Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives
Contents

Abbreviations 11
Preface 17

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 19

PART I
ACADEMIC VIEWS: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 33

Chapter 1
Introduction: The Debate on the Role of the UN in Modern International Relations 35
What is “Traditional” about “Traditional” UN Peacekeeping? 38
The Nature of Change in UN Field Operations 40
The Brahimi Report and the Problem of UN Reform 46
Conclusion: A More Effective Service Agency for the “International Community” 52

Chapter 2
The Development of Peacekeeping Forces by John Mackinlay 55
Introduction 55
The Traditional Peacekeeping Model 57
The New Conflict Environment 63
The International Response 68
Conclusion: Conceptualizing Complex Humanitarian Emergencies 71
Chapter 3
UN, OSCE and NATO: International Division of Labor in Peace Support Operations by Wolfgang Biermann

Introduction 75
Division of Labor in European Conflict Management in the 1990s 76
The Conceptual Challenge: Early De-Escalation of Conflict 79
The Division of Labor between NATO and UN during the Experimental Phase of UNPROFOR 84
Survey: Lessons Learned by Practitioners from an Unusual Division of Labor during UNPROFOR 88
The UN in Former Yugoslavia: Forgotten Successes 92
Conclusion 97

Chapter 4
Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations by Michael Pugh

Introduction 109
State-Centrism and Modern Conflict 112
Nationals, Internationals and Transnationals 117
Civilian Sector in Flux 121
Institutionalization of Civil-Military Cooperation 127
Conclusion: The Cosmopolitan Distance 130

PART II
PRACTITIONERS’ VIEWS: LESSONS LEARNED IN THE BALKANS 135

Chapter 5
A First-Hand Perspective from Kosovo by Bernard Kouchner

Introduction 137
Civil-Military Cooperation 138
Chapter 6
Lessons Learned as Commander KFOR in Kosovo
by Klaus Reinhardt

Introduction 147
Military Command and Politics 147
KFOR’s Assignment 150
Lessons from the Operation 152
Conclusion 154

Chapter 7
Humanitarian Aspects of International Peace Support Operations:
The Experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross
by Jakob Kellenberger

Introduction 157
The Nature of Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era 158
The International Community’s Response 159
The Balkan Wars and Conflict Management 160
The Militarization of Aid 164
The Development of Peace Support Operations and Lessons Learned by the ICRC 167
Conclusion 170

Chapter 8
International Stabilization and Peace Support:
What the European Union Can Contribute
by Leonidas A. Evangelidis

Introduction 173
The EU’s Future Role in International Crisis Management 173
The Need for Close International Cooperation in Peace-Building 176
NATO and the EU: an Essential Partnership 178
Conclusion 179
# Chapter 12
Training Soldiers for Peace Support Operations:
New Training Requirements and Switzerland’s Approach
by Bruno Rösli

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Military Skills</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Support Operations Requirements</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Swiss Approach</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About the Authors</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda of the Conference</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOS</td>
<td>Area of Separation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMKFOR</td>
<td>Commander KFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command, control, communications and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defense Capabilities Initiative (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (now Macedonia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAC</td>
<td>Interim Administrative Council (Kosovo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFY</td>
<td>International Conference on Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMTF</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Task Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTC</td>
<td>Kosovo Transitional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDU</td>
<td>Military-Civil Disaster Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>UN Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTA</td>
<td>Military technical agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, biological, chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non commissioned officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NGO Non-governmental organization
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization of African Unity
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHR Office of the High Representative
OUNC UN Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ UN Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL UN Observer Mission in El Salvador
ONUVEN UN Observer Mission for the Verification of the Electoral Process in Nicaragua
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP Partnership for Peace
PR Public relations
PSO Peace Support Operations
PTSD Post-traumatic stress disorder
ROE Rules of engagement
SADC Southern African Development Community
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SG/HR Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union/High Representative Common Foreign and Security Policy
SFOR Stabilization Force (NATO)
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SWISSCOY Swiss Company (Kosovo)
TCN Troop Contributing Nations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCPMB</td>
<td>Liberation Army of Presheva, Medvegja, and Bujanoc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCK</td>
<td>Ushtrisë çllirimtare të Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>UN Mission in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>UN Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>UN Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>UN Preventive Deployment Force (Macedonia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN Protection Force (Former Yugoslavia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSF</td>
<td>UN Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>UN Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTEA</td>
<td>UN Temporary Executive Authority (West New Guinea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

The end of the Cold War changed the peacekeeping environment in fundamental ways, and it also affected the international community’s way of reacting to crises. It highlighted the necessity for managing new types of conflicts in alternative ways. Major players like the UN, EU and NATO were forced to adapt to new circumstances and to reconsider their roles in conflict settlement. Moreover, cooperation between the various international actors has been transformed by their experience with peace support operations in the 1990s. Debates about “first”, “second” and “third” generations of peacekeeping, about “robust” or “wider” peacekeeping, and about the latest concept of peace support operations by NATO mirror the difficulties in conceptualizing and in adapting to the new situation.

This book addresses the experience made with international peace support after the end of the Cold War, particularly during the difficult years of the war in the Balkans, and it discusses the lessons to be drawn in order to improve future operations. International experts analyze the major changes in peace support operations, and they discuss the various problems of cooperation between international organizations and between civilians and the military. The book presents viewpoints of academics and practitioners with actual experience in the field.

The contributions were presented at a conference on Peace Support Operations – Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives, organized in February 2001 by the Center for International Studies (CIS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Over 270 participants from 28 countries took part, representing scholars and policymakers with different types of experience in peace support operations. They took stock of their experience in the 1990s, discussed “lessons learned” and drew conclusions about future peace support operations.

It may surprise that a conference on peace support operations should take place in Switzerland, a country that, so far, has not been a major contributor to international efforts of this kind. However, the Swiss
approach to world affairs is gradually changing. Hence, one essential purpose of the conference was to inform the Swiss public comprehensively about peace support operations. A referendum on the question of arming Swiss troops stationed abroad, voted on in June 2001, made this seem particularly important.

The editors want to thank all participants for contributing to the success of this conference, and they express their particular gratitude to the contributors of this volume. Furthermore, they are aware of the generous material and moral support granted by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Swiss Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports. Thanks also go to Yvonne Rosteck and Markus Mäder for the organization of the conference.

Yvonne Rosteck merits special mentioning for the superb job she did in editing and managing the publication of this volume. Additional thanks go to Miriam Mason Martineau, Christopher Findlay, Daniel Möckli and Marco Zanoli for their help with the manuscript.

The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editors.

Zurich, October 2001.

Prof. Kurt R. Spillmann
Prof. Thomas Bernauer
Prof. Jürg M. Gabriel
Prof. Andreas Wenger

Center for International Studies (CIS) Zurich
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich
General Introduction
The post-Cold War world has witnessed a sharp increase in the number of international operations to secure peace. Peace support operations (PSO) have become an essential instrument for the international community in responding to crisis and stabilizing conflict areas. In dealing with the increase of intra-state and ethnically motivated conflicts after the collapse of the bipolar system, the international actors soon had to learn that traditional concepts of peacekeeping were no longer applicable as the nature of conflict had changed. In the course of the many difficult operations that took place in the 1990s to ensure peace in troubled regions, previous peacekeeping doctrines were challenged. The new conflict environments were much more complex and necessitated different approaches to cover a wider range of tasks. Peace support operations at the end of the 20th century thus forced the actors involved to adapt to the new circumstances and to further develop their concepts of PSO, a process that is not completed yet.

About this book

The work presented in this volume deals with the experiences made during international PSO in the 1990s and the consequences that are to be drawn from these experiences. Particular attention is given to the war in the Balkans. The authors take stock of the lessons learned and give an outlook on the future of PSO by combining the views of academics and practitioners. The main recurring threads refer to the evolution of PSO and the actors’ adaptation to the new realities, the international division of labor and civil-military cooperation in PSO. The purpose of the book is to deepen our understanding of PSO by examining the successes and shortcomings of recent operations in order to better prepare for future contingencies.

The book focuses on the following questions:

- In what ways has the new conflict environment changed the character of PSO? How did individual actors adapt to the changing nature of conflict?
• What lessons can be drawn as far as international cooperation is concerned? How should an appropriate international division of labor be designed?

• How should tasks be shared between civilian and military actors in order to satisfy new and complex requirements?

Distinguished international experts present their views on these topics. The book, which is based on a conference that took place in Zurich in February 2001, offers a compilation of articles with different approaches to the subject, including new conceptual studies by renowned academics and contributions by practitioners providing a first-hand perspective of their experiences in the field. It is intended to complement the multitude of individual case studies that characterize the extant literature on PSO. While identifying essential issues, the book does not claim to give a comprehensive overview on PSO. As PSO have been strongly influenced by the experiences in the Balkans, there is a special focus on this region. For a more thorough and comprehensive study, it would have been necessary to study a wide range of missions in other parts of the world, and the views of other relevant actors such as the OSCE or NGOs would have had to be included. However, this would have been beyond the scope of the conference. Although no two peace support missions are exactly the same, and though their only common characteristic may be their complexity, the sum of the individual experiences presented here allows the reader to arrive at generally valid conclusions. Recurrent elements and a common tenor can be identified in all contributions.

Key themes of international peace support operations

*The evolution of peace support operations*

An examination of how PSO evolved reveals the changed context in which the operations take place today, and shows how the international actors have adapted to these new circumstances. One central question
is whether peace support missions as conducted in the 1990s were an appropriate response to the emergencies encountered, and whether the international community’s approach was dominated by traditional concepts that might have been adequate for the Cold War situation but not for the post-Cold War world.

The Cold War model of peacekeeping required a mandate by the UN Security Council and the consent of the warring parties. The aim of peacekeeping operations was to supervise cease-fires; from thence came the important principles of complete impartiality and of restricting the use of force to self-defense. With the end of the Cold War, a new kind of intervention emerged. It soon became clear that traditional UN peacekeeping would not be able to respond appropriately to the new types of conflict. The new conflict environment was determined by the absence of clear geographical front lines and by the involvement of various highly violent armed groups. Genocide and ethnic cleansing caused a high number of civilian victims. As cease-fires or the signing of peace agreements did not bring an end to violence, a more comprehensive approach to peace was needed. The use of force became inevitable, but the UN did not have the means to enforce peace. The Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 can be considered the turning point in the shift from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement: the agreement led to the UNPROFOR mission being replaced by the multinational military implementation force IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. IFOR was established under the command of NATO and with the UN’s authorization. It was given robust rules of engagement for its mission, including the use of force as necessary.

The main characteristic of the new generation of PSO is that they can be carried out by armed forces even without the consent of the warring parties in order to enforce peace and restore international security. As such, they ensure a comprehensive approach as laid out by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace. The Agenda calls for mandates that allow the use of peace-enforcement units and that encompass civilian and executive tasks. While traditional peacekeeping is based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which encourages nations to settle disputes peacefully, PSO mandates are usually based on Chapter VII, which also allows the use
of armed forces to restore peace. NATO’s military engagement in the Balkans is an example of this new type of “Chapter VII operation.” The blurred distinction between Chapter VI peacekeeping and peace-enforcement based on Chapter VII reflects the complexity of this new generation of operations in regional conflicts that threaten international peace and security in a globalized world.

The concept of PSO was introduced by NATO to describe today’s complex missions and reflects the envisaged integrated approach involving political, military and humanitarian action. NATO defines PSO as “multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate. They include peacekeeping and peace-enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace-building and humanitarian operations.”

There are three fundamental reasons why PSO have become increasingly complex. The first reason refers to the nature of intra-state conflicts: While traditional peacekeeping took place between states, and not within states, PSO are implemented in failed or disintegrated states and in conflicts where genocide and ethnic cleansing occur. Also, more parties are usually involved in conflicts today. These include actors at the local, regional and international levels that may not have an interest in ending the conflict because they stand to gain from a war in terms of power and material profit. Second, PSO have to cover a broad spectrum of tasks that ranges from military to political, economic, social and humanitarian measures. Third, the activities of many external players such as governmental, non-governmental, national, transnational and international organizations need to be coordinated and integrated into a cooperative strategy. In particular, the cooperation between civilian and military components is becoming increasingly important in view of the wide range of tasks.

The complex nature of PSO means that cooperation among the various actors is rendered very difficult. Obviously, there is a need for a single

---

and integrated strategy if a PSO is to be successful, but in most cases this is not achieved. The articles presented in this book show that no coordinated plan was prepared in any of the cases under examination; rather, there were various parallel efforts based on different approaches and perceptions as to the necessary measures. In the worst case, this can even lead to competition among the actors. PSO still need to be developed further. The most essential requirement is to improve coordination and cooperation among the actors, which is why the experiences made in past operations have to be thoroughly evaluated.

Looking at the evolution of PSO, their complexity and the changed environment in which they take place, one may well ask if the actors are able to adapt to the new environment and to deal with its complexity. The UN, the EU and NATO have carried out some internal reforms regarding their performance in PSO:

Since 1989, a multitude of international PSOs have been established under the auspices of the UN or other organizations with a UN mandate; some of these missions have been more successful than others. The UN has repeatedly failed to meet the challenges it was confronted with because it lacked adequate management and resources to meet the sharp increase in the number of peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report, published by the UN in 2000, is an important step towards reforming UN peacekeeping. The report proposes a vision of a more effective UN and encourages member states to provide political, personnel, material and financial support to UN peacekeeping missions. In this context, it is necessary to analyze whether these reform efforts by the UN are sufficient and how likely it is that they will be implemented.

Regional security institutions like the EU and NATO have likewise reacted to the growing international instability and reviewed their prevention and security doctrines. In the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU revised its common foreign and security policy and provided the EU with new instruments, including both military and civilian capabilities. The Petersberg tasks as formulated by the Western European Union (WEU) were integrated into the European common security and defense policy. These tasks include humanitarian and rescue measures as well as peacekeeping and combat missions in crisis management.
They allow the EU to respond autonomously to international crises, and their inclusion also implies that the EU can initiate and pursue PSOs on its own responsibility. NATO has introduced the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces which led to the creation of multinational, multi-service deployable task forces assembled and tailored primarily for military operations not involving the defense of NATO territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. Furthermore, the European component was strengthened in the context of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) debate and the Defense Capabilities Initiative was designed in order to improve NATO’s military capabilities.

*International division of labor in PSO*

Today’s complex PSO require the coordination and management of a wide range of actors and instruments in order to be successful. As this collection of articles shows, international coordination and cooperation between various international organizations has been insufficient so far. The question of an appropriate international division of labor between the various actors is much debated. International cooperation to the extent required for PSO sometimes seems unattainable in view of the complex environment they take place in: Close cooperation is required of all actors involved, as well as an appropriate combination of instruments, while leaving room for the divergent views and different approaches to achieving a common goal. Thus, an integrated strategy that does not exclude heterogeneity is required. As some comments on the Balkan experiences show, unity of policy seems to be an essential prerequisite for the success of an operation. Several analyses in this book deal with the question of how a cooperative strategy could be designed.
Civil-military cooperation

Within the framework of international cooperation, the cooperation between military and civilian actors has particular importance. To stabilize conflict areas and to ensure a secure environment for civilian actors to work in, a military presence is an essential prerequisite. Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the immediate consequences of conflicts and the needs of the victims of war is equally important. Cooperation between the military and civilian components in PSO is not unproblematic. The relationship between the two is characterized by a wide variety of activities and perceptions as well as an overlap in functions. A certain degree of asymmetry can be detected, with a dominance of the military sector. On the part of the civilian actors, there are clear efforts to distance themselves from military operations, as they are afraid of losing their integrity and credibility if linked with them. On the other hand, the military sector is overloaded with tasks as it also performs humanitarian work. What is the best approach to civil-military cooperation in the context of modern conflict situations? How should tasks be distributed, and should the military perform humanitarian tasks? How can a distinction be drawn in order to avoid an overlap in tasks?

Different aspects of PSO

The book is divided into three parts: Part I deals with academic views on general theoretical questions of PSO. Part II presents the views of practitioners, that is the views of representatives of international organizations and of experts with experience in PSO in the Balkans. Part III lays out specific national views of PSO, focusing on military aspects. Drawing on the experiences of Austria and Switzerland, this section implicitly deals with the restricted maneuvering space that neutral countries have as a result of the new conflict environments in which PSO take place.
The first two articles in Part I deal with the shift from traditional “Cold War peacekeeping” to complex PSO in an altered conflict environment. They show clearly that the process of adaptation is still not complete. The other two articles concentrate on the subject of cooperation, on the one hand between the different international organizations, and on the other hand between civilian and military actors.

Mats Berdal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London focuses on the role of the UN in peace support operations. He analyzes the experiences with UN peacekeeping in the 1990s and the lessons to be drawn from them concerning the possibilities and limitations of UN action. Furthermore, he examines the reform of the organization’s peacekeeping efforts as set out in the Brahimi Report, and discusses the likelihood of the report’s findings being implemented. He draws attention to the fact that peacekeeping has its limitations and is not always the appropriate response to the challenges at hand when the necessary conditions for peacekeeping are not given. He further addresses the role of the UN in crises where peacekeeping is not an option.

John Mackinlay of the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College in London assesses the impact of the Cold War experience on PSO of the post-Cold War era. He introduces the model of complex humanitarian emergencies to explain why the international community has repeatedly failed to respond appropriately and successfully to these emergencies and has only been able to contain the problems. Mackinlay draws attention to the role of warlords in modern conflicts. The most important issue for him is the basis on which nations intervene in conflicts. Is it in order to prevent the breakup of a failing state, or to accelerate the state’s disintegration, eventually resulting in more instability?

In assessing the international division of labor in conflict management, Wolfgang Biermann of the German Social Democratic Party’s international policy department focuses on the cooperation between the UN and NATO during the deployment of the United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). Drawing on the findings of a survey conducted among practitioners in the field, he outlines the mission’s shortcomings and successes. The general emphasis of his
article is on the importance of unity of policy among all organizations involved in a PSO. He presents the model of de-escalation as a cooperative and inclusive approach that should be the primary goal of the international community in any attempt to halt the escalation of violent conflict.

The problems of cooperation between external military and civilian actors in conflict environments are the subject of Michael Pugh’s contribution. The director of the Plymouth International Studies Centre notes that although civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is becoming institutionalized, there is still confusion over identity and roles; overlaps and convergences between civilian and military actors preclude an effective CIMIC. Since modern conflicts below state level require non-statist approaches, Pugh emphasizes the importance of the civilian sector in performing humanitarian tasks. He focuses on obstacles to coordinated and integrated responses to complex emergencies. These can often be traced back to an asymmetrical institutionalization of CIMIC that challenges the civilian sector.

The abovementioned problems and questions are taken up again in the second part of the book. Representatives of main actors like the UN, NATO, the EU and the ICRC present lessons learned from peace support operations, particularly in the Balkans.

Cooperation is the essential element of day-by-day field operations in support of peace. This is evident from the first-hand accounts given by Bernard Kouchner and Klaus Reinhardt of their missions in Kosovo. They show how cooperation between civilian and military actors, between UN and NATO, was achieved in an environment of conflict where the government had ceased to function and the basic needs of civil society were not provided. Bernard Kouchner, former head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), gives an impressive account of the multitude of tasks his organization had to perform in a chaotic environment. He shows that each mission has its own specific characteristics, and that the lessons of one mission cannot be transferred wholesale to another, although certain basic elements are required for the success of every operation. UNMIK was confronted with a completely new situation and was not adequately
prepared for the enormous tasks it had to perform. In this situation, the presence and support of KFOR was an important key to the success of the operation. *Klaus Reinhardt*, former Commander KFOR, emphasizes the positive experiences in cooperating with civilian partners in a situation where KFOR had to accomplish two kinds of tasks: to assume military leadership and to participate in the decision-making process at the political level. In order to avoid rivalries between military and civilian actors, and in order to define areas of responsibility, the closest possible cooperation had to be sought. In conclusion, Reinhardt outlines the practical consequences to be drawn from the Kosovo experience by the military.

The integrated approach of PSO poses a challenge to humanitarian organizations. The dividing line between political-military and humanitarian action has become blurred, giving way to the notion of a militarization of humanitarian aid. *Jakob Kellenberger*, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), uses the Balkan wars as an example to describe the challenge his organization is confronted with. For the ICRC, this challenge consists in keeping its added-value, its sense of identity, its operational independence and impartiality, while, at the same time, being a predictable and reliable co-actor in PSO. Kellenberger outlines the ICRC’s attempts to walk this tightrope.

Civilian and military crisis management capabilities are an important component of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) developed by the EU in the 1990s. Ambassador *Leonidas Evangelidis* points to the essential importance of political will for the success of PSO. In strengthening ESDP, the EU has stated its political will to engage actively in conflict prevention. The former director-general for common foreign and security policy at the Council of the European Union emphasizes the importance of close international cooperation to address future challenges, and describes the EU’s relationship with the UN and to NATO in this respect.

*James Appathurai* of the NATO Political Affairs Division presents NATO’s views and experiences with PSO in the Balkans, experiences that have fundamentally transformed the organization. While Bosnia-
Herzegovina was a lesson in Transatlantic cooperation and also in cooperation with non-NATO countries and civilian actors, the Kosovo operation exposed the deficiencies within NATO itself. Appathurai describes how the Balkan crisis has been a catalyst for necessary change, not only for NATO but also for Euro-Atlantic security policy as a whole.

The third part of the book concentrates on military aspects of PSO, in particular on the problems neutral countries encounter. By definition, neutral countries cannot participate in the full range of PSO activities. The question is whether such restrictions do justice to the complex conflict environment and to the requirements of the soldiers’ safety. Authors from two neutral countries present their views on this subject. Despite their neutrality, Austria and Switzerland take part in international peace initiatives as a form of international burden sharing and in order to prevent external conflicts from affecting their own countries. The three contributions on the Austrian and Swiss involvement in PSO show how different the engagement of neutral states can be. While Austria has a long tradition in peacekeeping, Switzerland is a relative newcomer. Both countries are confronted with fundamental questions: How deeply can a neutral country become involved in PSO? Should national contingents be armed or not? Is participation in peace enforcement compatible with neutrality? In Switzerland, this is a highly contentious subject as the country changed its legal framework in 2001 to be able to contribute more substantially to international efforts to secure peace in the future. The Austrian engagement in PSO is of particular interest for Switzerland. What problems and challenges has Austria faced in the past?

