy and foreign affairs), no. 1045, 19 June 1995: 13-14.


development for the Turco-Moslem peoples of the region: the secular model of Turkey with its political pluralism and the Islamist model supported by Iran.

In spite of their initial enthusiasm in approaching these republics, however, it has become increasingly apparent that both Turkey and Iran lack the economic resources that would enable them to exercise dominating influences in the region. Moreover, Moscow, which had no coherent policy towards its former colonies on its southern borders for about a year or so after the dissolution of the USSR, suddenly from late 1992 onwards, started to exhibit a keen interest in the region, redefining it as its “Near Abroad.” By 1994, the power vacuum created by the collapse of the USSR had proved to be a temporary phenomenon. Recognition of this fact ended both the speculations of Turkish-Iranian competition for influence, and the scenarios of a reformed “Great Game.”

However, the rivalry between Russia and Turkey over pipeline routes is likely to intensify in the foreseeable future. What is at stake is not only oil and gas transit revenues that both countries can extract from the pipelines passing through their respective territories, but more importantly, the pipeline network is seen as one of the key factors of securing and maintaining influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Quite clearly, usage of the southern route (Baku to Ceyhan) would give Turkey greater influence than Russia, which, on the other hand, could benefit greatly from the northern route (Baku to Novorossiysk). Thus there is increasing scope for major clashes of interests in the region, particularly intensified by the arrival of other extra-regional players such as Western oil companies and financial corporations.

Finally, in addition to the bilateral rivalries between Russia, Turkey


and Iran, in a more general level, we are witnessing the emergence of two rival groups or loosely defined political alliances in the region. They are the Russian Federation, Armenia and Iran on the one side of the axis, and the United States, Azerbaijan and Turkey on the other, while Georgia, though leaning towards the second group but fearing Russian reprimand, refrains from joining them openly.

*Extension of Western influence*

There exist various opportunities, to be exploited through Western investment, in the region, especially in the newly independent Transcaucasus republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, hence the possibility of clashes of interests and profit sharing. There is also a real possibility that the resultant economic benefits in time could also alter or even reverse the traditional orientation of the North Caucasian nationalities towards Russia. This is already happening in the case of Chechnya, which has developed trade routes through Georgia with investment and construction projects by Western companies. However, Russia is not likely to welcome Western economic involvement, assistance and exploitation of resources in the North Caucasus, which may run counter to its perceived interests there. In that case, Russia might move aggressively to prevent any attempt to supplant its primary position in the region.

Russians are already concerned because of the perception that the American influence in the region expands proportionally in relation to the reduction of Russian weight and influence. Russia is especially suspicious about the US position regarding N-K, believing that US oil interests now move towards consolidating the Azerbaijani position in the region. Even though Russia itself is getting closer to the Azerbaijani view, letting the US take the limelight and benefit from existing disagreements in the region is something that Russia would never voluntarily submit. In this context, Turkey too becomes suspicious as a possible agent of Western penetration into the region.

Still on the same ground, it is also possible to speculate about a scenario in which Azerbaijan might draw closer to escalating the situation in N-K in order to change the existing stalemate in its favor. Moreover, as both American and Russian oil companies are eager to utilize Azeri oil for their own benefit, it is likely that Azerbaijan might attempt to escalate the situation using oil as a trump card, banking on winning in an overall settlement that would deal with oil exploration rights and pipeline routes as well as the territorial dispute over N-K.

Reassertion of Islam

It is obvious today that the long periods of Russian imperial rule and atheistic Soviet-era indoctrination have failed to eliminate the influence of Islam from the Muslim-populated lands of the former Soviet Union. Islam’s position as an important element of individual and collective self-identity in the region guaranteed its survival and present strength, which has become, since the late 1980s, an increasingly politicized vehicle.

From a Russian perspective, there is a concern that “a de jure independent Chechnya would speed up the process of disintegration in the North Caucasus,” leading to the creation of a much larger Islamic state, combining Chechnya with Daghestan. However, this view is based on a more secular line of reasoning than simple religious fervor, that Chechnya, in its existing form, will not be able to survive on its own because of its economy unless it is joined with Daghestan in a much larger economic unit with access to the Caspian Sea.

There is of course a danger in the North Caucasus that Islam, or rather extreme political Islam, could grow as a result of the unpredictable changes, disillusioned hopes, economic deprivation and lack of


opportunities for employment.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, there is the risk of a growing tendency towards Islam on the other side of the Caspian Sea, where the potential role of Islam has been of special interest to international and regional actors. To put it simply, preventing an upsurge in Islamic militancy and the emergence of Islamic-oriented governments has been a primary objective of both Russia and the West in the region. This concern has even led some Western analysts to view the reassertion of Russian power as the lesser evil. On the other hand, Russia, too, used the same pretext of preventing Islamic militancy in the Chechen case to retain its military forces in the region as well as to forestall outside criticism.

Except for the Chechens in the Caucasus and the Tajiks in Central Asia, Islam, at present, does not play an important political role with most of the Caucasian nationalities. But it “remains a potent force … albeit underground. Therefore it is conceivable that in the future it may yet come to play an important social and political role.” More especially, if the development of secular democratic institutions and channels of popular expression are blocked while current governments fail to improve the living conditions of their populations, then “Islam may emerge as the only vehicle for the expression of grievance and dissent.”\textsuperscript{34}

The idea of a single Islamic state in Central Asia or in the Caucasus, on the other hand, is unacceptable to the existing leadership of those

\textsuperscript{33} According to Fuller, Political Islam flourishes under certain conditions: political repression, economic hardship, social grievance, state suppression of Islamist political activity, and repression of all alternative political movements that might also express economic, political and cultural grievances. These conditions exist in varying degrees throughout the Caucasus. In Chechnya, for example, only 10 percent of the population have legal employment, while in Dagestan 40 percent of the people are unemployed. In Dagestan over 60 percent of the population live below the poverty line. Unless practical steps are undertaken now these problems are likely to deteriorate further. See Fuller, Graham. “Central Asia: The Quest for Identity.” \textit{Current History} 93, no. 582 (1994): 147.

republics. Opposition to the idea also comes from Russia and Turkey, whose combined influence is considerable in the region. Moreover, the presence of a large Russian Diaspora throughout the region makes any attempt to establish an Islamic state even more difficult. Therefore, it could be argued with certainty that the future shape of these peoples’ connection with Islam will to a large extent depend on the state of their relations with Russia and the success or failure of reintegration efforts within the CIS, as well as Western policies and broader Middle East politics. At any rate, the nature and character of these relations will be determined more by security and economic relations than by Islamic factors. Thus, a union of all the Moslem peoples of the former Soviet North Caucasus and Transcaucasia within a single Islamic state is utopian, and the prospects for establishing an Islamic republic along the lines of Iran in the region are weak.

Environmental and ecological issues

The World’s attention has been attracted to the Caspian region mainly because of regional rivalries over highly explosive issues of oil extraction, transportation and profit sharing. However, there is an even greater danger about which politicians and actors with oil-interests generally remain silent, namely the ruin of the Caspian Sea’s unique ecosystem accompanied by an irreversible environmental catastrophe. This is caused by a total lack of respect for overall regional development and the long-term violation by the former Soviet Union of generally accepted environmental norms. The present rush of Western oil companies and lack of control in oil exploration operations in most of the newly independent Caspian riparian states only help to exacerbate the situation.

The general ecological situation is almost beyond recovery throughout the region. In addition to the rising sea level and the flooding of coastal areas, the problem of increasing saturation and greasiness of the soil

further worsen the conditions. As a result of the rising pollution, disturbances caused by the hasty exploration of the coastal shelf and the development of offshore oilfields, various forms of aquatic life, fish and plants, face the threat of extinction in the Caspian Sea. Moreover, because of the concentration of hydrocarbon waste, which is three times higher than the permitted norm, as a result of development work on the Azeri, Chirag and Guneshli oil-fields, the Azerbaijan coastline is now declared unsafe for humans, too.

All these present large-scale environmental and ecological damages underline the need for an international authority to enforce compliance in the Caspian Sea and the territory surrounding its basin. However, the ongoing dispute over access to resources presents a major obstacle to effective management of such problems, particularly at the supranational level.

Future Threats to Security and Stability in the Caucasus

Flash-points will continue to exist along the international borders between the Transcaucasian republics and the Russian Federation, namely, a state of continuing unease between Georgia and Abkhazia on the one hand, and between Georgia and South Ossetia on the other; in and around N-K with Armenian occupation of Azeri territory; and along the Daghestan-Azerbaijan border, where the Lezghins spread to both sides of the border.

Other conflict situations could include disputes between the Ingush and the North Ossetians; continued unrest in Chechnya; ethnic/boundary disputes in Daghestan; and new trouble spots are also likely to occur along the proposed pipeline routes, along the northern route through

36 In addition to the actual flooding of arable land and an overall population of 700,000 people, who live in the danger zone and who need evacuation at present, it is predicted that, by the year 2010 the water level will rise by a further 25 meters. Blandy, “The Caucasus Region and Caspian Basin,” 25.
Chechnya or the southern route through eastern Turkey. In addition, the following aspects of Caucasian affairs should be watched regarding future trends in the region:

- **The weakening of Russian power and influence**

  Further weakening of the Russian ability to cope with the increasing crime rates in the Northern Caucasus, when coupled with its inability to turn the economic trends upwards, poses a serious immediate threat to the stability of the whole region. Moreover, if Russia’s present financial and economic problems forces her to withdraw from the area *de facto*, if not *de jure*, this would open up further possibilities of rivalries, and thus conflict, among the Northern Caucasian nationalities and between (extra-) regional powers.

- **The democratization process**

  None of the major players in this region are fully democratic or stable. Their stability, to the extent to which it exists, depends on one man’s political and physical health, leaving them prone to protracted instability and internal conflict. Besides, personal authoritarianism makes political power an inherently unstable endeavor.

- **Economic poverty and dependence on Western economic aid and assistance**

  Except for Azerbaijan, which is a potentially rich country because of its energy deposits, most of the countries in the region have little to count on for long-term income and economic development. As they are mostly war-torn and just beginning to recover, the challenges they are facing are enormous. With ethnic strife, enforced migration, economic deprivation and large-scale unemployment experienced throughout the region,

  there is an inescapable need for foreign economic assistance and expertise from the West to reverse this trend, particularly in the north-east Caucasus before the political Islam can benefit from the ever-worsening situation.37

Otherwise, a worst-case scenario could include an extended armed conflict spreading from Chechnya to include the Northern Caucasus and eventually the whole area.

- **Limited political control over armed forces**

Including four key states and a score of non-state entities like the Chechen, Abkhazian or N-K movements, none of the regional players have absolute democratic control over their armed forces. Even where controls exist, they are not democratic ones that can foster long-term stability. There is therefore a serious danger of unauthorized groups touching off a war that drags in larger states.

- **The Caspian Sea**

An agreement on its status is urgently needed now to avoid miscalculation, which could lead to serious confrontation in the Caspian region. In the absence of an agreement on status, which would also assist in the preservation of the Caspian ecosystem, the ongoing dispute about oil extraction rights is ripe for an armed conflict.
The Asia-Pacific: A Zone of Co-operative Security or a Hotbed for Conflicts?

Introduction

The strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region on the eve of the twenty-first century is a paradox. On the one hand, the region, the scene of some of the great conflicts of this century, is stable, peaceful and prosperous; on the other, disturbing trends indicate threats that could undermine that benign security environment. The Asia-Pacific is best understood as a complex and troubled region. Fundamental changes in the regional strategic architecture have occurred since the end of the Cold War. Replacing a military threat from a specific power is a range of diverse threats, making strategic planning increasingly difficult.

The constant use of the phrase “post-Cold War” to describe the current climate of the times gives away just how uncertain analysts and policymakers are of the present strategic climate. Perhaps a more appropriate label for the period following the end of the Cold War, is “the era of uncertainty.” The security picture in the Asia-Pacific was relatively predictable during the Cold War. But now, as Richard Betts has written, East Asia is home to “an ample pool of festering grievances, with more potential for generating conflict than during the Cold War, when bipolarity helped stifle the escalation of parochial

Dealing with this anxiety-ridden landscape requires flexibility, particularly since nontraditional security concerns like food and resource shortages, narcotics, piracy, and refugee flows have been added to the list of concerns.

The Asia-Pacific region does not have – and is unlikely ever to have – a formal or overarching institution like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While it entertains thoughts of a regional society, the Asia-Pacific’s security arrangement will continue, for the time being at least, to be characterized by the following elements: an unbalanced strategic quadrangle made up of China, Japan, the United States and Russia, a web of bilateral alliances (the most important of which are the US security partnerships with Japan and South Korea), and inchoate multilateral organizations like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Regional peace depends on the commitment by Asia-Pacific actors to make this network of bilateral and multilateral security arrangements work.

My paper discusses briefly some of the reasons for regional anxiety and uncertainty. These include friction and suspicion among the powers that form the strategic quadrangle, continuing tension on the Korean peninsula, and territorial disputes. In addition, it outlines the factors that are working against the Asia-Pacific becoming a zone of cooperative security.

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Sources of Regional Anxiety

The strategic quadrangle

The future roles of the members of the Asia-Pacific’s strategic quadrangle – and certain actors’ relations with states outside the quadrangle – will continue to provide a source of widespread concern and potential source of instability. While Aaron Friedberg has warned that, over the long-term, Asia could become “the cockpit of great-power conflict,” most analysts agree that the likelihood of a major power confrontation, especially one involving the nuclear option, is remote. Still there is reason for apprehension.

Out of the four key regional players, China is the least predictable. China’s rising regional authority dominates a large portion of contemporary strategic studies literature, and is the source of much anxiety in Japan, Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Most experts agree that within the next fifteen years, China’s economy will surpass the US economy. It is expected that as China’s economy surges, so will its influence on the international arena, and region-wide apprehension will grow with it. Portraying China as a threat or “demon” must be avoided. In the words of Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir, demonizing China “would not only be wrong policy, but it would also be a bad and dangerous one.”

Will aggressive expansionism accompany China’s re-emergence as an international force? Will it eventually challenge the US for regional leadership or has the so-called ‘China threat’ been exaggerated? While the answers to these questions are unknown, one thing is for sure: for the sake of regional security and stability, China must be fully assimilated into regional and international institutions, and integrated


into the global and regional economies. After some initial reluctance, China is becoming more willing to take part in multilateral forums.\(^6\)

Washington seems preoccupied with the “China threat” and with engaging Beijing to alleviate it. Indeed, how Sino-US relations are managed is one of the region’s most formidable challenges. Relations between these two giants will have an impact on important regional matters, such as the future of the US-Japan security partnership, and events on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.

The continuing tension between China and Taiwan remains one of the most serious security problems in the Asia-Pacific. Conflict could result if China moves preemptively to unify the two countries or if Taiwan becomes over-zealous in its push for independence. Particularly unsettling is the fact that a large-scale attack could come with little or no warning, and conflict could escalate. If force is used in the Taiwan Strait, the regional balance of power would be altered dramatically, and stability undermined.\(^7\)

Relations between Beijing and Tokyo promise to be a major topic of concern in the coming century.\(^8\) Current Sino-Japan relations are marked by suspicion and distrust, and neither country has a clearly defined role in the region. Uncertainty over Chinese intentions has seen Japan, over the past eighteen months, strengthen its ties with not only the United States, but also Russia. But, at the same time, Japan recognizes the importance of the China market. And, for its part, China realizes that alienating Japan, which it is dependent on for technology, economic aid and much more, would have an enormous impact on its economic progress. It understands only too well the need for continued regional stability and increased trade and investment.

Suspicion of Japanese intentions runs deep in the Asia-Pacific. There is apprehension over its territorial disputes with Russia, North and South

\(^6\) Ibid., 23.

\(^7\) Dibb, “The Emerging Strategic Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 114.

\(^8\) Ibid., 107.
Korea and China, and its reprocessing and storage of plutonium. Perturbation about the possibility of Japan adding a military dimension to its economic might was conveyed most recently in the region’s ambivalent response to the revised US-Japan defense guidelines. Written within a Cold War framework, the original guidelines had focused on bilateral cooperation in the event of a direct attack on Japan’s homeland rather than a regional contingency. Reflected in the guidelines is the realization that in today’s strategic environment a regional emergency is a more likely scenario.

In accordance with the new defense guidelines, Tokyo has agreed to play a key support role to the US military in the event of contingencies in areas surrounding Japan. Japanese support would come in two main forms: making available to US forces various facilities, including civilian airports and harbors, and Self-Defense Force facilities; and providing rear guard support to US forces beyond the direct combat area – meaning that the Japanese would be used for minesweeping activities, as well as search and rescue operations at sea, and provide intelligence in the event of an emergency. Under UN Security Council resolutions, Japan will be able to conduct ship inspections to assist with “sanction-monitoring.” In the event of an attack on Japan or a crisis in areas surrounding it, Tokyo would be able to provide supplies and repairs, though not weapons and ammunition.

Having borne the burden of defending East Asia for over five decades it is not surprising that the US wants Japan to play a more active and explicit role in maintaining regional security. But there are several stumbling blocks to Japan doing this. Among them are its pacifist constitution and failure to recognize its right of collective defense; and lingering anger from China and other regional powers over what is seen as Japan’s refusal to face up to its militaristic past – an unequivocal apology for wartime atrocities is what China and others within the region want.

For the sake of regional stability, it is imperative that the Japanese

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clarify further the extent of their support to the US military in regional conflicts. If Japan refuses to provide the US with the support it has promised in the revised defense guidelines, the US-Japan security partnership could be damaged beyond repair. If the partnership fell apart and Japan adopted a more nationalistic regional stance and asserted a more independent military policy, the strategic equilibrium would be altered dramatically.

Discussions between civilian and military leaders from both countries should continue to focus on the regional implications of an expanded Japanese role, and Japan’s prime minister must work hard at building up a domestic consensus for the revised defense guidelines. At the same time, Japan and the US need to provide further assurances to China, in particular, that the new guidelines do not target any specific country. Contrary to what it believes, China is not the hypothetical adversary that provides the rationale for the maintenance of a continued US forward-based military presence in the Asia-Pacific.

Much of the alarm over China and Japan’s exercising power in the region stems from uncertainty over the direction of the Clinton administration’s Asia policy, and doubts about US commitment to the region. For the first fifteen months of office, the Clinton administration’s policy towards the Asia-Pacific region was seen as suffering from “terminal incoherence,” and described as ad hoc, flip-flopping, inconsistent, lacking in direction, spasmodic, and “episodic and reactive.” In May 1994, with its Asia policy “on the brink,” Winston Lord, the Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, submitted a memorandum to the then Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, warning that when it came to Asia the administration was going about things the wrong way. Its predilection for excessive pressure tactics in its dealings with the region, particularly in the areas of human rights and trade, meant that the US was increasingly being viewed as an

“international nanny, if not bully.” Fortunately, the administration took heed.

It has been argued that the difficulty the Clinton administration has had in developing a coherent and consistent Asia policy is due in large part to the vagaries of the post-Soviet world. “Clinton (...) inherited the fruits of victory,” noted William Hyland, but the Cold War ended so unexpectedly that “there was no practical preparation” for what was to follow. Adjusting to the “fruits of victory” has been a slow process. In recent times, US policymakers have accorded a far higher priority to the region, silencing many of their critics.

While it continue to work towards a more coherent and comprehensive Asia policy, Washington must continue to dispel doubts about a US withdrawal from the region. It is feared that a substantial downsizing of the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific could result in a power vacuum that Japan and China could move to fill. It could also mean that some regional states would see little alternative but to further build up their armed forces. There would be serious ramifications if the US no longer held the balance of power in the region. As Ralph Cossa observed, “the single largest determinant” of the Asia-Pacific’s relatively benign security environment is the US military presence. While it will become increasingly preoccupied with domestic issues, it is unlikely that the US will not remain the dominant global power in the region well into the twenty-first century.

In recent times, there have been repeated assurances from Washington policymakers of the durability of America’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. These guarantees have come in various forms:


• official pronouncements such as the East Asia Strategy Report\textsuperscript{16}
   and, more recently, the Quadrennial Defense Review
• its active participation in APEC
• its vigorous contribution to various regional security dialogues
• the recent reaffirmation of its bilateral relationships with Japan and
  Australia
• its enormous trade with, and investment in, the Asia Pacific – for
  instance, in 1994, US trade with the Asia-Pacific stood at $330
  billion, 50 percent more than its trade with Europe.\textsuperscript{17}

The US has too many important interests in the Asia-Pacific region for it to leave. Along with market access and control of sea lanes of communication, the list includes that of preventing the domination of the region by a hostile power, maintaining security on the Korean peninsula, ensuring the continuation of US political influence in the region, halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, improving relations with China, strengthening security treaties with Japan and South Korea, and developing a multilateral regional security structure to complement the US bilateral alliance framework.

Substantial cutbacks in US troop presence would add to regional uncertainty and insecurity. The unstable climate that would follow massive troop departures would undercut Asian growth and development, and would generate immense problems for a maritime power such as the United States, whose lifeblood depends on uninhibited access to, if not control over, the key sea lanes of communication in the Pacific as well as Atlantic oceans.

Despite all the strong evidence suggesting that Uncle Sam is not going away, doubts persist about a massive US military withdrawal from the

\textsuperscript{16} Formally known as the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, February 1995).

Asia-Pacific. With the end of the Cold War, the US, it seemed to many, had lost its rationale for keeping troops in the region. Skeptics have misread active participation in multilateral security of the US as part of a strategy of regional downsizing. Conversely, the region’s increased support for security dialogue and multilateral institutions is seen as a way of preparing for a region without an American presence.\(^{18}\) Over the long run, will the US be able to maintain 100,000 troops in the region, particularly if Korea reunifies? Indeed, the nature of the US force structure in the Asia-Pacific in the absence of a threat from North Korea has not been explained adequately. If the number of US troops in the Asia-Pacific does fall below 100,000 and a marketable justification for troop downsizing is not forthcoming, US credibility will be damaged and regional tensions will increase. The US must make it clear that a shift away from the 100,000 figure does not mean a weakening of US capability or resolve.

While Russia is unlikely to play a major regional role within the next decade, it still has the ability, over the long term, to influence the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. For the time being, though, its focus will remain on the home front. But, as Paul Dibb has warned,

> if Russia fails in its political and economic reforms it could re-emerge onto the world stage seeking to recover its lost status and influence. It could then, once more, disrupt the peace in Asia by reasserting its historical hostility to Japan, aligning itself with an anti-Western China, and reclaiming its lost territories in Central Asia.

He added,

> [s]uch a revanchist Russia would present a much greater challenge to regional order than China. And yet the possibility of another fundamental challenge emerging from Russian military power scarcely rates a mention in most strategic analyses of the region.\(^{19}\)

Korean reunification

The process of Korean reunification is a major source of regional angst. Will North Korea’s rapid economic demise and factional politics lead to an implosion? Or will the country launch a desperate attack on South Korea? Whether it is peaceful or explosive, Korean reunification will have major implications for the regional balance of power. As one commentator explained,

[a] unified Korea under the Seoul government would be more powerful and independent and would also confront a fundamentally different border relationship with China. These changes would radically transform the security considerations and foreign policies both of the Korean successor state and of its great-power neighbors.

In the absence of peace on the Korean peninsula, the United States security relationship with South Korea is vital, for it serves as the main deterrent against North Korean aggression. Already the prospect of a reunified Korea is raising questions about the future of the 27,000 US troops presently based in South Korea, and the implications of their withdrawal. If the US were to leave Korea it would face increased pressure to reduce its force levels in Japan, especially on Okinawa, where three-quarters of the roughly 46,000 US troops in Japan are based.

Territorial Disputes

Despite the Asia-Pacific region’s growing sense of economic interdependence, common interests and self-confidence, it plays host to over
two dozen disputes between key regional actors over sovereignty and territory.\textsuperscript{21} According to one survey of major conflicts,

\begin{quote}
Asia accounts for more disputes than any other region in the world, including Africa. And unlike Africa, where the majority of disputes are over the form of government, most conflicts in Asia are over territory.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

While it is possible to dismiss some as “bilateral irritants [rather] than disputes that are likely to spark military conflict,”\textsuperscript{23} others could trigger conflicts, undermining regional stability. In the medium term, it is the Spratlys that are the most likely source of conflict. Convinced that the area surrounding the islands could be a source of oil and gas resources, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have all registered their claims.

Economic Dynamism and Interdependence

The Asia-Pacific has been labeled, among other things, “the number one region of the future.”\textsuperscript{24} More than half the world’s population – more than 3 billion people – live in Asia. It is not difficult to find statistical evidence to illustrate Asia’s stunning economic growth: in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} See \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 1993}, quoted in Dibb, “The Emerging Strategic Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 102.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Manning, “Building Community Or Building Conflict?” 25.
\end{itemize}
1960, East Asia shared 4 percent of world Gross National Product (GNP); by 1990, the collective GNP of East Asian nations totaled 25 percent of world GNP. By 2010, it is expected to rise to 33 percent. In 1993, two-way trade between the United States and the Asia-Pacific stood at $361 billion. In the previous year, the trade between the European Union and the Asia-Pacific totaled $249 billion, $43 billion more than US-Atlantic trade. In Kishore Mahbubani’s view, the coming century will see East Asia “shed its passivity.” He predicts, “the region’s sheer economic weight will give it voice and a role.” This may be so, but the region’s economic dynamism could also prove problematic.

Some analysts maintain that deepening economic interdependence will bring about a cooperative world order. Regional disputes, they predict, will be resolved without the use of force, for the potential cost of a regional conflict will be seen as too high. Others fear that East Asia’s economic dynamism will inevitably lead to a struggle for regional supremacy. This pessimism comes from several sources:

1. As history has shown, economic growth and regional economic interdependence are not guarantors of cooperation or peace. In fact, as Gerald Segal has observed, “[t]he degree of economic interdependence (...) in the 1990s is little different from that which prevailed in Europe a century before, and we all know the results of the war that began in 1914.”

2. Compared with historical distrusts, economic links between the main regional players are relatively new.

3. Emerging out of Asia’s growing economic interdependence are non-traditional security threats, such as food and resource shortages, narcotics, piracy, and refugee flows.

4. Economic interdependence with ASEAN states or Taiwan failed to prevent China from its recent provocative behavior in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.\textsuperscript{30}

It is hard to imagine the Asia-Pacific – a region riddled with suspicions, disturbing trends, and contradictions – becoming, in the short to medium term, a solid zone of cooperation. One such disturbing and contradictory trend is that Asian states spend enormous sums on defense, and have some of the largest military budgets in the world. Despite this, the region’s security environment is said to be benign. According to one source,

\begin{quote}
[...] the Asian region is the only strongly growing defense market in the world (...) In 1985, Asia spent 58 per cent as much as NATO Europe on defense, whereas by 1994 the proportion was 81 per cent. This trend suggests that by the year 2000 Asia will have outstripped NATO Europe in terms of the amount of money it spends on defense.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

Whether one refers to this massive arms buildup as an “arms walk,”\textsuperscript{32} arms race, or “a competitive arms acquisition process,”\textsuperscript{33} there is no denying it is a disturbing trend, particularly since the region is not faced with any immediate security threat. It is also disquieting because it means increased military power will allow regional powers to resist US influence. Adding to the problem is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in Northeast and Southeast Asia, along with the spread of advanced conventional weapons.

\textsuperscript{30} Segal, “How Insecure is Pacific Asia?” 246.
\textsuperscript{31} Dibb, “The Emerging Strategic Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 103.
\textsuperscript{33} Dibb, “The Emerging Strategic Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 104.
There are other factors working against the development of a regional security community, one of which is the slow pace of democratization. While there is evidence to suggest that democracy is gaining momentum, it will be some time before pluralism replaces authoritarianism as the main political system in the Asia-Pacific. It is feared that some leaders in East Asian countries will continue to push for economic growth at the expense of political development. If the introduction of political democracy in the Asia-Pacific is postponed, "social unrest and political instability" and not "authoritarian order" will result. The reasons why pluralist political systems are so central to regional security has been spelled out in clear terms by Gerald Segal:

[c]ountries with pluralist political systems tend to be more diverse and complex. They tend to be understanding about differences with others and more sensitive to the need for political compromise. They tend to appreciate the joys of criticisms and the healthy role it plays in society. They understand that not all criticism and rhetoric is a cause for tension and conflict. When one pluralist political system confronts another obviously pluralist society, there is a greater willingness to tolerate differences and seek peaceful solutions.

At the same time, Segal warns that the emergence of new democracies should not be greeted with excessive optimism, for while it may be true that "well-entrenched" democracies' may not go to war, "it is also true that newer and more fragile democracies are more liable to slip into serious tension.

35 Segal, “How insecure is Pacific Asia?” 237.
The New Strategic System – Bilateral, Multilateral or both?

Bilateralism

Whether or not the Asia-Pacific becomes a zone of cooperation depends on the new strategic system that eventually replaces the current arrangement. Some commentators predicted that as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, multilateral arrangements would, before long, replace traditional bilateral approaches to security. The US, it was thought, would lose interest in providing security for its traditional allies, and Asian states would conclude that bilateral alliances no longer met their interests for they failed to allow for pragmatic approaches for dealing with new security concerns.\(^\text{37}\) This has not been the case. Instead, the Clinton administration has moved to strengthen its key bilateral security arrangements, while acknowledging that multilateral security dialogue also plays an important role. The efficacy of a multilateral approach to security issues is dependent on solid bilateral foundations.\(^\text{38}\)

Even if the regional security order in the twenty-first century becomes less reliant on bilateral military alliances than it has been in the past fifty-three years, the US-Japan security partnership will continue to provide the fundamental basis for strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific. With the end of the Cold War, the original rationale for the security arrangement between Washington and Tokyo disappeared. But, as is well-known, new risks and uncertainties have emerged to replace the Soviet threat, providing both the US and Japan with plenty of good strategic reasons for maintaining the alliance. Given the potential for instability in East Asia, the US and Japan have no choice but to


strengthen both military cooperation and policy consultations. Close security ties between the US and Japan are crucial to regional stability, especially as a deterrent to aggressive moves by North Korea or China. Policymakers and analysts must continue to examine the ways in which the US-Japan alliance can be revitalized and redefined, strategically and economically, so that the region can continue to gain maximum benefit. No nation, not even the world’s only superpower can go it alone.

**Multilateralism**

The Asia-Pacific has in place some useful tools for coordinating policies and airing regional concerns. Regional security apparatus, such as the ARF, play an important role in heightening confidence and enhancing transparency. The ARF, for example, allows Asia-Pacific countries, including Japan and China, to discuss wide-ranging security issues within a structured multilateral institution. But the ARF does have major limitations. Most significantly, it lacks a direct mechanism for dealing with conflict prevention, arms control and other key regional concerns. In the eyes of its detractors, “the ARF is that most uplifting of optical illusions – an optimistic illusion.” The ARF’s inertia over the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 provided its critics with further proof of its limitations.

Second track or nonofficial groups, such as the Council on Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), also serve an important purpose. Among other things, they provide an opportunity for analysts, academics and others to put forward their views and countries’ perceptions, and explore common approaches to traditional and non-traditional security concerns. But in terms of dealing with key regional


41 Segal, “How Insecure is Pacific Asia?” 244.
issues, this track two process has had even less success than official mechanisms like the ARF. While there is a good deal happening at the track one and track two levels, and the regional environment may over the long-term be shaped by multilateral networks, Paul Dibb, Gerald Segal, Ralph Cossa and others have warned that anything resembling an Asia-Pacific regional society to manage tensions is a long way off.\textsuperscript{42} It is for all these reasons that multilateralism must not be seen as a substitute for existing bilateral mechanisms that have served the region well, especially the US-Japan security partnership. Rather, it can serve as a useful ancillary mechanism.

Conclusion

Beneath the Asia-Pacific’s tranquil surface lurk fears and doubts raised by:

- the reawakening of China
- Japan’s powerful presence
- questions about US staying power
- uncertainties over how the Koreas may unify, and how their union may disturb the power balance
- a host of territorial quarrels
- the increase in military spending in many states
- the immaturity and brittleness of democracy in the region
- the implications of rapid economic growth, and increased economic interdependence.

\textsuperscript{42} Dibb, “The Emerging Strategic Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 117-18; Segal, “How Insecure is Pacific Asia?” 243.
Neither a hotbed of dispute nor a tranquil pool of cooperation, the Asia-Pacific carries the seeds of conflict and the seeds of hope for the twenty-first century.
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism

The level of security and prosperity enjoyed by today’s advanced democracies is virtually unprecedented in history. Internally, the basic political order of these states is not seriously contested. There are only a handful of external military threats, none truly global in reach. The world’s many civil wars and internal conflicts are largely confined to specific regions, and their effects can be prevented from spilling over into the protected nations of the West. There are of course many serious long-term foreign policy challenges – China’s rise, Russia’s decline, stability of the Persian Gulf, energy, environmental problems, and widening economic inequality come to mind – but the advanced democracies face few mortal vulnerabilities. Indeed, in a remarkable historical departure, the survival of the citizenry has nearly ceased to be a major preoccupation of national security policy.

All modern societies, however, are vulnerable to massive loss of life from an attack involving a weapon of mass destruction – nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC). This vulnerability has existed for many years: it is a simple function of accessible weapons, porous borders, free and open societies and high population densities in cities. Yet while national security leaders have generally recognized the military threat posed by NBC weapons, they have tended to downplay or disregard the possibility that these weapons might be used by a non-state or transnational actor in a campaign of mass-destruction terrorism. The threat of NBC terrorism had always had its aficionados, and remains

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1 This paper is a shortened version of the author’s article “Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism” which first appeared in Survival 40, no. 3, (1998): 43-65, and is reproduced here by courtesy of the Oxford University Press.
an inspiration for novelists and scriptwriters, but serious policy-makers have traditionally had other things to worry about.

Something of a paradigm shift now appears to be underway, evident particularly in the United States since the early 1990s. Senior U.S. officials, Congressional leaders, and respected non-governmental experts now routinely call attention to the threat of weapons of mass destruction terrorism – particularly biological weapons – and rank it among the most serious challenges to the security of the nation. Literally dozens of federal, state, and local government agencies have created new programs, or augmented existing ones, that seek to address the threat in some way. The media have taken their cue from these authorities, producing countless stories and segments on the subject, often with a sensationalist spin.

This paper addresses one basic question: How serious is the threat of NBC terrorism to the national security of modern liberal democracies? More specifically, where should combating the threat of NBC terrorism lie within a country’s national security priorities as it allocates resources for new capabilities, organizes its existing capabilities, and declares its policies and threat assessments to the public? To help answer this question, I put forward four arguments.

First, increased concern with the possibility of NBC terrorism is justified. All states have a vital national interest in preventing massively destructive attacks against their citizens and property, and where this possibility exists, government attention and action is in order. In many discussions of this threat, the basic distinction between national security and personal safety is often forgotten. If an individual were to rank the likely causes of death in terms of probability, it is quite unlikely that death from an act of nuclear, biological or chemical terrorism would make the top 100. He or she should quite rightly be more

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2 For a more complete treatment of these issues, see Falkenrath, Richard A., Robert D. Newman, and Bradley Thayer. *America’s Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998. The author thanks his collaborator, Robert Newman, for his input on these issues.
concerned with cancer and auto accidents, and even murder and natural disasters. However, if national leaders were to rank the single, purposeful events that could kill thousands or tens of thousands of its citizens, a terrorist NBC attack would have to be in the top three. The focus of this paper is on the threat to society, not individual safety or well being. Civil vulnerability to NBC terrorism is extremely high, and no state has the civil defense capabilities that would allow it to claim to be “prepared” in any meaningful sense. It is appropriate for the traditional paradigm about weapons of mass destruction to shift, or at least expand, to recognize the threat of NBC terrorism as one of the most serious national security challenges of the modern era.

Secondly, NBC terrorism is a low-probability, high-consequence threat. Many assessments of this threat fixate on one or the other of these characteristics, resulting in quite polarized conclusions. The principal reason one should be concerned with this threat is that even a single act of NBC terrorism could have devastating effects on the targeted society. This concern, however, must be tempered with a sober appreciation of the fact that NBC terrorism has been exceedingly rare in the past, and that there are good reasons to believe it will remain rare in the future.

Thirdly, the harm caused by even one successful act of NBC terrorism in a major city would be profound – and not only in terms of lives lost. Literally thousands to hundreds of thousands of people could be killed or injured in even a single such attack, but these casualties would be but the first in a series of consequences that could result from such an attack. Panic, economic damage, and environmental contamination could follow in the near term. Over the longer term, the nation could be confronted with deep social-psychological questions about the standards of internal security it is willing to live with, and the costs – in terms of curtailed civil liberties or foreign commitments – it is willing to bear to maintain these standards. The conventional, low-tech terrorism of the past has exercised a social and political impact far out of proportion with the casualties it has caused, which on a societal level have been statistically insignificant. It stands to reason that the massive, indiscriminate destruction caused by an act of NBC terrorism
would be similarly disproportionate to social, political, economic and strategic effects.

Fourthly, the likelihood of acts of NBC terrorism in the future is low, but it is not zero, and it is rising with time. Future acts of NBC terrorism are by no means inevitable. However, there is no logical reason to believe that future acts of NBC terrorism are any less likely than other forms of NBC attack, such as a ballistic missile strike. The threat of NBC terrorism is present now, is not confined to a few technologically sophisticated proliferators with long-range ballistic missiles, and is very hard to detect and defend against. The bottom line is that, given the severity of the potential consequences, future acts of NBC terrorism should be regarded as likely enough to place this threat among the most serious national security challenges faced by modern liberal democracies. NBC terrorism should, therefore, command the sustained attention of senior national security officials.

This paper develops these arguments. The first section below provides a brief description of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and assesses the extent to which they can be acquired and used by non-state actors. The potential consequences of acts of NBC terrorism are explained further in the second section. The third section below presents a more detailed analysis of the likelihood of acts of NBC terrorism in the future, focusing particularly on the argument that this likelihood is low but growing with time. The final section offers an overview of the ways in which a nation can act to reduce its vulnerability to NBC terrorism.

**Characteristics and Accessibility of Weapons**

Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are largely unfamiliar devices. Few people have ever actually laid eyes upon one, much less built one, and a comparably small number have actually seen their effects on human beings. A basic understanding of the nature of the three weapon types is important for understanding the nature of the
threat of NBC terrorism, and for fashioning an appropriate strategy against it.

The difficulty of obtaining and using nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons varies widely, both between and within the weapon types. Many factors are relevant: the size, sophistication and type of the weapon being sought; the availability of the technical information needed to design the weapon; the accessibility of essential precursor materials and equipment; the difficulty of weapon design and construction; the extent to which the peculiarities of the weapon complicate the organization of a clandestine acquisition effort; and the existence of externally observable marks that increase the likelihood of discovery.

**Nuclear weapons**

Nuclear weapons release vast amounts of energy through one of two types of nuclear reaction – fission and fusion. Fusion weapons are far more destructive than fission weapons, but can be produced only by technologically advanced states, at great cost. Fission weapons are less powerful than fusion weapons, but are considerably more accessible. A first-generation fission weapon – like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – would have an explosive yield of around 10,000 tons of TNT. Depending on population density, weapon yield, and the severity of subsequent fires, a nuclear fission detonation in a city would kill over one hundred thousand people and devastate an area extending a mile or more from ground zero. Unless the weapon can be found and disabled, evacuation is the only real possibility for damage limitation prior to the detonation of a nuclear weapon.

Nuclear weapons are presently found in the arsenals of only eight states: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel. South Africa built six fission weapons, but dismantled them before the transfer of power to the ANC-led government. Iraq sought to obtain nuclear weapons, but its program was rolled back by the post-Gulf-War inspection and disarmament measures imposed by the United Nations. North Korea is believed to have produced and separated a small amount of plutonium, perhaps enough for one or two weapons, but further production appears to have been suspended and
the weapons program is being rolled back under a negotiated agreement. Iran is believed to be seeking nuclear weapons, but is thought to be at least several years from developing them. Other states, including several European states, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, and others, have a well-developed scientific and industrial base that would allow them to build nuclear weapons relatively easily if they chose to do so.

The only absolute technical barrier to nuclear weapons acquisition is access to a sufficient quantity of fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). If this obstacle were removed through the theft or purchase of fissile material, almost any state with a reasonable technical and industrial infrastructure could fabricate an improvised nuclear weapon. Some exceptionally capable non-state actors could also design and build a nuclear weapon, particularly if they had access to a substantial quantity of HEU metal, which allows an inefficient but simple weapon design to be used. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which exposed large stockpiles of fissile material to an unprecedented risk of theft and diversion, has significantly heightened the risk of nuclear weapons acquisition by non-state actors and states without an indigenous fissile material production capability.

**Biological weapons**

Biological weapons disseminate pathogenic micro-organisms or biologically produced toxins to cause illness or death in human, animal or plant populations. Whereas normal diseases begin in small pockets and spread through natural processes of contagion, biological weapons using microbial agents deliberately release large quantities of infectious organisms against a target population. The result is a massive, largely simultaneous outbreak of disease after an incubation period of a few days, depending on the agent and the dose inhaled. Because of their ability to multiply inside the host, pathogenic microorganisms can be lethal in minute quantities: an invisible speck of disease-causing microbes can kill or incapacitate a grown man, and a few kilograms of effectively disseminated concentrated agent could cause tens to hundreds of thousands of casualties. Biological warfare agents without
a system for aerosol dissemination cannot easily cause casualties on this scale, and should therefore be considered potentially dangerous contaminants rather than weapons of mass destruction.

Toxin weapons disseminate poisonous substances produced by living organisms, and are therefore commonly classified as biological weapons. Like biological agents, toxins generally need to be delivered as an aerosol to be effective as anything more than a contaminant or an assassination weapon. Toxins differ from microbial biological warfare agents, such as bacteria, in that they are non-living, like man-made chemical poisons. Gram for gram, toxins are less deadly than certain living pathogens, since the latter reproduce themselves in the victim. Toxins are not contagious, and thus cannot spread beyond the population directly attacked.

Aerosols of toxins and pathogenic microorganisms in low concentrations are generally odorless, tasteless and invisible. Unless the agent-dissemination device (e.g., an aerosol sprayer) is found and identified, it is entirely possible that a terrorist biological weapons attack could go undetected until the infected population begins to show symptoms of disease or poisoning. Once a surreptitious biological attack is identified, it may be too late to limit its geographic extent or control its medical consequences. In addition, dispersal devices could be gone, perpetrators could be nowhere near the location of the attack, and responsibility for the attack could be very difficult to attribute to a particular state or non-state actor. This combination of factors makes biological weapons especially suitable for terrorist delivery. Also, depending on the type of agent used and the nature of the disease outbreak, a surreptitious biological attack on a civilian population could initially be mistaken for a natural epidemic. Detection time, therefore, may depend on the nature of the attack and the quality of the public health system.

Many states and moderately sophisticated non-state actors could construct improvised but effective biological weapons. Quite detailed information on the relevant science and technology is available from open sources. Culturing the required microorganisms, or growing and purifying toxins, is inexpensive and could be accomplished by individuals with college-level training in biology and a sound knowl-
edge of laboratory techniques. Acquiring the seed stocks for pathogenic microorganisms also is not particularly difficult, but the easiest acquisition option – placing an order with a biological supply service – has been made somewhat more difficult by regulations enacted in 1995. The most significant technical challenge in fabricating a biological weapon is effectively disseminating a bulk biological agent as a respirable aerosol. The most efficient aerosolization systems, which could produce extremely high casualties over wide areas, would require considerable technological sophistication, and remain beyond the reach of most states and most conceivable non-state actors. However, less efficient aerosolization techniques are available, and could be mastered by many states and some highly capable non-state actors. The effects of biological attacks could vary greatly, but a single biological weapon could kill or incapacitate thousands to tens of thousands of people even with an inefficient delivery system, especially if directed against large indoor targets.

**Chemical weapons**

Chemical weapons are extremely lethal man-made poisons that can be disseminated as gases, liquids or aerosols. There are four basic types of chemical weapons: choking agents, such as chlorine and phosgene, which damage lung tissue; blood gases, such as hydrogen cyanide, which block the transport or use of oxygen; vesicants, such as mustard gas, which cause burns and tissue damage to the skin, inside the lungs, and to tissues throughout the body; and nerve agents, such as tabun, sarin, and VX, which kill by disabling crucial enzymes in the nervous system. Chemical warfare agents are highly toxic, but must be delivered in large doses to affect large open areas. For open-air targets, the mass of agent required – even highly toxic ones, such as sarin – rapidly reaches hundreds to thousands of kilograms per square kilometer, depending on weather conditions, and even if the agent is efficiently dispersed. A simple outdoor attack, involving no more planning and execution than a large truck-bomb attack, is thus likely to kill at most a few hundred people even at high population densities. An attack on a crowded indoor area might kill a few thousand people. Some chemical warfare agents are highly persistent, and could render
large areas uninhabitable for extended periods of time, requiring costly decontamination and clean-up efforts.

Chemical weapons suitable for mass-casualty attacks can be acquired by virtually all states and by non-state actors with moderate technical skills. Certain very deadly chemical warfare agents can quite literally be manufactured in a kitchen or basement in quantities sufficient for mass-casualty attacks. Production procedures for some agents are simple, are accurately described in publicly available sources, and require only common laboratory glassware, good ventilation, and commercially available precursor chemicals. Greater expertise and some specialized equipment are required to fabricate the most toxic chemical warfare agents, but the acquisition of quantities sufficient for mass-casualty attacks would still be within the reach of some technically capable non-state actors. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo produced tens of kilograms of the nerve gas sarin, demonstrating the technical feasibility of the acquisition of chemical weapons by capable non-state actors. The actual use of a highly toxic chemical agent as a weapon of mass destruction is not especially difficult in principle.

Consequences of a Terrorist NBC Attack

The defining element of a terrorist NBC attack is that the weapon is delivered against its target in a manner that cannot be readily distinguished from the normal background of traffic and activity. A wide variety of terrorist NBC delivery methods are available, ranging from the simple to the sophisticated. This attack technique can be used by anyone with access to an appropriate weapon, be it a state with advanced delivery systems at its disposal or a terrorist group with no other delivery option. Any potential aggressors competent enough to acquire a weapon of mass destruction in the first place would be able to deliver the weapon covertly against high-value targets in open societies with a very high chance of success.

In a real terrorist NBC attack, the target may not initially know if the perpetrator is a state or non-state actor, and the issue will not make
much difference to the immediate operational response to the incident. A terrorist NBC attack could target civilians, military forces, or infrastructure; could occur in peacetime or during war; and could be a single event or part of a larger campaign. The physical and social consequences of even one attack of this kind against a population center could be catastrophic. Every reader can imagine a gruesome hypothetical attack, with casualties mounting from the thousands to hundreds of thousands. For years, these nightmarish scenarios have been depicted in Hollywood films and classified briefings, often numbing the audience into passivity.

The effects of a successful terrorist attack using a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon would vary widely depending on the weapon, the target and the effectiveness of the means of delivery. The consequences of a major NBC attack would come in waves, played out over a period of months or years. The first impact would be immediate physical damage, but terrorist NBC attacks would also have broad repercussions for the economy, for the nation’s strategic position in world affairs, and perhaps even for its ability to sustain itself as a strong and democratic polity. These effects could be compounded by an organized campaign of multiple attacks, or of a range of different weapon types – including conventional weapons – used in conjunction. At least seven general types of consequences are likely.

Massive casualties

The first and most obvious effect of a NBC attack would be its destruction of human life. The Tokyo subway attack killed twelve and injured about 5,000, but this is low on the scale of NBC weapons effects. If Aum Shinrikyo had been more efficient in its delivery of the nerve gas, fatalities would have climbed into the thousands. A well-executed chemical weapon attack against a crowded civilian target could kill several thousand people. The effects of biological weapons are even more variable, but fatalities in the low tens of thousands are feasible even with unsophisticated weapons. While a more advanced biological weapon in principle could kill or injure hundreds of thousands of people, a single nuclear weapon could easily kill over a
hundred thousand people if detonated in a densely populated urban area. Only wars and plagues have produced casualties on such a scale in the past – never a single attack from within.

Contamination

Second, a NBC attack could contaminate a large area. Depending on the type of weapon used, the area immediately affected by the attack could be rendered uninhabitable for extended periods of time, requiring a costly and perhaps dangerous clean-up operation. A nuclear weapon would also spew radioactive waste into the atmosphere, killing and sickening people downwind. NBC contamination could raise disease rates and reduce the quality of life for a much larger population than that which suffered the immediate effects of the weapon.

Panic

Third, a NBC attack against a civilian population would, in all likelihood, trigger a panic incommensurate with the real effects of the weapons. After the World Trade Center bombing, many more people reported to hospitals claiming ill effects than were actually injured in the incident. In a chemical or biological attack, hospitals are likely to be overwhelmed by people fearing contamination or infection. A nuclear attack – or even a limited radiological incident – is likely to stimulate uncontrolled movement away from the affected area, given the public’s deep-seated fear of all things radioactive.

Degraded response capabilities

Fourth, the government personnel needed to conduct an effective operational response to a real NBC threat may themselves panic, flee, or refuse to carry out their responsibilities as required, compounding the effects of any attack. Active-duty military personnel will generally have the training and discipline needed to conduct operations in an extremely hazardous environment. But without appropriate equipment and training, emergency response personnel such as police, firefighters,
and paramedics may well end up among the first casualties of a NBC incident. Those who arrive at the scene later might decide that the risks to themselves are too high. Congested roads and airspace are also likely to complicate whatever operational response the government is able to mount.

**Economic damage**

Fifth, a NBC attack could cause major economic damage to the affected area. A large attack or a series of attacks could damage the national economy, perhaps even precipitating a recession. Likely effects include death of and injury to workers, the destruction of physical plants, and the contamination of workplaces. An attack could also trigger a run on international financial and equity markets, especially if the target has unusual economic significance. The loss of plants and productivity from even a single, moderately damaging NBC attack could easily climb to the tens or hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.

**Loss of strategic position**

Sixth, a NBC attack or campaign of attacks could do great damage to the strategic position of the United States. The United States could be deterred from entering a regional crisis in which its national interests are threatened. Key U.S. institutions and political leaders might be attacked directly, or U.S. forces and force-projection capabilities might be damaged, in an effort to prevent an effective U.S. response. A U.S.-led coalition might collapse, or an essential ally might request the withdrawal of U.S. forces from its territory, under threat of a NBC attack. The precise nature of these strategic effects is impossible to predict, but the attacks could seriously complicate U.S. efforts to deal with a foreign adversary or crisis.

**Social-psychological damage and political change**

Seventh, actual mass-casualty attacks, and the prospect of their con-
tinuance, could have a profound psychological effect on the target population, and an equally profound effect on the nation’s politics and law. Public terror in the aftermath of a domestic NBC incident would likely be at least as intense as the abstract Cold War fear of nuclear war. Powerful, conflicting forces, including xenophobia, isolationism and revenge, would struggle for control of foreign policy. Domestically, the inability to prevent terrorist NBC attacks, or to respond to them effectively, could cause the population to lose confidence in its government, and initiate a chain of political and legal reactions leading to a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. A society that comes to fear massively destructive terrorist attacks is likely to demand action from its government. In the case of a terrorist NBC threat, that action is quite likely to involve a curtailment of civil liberties that lie at the core of the governmental systems of advanced democracies.

The Likelihood of NBC Terrorism in the Future

Only one non-state actor has successfully acquired and used a weapon of mass destruction: the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo. In June 1994, this fanatical Japanese cult carried out a terrorist nerve gas attack in the town of Matsumoto, Japan, which killed four people and injured 150, but went unnoticed by Western intelligence. The cult conducted a second attack in the Tokyo subway in March 1995, killing twelve and injuring over 5,000.

Still, the Aum attacks were essentially unprecedented, and might go down in history as unique. If threat assessment were a simple extrapolation of past trends, right now one would probably conclude that modern societies have little to fear from the prospect of terrorist NBC aggression. But threat assessment must also consider the changing capabilities, motives, and strategic options of potential adversaries. The capacity to conduct terrorist NBC attacks is growing among states and non-state actors alike. It also appears that the motivation to conduct attacks of this kind is increasing as well. For these reasons, the
likelihood of terrorist NBC attacks already should be regarded as appreciable and rising.

The ability to acquire and use NBC weapons is quite distinct from the interest in causing mass casualties, which in turn is distinct from wanting to use weapons of mass destruction. A specific threat of NBC terrorism arises when a group emerges that falls into three categories simultaneously: it is capable of NBC weapons acquisition and use; interested in causing mass casualties; and interested in using NBC weapons to this end. The threat of NBC terrorism is growing more serious with time because of a widening convergence of non-state actors that are simultaneously NBC-capable and interested in causing mass casualties. At a minimum, these two trends suggest that conventional non-state violence is likely to become more deadly; at the other extreme, however, these two trends suggest that violent non-state actors are moving into position for more frequent and more effective forays into the largely uncharted territory of NBC terrorism. It is possible that none of these capable, bloodthirsty groups will choose to resort to NBC weapons, but considering the consequences which would result from such a decision, it would be imprudent in the extreme to continue to assume that the threat of NBC terrorism will lie dormant indefinitely.

**NBC terrorism is historically rare, and likely to remain so**

A review of the history of non-state actor involvement with weapons of mass destruction yields several empirical conclusions. First, with the important exception of the Aum Shinrikyo nerve gas attacks, no non-state actor has ever conducted, or attempted to conduct, an attack with a functional nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon – that is, by a device that can produce a nuclear yield or disseminate significant quantities of a biological or chemical agent over a wide area in effective form. There is little evidence that any established terrorist organization is or has been interested in acquiring, much less using, weapons of mass destruction. There are virtually no reports, much less solid evidence, linking established terrorist groups – the Irish Republican Army, the Basque ETA, the Fatah faction of the PLO, Hizballah, Jewish extremists, the Italian Red Brigade, the many different Latin
American terrorist and revolutionary groups, the Japanese United Red Army, or the various Turkish and Armenian terrorist organizations – to any serious interest in weapons of mass destruction. A possible exception is West Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF), which may have tried to produce botulinum toxin in Paris in the early 1980s, but it is not at all certain that the RAF had a clear delivery concept in mind for the toxin, much less the determination to use it.

Dozens of cases have been documented in which a non-state actor is known to have used, or attempted to use, lethal chemicals or harmful biological agents in indiscriminate poisonings, as have countless more individual assassinations and assassination attempts involving poisons. These incidents should not, however, be confused with an attack involving a biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction, which requires effective means for wide-area airborne dissemination and generally far more lethal agents. Murdering a few people with poison is a relatively simple matter, but there are logistical limits to the number of people who can be killed through product tampering. Perhaps the best known such incident occurred in September 1984, when two members of an Oregon cult led by the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh cultivated the Salmonella bacteria and used them to contaminate salad bars in restaurants to influence a local election; an estimated 750 people became ill. Biological and chemical agents should not be considered weapons of mass destruction unless they are mated with an effective technical system for large-scale dissemination, such as an aerosol sprayer. Poisoning, product tampering, and assassination – whether by chemical or biological means – is a separate and altogether less worrisome phenomenon than the threat of terrorist attack involving biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction, or nuclear weapons, because the number of possible casualties is far more limited, product contamination is not a first-order national security threat.

Similarly, many cases have been reported – including several in the mid-1990s – in which ostensibly hostile non-state actors have been caught in possession of lethal chemicals, dangerous biological agents, or radioactive material. In April 1993, for example, Canadian border police confiscated 130 grams of ricin from Thomas Lewis Lavy, an
Arkansas resident with reported links to survivalist groups, as he tried to enter Canada from Alaska. After a two-year investigation by the FBI, Lavy was arrested and charged under the 1989 Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act with possession of a biological toxin with intent to kill. He was never tried, because he hanged himself in his cell shortly after arraignment. In August 1994, Douglas Allen Baker and Leroy Charles Wheeler – both associated with the Minnesota Patriots Council, a right-wing militia group – were arrested for possession of ricin and planning to murder law enforcement personnel; their intended delivery technique was to smear the toxin on the doorknobs of their intended victims. In 1995, Larry Wayne Harris, an individual with some scientific training and right-wing affiliations, was arrested for mail fraud after ordering three vials of freeze-dried bubonic plague bacteria from American Type Culture Collection. These are not the only cases in which non-state actors have acquired some quantities of biological warfare agents, but they are the most recent. Although these cases indicate a worrying fascination with chemical and biological agents among some disaffected Americans, all of these cases lacked the evidence of serious intent or technical capacity to use the agent as an effective weapon of mass destruction.

Likewise, countless threats and extortion attempts have been made involving attacks using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by non-state actors, but virtually all of these have been hoaxes – often perpetrated by mentally unstable individuals – and most have been easy to dismiss as not credible.

In short, NBC terrorism is an exceptionally rare, almost unheard of, phenomenon. Put differently, except for Aum Shinrikyo, no non-state actor has yet emerged with both the technical ability and the will to acquire and use nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Clearly, there are non-state actors – including many of unambiguous hostility, such as terrorist organizations – that possess the technical ability to acquire and use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, but the historical evidence suggests that virtually none of these groups have entertained a serious interest in carrying out NBC attacks. Conversely, with the exception of Aum Shinrikyo, non-state actors that have wanted to commit acts of NBC terrorism have not, so far, been able to bring them
Latent NBC potential of non-state actors is rising

The latent ability of non-state actors to master the challenges associated with NBC attacks is rising in all modern societies. This gradual increase in NBC potential is a byproduct of economic, educational and technological progress. This trend also results from the fact that in most modern societies the ability of the state to monitor and count illegal or threatening activities is being outpaced by the increasing efficiency, complexity, technological sophistication and geographic span of legal or illegal activities of non-state actors.

• The Impact of Economic, Educational and Technological Progress

The technological and scientific challenges associated with covert NBC acquisition and use are significant but they are also not getting any harder. The amount of HEU needed to produce a nuclear explosion is the same today as it was in 1945; the particle size necessary to create a stable, respirable aerosol of anthrax spores is the same today as it has always been; and the chemical structure of sarin has been the same since 1939, when the substance was discovered by a German chemist trying to produce a better pesticide. Meanwhile, non-state actors are growing steadily more capable, and thus better able to surmount the technical hurdles to NBC acquisition and use – along with many other prosaic tasks, of course. As a result, the number and range of non-state actors with NBC potential is expanding. Since the fundamental cause is social progress, this expansion of latent non-state actor NBC potential is inexorable and is not reversible by governments.

How and why is the underlying capacity of non-state actors to master the technical challenges of NBC acquisition and use increasing? The first reason is that the basic science behind these weapons is being learned by more people, better than ever before. In the United States alone, the number of people receiving bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral degrees in the science and engineering fields each year more than doubled between 1966 and 1994. Education data on other countries suggest similar trends. An even more important gauge of the ability of
non-state actors to build and use weapons of mass destruction, however, is the increasing level of knowledge available in even high school science courses, not to mention in undergraduate- or graduate-level courses, as well as the sophistication of laboratory and analytical tools, from computers to laboratory-scale fermentation equipment, that are now routinely available. The new physics that the Manhattan Project scientists had to discover to make nuclear weapons possible is now standard textbook fare for young physicists and engineers.

Nowhere is this phenomenon more pronounced than in biology. The advance of biological sciences is creating a situation in which a sophisticated offensive program can produce more easily advanced biological weapons with heightened resistance to prophylaxis or treatment, increased virulence, controllable incubation periods and agent longevity, and conceivably even a selectivity that targets groups of people according to their genetic makeup. The biotechnology revolution is also increasing the number of people who know how to use such agents and make them easier to produce and use. The biotechnology industry’s growth is causing a steady increase in the number of people who understand how simple biological processes (such as growing bacteria) can be used in a practical way, and who are capable of manipulating these processes for their own ends. As the biotechnology sector becomes entrenched in the global economy, the number of people with the skills necessary to undertake a basic biological weapons program will inevitably grow. Just as important, the industry’s growth has made available a wide range of tools and supplies – such as efficient fermenters for producing large amounts of bacteria in small facilities, and increasingly sophisticated tools for measuring aerosols – that would facilitate a basic biological weapons procurement effort.

Finally, even apart from rising education levels and growing familiarity with relevant technologies, the latent NBC potential of non-state actors is growing because the ability to acquire information of all kinds, quickly and with ease, is increasing. The Internet contains a vast amount of information relevant to the planning and execution of complex violent acts, ranging from information on specific targets to detailed accounts of previous terrorist incidents and tactics, and
sometimes even basic technical information for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Much of this information has been present in libraries for years, but access to it has never been easier. Today’s violent non-state actors are able to start substantially higher on the terrorist learning curve, compared to their predecessors of even a decade ago, if they can conduct even a modest computerized search for information.

- **Non-State Efficiency and Flexibility is Outpacing the State**

Most countries could seek to suppress non-state efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction on their territory. The difficulty of clandestine NBC acquisition, therefore, depends in part on the interested non-state actor’s effectiveness at eluding the surveillance and enforcement efforts of state agencies. The relationship between any particular non-state actor and its pursuers is likely to be idiosyncratic, but as a general matter it appears that the efficiency of non-state operations is outpacing the efficiency of state operations, at least in the United States, and probably everywhere in the developed world.

A complex, illegal activity like clandestine NBC weapons acquisition has several different constituent parts, any of which may be vulnerable to law enforcement surveillance. A team of like-minded, appropriately skilled individuals must be assembled; places must be found for them to work; they must be able to communicate with one another, possibly over great distances; information, materials and equipment must be gathered, possibly from abroad; and a dangerous weapon must be assembled and delivered without mishap. This is a challenging set of tasks, and would entail risks of detection in any state able to provide for its internal security. The rapid development of increasingly pervasive communications and transportation systems makes several of these tasks easier, while the explosion of the legitimate use of such systems makes criminal usage harder to spot.

Fundamentally, this phenomenon results from advances in the private sector’s ability to communicate. Whereas non-state actors once had access to little more than analog phone lines and the mail, today they can communicate by fax, cellular or satellite telephone, teleconference, alpha-numeric pagers, e-mail, computer modem, and computer bulletin
boards. They can quickly transport at least certain kinds of weapons and supplies via Federal Express, the United Parcel Service, DHL, and numerous other highly efficient shipping services. Telecommunications traffic has increased dramatically in both volume and variety over the last decades, easily outpacing the state’s ability to keep track of it all. The communications systems available to non-state actors also now have the potential to be more secure than ever. Strong encryption systems were once “the exclusive domain of governments,” but today virtually unbreakable encryption software is now readily available on the global software market, and easily downloaded off the Internet. The benefits to legitimate users are considerable, but the implications of this trend for the ability of law enforcement to cope with increasingly sophisticated non-state actors are profound.

The U.S. government’s efforts to control the availability of unbreakable encryption software have failed, and the nature of the technology makes them unlikely to succeed in the future.

Before the information age, this situation was markedly different: state agencies had clear technological dominance over their non-state challengers, in areas ranging from sophisticated eavesdropping equipment to advanced surveillance cameras. Law enforcement and intelligence gathering continue to benefit from improving technology, but generally cannot increase their effectiveness at detecting hidden illegal activities at the same rate because of the constraints of law, manpower, financial resources and technology. As one study has put it,

power is migrating to actors who are skilled at developing networks, and at operating in a world of networks…. Non-state adversaries – from warriors to criminals, especially those that are transnational – are currently ahead of government actors at using, and being able to use, this mode of organization and related doctrines and strategies.3

In this competition between a centralized process, in which the state seeks the needle of criminal activity in the haystack of an increasingly

complex society, and decentralized criminal processes where effectiveness is limited only by human competence, resources, and ever-advancing technology, the state is clearly at a disadvantage.

Propensity toward mass-casualty violence appears to be rising

There is a growing body of evidence that non-state actors are becoming more interested in causing human casualties on a massive scale. This is a relatively new development, and it remains poorly understood. The classic conceptual model of a terrorist organization – that of an established group with limited political aims, a strategy of controlled violence for achieving them, and an interest in self-preservation – appears to be breaking down. New groups are emerging with hazier objectives, shorter life spans, and a more direct interest in violence for its own sake, often for reasons rooted in religious fundamentalism or political radicalism. And the ascendance of Western culture and U.S. power in the post–Cold War international system is making the United States and its allies increasingly attractive targets of terrorism. In short, the nature of terrorism is changing in a way that points toward an expanding range of groups that are simultaneously NBC-capable and interested in inflicting human casualties at levels well beyond the terrorist norms of the previous decades.

What is the evidence that supports this claim of rising lethality? According to the U.S. State Department,

while the incidence of international terrorism has dropped sharply in the last decade, the overall threat of terrorism remains very serious. The death toll from acts of international terrorism rose from 163 in 1995 to 311 in 1996, as the trend continued toward more ruthless attacks on mass civilian targets and the use of more powerful bombs.4

The 1995 FBI report on terrorism noted that “large-scale attacks

designed to inflict mass casualties appear to be a new terrorist method in the United States.” Based on the most detailed database of terrorism incidents in the public domain – the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorist Incidents – Bruce Hoffman similarly concluded that “while terrorists were becoming less active, they were also becoming more lethal.”

In other words, it appears that the number of groups interested in killing large numbers of people is growing, and that the level of killing that violent non-state actors believe necessary to achieve their objectives is rising.

Four trends, often tightly interrelated, suggest that the past disincentives to mass-casualty attacks will have diminishing force in the future. First, violence and terrorism motivated by religion is becoming more common and more lethal. Second, local opposition to U.S. influence and military presence appears to be intensifying in the moderate, pro-American sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf region, resulting in increasingly frequent and damaging anti-American terrorist attacks. Third, right-wing terrorism appears to be growing both more prevalent and more lethal. In the United States, this was seen most clearly in the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. Fourth, it now appears that more and more non-state violence is committed by ad hoc collections of like-minded individuals who come together for specific purposes, sometimes to commit a single attack. While these “amateur” terrorists probably have a somewhat lower capacity to carry out mass-casualty attacks, the motivational restraints on their ability to do so are also likely to be lower.

How Governments Should Respond

Arguing that the threat of NBC terrorism should be treated as a first-order national security challenge inevitably raises questions about what can, and should, be done by governments about it. To protect all potential targets, all the time, from NBC terrorism is clearly impossible, and should not be attempted. But a purely passive, reactive posture is equally unsatisfactory. The governments of the world’s leading democracies should instead put in place a package of measures to make NBC terrorist threats less likely to emerge, and should create operational capabilities that give them a reasonable chance of detecting, defeating and minimizing the consequences of specific terrorist NBC threats. These measures should be viewed as a prudent investment in the long-term security of their citizens and national interests, not as an emergency campaign. The response to the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism should be vigorous, coherent, and purposeful, but it should also be measured, balanced, and respectful of core democratic values.

There is no simple, technical “fix” to the national security threats posed by the threat of nuclear, biological, or chemical terrorism. A society’s vulnerability cannot be eliminated or substantially reduced in the same way as some military threats, with specific technical or operational countermeasures developed to meet particular offensive systems. This is a major difference between NBC terrorism and traditional military NBC threats, such as ballistic missiles: the appropriate response to the latter tends to be relatively straightforward, if technically complex, while the former requires responses scattered across diverse policy areas and multiple jurisdictions.