Günther Greindl, the Austrian military representative to the EU and to NATO, describes how the requirements of the new conflict environment have changed Austria’s policy concerning PSO. As a neutral country, Austria has so far taken part in peace support missions without agreeing to the use of force in all instances. A comprehensive strategy of conflict resolution is, however, required nowadays and the credibility of peacekeeping forces demands the capability to enforce a mission. Austria has therefore made the necessary legal adjustments; with the Treaty of Amsterdam, Austria has the legal right to take part in
peace-enforcement within the framework of the Petersberg tasks. Greindl further outlines lessons learned by Austria in recent operations regarding the military aspects and the cooperation with international organizations and nations contributing contingents.

In Switzerland, the questions of whether and to what extent a neutral country should become involved in international PSO remain highly debated. Bruno Lezzi, editor for security and defense policy at the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, shows the difficulties Swiss troops were confronted with while performing unarmed logistical missions in yellow berets and Swisscoy missions. It becomes clear that unarmed participation of Swiss contingents is not commensurate with the realities in the field and is impractical in everyday work. He focuses on the necessary changes Switzerland has to make in order to contribute constructively to PSO. The referendum of June 2001, which saw the adoption of the partial revision of the Military Act allowing the arming of Swiss contingents, while peace-enforcement operations remain excluded, is a significant step to a more substantial Swiss contribution to UN- and OSCE-mandated peacekeeping operations.

The importance of this change in the Swiss approach is underlined by Bruno Rösl's contribution. The head of the Division for Peacekeeping Operations at the Swiss Ministry of Defense emphasizes the need for well-trained and skilled soldiers with improved battle readiness in PSO. He outlines the new training requirements and the implications that the restrictions on the Swiss participation in PSO have for the training of the Swiss contingents. Attention is also given to how the lessons learned make their way into the training syllabus.

The editors hope that this compilation of articles contributes to a better understanding of the complex nature of PSO and that the authors’ findings and recommendations will receive consideration among policymakers in future operations.
Part I
Academic Views:
Conceptual Frameworks
of Peace Support Operations
By the autumn of 1995 there was a widespread sense among students and observers of UN affairs that the organization had become irreparably damaged by a succession of catastrophic “peacekeeping” failures. Few were those who, in the aftermath of events in Rwanda and Bosnia, still envisaged a major role for the organization in international security, let alone one at the hub of what George Bush in 1991 had bravely, if foolishly, described as a “new world order.” And yet, by the time of the UN’s much-heralded “Millennium” festivities, the future of its field operations was again a lively subject of discussion among member states, as well as within the organization. After a period of retrenchment, the number of soldiers and civilians serving under the UN flag had by the end of the decade again climbed above the Cold War average, though it remained (and remains) well short of the peak level of just below 80,000 reached in late 1993.1

1 In 1991 some 10,000 peacekeepers were deployed on various missions around the world. After scaling down its activities in the mid-90s, large-scale deployments to Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone had by 2000 resulted in a surge to 38,000 peacekeepers. The UN’s budget for peacekeeping operations, amounting to some $1 billion in 1991, rose to an all-time high of nearly $4 billion in 1993. Projections for 2000 were for a budget of $2.8 billion, again a very high number by historical standards. For further details see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm.
This time around, however, the painful memories of 1993–95 ensured that the renewed growth of UN involvement was accompanied by more critical and searching questions: was the UN Secretariat equipped to deal with increasingly complex missions? Did the UN need a new “doctrine” for its activities? Could it not, perhaps, more usefully seek to delegate jobs to regional bodies? Some of these questions were directly stimulated by the launch of several new missions. The interposition of peacekeepers between Eritrean and Ethiopian forces in July 2000 suggested a return to more “traditional” and, hopefully, more manageable forms of peacekeeping. The deployment of a large UN contingent to Sierra Leone the previous autumn, however, had revived memories and rekindled fears about the humiliating experiences of the early 1990s. So did the continuing debate about deploying troops and civilians officers into the Democratic Republic of Congo (henceforth DRC), a country, or rather a piece of territory, roughly two-thirds the size of Western Europe, rich in natural resources, and strewn with a myriad of foreign armies and rebel groups.

Further evidence that the debate on the UN’s role in the field of peace and security was far from over came in March 2000, when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed a Panel on UN Peace Operations. Chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, a former foreign minister of Algeria with a distinguished record of service for the UN, the Panel was asked to “undertake a thorough review of UN peace and security activities.” Published in August 2000, the Brahimi Report, as it soon came to be known, amounted to, and was partly intended to serve as, a kind of stocktaking and prospectus of UN efforts in the field of security since the end of the Cold War. Its implicit assumption was that the UN had, in the course of its first 45 years, developed a tried and tested system of field operations encapsulated in the term “peacekeeping.” Both the theory and practice of UN peacekeeping, however, had been called into question by contextual and normative developments since the late 1980s. At one level, therefore, the Brahimi Report was posing

---

the question, if only implicitly, of whether “traditional” peacekeeping still had a future.

This paper argues that this question is of limited value on its own, as it conceals assumptions that on closer scrutiny need qualification. In view of the continuing debate about the UN’s activities and, indeed, its continuing engagement in the field, three sets of questions, not easily separable, seem more appropriate:

• What is meant by “traditional” or “classical” UN peacekeeping, and how appropriate a term is it to describe the Cold War experience of UN field operations?

• In what ways did the practice of UN peacekeeping evolve in the 1990s, and what lessons should one draw from this experience about the possibilities and limitations of UN action in the field of security?

• Is the UN Secretariat up to the task of mounting, sustaining and providing executive direction of contemporary peacekeeping operations, and, more specifically, how likely is the Brahimi Report to result in meaningful improvements in this respect?

It may be objected that none of these questions are very original or, even worse, that they are lacking in imagination at a time when the organization badly needs to be both bold and forward-looking. Yet, the answers given to questions about the challenges facing the UN have too often been informed by what one wishes to see happen, rather than by a careful analysis of what actually happens on the ground and within the UN when the organization does become involved. As will be argued, an attempt to answer the aforementioned questions dispassionately, resisting the tendency to blur aspiration and analysis, offers a more promising starting-point for thinking about the future role of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security.
What is “Traditional” about “Traditional” UN Peacekeeping?

United Nations peacekeeping crystallized during the Cold War as a technique to control violence by means other than enforcement or counter-violence. As a form of third party involvement geared towards preventing the outbreak or resurgence of violence between parties to a conflict, it came to be governed by three interwoven principles: host-party consent, minimum use of force and impartiality as the determinant of operational activity. Together these principles gave UN peacekeeping operations an expressly non-threatening and impartial character. In the field this translated into relatively small and light military deployments, consisting in the main of infantry units drawn from a number of countries and possessing only a limited defensive capability. Not surprisingly, a careful survey of UN operations during the Cold War reveals that there was a great deal of variation among them, and it would be difficult and somewhat artificial to single out any one operation as constituting an “absolute” ideal against which others can be measured. Levels of consent and perceptions of impartiality have varied, as indeed have the interpretations and applications of “minimum force.” Thus, while the principles of consent, minimum use of force and impartiality have been key to the comparative success of individual missions, the essence of peacekeeping as a class of operations lies in the fact, as Alan James observes, that it is an activity of a “secondary kind.” That is to say, peacekeeping “is dependent, in respect of both its origin and its success, on the wishes and policies of others.” It is, in short, a form of outside international assistance designed to ‘buy time’ by stabilizing a military situation in the interests of pursuing and, hopefully, reaching a political settlement to the conflict at hand.

3 Compare and contrast, for example, the experience of the UN Disengagement Observer Mission on the Golan from 1974 to the present, and the first phase of deployment for the troubled UN Force in Lebanon from 1978 to 1982. See:
   • http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/undof/undof_body.htm;

These seemingly labored distinctions do draw attention to realities that are sometimes lost when the whole gamut of UN field operations is lumped together under broad and ill-defined categories such as “peace support” or even just “peace operations.” In particular, they remind us that the ambitions of peacekeeping are modest and that there are real limits to how far the concept can be pressed beyond its essential meaning. This is not to suggest that member states’ level of ambition in addressing conflict, or even of using force to that end, should necessarily be scaled back. Indeed, there is a common confusion among many observers of the UN scene that leads them to dismiss any reference to “traditional” peacekeeping, including an examination of its basic purposes and functions, as somehow evidence of being out of touch with new realities. In fact, drawing attention to the aforementioned distinctions is deeply relevant to the present context. It makes it clear that for peacekeeping to be effective, certain minimum conditions must be met, and these flow directly from its basic character as an activity of a “secondary kind.” As will be argued further on, to conceive of peacekeeping in these terms – that is, as essentially a “secondary” kind of activity – is not to exclude its potential for further growth and/or adaptation to new and challenging circumstances. Yet, it also means – and this is perhaps the chief lesson to be learned from UN operations in the 1990s – that to deploy peacekeepers to situations where peacekeeping is inappropriate may, in the long run, turn out to be catastrophically counterproductive.

Making the judgment – for it remains, ultimately, a matter of judgment – as to whether or not a peacekeeping force, or “traditional” peacekeeping, is appropriate to a given set of circumstances depends, in large part, on an assessment of the environment into which a prospective force will be deployed. And, as a general trend, this environment has changed in important ways over the past ten years. The inevitable follow-up question is whether the UN itself has adapted to these changes and whether it is up to the task of modern peacekeeping.
The Nature of Change in UN Field Operations

A common starting point for discussions about the UN’s “post-Cold War” activities has been to identify two developments that together have defined the context of those activities: first, conflict in the international system is increasingly of a “sub-state” or intra-state character, and second, the normative climate of international relations has shifted towards a greater concern for issues of human rights broadly conceived. Both these propositions contain relevant cores of truth. Yet, as pieces of empirical observation they require qualification. Nor do they, on their own, explain how the character of UN field operations has changed.

The Post-Cold War Context: Elements of Continuity and Change

It is commonplace, not least in UN reports, to stress the increased incidence of “internal,” “intra-state,” or “civil” conflict as a particular feature of the post-Cold War era.5 While it is certainly the case that the UN has become much more deeply involved in conflicts of this kind, the view that we now live in an era of “intra-state” as distinct from “inter-state” conflict is too simplistic.

In the first place, civil wars are hardly post-Cold War phenomena. Indeed, a thoughtful study of the international regulation of civil wars published in 1972 was premised on the view that in the “modern international system ‘aggression’ in the classical sense – attacks across recognized frontiers – has become an increasingly rare phenomenon.”6 The period since 1945, the work concluded, had seen a “rapid increase

---


6 Luard, Evan, ed. The International Regulation of Civil Wars. London: Thames and Hudson, 1972.
in the number of civil conflicts.” 7 Although quintessentially a “state-centric” organization, the UN also became deeply drawn into some of these conflicts, most notably in Congo between 1960 and 1964. At the same time, just as it would be empirically unsustainable to characterize civil wars as “new” phenomena, so the recent post-Cold War past suggests that it might be too soon to relegate conflict between states to the dust-heap of history. Major armed conflict between India and Pakistan, Eritrea and Ethiopia, as well as serious tensions between Iran and Afghanistan or Burma and Thailand all suggest otherwise. But these examples also point to a more serious difficulty with the blanket assertion that internal conflict is now the order of the day: on closer inspection the very distinction between “civil” and “international” conflict becomes blurred and hard to maintain. In several of those cases where the UN became deeply involved in the 1990s, conflicts had internal as well as international dimensions. The wars of Yugoslavia’s succession cannot be easily be pigeonholed into either category, nor is it possible to analyze the war in the DRC and the agony of Sierra Leone outside their respective Central and West African contexts. The argument presented here is not that nothing much has changed but rather that elements of continuity as well as discontinuity mark the “post-Cold War” world of the UN.

The second contextual change alluded to above is of a normative kind. Both in word and deed the “international community” has taken a growing interest in matters that previously would have been deemed to fall essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. The growing emphasis in international forums on issues of “good governance,” human rights and democratization all reflect this trend, as do more specific initiatives and events, including the creation of ad hoc war crime tribunals and the manner in which the use of military force has

7 Ibid., 7.
increasingly come to be justified on humanitarian grounds.\textsuperscript{8} The trend is far from unambiguous, however, and it most certainly has not over-
ridden interest-based calculations on the part of governments in the for-
mulation of their external policies. Whether or not a “right” of human-
itarian intervention has emerged remains deeply contested.

Yet, as far as understanding the evolution of UN field operations over
the past decade, this shift in normative priorities, however ambiguous,
has been significant for two reasons. First, it explains the increasing
involvement of the organization in “internal” conflicts (allowing for the
aforementioned limitations inherent in describing any conflict as purely “internal”). And, second, it provides an important background to
the increased complexity of many individual missions. Terms such as
“multi-dimensional” or “multifaceted” peacekeeping are meant to con-
vey the sense that UN peacekeepers now work more routinely along-
side other actors (including specialized UN agencies, NGOs and other
civilian agencies) and, above all, that they have taken on new tasks that
reflect a heightened level of ambition. This expanded range of tasks has
come to include:

- Electoral support, ranging from limited observation (“Follow and
  Report”) to the organization and conducting of entire electoral
  processes (e.g., ONUVEN in Nicaragua, UNTAG in Namibia, UN-
  TAC in Cambodia and ONUMOZ in Mozambique).

- Repatriation and the temporary protection of refugees/displaced
  persons, and assistance in humanitarian relief activities (UNPRO-
  FOR in former Yugoslavia and UNTAC in Cambodia).

- Observation and verification of compliance with basic human rights
  standards and commitments (ONUSAL in El Salvador, UNTAC in
  Cambodia and UNMIH in Haiti).

\textsuperscript{8} For a better sense of the extent to which current Secretary-General Kofi Annan has
himself embraced this normative agenda and made it his own, see the collection
of his statements put together by the UN’s Department of Public Information
in \textit{The Question of Intervention – Statements by the Secretary-General}. New York:
UN DPI, 1999. For a survey of the way humanitarian issues have come to be used
as grounds for military intervention, see Roberts, Adam. “Humanitarian Issues
and Agencies as Triggers for International Military Action.” In \textit{Civilians in War}, ed.
Preventive deployments (UNPREDEP in Macedonia).

The separation of armed forces (including paramilitary, private and irregular units), their demobilization, and the collection, custody and destruction of weapons (attempted with only partial success in Central America, Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique).

The Need for the UN to Prioritize its Efforts and Activities

How, then, does this expansion of tasks and the wider trends they reflect relate to the previous discussion of “traditional” peacekeeping and its future? Undoubtedly, these tasks, and the volatile environment in which they are often pursued, have posed some unfamiliar challenges to the UN. In this context, the need for more “robust” forces, improved logistics and better command and control arrangements, have often, and rightly, been highlighted as urgent requirements. Yet, at the end of the day, the key question regarding the role of UN military personnel on the ground remains whether or not they are operating in a “secondary” or “primary” capacity; that is, whether they are deployed to assist others in resolving a conflict or whether they themselves are there to enforce a particular outcome on disputants. This choice dictates radically different requirements, both political and operational. The expanded set of tasks, albeit new and more demanding, can be viewed as an extension of “traditional” peacekeeping, because they remain, in essence, activities of a “secondary kind.” As such, they should be welcomed as evidence of functional adaptation on the part of the UN to a new international environment. They should also be welcomed because, although much less commented upon than the UN’s failures, some of these tasks have been carried out with comparative success, suggesting, in turn, a capacity for learning and innovation on the part of the organization.

Perhaps the most striking example of this is the effectiveness, acquired through trial and error, with which the UN’s Electoral Assistance Division (established in the Department of Political Affairs in April 1992) now routinely assists in the organization of elections around the world. Another area of adaptation, reflecting new normative priorities
and the UN’s increasing involvement in internal conflicts, has been efforts to integrate human rights monitoring and training into its field operations. In places such as Nicaragua, El Salvador and Haiti, years of civil conflict were accompanied by widespread human rights violations. The creation and the workings of outside bodies, such as the UN Mission for Guatemala (MINUGUA) in September 1994 and the human rights components of ONUSAL in El Salvador, represented important advances in UN practice and a serious attempt to address the legacy of war and repression. Yet another example of functional adaptation is provided by UN efforts, so far very limited, at “preventive” action. In December 1992 the UN Security Council authorized the preventive deployment of a Nordic battalion in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia along the border with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The objective of the force, which was later reinforced by a contingent of US troops, was to report on “developments which could pose a threat to Macedonia” and “by its presence … deter such threats from any source.” It was the first and so far only deployment of its kind, even though the concept of deploying multinational military forces in a preventive mode – that is, to prevent tensions from escalating to the level of violent conflict – has long been advocated.

Some important implications flow from this analysis. First, for the UN to engage in operations of this kind, a measure of consent for the UN’s presence will still be required, and difficult judgments will have to be made as to whether a given deployment scenario merits a consent-based approach. The Brahimi Report is right to call on the UN Secretariat “not to apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behaviour.”

The 1990s suggests that this advice should be directed with even greater force to governments and troops-contributors who have again


and again sought to apply the “peacekeeping treatment,” believing it to be cheaper and less risky, to situations where it was clearly not appropriate. It is highly questionable, for example, whether the promise of cooperation extended under the Lome Accord by the parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone was a solid foundation on which to base a UN peacekeeping operation. The fact that no easy alternatives or options were available at the time does not detract from the basic point that UN peacekeeping, as an instrument or choice of involvement, has inherent limitations.

This raises a second issue. Where the “peacekeeping treatment” is not an option, should the UN be prepared to consider enforcement action? Although the arguments in favor of creating a permanent UN force capable of enforcement as well as peacekeeping are still occasionally voiced, the entire experience of post-Cold War “peace operations” points to the conclusion that the UN is not a suitable instrument for military enforcement. For some very basic political and resource-related reasons, this reality is unlikely to change in the near future. The Security Council should, of course, continue to play its proper role in authorizing and legitimizing military action, but the UN itself is fundamentally ill equipped to launch and direct such operations.

In short, the argument presented here is that the UN should concentrate its efforts on consent-based activities that include the expanded range of tasks outlined above. A clearer sense of priorities is not in itself, however, any guarantee of success.
The *Brahimi Report* and the Problem of UN Reform

**The Limits of Self-Criticism**

A willingness to engage in self-criticism is the starting-point for substantive reform of any institution. By this measure, the UN has made real progress since the mid-1990s, and the *Brahimi Report* is itself an acknowledgement of the fact that the organizational set-up for UN field operations is deficient. The most notable and, indeed, the most impressive exercise in UN soul-searching in recent years, however, was the investigation, released in November 1999, of the circumstances surrounding the fall of the so-called “safe area” of Srebrenica in Bosnia in July 1995. Authored by David Harland and Salman Ahmed, both UN officials, the report details the sequence of events leading up to the collapse of the “safe-areas” regime in Bosnia. Although it balances its criticism of the UN with that of member states, especially the Security Council, its final conclusion is unambiguous: the UN, “through error, misjudgment and an inability to recognize the scope of evil confronting [it], [had] failed to do [its] part to help save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder.” The real strength of the report lies in its sheer thoroughness and in its readiness to present facts in an unvarnished form even though these might be disturbing and uncomfortable for the organization. Indeed, one half-suspects that the seriousness with which Harland and Ahmed approached and completed their assignment rather forced the hand of the UN senior management with respect to the question of just how far to go in terms of airing the linen of self-criticism in public. As it turned out, the report was well received. Moreover, as a piece of analysis and documentation, it was far more impressive than a similarly-intended study on the UN’s role in the events leading up to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, even though

13 While both authors were duly commended for their work, the advisability of publishing the full report and all its details was certainly discussed.
that report had been drawn up by a panel of “outsiders.” Still, both reports suggested that the UN was prepared to examine its own performance critically. Together they formed the background to Kofi Annan’s decision to commission a review of UN peace operations and to include in that review a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations. This was the mandate given to Lakhdar Brahimi and the members of his panel.

The report issued by the Brahimi Panel on the eve of the organization’s millennium celebrations is a UN report. As such, any assessment of its content, quality, and likely fate should bear three, more general, considerations in mind.

As with most UN reports of this kind, there is a ritualistic quality to some of its recommendations. Security Council mandates, for example, should be “clear, credible and achievable,” and “clarity” is needed “for operations that will deploy into dangerous circumstances.” This, of course, is uncontroversial, although it no doubt needs to be stated again. The history of UN operations in the 1990s, however, suggests that it is precisely in “dangerous circumstances” that member states prefer to leave mandates unclear and not dwell too much on what is achievable. Agreeing to a mandate at all can be quite enough. As the Brahimi Report emphasizes, however, there often is a terrible price to pay later for fudges of this kind, which, of course, is also the devastating subtext of the “Srebrenica report.” Whether or not member states take heed is another matter. A discouraging indication that they might not was provided by the United States and its permanent representative at the time, Richard Holbrooke, in January 2000. While holding the presidency of the Security Council, the United States appeared to be pressing for the dispatch of a small force to the DRC (some 5000 is small by the standards of the DRC) in circumstances that, as far as the problems likely to be encountered on the ground were concerned, were


not dissimilar from those of Bosnia in mid-1993: an ill-defined mandate promising “protection” to civilians in the midst of an ongoing war, with little evidence of political settlement in sight, let alone a strategy of how to get there.