Clearly, no two countries will respond identically to the threat of NBC terrorism, as the deficiencies in their governmental organization, policies and operational capabilities vary enormously. Nonetheless, five key prescriptive concepts should guide the policy responses of any government motivated to reduce the vulnerability of its society to NBC terrorism.

Firstly, concerned policy makers and legislators should not overreact – and in particular, should take no action that might compromise the personal liberties and freedoms of the citizenry. The threat of NBC terrorism straddles the traditional domains of law enforcement and
national security, and any discussion of how to respond to the terrorist NBC threat will almost inevitably raise uncomfortable questions about the relationship between the state and its citizens. Many of the measures that could be taken to combat terrorist threats would tend to increase the power of the state, at the expense of the freedom and privacy of individuals or groups. An unprepared society’s vulnerability to NBC terrorism can be significantly reduced through policy changes, improved government organization, and focused investments in new operational capabilities without undermining essential civil liberties. The threat of NBC terrorism is a serious national security challenge, but it is not so imminent that governments should preemptively begin to change the nature of the societies they have been charged to protect.

Secondly, before starting new programs and initiatives, the government should have a sound national strategy for addressing the problem, and should put in place a system for effective interagency coordination and long-range planning. This is a particularly marked deficiency in the United States, which has a hodgepodge of disparate policies and operational capabilities directed against the NBC terrorism threat – some quite formidable, others wholly inadequate – of haphazard origin and uncertain future. Although the Clinton Administration has expressed high concern about the threat of high-technology terrorism, it has not established a coherent national “blueprint” for long-term capability building, and most new initiatives have been driven either by activist legislators or the individual federal agencies. Although it is impossible to establish a unitary authority or command with responsibility for all aspects of prevention, preparedness and response to NBC terrorism, coherent interagency planning and effective coordination is essential if the whole of a government’s response is to remain at least equal to the sum of its parts, to prevent unnecessary wastage of the limited resources that can be devoted to this problem.

Thirdly, intelligence is the first and most important line of defense against terrorist NBC threats. Any effort to reduce a nation’s vulnerability to terrorist NBC attacks must, therefore, seek to improve the quality of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination on the full range of extant and potential nuclear, biological and chemical weapons threats. As an operational matter, a nation’s ability to defend itself
from a real threat of terrorist NBC attack will depend most critically on the quality and timeliness of its intelligence. Specific conspiracies are relatively easy to defeat if the authorities learn of their existence ahead of time and in sufficient detail to investigate and take action. Acquiring good intelligence on the full range of potential NBC threats – state and non-state, foreign and domestic, terrorist and military – is a profoundly difficult task, but it must be strongly emphasized because of its great importance to a nation’s ability to defend itself from existing and potential threats. Most intelligence services already give some attention to the issue of NBC weapons proliferation. However specific enhancements are needed to acquire early warning of emerging NBC threats, especially by watching for the most likely endorsements of small-scale, improvised NBC acquisition programs, abroad and at home; to improve the use of public-health capabilities – particularly epidemiological surveillance – to detect medical evidence of NBC weapons programs and biological weapons attacks; to identify those responsible for NBC attacks after the incident has occurred; and to cooperate internationally against shared transnational threats. In the United States, shortcomings in these areas are symptomatic both of the difficulty the U.S. intelligence community has had in adapting to the security challenges of the post–Cold War era, and of its failure to make use of state-of-the-art information processing technology. Since the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the shortcomings of U.S. intelligence have been commented upon and studied at length, by the government itself and by others. But the incremental pace of current reform efforts does not reflect an appreciation of the community’s fundamental problems, or the political will to address these problems with the boldness required.

Fourthly, the single best possible insurance policy against the risk of nuclear terrorism is to ensure that all stockpiles of fissile material (especially highly enriched uranium) and nuclear weapons themselves are properly accounted for and guarded. Safeguarding nuclear weapons or fissile material in proper facilities is a much simpler task than locating and recovering stolen fissile material, preventing its use in building weapons, and defending against an improvised nuclear weapon used in a terrorist attack. Nuclear terrorism is not a serious threat when all the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and direct-use fissile material are
held under secure conditions. However, the degradation of the Soviet nuclear custodial system has heightened the risk of nuclear terrorism by rendering vast quantities of fissile material more accessible than at any other time in history. The U.S. government has been fairly active in attempting to address this issue, but its European and Asian allies have largely ignored the issue, making only miniscule investments in the needed training and assistance programs in Russia. The problem is of such a scale that it will require a sustained international effort for many years before the risk of insecure former Soviet nuclear material and weapons is brought in line with international standards.

Finally, national governments should enhance their operational capacity to detect and mitigate the consequences of chemical and biological weapons attacks at home and, in the case of states with external security commitments, abroad. This should be done not by establishing new stand-alone assets, but by strategically augmenting certain existing capabilities, most of which are independently valuable and worthy targets for further investments. In preparing for biological terrorism, the most important area for capability enhancements is the public health sector, which already has systems in place to detect, contain, and treat natural disease outbreaks – a process known as epidemiological surveillance. Most biological weapons do not cause immediate ill effects, and the symptoms of many biological warfare diseases initially resemble a cough or the flu, so acts of biological terrorism may well be detected first by the existing systems for epidemiological surveillance. Since the effective medical treatment of most biological warfare diseases depends on early detection and prophylaxis, states should invest in improving the speed and accuracy with which their epidemiological surveillance systems can detect unseen biological weapons attacks. Likewise, most states will have to enhance their emergency medical systems so that they are capable of mounting an effective, no-notice medical response in a major biological weapons incident. An exceptionally demanding contingency that would require stockpiles of key medicines and vaccines, trained personnel to deliver them, and a high-readiness mobilization system should be set up in every state.

Unlike biological weapons, chemical warfare agents generally have
prompt, noticeable effects on humans, and the chemical incident is likely to play out over a matter of hours rather than days. For this reason, the most important operational capability for mitigating the effects of an act of chemical terrorism is the “first responder” community, which consists of the local police force, fire departments, hazardous material specialists, emergency medical personnel, and public health and disaster relief officials. In a no-notice chemical weapons attack, there will simply be no time to bring in specialists from around the country to manage the incident. This demanding task will inevitably fall to municipal and state officials, the vast majority of whom have no special knowledge, training, or equipment for dealing with weapons of mass destruction. Of course, one cannot expect all potential first responders in a large country to have an extensive understanding of how to respond to this threat. But it is possible to create a layered system of preparedness, which would start with broad-based awareness training, specialized training and equipment for local specialists (e.g., HAZMAT teams, bomb squads, police special weapons and tactics teams, emergency management officials), and specialized medical units for large-scale chemical or biological attacks at the regional level. These response capabilities should be regularly tested and examined through full-field exercises against realistic, challenging weapons of mass destruction incidents, with the participation of all relevant federal, state and local agencies.

The military should be tightly integrated into any national preparedness plan of this kind, since the armed forces will generally contain most of a state’s technical and operational capacity to counter specific NBC threats, including most of its capacity to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment, to decontaminate casualties, equipment, and facilities, and to treat large numbers of chemical and biological warfare victims. The capabilities needed to manage the consequence of domestic NBC weapons attacks overlap substantially with those needed to fulfill the more traditional mission of protecting military forces on the battlefield and in rear areas against chemical and biological attacks. As the United States and its allies work to enhance their armed forces’ overall capacity to fight against NBC-armed regional adversaries (an effort known in the United States as “counterproliferation”), they should ensure that these capabilities
enhancements also improve their society’s capacity to cope with domestic NBC attacks.
JEFFREY P. BRADFORD

Information Vulnerabilities

There have been many dramatic representations about how post-industrial society has become an “information”-based society.¹ Further the advent of accessible computers has led to concern regarding the “Year 2000 or Y2K problem” for government, industry and us as individuals. It is my intention to identify whether we are observing a major change in the international environment akin to the industrial revolution or whether it is merely a change of process (i.e. computers as opposed to communications developments such as the telegraph, or telephone).

In order to facilitate this analysis I have chosen to examine the problem of information vulnerabilities from three distinct perspectives. Firstly from the position of the nation-state as actor, secondly with regard to intra-state activity and lastly from the perspective of the individual, as depicted below in figure 1:

Firstly however it is necessary to make a few definitions. Information is, it could be suggested, distinct from knowledge in the context of this situation. One could have access to timetables for the Swiss railway system (constituting information) but it could be argued that this only constitutes useful knowledge for a person using that railway system. In short, knowledge is relevant only within certain social situations and environments. Information is simply that, a source of data which is in itself consistent.

Allied to these two concepts is the issue of competence. We may be able to obtain from the Internet instructions for building a personal nuclear deterrent. We may actually be interested in doing this. However without access to the materials and facilities our attempts will not get far. Competence refers to the ability of humans to take contextualized information (knowledge) and have both the will and ability to use it to change their environment. Figure 2 explains the interaction between these three concepts:
Figure 2: Information, knowledge and competence.

To summarize the introduction it could be suggested that the essential terms for considering information vulnerabilities are information, knowledge, and competence. Now we shall consider these issues from the perspective of the nation-state, intra-state and the individual.

The Nation-State Perspective

The dominant paradigm within international relations regardless of the challenges faced remains that of state-centric realism. The world is

composed of nation-states engaged in the pursuit of power within an anarchic environment with no over-arching authority. The pursuit of power is explained in terms of the national interest.

For inter-state relationships to function the formal communication channel we recognize as diplomacy exists. Historically when communication times were very long ambassadors would travel to countries, spend several years in a court and write papers which would be carried to the home government via ship and horse. Subsequent developments improved the speed with which these messages could be carried, but it is revolutions such as the telegraph, telephone, satellite and computer which have had the greatest effect in shortening communication times. Today in Britain like many countries embassies are in constant communication with the center via electronic mail.

The history of cryptography – the study of codes and code-breaking is clearly linked to diplomacy. The Roman Cytaele through Cardinal Richelieu, to the black chamber, the cracking of Japanese diplomatic codes and the Walker brothers spy trial in the United States indicate the threat to inter-state communications in terms of obtaining information.

The formation of foreign departments and intelligence agencies represented the attempt of the state to translate information into knowledge. Analysts and country specialists can provide decision-makers with a context for the pieces of information emerging from another state. Vulnerabilities at this level of analysis, could be suggested, focused upon the ability of the state to ignore its ambassadors and impose solutions generated at the center. Further the dilution of authority and expertise regarding the state in question will clearly affect the quality of analysis.

A further vulnerability for the nation-state is the ability of others to monitor communications traffic through cryptography. Code-breaking renders the strategy of state vis-à-vis others visible and therefore vulnerable to subversion. The Zimmerman telegram from Germany to Mexico during the early stages of the First World War provides one example. The British interception and decoding of the message enabled them to transfer information, which to the United States constituted knowledge regarding Mexico and Germany.
Given the anarchic nature of the international environment, international law illustrates some of the efforts being undertaken by states vulnerable to information manipulation. In a manner akin to nuclear deterrence legal moves seek to build confidence among players. At present the main laws which could be applied are the international telecommunications convention and the 1967 treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space.3

Regarded as being particularly forward-thinking about the philosophy of fulfilling defense needs, the 1997 Russian national security concept provides indications of future thinking.4 The concept calls for a need to balance between the need for free exchange of information and permissible restrictions on its dissemination. The Russian government further has a body designed to perform a coordinating role in information security, the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information.5

The Intra-State Perspective

The intra-state level of analysis considers the problem from a different angle. The ability of states to act is conditioned by activities within them. One manner of considering this would be to use the feedback loop from Easton’s work in the 1960s. The political system makes


decisions, which are then implemented in the environment which gives feedback regarding them back to the government, and so forth.

This level of analysis considers information vulnerabilities as the consequence of mass communication. Newspaper, radio, television and the Internet represent tools, which can inform the majority of citizens with ease. All of these tools with the obvious exception of radio use pictures to communicate. The power of the image as we are all aware is highly potent. Images from news networks during the 1991 Gulf conflict brought the war into the average citizen’s home.

For industry marketing techniques seek, so cynics say, to convince consumers to buy goods they would avoid under normal circumstances. At the intra-state level all four tools provide a means for market economics to flourish. Regulation in some societies is tighter than others, as to the content of marketing advertising. Industry therefore is largely dependent upon access to the tools of mass communication.

For governments the growth in mediums for communication is somewhat more problematic. In Britain few people would remember a party political broadcast from the last general election. Given the statistics sometime ago that only 3 percent of people have a regular interest in foreign affairs it would seem that the only way governments can communicate is to allow representatives to be cross-examined on news programs. Alternatively briefing journalists offers a way to shape the information being transmitted to the citizens.

What then are the vulnerabilities for intra-state actors? Firstly propaganda. The tools available are all susceptible to misinformation either by accident or design. The permeability of state borders means that misinformation can easily be inserted into another society. After all, satellite television and the Internet are barely regulated for the validity of content – however, who in a democracy can objectively regulate information without causing a level of angst against them?

In terms of industrial competitive advantage the ability of some societies to advertise products in ways actively detrimental to their competitors provides in some cases a significant advantage. Some economies are vulnerable to the marketing ability of others. Given future developments in the realms of supply chain management and
other commercial fields the western accent shall definitely move towards controlling information and by contextualization knowledge, and thereby cash flows and profitability.

The challenge to organizations engaged in commerce is clearly to react realistically to protect its human resource assets from defection to other organizations and protect its information whilst maximizing their understanding of knowledge. This understanding manifests itself in terms of understanding information flows throughout the organization, the links to its operating subsidiaries, suppliers and customers, and thence to its competitors.

The Individual Perspective

The individual perspective is influenced by the writings of John Burton. The idea of the human needs theory suggests that individual desires and drives provide a better level of understanding than the power politics approach.

Individuals communicate via language. What is meant by this is broader than merely the ability to articulate. Rather it could be suggested that society is fragmented into groups which use language as a means of exclusion but also to distinguish themselves. For example the predilection of the military establishment to use acronyms – most notably the TLA or Three Letter Acronym.

The individual is vulnerable insofar as he/she can be excluded from participating in particular careers, or social environments. Given the demographic shift downward in Europe, there is clearly a potential vulnerability if the talents of individuals cannot be harnessed and engaged effectively.
Conclusions

In this brief overview I have sought to demonstrate different ways of conceiving the problems surrounding information, knowledge and competence. These together create security threats at the three levels of analysis indicated. However, are these really new threats?

It has already been indicated that coded messages between states have been vulnerable for several centuries. Efforts to influence societies through the use of propaganda dates back arguably to Caesar’s chronicling of his campaigns in France and Gaul. The use of particular language dialects to distinguish groups within society has been a prevalent feature for some time.

My closing argument, having devised a framework for considering information vulnerabilities, is that of the devil’s advocate. It could be suggested that whilst the means at some levels of analysis has changed in terms of transmission time and process the actual situation has hardly changed. At the height of the British Empire in the 1850s the editor of the Times newspaper arguably had the capacity to influence on a scale akin to cable news networks such as CNN today. Those in key positions can in the extreme exert control over agenda setting to mass audiences.⁶

For commerce it is the process developments which are requiring new responses. The speed with which information becomes knowledge leads to a requirement for highly skilled analytical people who are mentally agile. Further organizational structures, which include a large measure

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of devolution, enable rapid response to changing market conditions and are able to identify opportunities and react faster than the competitors. Management consultants in the late 1990s will be challenged with the issues of facilitating organizational change at a cultural level to harness these developments.

In closing, in this short space the author has sought to contemplate the issues of information and knowledge in an era of globalization and revolution in process terms for accessing information. As a brief conclusion, historical experience suggests that beneficial adaptation to change is possible. Furthermore it shall occur regardless of the world-view of individuals.
Scenarios

As an “entrée” just envision a very likely scenario: the attack starts silently, no alarm, no bombing, no explosion. Computers of electricity companies crash. The electricity system collapses. Radar systems at airports and airfields stop working, as well as traffic lights in huge cities such as Los Angeles. At Wall Street the computers calculate incredible exchange rates and then crash as well. The phone turns to be silent as the grave. The Internet is dead due to manipulated, simulated overloading. Neither TV nor Radio is broadcast. People start to panic. Meanwhile, the aggressor crosses the border to conquer a foreign country – unknown to the rest of the world. This scenario – as an example of “cyberwar” – is becoming more and more likely. Just recently at Los Alamos a wrongly initiated electromagnetic pulse-bomb completely destroyed the electronics of all items – in this case mainly cars – in a distance of 300 meters.\(^1\) Third example: recently, the Pentagon published a study on new strategies used by worldwide cooperating hackers. They apply guerrilla strategies and tactics.\(^2\)

These are a few scenarios of how modern wars could or, respectively, can happen and to what we usually refer with the term information warfare (IW). Information warfare, however, is only one possibility of modern warfare.


When we talk about modern warfare which possibilities, capabilities and technologies are envisioned, particularly by the US? What is really new? What is information warfare? Why has IW become such a prominent topic? Should IW really concern us?

What is New? – Modern Warfare

The so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) caused by technological advances is particularly revealed in information systems, weapon systems, command and control systems and has also influenced military doctrines, operational, tactical, and strategic thinking (for example with regard to handling international conflicts and multinational crisis management). The gap between states with hi-tech warfare capabilities and states with only low-tech capabilities – the technological asymmetry – is becoming more and more significant and profound. Many critics, therefore, argue against large expenditures for hi-tech, since it is not clear who the potential enemy is. Talking about modern warfare we have to focus on developments in the US and conceptual US- as well as NATO-studies (New World Vistas, Joint Vision 2010, Spacecast 2020, Aerospace 2020). I also refer to recent German Armed Forces’ studies (Streitkräfteinsatz 2020, Technologie und Doktrin, Elektronische Kampfführung 2020."

7 Amt für Studien und Übungen. Studienbericht Streitkräfteinsatz 2020. Bonn-
A number of technology and research fields were identified in the publications mentioned above as being of extraordinary interest for enhancing core competencies in preparation for modern warfare. These include speed, range, information superiority, air and space superiority, precision, precision engagement, lethality, freedom of maneuver, flexibility, agile combat support, global perspective, global engagement, responsiveness, survivability, and sustainability.

- To meet the task “to know more and to know it sooner” sensors in combination with the respective information technology are crucial. Sensors, whether for the electromagnetic spectrum, mechanical footprints, or with a “nose” for chemicals or biological components, are essential elements of virtually every weapon (e.g. Taurus-missile), support (e.g. tank “Fuchs” for detection of biological and chemical agents), and reconnaissance system (e.g. satellites). Increasing connectivity and functional integration allow near-real-time situational awareness, and thus eventually global awareness. Moreover, it enables the military to locate activities in underground facilities, accurate delivery of munitions and ballistic missile defense.

- Smaller, “micro-” or “miniature,” lighter, more agile, and hypersonic munitions are designed to be more lethal and have a much broader range of application. These characteristics will give them a new role in modern warfare.

- Lasers and microwaves – directed energy – are developed as new, eventually space-based weapons with the aim of global engagement through space.

- Major attention is drawn on space technology and space applications so as to achieve the above-mentioned global awareness,

global positioning capabilities, information dominance, projection of power from space, and space control. The US is thinking in dimensions of space-based platforms and weapons systems, clusters of cooperating satellites and improvements in launch vehicle- and satellite bus-technologies.

- Apart from space-based operations, all other operations in the air, on ground, or on sea research and development of new materials, especially pyrotechnics, are regarded as high priority. New explosive material, fuels, lubricants and stealth materials are on the agenda. Developments in biotechnology have an increasingly bigger impact on new military technology, in this case, materials.

- To achieve power projection worldwide much attention has been paid to improving and enhancing mobility – rapid global mobility – by developing capabilities for long-range precision strikes (F-22 Raptor), supersonic transport aircraft, global navigation systems, stealth capabilities, information technology, and global reconnaissance and surveillance systems, as well as high fidelity and virtual reality training. In this context the promotion of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) plays a major role.

- It has become obvious that owing to new technologies and improving knowledge of “human systems” new methods and standards in training are required.

Before I focus on new warfare evoked by new information technology – which has had the most profound influence on modern warfare – I would like to point out the four capabilities which are considered to be the most important in modern warfare so as to reach full spectrum dominance. 10 These four capabilities are based upon the technologies and core competencies discussed above:

1. Dominant Maneuver (across the range of military operations to gain asymmetric leverage – the enemy must react from the position of disadvantage or quit.)

10 Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010.
2. Precision Engagement (be responsive and accurate from extended ranges so as to have a wide array of flexible and accurate options.)

3. Focused Logistics (precise application of logistics with the result of more capable forces.)

4. Full-Dimensional Protection (multi-layered protection for forces and facilities from theater to individuals).

What is Information Warfare?

As indicated above information technology is the most relevant basis for modern warfare. It has become conceivable to fight a war solely with information, which is expressed by the term ‘information warfare.’

For thousands of years the role of information in warfare has been well understood. 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu, a Chinese philosopher and general, mentioned in his well-known and appreciated work on “the art of war”\(^\text{11}\) that “if you know the adversary you do not have to fear the outcome of any battle.” He revealed the importance of information in strategy, tactics and operation as an additional operational factor to space, time and forces.

Today, however, the role of information in warfare has reached a completely different dimension, dominating and stimulating almost all other aspects of modern warfare. Information warfare is no longer the domain of a few electronic combat specialists.\(^\text{12}\) Basically, it concerns everybody. If a passenger aircraft crashes because of a deliberately introduced virus into the avionics system it concerns us. The possibilities of information warfare are not restricted to the military world but might play a role in economics, traffic control, supply with energy or electricity, water supply, transport systems and infrastructure in


\(^{12}\) Führungsstab der Luftwaffe, *Studienbericht Elektronische Kampfführung 2020*.
general. Borderlines between different areas, between civilian or commercial and military domains, between interior and exterior, national and international security are fading away because of information technology and its consequences on information warfare. Information technology is developed and produced mainly commercially: dual-use products with spin-off effects from the commercial sector.\textsuperscript{13} Former third-world countries (also: non-governmental organizations or, on the other side, terrorists) can make use and take advantage of information technology even disproportionally well which will, of course, balance the asymmetry discussed above to some extent. (The role of mobile phones in the 1993 engagement in Somalia serves as one example: the Somalis were equipped with better mobile phones than the allied forces and, consequently, had better situational awareness.\textsuperscript{14}) Information and possibilities of information warfare play a major role in multinational operations – in combinedness (armed forces of different nations are engaged together) and jointness (different services of one nation’s armed forces are employed) – as well as in the influential effect of media on the public, and thus on the decision-making processes. Human losses and collateral damage perpetually presented by the media can influence the people to force the politico-military decision-makers to either become active or to stop their activities. Fatal attraction of rules of engagement (ROE) - micromanagement by politicians, could be the result. (Stalingrad and Vietnam serve as negative examples in history).

So far the term information warfare has been defined in different ways depending on the author in question. Different expressions such as electronic warfare, command and control warfare, hacker warfare, netwar, psychological or intelligence-based warfare have been used simultaneously with or instead of information warfare or have been considered part of it.\textsuperscript{15} A generally accepted definition does not exist.


\textsuperscript{14} Führungsstab der Luftwaffe, Studienbericht Elektronische Kampfführung 2020.

To understand the dimension and complexity of information warfare we should first differentiate between the fight for and with information (e.g. Electronic Combat Reconnaissance (ECR)- Tornado) – information is considered as an object – and the fight for and with information dominance (as it is the case, for example, in the intelligence sector) – which reveals the additional functional character of information warfare. Information and information technology determine – among others – weapon’s precision, lethality, range or reconnaissance capabilities, or, on the other hand, exert an influence on people’s knowledge and conviction and, consequently, also on command and control capabilities. Information can thus be regarded as a weapon. Information can be applied in the Clausewitzian sense to coerce the adversary.\textsuperscript{16} On the other hand information or information technology can protect us, our weapons, our knowledge and our purpose – information or information technology can be a protection or protection technology as well.

Information warfare could be defined as comprising all the means of accomplishing and securing information dominance so as to support politico-military strategies by manipulating adversary information and information systems and simultaneously securing and protecting one’s own information and information systems and increasing their efficiency.

In an extreme case information warfare would then be applied without exerting physical power. Sun Tzu already said: “To win the war without a fight will be the best accomplishment.”\textsuperscript{17}

Relevance of Information Warfare

Information warfare can be looked at on strategic, tactical and opera-


\textsuperscript{17} Sun Tzu, \textit{The Art of War}. 
tional levels. The strategic role derives from the effect on command and control and thus eventually on the politico-military decision-making process. On the tactical level information warfare plays a role as far as the information technology of weapon or sensor systems or command and control systems (e.g. “Heros,” “Eifel,” “Guppis,” “Güz” in Germany) are concerned. The “urban warrior”-concept is a good example in this context. The role of information warfare is particularly interesting on the operational level: information and information technology is the fourth operational factor in addition to time, space and force. Moreover, it has altered the relative importance of each factor. Space can be used more flexibly and with higher mobility because of information technology capabilities. Force, as revealed above, has gained a completely new face. The importance of time has particularly and dramatically changed by information technology.

Some people expect information warfare to play the dominant role in modern warfare and, furthermore, think that we will transfer from the former hard-kill to a “modern” soft-kill. However, information warfare or manipulation of information can, of course, have lethal consequences. If the data source on munitions supply is manipulated it can certainly have a lethal effect. Information or information technology can only be a means for a specific purpose – one example being that despite a transparent battlefield (like on a chess board) the human being is still asked to make the decisions. The human factor still plays a major role, also revealed in the “Op-force” training tests in the US, for instance, and is even more challenged in an information warfare scenario. Internal command and control structures, “Auftragstaktik” (on each level within the military hierarchy everybody is responsible for his respective subordinates and how they will fulfill their respective tasks) and decentralization of structures as well as responsibilities are essential to oppose and manage the threat by information warfare.

The knowledge of the possibilities of manipulating information might eventually create constant doubts of the truth of information so that in a war conventional warfare might then again prevail and determine victory or defeat – even or particularly in symmetric force constellations.  

Mechanisms and Effects

What are the mechanisms of information warfare? An attack on the info-sphere can occur by viruses (self-multiplying, uncontrollable manipulations in systems), “Trojan horses” (introduced into a system with a program, dependent on the host), chipping (introduction of detrimental functions with the chip), spoofing (a function that pretends the existence of a certain data-environment), or hackers with the effect of manipulating, pretending, destroying, refusing, or protecting information, reconnaissance, or psychological influence, just to name a few. Of particular interest is cryptography and steganography. Very complex mathematical methods, algorithms, allow the protection of one’s own information and reconnaissance of adversary information.

Informational Vulnerabilities and Means of Protection

The possibilities of making use and applying information warfare to our own advantage are set back by informational and technological vulnerabilities as well as commercial dependencies. How can we

protect ourselves against these vulnerabilities and attacks against the info-sphere? The US have put a lot of energy into developing protection methods.\textsuperscript{21} Each service is now equipped with its own information warfare squadron. Moreover, the US has just recently founded a joint C2 warfare center. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) revealed that only 6 percent of all hacker attacks are discovered and from these 6 percent only 10 percent are made public. The DISA deliberately simulates attacks on the info-sphere, analyzes the results, and tries to improve information security and protection. First of all everybody is asked to apply already known and existing protection means and methods. Plausibility controls, authentication methods – “firewalls”\textsuperscript{22} – and the application of only certified commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) material are further possibilities of avoiding the deliberate introduction of manipulated or false information. The specific training of experts is, of course, of utmost importance. Furthermore hardening and other physical means of protection against electromagnetic pulses are essential. Additionally, one should support decentralization and redundancy of resources (data, computer, functions, etc.).\textsuperscript{23}

We have only touched the complex field of information warfare, many questions remain unanswered, such as:

- When does information warfare start?
- What does victory/defeat mean in an information war?
- Should an information warfare attack be allowed by the parliament?


What is an appropriate reaction to a massive information warfare attack?

Besides, in international or martial law no paragraph on information war exists or is in preparation.²⁴

These are a number of as yet unanswered questions that need to be resolved urgently.

The issue of water conflict belongs strongly to the post–Cold War era with its changing perceptions of security. The emergence of “Water Wars” as a major threat to international conflict may be dated to a 1991 Foreign Policy article with precisely this title by Joyce Starr. Since then we have been regularly subjected to a number of official views of the kind that the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics.

The issue to be addressed here is simple: does this represent the most knowledgeable view of the future consequences of water scarcity? For a simple analytical framework, let us start with a few notes on the concept of scarcity.

Scarcity by definition entails increased competition for a resource with increased economic value. Attempts to overcome scarcities are sought through two distinct mechanisms: supply-side regulation and demand-side regulation.

Competition, however, also entails a potential for conflict. Two levels of conflict are easily identified: international and within countries. Combined with the two mechanisms for adapting to change we get the convenient four-field diagram below.

Causes and types of water conflicts:
(Numbers refer to the arguments in the text)

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Following this simple analytical framework, it is the argument of this paper that 1) the driving force for conflicts between countries over water is attempts to increase supply; 2) attempts to manage demand by definition will alleviate this pressure; 3) driving forces for conflicts within countries at present are attempts to increase supply, resulting in competition between different sectors of society and different groups of population; but that 4) attempts to increase supply by necessity will be superseded by demand regulation; and consequently from a policy point of view the most important potential cause for conflicts over water will be mechanisms for conflicts within countries caused by the new demand management practices necessitated by water scarcity. To summarize the argument, in water affairs we will increasingly experience a shift of focus from square (1) above to square (4).

Both in order to test this argument and develop the appropriate policy responses, we need to have an understanding of i) how water scarcity will develop over the short term ahead (ca. 2025), ii) an overview of theories and societal tools for dealing with international water conflicts, and iii) a similar overview of societal tools for demand regulation, plus theories of links between water scarcity and conflict within countries.
Water Scarcity

Scarcity by definition implies diminishing resources and/or a pressure on the supply of available resources from an increasing demand. Analyses of water scarcity conventionally therefore take as their point of departure geophysical inventories of available water resources. This is combined with a socio-economic analysis of the driving forces for increasing demands and their evolution over time, resulting in projections of water scarcity, according to some predefined level of water availability per capita. At best, these projections are adjusted for the adaptive economic and technological measures societies inevitably will undertake in the face of growing water scarcity.

Availability of water resources

There is a general awareness that water is a scarce resource. At the same time there is also a common perception that an abundance of water could be mobilized if socio-economic and technological constraints could be overcome. Both scientific and policy interests would gain from a greater clarity of perception on how large a part of the annual flow of water over the continents societies actually have appropriated and how much is left for future increases in demand.

The best such calculation I have seen has been made by Sandra Postel, Gretchen Daily and Paul Ehrlich. They start by calculating how large a part of the total evapotranspiration humans have appropriated, and arrive at the conclusion that rainfed agriculture uses up fully a quarter of all the water that evaporates from the leaves of all the green plants on the planet, which means that the three remaining quarters must suffice for the rest of the terrestrial ecosystems.

A number of items should be noted here: evapotranspiration is the larger part of the water cycle over continents, roughly three times the


amount of water that flows over and through the ground. It also represents the final “consumption” of water; until water is evaporated from the ground or through the transpiration of plants, it remains accessible for potential use – and reuse – by populations and ecosystems. This means that agriculture by principle remains the “end-use” of societal water-use. (As we shall see agriculture is also by far the largest societal water-user.)

Evaporation (from the ground) is also called “the thirst of the atmosphere,” and plays an extremely important role in water scarcity in arid countries. Here, the water availability is radically diminished by evaporation, and rains that may fill water reservoirs in temperate countries may not even suffice to give any usable infiltration into the ground or runoff to rivers at all.

From a conflict-analysis point of view, however, evapotranspiration as such (through rainfed agriculture) is not a cause of conflict. Conflicts are about getting more water for societal use, particularly for irrigated agriculture. Of more immediate policy interest therefore is the calculation of available runoff, i.e. the renewable flow replenishing all rivers, lakes and groundwater reservoirs, from which all water for irrigated agriculture, societies and industries is taken. A figure of ca. 12,000-14,000 km$^3$ per year is commonly cited in the literature. It is very important to understand the process by which this figure is arrived at, and what it implies for the potential increase of supply.

Postel et al. use a figure of 40,700 km$^3$ for total global annual runoff. The accessible runoff, i.e. the flow in rivers and through groundwater reservoirs which is geographically accessible and available when it is needed (e.g. the growing season), is much smaller for three reasons. i) The distribution of runoff over the continents is uneven and does not match population concentrations. Asia has 60 percent of the world’s population but only 36 percent of the runoff. South America with 5 percent of the world’s population has 25 percent of the runoff. ii) A large part of the runoff, both in the tropics and in the northern areas, is inaccessible both today and in the foreseeable future. iii) Water must be available when it is needed, both for irrigated agriculture, industry and domestic uses. This means that the highest reliability comes from that part of global runoff, which is constituted by renewable groundwater or
the minimum river flow. This part only constitutes 27 percent of the geographically available flow.

By adding the minimum flow in rivers and that part of surface runoff that ends up in dams you get an estimate of the permanently accessible flow, after having deducted that part of the flow which is geographically inaccessible. The result is a mere 9,000 km$^3$ per year. To this should be added the ca. 3,500 km$^3$ runoff which is regulated by large dams. The result is the widely circulated figure of 12,500 km$^3$ per year of accessible runoff, which is roughly a third of the total annual global run-off of 40,000 km$^3$.

In order to determine whether this available supply represents a resource constraint, and thus a potential source of conflict, we must get an understanding of present societal water use.