Secondly, as pieces of analysis, UN documents suffer from the fact that they often inherit, and then have to struggle with, categories that might make sense in the abstract but quickly dissolve when set against realities on the ground. Thus, ever since Boutros Boutros-Ghali published his *Agenda for Peace* in 1992, discussions about the UN’s role in peace and security has been pigeon-holed into such categories as “preventive diplomacy,” “peacemaking,” “peace-keeping,” and “post-conflict peace-building.” There may be sound bureaucratic reasons for this, but it imposes a certain artificiality into discussions, which in turn feeds into debates about practical reform (witness the never-ending and disruptive tensions between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs about who should be doing what, when and where). In one of several follow-up meetings designed to assist in the implementation of the *Brahimi Report*, one session ended up with the rather curious title “conflict prevention in the conflict phase.” The discussion that followed was predictably muddled.

Finally, and closely related to the previous consideration, bureaucratic sensitivities and context provide, to a greater and lesser extent, unspoken parameters for reports of this kind. The degree to which these can be transcended in the interests of better and more dispassionate analysis depends in part on who is chairing the panel. In this respect, the stature and standing of Brahimi himself has undoubtedly lent credibility to the report. Yet, there are issues, as will be argued, that have been left largely unexplored.

---


Implementing the Brahimi Report

Mindful of these considerations, the Brahimi Report does represent a serious and commendable effort at taking stock and pointing the way forward. It contains potentially important innovative elements, including, in particular, a call for the creation of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF), drawing on personnel seconded from throughout the UN system, as the “standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support.”\(^\text{18}\) It also makes useful suggestions as to how those field activities in which the UN has become increasingly involved, most notably civilian policing, can be more effectively supported from the headquarters and in the field. Many of its other recommendations – such as those dealing with the important but tedious issue of streamlining UN procurement procedures – will be familiar to students of UN reform. Indeed, it is striking how many of the issues identified by the panel are ones that have long since been highlighted as requiring attention. This is something for which the panelists cannot be faulted. But it does suggest that, beyond some of the innovative solutions alluded to above, the real value of the report lies in its galvanizing potential and its explicit recognition of the need for change. What, then, is the likelihood that some of its specific recommendations will be implemented?

Embracing change will require the support of member states and the UN Secretariat, and it is a mistake to assume that only the former will pose problems. Spearheaded by Britain and other “like-minded” nations, a concerted campaign to “sell” the report was launched soon after its publication. The reaction, however, from the Group of 77, a grouping broadly representing the interests and views of the developing world, has been distinctly cool from the outset. The reasons are familiar ones: the report is seen as pushing a “Western” agenda with recommendations that undermine the sanctity of the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference by states in the internal affairs of other states.

Some even detected a smell of conspiracy in the expression ‘peace operations,’ suspecting that its mere use would somehow open gates to the much feared ‘humanitarian intervention’ in small countries at the behest of powerful states.  

Countries such as India also assert that the report, although it is not entirely clear why this should be the case, relegates the issues of economic and social development to a secondary status within the UN system. While the scale of resistance from this quarter was surprising to some, it should be possible to bridge differences on specific issues for, as Brahimi himself points out perceptively, “the uneasiness felt … and the reservations expressed were not so much a rejection of this or that recommendation, as it reflected a profound dissatisfaction with the state of international relations.” While this is a real issue, countries such as India and Egypt, both regular troop-contributors to UN operations, have in the past been prepared to address the kind of technical or practical issues thrown up by the report. If it can be shown that it is in their interest to do so, developing countries will be prepared to support reform.

Much less attention, however, has been given to what is potentially a more serious source of resistance: from within the UN itself. Indeed, some panelists privately view this to be a more difficult hurdle to overcome. An indication of this is already evident in the fact that the report does not tackle head on some of the more striking problems of headquarters management of field operations (though an attempt is made to address them indirectly). One of these problems was alluded to above and merits further comment, both in its own right and as an illustration of the wider challenge of UN reform. It concerns the issue of departmental coordination and executive direction of field operations.

The efficient management and direction of UN operations require effective horizontal integration within the Secretariat, that is, using simpler and less technical jargon, proper cooperation and coordination.
among the key departments, offices and divisions involved in various aspects of UN field activities. The increasing complexity of UN missions discussed above has placed a much higher premium on the achievement of such integration. The two key departments involved are the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).21 On paper, the division of labor between them is clear-cut. The DPA is described as the “political arm” of the Secretary-General, the DPKO as his “operational arm ... for the day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations.”22 By their very nature, however, peacekeeping operations encompass overlapping political, military and humanitarian components, and it is not possible to separate the “political” and “operational” aspects of a mission from each other. Within a bureaucratic structure such as the UN, this contrived allocation of functional responsibilities makes effective decision-making particularly contingent on close working relationships between departmental heads and officers further down the hierarchy. In practice, of course, such a division is entirely artificial and can, as field officers will attest to, create confusion, poor communication and lack of proper support on the ground. When, added to this, the departments themselves, especially the DPKO, are fiercely protective of their turf rather than trying to overcome artificial bureaucratic divisions, the problems only mount. An exchange of ill-tempered memos in late January 2000, drawn up by the heads of each department and submitted through the Deputy Secretary General, Louise Fréchette, painted a picture of fairly acute tension.23 According to some sources, the Brahimi Panel was restricted in what it could do in this matter. Yet, its

21 Others are the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Department of Management.


23 In short, the DPKO claimed that the existing system of appointing a “lead agency” was working perfectly well, a claim denied by the DPA, which pointed to a number of examples showing it clearly was not. Private interviews, UN HQ New York.
call for the creation of Integrated Mission Task Forces, and the identification of this as one of its more important recommendations, shows an awareness of the problem. Whether this will address the problem remains unclear, especially since all previous efforts to encourage horizontal integration — e.g., by designating “lead agencies” or setting up “high level” inter-departmental working groups — have been, at most, only moderately successful.24

Conclusion: A More Effective Service Agency for the “International Community”

The importance of dwelling on UN reform flows from my earlier argument that the UN should concentrate its efforts on consent-based operations or activities of a “secondary kind.” The past record suggests that member states are less likely to interfere, distort and constrain UN efforts when its activities fall within this category. This view accepts, and indeed rests on, Inis Claude’s typically perceptive conclusion to a paper that he wrote in the early 1990s at a time when it was hoped that a system of “collective security,” with the UN at its center, would emerge after the Cold War. The “major value of a resurgent world organization,” Claude maintained, “can be expected to derive not from increased power to coerce states but from expanded usefulness to states.”25 Recognizing this, he suggested further, the UN should concentrate on “developing its potential as a central service agency” for the member states.26

And yet, this should not be construed as an abdication of responsibilities on the part of the UN or as a scaling down of its ambitions. For one

24 My own sense, after speaking to and encountering senior staff in both departments in April 2001, is that very little progress has been made.


26 Ibid., 270.
thing, operations of the kind listed above also present major organizational and logistical challenges. More importantly, concentrating on the UN’s potential as a central service agency means concentrating on those areas where the organization is likely to be most effective. As illustrated earlier, these areas are also where the UN has demonstrated a capacity for innovation and effectiveness.27 Whether or not member states will actually turn to the UN as a “service agency” will depend on a range of factors, not all of them related to whether or not the UN is the most qualified body to take on a particular task. There was, for example, no reason why the organization of elections in Bosnia in the period after the Dayton Accord could not have been entrusted to the UN and its Electoral Assistance Division. For political reasons, however, the Clinton administration insisted that elections had to be organized and run by the OSCE.28 What is clear is that the UN’s capacity for adaptation, learning and reform will determine whether it is a serious candidate for certain kinds of missions. As of June 2000, the Brahimi Panel counted 41 requests from member states for assistance from the UN’s Electoral Assistance Division. The record of its performance since its creation in 1992 undoubtedly provides part of the explanation for this surge in the demand for its services. There is no a priori reason for supposing that the UN is not capable providing better service to member states in other areas. There are very good reasons, however, for member states to support these efforts.


28 Hence the joke at the time that the OSCE really stood for the Organization to Secure Clinton’s Election!
Introduction

Peacekeeping forces are reactive. They are not instruments for invasion, conquest or strategic defense. Peacekeeping doctrine is also reactive. It reflects the security needs of a particular environment, but it does not set out to change it. During the Cold War, there was an element of certainty about the strategic environment. For 40 years, the massive continental forces which opposed each other along the inner-German border recognized each other as enemies and refined the procedures for their mutual destruction. The nuclear balance and the pervasive nature of the Soviet-American confrontation imposed a form of intellectual stagnation on the world’s most powerful armies. Innovation and new doctrine were led more by technology than by dynamic thinking. During this period, peacekeeping developed under the same constraints of the static but potentially dangerous military confrontation that fomented the Soviet-American rivalry. The armies that participated in peacekeeping were drawn mainly from non-NATO and non-Warsaw Pact nations, so that two separate military communities co-existed in the same strategic environment: the diminutive peacekeeping forces on the buffer zones of the Eastern Mediterranean and the larger armies in central Europe. The doctrines of peacekeeping were first articulated in the 1950s and changed very little during the remainder of the Cold War. Just as the military staff of the major armies enjoyed the comfortable sterility of the Cold War routines, peacekeeping forces were also restricted by the same pressures. In this barren period of intellectual development, the peacekeepers and academics who wrote about peace-
These developed over a number of years from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s and are articulated clearly in Ramsbotham, Oliver and Tom Woodhouse. *Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations*. Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 1999, xi.

The speed of these developments surprised defense analysts. In 1989–93, when the sudden and visible manifestations of a major strategic change took place, the majority of military staff and defense academics were still caught in the thrall of the nuclear balance. Because the peacekeeping community existed separately, few mainstream defense thinkers had much intuitive knowledge or previous interest in peacekeeping. Nevertheless, in the years that followed, the tiny stream of publications assessing traditional peacekeeping operations expanded to a cataract of analysis on the problems of responding to the military/humanitarian contingencies of the post-Cold War period. A new community of born-again peacekeeping enthusiasts transferred their professional interests from the theories of nuclear warfare to the more immediate emergencies of the post-Cold War. Much of this scrutiny was reactive, however, narrowly assessing each contingency as it arose, without much intuition of where the doctrine had come from, the trauma of its metamorphosis from traditional peacekeeping, and its
sudden elevation from the tranquil buffer zones to the center-stage of global emergencies.

This paper takes a perspective view of these changes, and emphasizes the cultural shock of moving swiftly from the humble Cold War origins to the larger, more muscular military coalitions that deployed to the Balkans and beyond. It assesses the impact of the Cold War experience on the operations of the post-Cold War, when so many of the essential doctrinal principles of peacekeeping were seriously challenged or completely overturned. Two models emerge. The Cold War experience is characterized by the model of “traditional peacekeeping.” The post-Cold War model is still under development, it describes a multifunctional response to a complex emergency. This second model has no universally accepted name. “Coalition forces” describe only the military element, but, in reality, there is now also a large and essential civil element in every international intervention. The comparison of the two models conveys the suddenness of the change from traditional forces to the multifunctional response. It also shows that its speed and intensity have outstripped our ability to conceptualize what has happened and design an effective response to the continuing emergencies of a new strategic era.

The Traditional Peacekeeping Model

“Traditional peacekeeping” forces emerged as the most important experience during the period from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s. Nevertheless, during this period, the UN was also engaged in contingencies that did not conform to the model of “traditional peacekeeping.” From 1950 to 1953, UN forces deployed to Korea to take part in a muscular, war-fighting campaign against the North Koreans. From 1960 to 1964, a powerful force of UN troops deployed to the Congo as part of ONUC, the United Nations Operation in the Congo,

authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 143. Initially, 15,000 troops deployed, but this number increased to 18,500 by 1961. The strength and configuration of the Congo force indicated that it expected to have a militarily challenging task and to have more than just a symbolic presence. The ONUC operation was therefore “peace enforcement” and involved UN troops in maintaining local security as well as enforcing law and order.3 In 1962 a United Nations Security Force (UNSF) deployed to West Irian to monitor a cease-fire between Indonesia and forces of the Netherlands, and to support a transfer of power from the colonial regime to the Indonesians. The UN operation in West New Guinea (West Irian) was therefore a “transfer of power” operation which required UN troops to support a UN interim administration, the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), as well as maintaining law and order while the host nation’s police and security forces became established.4

After the Cold War, some academics and military doctrine writers felt that these experiences somehow were sufficiently lodged in the institutional memory of the peacekeeping community to prepare it for the contingencies of the 1990s. There was nothing new, they claimed, about the emergencies in the Balkans and Somalia, and the internal security challenges faced by UNTAC in Cambodia in the early 1990s. The UN had seen it all before.5 The problem with this approach was that, besides being a backward-looking prescription for what turned out to be an era of intensive change, none of the peacekeepers who “had

---


seen it all before” was still around 30 years later to give the peacekeeping community the benefit of their experience. Institutionally, the UN’s involvement in Korea, Congo and West Irian had passed out of the system without leaving a mark or legacy on its doctrine. The passage of time had ensured the retirement of all UN staff who took part. In the case of the Congo, there was also much rancour among the new members of the General Assembly who saw ONUC as a clumsy, colonial-style, intervention into the domestic affairs of an emerging state.

Major General Indar Rikhye, force commander in West Irian and later the military adviser to the UN Secretary-General, stressed that this animosity, together with the UN’s inability in the 1970s to capture its own operational lessons and create doctrine, ensured that nothing of these operations survived in the UN’s institutional memory.6 The UN may have seen it all before, but by the 1990s, there was nothing left of this knowledge which could have prepared it for the onslaught of the new strategic era.

What did survive from the Cold War period was traditional peacekeeping. In a Security Council divided by bipolar rivalry during the Cold War, the deployment of peacekeeping forces allowed the United Nations to engage in conflict containment. To avoid confronting superpower interests, peacekeepers were constrained in their operations. The gradual acceptance of the concept of neutral interpositional forces by the international community gave the peacekeepers, working between opposing armies, a recognized immunity. In its initial manifestation, “peacekeeping” had no commonly accepted definition. The term was misapplied outside the UN context to describe non-UN multinational and unilateral interventions, as well as UN operations that did not have the accepted characteristics of peacekeeping. The UN referred to peacekeeping as “an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or

6 Major General Indar Rikhye in a lecture on Problems of International Peacekeeping held on 29 December 1976 at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), London.
restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.” 7 The principles of early interpositional peacekeeping included:

- Need for support by mandating authority (i.e. the UN Security Council)
- Requirement that the operation be deployed only with the consent of the warring parties
- Restrictions to the effect that force could be used only in self-defense
- Complete impartiality in the performance of the functions of the force 8

Traditional peacekeeping was a product of the strategic consequences of the Cold War. Mary Kaldor has characterized this environment in her description of “Old War.” 9 The intensely pervasive Soviet-American rivalry debarred the intervention of UN forces into internal conflict within states, so that Congo and West Irian were exceptional cases. UN peacekeeping forces, on the occasions when they were deployed, therefore acted mainly between states. A number of important consequences of acting between states became a common feature of interpositional operations. A successful state implied that within its territory, the government enjoyed a monopoly of violence. The armed forces facing each other along the cease-fire line, which would in due course be monitored by the UN, were the state’s armed forces. As a rule, they were, therefore, regularly paid, wearing uniform, disciplined, trained, and organized into vertical command structures culminating at a war cabinet or similar office from where the war effort would be controlled. Although


the violence at the interface would be intense and highly destructive, it was regulated by international codes. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 now included protocols for the protection of the wounded, hospitals, prisoners of war, civilians and refugees. These conditions achieved a Clausewitzian separation of war from peace, military from civilians, and combat-zones from rear areas, and in time defined the beginning and end of violence.

The UN peacekeepers’ role in this conventional war setting unfolded in two phases. Initially on their arrival, the main problem was to stabilize the battlefield. This required the peace force to operate over a wide area with a high degree of mobility. Their tasks included leading or escorting units cut off on the battlefield through the opposing lines back to rejoin their own forces. Peacekeepers were also required to bury the dead, mark minefields, deliver aid to the wounded, and facilitate liaison between the opposing sides. Once the battlefield was stabilized, the main forces of each opposing army were moved further apart into “Areas of Limitation,” leaving a strip or a vacuum between them which would be occupied by the UN force.

In the second phase of the UN’s role, the area of the UN operations in the interpositional phase tended to become more closely defined. The main UN contingents would occupy the “Area of Separation” (AOS), which now lay between the opposed armies. The UN soldiers in the AOS became isolated from the opposed forces. This isolation was reinforced by the presence of UN observer teams that operated at the interface of the forces present in the former conflict zone. This meant that a contingent could be in the AOS and see very little of the state forces which had previously fought over the area, because the day-to-day liaison between them was done by the observers. The reason buffer zone experiences gained such a strong foothold in the institutional memory of the peacekeeping community was that they remained in position for so long. UN operations in Congo, Korea and West Irian lasted only a few years, but Golan, Lebanon and Cyprus have each deployed for more than three decades and are still in the field. Similarly, thousands of international military officers have by now served as observers in the UN Truce Supervisory Organization, which has been located and operating in the Eastern Mediterranean region since 1948.
The key to the traditional peacekeepers’ success and survival was that the opposing armies on either side consented to their presence and functions. In the circumstances of the Cold War, consent was regarded as an absolute by the peacekeeping community. If it was withdrawn, the UN force would also have to be removed. The absolute reliance on consent encouraged and, in some cases, dictated the deployment of small, token UN interpositional forces to act as guarantors of a truce, without disturbing or challenging the military balance on either side of the “Area of Separation.” Although in the first, initial phase of their role UN forces were required to be extremely proactive and operate in a brave and determined way in order to stabilize the battlefield, this phase was fairly short. In the second phase, which lasted very much longer, the UN peacekeeping force became a small, passive garrison in the buffer zone. It was not capable of any operation of war or manoeuvre. Its non-confrontational appearance and modus operandi were designed to encourage the consent and the cooperation of parties. It also, however, encouraged a passive, almost supine professional approach towards upholding the conditions of the truce. Violations were not dealt with in a confrontational manner by troops on the ground, but usually far away from the scene of the incident through negotiation and diplomacy.

The “traditional peacekeepers” of the Cold War buffer zones were therefore the forerunners of the modern peace force. They passed on important principles and experience, as well as some debilitating doctrinal baggage. An example of the doctrinal baggage is the

10 Consent was withdrawn in the case of UNEF I on 16 May 1967, when Egypt demanded the removal of UN forces at the Gaza border with Israel. UNEF I consequently withdrew. See UN Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1990, 75.


12 Ed Doyle is one of the best exponents of the traditional peacekeeping experience. A good example of one of his accounts of buffer-zone peacekeeping is: Doyle, Eamon D. “Verification in the Sinai – An Integrated Approach.” International Peacekeeping 1, no. 3 (1994):336–348.
prescriptive views on consent in Wider Peacekeeping, which insists that, “the consent divide, if crossed by default, may prove to have been a Rubicon. Once on the other side, there may be very little chance of getting back, and the only way out for that particular force is likely to be by leaving.”13 Consent was a sine qua non for traditional peacekeeping, but in this manual the same principle was applied to complex emergencies. The peacekeepers’ passive form of neutrality towards the parties and their behavior, in respect of the terms of the truce, had became a characteristic of buffer zone peacekeeping. It epitomized an approach that would be rudely confronted by the emergencies of the post-Cold War.

The New Conflict Environment

Although academics argued whether or not we had passed into a new strategic era, the physical manifestations of a massive change have nevertheless confronted us in a rather compelling manner. Some of these manifested themselves suddenly and visibly after Glasnost, and some had been exerting their influence over a longer period but in a more profound way. The sudden and visible changes concerned the collapse of the Soviet Union, the removal of the inner-German border, the withdrawal of the Soviet Forces from Germany, the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and, over a longer period, the secession of individual states from the Soviet Union. The end of the Soviet-American zero-sum game and the bipolar world that it encouraged also had a profound impact on newly independent and developing countries, which had become proxy war zones in the struggle. Ending Soviet-American rivalry also meant the end of superpower patronage, weapon supplies and financial support.

Meanwhile, the strands of development implied in the concept of globalization were altering the world in a much more profound way. A surge

of communications of every kind seemed to be dragging individuality away from the state, away from distinct communities and ethnic groups towards a global culture, at its worst an American culture personified by the Marlboro cowboy in his blue jeans. Some saw ethnicity and identity politics as a local reaction to these stresses. The physical nature of the land and the dynamics of urban development were also changing. In conflict areas of sub-Saharan Africa, there was a general migration of displaced populations towards the townships. Densely populated cities expanded to become conurbations which continued to grow, crossing international borders and major waterways.

The remote areas of developing countries were growing more accessible. Transport technology had improved the reach and capacity of overland haulage and bulk carriers; 4x4 cross-country vehicles were becoming more widely produced and relatively cheaper. Engineering plants for moving and digging earth became smaller and more mobile. In the air, the strategic transport aircraft of former Warsaw Pact armed forces became available on the commercial market. This meant that the extraction and movement of bulk raw materials, which had been the monopoly of powerful international companies, was now feasible for the determined individual entrepreneur. Marketing misappropriated raw materials was also made easier by a simultaneous proliferation of global communications. It was now possible for the lone trader to set up his own international communications system, if necessary from the same remote hinterlands where the raw materials were found. From here he could communicate with the international banking system, the commodity markets and suppliers of military and logistic equipment. The unregulated global market provided a meeting place on the Internet where illicit raw materials could be traded, and large sums of money transferred with greater facility than before. Improved technology and globalization combined to alter the definition of portable resources. The restrictions imposed by old technology and trading regulations,

which limited portable resources to gold, precious minerals and gemstones, were removed. Portable resources now included hardwood timber, ore, oil, bulk minerals, offshore fisheries, agricultural produce and wild game.