*Water use by category and sector*

Three categories of water use can be identified. i) Withdrawals or abstractions, i.e. water taken from rivers, lakes and aquifers for human activities (also known as water demand or water use). ii) Consumption, i.e. water that is withdrawn in such a way that it cannot later be reused (mainly by agriculture but also as a result of e.g. pollution). iii) Human needs for what is known as “in-stream purposes” (mainly to maintain wetlands and aquatic ecosystems, water-courses as transportation routes, or for aesthetic and recreational purposes).

Postel *et al.* calculate that the human appropriation of the accessible runoff now amounts to fully 54 percent. The amount actually withdrawn is roughly twice as much as the amount left for in-stream purposes. The amount actually consumed is calculated to be roughly a third of the total human appropriation. To understand how this figure is arrived at a more detailed analysis of water by sector is illuminative.

A commonly cited figure of 65-70 percent of global societal water withdrawals makes agriculture by far the largest water-user. It should be noted that this figure refers to the withdrawal by irrigated agriculture from the accessible runoff (rainfed agriculture, the largest part of agricultural production, is by definition not included here). The amount
actually consumed in agriculture varies according to climate, types of harvests and water-use efficiency by irrigated agriculture. Postel et al. calculate a figure of 65 percent for consumption.

A benchmark figure for industrial withdrawals is 20-25 percent. Industrial water use has leveled off or declined in many industrial countries but is still increasing in large parts of the developing world. In contrast to agriculture only a small fraction, roughly 9 percent, is for consumption.

The benchmark figure for household water withdrawals is 5-10 percent of the total societal withdrawal. The use for consumption is 17 percent.

Other uses for consumption noted by Postel et al. and not noted in the rough classification above are evaporation losses from large dams, where as much as 5 percent of the amount stored may be lost every year. Importantly, the amount set aside for in-stream purposes depends on the need to dilute pollution to an acceptable level.

From a policy point of view the purpose of such a detailed analysis as above is to gain a realistic understanding of the potential for increasing supply, to which we now turn.

**Potential sources of increased supply**

A systematic inventory of potential sources of increased supply starts with the amount of rain falling over continents, which has led to attempts of cloud seeding from the air. Little or no success has been noted. The same goes for plans to tow icebergs from the Antarctic.

Desalination of sea water today amounts to 0.1 percent of global fresh-water use. It will be an alternative to drinking water supply in arid countries with large energy resources and capital. The cost of providing desalinated water at present is greater in magnitude than any other method. It is important to note that desalinated water may come to play a greater role for industry and household use, but never for agricultural purposes.

The next logical step would be to attempt to increase the amount of runoff which at present is geographically inaccessible, which has
resulted in plans for mega-projects of diverting the rivers of Siberia, the Mackenzie river in Canada, etc. No major project of this kind, however, seems to be feasible, ecologically or economically, during the foreseeable future. This constitutes an aspect of the regional dimension of water scarcity – water, particularly in the amounts needed for agriculture, is an extremely bulky and low-value (per ton) resource; it is simply not economically feasible to transport it through man-made infrastructures for larger distances. The main alternative during the next 30 years or so therefore would be greater capture of runoff in dams.

New dams will continue to be built, albeit at a slower rate. Between 1950 and the mid-1980s on average 885 large dams were built annually. At present only 500 new dams are built annually, and this number is projected to diminish economically, ecologically and not least socially because of rising costs. The building of new large dams is increasingly a cause of social conflict within countries. (Cf. the Narmada dam, and the displacement of roughly 1.5 million Chinese as a result of the Three Gorges dam on the Yangtze river).

Postel et al. calculate that if 350 new large dams were to be built annually during the next 30 years, and the proportion between size and usable amount of water is the same as now, this will increase the accessible runoff by ca. 10 percent (to 13,700 km\(^3\)). The uncertainties here are first of all the effects of climate change, which would change the pattern of runoff and probably diminish the accessible runoff, since increased runoff cannot be captured by existing dams, and dams that will get less runoff will capture correspondingly less water.

As will be apparent from the next stage in the analysis, water needs and demands during the same period will by far outstrip the possible increase of 10 percent in accessible runoff. A first conclusion is that very strong pressure exists for appropriating an even larger part than the present 54 percent of the geographically and temporally accessible runoff. This, in turn, forms the basis for increased competition both between countries, and within countries between different sectors of water use and population groups within these sectors.

A conclusion entailing more far-reaching consequences, however, is
that the largest and most readily accessible sources of more water do not reside in attempts to increase the amount of water appropriated from an already heavily taxed runoff, but in increasing the amount of accessible water by reuse and increased efficiency (cleaner processes mean that less water will have to be used for diluting pollution; higher end-use efficiency in e.g. irrigation means more available water, etc.), which brings us to the management of the demand side of the equation.

**Water needs and demands**

The water needs of human beings differ drastically according to lifestyle, region and degree of development. Even larger, however, are the differences between the different categories of needs of a single individual:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water needs of one human being, liters per day:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drinking water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household uses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and biomass</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is clear from the breakdown of water needs above, is the enormous amount of water required to feed a single human being (as a rough benchmark, growing one kilogram of grain requires a thousand liters of water), regardless of where this water comes from. If the food is grown by rainfed agriculture (as in large parts of North America and Europe), these water demands will not increase pressure on and competition for the accessible runoff. If the food is grown by irrigated agriculture (as in large parts of the world where both population increases are highest and consumption levels are increasing rapidly), the demand from agriculture will increase the pressure on accessible runoff dramatically, thereby constituting the main driving force for potential conflicts over supply, and also within countries.

The first two categories of water needs (drinking water and water for household uses) must be satisfied on a local level. This is what leads Lundqvist & Gleick to make a distinction between *needs* and *demands*.
for water, and to stipulate a basic water requirement (BWR) of ca. 50 liters per day, the fulfillment of which must be considered a human right. Demands above this level are, in a sense, negotiable. Food can be bought instead of grown, and in the case of such water-scarce and food-importing countries as Egypt (which imports more than half of its food needs) one could even say that every ton of grain imported equals a thousand tons of water, which the Nile could not provide the irrigated agriculture of Egypt.

But such a trade-off between easing the pressure on heavily taxed water resources, substituting it for increased societal efforts in the economic sphere (exporting industrial products) by definition means finding the proper societal tools for executing major changes in the economic structure of a country. This is what makes demand management not only a necessity, but a potential source for conflict.

The need for and consequences of demand management

When increasing the supply no longer is a readily executed option for societies, competition between different sectors of a society, and the need to regulate demand, surface as new features in water issues. The unfolding of such competition has been described as the “triple squeeze on water.”

1) From having been an open-access resource water is transformed into a public responsibility good, and to a certain extent also a private good (through industrial water treatment plants, etc.). This means that a resource that until now has been available to anyone at no cost is


transformed into an economic good with a price – and with the entailing scarcity, distribution and equity problems.

2) There is increased competition between different sectors for the now societal economic good, water, mainly as a result of the growth of urban systems; water demands from cities compete directly with the demands from agriculture.

3) Water pollution now becomes a “public worry good,” resulting in diminishing accessibility of water.

Pivotal in attempts to regulate the demand for the now public and economic good, water, is the concept of efficiency; both in the use of water, and the uses that water is put to. In the first instance efficiency comes into play as a means of increasing the amount of available water by increasing efficiency in the end-use of water, in other words increased efficiency in irrigation practices (e.g. drip irrigation) and also in industrial use (more water-tight production processes and less pollution); in urban supply systems (leaky pipes); and households (leaky toilets, watering of lawns, etc.).

The main societal tool to implement measures of end-use efficiency is an economic incentive, i.e. putting a price on water. Let us just at this point note that putting a price on a formerly free good is a major source of potential conflict in any society. In the case of water it would mean far-reaching changes, not least for farmers, rich or poor, in large parts of the world.

Still larger changes, however, will entail from the wider concept of efficiency that increasingly is brought to the fore, namely how to put water to the most efficient use; what is referred to as allocative efficiency. If scarcity by definition transforms water into an economic good, and economic tools increasingly are used to manage the demand for water, economic logic also compels societies to use the scarce resource in a way that will maximize the economic output of the resource use. The rationale is eloquently described by Tony Allan:
If allocative efficiency is not achieved, it is possible, and even common, to be doing the wrong thing extremely efficiently. It would be much more useful to be doing the right thing, that is with efficiently allocated water, a little badly.\footnote{Quoted in Lundqvist/Gleick, \textit{Sustaining our Waters into the 21st Century}, 19.}

From a water-policy point of view, development towards allocative efficiency seems inevitable, although the ramifications are enormous. It will mean major economic restructuring, first of all for the agricultural sector in water-scarce countries. It is a process that few societies will enter into willingly, since in the short run it will mean increasing pressure on sectors that in many cases already are at the point of breaking down, not the least urban centers and the job market in the industrial sector. On a global level it will mean a major restructuring and increase in the volume of the food-trade system, as more and more countries choose to become large food-importers – or are forced to accept the role of food-aid recipients.

Before coming to grips with the risk of conflict stemming from this powerful driving force for societal change, we need to take the analysis one step further and outline some actual projections of water scarcity.

\textit{Projections of water scarcity}

As a rule of thumb hydrologists use the level of 1,000-2,000 m$^3$ per person and year to designate a danger of water-stress. When the figures drop below 1,000 m$^3$ per year and person, nations are considered water scarce. This means that a lack of water becomes a severe constraint on food production, economic development and protection of natural systems. Today, 26 countries with 232 million people belong to this group.

Early projections of water scarcity typically took the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) med-term scenario for projected population increases as their point of departure and simply calculated the projected water needs at constant or even increasing per capita withdrawals.

\footnote{Quoted in Lundqvist/Gleick, \textit{Sustaining our Waters into the 21st Century}, 19.}
Falkenmark made a profound impact, showing that a number of African countries were heading straight into the “water barrier” because of a combination of continuing demographic explosion and unfavorable climatic circumstances. The argument was doubly powerful and still very salient, since it underlined the then little understood importance of “thirst of the climate” (evaporation).

But it is of course impossible to maintain the supposition that societal water use will remain the same in the face of mounting scarcity. If anything is certain, a change in societal resource use is the order of the day. Israel, for example, maintains a modern industrial and agricultural society on water withdrawal levels far below the 1,000 m$^3$ per year and person (and even below the so-called water poverty line of 500 m$^3$ per year and person), and so does Jordan, although far less successfully.

In fact, both countries could be used as examples of the dangers looming from water scarcity; external conflict (Israel’s occupation 1967 of the West Bank with strategic aquifers), and internal breakdown tendencies (bread riots 1997 in Amman as a consequence of rising food prices); but also of water’s instrumental value in peace-making (the Israel-Jordan peace treaty 1994), and societal capacity for adaptation (Israel realistically plans to survive on a level of 125 m$^3$ per year and person by reusing waste-water and substituting industrial products for food-imports).

**Water scarcity – the emerging consensus**

There is an emerging understanding of, and consensus on, the characteristics of water scarcity roughly along the following lines.

Water resources are extremely unevenly distributed in relation to population concentrations and the demand from rapidly expanding

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7  Cf. the special contribution by Israeli water expert Hille Shuval in Lundqvist/Gleick, *Sustaining our Waters into the 21st Century*, 37-39.
economic activities. Growing regional and local scarcity cannot be addressed by conventional supply-oriented measures, since the accessible supply is already taxed to the limit, and since there is an economic limit to large-scale water infrastructures with a long-distance capability.

Compared to all the other sectors agriculture is the largest consumption user of water by far. Conversely, water availability is increasingly identified as the limiting factor for agricultural productivity increases. Water scarcities on a country basis are therefore rapidly translated into food production constraints. Critical areas are countries with unfavorable climatic conditions, still high population increases and with strong developmental expectations.

Although water scarcity is often perceived as an absolute, static condition, dealing with it requires viewing it in relation to present water-use practices, and the choices made about which economic activity water is used for. There is large room for efficiency improvement in the different usage of water; and still larger room for putting available water resources to better economic usage. Viewed in this way water scarcity is transformed from an absolute constraint into a strong driving force for societal and economic structural change.

Almost by definition, however, change means societal stress. It is to the inherent conflict potential of this stress that we now turn.

Water Scarcity and the Risk of International Conflict

Returning to the simple analytical framework introduced at the beginning of this paper, the risk for international conflicts over water is linked exclusively to attempts to increase supply. Attempts to manage internal demand, by definition, means less pressure on the resource base, and thus works towards lessening tensions among conflicting demands on the common resource.

The key word here is the sharing of a common water resource. The problem lies at the nexus of what essentially is a zero-sum game, and
the peculiarities of the upstream-downstream dilemma. When the sum of the riparian states’ water withdrawals from a shared river approaches the finite flow of the river, any further withdrawals from an upstream state will mean less water for the downstream states.

Conflicts between countries over such shared water resources occur in all parts of the world. Most often they are about dividing the volume of water in a river between riparian states, but they may also be about water quality (pollution means a scarcity of usable water for downstream recipients), and about groundwater withdrawals (aquifers know no borders). It is important to understand the limitations of attempts to overcome the zero-sum game by attempts to increase supply.

**Zero-sum game or confidence building**

There are in fact ways to increase the supply (flow) of a river. The clue lies in minimizing the large evaporation losses that follows whenever water is spread out over a large area in hot and arid climates. Such spreading-out may occur naturally (a prime example is the Sudd marches on the Nile in southern Sudan), or more commonly, through the building of dams in flat areas (such as the Aswan dam, or a majority of the dams in the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union).

Staying on the Nile for an illustration, the Assuan dam is in fact situated in a singularly bad position from the point of view of evaporation losses. Situated on Egyptian territory close to the border with Sudan it covers an enormous area in order to capture an amount of water sufficient to maintain the flow of the Nile through Egypt even during several dry years in a row. The same amount of stored water, and the same regulatory function, could in principle have had from building a dam on the Blue Nile, in the Ethiopian mountain gorges, but to a much lesser cost of evaporation losses, since a dam of similar volume there would have much less surface area. A joint Egyptian-Sudanese-Ethiopian project in Ethiopia thus would result in more water being shared among the riparian states.

The problem, of course, is that to the Egyptians such a solution is
unacceptable on two grounds: as things stand at present, they could never leave the fate of their agricultural production capability to the good will of Ethiopia. Secondly, they could never trust Ethiopia not to use the dam for irrigation projects of their own, thus diverting potentially much larger amounts of water from the upper Nile than at present.

The same, unfortunately, applies to the now aborted project to dry up the Sudd marches by building the Jonglei Canal. Any attempt by the Sudanese to use the canal to divert water for irrigation would be a threat towards downstream Egypt, since potentially it could mean larger water withdrawals than present evaporation losses.

Two lessons could perhaps be derived from this example: the extra amount of water to be had from attempts to increase the supply in rivers may not be that large (particularly compared to the magnitude of steadily rising demands); and realizing what potential there is crucially depends on creating enough confidence between the riparian states.

Conflict resolution – water for peace

In fact, the pressure on riparian states to cooperate in managing shared water-resources are so strong, that pragmatism in many cases tends to overcome a less-than-perfect international legal framework. Evidence comes from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database developed at Alabama University, which now includes the full text of 140 water-related treaties, negotiating notes from 14 basins, and files on water-related conflict:

What we’ve been finding should not surprise anyone actually working in transboundary issues – the history of cooperation, creativity, and ingenuity over shared basins is infinitely more rich than that of acute conflict. We have found a total of seven cases of transboundary, water-related, acute conflict – in only four were shots fired (two of those four were between Israel and Syria). To our knowledge, there has never been a war over water!
At the same time, over 3,600 water-related treaties have been negotiated, dealing with all manner of water management.⁸

These findings were dramatically confirmed in October 1994, when the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was announced. Central to the treaty was an agreement on dividing the waters of Jordan in a way that at least began to approach the old Johnston-plan of 1955. In a way, peace was bought at the price of water, even if the treaty also hinged on an agreement to build a number of dams on the river Jordan to capture virtually the last drops of the winter rains flowing into the river on its way to the Dead Sea.⁹

The treaty thus could be said to manifest the utilization of the last reserve potential for increased supply. Increasing the amount of water available for future demand increases now hinges entirely on re-using water and freeing water from other uses (agriculture).

This, however, does not necessarily imply that the potential for conflict has increased in other parts of Israeli water conflicts. Israeli water expert Hille Shuval explicitly confirms that Israel may have to make further water concessions in exchange for peace treaties – and still manage a growing population with increasing per capita water demands.¹⁰

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⁸ Quoted from an e-mail conference intervention by Aaron Wolf (BASMGT conference intervention no. 13, FAO, 1997).


¹⁰ In his contribution to Lundqvist/Gleick, Sustaining our Waters into the 21st Century, 37-39.
International water conflicts – the emerging consensus

The risk of international conflict over water stems from the contradiction between increasing demands and the difficulties in adapting by demand management, including structural changes in water use. The risk is highest for countries in arid areas with strong driving forces for increased water demands (still large population increases, large developmental expectations from the population) and a large dependency on external sources of water (rivers or aquifers flowing into the country).

Countries which cannot muster the necessary capacity to change quickly enough may be pressured by internal contradictions into attempts to increase or safe-guard present quotas of imported water by pressuring neighbors, ultimately by military means. War, however, still is the most wasteful and resource-demanding way of managing a resource scarcity. It is also a largely futile exercise, since the water amounts that realistically could be appropriated by war very quickly will be insufficient compared to the driving forces for increased water demand.

The tendency therefore, even where water conflicts have been deemed an imminent risk, is to trade water for peace and structural change in water-use. The emerging consensus is well summarized as “water is a trigger for conflict, but a reason for fostering peace.”

From a policy point of view, facilitating this process by water-conflict management and resolution still is high on the agenda. In the long run, however, policy-makers would be well advised to regard this as a stopgap procedure, since the driving forces for international water conflicts will still be at work within countries. Attempts at water-conflict resolution therefore ideally should be coupled with incentives for structural changes in water use.
Water Scarcity and the Risk of Conflicts within Countries

Aaron Wolf, working on the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database cited earlier, notes:

[our findings should not be taken to mean that there is no conflict over water – as we all know, there is lots – only that it does not happen at an international level. In fact, our findings suggest that the likelihood of violence increases as the scale decreases. This [...] suggests that rather than being causal, environmental degradation leads to internal political instability, which in turn can provide an environment conducive to acute conflict.]

Returning to the simple analytical framework (from the beginning of this paper) of external or internal, supply- or demand-induced conflicts, the risk of conflicts within countries (in contrast to the risk of external conflict) is two-pronged. Analytically they can be separated into risks of conflict as a result of attempts to increase supply, or as a result of societal changes necessitated by attempts to regulate demand.

The first risk is comparatively easy to spot, although the causal links are much more complicated to trace than in international conflicts. Analytically it may be regarded as a consequence of competition for a scarce resource. A growing literature exists on policy tools.

The second risk is considerably more obscure, although the potential ramifications are stupendous, and the causal links even more complicated to trace. Analytically it may be regarded as a consequence of difficulties adapting to natural resource scarcity, i.e. the set of policy measures introduced to manage the first risk. Policy measures go way beyond the water sector.

A growing mass of empirical evidence and theoretical work points to a link between environmental degradation, or scarcity of natural resources, and social conflicts. The concept of “environmental scarcity,” introduced by the work of Homer-Dixon et al., has proved to be an extremely powerful tool for analyzing the challenges ahead, and is used here to get a conceptual grip on the risk of conflicts within countries induced by water scarcity.\textsuperscript{12}

Environmental scarcity is defined as the sum (or product) of i) a particular environmental impact, ii) population increase and iii) societal inequality. Simply put, the \textit{environmental impact} (e.g. overpumping of aquifers) will make the resource pie smaller, \textit{population increase} will make the slices (per capita allotments of finite water resources) smaller, and \textit{societal inequality} will make an inordinate number of slices end up in the hands of the well-off, while the less powerful will get fewer slices of the already shrinking pie than they are entitled to.

A typical example would be increasing water scarcity in a farming community from overpumping groundwater boreholes or farming on steep mountainsides. Driving forces would be the environmental impact \textit{per se} (lowering of water tables or less infiltration of rain into the ground). At the same time, demand-induced scarcity will probably be at hand, stemming from population increase, possibly also from increased

\textsuperscript{12} For an introduction to the field, see Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.” \textit{International Security} 19, no. 1 (1994): 5-40. The work carried out by Homer-Dixon and co-workers at the Peace and Conflict Studies Program, University of Toronto, in cooperation with the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), can be tapped into by accessing http://www.library.utoronto.ca/www/pcs/eps.htm. A similarly ambitious undertaking on European ground is the ENCOP joint project among Swiss peace researchers based at Zürich and Bern. Findings have been collected in three volumes by Bächler, Günther, Volker Böge, Stefan Klötzli, Stephan Libiszewski, and Kurt R. Spillmann. \textit{Kriegsursache Umweltzerstörung: Ökologische Konflikte in der Dritten Welt und Wege ihrer friedlichen Bearbeitung}, Zürich: Verlag Rüegger AG, 1996. (Main study in German, two volumes of country studies in mixed English-German).
affluence and economic activity (more people demand more and better food, placing still greater demands on water resources).

In a situation of growing scarcity, the more powerful sectors within a local society would tend to monopolize access to diminishing water resources (resource capture), leading to marginalization of poorer segments. Structurally-induced scarcity may be reproduced on a larger societal level, through competition over water from more powerful sectors (cities and industries), thus further marginalizing the agricultural sector in general, and poorer farmers in particular. Marginalized people in turn will tend to sustain themselves in ways that by necessity rather than choice are unsustainable, i.e. result in increased environmental impacts.

Conflict would not be a predetermined outcome of such a vicious circle. Contrary to common wisdom, there is no clear-cut connection between poverty and conflict. For conflict to occur several conditions must be fulfilled, among them the fact that impoverishment is pervasive to the degree that the legitimacy of the state is threatened. The existence of ethnic or religious cleavages within a society, acting as a channel for organizing resentment, is a common exacerbating factor.

Finding the appropriate policy tools of dealing with water scarcity and the risk of these complex causes of conflict within countries is a task that has only recently begun to take form.

**Policy tools for adapting to water scarcity within countries**

The analysis so far has pointed to three great challenges for water-policy makers: to manage conflicts, to get more use out of the same amount of water, and to get better use out of the available water.

The policy goals for dealing with water scarcity within countries accordingly could be formulated as i) managing the competing water demands from different societal sectors and population groups in order to achieve a distribution of the scarce resource that is perceived as equitable; ii) facilitating technological changes to achieve greater end-use efficiency; and iii) facilitating socio-economic changes to achieve greater allocative efficiency.
The policy tools available for these tasks fall roughly into two families: the administrative approach and the market approach. Crossing the policy goals with the available tools we get the following simple framework to discuss the applicability of policy tools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals (right):</th>
<th>1) Equitable distribution</th>
<th>2) End-use efficiency</th>
<th>3) Allocative efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tools (down):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Recommended but not neces-</td>
<td>Clumsy but probably still necessary</td>
<td>Governments face tough decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approach</td>
<td>sarily best</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>(Needs administrative measures as well)</td>
<td>(Not an easy task to get the prices right)</td>
<td>(Markets can be cruel decision-makers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The debate so far has mainly concentrated on the first two goals, reaching equitable distribution and promoting end-use efficiency, and whether administrative methods or economic incentives are the best ways of reaching these goals. As water scarcity continues to increase, governments inevitably will have to face the tough choices entailed by the third goal:

Achieving allocative efficiency is difficult and should involve more than purely economic considerations. If the highest valued uses are allowed to purchase all water in a purely free market, some groups, typically farmers and farm workers, are going to lose water and their economic base of support. This requires that the economy and the political system be able to provide alternative livelihoods, compensate third parties affected by market transactions, and judge between diverse claims for allocation.¹³

We now turn to the risks of conflict in this process.

The risk of conflicts induced by attempts to adapt to water scarcity

The analysis so far points to a clear (albeit not immediately obvious) risk of conflicts induced by the very tools adopted in order to manage water scarcity. (Ironically, these tools by definition are aimed at reducing the risk of conflict, since open conflict obviously is the least desirable “management” outcome.)

I would suggest that this risk of conflicts merits a level of analysis of its own, and that such conflicts are best understood as second-order conflicts, in the sense that they are not (first-order) conflicts over a scarce resource, but rather consequences of a failure to introduce the correct kind, or the sufficient amount of, adaptive measures, or unforeseen consequences of these measures. This kind of policy failure reflects what I would like to term social resource scarcity.

Resource scarcity will place a greater demand on the adaptive capacity of a society. Under certain circumstances it may also work in the direction of weakening this adaptive capacity. Identifying the mechanisms whereby the adaptive capacity of a society is diminished would take us a long step towards finding the links between social resource scarcity and second-order conflicts in water issues.

Just as with natural resource scarcities, social resources have supply- and demand-side aspects; the adaptive capacity may be in short supply compared to demands in a given situation of societal need for change, e.g., in water-use practices. One could compare the first-order concept of water stress discussed earlier, with the second-order social stress caused by social resource scarcity in the face of water scarcity. Following the terminology from the discussion of natural resource scarcities, I would further suggest the possibility of using a sustainability level of social resources concept, defined as the amount of adaptive capacity required to maintain societal legitimacy in the face of social stress, e.g., caused by water scarcity.14

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The sustainability level of social resources is not a constant; it will be determined by, among other factors, how long into the future projections are made. In the short-term perspective, a fairly low level of social resources will suffice to uphold societal legitimacy in the face of water scarcity if, for example, we allow the continued over-pumping of aquifers. On the other hand, if we are concerned with preserving the sustainability level of the natural resource in spite of rapidly increasing demands, the level of social resources necessary to deal with the resulting societal stress will rise rapidly.

The supply of the social resource adaptive capacity may be regarded as determined by the price a society is willing to pay for it in the form of measures undertaken to accomplish social and technological processes of change. In the face of natural resource scarcity and stress, leading to social stress, the demand for adaptive capacity may rise to the point of social resource stress. In the terminology suggested, this would entail that the sustainability level of social resources had been raised.

The increasing demand for social resources may lead to an increased amount of available adaptive capacity (through society’s willingness to pay more for technological and institutional change). In the tumultuous process of change, however, there may also be factors that result in a diminished supply of social resources, i.e. adaptive capacity.

**The risk for conflicts within countries – the emerging consensus**

There is an increasing awareness that natural resource scarcity – renewable resources in particular – constitutes a risk for conflicts within countries, rather than between them. The causal link, however, is indeterminate and the causal chains hard to track. By the stage that conflicts erupt, the causal links may be buried under several layers of intermediate links and links to other causes of conflict.

It is nevertheless regarded as an urgent policy-related research task to understand the mechanisms behind the pervasive conflicts now threatening the stability and welfare of populations in an increasing number of developing countries. The key factors in these mechanisms are thought to be population increase, frustrated development expec-
tations and a lack of adaptive capacity to manage shrinking per-capita
allotments both of income and renewable resources, water ranking high
among them.

Dealing with water scarcity under such conditions entails strengthening
the capacity for institutional change, in order to create the new societal
tools needed to manage water scarcity. The debate on whether these
tools should be founded in an economic incentive approach or a
traditional administrative approach is gradually converging into the
understanding that suitable market conditions cannot be created without
substantial inputs of both administrative regulation and governmental
intervention.

The challenge of undertaking these large-scale societal processes of
change, without at the same time creating new sources of conflict that
may threaten the very adaptive capacity needed, has only begun to be
understood.
Energy Security and the Middle East

Introduction

The problem of energy security and the Middle East can be stated simply: over the next few decades the world demand for energy will increase sharply, along with reliance on Middle East fossil fuel reserves to meet that demand. Supplies of a vital commodity will therefore be controlled by certain states whose intentions and stability are decidedly problematic, and if history is any guide there will probably be a major crisis involving Middle East energy supplies at some point over the next few years – with potentially dramatic consequences for the world economy. The policy challenges for the West in this area can be stated equally simply: minimize the probability of such a crisis, minimize the harmful effects it might produce, and minimize the friction within the Western camp generated along the way.

Global Energy Trends and Middle East Concerns

Over the next few decades the world’s demand for energy will increase dramatically. One source of increased demand will be the continued modest growth of Western industrialized economies. Another and much greater source of increased demand will be the rapid growth, urbanization and industrialization of rising economic powers, particularly those in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the Asian financial crisis and economic slowdown have temporarily reduced demand and driven energy prices down, these trends will eventually reverse course and drive global energy consumption to unprecedented levels.
The U.S. Department of Energy, for example, projects that total world energy consumption will increase by 75 percent between 1995 and 2020, with almost two-thirds of the increase coming from the developing world. In 2020, it predicts, oil will account for 37 percent of total energy consumption while natural gas will account for 27 percent.\(^1\) The International Energy Agency, meanwhile, predicts that world energy consumption will increase by 65 percent over the same period, with fossil fuels responsible for 95 percent of the increase.\(^2\)

As to where the supply will come from to meet this increased demand, the short answer is the Middle East. Collectively, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates contain 65 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 30 percent of the world’s proven natural gas reserves. As most non-Persian Gulf states exhaust their reserves over the next few decades, the Gulf states’ share of world oil production will rise — in the International Energy Agency’s reference case, from one-quarter in 1996 to two-fifths in 2020. Today the Persian Gulf producing states contain about two-thirds of the world’s spare oil production capacity; in two decades they will contain practically all of it.

If the Persian Gulf states resembled, say, Canada or Norway, this increased dependence on their energy supplies would not be a significant cause for worry. Unfortunately, the countries in question do not look anything like such stable polities, and in fact are marked by domestic troubles and revisionist foreign policy agendas.

Contemporary Iraq, for example, is a totalitarian state ruled by a tyrant whose malign intentions and lust for power have been demonstrated repeatedly over the past two decades. Saddam Hussein has felt no compunction about using chemical weapons against his own people or


invading and savagely repressing a neighboring country, and he continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction despite the most stringent and invasive inspection regime in the history of international arms control.

Contemporary Iran also represents a disturbing, if more complex, case. Iran is ruled by a revolutionary theocratic regime and remains an important state sponsor of international terrorism. It has supported the subversion of other states in the region, is actively pursuing nuclear weapons and a long-range ballistic missile capability, and ultimately aspires to some form of regional hegemony. However, Iran’s revolutionary fervor has diminished considerably over the years, its political system has some important democratic elements, and it does not appear to pose a clear and direct threat to Western interests comparable to that posed by Iraq. The country is currently witnessing a power struggle, moreover, between the conservative old guard and liberalizing reformers led by the recently elected president, Mohammed Khatami.

Saudi Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), finally, give cause for worry not because of their strength but because of their weakness. They possess premodern political systems that deny their citizens a host of basic rights; weak political institutions with indeterminate-to-low popular legitimacy; and illiberal oppositions bent on revolution. Taking into account these countries’ rapid population growth, poor employment prospects, and worsening financial situations, it is hard to be very optimistic about their potential for stable development over the long term. The worry here, in other words, is not an explosion but rather an implosion.

Because all of the major Persian Gulf states threaten the region’s stability in one way or another, it is possible that over the course of the next decade or two there will be some kind of crisis that will interfere with the smooth flow of energy at reasonable prices. Such crises have occurred with depressing regularity over the last two-and-a-half decades, from the 1973 oil embargo and 1979 Iranian Revolution to the Iran-Iraq War and the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It is difficult to predict just which of the regional powderkegs will touch off next, but it would be highly imprudent to assume that none will blow.
Western Policy Options

Three basic approaches to this situation are evident. The first is to focus on suppressing regional troublespots, and the second to focus on ensuring access to multiple sources of energy. Both are simple, popular in certain quarters, and yet ultimately insufficient. A third approach, trying to balance regional and energy concerns while taking steps to dismantle the trap over time, is more complex and requires intelligent and concerted action in several arenas. It is the most prudent, however, and should therefore be adopted.

Some argue, especially in the United States, that the chief prism through which we should approach the region is the containment of so-called “rogue” states, such as Iraq, Iran and Libya. Preventing these states from making trouble beyond their borders while trying to transform their internal regimes, it is said, is the best and only way to protect Western interests over the long term. The problem with this approach, however, is that it elevates certain goals, such as combating terrorism and promoting Western ideals, over other goals that are at least as important, such as ensuring adequate access to regional energy supplies. When advocates of the containment-and-rollback approach try to coerce other countries into following a stiff U.S. line through the use of secondary sanctions, moreover, they jeopardize critical transatlantic relationships and threaten the very foundations of the global free trade system.

Others argue, especially in Europe and within the energy sector, that the chief prism through which we should approach the region is maximization of access to energy. The best way of avoiding crises and promoting global economic growth, it is said, is to pursue full development of all available energy sources without restriction, thus diversifying supplies while lowering prices. The problem with this approach, however, is that it ignores the proven capacity for trouble-making of rogue regimes. Unrestricted commercial dealings with all Middle Eastern states, however brutal, is not merely morally distasteful but also bound to lead to some new crisis down the road when a Hussein or Qaddafi overreaches once more.
A third approach would give due weight to both security and supply concerns in the short term while taking steps to make sure that over the long term the West can distance itself more easily from the region’s enduring problems. This would mean pursuing a variety of distinct policies simultaneously, none of which would prove a panacea but whose combination would address the diverse Western interests involved. The necessary components would include the following:

**Iraq**

The continued rule of Saddam Hussein poses a clear danger to the stability and security of the Persian Gulf region. Since the West can neither engineer his removal nor accept him back into the international community, there seems little choice but to stick with a policy of continued containment so long as he remains in power, despite the costs and frustration involved. Similarly, while there are costs to keeping Iraq’s oil off the world market, retaining the economic embargo in general is necessary, because with unrestricted access to large profits Hussein would more likely embark on further military adventures. Certain revisions to the political and economic aspects of Iraq’s containment may be in order, however, if only to maintain support for such containment and bolster the victorious Gulf War alliance. Firstly, the West should reassure Iraqis and their neighbors that it seeks neither the evisceration of the Iraqi people nor the breakup of the Iraqi State. Secondly, the West should send a clear signal that it is prepared to deal with any post-Hussein Iraqi regime that is ready to fulfill Iraq’s basic international obligations. And thirdly, the United States and European countries such as England, France, and Germany should take more care to consult closely among themselves and with allies in the region in order to frame a common policy that keeps Saddam in check while addressing other legitimate concerns.