Many newly emerged nations fell into debt. In some cases, their fragile economies were disrupted by civil conflict. Others were weakened by the collapse of the price of their exports. Debts attracted huge loans which had to be repaid on a regular basis. The combination of loan repayment obligations and the diminishing value of the state assets removed executive power from governments. National institutions such as trade unions, parliaments and the media were supplanted by international influences exercised by transnational corporations, international broadcasting agencies, the global currency market and international development agencies. Even the most intimate responsibilities of a weakened state – the management of law and order, welfare, education and health – were now subjected to international scrutiny. Another consequence of this crisis was the widening of the gap between rich and poor. In sub-Saharan African nations, GDP decreased from an average of 14 percent of that enjoyed by most industrialized states to between 5–8 percent.16 It was now possible for communities to see their position in the global scale of social endowment with greater clarity. Particularly obvious were the inequality, the enormous wealth of the rich nations and the wretchedness of the poor. The speed and volume of capital flows from one country to another had no antecedent in the old strategic paradigm. Electronic money at the rate of more than $1 trillion each day now passed from one side of the world to another at the click of a mouse, destabilizing the solid economies of one state in favor of a market trend in another. Some felt that a global community which condoned such inequality and exposed the weakest to the mercies of volatile economies must also expect that the most deprived elements of that society would, in due course, find a way to strike back.17

In the post-Cold War world, the classical Maoist insurgent, who survived by living on the support of the population, was becoming extinct. Insurgent forces, which had been supported by one or other superpower, now faced the prospect of a considerable reduction in their power and ability to survive as armed factions. As Jean-Christophe Rufin noted, “this lack of international support has not led guerrilla movements to conclude that they should stop fighting; it has just made them realize that their war economies have had to change completely. They have moved from relying on political assistance from abroad to a new, more business-oriented attitude.” There were fewer wild and unreachable areas to use as operational bases. In a regional sense, there was also less separation between states.

The change in a weakened state from peace to widespread violence was not sudden. It did not take place with the impact of a declaration of war. Instead, there was more likely to have been a gradual erosion of individual security. There were many possible factors in a collapsing state which could contribute to this change: the withdrawal of superpower support at the end of the Cold War may have weakened the state government and left it more vulnerable to military threats. There may not have been much popular support for the state government itself, which might have failed to protect the population and provide the basic needs of a civil society. The armed forces and police may not have been paid for some time. They might therefore have used their weapons and military power to “tax” the population in an informal manner, primarily to provide for their own survival, but also to enrich themselves. The state’s borders might have been unmanned, and the government offices and law courts may have ceased to function. Civil amenities such as water, electricity, hospitals, schools and public transport may not have been operating reliably.

The rich could usually survive by making their own arrangements through the private sector, but the poor moved closer to the edge of survival. In due course, when violence broke out, perhaps in the teeming ghettos of the capital city or in a distant province, the government’s

forces could no longer reach the site of the incident or contain its effects. The writ of governance shrunk back to the margins of a nominal state. The rituals of statehood continued, but, in reality, the inaccessible and dangerous corners of the country became no-go areas. There was a vacuum of authority, and into these black holes stepped local war leaders to seize the dangling reins of power and anything else they could lay their hands on.

A local war leader in the post-Cold War context was not a mindless barbarian returning an ungoverned population back to a tribal phase in their evolution. He might be violent, perhaps evil, but there was nothing irrational about his behavior. He followed a ruthless logic in his activities. He was a product of his time and of his environment, intensely modern, exploiting the same global marketplace and universal culture that increasingly dominated organized society in the world at large. It was this overwhelming commercial motive, this international dimension of his operations, that distinguished the new warlord from his Cold War antecedents. What was new about the new warlords was that their commercial agenda had become extremely sophisticated, in some cases involving huge international trading accounts. The warlord was, nevertheless, an extractive presence within his territory. His fighters continued to loot in a physical sense for personal and logistic purposes. However, in many cases an additional dimension of a warlord’s wealth was derived from much larger deals in which the state’s natural resources – gold, diamonds, gemstones, hardwood timber, fisheries, latex, even bananas and coffee – were traded out onto the international markets. The new warlord was now able to gain wealth far in excess of the day-to-day spoils of a traditional plunderer. Warlords were not alone in exploiting these resources. Private security companies, elements of international forces, and even rulers of weak states themselves were also involved. The value of these unseen trading accounts and the relative ease with which most of these commodities could be removed and transacted influenced the size and configuration of a warlord’s warfare needs and dictated his priorities for survival.19

The International Response

Nations that responded to the complex emergencies described above may have had different underlying motives. Some had a direct interest in maintaining stability in a conflict zone where they had strategic interests. Others had more complicated reasons to influence international response. When political leaders decided to contain or take action to mitigate the effects of conflict or natural disaster, the response was likely to be multilateral. Nations seldom had the power or inclination to act alone to protect a threatened collective interest. A collective response was organized by combining elements from several international or regional organizations, such as NATO or WEU with individual organizations. As a rule, the UN remained the overarching global organization that could arrange a multinational response and authorize its deployment through the Security Council. In place of the traditional buffer zone, multinational response groups found themselves operating state-wide in a less defined area of responsibility, without the familiar structures of a functioning state at hand. In many cases, local government had collapsed, and the international organizations faced a chaotic situation and a continuously changing security environment. The responding elements nevertheless had to interact with the host state at all levels. The harmony and cooperation achieved in their relationships could have a direct bearing on the success of the operation.

A response to a complex emergency had to reflect the nature of the problem and comprise multiple capabilities. Most of its elements were individually established and controlled. Although the larger and more powerful military operations continued to be authorized by the UN Security Council, the necessary military assets were provided from security organizations and ad hoc coalitions. Some development and relief agencies would have been operating in the host country for several years before the crisis. Usually, all the elements of the response would not arrive as part of an orchestrated plan. In each complex emergency, they developed focal points from which their conduct of operations could be managed. The major components of an international response included:
• International land forces, naval ships and air assets
• Principal UN agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, FAO/WFP, UNDP)
• UN civil elements (Human Rights, Civil Administration, Electoral Staff and Development Staff)
• UN or international civilian police
• International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Red Crescent Movement
• Bilateral national donors
• Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
• International media

The problem with the international response was that each element had its own idiosyncratic view of the final outcome of the intervention, so that within the same conflict or humanitarian crisis area, there could be several different strategic approaches. The long-term impact of a humanitarian effort might be, for example, to sustain individual communities as sub-state entities within a failing state, while the international military and police efforts would be concerned with restoring a monopoly of power which would have the effect of reunifying the state and its former no-go areas. Individual NGOs and bilateral donors added additional layers of advocacy and action including human rights investigation, reconciliation, political reorganization and security sector reform. Despite each having its individual agenda, the major response elements might act together to stabilize the area and revive the key institutions which were essential to a civil society. After achieving some form of cease-fire agreement, the response effort usually had to take swift action in four priority areas: the immediate relief of any threat to humanitarian survival; maintaining a workable level of security; restoring the vital organs of civil society; and returning the displaced elements of the population to their correct locations.

Under the heading of acting together, the first step might be to organize a general disarmament. In a host state that had been a proxy war zone
for the superpowers during the Cold War, there was likely to be a proliferation of small arms. As a result, most able-bodied men would possess a weapon. The aim of disarmament was to reduce the number of individual weapon owners and restrict the carriage of weapons to the recognized armed forces of the parties involved. The next step would be to break up the informal militia bands and return the disarmed fighters to their farms and townships. Simultaneously, it was important to resuscitate the state economy, so that when the displaced population returned to its proper home environment, there were markets and jobs to sustain them. While the international response focused on the tasks of immediate humanitarian relief, disarmament, demobilization and the restoration of the states’ vital organs, a number of programs would also be taking place to organize elections, repatriate refugees, investigate human rights and encourage reconciliation.

This model of how the international elements responded to a complex emergency seldom succeeded in real life. In most cases, the best that the participants would hope for was to contain the problem and allow the affected civil population to survive in a more humane way than before. There are many reasons why the international efforts tended to fail, but the main one was that disarmament was a voluntary process and therefore impossible to enforce. In many cases, there was more pressure on individuals to retain and, if necessary, hide a weapon than to give it up. They might hand over surplus or unserviceable weapons, but they would not ultimately surrender their armed status. As long as the monopoly for using violence had not been restored into the hands of the government, individuals needed their weapons in order to protect their homes, their property and, in the case of individual faction fighters, to continue to extort a living from the local people. The success of the international effort at its fundamental level depended on having a viable degree of individual security in the state. Without it and the consequent freedom of movement, it was impossible for the elements of the response to achieve a real success in the three other priority areas of the response effort.
Conclusion:
Conceptualizing Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

In the 1990s, each crisis had its own individual character, so that a model might incorporate the key features of the complex humanitarian emergency without corresponding exactly to any particular real-life situation. The model created for the purposes of this paper has the following key characteristics. As a rule, a complex humanitarian emergency takes place in a failing state where the government can no longer exercise its writ over the whole of its territory. The breakdown of security in the state occurs gradually, sometimes over a number of years. Several irregular forces, including militias allied to the government, may be involved. The effects of violence may flow across borders into adjoining states. The area of conflict is ill-defined and there may lack front lines or safe areas. Entire civil communities may be displaced from their homes, and their forced movement may cause many civilian casualties. The causes of death may vary from the results of minor illnesses to genocidal attacks. The international response is multifaceted. Its elements usually reflect the variety and nature of the problems in the conflict zone. Each element may have its own institutional controlling structures, which may culminate at international headquarters; in the conflict area, however, there is no accepted structure which organizes the efforts of individual agencies into a single coordinated approach.

Complex humanitarian emergencies have been variously defined as:

a humanitarian disaster that occurs in a conflict zone and is complicated by, or results from, the conflicting interests of warring parties. Its causes are seldom exclusively natural or military; in many cases a marginally subsistent population is precipitated toward disaster by the consequences of militia action or a natural occurrence such as earthquake or drought. The presence of militias and their interest in controlling and extorting the local population will impede and, in some cases, seriously threaten relief efforts. In addition to violence against the civilian populations, civilian installations such as hospitals, schools, refugee centres and cultural sites will become war objectives and may be looted frequently or destroyed.20

There are several reasons why the international response to a complex emergency fails to do more than contain the problem. At a tactical level, neither the international military forces nor the humanitarian agencies have developed a concept or a modus operandi to deal with the hostile local war leader. The unresolved questions are whether and how to incorporate him into the peace process. The local war leader uses the chaotic and lawless environment in the host state to plunder the resources around him. A successful peace process will remove his opportunity for further self-enrichment and expose him to the possibility of justice and retribution. He may sign peace agreements in the pressured atmosphere of a peace negotiation, but on returning to his own environment he may not fulfil any of its conditions. Successful action regarding the local war leader and his militia would require, first of all, a collective decision on whether he was a positive or negative actor in the region. Should he be brought into the peace process and become part of the rebuilt state, or remain isolated and cut off from his constituency and sources of power?

Still at the tactical level, the international military forces may find themselves gradually drawn into a counter-insurgency campaign aimed at defeating the rump of local factions, which resist the peace process and the restoration of law and order. In the military experience of the Cold War period, one of the key principles of success in counter-insurgency was for all the institutions of governance, security and civil society within the state to be coordinated into a single strategy. In the post-Cold War context, there is no concept for this to happen. In particular there is a resistance among the civil agencies to being pressed into a consolidated approach, especially where this links them to military operations. For this reason, international military forces are seldom successful in restoring the monopoly of violence to state level in the context of a complex emergency.

At a higher level, the term “complex emergency” raises serious doubts about the conceptual approach of intervening nations and agencies, as well as lesser problems of definition. Words such as “emergency” and “crisis” imply an unexpected contingency, a situation which has suddenly grown dangerously out of control. The corollary to this thinking is that the crisis has a definite span; it is an aberration which occurs
suddenly and, with an effective rescue action, can be brought as swiftly under control. In reality, however, the situation in the collapsing host state is far from a sudden emergency and has been developing gradually over many years, if not decades. The international response has not intervened in an isolated crisis, but rather in a long-term process of social transition. The “end state” thinking of NATO commanders and the “exit strategies” of their political leaders are artificial concepts. The intervening forces and agencies have created a false and rosy scenario in which war lords surrender their weapons, elections are held and the state is restored in the space of a few years. Developing a concept of response which addresses the real situation is much harder.

Finally, at the highest level of importance is the question: on what basis do nations intervene in these so-called “complex humanitarian emergencies?” If it is in order to arrest the breaking-apart of a failing state, then are they not preventing a process of evolution which almost certainly took place in their own countries, probably with as much bloodshed and cruelty? In addition, by interrupting the process, do they not become largely responsible for the restoration of the status quo ante, which will certainly require a major commitment of their armed forces and funds for several decades? On the other hand, if they intervene to support and foster the breaking-apart of the state and to protect the individual communities which emerge from this process, on what basis do they expect these communities to survive within the global system? A new generation of unattached communities and sub-states will undermine the security and economic structures, which are the pillars of international order.
UN, OSCE and NATO:
International Division of Labor
in Peace Support Operations

Introduction

The division of labor in peace operations between the UN, the OSCE and NATO has many facets. This article concentrates on a few aspects of that cooperation regarding lessons learned from peacekeeping under unstable conditions in the Balkans. The scope of this paper is limited, in that it is “eurocentric,” focusing on lessons learned from peace operations in Europe that might be relevant for international cooperation (or division of labor) in peace operations. The paper may also be biased as it is intended to reflect the views of practitioners who deserve respect rather than blame for having been tasked by the international community with implementing mandates under the worst possible conditions of an ongoing civil war. Most of the empirical data was generated by a research project with UNPROFOR and SFOR military officers and civilian leaders who shared their insights in a representative survey and at two UN Commander Workshops in 1995 and 1996.¹

¹ Some 900 of 1200 asked officers participated in the field study organized by the Danish Norwegian Research Project on UN Peacekeeping (DANORP). Results were published in Biermann, Wolfgang and Martin Vadset, eds. *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia*. Ashgate: Aldershot, 1998.
As participants\(^2\) had often served in various UN missions outside of Europe, and no representative data from international field studies is available, their views could be interesting for the analysis of the operational impact of UN mandates in the field. The limitations of this contribution may therefore be justified. According to the survey, most practitioners advocate the principles of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and minimum use of force in self-defense – as the appropriate approach to intervention in civil war-like conflicts. This is consistent with the statement in the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* ("Brahimi Report") that “consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defense should remain the bedrock of peacekeeping.”\(^3\) This paper is meant to contribute to a discussion about peacekeeping as the most favorable form of civil-military intervention for international cooperation between the major international actors in security matters.

**Division of Labor in European Conflict Management in the 1990s**

Conflict prevention and crisis management through mutually reinforcing institutions has become a central field of cooperation in Europe since NATO’s Rome summit in 1991, complemented by efforts of post-war peace-building. In the following decade, international institutions dealing with security threats on the European continent often worked in parallel, rather than coordinating their activities: this applies to the UN and the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the WEU and to some extent the CIS. In addition, sub-institutions such as the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Treaty on Conventional

\(^{2}\) Among them civil UN personnel Yasushi Akashi, Sadako Ogata and Thorvald Stoltenberg; and military leaders Bertrand de Lapresle, Michael Rose, Lars-Eric Wahlgren, Andrew Ridgway, Bo Pellnäs and John M. Sanderson.

Forces in Europe, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council also played a role in supporting peace. During the 1990s a division of labor emerged among the major organizations:

The OSCE promoted “soft” types of security and crisis management, such as conflict prevention⁴ and settlement (arms control, early warning, mediation, observer missions) and post-conflict activities (election assistance, human rights monitoring). The EU also played a role in “soft” types of security and post-conflict activities (EU monitoring missions, mediation, civil reconstruction). The WEU has adopted principles on humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management activities since “Petersberg”⁵ and has been engaged in minor military or police operations (e.g. the Danube River embargo monitoring, WEU police in Mostar) and developed peacekeeping concepts. In 1992, NATO started to support UN- or OSCE-mandated peacekeeping operations,⁶ extended peacekeeping activities through PfP and NACC,⁷ developed “harder” types of peace support for the UN (e.g. close air support to UNPROFOR), and finally took over responsibility for the implementation of the military part of the Dayton Agreement in 1995.

The conflict in former Yugoslavia, however, came at a moment when these international organizations were redefining their roles in a new and promising European security landscape. Neither the UN nor NATO, the EU or the OSCE were prepared to meet the challenge in former Yugoslavia. In particular, the public perception of the role of the UN and NATO is still simple: The UN is weak and cowardly (see UNPROFOR), while NATO is strong and brave (see SFOR, Allied Force and KFOR). Of course, reality is not that simple, as the former

---

⁴ The use of the term “conflict prevention” means prevention of armed conflict.
⁶ NATO. Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions on NATO support for peacekeeping operations under the responsibility of the UN Security Council), 4 June 1992.
deputy supreme commander of NATO, British General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie, has stated:

UNPROFOR was perceived by many as a failure in its attempt to untangle the aftermath of the collapse of Yugoslavia. This is a harsh judgement. UNPROFOR achieved much: in particular, it brought the civil war to a close and it laid the foundations for IFOR and subsequently SFOR to take the process forward. There were two vital elements in its legacy to NATO – international legitimacy and a package of lessons learned.8

NATO is a newcomer to the business of peacekeeping. After PfP had been set up together with the former Warsaw Pact enemies, however, cooperation in peacekeeping within the framework of the NACC9 became one of the great success stories of the cooperative approach of the “new NATO.” The fact that NATO took on the responsibility for peacekeeping in Bosnia after Dayton leads to the question of the future of UN peacekeeping: Why could the UN not do the job? In future crises, will NATO be in and the UN out? These questions have become even more pressing since Operation Allied Force and the KFOR mission. Apart from the question of who is in charge, conceptual as well as political problems with both the UN and NATO have to be overcome.

9 NATO, Report to the Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, M-NAC- 1(93)40, Athens, 11 June 1993.
The Conceptual Challenge:
Early De-Escalation of Conflict

Since the wars of the 1990s, there have been two lines of argument: one side emphasizes the ability to use force as a key to the success of peace support operations and refers to capability gaps in the military field.10 Others strongly advocate the civil instruments of crisis prevention or (armed) conflict prevention as a key issue of international politics.11 The German government has given crisis prevention a prominent place in its coalition agreement of October 1998. Operation Allied Force in 1999 triggered the EU’s most serious effort to develop both its own military and civilian capability for crisis management, and the European Stability Pact, a civilian project for conflict prevention through comprehensive cooperation. Prevention is fashionable, but often fails. UNSG Kofi Annan has criticized the international community’s responses to violent crises as “too few, too little and too late.”12 Despite the advantages of prevention, the “reactive approach to crises and conflicts still predominates in the world of states.”13 Once prevention has failed, governments and international organizations tend to

employ ad hoc policies. There is a political feasibility gap between conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building. On the one hand, concepts for prevention are often complex and focus on long-term strategies. On the other hand, one key question is hardly solved: What happens if prevention fails, and the international community arrives on the scene too late?

In politics, not enough conceptual attention is given to the dynamics of conflict immediately after open hostilities have begun. While Chapter VI15 peacekeeping operations are impotent in the light of irresponsible leaders of fragile states, the “last resort” of military enforcement according to Chapter VII is rarely available. What can be done instead when prevention fails? What happens between the failure of prevention and post-conflict peace-building? Under which conditions can de-escalation rather than escalation work? The record for de-escalating conflict through early action, once prevention has failed, is poor. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) noted a “surprising paucity of rigorous and empirically sustainable analyses of the problems associated with early action … designed to forestall violence.”16 One of the reasons might be the widely shared tendency during the first decade after the end of the cold war to over-estimate the “ability of the UN to intervene effectively in internal conflicts”17 by forceful means. The cooperative approach of the UN Charter seems to have been forgotten along with the lessons learned from the détente period.

Meanwhile, since the Balkan tragedies, the international environment seems to support a cooperative approach aimed at crisis prevention and de-escalation of conflict rather than a confrontational approach. In the US, the new administration is expected to “re-evaluate past US policies of punishment.”18 Richard N. Haas, head of the planning staff of the US State Department and a key adviser to former president George Bush, argues against “punitive policies such as sanctions and military force in the foreign policy repertoire of the US,”19 because “the record of sanctions enforcing change (has) been poor … the limits of military force have been exposed.”20 The “growing recognition of drawbacks of punitive policies … has spurred a search for alternative strategies…”21 Haas recommends a policy of engagement, very similar to détente, to achieve change in authoritarian regimes. Meghan L. O’Sullivan from the Brookings Institution describes the inefficiency of punitive policies towards Iran, Iraq, Cuba and Libya, and takes the case of North Korea to turn the argument of military force as a “last resort” upside down. According to her, US “policy makers … turned to engagement as a last resort when other options appeared certain to fail.”22 Instead of escalating a conflict through military action, de-escalation of conflict by a cooperative, inclusive and proactive approach became a better alternative for solving problems between the US and “rogue states” or, as they are now known, “states of concern.”

While the cooperative approach seems more feasible for handling international conflict with “rogue states” than punishment and escalation, the key question that arises is whether this approach is also applicable for interventions in civil war-like conflict. While the last decade was
characterized by a widely shared overestimation of the “ability of the UN to intervene effectively in internal conflicts,” experience shows that the last resort of military enforcement is also rarely available in cases of civil warlike conflicts. Great Britain has learned its lessons from Northern Ireland. The UK minister of state, Peter Hain, offered the British concept of “devolution” as a model to solve secessionist conflicts in other parts of the world such as Sri Lanka. “Devolution” as practised in Northern Ireland shall, through an inclusive and cooperative approach, even involve “parties close to terrorist organizations” as well as representatives of the international community in order to overcome the stalemate of confrontation. After the Kosovo war, the EU changed its patterns of crisis management towards an integrated approach whereby both military and civilian crisis management capabilities are built up. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe has also set a precedent for alternatives to punitive policies.

The Challenge of Early De-Escalation

While “escalation” and “escalation control” are familiar terms among military strategists, “de-escalation” has not been at the center of strategy debates. Political decision-makers are repeatedly caught up in the dilemma of threatening to escalate through use of force and the risk of being unable to implement the threat once it fails its intended purpose. There is, therefore, an urgent need for a realistic alternative to enforcement: de-escalation as a key challenge to peace support strategies. De-escalation is defined as a rapid, impartial and basically peaceful crisis intervention with a very limited but crucial task: halting the escalation of violent conflict.

De-escalation is focused on initially reducing violence, stopping escalation, furthering readiness for restraint and compromise, facilitating


consent with the third party and among the conflicting parties. It uses operational methods similar to peacekeeping but with a wider, more proactive and police-like scope of activity. With respect to political aims, de-escalation is more limited than peacekeeping. De-escalation does not intend to implement a peace agreement between the conflicting parties or to put into question the basic military or political aims of conflicting parties. De-escalation should assist in defusing tense situations, stop the parties from using force to achieve their aims, and create time and space for conflict resolution. It should facilitate but cannot replace energetic mediation efforts aimed at conflict resolution. De-escalation should be seen within a wider context. It is both a political goal and a military operational method. It is, in principle, a cooperative and inclusive approach and is therefore well suited for cooperation between the UN and the OSCE on the one hand, and NATO – and in future the EU – on the other. The concept of de-escalation should not be mistaken for weakness or appeasement. On the contrary, it can require substantial military capabilities. While a force may be heavily armed, the rules of engagement (ROE) are designed “to restrain the use of force in order to avoid escalations in situations where escalation would otherwise be legally permissible.”

On the operational level, de-escalation originates from methods of traditional peacekeeping with reference to the principles of impartiality, consent and minimum use of force in self-defense. Compared with traditional peacekeeping, however, de-escalation requires a dynamic interpretation of the principles under conditions of open or virulent civil war-like conflict:

- De-escalation requires an *active* policy of impartiality, that is, even-handed action rather than “neutral” inaction.
- Consent is an aim rather than an existing condition: De-escalation requires *politically proactive* operational leaders to achieve, (re-)create and maintain the consent of conflicting parties. It requires a comprehensive system of liaison or joint commissions.

De-escalation requires a credible capability to use force in self-defense. De-escalation, however, is militarily reactive, with a proportionate use of force to defend peacekeepers and their mandate. It prohibits military punishment and reprisal.

The political goal of de-escalation is well described in the Swedish peace support doctrine:

De-escalation revolves around three overlapping activities: controlling the physical violence in a conflict; producing an atmosphere conducive to the promotion of consent and further negotiation; and identifying and addressing the underlying causes of the problem so as to facilitate settlement and longer term resolution.26

In conclusion: If the international community would agree on de-escalation as the prime task of peace operations, cooperation and consent among the international actors would be easier to achieve and mandates would be better accomplished. Many contradictions between words and deeds, between mandates and methods of implementation could be avoided. Lack of success in peace operations often stems more from political “feasibility gaps” rather than from military “capability gaps.” This could be best exemplified in the case of lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia, where peace support of the UN often suffered from a lack of political feasibility rather than of military capability.

The Division of Labor between NATO and UN during the Experimental Phase of UNPROFOR

NATO’s role in cooperative security after the fall of the Berlin Wall set a precedent for its gradual involvement in peace support operations. In the beginning, however, the new division of labor between NATO and the UN was not necessarily just a success story. Since 1993, NATO has equipped UNPROFOR headquarters and provided resources and capabilities such as communications, logistics and infrastructure. The UN
received what the EU today hopes to get from NATO for its “independent” military role: NATO assets. NATO support included enforcement of the UN embargo in the Adriatic and the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Alliance made contingency plans for the implementation of a possible UN peace plan and for a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR. The positive cooperation between the UN and NATO in support of UN peacekeeping, in particular between the secretaries-general of the two organizations, went smoothly, with no conceptual dissonance. When the international community was unable to stop the escalation of war, however, UN-NATO cooperation escalated into a deep crisis over the issue of air strikes.

A number of UN Security Council resolutions mandated UNPROFOR to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (threat to peace). Understandably, public opinion expected UNPROFOR to become an “enforcement operation” and its troops to act forcefully. Many politicians followed this interpretation. Labelling UNPROFOR as a “Chapter VII operation,” however, reflected a political course that was at odds with the operational reality. The UN secretary-general rejected the idea of “tough action”. Boutros-Ghali feared that peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia would end in the same humiliating way as the UN mission to Somalia.27 While the UN was under increased public pressure to use force, the “effective” use of force had counter-productive consequences. A bad example of the counter-productive use of force was set during intensive fighting around the Bihac “safe” area in November 1994,28 when NATO received UN authorization to bomb


Bosnian Serb positions. Euphorically welcomed by some media in the beginning,29 the follow-up was disastrous for both NATO and the UN: Bosnian Serb counter measures against the air strikes (blocking UNPROFOR freedom of movement, taking hostages and activating SAM-2 and SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles) made it practically impossible to even continue routine NATO air surveillance or humanitarian flights. As a result, the division of labor – following the principle that each should do what it does best: peacekeeping on the ground by UN, enforcement from the air by NATO – did not work. Both concepts turned out to be incompatible, as the NATO secretary-general concluded in 1994:

I do not believe … that we can pursue decisive peace enforcement from the air while the UN is led, deployed and equipped for peacekeeping on the ground. If we have learned anything from this conflict, it is that we cannot mix these two missions…30

Similar statements came from the UN Secretary-General in his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace in January 1995:

The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peacekeeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping operation and endanger its personnel.31

Another even more tragic failure in the division of labor was the case of safe areas. In the spring of 1993, UNPROFOR was denied the 35,000 men and supplies it had requested to protect and demilitarize

30 NATO-Secretary-General Willy Claes, Statement to the NAA. 18.11.1994 in Washington D.C.
safe areas in a robust peacekeeping fashion. Under this concept, devised by the UNPROFOR commander, any attack on a safe area would have been a case for self-defense by the UN troops deployed in UN-controlled territory around the safe areas. The concept would have made self-defense plus close air support a viable option. Instead, the UNSC decided to accept “self-defense” by the Muslims within the area and to offer NATO airpower in order to enforce the safe areas. The resulting tragedy that occurred at Srebrenica is well known, and was evidence that this kind of enforcement was not feasible.

Diverging concepts and interests gave the conflicting parties manifold opportunities to act as peacekeepers and peace-supporters against each other. Obviously, it was the conflicting parties who wanted war and not an agreement. Disunity between NATO and the UN undermined the international community’s willingness to jointly pressure the parties for a compromise under a peace agreement and to deploy an implementation force. International disunity therefore encouraged the parties to continue the war. In reality, the conflict between the UN and NATO about the use of airpower was really a conflict among NATO nations: between those NATO countries with troops and those without troops on the ground. UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg concluded from the conflict between NATO and the UN that “… in the future, members of the Security Council will be obliged to provide personnel for the UN peacekeeping operations.” The lesson learned from UNPROFOR, namely the need of shared risks by also having US ground troops engaged in peace operations, has meanwhile become part of NATO’s policy.

UN peacekeepers had to deal with several military capability gaps arising from the fact that UNPROFOR was equipped and deployed in the


midst of an evolving war. A division of labor between the UN and NATO was therefore necessary. The two organizations came to the situation with very different legacies. For decades, the UN has been preparing for peacekeeping, while NATO has been preparing for collective defense under a wartime scenario. Neither of the concepts, neither traditional peacekeeping, nor traditional combat operations, could prepare the two organizations for the extremely violent civil war that escalated in former Yugoslavia. Neither organization was accustomed to cooperation, and their respective approaches – de-escalation efforts on the side of the UN and escalation dominance on the part of NATO – were incompatible. The result was that neither military concept was politically feasible.

Survey: Lessons Learned by Practitioners from an Unusual Division of Labor during UNPROFOR

The Conceptual Dispute between NATO and the UN

How was the conceptual dispute between NATO and the UN perceived by the officers in the field? With regard to air support for UNPROFOR, the UN requested NATO airpower. Some 90 percent of the officers on the ground welcomed close air support for the self-defense of UNPROFOR, as well as for the enforcement of the no-fly-zone. They were, however, deeply divided regarding the feasibility of air strikes. The higher the ranks, the lower the support for air strikes. This also reflected the experience that air operations in self-defense or in defense

35 The following data are results of the DANORP survey. See charts 7–10 at the end of this chapter. Source: Biermann, Wolfgang and Martin Vädet, eds. UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia. Ashgate: Aldershot, 1998.

36 In the DANORP survey, about 90 percent of all officers welcomed close air support for self-defense and evacuation, see Biermann, Wolfgang and Martin Vädet, eds. UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia. Ashgate: Aldershot, 1998, 102.
of the mandate – enforcement of the no-fly-zone – rarely led to a dramatic escalation, while “punishment” by air strikes frequently led to disaster. A major reason for this was the vulnerability of the dispersed peacekeepers and humanitarian organizations.

Both the disunity of policies between NATO and UN and the interference by nations contributing troops were of major concern to 76 percent of the officers on the ground, who noted that “interference by individual countries in operational matters can put my work as a peacekeeper at risk unnecessarily.” While this statement only expressed a possibility, the control question made it very clear that it was not hypothetical: 62 percent stated that countries contributing troops actually “are interfering in operational matters.” The dramatic lack of “unity of policy” in the UNSC was also strongly criticizing by 73 percent of the officers, who stated that “contradictory mandates by the UN Security Council are making the peacekeeping job very difficult.”

**Peacekeepers’ Proposals to Improve Cooperation between NATO and the UN**

What did UNPROFOR officers suggest to overcome problems in cooperation between NATO and the UN? The great majority of officers were clearly in favor of the UN as the lead organization: 64 percent supported the notion that under a UN mandate, NATO should “act in a supporting role under UN command only,” and that “there are strong differences between NATO and the UN in relation to the practical implementation of peacekeeping.” The statement that “NATO should not take sides when supporting a peacekeeping operation” was supported by 83 percent of respondents. Some 76 percent demanded that NATO countries should commit “trained, earmarked and rapidly deployable” stand-by forces to the UN, while 73 percent stated that “NATO members should support the idea of a permanent UN peacekeeping force for rapid deployment.” On the other hand, nearly 80 percent stated that “NATO’s support is very important for a successful UNPROFOR operation.” Obviously, the officers favored an integrated approach, with 91 percent recommending “a joint
UN-NATO agreement on criteria about how NATO may support UN peacekeeping operations.”

The Negative PR Factor

In the survey, politicians and international media were given a high rate of co-responsibility for escalating the conflict: Fifty-eight percent of the officers observed that “politicians from outside visiting the mission area often encourage one side and provoke the other side of the conflict.” The same percentage of officers says that “media of the conflicting parties are the most responsible for escalation of violence.” Even greater responsibility was attributed to the international media for worsening the situation: The media were blamed by 70 percent of the officers for “encouraging one side and provoking the other side of the conflict.” In order to verify the impact of international media in the area, we asked officers to rate the following statement: “International media have only little impact in the mission area.” Seventy-four percent rejected this statement, and only 25 percent agreed.

One may say in summary that one crucial element for the success of UNTAC in Cambodia was the fact that the UN had its own media to inform the local people about the character of its mandate. This option was denied to all UN operations in the former Yugoslavia. According to the UN soldiers’ experience, media and external politicians often have an escalatory influence on the behavior of conflicting parties. To some extent, this is understandable: In a democracy it is normal procedure for politicians to polarize between good and bad in order to win support. A visitor in an area of conflict is always under pressure, both by the parties he is visiting and by the public at home, to “speak out.” Taking sides in a conflict, however, can contribute to escalation. Parties at war use every opportunity to provoke escalation by the other side in order to win support among their own constituency and solidarity from

the international community, regardless of whether such an approach is legitimate or not, or whether guerilla groups or repressive security forces are being used. Intervention in civil war-like conflict should therefore aim at prohibiting the conflicting parties from escalating the conflict. This may sound like wishful thinking, but what is missing is a doctrine of de-escalation control.

Trained for the Wrong Mission

Senior US officers fervently assert that they were “not prepared for the experiences they encountered in Bosnia. The training encompassed the art of fighting... But after initial deployment ... it became … obvious that the skills acquired by the general officers ... were not enough for what they were called upon to confront in Bosnia.”38 Acting as SFOR commander in 1997, US General William Crouch invited a former British commander of UNPROFOR “to provide the First Armored Division’s senior leadership with specific training on historical, ethnic, political and cultural awareness issues, conflict resolution and negotiation techniques, how to use language translators, how to conduct joint military commissions, how to deal with hostile and friendly media, how to work with civilians.”39 All these skills belong to the conceptual and methodological tools of proactive de-escalation, and are required in complex emergencies.

For the military trained in traditional peacekeeping countries, de-escalation in a civil war-like conflict is not such a new concept. The Peacekeeper’s Handbook of 1984 notes the methods and requirements for UN troops to reduce violence, stop escalation, prepare the ground for constraint and compromise, and to reestablish consent among the conflicting groups with the help of a third party.40 Despite of this, many

39 Ibid., 8.
UNPROFOR officers who came from traditional peacekeeping nations felt they were trained for the wrong mission. While nearly 75 percent officers claimed they had “received a comprehensive peacekeeping training,” 90 percent emphasized that “more emphasis should be given to achieve an open and friendly attitude towards foreign cultures” and “to meet the stress of behaving in fair, firm and friendly manner in hostile environments.” On the other hand, more than 80 percent disagreed with the notion that a “well-trained soldier is a good peacekeeper and does not need additional training.” Obviously, traditional peacekeeping training is not nearly sufficient for peacekeepers in situations of open conflict. In addition, traditional peacekeepers lacked the soft skills necessary to act in a hostile environment.

The UN in Former Yugoslavia: Forgotten Successes

Due to disunity among the major nations in the UN Security Council, UN mandates in former Yugoslavia were often designated as “mission impossible.” Even though UNPROFOR has a reputation for being a “complete failure,” the UN missions in former Yugoslavia do have a record of several forgotten successes, as the following case studies prove.

Case 1: UNPREDEP

The UNPROFOR peacekeeping operation in former Yugoslavia had been deployed since 1992 and headed by a Scandinavian UN force commander together with a US chief of staff. In 1995, UNPREDEP replaced UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This was a complex peace operation that included a variety of international civil, humanitarian, police and military components. Cooperation with the OSCE was very close. UNPREDEP was a great

success and obviously contributed to the prevention of war. It helped to defuse domestic ethnic tensions and succeeded, for example, in convincing the Macedonian Serbs to give up plans for a referendum on secession after they had received constitutional minority rights. The UNPREDEP battalion managed to de-escalate a dramatic border conflict with Serbia by an unauthorized, but successful mediation effort. Norwegian Lt. Gen. Tellefsen and his US deputy, Col. Kuenning, took the risky personal initiative of de-escalating the conflict by simply negotiating – against the will of the UN command and the Macedonian president – with Belgrade. The conflict could otherwise have triggered a war between Serbia and Macedonia in 1994. Unfortunately, such bloodless success stories did not receive the media attention they deserved.42

Case 2: UNTAES

The United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) was established after the 1995 Basic Agreement between local Serb authorities over the peaceful integration of the area into Croatia. The agreement was aimed at the establishment of a transitional UN administration during an initial period. UN Security Council Resolution 1037 instructed UNTAES to monitor the parties’ commitment to respecting the highest standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all local residents, irrespective of their ethnic origin. The mandate included complex tasks similar to UNPREDEP’s, as well as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; demilitarization of the region; and international monitors along the international borders of the region. UNTAES was able to fulfill its basic mandate since the unity of political support was given.

42 See Kuenning, Howard F. “Preventive Peacekeeping as a Model for the Prevention of War.” In: ibid, 218ff.
Case 3: 
The 1994 Washington Agreement and the 1995 Cease-Fire in Bosnia

The rule of impartiality and united political support by NATO and the UN applies to the Washington Framework Agreement of March 1994 between Bosnian Croats and Moslems. The agreement was signed after a cease-fire was negotiated on 23 February 1994 and implemented by UNPROFOR. The UN force separated the military forces of both sides and enforced various civil provisions. The contribution of this UN peacekeeping operation in Central Bosnia towards military and civil stabilization was impressive, as the statistics on freedom of movement and distribution of water and electricity supplies between Bosnian Croats and Muslims indicate. The British UNPROFOR command in Central Bosnia managed to persuade the previously fighting factions to work together in pursuit of a lasting settlement. A comprehensive system of Joint Commissions played a crucial role in encouraging the peace process. This was an awesome task, with no enthusiasm for reconciliation apparent between the parties and continued fighting by both sides with the Bosnian Serbs. The degree of success was quite remarkable and could be described as a textbook example of cooperative, proactive and inclusive peacekeeping.

In October 1995, a cease-fire was negotiated and implemented by UNPROFOR to separate the military forces of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serbs. In achieving this, UNPROFOR prepared the way for the Dayton Agreement of November 1995 and the subsequent deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995. Hans Hækkerup, at that time Danish minister of defense, described both operations as proof that UNPROFOR was “...setting the scene for a classic peacekeeping operation in which forces can be separated and fighting brought to a conclusion. The October 1995 cease-fire, the Dayton Agreement and the subsequent

43 See charts 2–5 at the end of this chapter.
44 See chart 1 at the end of this chapter.
95

95

 deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force made this come true.”45

Case 4: The Impartial Use of Force – the “Tuzla Battle”

There are cases where tough action by UNPROFOR was necessary, but did not escalate at all. One case is the battle of Tuzla, where robust military force was applied according to peacekeeping rules. It is often quoted as a case of enforcement, but really it was a case of self-defense. By the end of April 1994, Danish tanks were involved in a fierce fight with a Bosnian Serb artillery unit, which, after attacking Moslem positions, suddenly launched a massive attack on the UN post NORBAT. The incident is worth studying carefully in regard to the type of forces and, in particular, the type of training required for self-defense in a violent environment according to peacekeeping operations ROE:

- The use of force in self-defense
  Only the Danes acted as they had been trained for peacekeeping operations. The Danish unit gave clear warnings to the attacking Serbs, also by demonstratively illuminating their own white-painted Leopard tanks. Only after the Serb position continued firing against NORBAT positions did the Danish unit shoot several dozen shells precisely at the attacking Serbian forces. In order to act with transparency and restraint, the Danish unit neither asked for close air support nor did it react in revenge.

- Impartiality
  Prior to the battle, the Danes had proven their impartiality by providing humanitarian help and protection both to Muslims in Tuzla and to the Serbs by protecting Serbian school children with armored transportation and by building a road out of reach of Muslim snipers.

45 Hans Hækkerup, Danish defense minister, in a letter to DANORP on 11 March 1997.
• Consent
  After the shoot-out, the Danish commander immediately communicated with the Serb side to clarify that the Serb unit had broken its commitment not to attack UNPROFOR. The Serb commander accepted this, and although the massive Danish reaction reportedly led to many Serb casualties, the battle did not escalate further, nor did the Serbs seek revenge.

This shows that the use of force can become a tool for de-escalation, provided the troops act in self-defense only, under the strict rule of impartiality, and not as an act of punishment.

Unity of Policy as the Key to Success

As the case studies show, all three missions were able to actively de-escalate conflict, once they received unanimous support and enjoyed the unity of policy between NATO and the UN. They were complex missions: UNPREDEP as preventive deployment, UNPROFOR as a mission to enforce the Washington Agreement of spring 1994, and UNTAES to implement the December 1995 agreement. The force commanders de-escalated conflict by means of impartiality, inclusiveness and cooperation. They had, or took, the freedom of acting flexibly and proactively according to the local conditions. This was not without risk. All in all, unity of support by the international community, both by NATO and the UN, is the secret of the forgotten successes of peacekeeping in the Balkans. The head of the DPKO, General Bernard Miyet, reminds us that the UN in part had a more complex task to fulfill than NATO:

The decision to replace UNPROFOR with IFOR in Bosnia was taken when peace had already been settled, when an agreement was in place, and when the parties were ready to participate in the fall of 1995.46

He continues:

At the same time, the United Nations were requested to send... 7,500 troops to Eastern Slavonia and Croatia to carry out a very complex, difficult operation under Chapter VII. Two years later, in Eastern Slavonia, the objectives of a peaceful reintegration of the region in Croatia had been achieved, while, at the same time, the situation in Bosnia remained difficult despite a strong NATO presence in the country.47

NATO Commander General Mackenzie commented that “UNPROFOR … laid the foundations for IFOR and subsequently SFOR to take the process forward. There were two vital elements in its legacy to NATO – international legitimacy and a package of lessons learned.”48 When SFOR began its mission, most officers and soldiers simply changed the color of their helmets from blue to green, from UN to NATO. Provided a UN (or for peacekeeping, OSCE) mandate is in place, the hat or flag of a mission is not all that relevant. The mentioned collective actors – the UN, OSCE, NATO and the EU – can be successful if they cooperate and act in consent. If they quarrel, they are unlikely to be successful in handling conflicts.

Conclusion

1. Main Task: Prevention and De-Escalation

The main lesson is the absolute priority of preventing violent conflict. Once prevention fails, the international community should act early, but impartially, before escalation can start. The early de-escalation of conflict is a major task of NATO, the EU, the UN and the OSCE in order to halt an initial spiral of violence and destruction. A cooperative approach of the international community, combined with unanimous

47 Bernard Miyet, *ibid.*
political support, is more likely to support peacekeeping efforts than a confrontational approach. Such an approach – prevention first, de-escalation in case of crisis – must, however, be prepared. Conflict prevention and conflict de-escalation are complementary concepts. The more civil prevention has taken place, the better, even if prevention has failed. The more the international community is present in potential crisis areas, the more clearly one will be able to discern which actors in a conflict are able to reconcile and/or which should be isolated.

2. First Option: Preventive Peacekeeping

Preventive peacekeeping should be the “prima ratio” rather than the “ultima ratio.” It should be achieved through a de-escalation force that prevents escalation and facilitates civil prevention. This has worked in Macedonia with UNPREDEP, and it could work in other places. It has, for example, been proven repeatedly that it is naive for the international community to organize referenda without having first pressured the parties concerned a) to work towards a consensus for conflict resolution and b) to accept an international presence, including armed peacekeepers, as part of a de-escalation force. Referenda are extremely polarizing, even in democratic nations, and they are explosive in crisis-torn countries that are in transition. This is an important lesson to be learned from the referenda on independence that have taken place in many countries around the world, including former Yugoslavia. It should also be applied, for example, in the case of a referendum in Montenegro. In Macedonia, preventive peacekeeping enabled mediation by the OSCE and the UN (ICFY) that convinced the Serb minority to give up plans for a referendum.