**Iran**

Iran’s geopolitical importance is greater than Iraq’s and the challenge it presents is more complex. As long as the United States retains a
significant military presence in the Gulf Iran will not pose a threat of military aggression. However, its long-term policies – including its support for terrorism and subversion, its quest for nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and its desire for local hegemony – could destabilize the region. If the truth were told, neither the American policy of containment, nor the European policy of critical dialogue has achieved much with regard to Iran. The differences between them undermine the transatlantic alliance. The best Western course toward Iran for the period ahead might well be one of increased dialogue combined with cautious reciprocity of Iranian initiatives, in the hope that the Khatami faction will gain the upper hand and increase the prospects for a full rapprochement.

**Libya**

Libya remains an important source of energy and an attractive commercial partner for Europe at the same time that its leader continues to be an erratic despot with a revisionist foreign policy agenda. In response to this difficult situation, the pre-1996 Western policy (which kept the country on the sidelines of regional and world politics while allowing its energy to flow, under supervision, onto international markets) represents the least bad of the policy options realistically available.

**Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)**

The domestic problems facing Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states, however worrisome, are not amenable to significant outside influence. Given these countries’ importance as energy suppliers, accordingly, Western policy towards them should center on expanded commercial contacts, domestic non-interference, and discrete military protection.

**Policy coordination**

The United States, Europe and Japan need to do a far better job at coordinating their policies toward the Middle East than they have done
recently. A large part of the blame for the current sorry state of affairs lies with the United States and its misguided attempt at bullying its allies into adopting a stiffer line through the application of secondary sanctions. Still, the actions of certain European states have been egregious as well, and seem motivated by a combination of crass self-interest, callous appeasement, and an almost childish desire to oppose whatever the United States supports. In order to maximize policy effectiveness, particularly with regard to Iraq and Iran, it is imperative that the West reacts to future developments within a reasonably common and measured framework.

**Reduced crisis exposure**

In the end, precisely because there are no really good answers to the perennial problems of Middle Eastern politics, the best long-term response to energy security and the Middle East must be to reduce the global consequences that any regional supply disruption might have. Energy crises occur not because of any absolute problem with the availability of physical supplies, but rather when a disruption of supply is larger than available replacement capacity, which causes prices to rise over the short term. Virtually all of the ensuing damage stems from higher prices rather than the ability to obtain sufficient physical quantities of energy sources. Energy crises are therefore ultimately global, not regional, events, and the damage they cause can be limited by careful advance precautions taken in different areas.

The first and most important imperative is to maintain large strategic oil reserves in Western countries. By providing a “surge capacity” that can cushion the impact of short-term oil disruptions, such stockpiles can play a vital role in mitigating the negative consequences of whatever future Middle Eastern supply crises do emerge. The temptation to sell off such reserves to meet current budgetary goals should be resisted, and these reserves should be considered as the world’s main insurance policy against supply disruptions.

The second imperative is to reduce demand, primarily through effective conservation measures. In small, incremental, low-cost ways and through careful fiscal and regulatory policies within OECD states, the
long-term exposure of Western societies to energy crises should be gradually diminished.

The third imperative is to look beyond the current short-term energy glut and consider how to expand energy production and improve the efficiency of the energy sector technology over the long term. In recent decades a variety of technological advances and financial mechanisms for resource development have made it feasible and cost-effective to tap energy supplies previously beyond reach. It is important that Western countries continue to help foster such advances where possible, and exploit new potential fossil fuel reserves of various kinds around the globe.

The fourth imperative, finally, is to move towards the development of cost-effective renewable energy supplies. Ultimately, the best way to handle the Gordian knot of dependence on Middle Eastern fossil fuel reserves is to slice through it entirely, by developing new energy sources without the attendant political problems. Recent research sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy involving genetically engineered organisms that enhance the fermentation of cellulose, for example, has reduced the cost of ethanol to about $1 per gallon today from $3.60 per gallon fifteen years ago, and holds out significant promise for still further reductions. Substantial investment in a wide variety of research projects involving renewable energy sources should be a major part of any long-term response to the challenge of energy security.

Together these policies will not “resolve” the problem posed by energy security and the Middle East. They should, however, make the cross easier to bear.

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Conflict Prevention in post–Cold War Europe: Lack of Instruments or Lack of Will?

Introduction

Since the so-called end of the Cold War, and furthermore since the beginning of the Bosnian war(s), there has been a constant call for the development of efficient Conflict Prevention (CP) mechanisms in Europe. The possible violent fragmentation of the former Eastern bloc and the explosion of nationalistic and ethnic rivalries all over Europe reinforced the conviction that Europe needed to develop early warning and CP mechanisms that would be capable of avoiding the insurgence of violent conflicts. All the international organizations involved in European security issues, while undertaking their institutional re-adaptation to changing international circumstances, developed a broader concept of “security” and included CP activities among their tasks. However, these mechanisms did not actually function when they were supposed to avoid violent conflicts such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Albania and now in Kosovo. We ask ourselves why? Among the many possible answers one of the most common is that CP mechanisms are still inadequate and should be developed further, especially as far as early warning tools are concerned.¹ A further explanation is that the “policy-makers and administrators who are now receptive to looking for and preventing future conflicts do not

¹ This was clearly one of the ideas behind the establishment of an EU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) in the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU (Declaration to the Amsterdam Final Act, 16 June 1997).
know what they should specifically do.” Finally, it is claimed that CP does not always take place and/or is not efficient because of an inherent lack of political will.

This paper will deal with the first and latter explanations, which claim that the international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that form the so-called European Security Architecture indeed developed tools and activities aimed at preventing violent conflicts. Therefore, the reason for the inefficacy (or limited efficacy) of the CP machinery in Europe is to be found elsewhere. The main claim here, is that, although both the CP machinery and the expertise on the profitable use of CP tools can be improved, the main reason behind the poor results of CP in post–Cold War Europe is the lack of political will.

The core of the paper is represented by a review of activities and tools with a CP component. This was put into existence in the post–Cold War period by: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community/Union (EC/U), the Western European Union (WEU), the Council of Europe (C.o.E.), the United Nations (UN), and the Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (C/OSCE). This longer session is then followed by an assessment of the “state of the art” institutional CP activities in Europe and the implicit assumptions on which such tools were developed.

A Terminological Clarification

Despite continuous calls for better CP, the concept is rather blurred and lacks a clear definition. Only a few writings provide a precise

definition of CP, while most of the time the meaning of the concept is
given/taken for granted.

In most cases “conflict” is used as a synonym of “violent conflict” or
“war,” whilst in reality the meaning of the concept ranges from a
situation in which two or more parts have contending interests, to one
of organized violent confrontation between the parties. It is already
clear that “CP” has a completely different meaning according to what
is meant by “conflict.”

In this paper by “international conflict” I mean a situation in which
conflicting interests between two or more organized actors (not nec-
essarily States) have led or have a significant possibility of leading to

3 The literature on international conflict is rather vast, suffice it here to recall:
University Press, 1987; Burton, John W. Conflict Resolution and Prevention.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990; Mitchell, Christopher R. The Structure of
New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict
“Developing Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Strategies from Recent
Experience in Europe;” id. Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for
Bauwens, Werner and Luc Reychler, eds. The Art of Conflict Prevention.
Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries, no. 7. London/New York: Brassey’s, 1994;
Jentleson, Bruce W. Preventive Diplomacy and Ethnic Conflict: Possible,
Difficult, Necessary. Policy Paper, no. 27. La Jolla, CA: Institute of Global
Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1996; Chayes, Abram and
Antonia H. Chayes, eds. Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World:
Mobilizing International and Regional Organization. Washington, D.C:
Brookings Institution, 1996; Bonvicini et al., Preventing Violent Conflict;
Bonvicini, Gianni, Ettore Greco, Bernard von Plate, and Reinhardt Rummel,
eds. Conflict Prevention in Europe: Policies and Institutional Actors. The
Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience.
European Union, 1994. See also: Jørgensen, Knud Erik, ed. European
Approaches in Crisis Management. The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
1997.
In this way it is possible to conceive an international conflict as a broad experience which can take place at different levels of expressed violence between the parties. The definition includes both inter-state conflicts and “ethnic,” “communal” and “domestic” conflicts, as the only requirement is that the conflicting parties are organized groups.

According to the above definition, CP can be conceived as a complex and rich set of activities, all of which aim at avoiding the development of conflict, its vertical and horizontal escalation, and its reappearance. Synthetically, the activities, which can be performed in relation to an international conflict, are the following:

1. **Conflict avoidance and prevention**: activity aimed at preventing disputes from arising and/or becoming violent. These include preventing most common background, long-term, causes of conflicts from taking place;

2. **Conflict management**:
   2a. **Conflict de-escalation** = activity aimed at diminishing the intensity of an armed conflict;
   2b. **Conflict containment** = activity aimed at preventing violent conflicts from spreading to other areas;

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5 Factors most frequently identified as background conditions for violent conflict are: extent of violent history, deterioration of living conditions (economic and/or social crisis, etc.), break up of reference points for individual and collective definition of identity (identity crisis), lack of democratic instruments of peaceful resolution of disputes, etc.
2c. Conflict settlement (i) and resolution (ii) = activity aimed at settling the dispute (i) with the aim of finding a long-term solution, thereby resolving the conflict completely (ii);

3. Post-war conflict prevention (or Peace-building) = activity aimed at preventing a re-emergence of a concluded war, including the (re)establishment of democratic institutions.\(^6\)

CP activities, therefore, are present at all stages of conflict: before, during and after it turns/has turned violent, although it is undeniable that the very “rationale” of CP is that of avoiding that a violent conflict occurs in the first place. The mechanisms that aim at conflict avoidance and/or prevention are varied and most of them are also used in conflict prevention measures that take place while the violent conflict is taking place (conflict management).

\(^6\) The first two activities (1. and 2a.) broadly correspond to what Boutros Boutros-Ghali referred to as “preventive diplomacy,” an activity which includes all those actions aiming at preventing disputes from (i) arising, (ii) turning violent or (iii) spreading beyond their current borders. “Conflict management” corresponds to Boutros-Ghali’s “peace-keeping,” “peace-making” and “peace-enforcement,” the first being defined as the deployment of interposition forces with the assent of the fighting parties, and the latter two consisting in attempts at bringing hostile parties into compliance with UN Resolutions either via peaceful means (ex Chapter VI of the UN Charter, in the first place), or through forceful means (ex Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in the second case). Finally, “peace-building” was used by the then UN Secretary General to refer to actions aiming at (re-)establishing democratic institutions, and in this the concept resembles that of PWCP (point 3.). See Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.* New York: United Nations, 1992; *id. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations.* New York: United Nations, 3 January 1995.
CP Tools and Activities at the Disposal of Major International Organizations

All international organizations involved in European security issues have at their disposal CP tools to intervene at various stages of a conflict (see list of stages above). Here follows a review of activities and tools with a CP component, developed in the post–Cold War period by major IGOs present in the European arena.

NATO

Although NATO’s traditional functions as mainly a “collective defense” institution had elements of CP from its inception, the new security tasks set by the Alliance (see The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, NAC, Rome 7-8 November 1991) introduced significant elements of CP.


8 The Alliance aimed at preventing violent conflicts between the Allies and external powers (arts. 4, 5, 6 of the Washington Treaty), and among the Allies (art. 1, 2). The avoidance of disputes among inter-Allies is less explicit but still fundamental. It was both the rationale behind the creation of a common security organization among ex-enemies in the postwar period. At present this function has been de-emphasized, especially in relation to the enlargement issue. As a matter of fact, one of the conditions for new membership is that the applicants have already resolved their disputes.

9 Identification of the new security threats and the response that NATO could possibly offer was the object of – in sequence – the London Declaration (on East-West cooperation, July 1990), the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation and the definition of the New “Alliance’s Strategic Concept” (November 1991), the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC, December 1991), the rising attention to inter-institutional relations (CSCE/OSCE-NATO; UN-NATO; WEU-NATO), the launching of the “Partnership for Peace” program (PiP, December 1994), and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC, July 1997).
(1) Conflict avoidance and prevention

(a) NATO’s increased transparency and cooperation with its new Central and Eastern European (CEE) partners played an important role in building the basis for increasing confidence in the former “enemy.” The spirit of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the PfP, later Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) (cf. footnote 9), and of the so-called “16+1” meeting between Allied ambassadors to the Atlantic Alliance and a Russian delegation, was that of enhancing transparency and creating channels for peaceful resolutions of crises.

(b) A further element of NATO’s preventive diplomacy lay in its efforts to support the development of democratic societies and the respect of international law. The states subscribing to the PfP program signed a Framework Document, in which they agreed to commit themselves to the preservation of a democratic society; respect of obligations undertaken in the field of arms control; respect of the principles of international law, of the UN Charter, of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and of all CSCE/OSCE documents.

As far as intra-state conflicts are concerned, NACC’s attention to the respect of human rights and to issues of economic development, as well as to democratic national institutions (see NACC’s Work Plans), is to be regarded as a limited but interesting attempt at creating conditions for peaceful international coexistence. In this context, of special interest are NATO’s efforts at developing democratic control over armed forces in the framework of the PfP.

(c) NATO’s contribution to arms control was not conceived in the Washington Treaty, but it was soon considered an implicit tool to develop “peaceful and friendly international relations” (Washington Treaty, Art. 2). Arms control negotiations have always been considered instrumental in improving stability and enhancing the long-term security interests of the Allies. There are two facets to NATO’s contribution to arms control:

(i) NATO’s political support to arms control. NATO’s efforts to reduce the level of armed forces in Europe (launched in 1986) paved the way to the CFE Treaty (November 1990).
NATO has always supported OSCE efforts in conventional arms control and the great powers’ negotiations for the reduction and control of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

(ii) NATO’s technical contribution to arms control. NATO created instruments for the verification and monitoring of the signed agreements. Among them, the Verification Coordination Committee created in 1990 to coordinate verification and implementation efforts among the allies on conventional arms. Later, the Committee assumed tasks directed at implementing the 1994 Vienna CSCE document (visits, inspections, observation of exercises, etc.), sponsored verification courses for cooperation partners (1994) and agreed to give them access to NATO’s verification database, Verity (Verity was opened to the partners in November 1993). On conventional armaments, NATO fully supports the UN Arms Register, established in June 1992.

As for WMD, several allies are providing technical and financial assistance for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the former USSR. Consultations on these assistance programs take place in an Ad Hoc Group to Consult on the Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union (GNW), established by the NAC in February 1992.

NATO’s efforts at harmonizing strategies for the conversion of military industries can also be seen as a contribution to arms control.

(d) NATO’s early warning system and contingency planning activity. Early warning capacity is based mainly on national intelligence gathering, NATO Current Intelligence Groups and the exchange of information with other institutions.

Contingency planning is an ordinary NATO activity, which has been extensively used in NATO’s post–Cold War functions. In particular, NATO has provided contingency planning for a number of possible operations in ex-Yugoslavia. The enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the establishment of safe areas, the eventual withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops, as well as the implementation of the peace plans were all the subject of NATO’s contingency planning activity.

(e) NATO’s enlargement eastward has frequently been presented as a
policy aimed at extending the western security area to CEE countries. However, the enlargement seems to be two-sided. While it has been presented as an attempt at extending NATO’s security coverage, on the one hand, it might create instability because of Russia’s perception of such a decision on the other. As a matter of fact, Russia seems to interpret NATO’s extension up to its borders not only as an attempt to isolate the former adversary, but also as a possible real threat. Furthermore, NATO’s enlargement might undermine the internal cohesion and the efficiency of the institutional decision-making machinery.10

(2) Conflict management

(2a/b) Conflict de-escalation and/or containment:

(a) Development of a conflict management capacity. The management of crisis situations has been one of the tasks of NATO since its origins. The rapidity of the decision making necessary for the management of crises is facilitated by permanent consultations among the allies. Such intensive consultation takes place through the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), the NAC, and the political committees. Support to the communication process is offered by the NATO Situation Center, which operates 24 hours a day.

Crisis management was one of the main fields of activity in the context of the NACC and the PfP, and now of the EAPC, where crisis management courses, workshops, briefings, and joint exercises took place.

On peace keeping, the 1993 Work Plan established an Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation and Peace-keeping. In the June 1993 NACC meeting in Athens, the Group issued a report focused on peace keeping activities, which included a program for practical cooperation in eventual peace-keeping operations under a UN or CSCE/OSCE mandate. Further reports were issued from then onwards. In terms of actual peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations, the war and reconstruction in


(b) In order to undertake actual conflict management operations, however, NATO needs to cooperate with other institutions, each of which should contribute to European security according to its own specific characteristics. With the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept (Rome, 7-8 November 1991), the Allies announced that in order to enhance NATO’s crisis management and peace-keeping capabilities they would support the role of the CSCE and other international bodies such as the EC, the WEU and the UN. NATO’s support, on a case-by-case basis to CSCE peace keeping operations was formalized at the NAC meeting.
in Oslo (June 1992).

Several key decisions in support of UN peace-keeping activities in former Yugoslavia were adopted in 1992/93. At the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels, the Allies reaffirmed their support for UN and CSCE peace-keeping, and developed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) as a means of strengthening another institution’s CP capacity. Although the CJTF seems to be at a critical point, it is interesting to observe the Allies’ concern over developing strong linkages between different institutions in order to make them “interlocking” and not “interblocking!” Although practical inter-institutional cooperation took place both in the Gulf (1991), in the former Yugoslavia (1992-), and now in Kosovo (1998-), it is still unclear to what degree NATO is actually willing to pay the costs of supporting other institutions’ operations and to accept outside constraints on its action.

NATO does not have specific tools of conflict settlement/resolution. For these activities it relies on other institutions.

(3) Post-conflict conflict prevention/peace-building

The most telling case of NATO’s peace building is the implementation of the DPA for former Yugoslavia. In this case NATO took the lead in the implementation of the military side of the peace plan.\(^\text{12}\)

_European Union_

The European integration process can be regarded as a successful example of CP in itself. The original European Steel and Coal Community as well as the European Economic Community responded mainly to the need of building confidence and constructing linkages among the member states, so as to avoid new conflicts among former enemies. Today, the EU plays an important role in trying to extend to

other areas the stability and peace which it contributed to guaranteeing in Western Europe for forty years. However the type of CP the EU can best perform is sensibly constrained by its own institutional characteristics and original objectives. In the following, I will briefly describe the EU’s main activities that can be regarded as CP instruments.

(1) Conflict avoidance and prevention:

(a) The EU’s activity aimed at promoting democratic institutions is based on the conviction that these help to avoid conflicts within and between countries. The EU’s efforts to promote democracy are multifaceted and include the following:

(i) “Conditionality has become a regular part of EC/U’s foreign policy actions” and it was applied also in the case of the twelve cases of EU aid suspension in the Third World since 1990 because of setbacks of democratization. Democratic conditionality constantly has been applied since 1992 with the new cooperation and association agreements. In many cases in the CEE, conditionality functioned even better as the agreements were perceived as first steps in the direction of possible future membership. This incentive seems to have functioned as a real “carrot” for CEE states to accelerate the process of institutional democratization. Furthermore, both the Europe Agreements and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements opened political dialogues, which helped to put economic cooperation into a political context.

The European Community/Union also used the tool of democratic conditionality in the case of recognition of new states. The “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,” adopted by the Union in December 1991 included respect of the rules of international law, democracy and human rights (see. EPC


(ii) Economic assistance in itself. Since 1990, the EU, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the G-24 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have not only provided CEE countries with humanitarian aid, but also with practical support for their market systems through technical and administrative advice, training, investment capital, etc. This type of “practical” support has been offered through two main EU programs for the CEE: Phare and Tacis (the latter is limited to the former Soviet Union). In this framework, democratic assistance programs started in 1992 (by 1994 they were managed by the European Human Rights Foundation). In contrast to the bulk of the Tacis/Phare assistance, the democratic assistance programs were directed at non-profit organizations in civil society rather than at governments.

The EU-US Joint Action Plan signed in Madrid in December 1995 includes an agreement of closer coordination of the micro- and macro-economic assistance of the EU and the US. The document also contains reference to future joint initiatives with respect to countries that violate human rights.

(iii) Direct assistance in the development of democratic institutions. With this aim, the European Parliament (EP) set up a program to train the elected members and the staff of CEE parliaments. Another form of assistance to democratic development consists in monitoring elections, as in the case of the Russian elections, when an EU team of observers (made up of experts and diplomats of the member states, representatives of the Commission and a delegation of the EP) joined the OSCE mission (Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Joint Action, Council Decision 93/604).

(b) Particular attention should be given to the “Stability Pact.” The Stability Pact is no longer really an EU instrument of CP, but it was conceived in the EU framework as one of the first EU “Joint Actions.” The concrete project (presented in June 1993 and concluded in May 1995) consisted in the organization of a pan-European conference aimed at stabilizing “the CEE countries which may eventually be associated to varying degrees with the EU” (par. 3). The immediate aim
was the definition of principles to resolve minority and border disputes. The goal was the signature of bilateral agreements between countries with border and minority problems. At present, 100 new and existing agreements have been signed, including the bilateral agreement on Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Rumania. Since January 1995, the OSCE has been entrusted with the pact’s follow-up and implementation.

(c) Arms Control. The EU has undertaken a CFSP “common action” on the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), entangling the Union in a difficult negotiating process. A further CFSP Joint Action limits and controls arms transfers concerning so-called “dual-use goods” (Council decision 94/942/CFSP). The Council decision 95/170/CFSP (12 May 1995) on anti-personnel mines can also be regarded as an arms control initiative.

(d) Early Warning. The EU’s timely warning is already made possible by a set of instruments. Among them:

- the European Commission’s diplomatic missions abroad;
- the Commission’s DG1A’s high-level diplomatic contacts;
- the European Parliament’s contacts with third countries’ parliamentarians or foreign ministers; – the President of the Commission’s participation in international institutional fora (such as the G7), contributing to exchange of information and enhancing the possibility of early warning;
- the member states’ intelligence and external contacts;
- the information provided by the diplomatic delegations to the EU of the countries concerned;
- the fact-finding missions of the Presidency or the Troika;
- the EU observers’ missions.

However, the fact that the Council Secretariat lacked its own information and planning capacity has been frequently felt to undermine the results of the CFSP machinery. For this reason during the Inter-governmental Conference for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty, an
agreement was reached for a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) to be created in the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. The aim would be to enable the EU to develop adequate foreign policy options to respond to international developments and crises, to coordinate all available Union and national instruments, to be more proactive and preventive to international political events or potential conflict.\textsuperscript{15}

New life was given to an EU-US exchange of information by the Joint Action Plan (Madrid, December 1995), which establishes an early warning system for refugee crises and asylum seekers. The system itself is not one of CP, but it will surely increase the EU’s early warning capacity.

(e) In the case of the EU, as for NATO, the issue of enlargement is proposed as a means of extending security and welfare eastward. However, the enlargement of the Union can be regarded as a double-edged tool. On the one hand it has been and is an efficient “carrot” used to obtain a certain behavior by the applicants. On the other hand possible entrance into the Union might have weakened the possibility of creating forms of regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe.

(2) Conflict management

(2a/b) Conflict de-escalation and containment

There is no explicit reference to the management of external conflict in the EC/U Treaties, but there is general attention to the “preservation of peace.” In terms of military capacity, the Maastricht Treaty aims at strengthening the EU-WEU relationship – at least in the future – although in a tentative and undefined way. Ex art. J.4(1), mechanisms which enable the EU to ask the WEU to work out and implement decisions in the field of defense have not been used so far – not even in the case of the administration of Mostar. Furthermore, if the administration of Mostar envisaged a relationship between the EU and

the WEU, which is close to the rationale of art. J.4(1), the EU request for convocation of the NAC in order to implement a no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (8 February 1995) acted as a complete dismissal of art. J.4(1).

The actual terms of the future relationship between the EU and the WEU, and between them and other international organizations were debated within the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty. The text of the outcoming document (the Amsterdam Treaty) is somehow deluding as far as a clearer position towards the EU-WEU relationship is concerned, but it leaves to the European Council the “possibility for the integration of the WEU into the Union” (Draft Treaty of Amsterdam, art. J.7.1).

A specific tool of conflict management, which the EU was able to use, is the imposition (or the threat of) economic sanctions on countries which do not respect the rules of international law.

(2c) Conflict settlement/resolution

Efforts at mediating between two or more fighting parties have been undertaken by the EC/U on various occasions. The Yugoslav crisis offered the occasion for three new peacemaking attempts: the Troika mediation, the nomination of a special EU representative (first Lord Carrington, then Lord Owen, followed by Mr. Bildt), and the EC-sponsored/UN cosponsored Peace Conferences. The Peace Conferences did not have “only” peacemaking aims, however, as they attempted to define a long-term settlement of the entire Yugoslav problem. In a sense, they aimed at creating the basis on which peace could be built.

(3) Peace-building

As seen above, the activity of mediation and negotiation sometimes entails aspects of peace building. The most important experience of peace building ever undertaken by the EU was the European Administration of Mostar. The administration seems an interesting case study of the EU’s capacity to play a role in reconstructing peace and confidence, thereby avoiding further conflicts, between former enemies. A further relevant involvement of the EU in peace-building activities is
the organization’s efforts for the implementation of the DPA in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.

A further way in which the EU has attempted to prevent conflicts is by
financing the initiatives of other organizations, which have a CP
component. These are usually activities of NGOs such as the Red
Cross or Médecins Sans Frontières, not to talk about its financial
contribution to the reconstruction of war-torn countries.

Western European Union

The WEU, like NATO, was first created as a collective self-defense
in institution (and in this regard it already had functions) and only later
adapted its “security concept” to the post–Cold War era by undergoing
a substantial transformation. The two Gulf wars and the Yugoslav
crisis opened a new era for the WEU. WEU’s new role was
institutionalized in the Maastricht Treaty plus the WEU-annexed
Document (adopted in December 1991) and the Petersberg Declaration
of June 1992. In the latter, the WEU Council supports the imple-
mentation of CSCE or UN CP and crisis management initiatives,
including peace keeping activities. However this line of “interlocking
institutional cooperation” – confirmed by the CSCE Helsinki Summit
(July 1992) – was denied in another part of the Petersberg Declaration,
in which the WEU did not seem to accept the subordination of its
capabilities to other institutions (Petersberg Declaration II, par. 4). The
WEU “White Paper” on the future of European security restated
WEU’s attempt to develop crisis management capacities and clarify the
relationship between the WEU and the EU.

1) Conflict avoidance and prevention

(a) WEU activity aimed at enhancing confidence and transparency, as
well as guaranteeing stable future relations. The WEU, like NATO, has
developed institutional links with CEE countries. In June 1992, WEU
Council ministers and the defense and foreign ministers of eight CEE
countries decided to establish a “Forum of Consultation.” In May
1994, the WEU Council accorded the nine CEE members of the Forum
the status of “associate partners” (Kirchberg Declaration), thereby
delineating a system of variable geometry: members (WEU, NATO and EU members), associate members (NATO but not EU members), associate Partners (neither NATO nor EU members), observers (members of NATO and/or EU).

(b) Early Warning and Arms Control. At the Vianden meeting of June 1991, the WEU Council created a center for the interpretation of satellite data on issues related to arms control, verification, crisis management and environmental monitoring. The Satellite Center in Torrejon is now a permanent WEU body. A Situation Center and an Intelligence Section, both within the WEU Planning Cell, were decided at the WEU Council meeting in Lisbon, May 1995. Further exchange of information takes place directly among the member states. The WEU plays a further role in arms control through its system of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) and meets diplomatic efforts for the implementation of the Open Skies Agreement. The Arms Control Agency was closed in 1995.

(2) Conflict management

(a) The post–Cold War process of self-redefinition of the WEU has included development of operational capacities to intervene in crisis/conflict situations (which do not come under art. 5 of the Brussels Treaty). For this purpose, in June 1992, WEU member states decided that their own forces could be used to support “the effective implementation of conflict prevention and crisis management measures including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the UN Security Council” (WEU Defense Ministers meeting, Bonn, 18 June 1992). Furthermore, the WEU can now call on “forces answerable to the WEU” (FAWEU) – such as the Eurocorps, the Euroforce and Euromarforce – for operations such as peace keeping and humanitarian aid (Lisbon Declaration, May 1995, par. 5).

(b) Among the actual operations of conflict management already undertaken by the WEU, of particular importance are those (although not many) in ex-Yugoslavia. In particular, the monitoring of the arms embargo on the Danube (Sanctions Assistance Mission, (SAM)) and in the Adriatic (Operation Shape Guard) and the police operation in Mostar. Furthermore, at the WEU Council meeting in Lisbon (May
A document was approved on a WEU intervention force in humanitarian crises. In summary, if on the one hand the WEU has been limited by the lack of consensus among its member states, on the other hand in recent years the WEU has explored new types of operation which include police- and gendarmerie-type units.

(c) In order to test WEU’s operational mechanisms and procedures, the WEU launched its first crisis management exercise, the “CRISEX WEU 95/96,” in December 1995. The exercise included all 10 full members of the WEU and sees the participation in varying degrees of some of the other members of the WEU family. CRISEX 98 has seen the participation of 23 WEU nations and the presence of NATO and EU representatives attending as observers. The annual WEU Exercise Conference then saw the participation of representatives from all WEU nations as well as representatives of NATO and FAWEU Headquarters (5-6 March 1998). Furthermore, the first FAWEU Headquarters conference took place in November 1997 and was considered useful enough to be repeated annually.

(3) Peace-building

For the WEU, as for the EU, the administration of Mostar represents an unprecedented peace-building operation (see also the EU section). The organization is then involved, as “all” the others, in the implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement, although its limited participation in the implementation of the military aspects seems to reinforce the idea of a still rather undeveloped military organization mainly with gendarmerie-type tasks.

Council of Europe

Like the other institutions examined here, the C.o.E. has enlarged and intensified its contacts with CEE countries since the end of the Cold War. Some CEE states joined the Council and had their legislation examined by the Council, for evaluation of its compatibility with European standards in human rights.

Furthermore, the Council also developed closer links with other international organizations, such as the EC/U and the OSCE.
(1) Conflict avoidance and prevention

(a) The production of norms has been one of the main tasks of the European Council since the beginning. Of particular importance, as far as CP is concerned, was the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and its various protocols. The European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court on Human Rights, created to monitor the implementation of the Convention, play an important role in this field. Beyond the human rights field, it might be worth recalling the Social Charter – a catalogue of social and economic rights, which has a monitoring mechanism as well.

Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, the system of Conventions and treaties regulating international cooperation developed within the C.o.E., has been extended to some CEE countries that have joined the Council. Of particular importance is the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (adopted in November 1994 and opened to signature since January 1995).

(b) Confidence building on the basis of permanent political consultation.

(c) Trans-border cooperation. The C.o.E. has sponsored cooperation among provinces on sensitive borders, and to this end it has created several “Euro-Regions.”

(d) Support to newly democratic states. Since 1994, the C.o.E. has extended its joint program with the EC Commission (Phare), including assistance in the drafting of new constitutions and examining the CEE countries’ records of human rights.
The UN was created with the aim of preventing another world war. Therefore, CP was conceived as the organization’s main aim. Yet, even though the UN mandate on CP has not changed in the past 50 years, the nature of CP has, especially since the end of the Cold War. As a matter of fact, the UN now has the possibility of playing a more active role in peace keeping, peacemaking, and, most of all, peace enforcement activities which were more or less explicitly contained in the Charter, but whose implementation was blocked by the paralysis of the Security Council.

(1) Conflict avoidance and prevention

(a) The UN activity of international norms production is to be considered an important although not necessarily “efficient” – instrument of CP. The declarations of principles of the UN General Assembly, since its well-known 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, are a significant example of this UN activity. These Declarations of principles are not per se norms of international law, but they may become so if the members of the international community embody their intent into a treaty.

In the early 1990s, the UN produced a Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (46/58) and a Declaration on Fact-finding by the UN in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (46/59 of 1991).

(b) The UN efforts at developing democracy, better economic conditions and the respect of human rights.

(i) UN monitoring of elections. In 1990, the UN mounted its first electoral observation mission in a member state, Nicaragua.

(ii) Economic and social cooperation. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is to serve as the major organ for the promotion of economic and social cooperation, with the support of the General Assembly, international specialized agencies, subsidiary bodies of the ECOSOC, and NGOs. The UN Economic Committee on Europe (UNECE) – one of the nine regional commissions of the ECOSOC – is
currently assisting CEE countries in their transition to market economy. The program (in conjunction with other organizations such as the EBRD and the OECD) includes training seminars, technical cooperation for the development of industry and infrastructures.

As far as the promotion of the respect of human rights, the Charter does not provide any stringent guideline for implementation of the reference made in art. 1, 55 and 56. At present, major responsibilities for the respect of human rights are assigned to the Human Rights Commission (established as one of the commissions with special responsibilities set up under the ECOSOC) and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The third Committee of the General Assembly, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and specific NGOs also play an important role. In recent years, the UNHCR has been mobilized in the general framework of UN peace-keeping operations, as in the case of ex-Yugoslavia.

(iii) Cooperation in the development of democratic institutions in post-conflict areas. The 1989 UN supervision of the Namibian elections marked a turning point in UN activity in this field. As a matter of fact, the UN not only was involved as territorial trustee, but also undertook a new, broader type of democratic intervention, which included peace keeping, civilian police operations, civic education, and post-election assistance in institutional development. A further departure from the past was represented by the UN intervention in Haiti, in 1991, which was justified on the basis of restoring democracy.