3. Second Option: De-Escalation Taskforce

In the early stage of erupting violence, a diplomatic/civil/military de-escalation taskforce, actively searching for consensus and cooperation together with the parties to the conflict, is immediately required when a conflict first turns violent. In no case should the taskforce take sides in a conflict. Rather it should assist in handling the conflict without
violence, or at least even-handedly. By being prepared for the Petersberg tasks, the EU could become an excellent mandate carrier for the UN or the OSCE. NATO assets could be required, and if possible, there could also be US officers on the ground.

4. More Stability Pacts Required

More Stability Pacts are needed in order to make peace sustainable. This opens the way for close cooperation and a pragmatic division of labor between the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the EU. Once the EU has developed its integrated military and civil capability to carry out the Petersberg tasks, it will be a highly credible actor of peace support operations. The EU will then hold both the carrot of financial aid and the stick of military capability; at the same time, the EU will have its own interest in reducing reconstruction costs as well as military costs. This is an incentive for being cost-effective. A military alliance like NATO has to balance military efficiency with the potential costs for international stability, which as a variable might be less easy to calculate.

5. Strengthening the UN System of Cooperative Security

It has become fashionable to ridicule the UN as an impotent endeavor. We should not forget, however, that it is the leading nations who sit in the UNSC. We should also not forget that the UN Charter has been an enormous progress in world history by forbidding the use of military force other than in cases of self-defense. The veto right is intentionally built-into the charter in order to encourage cooperation towards finding solutions. Even if it cannot function as decisively as the founding fathers had expected, cooperative security hinges on the UN system as a whole. The values and principles inscribed in the UN Charter and promoted in Europe by the EU, OSCE and NATO, cannot actually be imposed by means of war, but rather are dependent on cooperation. The Warsaw Pact was not defeated by confrontation on the battlefield, but rather by cooperation through the CSCE Helsinki Act. No regime in the world dares to openly challenge the UN Charter as the basis of inter-
national law. Therefore, the “notion must be dispelled that the UN and OSCE are ineffective and can therefore be sidelined.”\textsuperscript{49} They should be measured “by their fundamental purpose to generate consensus and the resulting legitimacy”\textsuperscript{50} aimed at the preservation and promotion of international law and order. As Guido Lenzi stated, the essential issue of international intervention “is not … how to cope with the inadequacies of warfare, but rather to ensure the most adequate. i.e. persuasive, mixture of civil and military ingredients.”\textsuperscript{51}

Legality is a key principle in democratic states. According to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the use of military means in peace support missions “must be based on an unequivocal mandate under international law. As a rule, this would be a mandate of the UN Security Council or action under the aegis of the OSCE. A community defined by values such as the transatlantic alliance cannot afford delay on this issue.”\textsuperscript{52} The notion must also be dispelled that the UN and OSCE are per se ineffective, and should therefore be sidelined. They should be supported in their most essential institutional function of consensus building. They should not be measured by their capability to deliver decisions and forces, but rather by their fundamental purpose of generating consensus and achieving legitimacy as a result.\textsuperscript{53} The UN and the OSCE are inclusive regarding membership, but exclusive in terms of giving mandates according to international law. They are the only normative bodies. Without the UN and the OSCE, the rule of law would be replaced with the rule of force. Without NATO and the EU, the rule of law would be powerless.

When designed in a cooperative manner, peace support operations are compatible with each of these organizations. Once they are compatible,


\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{52} Schröder, Gerhard. Munich Conference on Security, 6 February 1999, 3 (manuscript for the press).

the question of who is in charge becomes a matter of pragmatism rather than principle. It would be desirable for the main actors to formulate a joint peacekeeping doctrine. Such doctrine should primarily focus on a policy that supports prevention and the de-escalation of conflict in cooperation with the main actors of civil crisis management. In the light of various terminologies, concepts and doctrines, doctrines for peace support should at least be compatible with the principles of UN peacekeeping, as outlined in the implementation report54 to the Brahimi Report. With future military capabilities for the Petersberg tasks, the EU may become the UN’s key partner, because the EU represents a wide range of means, from development assistance to stability pacts and perspectives of integration, which in my opinion are the most compatible for peace support operations.

The main criterion for peace support should be the compatibility with international law and the spirit of the UN Charter. By being compatible, the close cooperation and division of labor between OSCE, NATO, EU and UN provides many synergies in the area of economic, financial and military resources. The UN, which has the main responsibility for security and development, would benefit, the European security scenario would improve, and everyone else would also stand to gain. Last but not least, when pleading for a maximally cooperative approach, the real success story of NATO should be recalled. By adopting the Harmel-Report in 1967, NATO overcame the deadlock of the Cold War by offering cooperation with the potential enemy in order to reunite Europe. This paved the way not only for détente, but also for the communist block’s final option, namely ceasing resistance without a fight.

Chart 1:
Joint Commission Introduced by UNPROFOR in 1994 to Encourage Conflicting Parties in Central Bosnia to Cooperate

Part I: Bosnian Croat-Muslim Cease-Fire of April 1994: UNPROFOR’s Effect on Normalization\textsuperscript{56}

Chart 2:

*Permitted and Actual Freedom of Movement through the UN Checkpoints in Lasva Valley (Central Bosnia), February to October 1994*

![Bar chart showing population movements per month from February to October 1994.]

Chart 3:

*Distribution of Electricity to Bosnian-Muslim Areas within the Lasva Valley (Central Bosnia), February to October 1994*

![Bar chart showing total consumers from February to October 1994.]

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 226f.
Chart 4:
Distribution of Electricity to Croat Areas within the Lasva Valley, February to October 1994 (Central Bosnia)

Chart 5:
Distribution of Water to Consumers in the Lasva Valley, February to October 1994 (Central Bosnia)
Part II: Figures and Data from a Survey of UNPROFOR and SFOR officers, 1995–1997\textsuperscript{57}

**Chart 6:**

What contributes to the escalation of violence and deterioration in the mission area? UNPROFOR officers’ attitudes to the impact of external actors on the mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Interference by individual countries in operational matters can put my work as a peacekeeper unnecessarily at risk”</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Contradictory mandates by the UN Security Council are making the peacekeeping job very difficult”</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“International media have a strong impact in the mission area. They encourage one side and provoke the other side of the conflict”</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Troop-contributing countries are interfering in operational matters”</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Politicians from outside visiting the mission area often encourage one side and provoke the other side of the conflict”</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Media of the conflicting parties are the most responsible for escalation of violence”</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“International media have only little impact in the mission area”</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 7: Should and could peacekeepers intervene against violation of human rights? UNPROFOR officers’ attitudes to the principle of “impartiality” in civil war situations

“A peacekeeper must act impartially, even if his heart demands that he takes sides”

“Like a policeman, a peacekeeper can intervene against grave violations of human rights”

“Impartiality makes it impossible for me to prevent atrocities”

“Impartiality is a myth: A peacekeeper must take sides against aggressors”
Chart 8: Should and could the UN do the job alone? UNPROFOR officers’ recommendations for improving UN-NATO relations

- “There should be a joint UN-NATO agreement on criteria on how NATO may support UN peacekeeping operations”
- “NATO should not take sides when supporting a peacekeeping operation”
- “NATO members should commit forces which are trained, earmarked and rapidly deployable under the UN stand-by concept”
- “NATO members should support the idea of a permanent UN peacekeeping force for rapid deployment under the command of the UN Secretary General”
- “NATO should have the right to execute a UN mandate under NATO command only”
- “The UN must accept that NATO develop its own doctrine for Peacekeeping Operations”
- “The UN should conduct peacekeeping operations alone”
Chart 9: How realistic are the stipulations of the Dayton Agreement for carrying out the mandate? IFOR/SFOR officers’ attitudes to the feasibility of tasks expected from the Dayton Agreement.

- “Implement the military parts of the Dayton Agreement”
- “Reverse ethnic cleansing”
- “Arrest war criminals”
- “Implement the political parts of the Dayton Agreement”
- “Restore Bosnia as a single multi-ethnic state”
Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations

Introduction

Civil-military relations in peace support operations can be represented in several dimensions: relations between external military forces and internal civilian authorities or society; between internal regular or irregular forces and external civilian agencies; and between the external military and civilian components of interventions. It is the last of these, the relationship between external military and civilian (exclusively humanitarian) actors in conflict environments, that provides the material for this discussion. This relationship is interesting because it has manifested a shift from detachment, suspicion and ignorance – in which interaction was based essentially on a duality of roles and culture – towards a level of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) that is becoming institutionalized. Indeed, this relationship has been described in some quarters in terms of “partnership.” It is, nevertheless, laced with a degree of confusion over identity and roles, and many of the previously assumed boundaries around operational principles have

1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the BISA Conference, 18–20 December 2000, University of Bradford and an ODI Seminar on Aid and Politics, London, 1 February 2001. It also draws on material published in Security Dialogue. Thanks are expressed to Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Neil Cooper and Mark Duffield for their helpful comments.
become rather porous. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has noted that:

[All] partners currently face the challenge of trying to define the increasingly blurred boundaries and limits of humanitarian action, in an environment that is subject to political and military imperatives which are outside their respective mandates.2

This paper sets out to analyze the problems facing civil-military cooperation in the humanitarian field in the light of the blurring of roles and the process of institutionalization of CIMIC. Although the paper does not claim to contribute to theory, it is grounded in critical security studies and might be considered an application of the solidarist/emancipatory theories concerning: voice, empowerment, social justice, human rights and humanitarian intervention.3 A second disclaimer is in order at the outset because this paper takes a pragmatically convenient rather than a theoretically robust stance in treating institutions as the basic unit of analysis rather than individuals. This approach has implications for the concept of emancipation, because even institutions claiming to stand for solidarism and emancipation are frequently hierarchical, bureaucratic and hegemonic in their control over individual participants. However, the focus on collectivities might be excused in the light of the empirical evidence that CIMIC has become codified, bureaucratized, and “sentenced to death by doctrine” – in short institutionalized. Of course, it also hardly needs emphasizing that within each part of the civilian-military duality there are manifold perspectives. UNICEF, the ICRC, the Danish Refugee Council, Oxfam, local NGOs and Military Professional Resources Inc. all have distinctive practices and standpoints. The NGO world is a fractured, fractious zoo full of weird and wonderful animals. A major practical obstacle to coordinated, let alone integrated, responses to complex emergencies is the sheer scale and fragmentation of actors, activities and perceptions in the civilian sector. The military sector, too, is marked by a variety of


traditions, cultures and objectives – sometimes proving debilitating, as in the UN mission to Sierra Leone.⁴

With these reservations in mind, the argument can be summarized as follows. To the extent that civilian components represent non-statist, or even cosmopolitan, approaches to humanitarian emergencies, their distinctiveness safeguards the integrity of emancipatory responses that have particular relevance to contemporary conflicts. Indeed, if this demarcation ceased to exist, the blurring of boundaries would lead not to an appropriate pragmatism, but to a dilution, even a dysfunctional re-nationalization, of non-statist humanitarianism. Whilst the demarcation remains intact, it places a ceiling on the prospects for CIMIC. However, institutionalization has been marked by the military-driven approach to CIMIC that emerged from the Somalia and Balkan interventions. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UNHCR was in control,⁵ but in Somalia and Kosovo, the military enjoyed a hegemonic position. Practice may not yet demonstrate an overriding militarizing trend in civil-military relations, but the evolution of CIMIC and CIMIC doctrines present challenges to the cosmopolitan potential of civilian agencies.

This paper begins by identifying the disjunctions between the modern conflict context and statist responses. It then argues that the demarcation between civilian and military components rests, to a large extent, on their different transmission functions vis-à-vis the state. The contention is then made that, in spite of frequent observations that the civil sector is in a condition of flux, a willingness to professionalize and reform inter-civilian cooperation is evident. Finally, the paper notes the institutionalization of CIMIC by military sources and towards a military model, a development that challenges the non-statist elements of the civilian sector.

---


State-Centrism and Modern Conflict

Civil-military partnerships in responses to emergencies are marked by two disjunctions. First, there is a disjunction at the systemic level between the dominant representation of the world as statist by politicians and military intervenors, whereas modern conflicts represent a challenge to statism. Second, and within the first, there are historical disconnections between the military and civilian components, not simply because they have different roles (which are represented as increasingly overlapping in the humanitarian field), but because of divergent philosophical allegiances (see section on “Nationals, Internationals and Transnationals”). These two disjunctions might be regarded as placing a ceiling on CIMIC that, in the short term at least, seems to be significant.

Statist representations of the world remain dominant in western discourses and activities concerning complex emergencies. This leads to a disjunction between the dominant statist notions of sovereignty and the nature of many contemporary conflicts (variously labelled “new”, “post-modern” and “residue” wars), in which local elites mesh their agendas with those of external elites to create “virtual states.” The territorial state is dysfunctional, lacking elementary control of its borders. Violence is less about ideology and competing views of the public good or even about control of territory, and more about private control and exploitation of resources, whether these are guns, diamonds, drugs or laborers. Multiple centers of authority create linkages to the global economy for markets, the acquisition of arms and the expatriation of profits, much as the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone had done through Charles Taylor of Liberia.6 In a sense it represents structural adjustment with a vengeance: a logical development of

marketization, privatization and decentralization. Military activity is characterized by the absence of centralized authority, free-booting paramilitaries, the use of child soldiers, the flow and currency of small arms and the privatization of security through profit-making companies. Such conflict is also marked by the deliberate goading of civilian population movements to accompany or counterbalance military power and the manipulation of refugees and diasporas as transnational actors. At the same time, the perpetrators of domestic abuses are under international scrutiny, and alternative sources of non-territorial governance, whether in the form of regional communities, private institutions, real-time media reportage, civil society, mafia networks or supranational bodies, have disfigured the Westphalian system.

Moreover, according to Mark Duffield’s analysis, post-modern conflict is also associated with a new aid paradigm. It is no longer assumed in the major capitalist centers that economically marginal areas can be developed and integrated into the global system. Crisis areas have to be insulated, and refugees contained by in loco protection. By the mid-1980s, development support to governments began to give way to donor policies of funding NGOs, whose role was essentially to provide a welfare safety netting, particularly in conflict areas where NGOs

7 Private security and military involvement in Sierra Leone illustrates the post-statal dimensions of modern conflict. The UK’s decision to send troops may have been partly influenced by the attention the Labour government had to give to Sierra Leone after bad publicity had attended the use of a private company, Sandline, by the Sierra Leone government in exile in 1998. In 2000 a British firm, Air Foyle, shipped 67,000 kilograms of arms from Ukraine to Burkina Faso, from where, contrary to an arms embargo, they were transported to rebels in Sierra Leone, though the firm claimed it had no knowledge of the final destination. The plane which delivered the weapons was subsequently used by the Ministry of Defence to take British troops to Freetown, and the UK government took no action against the firm. See Cooper, Neil. “Arms Exports, New Labour and the Pariah Agenda.” Contemporary Security Policy 21, no. 3 (2000): 54–77.

have gained unprecedented access (Operation Lifeline Sudan in 1989, for example). In this respect, subcontracted NGOs have been the handmaidens of a shift from development to safety netting for areas excluded from global integration. Emergencies do not emerge and go away: they stay. The phenomenon is not sustainable development but sustained emergency. Civilian agencies have resented the use of humanitarian action as either an alibi for political inaction, as this merely serves to prolong emergencies, or as a political weapon through the imposition of conditionality.

The new aid paradigm reflects not so much a normative shift towards humanitarian intervention, as a statist use of humanitarianism to address issues of poverty and redistributive justice. In the dominant capitalist centers, state authorities may have nurtured a new aid paradigm as a kind of semi-detached engagement, but they define humanitarian emergencies according to their assessments of state interests. The end of the Cold War has not made a great difference in the way that peace, security and justice are constructed and represented in the international system. There has been no fundamental normative shift in what determines external engagement in war zones, and perhaps there cannot be one as long as states are the prime determinants of intervention and its representation. Dramatic interventions, such as the protection of the Kurds in northern Iraq, will not represent a normative extension of global justice and security when abuse is condoned elsewhere. The deployment of multinational forces depends upon the policy among state authorities coinciding with their means and their strategic interests. Jakobsen’s analysis of the factors triggering intervention is a useful reminder that governments are not especially heroic about

They are nervous about incurring casualties and weigh up a range of interests, including intangibles such as credibility and prestige. One might go further to argue that rational, civilized, humanitarian intervention is part of the packaging in which Western security culture, self-perception and self-interest are wrapped. The new humanism and the demonization of “rogue states” have been key elements of the West’s script for reconstituting security so as to fill a threat vacuum in the unruly post-Cold War world. Contrary to Tom Weiss’ estimation that the first half of the 1990s saw an “unleashing [of] the humanitarian impulse,” there has perhaps never been a clear ethical mobilization of governments to intervene, regardless of whether they were pressured by domestic publics or not. A genuine normative shift will only occur when individuals and non-state communities contest the sources of sovereignty and its statist representation.

Varieties of cosmopolitanism address this issue in various ways; they do, however, commonly reprove the society of states as part of the problem. From a critical theory perspective, interventions only deal with the manifestations of social, economic and political breakdown which are embedded in the state-oriented structure. Intervening states and intergovernmental organizations fail to attend to an incubating unrest, because they construct the meaning of sovereignty in terms of a


As Cynthia Weber argues, intervention is necessary to “prove” the existence of sovereignty whose boundaries are thereby violated, see Weber, Cynthia. Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 128f.


communities, civil society networks, city links and regional associations, this would make for a less conflictual world, not only because individual rights rather than state interests would take precedence, but also because it would give a voice to groups that are ignored, disadvantaged or abused by states. Solidarist versions of cosmopolitanism, as represented by David Campbell, imply expressions of solidarity with “alterities” (i.e. tolerant alternatives), that are suppressed by power-holders. Solidarism underestimates the persistence of state forms and the dilemmas arising when two or more suppressed groups abuse each other. The cosmopolitan approaches, however, are both relevant to intra-state conflicts and a potential modification to the prevailing statist responses of integrated capitalism.

Nationals, Internationals and Transnationals

The second element of the problem in civil-military cooperation is a refinement of the first. It is worth re-emphasizing the fact that military and police forces are state servants sent by governments. This is partly what gives military establishments a clear advantage in configuring civil-military relations. They boast a hierarchical structure, relatively regular funding, logistic capabilities, a pool of labor and the backing of the state that sent them. In UN missions, when military contingents are under the operational control of a non-national commander, strategic command remains with a national government, and this determines a national accountability. Indeed, the more powerful western military establishments avoid being answerable to international civil servants, especially in enforcement operations. When states deploy forces under the UN, national military forces set up parallel reporting and control structures with their home base. Even in a well-integrated military institution such as NATO, the member states, and


particularly hegemonic states, directly determine crisis management and their contributions to it. This sometimes leads to conflicts of loyalty, as General Mike Jackson’s refusal to start World War III demonstrated in Kosovo; state and alliance interests are, however, generally constructed as synonymous, or else a form of “variable geometry” is tolerated. By contrast, international civil servants are sent by international organizations whose policies are less directly molded by states, and NGOs are private sector transnational communities with diffuse allegiances, dividing their loyalty between donors, governing boards and local communities. Such distinctions suggest that CIMIC problems cannot be solved by lofty appeals to integrated authority, agenda-setting, or management.

Of course, the distinction should not be exaggerated: overlap and convergences exist. In the jostling for media coverage and funding, the various civilian elements are thrust into the market-place. UN agencies, such as UNHCR, are dependent on, and politicized by state funding and policy orientations. NGOs draw significant proportions of their funds from governments. The ICRC’s mandate is based on the Geneva conventions, to which only states can be signatories. US and Northern European NGOs have often had a close relationship to their respective states. In spite of the example cited above, a strong degree of nationalism was present in Kosovo, where many NGOs worked with refugees in tandem with their own nation’s army. The US military requested US NGOs to provide refugee camp services in Albania. Other demarcations seem to have been eroded. Transnationals are not only political in their unwitting or collateral impacts. Aid has been politicized in the sense that agencies use it to achieve social transformation, to construct market-orientated societies (which may actually


20 MSF received 46% of its income and Oxfam 25% of its income from government sources in 1998, see “NGOs: Sins of the Secular Missionaries.” The Economist, 29 January 2000, 25.
foster further instability). Many now engage in political advocacy and seek a rights-based approach. NGOs have also worked closely with armed factions, in the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia and elsewhere, negotiating for access (and perhaps being manipulated in the process). On the other side of the relationship, military forces are often integrated at certain levels (in NATO, for example) and take on the attributes of internationals. Committed humanitarians in military and other state institutions sometimes strive to move their state apparatus in a more cosmopolitan direction. Moreover, military establishments, much like NGOs, have been penetrated by private security companies that run facilities and logistic support. In conflict zones, private companies are involved in camp construction, demining and security services. Still, it remains true that a certain class of international actors and transnationals bodies are not under state control, regardless of whether or not they represent alternatives to statism.

A further cultural distinction that has a bearing on approaches to transformation is worth making. Diplomats, politicians and military personnel are trained to interrogate and negotiate with political elites, warlords and paramilitaries. External and internal military actors speak the same “language” of security, command, hierarchy and ceremony, and they have a common culture and technical interest in such issues as demilitarization. This could be particularly important in arranging cease-fires and transitions, and may have been a factor in NATO forces moving from an attitude of ambiguity about the KLA into a situation that allowed the KLA to become the de facto ruler of Kosovo. It is not the military’s job to empower those who are vulnerable to abusive states or warlords. NGOs, however, are relatively free from the encumbrances of statism. They have the potential to operate in local communities in ways that reach groups without power, as well as local authority structures. Although critics have accused civilian humanitarian
agencies of failing to adapt to the contexts of post-modern war, their social services may be more adaptive and critically aware because they form transnational communities and are not state employees. They certainly have the greater potential, actively pursued by French humanitarian organizations, to take a solidarist and non-state centric approach to disadvantaged communities. Even if they depend on state funding, the large aid agencies such as Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and CARE have parallel international structures, and are cosmopolitan in their staffing and organization. Above all, they are either concerned with, or have the potential to explore and develop norms that advance welfare, human rights and social justice. In this role, they ought to be better equipped than soldiers to nurture those processes that are prized by cosmopolitans: education, capacity-building, transparency, accountability and responsibility in civil relations.

The disjunction of state and non-state imperatives is thus perceived to be blurred, but is sufficiently significant to preclude the achievement of an integrated civil-military ideal. Transnationals may be uneasy about being depicted alongside military components. Indeed, British agencies made efforts to avoid being trapped into the prevailing bilateral relief effort in the Kosovo crisis. The formula that Hugo Slim of Oxfam and the Center for Development Policy uses to describe the NGO relationship with a PSO seems appropriate: “We might work with it but we are not ‘in it’.” On the grounds that we need to think more radically about


24 Hugo Slim in correspondence with the author, 13 November 1998.
the ethical problems of statism and the disjunction between statist realpolitik and the modern conflict, non-state responses play an important role that needs to be preserved. Where blurring occurs, it may do less harm if it results in a dilution of state-centrism. Whether the role can be preserved can be questioned because of the view that the civilian sector is in a state of crisis.25

Civilian Sector in Flux

In the civilian sector, a post-Cold War period of optimism gave way to critical reflection after the tragically inadequate responses to crises in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. Many shortcomings are patently familiar: lack of regulation, poor assessment of needs, duplication of effort, weak evaluation and rapid expansion in the numbers of NGOs enabling rogue outfits to take advantage of an unregulated field to further non-humanitarian agendas.26 It is also widely acknowledged that aid and the presence of external actors have become part of the political economy of war, thus raising issues about the diversion and targeting of assistance, the hiring of protection and the practice of aid conditionality.27 In a competitive industry, cursed by uncertain funding, NGOs have also sought to perpetuate their existence through publicity, aware that media coverage of emergencies makes a huge difference to their capacities. In this respect Kosovo was a Rolls Royce emergency, that presented some agencies with more money than they knew what to do with and


diverted attention away from less strategically placed “silent” emergencies. In the words of one assessment: “At a global level, the humanitarian system has not proved itself impartial.” An analysis of civilian activity in the Balkans and Africa has led Mark Duffield to conclude that the humanitarian system has risked serving the exclusionary and containment purposes of the capitalist centers of world economy. NGOs have colluded with the false notion that emergencies are discontinuous, rather than sustained, and that they are incapable of commanding the resources necessary to react effectively. Similarly, Stubbs argues that NGOs are too preoccupied with replicating themselves locally and acting as bearers of western/northern cultural values, to be able to navigate among the shoals of local hegemonic politics. Their claims about having an impact on social transformation are simply not justified. He sees greater potential among the major UN agencies, particularly UNDP, for undertaking integrated social development and providing vertical coordination from a local to international level. UN agencies have also had unenviable experiences, however, partly due to irregular funding and half-hearted reform. In lieu of a well-established, tailor-made coordination agency, the solution favored by major states to the problems of coordination under UN auspices has been the lead agency concept. The UNHCR’s designation for this role has given it burdens for which it was not designed and to which it could not readily adapt, but which was in the interests of the commissioner’s main state providers. The immediate cause of UNHCR’s poor showing in Albania and Macedonia (except around Kukes) seems to have
been the lack of qualified coordinating staff as a direct consequence of
cuts to its Emergency Preparedness and Response Section (especially
administrators). The section had worked well in the Great Lakes Crisis.
A vicious circle was then sealed when key donors restricted cash flows
to UNHCR in the Kosovo refugee emergency because it was perform-
ing poorly. Concern is now being voiced that the high-profile military
effort in Kosovo could lead to a diminution of the UNHCR’s role.32

With both NGOs and UN agencies assailed by such problems, is there
any sense in depending on internationals and transnationals to offset
the realpolitik of statism? There is, however, little sign of the NGO sec-
tor diminishing in size or influence, and private firms may be in addi-
tion to, rather than replacements for other parts of the sector. On the
contrary, the transnational dimension of the international system has
expanded dramatically, suggesting the growth of a counterbalance to
statism. Since the Great Lakes Crisis in 1997, the Security Council has
held sessions with non-state humanitarian organizations, “penetrating
the state monopoly on humanitarian perspectives.”33 The 1990s also
saw efforts to promote inter-agency collaboration, partnership and the
pooling of resources. There are many examples of collaboration at the
national level, such as the UK’s Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC),
which raises and distributes funds, and evaluates performance
on behalf of 12 agencies.34 At the international agency level, examples
include CAFOD, Oxfam and Christian Aid sharing expertise on water
and sanitation issues in camps for Kosovo refugees. At the grass-roots
level, local partnerships with existing or new local NGOs are processes
that help in capacity-building, local ownership and stakeholding. The

32 Valid International. Final report for DEC Kosovo Crisis: Lesson Learning Study.
London, 29 November 1999, 15–16; Morris, Peter. “Humanitarian Interventions in
33 Weiss, Thomas G. “Civilian–Military Interactions and Ongoing UN Reforms:
DHA’s Past and OCHA’s Remaining Challenges.” In Peacekeeping and the UN
34 Help the Aged, Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN), the Tear
Fund, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), Oxfam, Christian
Aid, CARE, Children’s Aid Direct, Concern (Concern Worldwide), World Vision,
British Red Cross Society, Save the Children Fund. The Disaster Emergency
Committee raised £50m for Kosovo relief.
proliferation of local NGOs in Macedonia and Kenya, for example, has been seen as adding to the texture of civil society. In the UN family, a start was made to grapple with problems of coordination after the Gulf War, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) made useful progress in developing the Military-Civil Disaster Unit (MCDU) to coordinate assistance packages. The DHA’s successor, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), plays a key role in the UN’s executive committees for peace and security and for humanitarian affairs, though it has a limited field presence itself. The UN Security Council holds meetings, originally with the ICRC, but now with Oxfam, CARE, MSF and others to provide non-state perspectives.

Furthermore, there is a commitment among agencies to accountability and professionalism. The major UN agencies are more transparent and accountable than in the 1980s. The UNHCR’s commissioning of an independent report of its Kosovo performance, and its broad acceptance of the findings may be indicative of this. To underpin its democratic integrity, Oxfam goes to the length of providing household donors with ballot papers for elections to its board of trustees. More generally, various codes of conduct have been developed, and donors insist on adherence to the ICRC/NGO code to qualify for funding. An annex to the code recommends that donor governments should provide funding with a guarantee of operational independence. The International Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response comprising the major umbrella organizations also produced a manual, known as the Sphere Project, to set minimum standards of provision in disaster response. The civilian sector is now more aware of the possibilities of monitoring and evaluating its own procedures and impacts, and in the UK there is growing support for an ombudsperson to monitor NGO

35 A UN Report of 1995 estimated there were 29,000 international NGOs and thousands more domestic. See “NGOs: Sins of the Secular Missionaries.” The Economist, 29 January 2000, 25.

36 OCHA has about 120 core positions and only 100 expatriates, plus another 200 nationals in the field.
compliance with the ICRC code.37 Professionalism also extends to engagement in theoretical and empirical research, involving practitioners, politicians and academics.

Problems persist, however. The Security Council may be listening to privileged western agencies rather than a wide representation. To some critics, the UN system offers something worse than no coordination at all, since it provides neither coordination by command nor consensus. Coordination is left to the market-place and to subcontracting. The vast majority of agencies, however, seem well-disposed to the idea of UN coordination, even if their priority is internal coordination, and coordination with others is time-consuming. One Kosovo evaluation found that:

A strong, independent coordination body is required to ensure adherence to humanitarian principles, and to ensure respect for minimum (and maximum) standards, particularly in highly politicized emergencies.38

In the NGO world, evaluation mechanisms are generally weak, and aid workers continue to bemoan problems in personnel management, such

37 The first four of the ten points in the ICRC code of conduct fit with a cosmopolitan approach, though humanitarian organizations generally emphasize that primary responsibility for coping with emergencies lies with state governments: “(1) The humanitarian imperative comes first; (2) Aid is given regardless of race, creed or nationality on the basis of need alone; (3) Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint; (4) We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.” Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, ed. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1994, Annex II (2). See also The Sphere Project. Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Oxford: Oxfam, 2000; Davidson, Sara, ed. People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel. Humanitarian Practice Network Paper No. 20, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1997; Van Brabant, Koenraad. “Operational Security Management in Violent Environments.” Humanitarian Practice Network Good Practice Review 8, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000.

as a lack of training. There is limited monitoring of the implementation of the ICRC Code and the Sphere manual, especially by local partner organizations. Standard-setting has limits when each situation is unique, and French humanitarians regard the Sphere manual as a lever for state donors to control NGOs rather than a way of ensuring NGO independence. Considering that rations for displaced Kosovars contained Turkish delight, an important lesson from that particular war is that maximum as well as minimum standards are necessary. Partnerships with local NGOs may empower groups with exclusionary political agendas or ethnic biases, and the creation of local offspring in the image of a major agency may lead to a dependency culture.

While humanitarian agencies seem to be far more reflective about their purposes and performance than in the 1980s, political analysis is still lacking because, as Joanna Macrae contends, the humanitarian aid community has failed to understand the centrality of politics in analyzing the roles of conflict and humanitarian relief in international politics. This was demonstrated during the Kosovo crisis, when virtually all agencies were barred from assisting displaced persons in Kosovo during the bombing, and the Serb, Roma, Montenegrin, Bosnian and Krajina refugees were largely ignored. Christian Aid and Save the Children called for an early cease-fire and access to Kosovo itself, but few civilian agencies contested the official NATO representation of a

---

39 The Code of Conduct and the Humanitarian Charter of the Sphere Project were relatively new at the time of the Kosovo War, and Oxfam was exceptional in taking the latter seriously. See Disaster Emergency Committee. *Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) Kosovo Appeal Funds.* London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 6 April 2000.


humanitarian war (although subsequently, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and independent commentators have done so). 43 Without greater political awareness, the capacity of civilian non-state groups to counterbalance or influence strategic preoccupations will be limited. Indeed, the statist formulation of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) has been progressively institutionalized by military establishments.

Institutionalization of Civil-Military Cooperation

Given that relief operations detract from the main purposes for which armed forces are maintained, it is significant that, beginning in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, military establishments took initiatives to institutionalize civil-military relations. 44 Forces may be dependent on local civilian authorities and populations for resources and freedom of movement, and on external civilian organizations for advice and

43 See Valid International. Final report for DEC Kosovo Crisis: Lesson Learning Study. London, 29 November 1999. 11, 23; and Disaster Emergency Committee. Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) Kosovo Appeal Funds. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 6 April 2000; Kosovo has been called the “graveyard of independent humanitarian action”, see Rieff, David. “Did Truly Independent Relief Agencies Die in Kosovo?” Humanitarian Affairs Review no. 7 (2000): 4–7. However, according to the study by Valid International, agencies felt either that they were able to maintain neutrality and independence or that working closely with NATO made no difference to the Yugoslav perception of them as fatally compromised, see ibid., 11f.

44 UNPROFOR and UNHCR created a Civilian-Military Operation center in Bosnia in 1993, and a CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) Center was set up by the United States in Somalia for coordination with humanitarian organizations. France did not agree to NATO preparations, exchange of plans or coordination with UNHCR for Kosovo and has opposed further expansion of NATO humanitarian relief functions that might expand the organization. The UK’s resistance to the idea derived from a more pragmatic objection to the potential costs. Kennedy, Ken. “The Relationship Between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.” International Peacekeeping 3, no. 1 (1996): 92–112.
information. The Euro-Atlantic military institutions therefore foster good relationships with civilian organizations for their own effective military functioning: known as “civil environment protection.” Peace support operations that include enforcement designed to coerce parties into desired forms of behavior can make relations with civilians based on the traditional principles of humanitarianism somewhat problematic, but CIMIC can help to manage such issues.

Although the absence of military protection is the rule in most civilian relief missions, civilian organizations have learned from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and the Great Lakes that in order to do their job effectively, they are often dependent on military/police operations for the provision of security. Forums exist to encourage dialogues, mutual awareness, exchange of information and support. In practice, civilian field workers are often full of praise for this support and the facility with which it can be delivered. Finally, civilian agencies are involved in the planning of CIMIC implementation. Danish organizations and the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), for example, established good practice by initiating a project to map civil-military guidelines for emergencies (although these are limited to unopposed peacekeeping missions).

Asymmetries are apparent, however. First, because NATO members effectively conducted uncoordinated national relief efforts in the Kosovo war, some states have been demanding structural transformation in NATO to give it a more central humanitarian role. Second, CIMIC formulation has tended to be stronger in one direction than another. Current military concepts in the Euro-Atlantic institutions have not involved humanitarian work in the initial design of cooperative frameworks. Third, one cannot assume that because a military


47 A NATO delegation official interviewed by the author in July 1999.
mission derives from political goals, the objectives of most of the civil-
ian organizations will be the same.\textsuperscript{48} CIMIC operations give priority to
supporting a military mission in all circumstances. The Euro-Atlantic
military institutions foster good relationships with the civil environ-
ment so as to “create civil-military conditions that will offer the com-
mander the greatest possible moral, material and tactical advantages.”\textsuperscript{49}

The coercive orientation of PSO may improve physical access to con-
flict zones and protect populations, but the civil-military relationship
can be highly charged because subordination of CIMIC to strategic
purposes, as in Kosovo, can lead to forms of political conditionality
that are liable to dilute cosmopolitan approaches and strengthen neo-
liberal realpolitik. Finally, the joining of military intervention and
humanitarian relief can make it look as though humanitarianism is an
excuse for military intervention, creating suspicion among protagonists
about the real motives of humanitarian efforts.\textsuperscript{50} This may not be prob-
elmatic if solidarists decide, as they did over Kosovo, that there is a
coincidence between a “just war” and humanitarian imperatives.\textsuperscript{51} In
any conception of work for humanity, as well as in humanitarian law,
however, the principle of treating people according to need, including
casualties of “friendly” military forces, is an ideal that demands
respect. In any event, troops are dependent on governments to deploy
them, and they will not always arrive ahead of civilians. The post-
Kosovo problem lies in the prospect that host governments will now
prevent humanitarian access because it is associated with military
intervention for national interests. For the civilian aid community,
CIMIC not only raises presentational and practical issues, but also
requires consideration of long-standing principles. Principles such as

\textsuperscript{48} NATO. \textit{NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine.} AJP–09, Annex A

\textsuperscript{49} Western European Union. \textit{WEU Draft Concept on Civil-Military Cooperation
(CIMIC).} WEU-DMS 99246, Brussels: Western European Union, 17 February
1999.

\textsuperscript{50} Roberts, Adam. \textit{Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection and Impartiality in
a Policy Vacuum.} Adelphi Paper 305, Oxford: Oxford University Press/IISS, 1996,
70.

\textsuperscript{51} See Booth, Carrie. “Intervention, Emancipation and Kosovo.” \textit{Civil Wars} 2, no. 3
independence and impartiality cannot be absolute, but need to be negotiated and defined for each situation. This requires a degree of political education and perspicacity about the role of conflict in society that has been patently lacking in the past.

Conclusion: The Cosmopolitan Distance

CIMIC mirrors the changing politicization of humanitarianism. The transnational and international civilian elements have made strides to professionalize, advocate, collaborate and engage in civil-military cooperation. The current situation, however, does not suggest the triumph of an emancipatory model, in which participants are working from a solidarist or cosmopolitan baseline of non-state allegiance. Moreover, non-state actors may be increasingly co-opted within an aid paradigm dominated by neo-liberal statism.52

CIMIC doctrine, inherited from Somalia, is a realist one, in which coordination is hierarchical and hegemonic. Although UNHCR was in control in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and although a planned military logistic center at Entebbe Airfield in the Great Lakes Crisis had an MCDU official playing a prominent role, these cases may well be exceptional. The Balkan crises have spurred military establishments to review CIMIC frameworks and given them incentives to institutionalize civil-military relations, whereby humanitarian organizations are invited to integrate into a peace support mission. Consultation with civilian sector representatives has been limited to planning for the implementation of frameworks already designed and presented as a fait accompli. Participation of UN agencies in NATO crisis management exercises

has not involved planning the exercises. In sum, such efforts to improve coherence through CIMIC run the risk of closing off a cosmopolitan future. Even if civilian components simply ignore CIMIC, this might not be enough to avoid being regarded by host communities as humanitarian camouflage for strategic goals.

Antonio Donini has posed the question: “Should the humanitarians be better equipped by the international community to do their job or should the military be trained to take on tasks other than war and security?” Military personnel are clearly capable of performing humanitarian tasks, not least in civil emergencies. Whether, however, military establishments can do this well – or according to need rather than political interests and strategic calculation – at the same time as enforcing peace or fighting a war is another matter. Control and coordination of relief work will be ancillary to military goals. And although state military forces can help to improve the environment for human rights, it is not their job to empower groups whose voices are ignored or suppressed. Rather, they may deal with local power-brokers who are responsible for feeding the conflict in the first place. Moreover, without the empowerment of civilians, phasing-out the military presence is delayed.

Coordination of relief and peace-building, molded by military security considerations, has been proposed by Gen. George Joulwan (former Supreme Allied Commander Europe), mandating the North Atlantic Council to coordinate all conflict prevention activities through a civil-military implementation staff. The assumption, however, that, in Joulwan’s words, “NATO is the organization of choice to accomplish

---


UN-mandated conflict prevention operations throughout Europe, the Middle East and Africa,” is highly debatable. 56 The authority of the NATO Council is not recognized as the global repository of humanitarian values or as the fount of solidarity with oppressed people. Further, military institutions cannot be expected to address the systemic problems of statal or interstatal responses to non-state conflicts. They might even add to them. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, one of the key objectives in implementing the Dayton Peace Accord, subscribed to by all external actors, is the creation of a multi-ethnic state. If the internal actors, however, are divided about accepting this to the extent that conflict would resume if the entity system is dismantled, then perhaps it is not the external integration that is flawed, but the integrated mission goal. 57 There is little point in advocating clarity of mission and objectives if those objectives turn out to be inappropriate.

Mike Aaronson of Save the Children has distinguished between “logistical support to humanitarian operations, which is fine, and military coordination of a humanitarian operation, which is not fine.” 58 This paper concludes that the principle of civilian leadership for civilian relief should be preserved, and cosmopolitan approaches at least sustained, if not privileged, because of their actual or potential non-statist orientation. If a cosmopolitan approach has a future, it is more likely to be found in those whose ties to state or inter-state interests are weakest. There has been no fundamental normative shift in statist responses to sustained emergencies: strategic and territorial thinking have not been displaced. There is little reason yet to abandon Hedley Bull’s view that, in the absence of a universal consensus about justice, international stability is jeopardized by groups of states assuming the right to decide the


common interests of humanity. It is hardly surprising then, that governments in the conflict-prone South are anxious to cling to non-intervention principles and seek to divorce humanitarianism from peacekeeping actions.

The biggest threat to ethical humanitarian politics may be that, in the process of abandoning neutrality for solidarity, states and their military forces set the agenda of civil-military relations, and the agenda is not debated. Civilians, whose activities are of course inherently political, need to be more politically conscious about their role. Do they want to be co-opted by the state, substitute for the state where there is a welfare vacuum, or contest statist assumptions? Fractured and fractious though they might be, internationals and transnationals may provide alternative approaches to the authority of warlords, mafiosi and abusive state elites in conflict zones, and they may have a political impact that is detached from external states promoting their strategic and possibly inappropriate interests and values.


60 See, for example, statements by the Jordanian, Mexican and other delegates in Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. 160th meeting. Press release GA/PK/166–67, 14–15 February 2000.
Part II
Practitioners’ Views:
Lessons Learned in the Balkans
A First-Hand Perspective from Kosovo

Introduction

General Klaus Reinhardt was the KFOR Commander, and I was the civilian in charge of UNMIK. The situation in Kosovo in 1999 demanded close cooperation between the two of us, and we gradually came to be considered as twin brothers. This should not be taken for granted. We were born close to each other, in Germany and France; these are two countries that have fought against each other for centuries. Back then it would have been highly unlikely to think about the future as a perspective for common work. Through our cooperation, however, we frequently offered an example to the Kosovars of two people whose countries had fought for centuries and who were now working together for peace and human rights. This was my very personal lesson out of Kosovo. In a general perspective, the lessons learned from Kosovo were twofold. They concerned the civil-military cooperation during the conflict, and the building of a nation and reconstruction of a civil administration.
Civil-Military Cooperation

When the civilian authority UNMIK took up its work in July 1999, we came to realize that, in contrast to KFOR, we were not prepared for the job. Both General Reinhardt and I had gathered experience in field missions in Bosnia and in Somalia. Kosovo, however, showed us that for the civilian authority it was a different kind of mission. Besides its peacekeeping mission, UNMIK was simultaneously in charge of building up an administration. This was also the main difference between the UN peacekeeping or peacemaking missions in Kosovo and in East Timor. In East Timor, Sergio Vieira de Mello of UNTAET was in charge of building a nation; Kosovo, however, is not a nation. Instead of rebuilding a nation, we had to build the entire administration from scratch. Our staff consisted of very able UN volunteers; they were not specialists, however, in, for example, building up a social welfare system. Likewise, they were not specialists in road repair. For this reason, we were very glad to rely on KFOR for the repair of the roads. The UNMIK was therefore simultaneously engaged in setting up or trying to set up some sort of administrative network from the very beginning, providing humanitarian assistance to the refugees, and rebuilding a civil administrative body or government. These tasks were all very difficult and demanding.