The UN involvement in monitoring elections was institutionalized with the creation of an Electoral Assistance Unit. The missions undertaken by the Unit, however, were not limited to the observation of the correctness of the elections, but included monitoring of human rights, cease-fires, peace keeping and police assistance. That is, these types of intervention (El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, etc.) are a combination of more tools of CP. However, in most cases they take place after an armed conflict. For this reason they can be regarded as “peace building” operations.

(c) UN contribution to arms control. In spite of the UN Charter’s lack of emphasis on disarmament and arms control, a number of proposals
and mechanisms have been profuse and varied since 1946. However, in reality the most important arms control agreements (SALT and START) have been concluded outside the UN framework. At present the UN is contributing to the transparency of conventional arms earnings and transfers with the 1993-established UN Register of Conventional Arms. Furthermore, the UN offers various fora for discussion among its member states on these issues (among them: the General Assembly’s annual discussion on transparency in armaments; the UN Institute for Disarmament Research – UNIDIR; part of the activity of the International Economic Energy Agency).

Furthermore, the Security Council can delegate the Secretary General to carry out fact-finding/verification missions to monitor WMD.

(d) Early Warning. Different UN offices, according to the problematic areas of interest, perform the UN activity of early warning. A sort of “political” early warning was the task of the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) until March 1992.

ORCI’s components were then integrated into the newly established Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The new system is divided into several channels for information and advice to the Secretary General. In 1991, the Administrative Coordinating Committee set up the Working Group on early warning in the humanitarian field. In the same year, General Assembly resolution 46/182 provided the basis for establishing the post of Emergency Relief Coordinator to head the new Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Early warning – stated the resolution – should be one of his guiding principles. However, a general capacity to alert the UN Security Council is also envisaged for the Member States (art. 35), the General Assembly (art. 11.3) and the Secretary General (art. 99).

(2) Conflict management

The basis for UN action in conflict management is contained in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. However, the actual implementation and interpretation of these chapters have changed considerably since 1989. Not only is the UN more active and involved in the management of numerous conflicts, but it also has developed more principles to share the burden of conflict management with other
international organizations.

The type of relationship between the different organizations is far from being clear, and the Yugoslav experience, more than any other, has shown an interesting evolution in inter-institutional coordination especially as far as the NATO-UN relationship is concerned. However, if at the beginning a sort of EU/UN burden sharing seemed to be at work, later on, the terms of this division of labor were no longer clear. As a matter of fact, the EU-peacemaking/UN-peace-keeping division of labor could not but be an illusion. Just as the idea of the UN being able to keep the different functions, which it performed in ex-Yugoslavia (humanitarian aid, peace keeping, peace-enforcement, and mediation), separated, was an illusion.

A further type of UN cooperation with other organizations is represented by NGOs’ support for UN peace keeping and humanitarian operations (as has been the case with relief operations in Somalia).

As regards the UN legitimacy to “intervene” within the borders of a state, the barrier to intervention represented by art. 2.7 of the UN Charter finds significant “exceptions” in the following cases:

- collective action under Chapter VII;
- the concerned country’s agreement to the involvement of the UN in domestic affairs (as for the monitoring of elections in various countries; the mediation of the Secretary General in El Salvador; the monitoring of the peace agreements in Angola and Mozambique);
- a recognized international dimension – and threat to international peace – of a local conflict (as in the case of Cambodia);
- a denunciation of human rights abuses in a particular country.

Although UN intervention may be considered legitimate in these cases, it is more difficult to clarify the conditions under which intervention under art. 41 and 42 is legitimate. As a matter of fact, both the doctrine and the practice in this field are undergoing change. As the issue touches on the fundamental concept of state sovereignty (on which the modern international system is based), a normative solution to this
problem will be slow in developing. For the moment, the decision over intervention in a third country is because of a political decision of the Security Council’s member states.

(2a/b) Conflict de-escalation and containment (peace keeping and peace enforcement)

(i) Peace keeping. Peace keeping was not specifically stipulated in the UN Charter, but it soon started to be considered an adequate means for the UN’s task of maintaining peace.

The term originally referred to interpositional deployment of forces such as that practiced in Cyprus, the Sinai and the Golan Heights. However, new types of peace keeping have appeared recently. On the one hand, a newer, more robust peace keeping closer to peacemaking and/or peace enforcement, as was the case of the Blue Helmets deployment in Bosnia and Somalia. On the other hand, a peace keeping which occurs in a framework of peace building, as in the case of El Salvador.

(ii) Actions of the Security Council to enforce peace. The UN Charter gives the UN absolute primacy in enforcement actions (art. 53), unless they respond to the need of self-defense (art. 51). Regional organizations should provide the forum for peaceful settlement of disputes (art. 52) but cannot undertake a forceful action against a state, unless the UN has given its consent (art. 53). This implies that the underlying division of labor between regional bodies and the UN has its ratio in the type of tool used (military force requires UN authorization) and the agreement of the warring parties (without it, the UN has to provide the necessary mandate).

Security Council actions aimed at enforcing peace can take various forms: sanctions, deployment of UN troops or authorization to states (acting individually or jointly within an organization) to deploy troops in the application of a UN resolution (as in the case of NATO implementation of the no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina). Authorization of the use of force could concern protection of humanitarian relief, as in the case of the protection of relief convoys in Bosnia (UN Res. 770, August 1992) and Somalia (UN Res. 794, December 1992); military protection of populations under siege, as in the case of the safe havens
for the Kurds in Northern Iraq (UN Res. 688, April 1991) and for the civilian population in former Yugoslavia (Res. 819 and 824, April/May, 1993); enforcement of a peace or cease-fire agreements, as in the case of the implementation of the DPA in ex-Yugoslavia; and finally, intervention to re-build a collapsed state, as in the case of Somalia and Liberia.

(2c) Conflict settlement/resolution (peacemaking)

On the basis of art. 33, the UN can call upon the parties of any dispute to settle it by means of negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Secretary General and/or his representatives are responsible for peacemaking. Their work is supported by task forces, which study the dispute and the appropriate means of settlement. Since 1991, the newly established Department for Humanitarian Affairs also undertakes mediation missions.

The experience of the UN shows that peacemaking is most successful when a number of instruments of peaceful settlement are used at the same time.

(3) Post-conflict conflict prevention/peace-building

The UN is involved in a number of operations whose aim is the construction of peace through development. This activity is frequently coordinated with that of peace keeping, as there is the need to oversee the agreement reached while constructing the social and cultural conditions for the peace to last. For a rapid overview of the type of operations the UN has undertaken, see (1/b/iii) above.

OSCE

At the Helsinki Review Meeting in 1992, the CSCE came up with a number of important reforms aimed at strengthening the institution’s capacity to perform CP tasks. The creation of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the revision of CSCE mechanisms and procedures for political consultation, for peaceful settlement of disputes and for review of compliance with human rights commitments
are all decisions which facilitate a stronger role of the OSCE in CP. The Permanent Council, established in December 1992 and strengthened in December 1993, has an analogous function. Furthermore, ad hoc and long-term missions have been set up in response to specific crisis situations in Europe.16

(1) Conflict avoidance and prevention

(a) Promotion of human rights and democratic institutions

(i) Norm setting. Permanent consultations within the OSCE are developing a common area of agreed principles.

The OSCE’s activity of norm setting mainly relates to the field of arms control, human rights and the recent practice of “humanitarian intervention.” Although OSCE commitments are not legally binding, an increasing number of documents signed in the OSCE framework are associated with a specific mechanism, which monitors the implementation of the agreement.

The “Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security,” approved at the Budapest Summit in December 1994, enriched the OSCE normative acquis. The Code of Conduct includes a set of principles regarding the democratic control of military forces and the possibility of ensuring human rights to military and paramilitary forces.

(ii) OSCE activity aimed at promoting the respect of human rights is one of the OSCE’s main activities and a tool of CP, both because it aims at promoting general principles of “respect” and because the system includes mechanisms of early warning and monitoring of violations of human rights.

A specific function of vigilance of human rights is performed by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw. Among other things, the office can set up missions to monitor elections and require a debate on human rights issues within the

consultation fora. The ODIHR also provides support for democratic institutions.

The consensus-minus-one procedure (approved in January 1992) entitles the Council of Ministers to take political measures against the state which violates the agreements, without the assent of the state itself (as happened in the case of the suspension of Serbia and Montenegro).

An important role in the monitoring of the respect of human rights is played by the HCNM, although it is formally considered an instrument of the security dimension. The HCNM ensures pre-alarm and preventive action in case of tensions concerning a national minority, which might lead to a conflict.

(iii) The OSCE provides support to newly independent states. In particular, it provides recommendations and technical support for the establishment of democratic institutions and free market principles. Thereby, the OSCE performs a “pedagogic” activity, facilitating the new democracies’ compliance with the membership requirements of the other international organizations.

(b) Political consultation. The OSCE permanent consultations provide the necessary framework for enhanced confidence. Consultations can be activated through three main mechanisms: the military mechanism (in case unusual military activities are discovered), the human mechanism (in case of major breeches of human rights); and the emergency mechanism (in case of serious emergencies). At present, however, permanent consultation is guaranteed by the collective political bodies – the Ministerial Council, the Senior Council, the Permanent Council, the Forum for Security and Cooperation (FSC) – each of which has consultation and alert procedures, which allow it to discuss situations of threats to peace at an early stage and respond with the tools at its disposal.

(c) Arms Control. The CSCE played a central role in the process of negotiation, which led to the signing of the 1990, and 1992 agreements of CSBM. Other agreements were then signed in the framework of the FSC – established in September 1992. The declaration on non-proliferation signed at the Budapest Summit had a strong influence on the possible removal of the NPT.
Furthermore, the FSC provides not only the forum within which consultation on arms control takes place, but also the mechanism, which monitors the implementation of the CSBM. As far as the CFE is concerned, the monitoring function takes place out of the OSCE framework, as the agreement was not signed by all the OSCE member states.

(d) The monitoring of the implementation, negotiation and supervision of the mechanisms of the Stability Pact agreements (see section on the EU).

(e) Early Warning. The 1992 Helsinki document attributed the main role of early warning to the regular political consultations which take place – since December 1994 – in the Permanent Council and the Prague Senior Council. However, nearly all OSCE institutions have an early warning function. In particular:

- The HCNM (according to the Helsinki Document, Decisions, II, 3);
- the FSC;
- the ODIHR;
- the Permanent Council;
- the CSBM system;
- the NGOs.

2) Conflict management

(a) The OSCE’s competencies of conflict management are far less developed than its competencies in “conflict avoidance and prevention.” The OSCE does not have the power to intervene in a country without its assent. It can only undertake a “traditional” type of peace keeping, which requires the agreement of the warring parties, a cease-fire, and the neutrality of the OSCE troops. If this seems to constrain the OSCE’s capacities in conflict management, it also enables this institution to appear to the warring parties to be a less threatening and more convenient third party than other international organizations. This has been the case, for instance, with OSCE efforts in Chechnya.

(b) The missions. These represent one of the main forms of third party
intervention at the disposal of the OSCE. They usually have more than one function (mediation, monitoring, technical support, etc.) and can be of three types: long-term (e.g. Macedonia, Kosovo and Sandjak in 1992), ad hoc (e.g. the sanctions assistance mission to ex-Yugoslavia’s neighboring states), and fact-finding.

All the missions must have a humanitarian dimension. They generally have more than one conflict management function as they may represent a deterrent to the transformation of a dispute into a violent conflict, provide early warning, support both peace-keeping and peace-making operations. The function of the missions, therefore, is rather enlarged and the record so far shows an important role in the prevention of violent conflicts. One of the most interesting and recent examples of OSCE’s missions is the Kosovo Verification Mission, some 2,000 men deployed in Kosovo, with the task of verifying the maintenance of the cease-fire agreed by the parties in October 1998. It is interesting to observe that in this case NATO provides a sort of military support to the functioning of the OSCE’s “Kosovo Verification Mission,” under the form of a deterrent force deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).


(c) Peace-making role of the Chairman in Office (CiO) and his/her staff (Troika, special representatives and missions). The CiO is the OSCE body with the greatest role in mediation. In practice, the HCNM provides support for the mediating efforts of the CiO.

(3) Post-conflict conflict prevention

This is an important role of the OSCE, but the organization’s limited resources represent a serious constraint to its actual impact in post-conflict areas. The type of action which the OSCE can undertake in post-conflict areas is one of mediation among the civilians, support to the development of democratic institutions (starting with the preparation of regular elections, the definition of legal documents), monitoring of disarmament and CSBMs. The OSCE is currently involved in the implementation of the DPA. Its roles range from providing support to
the coming elections to offering a connection between the European Administration of Mostar and the citizens of the city through the figure of the ombudsman. Analogous figures have been established to promote dialogue within the Croat-Muslim federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

An Evaluation of the CP Tools at the Disposal of Major IGOs

The above review of CP activities and tools in the hands of IGOs showed that:

a) The international organizations under investigation devoted a great deal of their activities in the 1990s to the development of tools which could enable them to deal with the “threatening” – seemingly war-prone and characterized by state fragmentation and inter-ethnic rivalries – scenario of post-Cold War Europe. Most initiatives were conceived specifically in order to deal with the possible violent fragmentation of Eastern and Central Europe. They also intended to re-define a role for these organizations, which could provide them with a legitimate role in the changed international context (the organization that most faced the problem of re-defining its post-Cold War role and source of legitimacy was NATO).

b) Most of the activities show the adoption of a broader concept of “security” and the widening of the ways to achieve security. Just to provide some examples: NATO’s New Security Concept, and its attention to issues such as the development of democratic institutions as a condition to accede to the PfP Program, are the best examples of how in the post-Cold War context even traditional security institutions adopt broader security concepts and instruments. Adopting a somehow opposed approach, the C.o.E. broadened its membership thanks to the fact that it adopted a more flexible and “soft” approach, as far as the requisites for access were concerned (the condition of being a proved democratic state was by no means softened when some CEE countries entered the organization). However, the aim of the C.o.E. was still one
of enlarging its scope of CP activities that can now be better performed in a larger number of states. The institutional developments undertaken by the OSCE then reveal a growing attention by this organization to issues of human and minority rights, and therefore to issues that proved to be central in domestic conflicts in the former Soviet bloc.

c) The number of activities that have a CP component is very high and more instruments can be used at different moments of a conflict and with different purposes.\(^{17}\)

d) The greatest emphasis has been put on issues that have to do with background causes of violent conflict. Some of these could be a lack of knowledge by the “international community” about the forthcoming conflict, a lack of communication and transparency, undemocratic settings, economic development, a lack of democratic control of weapons or too many weapons, early warning and contingency planning, political dialogue and cooperation, development of democratic institutions, economic support, arms control and reduction. This implies that the following assumptions are now taken for granted:

- there is not enough information about forthcoming conflicts otherwise it would be easier to prevent them;
- democracies are less war-prone than non-democracies;
- societies with developed economies are less war-prone that economically disadvantaged societies;
- when there are lower levels of armaments there is a lower possibility of armed conflicts;

However, these statements are less obvious than they might appear and the diplomats of major Western states know it so well that in fact these principles are not consistently applied. The US for years have supplied non-democratic regimes with money and arms, precisely because on the basis of a crude geopolitical calculation these regimes were more able to guarantee stability (or a type of stability that suited the US’s

interests). Let us spend a few words on the theoretical and empirical problems relative to the above assumptions:

*Early warning* – that is not a CP instrument but may be preliminary to efficient CP activities – is by far the last thing that is lacking in Europe today. Contrary to what some claim,\(^{18}\) I believe that early warning is indeed possible, sometimes rather “easy,” and that what is lacking is by no means an efficient “European early warning machinery.” The already existing intelligence services of the major European states, together with the daily activities of organizations such as the OSCE provide enough information to recognize if and when a conflict can take place and might turn violent. The Kosovo violent conflict had been forecast for years, as it was clear that the Albanian crisis had not been resolved. The same can be said about the Bosnian war that had been foreseen by a CIA report already in 1990. So what? The actual problem is not early warning, but early will to use the available instruments in order to prevent a conflict from becoming violent.

As for *democracy building and economic development* as instruments of CP, some authors object that these are not efficient instruments and that the correlation between democratic and economic development and peaceful behavior proved false. In reality the thesis that liberal-democratic regimes are less war-prone has found – at least partial – empirical evidence: liberal-democratic regimes make war as much as authoritarian regimes,\(^ {19}\) but not among themselves.\(^ {20}\) More specifically on economic aid, the main criticism regards the low possibility of


actually developing the economy of a country, more than the fact that economically developed countries are less war-prone. Stephen Stedman, in his provocative “Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling ‘Preventive Diplomacy’” argues that foreign aid tends to go to countries that are already doing fairly well, the money then goes into the pockets of the local elite and does not actually develop the country. These undoubtful observations lead to the further consideration that economic aid cannot be an instrument that can be used alone and that it should be part of a broader strategy of which democracy building, economic aid, and the creation of forms of institutionalized regional cooperation are a part.

Finally, arms control as an instrument of CP could be criticized, because in reality cruel conflicts can take place even in areas with few weapons, as the case of Rwanda demonstrated. It could also be criticized by realist authors, who believe in the deterring effect of weapons. However, it should be recognized that activities concerning arms control have the main CP strength in the confidence that they are supposed to create between the (would-be) warring parties. In this quality, therefore, they seem to have more effectiveness in inter-state conflicts than in civil wars.

e) As we have seen, most of the instruments have been put into existence in order to prevent or manage conflicts that had their main origin (not necessarily in causal terms) at the end of the Cold War. This led to focus attention on intra-state, domestic, communal or inter-ethnic conflicts. Activities such as the Stability Pact, some of the requirements to accede to PfP, the creation of the HCNM, etc. responded to this need. Also, ethnic conflicts and their possible prevention have caught the attention of academic studies. It could be wondered, however, if

21 Stedman, “Alchemy for a New World Order.”
the phenomenon of ethnic/communal conflicts is now caused by diminishing intensity, the more we depart from the traumatic effect of the end of the Cold War. The plausibility of internal conflicts in the future is a further element, which is frequently taken for granted, but that could deserve more attention.

f) Although all the above instruments of CP existed when the Kosovo war started, the European Security Architecture has not been able to prevent it from happening. Why? The reasons for insufficient action in the specific case are many and would take us too far from the scope of this paper, but both the management of the Bosnian war and the missed prevention of the Kosovo conflict seem to teach some lessons:

If, as in the above list, IGOs have at their disposal numerous sets of instruments of CP, what has still not been well defined is the relationship among these various international organizations when they use CP or conflict management tools. This was clearly shown during the management of the Yugoslav wars and was only partially overcome with the DPA. In other words it is not clear who does what, in which circumstances, and in which relationship with other organizations.

The unresolved dilemmas of international politics and international law further complicate issues, that inevitably affect CP activities as well: external intervention vs. principle of state sovereignty, relationship between diplomacy and use of military force, legitimacy of intervention vs. third parties’ will to run risks, realpolitik diplomacy vs. international justice, etc.

Finally, CP and conflict management have probably been sold out before they were available. In other words, the international actors involved in possible CP in Europe (namely the states members to IGOs and the IGOs themselves) are less ready to run the risk of effective CP, as it involves the identification of an overall strategy and contingency planning for each risky situation and, most of all, the will to enforce such a strategy, backing threats with the use of “all possible means.”
The Dayton Peace Accords: Success or Failure?

When the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was approved in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995, President Clinton described its goal “to give all the people of Bosnia a much greater stake in peace than war, so that peace takes on a life and a logic of its own.” In the three years of their implementation, the Dayton peace accords have unquestionably not succeeded in creating a peace with a life and logic of its own.

Nor have the Dayton accords created a sustainable multi-ethnic state in Bosnia. The parties to the conflict remain unwilling to forge a common political democracy. However, the international community was probably much too ambitious in its expectations of transforming Bosnia into a market-oriented democracy with complex pluralistic institutions, the unbiased rule of law, and tolerance towards ethnic groups emerging from a heinous conflict in such a short period of time.

The accords have succeeded in the important but morally unpalatable task of channeling the ethnic cleansing that continues to occur in Bosnia into largely peaceful and administrative measures. It is likely that the long-term result of the Dayton peace accords will be the disaggregation of Bosnia, with the Bosnian Serb Republic joining Serbia, the Croat part of the Federation joining Croatia, and, as a result of arms control restrictions on the Serbs and Croats, the Muslim-controlled remnant of Bosnia strong enough to resist attack.

A Stable Peace?

The central component of a stable peace would be a military situation that gave no incentive to the parties to the conflict to revert to violence to achieve their aims. The Western political process that resulted in the Dayton accords attempted to create a stable military balance in Bosnia in three ways. This was done by interposing a NATO-led Implementation Force to enforce compliance with the terms of the accords; by combining Croat and Bosnian armies into a confederated force; and by balancing the military capabilities of the parties to the conflict through a combination of arms control limits on Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) forces, while building up the Federation forces through a “train and equip” (T&E) program.

Seven major military tasks were assigned to the Implementation Force (IFOR) as part of the Dayton peace accords. The tasks were: (1) ensure continued compliance with the cease fire; (2) ensure separation of forces; (3) ensure the withdrawal of forces from agreed cease-fire zones of separation back into respective territories; (4) ensure collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks; (5) ensure demobilization of remaining forces; (6) create conditions for the safe, orderly, and speedy withdrawal of United Nations forces; and (7) maintain control of airspace. The deployment of 60,000 troops under NATO command succeeded in quickly halting the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within four months of IFOR’s deployment, those tasks were largely completed.2

When the NATO force transitioned to a Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December of 1996, the potential for violence by the parties to the conflict was sufficiently low, so that the SFOR tasks were limited to preventing the resumption of hostilities or threats to the peace, con-

solidating IFOR’s achievements, promoting a climate conducive to the peace process and providing selective support to the civilian authorities. These tasks, too, have been largely achieved. Isolated incidents involving hidden weapons caches and roadblocks to prevent freedom of movement still occur, but they do not challenge the stability of the current peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^3\)

An area that NATO-led military forces have been skittish about enforcing the Dayton accords has been arresting war criminals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.\(^4\) The International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia has identified and collected forensic evidence at a number of mass graves, and issued eighty indictments for war crimes and crimes against humanity.\(^5\) Only twenty-eight war criminals have been arrested.\(^6\) IFOR and SFOR have been reluctant to arrest the most egregious war criminals, like Radovan Karadzic and General Mladic, preferring to drive them out of political life without forcing them to face the war crimes tribunal. While this choice may have practical advantages, the presence of war criminals in Bosnia virtually ensures that the peace will not be sustainable. For all intents and purposes, the deployment of NATO-led forces into Bosnia has prevented the recourse to violence by the parties to the conflict. However, they have not apprehended war criminals and it is not at all clear that the current situation is sustainable without the presence of IFOR.

A second element of stabilizing the military situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was pressing the Croat and Bosnian Muslim armed forces

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\(^3\) SFOR recently demanded the removal of a corps commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina for non-compliance with the accords. Joint Press Conference, 1 September 1998.

\(^4\) The military has proved more willing during General Wesley Clark’s tenure as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), however commanders on the ground in Bosnia continue to oppose efforts to arrest war criminals.


into confederation. The federation was intended to give the combined forces roughly twice the power of the Bosnian Serb military force (who would be assisted by the Serbian military forces), thereby making recourse to aggression by the RS forces unproductive. While the Bosnian Croat and Muslim military forces have frequently operated in coordination, there does not appear to be much genuine merging of the armed forces, despite substantial incentives from the U.S. for such merging. There is a defense council with a common leadership and some high-level interaction. However, the two forces have not formed common operational units or adopted common tactics; they could operate independently and be easily separated. The Federation militaries continue to report to the respective Bosnian Croat and Muslim political leaderships. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute flatly states that “there is no integrated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Force.”

The third element of building military stability envisioned in the Dayton accords is an arms control regime to balance the capabilities of military forces in the region. The 14 June 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control set equipment and troop ceilings for forces of the RS, Bosnian-Croat Federation, Croatia, and Yugoslavia. While concerns were raised about the accuracy of reporting, abuse of exemptions to the limits, denying access to inspection sites, and timeliness of equipment destruction, the arms control agreements were fully enacted and an effective inspection regime was in place by late 1997. The information exchange and validation through inspections greatly enhanced stability among the parties to the conflict.

9 For listings of the numerical limits by category (battle tanks, ACVs, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters) in the treaty, see Sub-Regional Consultative Commission Document (SRCC/48/97), 20 November 1997.
The stability of the arms control regime has been undercut by the “train and equip” program sponsored by the U.S.\textsuperscript{11} Military analysts of the Bosnia conflict considered there to be rough parity between the Bosnian Serb and the combined Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim forces at the time of the Dayton accords. Serb forces possessed better equipment, but Muslim forces had a numerical advantage and were better trained. The T&E program sought to reward cooperation between Bosnian Croat and Muslim forces and to diminish the threat of Bosnian Serb recourse to violence by providing the Federation forces with heavy weapons and training. Because the Federation forces have not integrated, Bosnian Muslim forces became the prime beneficiary of the T&E program, which has given them a significant advantage.\textsuperscript{12} Because of the successful implementation of the arms control provisions, criticism of the T&E program has diminished. However, should the Bosnian Muslims resort to violence either to hold existing Federation territory or to regain territory ceded in the Dayton accords, a program which armed an aggrieved party would seem a grave error in the effort to stabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The three military programs in the Dayton accords do not appear to have created a stable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. External military forces have succeeded in their tasks, and arms control provisions have been successfully implemented. However, the success of the arms control program depended heavily on the presence of the NATO-led military force to ensure compliance. The lack of political will between the Bosnian Croat and Muslim communities to create joint military forces and the continuing presence of war criminals in Bosnia suggests that once the external military forces are removed, the situation would again become violent. In fact, without NATO forces on the ground, NATO’s senior military commander believes, there is “a very high risk

\textsuperscript{11} The U.S. has been much criticized for the T&E program. While the U.S. government continues to support the program, privately U.S. officials admit that the program was damaging, but the Bosnian Muslims made it a condition for agreeing to the Dayton accords.

\textsuperscript{12} SIPRI Yearbook 1998, 523.
of an eventual outbreak of conflict.” The Dayton accords have succeeded in creating a stable security environment, only so long as NATO-led military forces remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A Multi-Ethnic State?

Even with international assistance and supervision, the parties to the conflict continue to prevent full implementation of many aspects of the Dayton accords, especially in the areas of freedom of movement, return of refugees, prosecution of war crimes, and creation of a multi-ethnic political structure. Municipal elections had to be postponed for more than a year to ensure valid balloting, and even after the postponement, the OSCE considered nullifying the elections. Arbitration over the status of Brčo, originally scheduled to conclude in December of 1996 has been extended several times, most recently until early 1999. Common license plates and passports are only now, three years after implementation, being issued, and minimal inter-entity legal cooperation is only just being established. The media remain largely in the hands of ethnic nationalists and are regulated by an international commission. The unwillingness by parties to the conflict to compromise has delayed


14 Wentz, Lessons from Bosnia, 12.


16 U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton Implementation.


civil implementation of the Dayton accords to the point that the Peace Implementation Council gave the High Representative authority to impose solutions. The High Representative had to use that authority to dissolve extra-constitutional political structures, threaten to dismiss elected leaders who do not abide by the Dayton accords, choose the flag and coat of arms for the Federation, open airports, and numerous other basic elements of governance. Bosnia’s leaders, both those who signed the 1995 Dayton accords and those elected subsequently, are “unabashed about the gap between commitments undertaken at Dayton and actual performance.” The political will to build a multi-ethnic state in Bosnia is not sufficient for an integrated Bosnia-Herzegovina to be either built or sustained.

Nowhere is the lack of political will to build a multi-ethnic Bosnia more evident than in the difficulty in facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons. More than two million people were displaced or made refugees by the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. Of those two million, only 22,000 have returned to an area not controlled by their ethnic group. The Dayton accords established an unconditional right of return to minorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and all of the parties to the conflict agreed to facilitate the return of refugees. All the governments have nonetheless created administrative, legal and, in some cases, physical obstacles to refugee return. Orchestrated violence and criminal reprisals against returning refugees are commonplace.


23 A total of 381,000 have returned (171,000 refugees and 210,000 displaced persons), but only 22,000 to places not controlled by their ethnic group. See “The Skies Brighten Over Bosnia,” 125.
particularly in contested regions like Banja Luka. As recently as 1 October 1998, roadblocks were still being erected to prevent the return of refugees.

The Problems with Dayton

There are four main problems with the Dayton accords and their implementation. The accords encourage continued ethnic identification among the citizens of Bosnia; the accords are probably more ambitious than the civil and political circumstances in Bosnia can support; the importance of building police forces that will enforce the rule of law in an unbiased way was ignored for too long in implementing Dayton; and the international community has been unable to convince Bosnians to resolve their own problems.

The central dichotomy of the Dayton accords is that they reinforce ethnic group identification at the same time that they seek to diminish its influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The accords preserved Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state containing two distinct “entities:” the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS). Both the Federation and the RS are allowed to form “special parallel relations with neighboring countries” and maintain multiple citizenship. The three major ethnic groups are each represented in all Bosnian Federal institutions, including the Presidency, two-chamber parliament, constitutional court, central bank and armed forces. By sustaining group identification, the Dayton accords perpetuated the problems that had caused the war in the first place. The ethnic recognition and ties to

neighboring countries that reinforce them may have been necessary conditions for getting any agreement. However, they gravely undercut the ability to build a multi-ethnic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia would have been better served by a strict recognition of individual rather than group rights.

A second difficulty with the Dayton accords is that the international community has set the bar so high. The Dayton accords will not be satisfied with a largely peaceful but segregated Bosnia because the international community has determined that Bosnia should be so much more. For example, candidates in the October 1998 elections were instructed that in addition to rejecting extra-Constitutional institutions, positive conditions included:

- maintaining a climate of peace, stability, law and order, tolerance and ethnic reintegration;
- making significant progress towards refugee return, and full implementation of laws on property;
- continuing the process of market-led reform;
- continuing police and judicial reform;
- working with international representatives on laws being introduced;
- respecting and strengthening the new government institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- fostering the creation of a civil society in line with the goals of the Council of Europe.

These are conditions that many successful leaders of stable democratic governments could not meet. In expecting so much from a country just recovering from a war and attempting to reconstitute a sense of community, the Dayton accords seem doomed to failure. A less


ambitious agenda might have served Bosnia better.

Given the very ambitious civil and political structures outlined in the Dayton accords, it should have been acknowledged that implementing them would be a very long-term obligation. Western states, and particularly the U.S., consolidated the necessary steps into a timetable of only a few years in order to make their intervention more acceptable to their own citizens. The rapid timetable for implementing key civilian aspects of the accords, like legislative elections, was clearly too ambitious to produce the confidence among the parties to the conflict or legitimacy for the newly created institutions. In fact, as the 1991 elections in Yugoslavia demonstrated, elections without adequate preparation to ensure unbiased access to media, voter education and reliable electoral practices can produce elections that simply validate control by extremists. In Bosnia, the rapid timetable called into question the legitimacy of those political leaders who supported its provisions. If solutions to the civil and political problems of Bosnia are to grow out of the indigenous communities, it will require much more time than envisioned under the Dayton accords.

Perhaps the key failure in implementation of the Dayton accords has been in not recognizing the essential contribution that civil police must play in rebuilding any society. Police forces are a key to establishing sustainable peace in Bosnia, but because the police conducted much of the ethnic cleansing during the war, many demobilized soldiers were simply transferred into the police forces. The stranglehold of intolerant police in Bosnia has affected everything, from the return of refugees to distribution of license plates.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution that created NATO’s IFOR also authorized an international police task force (IPTF) to oversee police activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The IPTF was not

29 “A Fragile Peace in Bosnia,” 136.
31 Wentz, Lessons From Bosnia, 13-14.
armed or empowered to enforce laws, however, leaving it no effective sanction except to appeal to NATO forces or the United Nations High Representative. Only recently has SFOR been providing military support to the IPTF, and have Dayton’s civil authorities become serious about reforming police practices. The international community’s efforts would have shown better results if we had focused more of our attention on policing than on grander issues of nationhood.

Finally, and perhaps most difficult to resolve, is the enduring problem of getting Bosnians to face up to their problems and contribute to resolutions. There continues to be an expectation by Bosnians that the international community will resolve their problems, and therefore they themselves do not have to participate. Many in Bosnia would like to have the international community impose resolutions along a broader range of civil and political activity. However, the High Representative is probably right in emphasizing the limits of his power by saying that “this is not a protectorate,” and imposed solutions are “not a substitute for local power.” Unless solutions grow indigenously out of the political culture of Bosnia, they are unlikely to be respected by the population once the international community leaves. People who have not contributed to the solution can abdicate responsibility for its failure. The Dayton accords have failed in the essential task of creating a political community that takes responsibility for resolving its problems, which is perhaps the most damning evidence that a peace, with a life and a logic of its own, has not been created in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Recent Elections

The October 1998 elections provide mixed results about whether attitudes are moderating. While initial diplomatic reactions were

33 U.S. Department of Defense, Dayton Implementation.
35 Carlos Westendorp, quoted in Smith, “Many in Bosnia Urge Foreigners To Push For Change.”
alarmist and very pessimistic about the defeat of Western-supported Bosnian Serb Presidential candidate, Biljana Plasvic, three very important positive indicators are worth remembering. Firstly, there was no election-related violence. Secondly, the elections had very little fraudulent activity or voter intimidation. Thirdly, every candidate cleared to stand for office was committed to continuing to support the Dayton peace accords.

Faced with the apparent defeat of moderate Serbs in the Serbian Republic, the international community rightly emphasized the terms that any successful candidate would be expected to meet. This approach sends an important signal to countries in the process of becoming democracies, that the process and institutions are the essential elements of democracy.

Returns appear to indicate that moderate candidates and political parties are gaining ground in the Bosnian and Croat Federation territory, but not in the Bosnia Serb Republic. Bosnian Serbs rejected the Western-backed Presidential candidate, who subsequently blamed her loss on the West pressing her too hard to support moderate policies.

The newly elected Bosnian Serb President, Nikola Poplasen, advocates the reunification of the Bosnian Serb Republic with Serbia. But even in the Bosnian Serb Republic, voters who put Poplasen into office created a balance by electing candidates who oppose Poplasen as a


majority in the legislature and also a moderate representative for the three-member Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency.40

This pattern of voting suggests that Bosnian Serbs support moderate political forces ruling local and inter-Bosnian affairs, but also wanted a symbol of their Serb nationalism and perhaps a statement of their desire for eventual unification with Serbia. If this is an accurate reflection of Bosnian Serb voter opinion, the Dayton peace accords may yet succeed in providing a stable environment for a sufficient duration until peace takes on a life and a logic of its own. However, it also suggests that Bosnian Serbs remain very wary of the West and could be mobilized on that basis to break completely away from Bosnia.41

Kosovo

While events internal to Serbia are not addressed in the Dayton peace accords, the prospects for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina are certain to be affected by the violence occurring in Kosovo. At a minimum, the volatile mix of ethnic groups in Bosnia will be affected by the 250,000 refugees fleeing Serb attacks in Kosovo.

Events in Kosovo have already affected the politics within Bosnia. Nikola Poplasen’s popularity can be ascribed in part to rising RS resentment of Western threats of military action against Serbia.42 The West evidently delayed action on Kosovo until after the October Bosnian elections in order to avoid negatively influencing the Bosnian Serb vote.43 The very real possibility exists that if the West intervenes

in Serbia to punish Slobodan Milosevic for his crackdown on ethnic Albanians, Bosnian Serbs may be motivated by patriotism or opportunity to break away from Bosnia and formally join Serbia. This would call the presence of NATO-led forces into question, since one party to the Dayton accords was abjuring the agreement.

Even if the Bosnian Serb Republic does not formally repudiate the Dayton accords, Western officials, aid workers and troops are likely to be at risk of reprisals, both official and unofficial. If Western action in Kosovo inflames Serb suspicions that the international community is biased against Serbs, as has frequently been alleged in the Serb-controlled media, the 30,000 troops in IFOR may not be adequate to ensure a stable and secure environment in Bosnia.

Conclusion

The Dayton peace accords have a mixed record of success in Bosnia-Herzegovina in their first three years of implementation. The NATO-led military force has prevented recourse to violence by the parties to the conflict, which is a major contribution to the prospects for peace in Bosnia. However, it will not be sufficient to prevent war when the international community concludes its mission, especially if war criminals are allowed to remain in Bosnia. The Federation has not been willing to integrate its military forces, suggesting that the Bosnian Muslim and Croat political leaders see an eventual need for their independent use. Arms control provisions have added to the stability, although their value and legitimacy has been somewhat undercut by the train and equip program.

The civil aspects of the Dayton accords have been much slower to gain traction in Bosnia, which is not surprising since they are a much more difficult challenge than has been assigned to the military forces. The

17 September 1998.
international community has designed and attempted to implement numerous programs to assist reconciliation; however, the parties to the conflict do not have the political will to implement the Dayton accords. The unwillingness or inability of refugees to return to their homes is a key indicator of the potential for sustainable peace.

In retrospect, it was probably a mistake to include ethnic group rights in the Dayton accords, and to make the goals of the accords so ambitious. In the implementation phase, inadequate attention to building neutral police forces has held back progress but is now being addressed, although the political culture of Bosnia has not become one in which the citizens of Bosnia take responsibility for their problems and resolve them. This suggests that the Dayton accords will not succeed in creating stable peace or a multi-ethnic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

While the Dayton peace accords have not succeeded in creating a self-sustaining peace or built a multi-ethnic state from the ruins of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they have succeeded in one very important way. Prior to the Dayton process, Bosnia was being violently dismembered into ethnic cantonments. After the Dayton accords, the cantonment may still be continuing, but it is occurring through intimidation rather than genocide.
The Challenges of Rebuilding War-torn Economies

Introduction

Economic aspects are at the heart of efforts to rebuild war-torn societies and consolidate peace in countries emerging from years of civil war. Yet relatively little attention has been focused on these issues in popular media as well as in the specialized press. This may be due to the fact that questions of humanitarian relief and the politics of peace keeping have been in the limelight of public and political interest. It may also reflect the fact that economists, and the main institutions of economic development and finance, have long been uneasy and ambivalent about focusing directly on complex politico-economic issues and getting involved in messy post-war situations.

Contemporary conflicts do obviously not fit into the former conceptual framework of bipolar confrontation. The overwhelming majority of today’s conflicts affect low-income or low-middle-income economies and take the form of protracted internal struggles that sporadically erupt into violence. Former peace economics – with its primary focus on arms race and defense expenditures, and its strong reliance on games theory – is therefore of limited help in meeting the complex challenges facing contemporary war-torn societies. There is now a clear gap between theory and practice in this field: assistance in economic rebuilding has rapidly become a major preoccupation of bilateral and multilateral development agencies while the academic literature on these questions has remained surprisingly limited.

Yet, research on conflict-ridden economies and on the complex challenges of rebuilding war-torn countries has intensified over the last few years. From 1992 onwards, humanitarian and development circles
have been engaged in a wide debate to establish a more effective and coherent framework for relief, rehabilitation, and development activities.\(^1\) In 1996-97, the World Bank worked out a policy paper for its involvement in post-conflict reconstruction and decided to establish a “Post-conflict Unit” to respond to the needs of its operations in conflict and post-conflict situations.\(^2\) The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC) has been working on the formulation of policy orientations for development co-operation in conflict-prevention and post-conflict recovery. The resulting guidelines were endorsed by DAC members at the May 1997 High Level Meeting in Paris.\(^3\) These guidelines provide valuable indications on the collective views and commitments of donor countries on ways in which the international community should address issues such as conflict prevention, peace building and reconstruction.

In this paper, we first focus on the dynamics underlying today’s wartime and post-conflict economies, and the resulting methodological difficulties for economic analysis. We then turn to the ongoing debate on structural adjustment versus peace building, as well as on external assistance and the issue of conditionality. In the fourth section, we highlight the limitations and weaknesses of traditional economic approaches when dealing with war-torn countries and show how recent contributions in the area of Political Economy and New Institutional Economics can contribute to widen economists’ perspective on post-


conflict rebuilding. We then outline a politico-economic framework on which we suggest the development of a model to analyze the relationships underlying economic policy and peace building. The last Section contains concluding remarks.

Wartime Economy

Ownership and distributional issues often lie at the heart of violent aggressions. War typically spurs radical changes in the allocation of resources and activities among sectors and institutions (primary income distribution) as well as among households and social groups (secondary income distribution). As a result, a small minority of people often acquires a vested interest in the continuation of conflict, while the vast majority slides toward, or below, absolute poverty. The objective of warring parties is thus not invariably to seize power and gain control over the state, but may also be more narrowly economic, as exemplified at certain stages in Liberia or Sierra Leone. Even if war is costly and seems irrational with regard to the society as a whole, it is usually a very profitable business for the particular groups who can secure control over resources and benefit from them. Political and army leaders have a direct personal interest in continuing the war if they perceive that they are bound to lose power through negotiated peaceful settlements.

Some analysts have recently suggested that contemporary conflicts can be better understood if considered as a logical outcome of the struggle between different social groups for access to – and control over – resources such as land, capital or humanitarian aid as well as trading routes and activities. As a result of falling foreign financial and


military support since the end of the Cold War, warring parties have to depend primarily on their own natural assets, i.e. exploiting and trading domestic resources such as tropical timber, rubber, mines, gems, as well as arms and drugs. Consequently, fierce fighting is taking place in and around strategic areas as opposing groups try to secure territorial control over key resources and trading routes. The increasing fragmentation of armed groups is mainly the result of heightened internal struggles among sub-groups in conflict to exploit and market local resources. Countries at war are then plagued by a surge in economic criminality and predatory behavior. In this environment, external assistance in general, and humanitarian aid in particular, is another resource that has been subject to increasing attacks in recent years.

Surprisingly, it is not economists but rather political scientists and humanitarian practitioners who have recently highlighted these fundamental politico-economic factors. Even if most economists would acknowledge the relevance of such variables in the rebuilding process, they tend to pay lip service rather than give them substantive attention. Filling this gap requires pioneering work in relatively new ground.

Methodological challenges

The study of contemporary war-torn countries poses major conceptual and methodological challenges, which may at least partly account for the paucity of economic research in this area. One of the major obstacles for economists interested in conflict-ridden economies is the difficulty of conducting solid empirical analysis because of an acute paucity of reliable data. This partly reflects the weakening of government capacity to collect and process data during hostilities. It might also be because information on inequality in income and asset distribution would be considered counter-productive or even dangerous by a

6 Opposition groups have also increasingly appealed to their diaspora established in richer countries for financial support.

7 See the chapter entitled “Proposal for a Politico-economic Framework,” below.
government under attack. Moreover, the information available usually fails to include the informal, illegal and criminal activities that often flourish during conflicts. In the case of the Horn of Africa, for instance, survival strategies have increased the share of subsistence agriculture in the overall economy and growing informal or underground sectors have pushed a considerable portion of economic activities outside the scope of national accounting.\footnote{Brown, R. et al. “Debt, Adjustment, and Donor Interventions in the Post-War Horn of Africa.” In Beyond Conflict in the Horn, eds. Martin Doornbos et al. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1992.}

Another methodological challenge is to distinguish the socioeconomic changes that can be attributed solely to the war from effects caused simultaneously by other factors (e.g. changing international terms of trade). Counterfactual analysis might provide some assistance, but is even more difficult to carry out than under normal circumstances.\footnote{Stewart, Frances, et al. “Civil Conflict in Developing Countries over the Last Quarter of a Century: An Empirical Overview of Economic and Social Consequences.” Oxford Development Studies 25, No. 1 (1997): 22.} Nonetheless, applied research and empirical analysis are required to improve our capacity to mitigate the costs of conflict and better contribute to post-conflict rebuilding. Cross-study comparisons are all the more difficult since there is no such thing as a \textit{typology} for the analysis of conflict economies. The lines between situations of widespread violence, civil disorder, and conflict have become blurred. Scholars have selected and categorized countries at war according to different criteria depending on the purpose of their research (e.g. causes of conflict, kind of actors involved, number of battle-related deaths, degree of state of regression or collapse, etc.).

But the greatest methodological difficulty may in fact lie elsewhere: during civil war as well as in its direct aftermath, politics tends to take precedence over economics. Questions such as how socioeconomic factors affect the structure and balance of power among all the actors involved are crucial in understanding the rationale and behavior of capitalists and landowners, peasants and urban workers, investors,
consumers, etc. Thus, what is needed may be more than a mere interdisciplinary perspective. Economic analysis of countries at war and post-conflict rebuilding requires a paradigmatic shift so as to integrate fundamental issues such as political stability and institutional capacity for peaceful conflict management.

Post-war Economy

From the existing country case studies, it is obvious that the key issues facing war-torn societies as they start rebuilding their economies vary greatly from case to case. Countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and the former republics of the USSR have to deal simultaneously with the challenges of a double transition: from centrally-planned to market economy and from war to peace. Under these circumstances, privatization, liberalization and decentralization obviously rank among the top priorities. But other countries emerge from protracted conflicts with an extraordinarily weak public sector. In Guatemala, for instance, one of the most urgent tasks is to restore the legitimacy and capacity of the state to perform basic functions. The peace accords therefore set as a priority an increase of government revenues as a share of GDP from less than 8 percent to 12 percent in four years. In other countries where the central state has collapsed, as in Somalia, reconstruction takes place in the absence of national authorities, which is somewhat perplexing for economists accustomed to assessing and designing economic policies with key ministries and the central bank.

Simplistic generalization is thus inappropriate when describing post-conflict situations. Nonetheless, the following often emerge as common features:

- a fragile peace-consolidation process and continuing instability;
- a bad macroeconomic record;
- damaged/obsolete physical capital and production facilities;
• a lack of confidence among socioeconomic actors;
• weak judicial, financial, fiscal, administrative and regulatory capacities of the state;
• large shadow economy (informal sector), parallel markets and/or criminal activities;
• widespread unemployment aggravated by the demobilization of ex-combatants and the reinsertion of refugees and internally displaced people;
• a dramatic lack of skilled manpower;
• sudden and massive movements of population;
• a low foreign aid absorption capacity in the face of sometimes massive intervention of the international community.

Some of these characteristics are not dissimilar from those facing other crisis-ridden developing economies. However, post-conflict countries often have relatively less capacity to address the crisis, which appears in starker relief than in countries at peace, mainly because fiscal and external constraints on macroeconomic equilibrium are exacerbated in wartime. Other characteristics clearly distinguish societies in transition from war to peace from other low-income and middle-income economies. War modifies the behavior of private agents, both firms and households, due to increased uncertainty and the survival strategies adopted during the conflict. In some instances, central government and state institutions have collapsed. Barter trade has been substituted for currency transactions and informal economic activities have overshadowed formal markets. Hence, in certain cases, basic exchange, trade and banking services may have to be rebuilt from scratch.

Post-conflict reconstruction cannot succeed unless the root causes of war are correctly understood and addressed. Socioeconomic variables only provide a limited and partial picture of the rationale for war but may still be an important factor contributing to the violent outburst of a conflict. There is no consensus yet with regard to the relationship between socioeconomic variables and violent conflict. It has been recognized that the relationship works both ways: political instability
may be the result of a disappointing economic performance, and poor economic development may stem from a high degree of insecurity and violence. In any case, socioeconomic causes contributing to the emergence of violent conflict often survive or reappear once the fighting is over. Addressing them is a priority and implies taking into account the complex interactions between the economic, political, cultural and historical factors at play.

*Structural adjustment vs. peace-building*

Civil war tends to seriously undermine the capacity of the state to govern, as well as its political autonomy and administrative ability to promote a broadly based development program. Except in cases of overall state collapse, governments are still supposed to design and implement social and economic policies, even in the midst of civil war.\(^\text{10}\)

International financial institutions are often the main creditors during the conflict as well as in the reconstruction phase. They play a crucial role in the design of economic policy as they determine which economic reforms are required to allow a country access to foreign funds. Following a major study on economic policy and peace building in El Salvador, Boyce and Pastor\(^\text{11}\) argue that economists and the international financial institutions they staff are not equipped to operate in post-conflict situations. They tend to take for granted the basic underpinnings of the economy, with a well-established legal system to enforce property controls and contracts and well-defined social norms. But these have often been shattered by civil war, if indeed they ever existed. Boyce and Pastor stress that macroeconomic stability and

10 The absence of policy other than those strictly dictated by war efforts may actually be one policy option that reflects a deliberate attempt to withhold public services and supplies from parts of the country to weaken the rebels.

fiscal discipline are required even as countries seek to finance the requirements of peace. Yet, the objectives of economic policy in post-conflict situations cannot be limited to conventional structural adjustment. Economic policy should also promote adjustment toward peace, for there is no prospect for sustainable development as long as minimal stability and predictability have not been restored.

Orthodox economic adjustment packages may have counterproductive effects in the context of war-torn societies and may produce results quite contrary to policymakers’ expectations. In theory, adjustment policies imply that supply and demand are highly responsive to changes in relative price. But this is often not the case in post-conflict economies mainly because of bottlenecks in production and infrastructure. Private investors are reluctant to commit their assets to the type of fixed, long-term investments that are needed to restore growth and employment. Let us illustrate this with examples drawn from the Mozambican experience.

Trade liberalization hits competing domestic enterprises and encourages the import of non-essential goods and services from neighboring South Africa, while the volume of export barely increases as supply is limited by a lack of investment. Increased real interest rates harm production and do not result in a major increase in bank deposits, as confidence in the exchange rate and the domestic financial system is too low in the aftermath of the conflict. The expected benefit of farm price deregulation can be canceled out by credit constraints, bottlenecks in infrastructure and commercialization, and the lack of input supplies that prevent farmers from increasing production. A prior requirement is to restore basic agricultural extension services, transportation and irrigation systems and the storage facilities that have been destroyed during the war. This would require that peasants and merchants enjoy favorable conditions of access to credit. But in the case of Mozambique, the credit policy implemented under stabilization programs is too restrictive, apart from the weakness and inefficiency of the financial sector.\footnote{See Hanlon, Joseph. Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique. Dublin: The International African Institute and Irish Mozambique Solidarity, 1996.}

The debate on economic reforms versus peace building has recently become slightly less controversial. Few structural adjustment critics would deny today the desirability of macroeconomic stability and reasonable fiscal and monetary policies, even in the aftermath of civil strife. On the other hand, international economic institutions, and the World Bank in particular, have come to recognize the need to tailor appropriate programs for each war-torn country so that adjustment policies do not frustrate, but enhance peace efforts. Indeed, there has been some progress in this regard when comparing post-war policies in El Salvador in 1991 and Guatemala in 1997. It nonetheless remains to be seen how far large institutions with different cultures and mandates are genuinely committed and able to translate new guidelines and official commitments into operational reality in post-conflict settings.

**Conditionality**

The international community has been criticized for pushing too hard on economic conditionality and not enough on political or peace conditionality. Brown *et al.* remark that “the desperation of most African governments for foreign exchange has tended towards ‘monologue’ rather than ‘dialogue,’ enabling donors to exercise considerable leverage in economic policy formation and implementation.” Conditions attached to IMF and World Bank loans have been blamed for eroding public institutions and weakening the state’s capacity to mediate conflict, secure law and order, and rebuild essential infrastructure and services. The current process of state collapse in several war-torn countries indeed deserves particular attention. Economic stabilization policies may contribute to accelerating state regression and the fragmentation of violence, leading to anarchical types of protracted conflict. The increasing number of low-income countries subjected to recurrent violence, corruption, banditry and collapse of public institutions has been the cause of mounting concern. Strengthening

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14 See for instance Zartman, I. William, ed. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration*
peace and rebuilding the economy in the absence of a minimal state apparatus poses major challenges to economists and the international community alike. Such situations call for innovative approaches to be worked out in conjunction with local and regional actors.

The debate on *peace and economic conditionality* is ongoing.\(^\text{15}\) Effective conditionality requires concerted efforts by the international community and presupposes some consensus on the objectives of – and criteria for – conditions attached to aid, together with improved transparency between donors and recipients. In this context, it is somehow encouraging that IMF Director General Camdessus publicly declared, on a visit to Guatemala in May 1997, that the principal requirement attached to financial assistance was the timely implementation of the Peace Accords signed in December 1996, implying a close parallel between peace and economic conditionality in this case.

**External assistance**

External assistance is neither neutral nor risk free. Through massive intervention, foreign agencies come to exert considerable influence on the way post-conflict economies evolve. As mentioned above, aid is a powerful instrument for policy conditionality and is often used as a lever for economic reforms and/or for peace-building requirements. The main difficulty is to strike a balance between urgent needs and high expectations at the end of hostilities on the one hand, and the negative side effects of aid on the other. For externally funded aid extended with purely humanitarian motivations may in fact revive conflict. Several analysts warn that aid more often worsens conflict rather than helps mitigate it.\(^\text{16}\) Foreign aid may contribute to sustaining the war or

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\(^{15}\) See also the section on “The political economy of rebuilding,” below.

exacerbating its causes by increasing resources available to continue the conflict. Aid can be used directly as an instrument of war by one or more parties to the conflict, by manipulating the access of foreign agencies to victims or using civilians as shields or food sources for combatants. Armed factions may also divert or simply steal humanitarian inputs for their own consumption, or for barter, sale, or even export.  

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has established a whole range of principles, guidelines and best practices in order to overcome potential contradictions and to integrate external assistance within the framework of a coherent, integrated, and long-term strategy. Although tribute is paid to these recommendations in official statements, observers in war-torn countries remark that they have seldom been put into practice so far. One of the major recommendations relates to the necessity of adapting aid and its delivery to local circumstances and of involving domestic actors in the design and distribution of externally funded assistance, putting strong emphasis on the strengthening of local capabilities. This very simple and basic stance appears much more difficult to implement at the operational level. For it requires a major shift in long-established practices and mentality among donors and international agencies. Serious commitment and political leadership are vital.

Other recommendations warn against the risk of foreign aid crowding out local initiatives and institutions, taking over basic functions of weakened states and reinforcing aid dependency. For, in the medium term, foreign assistance can undermine or even replace local authorities in the provision of minimal welfare services, thus releasing the government from its social duties and freeing resources for military activities. The negative impact of external intervention on the domestic labor market has also been highlighted: the ever increasing number of foreign agencies and NGOs divert scarce domestic skills from the public and private sectors to their own activities and increase

the cost of skilled labor.

In the 1997 Guidelines on Peace, Conflict and Development Co-operation, OECD/DAC Members set the following priorities for post-conflict reconstruction:

- Restoring internal security and the rule of law, legitimizing state institutions, establishing the basis for broadly-based economic growth, and improving food security and social services. This may require reforming security forces and legal systems or helping establish completely new structures where the former are viewed as illegitimate by society.\(^{18}\)

As for the World Bank, post-conflict reconstruction aims to facilitate the transition from war to a sustainable peace, and to support economic and social development. This requires that

- A peacetime economy be rebuilt as soon as possible, and that state-society relations are restored at all levels (...). Assistance must focus on re-creating the conditions that will allow the private sector and institutions of civil society to resume commercial and productive activities.\(^{19}\)

Yet effective economic normalcy will not return before some degree of political normalcy has been restored. As long as this is not the case, large inflows of foreign money increase dependence on external assistance and may turn a post-conflict economy into what Gupta calls a “welfare junky.”\(^{20}\)

A Wider Perspective on Economic Rebuilding

\(^{18}\) OECD, DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 50.

\(^{19}\) World Bank, A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-conflict Reconstruction, 9-11.

The economic literature on war-torn countries often neglects or simply ignores fundamental questions that are either taken for granted, or do not fit into the prevailing paradigm. For instance, there is a tendency to study post-war countries only once – or as if – some sort of “normalcy” had returned. Economists generally take political stability for granted even if reality often contradicts this assumption. Epistemologically, neo-classical economic theory holds the socio-political environment constant and pursues the objective of optimum allocation of resources under the ceteris paribus assumption. But the fact is that economic reform and rebuilding efforts will be in vain if conflict flares up again. What is thus suggested here is that absolute priority should be given to political stability in the aftermath of civil war, even if this means sub-optimal economic efficiency:

The challenges of post-war rebuilding require a wider perspective than that of traditional economic analysis. We argue that it is necessary to integrate and focus on the following elements to improve our capacity to deal effectively with post-conflict rebuilding.

- The political economy of rebuilding contemporary post-conflict countries, particularly in low-income and low-middle-income countries, at different stages of democratization.
- The distributional impact of economic policies, notably fiscal and trade reforms. This would help to identify potential winners and losers of peace and to design alternative or compensatory measures as appropriate.
- The complex set of interactions between economic reforms, institutional settings and conflict. The cost of private enforcement of property rights can be prohibitive for individuals in the context of widespread insecurity. Further research on economic rebuilding based on New Institutional Economics would contribute to a better understanding of the impact of transaction costs and the particular institutional challenges related to post-conflict situations.

*The political economy of rebuilding*

Traditional economic theory assumes that private “egoistic” entrep-
neurs are driven by profit, while “benevolent” policy makers are seeking maximum public welfare. The “political economy” approach departs from this basic assumption and analyzes the demand and supply sides of economic policy, i.e. how individual preferences are defined, aggregated and channeled into political demands and how policy-maker preferences take shape accordingly. Political economy analysis thus adds an essential dimension to research on post-conflict rebuilding by placing post-war economic reforms in their political contexts. Under this approach, economic policy is viewed as the outcome of interactions among politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups within a set of institutional constraints.

Research on the political economy of reconstruction reveals that the will and capacity of a government to implement and manage economic reforms may be a requirement for success, but does not suffice after a conflict. For powerful domestic actors are often in a position to block reforms if they refuse to cooperate. Participation of domestic constituencies in policy dialogue has been singled out as essential to the success of peace-building and reconciliation processes. This directly relates to the debate on the merits and disadvantages of technocratic insulation for optimal economic policy design and implementation. While technocratic insulation has been praised in the case of East Asian economic “miracles,” it may revive tensions and be counterproductive in the case of war-torn countries. For it contradicts the main objectives of the transition from war to sustainable peace, i.e. (i) the establishment of institutional mechanisms to settle disputes; (ii) the creation of checks and balances on the exercise of power; and (iii) the promotion of a culture of dialogue between former warring parties.

Most researchers feel that reducing income and asset inequalities is of prime importance as it strongly contributes to lessening tensions and

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22 OECD, *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*.

strengthening political stability. One may however argue that post-conflict situations often require a more cautious approach. In specific circumstances, redistribution in favor of the poorest may provoke a violent backlash in the aftermath of a civil war: former combatants, impoverished middle class representatives, and members of the former economic elite are often politically more vocal than the poor. If they feel threatened by redistribution policies, they may defend their interests with unexpected violence. In other cases, those who hold large assets may agree to allow some fiscal redistribution to protect their own asset holdings against the risk of renewed violence in the long run. A fundamental challenge for policy makers is thus to accommodate pressing demands for more equity, while avoiding at the same time a resurgence of violence. To this end, distributional issues should not be confined to income gaps or differences in wealth only. In post-conflictual situations, inequality should be assessed in the much wider context of individual and collective power, coping strategies, rights and obligations, access to public services and privileges, etc.

Institutional and human resource challenges

Conventional economics have little to say about the process of institutional change, upon which relies much of the success of transition from war to lasting peace. The international community now tends to recognize that institutional (re)building is at least as important as the more obvious reconstruction of physical infrastructure.\(^\text{24}\) Rehabilitating institutions may even be more urgent than rebuilding physical infrastructure since their functioning is essential for the restoration of minimum confidence, stability and predictability without which any attempt to restart formal economic activities is likely to fail. This needs yet to be qualified: in countries affected by civil war such as Guatemala, institutions have been maintained during the conflict, but the problem is that they have lost legitimacy. The main challenge is

\(^{24}\) OECD, DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation; World Bank, A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-conflict Reconstruction.
then not to rebuild public institutions, but rather to restore citizens’ confidence in them.25

The New Institutional Economics (NIE) may provide theoretical and conceptual guidance to study this complex set of issues. In this approach, institutions are understood as defining and limiting the set of choices of individuals in the jargon of economists. They are the formal and informal “rules of the game” presiding over human interaction and exchange.26 They include all the rules that can constrain behavior in a certain field and create behavioral regularities, including firms, families, contracts, markets, social norms, etc. Kumar specifies that institutional infrastructure includes legal or customary rights defining ownership of private property, contracts and their enforcement, and rules and regulations governing business transactions. The basis of institutional infrastructure is the expectation that the interacting parties will fulfill their respective obligations.27

Discontinuous and violent changes are likely to appear when institutional contexts render it impossible for players to make new bargains or compromises, and cannot provide a suitable framework for evolutionary change. When parties to an exchange have no space in which to settle disputes, violence may be the only alternative. In the case of war-torn societies, institutions are usually weak or have simply collapsed. Uncertainty and risk often reach prohibitive levels. Reforming the security and judicial sectors and restoring confidence in them thus ranks among top priorities with a view to fostering sustainable economic activity.

Besides institutional weaknesses, human capacities often do not match the requirements of competing demands by different groups for


reconstruction in the aftermath of prolonged civil conflict. The public and private sectors are usually faced with a critical shortage of trained personnel as skilled employees have left the country or are lured away to take up better-paying jobs in international agencies. In addition, education and training institutions have probably decayed during the war. In some cases, the intelligentsia and leading sectors of the civil society have disappeared as a result of systematic persecution. Recent research conducted in Eritrea illustrates this well. It emphasizes the relative discrepancy between labor demand and supply:

Eritrea is in urgent need of skilled labor for rebuilding; yet, the necessary human resources are not available. This is due in part to the large number of skilled workers killed during the war. It is also due to emigration and the physical destruction of industry, which forced many people to look for work outside their area of expertise (…) Thousands of laid-off civil servants, demobilized combatants and returning refugees have all aggravated the situation, since many do not possess the skills now in demand in Eritrea’s expanding economy.28

Proposal for a Politico-Economic Framework

Recent contributions drawing on public choice theory and modern political economy are relevant for the study of post-war rebuilding in that they concentrate on politico-economic interactions. But they generally focus on the institutional settings of industrialized countries, i.e. full-fledged democracies. Therefore they do not offer a suitable framework for the study of contemporary war-torn countries, i.e. mainly low-income countries ruled by authoritarian governments. In these countries, popular discontent is usually channeled through mass protest and violent uprising rather than through electoral sanction, even if elections do formally take place. Governments tend to respond with a mix of violent repression in an attempt to suppress opposition and populist measures to muster support of key groups such as the security

Following these considerations, we present here the thrust of a politico-economic framework to analyze the relationships underlying economic policy and peace building. It originates in the pioneering work of Frey and Eichenberger on the political economy of stabilization programs in developing countries, as supplemented by empirical research on the political feasibility of adjustment programs conducted under the OECD Development Center.

The framework basically consists of two groups of variables: economic or political measures (policy instruments) and economic or political events. There are three decision-making entities: the government, the social groups and the external actors. The whole system is driven by relative prices: the attitude of social groups toward the government is determined by a cost-benefit evaluation and depends on the relative cost of support or opposition, which in turn hangs on the institutional framework. The same applies to the decision of the government to reward or repress given groups. The framework thus integrates politics into economic analysis. It focuses on the interactions between the economy, the polity and the main players at stake, i.e. domestic actors (government and interest groups) and external actors (the international community including donors, creditors, aid agencies and foreign investors). Figure 1 suggested by Frey and Eichenberger illustrates these basic interactions:

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Resources are generated by the economy flow to interest groups, and thus influence the polity through their impact on the survival probability of the government. The latter seeks to manipulate the economy in order first to remain in power, and second to improve its own welfare. Political instability in turn affects the economy. External actors primarily intervene with financial and technical support as well as conditions attached to it (conditionality). Governments are reacting to economic and political signals, which induce them to design and implement certain economic and political measures, depending on their utility function. These measures in turn affect the economy and the political situation.

Let’s now turn to the specific behavior of three major actors (i.e. the government, the social groups and the external actors) in post-conflict
settings. The primary objective of a government under attack is to retain enough support to stay in power. The second objective of a political elite is to increase personal income, wealth and prestige, all the more that the risk of being suddenly ousted out of office increases with political instability. We assume that the government uses political and economic instruments to maximize its utility. Economic policy decisions can be classified either as restrictive (and/or unpopular such as stabilization measures) or as expansionary (and/or popular such as bribes to muster support). Political instruments fall under two broad categories, i.e. repression and liberalization.

The government faces a clear trade-off between economic reforms that are unpopular in the short-run and expansionary economic measures that increase short-term support but may impact negatively on the economy in the longer run. When implementing restrictive economic measures, the government tends to repress the resulting troubles in order to remain in power. Yet, the government might cancel the reforms if popular discontent cannot be kept under control any longer with political instruments such as repression. The dilemma is particularly acute in the direct aftermath of a conflict: the government is under mounting pressure for economic reforms. At the same time, room for violent repression is drastically reduced and the restoration of a minimal level of political stability is a prerequisite for effective reconstruction.

The framework singles out whether a given economic or political measure is sensed by key social groups to affect their short-term interests in a positive or negative manner. Groups voice opposition through passive or active support to armed insurgency, upheavals, strikes, demonstrations and the like. During the peace-building process, the analysis should focus on the main groups shaping politico-economic interactions such as:

Motivations for retaining power may be purely egoistic but also ideological, political, religious, ethnic, etc.
• The military, para-military and police forces whose support is essential to both suppress opposition and maintain the government in power.

• Key executive branches which may have a disproportionate political weight such as the fiscal and customs authorities in charge of collecting government revenue, or essential service providers (health, electricity, transport).

• The private sector, which is often highly organized and disposes of powerful means to defend its interests. The private sector plays an ambiguous role: it can be a driving force for peace as well as for conflict. Entrepreneurs may be instrumental in pushing for the restoration of the rule of law and security as a prerequisite to restart their business. At the same time, they may also perpetuate a climate of insecurity and impunity to carry on illegal/informal activities or preserve rents generated during the conflict.

• Other groups that are less organized but may also wield great influence because of their considerable size (e.g. the poor and middle classes in urban centers).

External actors intervene with relief, financial and technical assistance, trade measures ranging from active import promotion to embargoes, foreign direct investment, etc. External assistance is usually conditioned upon a set of targets to be met by the recipient country, be they economic (e.g. reduction of the budget and balance-of-payment deficits, privatization, trade liberalization) or political (e.g. prosecution of human rights violators, democratization, downsizing of security forces, reduction of military expenditure). In recent years, the international financial institutions (IFIs) have come to recognize the need for specific guidelines with regard to their operations in conflict and post-war situations. In addition to traditional economic conditionality, they tend to look more and more at peace-related issues and have openly set political conditions in selected cases (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina).

The framework outlined here differs from traditional economic approaches by integrating political variables. It also differs from the standard politico-economic models in public choice in that it accounts
for the specific institutional settings of low-income countries at war, in particular with regard to the autocratic nature of political regimes and the violent means through which discontent is channeled. This framework permits the highlighting of the potential trade-off between economic reform and peace building, which may provide indications on how to avoid a resurgence of the conflict. Structural adjustment tends to affect the very groups that stand to lose from peace, as both processes imply an improvement in market efficiency and the suppression of rents. Stabilization measures may thus add on to the incentives to oppose the peace process and restart hostilities.

Concluding Remarks

Post-war countries face the immense task of (re)integrating into the global world economy. Peace being settled, they have to strive to become gradually able to compete effectively on world markets and promote their interests in the evolving economic and trading system. This is more arduous now than it was decades ago, as the process of world wide liberalization and technological progress has accelerated. While many war-torn societies have fallen prey to the internationalization of criminal and purely speculative activities, they are in a much more difficult situation to seize potential benefits from globalization.

Economic research on contemporary countries at war and post-conflict reconstruction is an extremely complex and somewhat novel area for scholars and practitioners alike. There is no blueprint or tool kit for rebuilding war-torn societies. The rationale and dynamics underlying each and every war-torn economy have to be clearly understood in designing appropriate responses. Rebuilding war-torn economies implies taking into account all the intertwined variables that may

31 This analytical framework is a promising basis to build econometric models that include variables of political violence and conflict intensity. Such a model is currently being tested in a country case study on Guatemala.
simultaneously interact with the consolidation of peace (e.g. economic, humanitarian, political, historical, religious, ethnic, environmental, etc.) as well as different types of interventions by local, national, regional and international actors. The challenges of economic rebuilding calls for multidisciplinary research that goes far beyond mere contributions from experts in different disciplines. It requires profound and structural multidisciplinarity as defined by the economist Paul Streeten, i.e. integrating the concepts, models and paradigms from one discipline into the analysis of another. The pressing and mounting requirements for global research on economies at war and post-conflict reconstruction provide an opportunity to make rapid progress in this direction.
Cooperative Security Structures of the Western World: Challenges to Western Security in the 21st Century

Introduction

The changes in 1989 transformed the European order and removed old certainties. It led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and, in its wake, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Germany was reunited and its government became a key player in pressing for closer integration and enlargement of the EU and NATO. The concept of neutrality also seemed less relevant, and a number of European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries seized the opportunity to join the EU. And yet the collapse of the old world order did not give rise to a clear way forward and a number of factors have conspired against the emergence of a common approach to the transformation of West European security structures. Firstly, the West Europeans lost their external federator – the Soviet Union. Secondly, they had to cope with a series of external crises, most notably the civil war in Yugoslavia and its consequences in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the invasion of Kuwait and the continuing challenge posed by Saddam Hussein to the international community. Thirdly, initially, at least, the US lost its way and thus deprived Europe of strong political leadership. Finally, in

responding to these challenges Western European leaders were not starting from a *tabula rasa* – and had to work within and through a dense network of international institutions. At the time it appeared that West European institutions had won the Cold War, and that supremacy of European values and institutions was assured, but answers to these questions now look premature as the millennium approaches.

To unravel the contradictions thrown up by the dramatic changes in 1989, this paper sets out three visions of the type of security challenges the West will face, and the prospects for future security co-operation in Europe. It will take an explicitly narrow definition of what is meant by western security institutions and will therefore focus on the European Union, the Atlantic Alliance and WEU, with occasional reference to OSCE and the UN. In analyzing the co-operative security structures it will set out three different views of developments: the neorealist, institutionalist and domestic perspectives. On the basis of current trends it goes on to explore the issue of how Western security institutions might adapt to future challenges. The argument of this paper is that at the end of this century, significant challenges to our security institutions are already evident. They are under pressure to adapt from two particular sources: firstly, the end of the Cold War has raised some fundamental questions concerning the roles of NATO and the EU and the relationship between these institutions. Secondly, the emergence of new threats to Western security has challenged old conceptions of what it is the West is trying to defend. The key argument is that in the absence of a clear and present threat to our vital interests, domestic issues might well present the greatest threat to a secure and stable future.

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2 For a further discussion of this see Forster/Niblett, “The West European Response to the Transformation of Europe.”

The Neorealist Vision: Back to the Future

For scholars working in the neorealist tradition the challenge of the next millennium is unchanged from previous centuries: it concerns the struggle for power and influence. To these scholars, states are cohesive unitary actors, which monopolize relations with the outside world and are the sole arbiters of the national interest. Above all they are motivated by a desire to preserve the centrality of states in international relations. Sovereignty is a key element of the realist and neorealist view, an indivisible commodity attributable to and vigorously defended by states.

It follows from this that the possibilities for cooperation are strictly limited. In this environment, military and defense matters take center stage, and meaningful collaboration is impossible. Only states have the capacity to inspire loyalty and make war, which is the source of their power. That said, some neorealists are a little more optimistic about the possibilities of collaboration. States are always in competition and limited cooperation may take place, but only if it improves the relative position of a state vis-à-vis another. However, vehement advocates of neorealism – John Mearsheimer perhaps the most vehement of all – argue that the anarchic international system is a dangerous one in which states will again have to rely on their own ability to defend themselves. For Mearsheimer, the Cold War which dominated the last

half of this century, and the superpower rivalry which was its hallmark, masked this fundamental point: that alliances, whether NATO or the EU (or the Nordic Council, OECD, Group of 7 or even the UN) were a means to pursue a state’s interests and nothing more. The key point in looking through the neorealist conceptual lens is that world order in the 21st Century will be dominated by economic and military force, where the possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary (if not a sufficient) condition for a peaceful world.

For Mearsheimer, the Cold War institutions of NATO and the EU would most likely be unable to cope with this reversion to type, and would therefore fail to adapt to security challenges in the last part of this decade and the coming century. Any temporary adaptation of these alliances would be dominated by the leading powers in them, Germany in the EU, and the United States in NATO. Other states would be relegated to pursuing balance of power politics in both organizations with a particular focus on the potentialities of a revanchist Germany. This view is not limited to American scholars on a far away continent. British academics such as Hedley Bull and even British government ministers have echoed many of these views. For example Nicholas Ridley perceived attempts to deepen integration – especially through a single currency – as “(...) a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe” and French policy since the fall of the Berlin wall “(...) poodling to the German’s (...)” views known to be shared by Mrs. Thatcher.8

Evidence for the re-emergence of balance of power politics abounds. Anne Deighton has argued that the end game of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations cannot be understood except in the context of Bonn’s demands for EU recognition of Croatia – perhaps, she argues, one of the most fatal of all decisions since 1989.9 Likewise Bernard Connolly

8 See the comments by Nicholas Ridley, quoted in The Spectator, 14 July 1990: 8. For Nigel Lawson’s comments on Thatcher’s crude anti-German sentiments see his The View from No. 11. London: Bantam Press, 1996, 923.

has argued that we should not be misled into thinking that Monetary Union is motivated by anything more than in-fighting between countries over power and control over a would-be single currency.\textsuperscript{10} For John Mearsheimer in the post Cold War World “(...) the prospects of a major crisis and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly.”\textsuperscript{11}

At the European level it is NATO which assumes pre-eminence as the important international institution. The neorealist assumptions explain demands for NATO to enlarge to Central and Eastern Europe as a policy inspired by the United States, which was at first hesitant and devoid of a plan, but since 1994 has been committed to pushing for NATO enlargement. American demands for Partnership for Peace and NATO enlargements were launched without significant consultation with its West European partners, and the latter initiative was principally shaped in Washington, Moscow and to some extent Bonn, which has become increasingly anxious about the security of its eastern frontier.

To neorealists the reasons why these developments have taken place are threefold: firstly, to fill the security vacuum left by the former Soviet Union; secondly, to exploit the weakness of Russia at a time and place when she cannot or is unable to respond; and thirdly, because the NATO alliance is dominated by the United States and its security interests, which are best served by NATO expansion. The French reaction to this was an attempt to displace American domination of the Atlantic Alliance with a French-led European force, and when this was unsuccessful, a renegotiation of better terms and conditions for France’s readmittance to NATO’s military organization.\textsuperscript{12} British advocates of an Atlantic-European treaty were seen by fellow Europeans in the context of a traditional reversion to balance of power.

\textsuperscript{10} Connolly, Bernard. \textit{The Rotten Heart of Europe}. London: Faber and Faber, 1995.

\textsuperscript{11} Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” 6.

politics, using American influence to counteract German-French economic and political collusion. It was also perceived in London as a price worth paying for continued American involvement in European security structures.

An important question is the link between the security and economic structures of Western Europe. For neorealists this can be answered in a straightforward way: the EU is a secondary organization shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War, subordinate to the Alliance military structure and ultimately responsive to American leadership. Remove NATO, the argument goes, and the EU would collapse because it is US hegemony that maintains the peaceful context for the EU to operate. In turn Germany dominates the EU, with the key issue for West European partners being how to tie down a unified and potentially aggressive state in the middle of Europe. For the French the decision to commit itself to the Euro is explainable by a traditional approach to European integration, namely a desire to harness Germany’s economic might to French goals. For the British the decision to avoid entanglements in a single currency while maintaining the role of the US in balancing French and German economic power also makes sense.

So what does a neorealist vision hold for Western security institutions? Firstly, this exposes a contradiction between American hegemony and European integration. The EU could only flourish in the context of the Cold War and the stable order it produced, but once these constraints were removed the future would be far more uncertain. In this view, at best the EU might survive as a subordinate organization; at worst the EU will grow steadily weaker, with the Maastricht treaty as the high water mark of integration. Secondly, the post–Cold War order will be characterized by competition between states using international institutions to pursue their national interests, with states setting strict limits for the redefinition of institutions and continued dependence on states for their longevity. In short, the future of Europe and its development will depend on security competition and on military power, particularly nuclear weapons, and peace dependent on Germany’s nuclear armament and the continued US military presence in Europe in order to maintain it.
Liberal Institutionalism: An Interdependent World?

A second and alternative view is put forward by institutionalist writers. They argue that the development of a set of Western economic and security institutions with widespread acceptance of the principles of liberal democracy have transformed international relations. Looking through this lens, security is no longer about military power and the pursuit of balance of power politics. The dynamics of integration lead to complex interdependence, a situation in which transnational links become so strong that the notion of a sovereign independent state becomes obsolete. Michael Howard has argued that one of the defining features of liberal democracies is that force was no longer considered a legitimate means to pursue political ends and war of diminished utility as an instrument of policy. In this model, the challenge is no longer the traditional one of territorial defense of national boundaries against the anti-democratic forces of the Soviet Union and its Central and East European allies. The democratization of these countries, the regular holding of elections to legitimize governments and their political decisions, has transformed the European security dilemma. The challenge to the West is therefore clear: that of cementing the changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Thereafter it is to move beyond a security regime to a security community, which can respond to non-military threats such as ethnic conflict, migration and environmental threats and the promotion of human rights, social justice and democracy. For these writers “(...) the most pressing and dangerous

challenge (...) is to take care of the losers in a global market economy.”

The argument from supporters of this view is that a web of Western international institutions can help. The Council of Europe enshrines the key “European” values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It can act as an important international reference point for embedding these fundamental rights in the new democracies. Likewise the OSCE can provide for external monitoring of elections and provide a framework for the democratic handling of minority issues as developments in Hungary and Poland demonstrate. These institutions can also provide a golden glide path to eventual membership of the EU, which is perceived by many as the core European institution.

However, for scholars looking through the liberal institutionalist lens there are still real problems to be addressed. In particular the difficulty is defining what political, security and economic conditions are set for applicant states. For some scholars the EU can afford to be generous. Ralf Dahrendorf has argued that the opportunity to enlarge the EU is historic and should take place at all costs – even if that puts EMU into doubt. Others are more skeptical of the capacity of the EU to adapt. For example Michael Smith has argued that the major weakness of the EU is that it has built up forces of inertia in responding to change. Above all EU governments are more committed to defending the status quo and the accrued advantages of existing intergovernmental bargains, than responding to external pressures with speculative and uncertain outcomes. Evidence of the negotiations of the Association Agreements suggest that when it came to the detail of supporting Central and Eastern countries, EU member states were extremely reluctant to incur

additional expense. More recently the debate concerning who might pay for enlargement and the extent of institutional reform suggests that painful choices lie ahead.

The signs therefore look ominous concerning EU enlargement since it will inevitably incur extra expense at a time when member states are tightening their budgets, not least to stay within the Maastricht convergence criteria, and anyway all the governments are keen to reduce their budget contributions to the EU. It will also throw up tricky questions about the internal organization of the EU. Should all member states be committed to exactly the same goals; should derogations be temporary or permanent; how can the CAP and Structural Funds survive another enlargement; and how should the decision-making mechanisms designed for six member states be changed to take into account an EU of twenty or twenty-five states? These are fundamental questions that are already testing the resolve of member states and the outcome of these debates will shape the future of the EU.

But democratization and the return to Europe is not just about the EU, and as Greece, Spain and Portugal understood, almost all Central and Eastern European states want to join NATO as well as the EU. The response of NATO has certainly been remarkable as it grappled with the loss of its principal enemy and the need to respond to strategic changes. It has evolved first with the change in strategic concept, then with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace, and finally agreement on a multi-phase enlargement to the east beginning with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. At an institutional level the challenge of the next century is to ensure that the two principal security organizations of Western Europe, NATO and the EU expand in partnership rather than competition.


Looking through the liberal institutionalist conceptual lens, the most fundamental issue is to resolve a dilemma concerning the relationship between defense and economics, "(...) who pays for what: the security transition to full participation in NATO, and for economic transition to full participation in the EU’s single market." William Wallace argues that unless European governments develop a coherent strategy towards Russia and accept that Western security institutions must adapt even more – rather than demanding that applicant states adapt to the existing institutions – they will fail, leading to a more unstable world than existed during the Cold War. At a regional level the challenge of the next century is to ensure that a military division of Europe is not replaced by "(...) an economically and politically strong EU, dominated by a unified Germany (...) including Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia and the newly independent Baltic states," without consideration for those left outside this grouping. This would shut out the remainder leaving them on the wrong side of an "economic iron curtain."

This raises a crucial point of leadership and burden sharing. The US might make its own military contribution to the Atlantic Alliance conditional upon the Europeans making a larger contribution both to their own defense and support of the United States outside Europe. The US has always viewed European politics and economics through the same lens, while for a variety of reasons the Europeans have separated the two. The US might therefore insist that EU enlargement is used as a consolation prize for those states not admitted to NATO in the first round of enlargement and in doing so again raise the link between security and economic structures: between leadership and followership.

21 Wallace, Opening the Door, 29.
For another leading scholar firmly looking through the liberal conceptual lens, it is cultural communities and religious identities which are becoming ever more important in international relations.\textsuperscript{24} Sam Huntington argues that those with similar civilizations are coming together and those with different civilizations are coming apart. To Huntington the challenge to Western security institutions is no longer a security dilemma but a “civilizational equivalent.”\textsuperscript{25} Firstly, there will be a challenge between Western Christendom – defined as the EU/EFTA countries and Hungary, Poland, Czechs, Slovenes and Croatians – against other civilizations immediately adjacent, particularly Muslim and African civilizations. Secondly, a wider threat may appear from outside Europe from other “non-Western” civilizations namely China, Japan, India, Egypt, Iran and Brazil.

Huntington’s conclusions are that the avoidance of major inter-civilizational wars requires core states to avoid intervention in the spheres of influence of other civilizations. His solution, as well as his analysis of these challenges, is unashamedly institutional. Firstly, people in all civilizations should search for and attempt to expand their own civilizational values and these institutions should be as inclusive as possible for those states that fall within the limits of a particular civilization. Secondly, there should be joint mediation in frontiers between civilizations. Huntington’s thesis therefore encourages the widening of Western civilization by the consolidation of Cold War institutions: both the EU and NATO should amalgamate and then expand to create an Atlantic Community\textsuperscript{26} but in its immediate region should take into account Russian security concerns. Elsewhere the West should recognize difference and avoid intervention and seek co-operative solutions in the wider world. There is therefore great variety in the specific


\textsuperscript{26} For a discussion of merging and then widening West European institutions see Kupchan, Charles, A. “Reviving the West.” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, May-June, 75, no. 3, (1996): 92-104.
solutions offered by liberal institutionalist writers, with a focus on the utility of institutions and the potential they offer. Overall however the distinction between them and neorealists is optimism rather than pessimism.

The Domestic Politics View: Isolationist World?

A third view of security challenges comes not from neorealist and institutionalist scholars, but from those who argue that domestic politics have once again become the dominant concern of governments and their citizens. On one level this is simply an assertion that without any clearly defined threats, European taxpayers are increasingly less likely to be willing to foot the bill for expensive military equipment. For example demands in almost all the Western states for a so-called “peace dividend” have been a major feature of the post–Cold War era. On another level the emergence of the post-modern state has had a two-fold effect. First, fragmented decision-making ensures that it is extremely difficult for governments to mobilize sufficient support for military action. Secondly, governments are losing their legitimacy and the ability to send troops into action without an overwhelming raison d’être. David Gress has argued that the real problem for Europe is the democratic, social, cultural and above all economic malaise “(...) that grips people of Western Europe (...), stagnation, the lack of energy and dynamism which penalize reward and innovation.”

In this scenario the dangers are threefold: firstly, that governments might want to take military action to preserve international order, but are unable to persuade the legislatures and citizens that force is either justified or necessary. Secondly, participating states in international security and economic institutions, are unwilling to pay the full price of

membership. Antagonism in the United States already expressed by Senator Helms, over the US contribution to the UN and NATO, but also evident in member states over the cost of EU membership and of enlargement, would lead to the death of international institutions by negligence or indifference. The contradiction is most acute in the case of Britain, which has been one of the leading exponents of EU enlargement and yet one of the most fierce in defending its budgetary rebate. But Britain is not alone, and given the size of Germany’s financial contribution to the EU, its claims for a reduction in its payments illustrate the scale of potential problems. The danger is even more acute when both NATO and the EU face enlargements that inevitably imply a significant financial cost to existing member states. The argument of these scholars is one of disintegration rather than integration: a failure of the elite to provide political leadership over institutional adaptation that will inevitably have short term financial costs, but might well provide significant political gains in terms of a stable and prosperous Europe in the medium term.

Conclusions

It is clear that the future pattern of Western security institutions depends upon the theoretical lens one looks through, what policy makers want to happen and of course events. Each lens has something to offer: neorealism shows the limits to the dense network of institutions and casts doubts over a blind faith in the mystical qualities of these institutions to deliver peace. It also points the torchlight on the limits of adaptation of institutions created in the circumstances of the Cold War. Institutionalists help shed light on the way in which Europe’s institutions can shape the behavior of states. Avoiding military conflict depends on a pattern of institutional co-operation – and the transformation of NATO and the EU and OSCE illustrate the potential of these institutions to strengthen and give confidence and security to states. Clearly a core issue is the relationship between domestic and international politics, and the final view reminds us that the future is
not solely dependent on the international structure of the state system, but is also dependent on domestic issues: the preferences of states, the capacity of political leaders to mobilize support for their particular view of the way forward, and above all the costs and benefits involved.

These three approaches shed light on five factors that will be important in shaping any future European security arrangements. Firstly, there are strategic constraints on any fundamental overhaul of security structures. The United States is not prepared to disengage from this region and inevitably this has limited Europe’s ability to take charge of its own security. Under American leadership, the Transatlantic Alliance has been at the forefront of adaptation: the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept clearly introduces flexibility in NATO military operations, permitting non-NATO members to participate in NATO-led activities and reconfirms the Alliance as the leading security organization in Western Europe. The failure of member states to develop a European defense capability directly inside the EU or indirectly through the WEU, in part reflects an unwillingness of most EU governments to challenge the primacy of NATO. Yet at the same time, the failure of France to fully reintegrate into NATO’s military structures and to work from the inside to Europeanize Alliance structures and parallel warnings from American government officials concerning the danger of autonomous defense structures, indicates the volatile nature of existing arrangements. The search for an acceptable institutional compromise will clearly be a major challenge for Western states.

Secondly, concerns about the overbearing economic and political influence of a unified Germany at the heart of an undivided Europe, still pose a challenge to West European countries in the 21st Century as they have in the 20th Century. These concerns limit the willingness of West Europeans – particularly France and Britain – to support a defense organization without an American presence to broker their differences. Concern about Germany also limits the scope for rapid and outward-looking reform of the European Union. It continues to encourage many West European policy-makers to think of post–Cold War European order in terms of containment and balance of power – although in the EU the means to achieve this are institutional, economic
and bureaucratic rather than military. The experience of nearly fifty years of European integration has yet to overcome this.

Thirdly, over the last seven years, the need to meet the convergence criteria for a single currency, and now the introduction of the Euro, have set new material constraints on what might be achieved. On the eve of the next century, West European electorates do not appear to be willing to pay for a more autonomous European defense identity, or for a rapid and inclusive enlargement of the EU to its Central and East European neighbors. Domestic preoccupations concern issues of low politics, issues of unemployment and the maintenance of generous welfare state provision from the cradle to the grave, rather than issues of high politics. Echoing these concerns, EU leaders held a special summit in November 1997 to address unemployment and to search for a “third way,” a European employment model which might balance social protection competitiveness and welfare provision. Jobs, not defense and enlargement, was its focus. Moreover, with thirteen out of fifteen governments of the EU from the center-left, a preoccupation with managing the tension between the need for job creation and the EU single currency looks set to further preoccupy EU leaders.

Fourthly, divergent national concepts about the preferred shape of the new European order have impeded and will continue to impede wholesale change. There is no shared conceptual vision among West European governments on security, on enlargement or on institutional evolution. This is compounded by a fifth factor. The inability of West European policy makers to agree on security reform is exacerbated by the bargains which already underpin West European security and integration. In the absence of a consensus about change, American leadership continues to fill the conceptual vacuum, with West European responses essentially reactive and shaped by pre-existing institutional arrangements and bargains.

From the vantage point of 1999, the introduction of the Euro might well provide the impetus for change. Should the Euro be successful, it may yet trigger the United States Congress to re-evaluate its benevolent support for closer European Integration and disproportionate financial and military investment in the Transatlantic Alliance. A successful Euro might in time also become the new rallying point for a group of
politically like-minded and economically homogenous West European states that are dedicated primarily to deepening their integration, and willing to re-examine the link between the security and economic structures of Europe. In the meantime, there will be no strategic vision for Western security and no radical transformation of its institutions. However, a central contradiction will remain, between the unwillingness of political leaders to adapt to institutions and the increasing difficulty of justifying the status quo to their electorates.
About the Authors

**Mustafa Aydin** is assistant professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University, Ankara, and visiting lecturer on Caucasian affairs at the NATO Defense College, Rome. He is the author of *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War* (1998), editor of *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century* (1998), and co-editor of the *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*.

**Jeffrey P. Bradford** is currently completing his doctorate, examining strategic decision-making techniques and defense policy formulation. He has had papers published in internationally recognized journals and contributed to the recent British Strategic Defence Review.

**Gilles Carbonnier** is principal economic adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross, Switzerland. His most recent publications include *Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy* (1998), written while the author was research associate with the War-torn Societies Project (UNRISD/PSIS) in Geneva.

**Richard A. Falkenrath** is an Assistant Professor of Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is the author and co-author of *Shaping Europe’s Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (1995), *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material* (1996), *America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack* (1998), and numerous journal articles and chapters of edited volumes. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Council on Germany, and the American Economic Association.

**Ann Fitz-Gerald** is a lecturer and doctoral candidate at the Royal Military College of Science, Cranfield University in Shrivenham, Wiltshire, UK where she teaches in the Department and Defence Management and Security Analysis. Prior to this, she spent three years
at NATO Headquarters in Brussels working in the Canadian Liaison Office in the External Relations Directorate. She holds degrees in Business, Political Science and War Studies from Queen’s University and the Royal Military College of Canada, both of which are in Kingston, Canada. Ann’s primary research interests includes the use of military force in contemporary conflict environments, nonstate actors and collapsed states, and the privatization of security.

**Anthony Forster** is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Nottingham and Professeur Invité, Institut Supérieur des affaires de défense, Université Panthéon Assas, (Université de Paris II). He has published widely on Britain’s relationship with the European Union and European defense and security issues. His most recent book is *Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations*, St. Antony’s/Macmillan, (1999).

**Elisabeth Hauschild** is a research fellow and teacher in the security studies and conflict research department at the Academy of the German Armed Forces for Information and Communication. She holds a Ph.D. in Natural Science and has contributed to technology studies for the Ministry of Defense. She is currently working on publications on information warfare and a threat analysis on biological weapons for the German Air Force.

**Sonia Lucarelli** is a research fellow at the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War in Florence. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the European University Institute (Florence). Her recent publications include “Germany’s Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia: an Institutionalist Perspective” (1997); “The Yugoslav Imbroglio” (1997); “A Case Study of Multi-Institutional Post-war Conflict Prevention: The Dayton Peace Agreement and its Implementation.” (1999).

**Carlo Masala** is Senior Academic Researcher at the Research Institute for Political Science and European Affairs at the University of Cologne. Among his recent publications are: “The Institutional Reform of the European Union under Debate” (1997), *Der Mittelmeerraum als Herausforderung für die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik* (together with Andreas Jacobs, 1998), “A German View of NATO’s Future Development” (1999), and “Der Weg der EU von Maastricht nach Amsterdam” (1999).
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Maree Reid has recently completed a postdoctoral fellowship at the Strategic and Defence Studies Center, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. While there, she authored, among other things, *The Shape of Things to Come: The US-Japan Security Relationship in the New Era* (1998). Her work on US foreign policy and diplomatic history has appeared in international journals and newspapers.

Gideon Rose is Deputy Director for National Security Studies and Olin Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He served as Associate Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council in 1994-95.

Kori Schake is a Senior Research Professor at the Institute for International Security Studies, and teaches at the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs in the US. She has previously worked as the NATO desk officer in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff and as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Requirements.

Astrid Scharf is a research assistant at the personal office of Germany’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in Bonn. Currently she is preparing her Ph.D. thesis on Spain’s foreign policy. Among her publications are: “Kooperation statt Integration – Frankreichs Rolle in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und der NATO”

Barna Zsigmond is currently working in private business after having returned from his postgraduate studies at Uppsala University, Sweden. He is also a Ph.D. student at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, where he writes about security policy and minority questions in Central Europe. He has published on minority law, constitutional law, and security policy.
Agendas of the New Faces Conferences
1997 and 1998

The conferences were organized by the Research Institute of the Ger-
man Society for Foreign Affairs and the Center for Security Studies
and Conflict Research of the ETH Zürich, supported by the Robert
Bosch Stiftung and the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

New Faces Conference 1997:
“Security Challenges of the 21st Century,”
5-9 October 1997,
Gustav-Stresemann-Institut, Bonn, Germany

5 October 1997: Arrival of Participants

20:00 Welcome and Opening Dinner

6 October 1997: I. Security among Nation States

9:00 Paper on Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation among States
by Margriet Drent, University of Groningen

10:45 Coffee Break

11:00 Paper on Cooperative Security Structures of the Western
World by Anthony Forster, University of Nottingham; com-
mented by Amaya Bloch-Lainé Uzzan and Henning Riecke
13:00  Lunch

14:30  Paper on the *Asia-Pacific: A Zone of Cooperative Security or a Hotbed for Conflicts?* by Maree Reid, Australian National University, Canberra; commented by Alexander Lukin and Jeannet-Susann Frössinger

16:00  Coffee Break

16:15  Paper on *Energy Security and the Middle East* by Gideon Rose, Council on Foreign Relations, New York; commented by Murat Erdogan and Brian Taylor

18:00  End of the Session

20:00  Dinner

21:00  Speech by Dr. Rose Gottemoeller, Deputy Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

7 October 1997: II. New Sources of Conflict

9:00  Paper on *Water Scarcity and Conflict* by Leif Ohlsson, University of Göteborg; commented by Edmond Mathon and Andreas Wenger

10:45  Coffee Break

11:00  Paper on *Demographic Pressure and Ecological Restraints: The Case of the Mediterranean* by Carlo Masala, University of Cologne, Köln; commented by Radoslava Stefanova and Ivo Samson

13:00  Lunch

14:30  Paper on *Demographic Pressure and Ecological Restraints: The Case of Russia and the CIS* by Stephan de Spiegelaire; commented by Urszula Pallasz

16:00  Coffee Break
16:15 Concluding Session. Introduction: Dr. Joachim Krause (DGAP) and Prof. Dr. Kurt Spillmann (ETHZ)
17:00 Free Time
18:00 Dinner

8 October 1997: III. Bus Trip to Brussels

8:00 Bus departs from the Gustav-Stresemann-Institut
11:00 Discussion with members of the International Staff at NATO Headquarters on The Future of NATO
13:00 Lunch at NATO Headquarters
15:00 Discussion with Fraser Cameron and other members of the staff of the European Commission, DG 1A on Common and Foreign Security Policy
17:00 Bus returns to Bonn
20:00 Farewell Dinner

9 October 1997: Participants leave
New Faces Conference 1998:
“Security Challenges in a Changing World,”
11-14 October 1998,
Hotel du Signal, Puidoux-Chexbres, Switzerland

11 October 1998

20:00 Joint dinner at the Hotel du Signal

12 October 1998

9:00 NATO Enlargement – Round One: paper on Problems and Prospects in Implementing the Initial Enlargement Round by Ann Fitz-Gerald, Cranfield University; commented by Petr Drulak

10:45 Coffee Break

11:15 NATO Enlargement – Round Two: paper on The Prospects and Problems for the Further Enlargement of NATO by Barna Zsigmond, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest; commented by Judith Battjes

13:00 Lunch

14:00 Regional Security Issues I: The Eastern Mediterranean. Paper on the Greek-Turkish Conflict and Cyprus by Claude Nicolet, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Zürich; paper on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process by Astrid Scharf, University of Bonn; commented by Krisztina Arató

15:45 Coffee Break
16:15  Regional Security Issues II: The Caspian Region. Paper on The Caspian Sea Problems by Elena Vicéns and on Regional Security Issues and Conflicts in the Caucasus and the Caspian by Mustafa Aydin, Department of International Relations, Ankara University

18:00  End of Session

20:00  Dinner

21:00  Speech by François Heisbourg on Security Challenges in a Changing World

13 October 1998

9:00  New Dimensions of Security I: paper on Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism by Richard Falkenrath, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; commented by Renatas Norkus

10:45  Coffee Break

11:15  New Dimensions of Security II: paper on Information Vulnerabilities by Jeffrey Bradford, Cranfield University; paper on Information and Modern Warfare by Elisabeth Hauschild, Akademie der Bundeswehr für Information und Kommunikation, Strausberg; commented by Burhanudeen Abdul Gafoor

13:00  Lunch

14:00  New Dimensions of Security Policy I: paper on Conflict Prevention in Post–Cold War Europe: Lack of Instruments or Lack of Will? by Sonia Lucarelli; commented by Rubén Amor

15:45  Coffee Break

18:00 End of Session

20:00 Dinner

21:00 Concluding Session

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**14 October 1998**

8:00 Bus trip to Geneva

9:30 Visit at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP)

10:15 Speech by the Director of UNIDIR, Dr. Patricia Lewis, on *The Conference on Disarmament: State and Perspectives of Multilateral Disarmament*

12:00 Lunch at the Cafeteria of the UN Headquarters

13:30 Tour through the UN Headquarters (Palais des Nations)

15:00 Tour through the ICRC-Museum
List of Participants at the New Faces Conferences 1997 and 1998

Chairmen

Dr. Joachim Krause; Deputy Director of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Bonn (Germany)

Dr. Bernhard May; Senior Research Fellow at the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Bonn (Germany)

Prof. Dr. Kurt R. Spillmann; Director of the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zürich (Switzerland)

List of Participants 1997

1. Bloch-Lainé Uzzan, Amaya; CREST, Paris (France)
2. Drent, Margriet; Center for European Security Studies, University of Groningen (Netherlands)
3. Erdogan, Murat; University of Hacettepe, Ankara (Turkey)
4. Forster, Anthony; University of Nottingham, Great Britain (UK)
5. Frössinger, Jeannet-Susann; Foreign Policy Department, Federal Headquarters of the Christian Democratic Party of Germany (Germany)
6. Lukin, Alexander (Russia); Oxford University, St. Anthony’s College (UK)
7. Masala, Carlo (Italy); University of Köln (Germany)
8. Mathon, Edmond (Netherlands, Brazil); College of Europe, Bruges (Belgium)
9. Ohlsson, Leif; University of Göteborg, Dept. for Peace and Development (Sweden)

10. Pallasz, Urszula; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw (Poland)

11. Reid, Maree; Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University, Canberra (Australia)

12. Riecke, Henning; Free University of Berlin, Center for Transatlantic Relations (Germany)

13. Rose, Gideon; Princeton University, currently Council on Foreign Relations, New York (USA)

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15. de Spiegelaire, Stephan (Belgium); WEU Institute, Paris (France)

16. Stefanova, Radoslava (Bulgaria); Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome (Italy)

17. Taylor, Brian; Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA (US)

18. Wenger, Andreas; Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Zürich (Switzerland)

Special guest:
Dr. Rose Gottemoeller, Deputy Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (UK)

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5. Bradford, Jeffrey; Cranfield University (UK)
6. Carbonnier, Gilles; War-torn Societies Project, UNRISD and PSIS, Geneva (Switzerland)
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13. Nicolet, Claude; Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zürich (Switzerland)
14. Norkus, Renatas; Foreign Ministry, Vilnius (Lithuania)
15. Schake, Kori; National Defense University, Washington (USA)
16. Scharf, Astrid; Bonn University (Germany)
17. Vicéns, Elena; Moscow (Russia)
18. Zsigmond, Barna; Ministry of Justice, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest (Hungary)

Special Guest:
François Heisbourg, former Senior Vice President (strategic development), MATRA hautes technologies, Paris (France)