In the beginning, the cooperation between the military and the civilians was not as close as later on. The military units would usually stay 4–6 months, but the civilians would stay for much longer. The military people therefore considered the civilians pretty much as locals. During my stay in Kosovo as head of UNMIK, several commanders of KFOR were in charge. First, Mike Jackson, a British general, who was replaced by Klaus Reinhardt, a German general, in October 1999. Then Juan Ortuño, a Spanish general and commander of the Eurocorps, took over in April 2000. After October 2000 Carlo Cabigiosu, an Italian general, was commander of KFOR. In my opinion this is fantastic. For years now, the military have been excellently prepared and trained to work together in peacekeeping missions. One can, therefore, say that they are well on their way to becoming the international force for human rights. Above all, they are more advanced than some civilians
and diplomats, who tend to stick absolutely to their national views. So this was the first lesson from Kosovo: diplomats and politicians need to react more quickly and to improve communication and cooperation between each other. If KFOR and UNMIK had not met and talked with each other on a daily basis, thus enabling the sharing of both organizations’ political analysis with the politicians and diplomats, it would not have been possible to implement politics and to get a grip on the violence. We were together in the same boat, facing the same difficulties, and it would, therefore, be wrong to say that on the one side there was the military involvement, on the other side the civilian. We were working together closely.

Institution-Building in Kosovo

The second lesson learned from Kosovo refers to institution-building. We were not prepared to build a nation, neither was Sergio Vieira de Mello in East Timor. Although the term “nation” cannot be applied to Kosovo, the implications in terms of the administrative and the political requirements were the same as in East Timor. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 affirmed the call for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo. Substantial autonomy implies an administrative body, a government, and it was our task to build one even though we were not prepared for this task. Fortunately, I could rely on ten years of experience as a minister, as well as on the support of two other former ministers. The situation in Kosovo, however, did not at all have the same profile as former missions. In addition, there was no possibility of requesting a quick arrival of specialists to repair the power stations, to ensure a supply of electricity, etc. We were working under difficulty, lacking specialists and money. Without the support of KFOR it would have been absolutely impossible to bridge the gap until specialists were sent to Kosovo. For example, KFOR enabled temporary access to electricity. The European Union was very generous and willing to support us, but it took months
and a great deal of bureaucratic procedure to build up a sufficient pool of specialists.

The fact that many different nations were involved in the missions led to complications. As General Reinhardt pointed out, he had to deal with soldiers from 39 nations. The UNMIK police consisted of people from 53 nations. This was an enormously complicating factor, considering the fact that at the beginning there were no police, and we had to create a security structure out of nothing. To integrate a small number of police from one country into a group consisting of 53 different nationalities is an additional burden. Once again, the lesson came from the military: in order to ensure law and order, excellent training is needed for the police force. The training should also impart knowledge on the culture that the police has to deal with. Another important problem was that the rules of engagement differed from nation to nation. Some soldiers, for example, were not allowed to cross the bridge of Mitrovica to go to the northern part of the town. We were criticized for not imposing law and order in the northern part, while lacking the means to do so.

From an outside perspective it can be very difficult to understand Kosovo and its people. One has to take into account that we are dealing with some kind of colonial syndrome. The Albanians and the Serbs have been engaged in conflict for 12 centuries now. They have not been fighting against each other all the time; rather, they have often been ignoring each other. In Bosnia, for example, the percentage of mixed marriages amounts to less than ten. In Kosovo there are no mixed marriages at all. The Serbs and the Albanians work together in the same places, for example in hospitals or in courts, but they do not talk to each other except for at work. They do not consider each other as colleagues and do not even address each other by name. Flora Brovina and Vjosa Dobruna, both medical doctors at the hospital in Pristina, told us about the Serb and Albanian nurses at the hospital. The nurses would only talk to each other in order to fulfill their duties, but they would not have lunch together in the same refectory. One day, the Serb police expelled Flora and Vjosa from the hospital without any explanation. These were the politics of Slobodan Milosevic, a manifestation of colonial behavior. From the Kosovo Albanians’ perspective, they were ruled by a
minority of Serbs from the metropolis of Belgrade. To understand the situation in Kosovo one has to bear the colonial syndrome in mind. It is for this reason that the assumption of power by President Vojislav Kostunica in Belgrade is unlikely to dramatically and rapidly change the behavior of the people towards each other. There certainly exists a perspective for democracy now. Any government is better than Milosevic, and the change can also be regarded as a historical success: two years after the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo carried out under Milosevic and the killing of thousands of victims, we now have a new government under Kostunica, local democratic elections, and no more ethnic cleansing. For the people, however, the situation has not changed much. Whether President Vojislav Kostunica or Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic are in power is not all that important since what the people really want is independence. To give them independence was not our task; we were in charge of implementing UNSCR 1244, that is to say, substantial autonomy and self-government. In my opinion, this is the right way, but unfortunately I believe that if we do not fulfill our promises, it could turn out to be a big mistake.

The process of institution-building in the Kosovo can be divided into four phases: The emergency period, the demilitarization, the building of an administration and local elections.

The Emergency Period

The first phase was the emergency period in which humanitarian assistance was provided to the refugees and UNHCR did a very good job. The army set up refugee camps for which it was sometimes criticized by NGOs, although the refugee camps were absolutely necessary in order to give the people shelter before the coming of winter. More than 120,000 private houses had been destroyed in the war. The winter brought temperatures of minus 30°C, and there was no heating system or electricity in the camps. Nobody died, however, at least not that we are aware of. In addition, there was no epidemic among the people. They were very tough and did not even blame us for the situation they were in.
The Demilitarization

The second phase was demilitarization and the transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) into a civilian, multi-ethnic emergency response service. The members of the KLA fought and died for their country, and it could not be taken for granted that they would hand their weapons over to us. We did, however, accomplish the transformation of their army into a civil security service, even if not entirely, as there still remains hidden weaponry everywhere in the Balkans. The process of demilitarization is not yet completed and is still under way. Nevertheless, it can be considered as a success that has never been achieved before: it is the first time in history that one year after the transformation of a so-called liberation army into a civil body, its former guerilla leaders ran for a democratic election.

The Setting Up of Administrative Structures

At the beginning it took four months to bring Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, and Hashim Thaci, leader of the Party for Democratic Progress of Kosovo and former commander of the KLA, to the negotiating table. This was a necessary first step in order to build up an administration for Kosovo. Thaci considered Rugova to be a traitor and collaborator, but on 15 December 1999 we succeeded in signing an agreement with the Albanian representatives Hashim Thaci, Rexhep Qosja and Ibrahim Rugova. Four months later, in April 2000, we signed an agreement with the Serbs. This was the starting point. All in all, it took almost a year to get the Albanians and the Serbs to talk to each other. Peacemaking missions have a special pace, which does not necessarily correspond with the wishes of the media or the international community. When trying to reconcile the people, the resistance, the obstacles and the behavior of the people after their experience of war have to be taken into account. Compared to other peacemaking missions, we were very quick. We managed to set up three political bodies, namely the Interim Administrative Council (IAC), the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) and the interim administrative departments:
The Interim Administrative Council was the executive body and it also involved the military. General Reinhardt participated in the IAC, and it was a novel concept for a military representative to be part of a political body. For us, however, it was absolutely normal that KFOR had to be involved in decision-making processes, as they were dealing with the same situation and with most of the problems in the region. As head of the mission, I represented the four pillars involved in implementing the civilian aspects of rehabilitating and reforming Kosovo: UNHCR, OSCE, the European Union and the UN. When dealing with several organizations in one body, it is important to avoid difficulties inside the body itself. We managed to do so because we had excellent staff, and the majority of our working relations were very good. The IAC decided all the regulations and had over two-hour meetings twice a week. My primary aim was to involve the Kosovars in their own affairs and I therefore wanted them to be part of the IAC and of the decision-making process. If they did not agree, I would be the one to decide, but in 95 percent of the cases we decided together.

The Kosovo Transitional Council met once a week. The KTC was a consultative body that represented the full spectrum of Kosovo society: the main political parties, members of the IAC, religious community leaders, representatives of national communities and independents together with representatives of civil society. The KTC addressed day-to-day issues of concern to all groups of Kosovars, and it was the forum where the Serbs and the Albanians were able to talk to each other about missing people, the killings, and the mass graves. While the discussion atmosphere in the IAC itself was at times rather slow and difficult, the KTC was very open.

The third body was the administration itself. Each of the 20 administrative departments was co-directed by a Kosovar and by a senior UNMIK international staff member. Among the Kosovars, the co-management of the departments was shared among the three IAC members’ parties, three national communities, the Serbs, the Bosnians and the Turks, and a politically independent member. In this way, we had a double administration in which the co-heads were not confronting each other but were cooperating. Some of the departments were very
effective, others less, but the main success was that we actually set this administration up and it is still functioning today.

Local Elections

The fourth phase was a real achievement: municipal elections for Kosovo. UNSCR 1244 only demanded the implementation of substantial autonomy and self-administration, but not the carrying out of local elections. The UN Security Council and the international community in general, therefore, initially did not support our decision, and we had to convince them that carrying out the elections was an important and necessary step. There were even reproaches that we wanted to enforce independence for Kosovo and that we were biased in favor of the Albanians. This was definitely not the case. We did not in fact have so close relationships with the Albanians, as they tended to be very introverted and to live completely isolated. Their social ties were among their families, villages and the clans. Our task was to protect the victims, no matter what community they were from, and not to favor certain ones. We decided to carry out local elections because we considered elections to be essential for the establishment of a democratic Kosovo. On 28 October 2000 the elections were held, and we were very happy and surprised that after five weeks of political campaigning no major incidents happened. There were no killings, and the crime rate even decreased during this time. Election day was one of the least violent day in the history of our mandate in Kosovo. The most lasting memories of my stay in Kosovo are certainly the long queues of families in front of the election halls everywhere in the country. The Serbs did not register for the elections because they were threatened by Milosevic and forbidden to go to the polls. This has to be kept in mind. Nevertheless, the picture of the people queuing in the sun, wearing their clean Sunday dresses, and waiting for hours and hours to put the ballot paper into the ballot box for the first time in their life, and for the first time in the life of Kosovo, is one to be remembered. Thanks to OSCE, this election was the best run democratic election in the Balkans.
Conclusion

In conclusion, let me sum up our most important lessons learned in Kosovo:

1. The Protection of the Victims

Our mission was to help the victims who were for many years the Albanian people. We learned, however, that there were other victims as well, who were just as important as the Albanian victims: the Serbs who remained in Kosovo. We had been unable to sufficiently protect the Serb villages, and this was our failure. It is true that the crime rate decreased from 40–50 murders a week when we started our mission to 3–4 a week at the end, but this is a still too high a number. Even with 50,000 additional soldiers KFOR was unable to protect the victims, because if the murderers or terrorists wanted to kill somebody it was impossible to prevent this. We were not well prepared to protect the Serbs; we did our best, but it was certainly not enough.

2. Ensuring Law and Order

We have been blamed several times by NGOs that we were unable to protect the people in Kosovo. This is true, but we knew this and we did our best. It is easy to criticize, however, and to be neutral. Nevertheless, the restoration of law and order was an expression of our inability based on our lack of training. Kosovo presented a completely new kind of mission. We are now aware of our failures, as we had a long meeting with Sergio Vieira de Mello on the lessons learned from Kosovo and East Timor. We only had, for example, a provisional, temporary set of laws; a comprehensive legal base is needed, however, in order to impose a state of emergency. In addition, international lawyers are imperative, as the Albanian lawyers were partial and biased. We were too trusting with them, and they were under pressure because at the time Albanian political prisoners had not yet been released, and 5,000 to 10,000 Albanians were still missing, along with 500 missing Serbs.
The main lesson learned was that the restoration of law and order must be prepared thoroughly and comprehensively.

3. The Follow-Up of the Mission

My last point regards the continuation of our very worthwhile mission in Kosovo: the people in Kosovo who we were supposed to protect, the Albanians and the Serbs, believed that we would continue the implementation of UNSCR 1244. I hope that this will be the case. The only way to start the negotiations between the Serbs and the Albanians, between Belgrade and Pristina, is to implement democracy. For this reason, we must keep our promises. UNSCR 1244 demands self-government and substantial autonomy. The question is, therefore, whether UNSCR 1244, which was passed by the UN Security Council, is still the legal base or not. If it is, we should continue to put it into action. This is what I would recommend. If it is no longer the legal base, we must change the resolution. To remain undecided and seated between two chairs, however, will drive the people in Kosovo back towards violence and guerrilla action. This is my advice.
Lessons Learned as Commander KFOR in Kosovo

Introduction

The time I spent in Kosovo as Commander of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) from October 1998 to April 2000 was extremely challenging. Nevertheless, I consider these seven months to be the most exciting and eventful period of my 40-year career as a soldier. The peace support operation in Kosovo was a personal challenge for all of us. It demanded much, but it also paid off. We were able, by and large, to break up the tendency towards violence, and we succeeded in making life in Kosovo worth living again. In this process, the use of military means is only one of the many components that need to be coordinated to achieve a common objective if we want to lead the province to a better future.

Military Command and Politics

My task as Commander KFOR was essentially twofold: First, there was the purely military leadership task, a task for which I had been well trained and prepared. I was in command of some 50,000 women and men from 39 nations, and my troops were deployed in Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and Greece. This task was relatively easy, since the soldiers from all of the participating nations were extremely dedicated to accomplishing the peace support mission, and they all gave
their best. I say this for the battalions from NATO member states, but it also applies to the contingents from non-NATO countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, Austria, Switzerland, Azerbaijan and the neutral Scandinavian countries. They all performed well under extremely difficult conditions. Let me also briefly mention the Russian contingent here. I perceived absolutely no problems concerning the integration of the Russian forces into the overall framework of our mission. The Russian soldiers distinguished themselves in their application and professionalism, and they were honest and open in collaborating and working with other KFOR members.

That said, however, I learned, from the very beginning of my tour of duty, that almost all of the 39 nations had established different restrictions and limitations for their soldiers during the mission. Soldiers from nation X had, for example, initially not been authorized to establish check-points too close to the Ground Safety Zone separating Kosovo from Serbia. In addition, although nation Y authorized the deployment of their troops in Mitrovica, this was to take place only in the less threatened southern Albanian sector. Nation Z, in turn, had ruled out any employment of its forces outside the assigned area of responsibility right from the outset. It was obviously extremely important to know and understand these individual restrictions. We had to operate within an intricate framework of differing national ideas, policies and regulations, in order to avoid arguments with any of the contributing nations. This was only possible through continuous, close cooperation and proactive consultation. It was only after the first half of my tour as KFOR Commander that we managed – thanks to the close assistance provided by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) – to overcome almost all of the restrictions and operational limitations that originally applied when troops were used outside the individual national areas of responsibility.

Second, there was the much more difficult, although also solvable, task for which I had received neither special training nor preparation: cooperation with the various political organizations and personalities in Kosovo, most of whom were from very different backgrounds and often pursued contrary objectives. For me the most important partner was, of course, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), led
by Bernard Kouchner, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. He was Mr. Kofi Annan’s deputy on the scene. Bernard Kouchner presided over the four sectors involved with implementing the civilian aspects of reforming Kosovo: humanitarian assistance led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), democratization and institution-building led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), reconstruction and economic development managed by the European Union (EU) and civil administration under the UN itself.

Prior to the Kosovo deployment, I had already commanded the German forces missions in Somalia and in Bosnia under the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR). In Kosovo, it was therefore essential for me to implement the lessons I had learned earlier in dealing with civilian agencies about reducing rivalry and ensuring clarity about responsibility. I sought the closest possible cooperation with the civilian bodies, and this, I believe, was achieved. There are not many instances in which the two halves of a political entity were as tightly linked and complemented each other as well as in this case. This was true not only for the routine cooperation between KFOR and these organizations, plus some 350 non-governmental relief organizations, but also for the political cooperation within the provisional government, the Interim Administrative Council, and the Kosovo Transitional Council, a form of interim parliamentary group encompassing the different religious, ethnic and political factions. KFOR was represented in both bodies, and our vote actually had some weight there.

Besides all these activities, my days were filled with countless bilateral discussions and with various meetings with local leaders in towns such as Orahovac, Mitrovica, Strpce and many others. These meetings were intended to influence and change the course of events. They helped to prepare and coordinate activities, to shape majorities and, most important, to build personal trust and confidence. Although they were time-consuming, these meetings with people like Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, leader of the Party for Democratic Progress of Kosovo and former commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Rexhep Qosja, the writer, Serb Orthodox
Bishop Artemje and Mitrovica Serb leader Oliver Ivanovic provided an important foundation for cooperation. It was both paramount and decisive to discover trends, establish acceptable compromises and enforce them – even, if need be, with military pressure – to find ways out of deadlocked fundamental positions and to gather supporters. Throughout the deployment we hosted a steady stream of important military and political dignitaries from all over the world. Our protocol section counted a total of 1,358 visitors. These political talks were, without exception, very positive, since they offered the opportunity to brief the visitors candidly and directly about the current situation, to attain assistance, to generate understanding and to demand political improvements. One good example is the meeting I had with US President Clinton, who pledged and actually provided immediate financial aid.

KFOR’s Assignment

KFOR’s two task areas – military operational command and control and the political field of action – were two sides of the same coin, that is, the KFOR mission as set out in UNSCR 1244 by the United Nations Security Council. As set out in this resolution, KFOR had the following clearly defined missions:

Most important, we had to prevent return of the Yugoslav armed forces and the resurgence of open hostilities. This task was fulfilled, but it required a robust and substantial peacekeeping force. The political situation has since changed in Kosovo and especially in Serbia, with the election of President Vojislav Kostunica and Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, so there is no longer any imminent danger. During the initial deployment of KFOR, however, it was essential for the Yugoslav leaders to know that all the odds would have been against them if they had sent their forces back into Kosovo against the 50,000 well-motivated, well-trained and ready KFOR troops. Despite our reduction in KFOR troops today, the regular reinforcement exercises still run by NATO ensure that the protagonists know that the international community
remains willing and able to protect Kosovo by military action, if necessary.

Our second task was to improve the personal security of all Kosovars and thus create the preconditions both for peaceful coexistence of the ethnic groups and for economic and administrative reconstruction. KFOR has been largely successful in this respect, too. The high crime rate that prevailed at the beginning of the operation has been reduced to a level common for Central Europe. Life is safe again for the Kosovars, though it must be admitted that freedom of movement for minorities remains a problem. At present, it would be impossible to enforce greater freedom of movement for the minorities – particularly for the Serbs – without a higher level of tolerance among the Albanian majority.

Our third task, the demilitarization of the irregular Kosovo Liberation Army, was probably the most difficult one, since it involved disbanding an organized military body and translating it into a new, civilian, multi-ethnic and apolitical structure. Despite many situations that could have jeopardized demilitarization, this mission was also carried out, and it was probably the first-ever conversion of a rebel army into a civilian organization under external control. We assigned civilian jobs to the former fighters, such as building schools, constructing houses and environmental cleansing. These jobs are important in rebuilding the social infrastructure of Kosovo, and they have, by and large, been readily undertaken.

The fourth task for KFOR was to maintain close cooperation with UNMIK in elaborating a joint strategy. We set up bilateral strategy seminars to coordinate our activities, and Bernard Kouchner and I met daily. Our approach was very much geared to finding practical solutions, and it was not without reason that in Kosovo we were called the “twin brothers,” as we always acted in perfect accord and spoke with one voice.

The fifth part of our mission was to provide humanitarian aid within the framework of our capabilities. The CIMIC units within the national military contingents worked extremely hard at their tasks and achieved a great deal. Thanks to the coordinated practical efforts of KFOR, I
heard of no cases of people freezing or starving to death in Kosovo among the 850,000 refugees who returned. KFOR also undertook the mammoth task of mine clearance, as well as the reconstruction of schools, houses, bridges, roads, the railway line and the airport.

Lessons from the Operation

There are several practical lessons on the preparation and conduct of a peace support operation that can be derived from the Kosovo action:

Any operational headquarters must be precisely and intensively apprised beforehand of conditions within the host country. In other words, prior training of the HQ personnel is indispensable. Once deployed, soldiers have no time to gradually adapt to the new situation. This requirement is even more essential for troops in the field, who must understand the type of task they will be facing beyond the war-fighting they have been equipped and trained for. They must be aware that during peace support operations they will have to keep a firm grip on all available tools of escalation and de-escalation.

Another guiding principle is that orders must be enforced once they have been issued. With all due respect for national restrictions and mission-command doctrine, it must not be left exclusively to the discretion of the commander on the scene to make essential decisions on his own. On one occasion I relieved a battalion of its mission on short notice because its commander was not willing to apply the required vigor in clearing a road-block on a bridge. Another battalion was given the mission, and two hours later the cars and buses blocking the lanes had been pushed into the valley below.

Initially, almost all nations contribute strong contingents to the mission. After several months they discover that they lack the sustainability to maintain these forces over extended periods of time. During my tour, for example, I visited one battalion that had reduced its strength from 890 to 280 soldiers. Other nations withdrew their contingents without replacements in order to consolidate operational forces with SFOR,
while still other nations pulled back essential elements like helicopters or heavy vehicles. For all of these measures there were well-founded considerations and understandable reasons. These losses, however, created significant capability gaps in the force structure, and I could not accomplish my mission on the basis of national excuses and considerations. Our task could only be successfully completed with physical military resources. It was in this field that we urgently needed political assistance, and, fortunately, NATO was able to provide this assistance. I found it very helpful to be insulated from the direct influence of the contributing national capitals. All tasks had to go through SHAPE as a conduit, and General Wesley K. Clark always keenly ensured that he kept the sole authority for decisions. We maintained an intensive daily exchange of views, and all tasks for KFOR were issued exclusively through him.

All negotiations in Kosovo took place in an area where at least two ethnic groups were facing each other as enemies. It was therefore utopian to believe that both sides would be willing to sit at the conference table at once, start negotiating on essential issues and eventually sign agreements. It was only through preparatory individual talks that progress could be made. Quite often, visible pressure had to be put on the interlocutors to force them to “sell” the outcome to their people as a dictate by the Commander KFOR. Face-saving is often essential in Balkan negotiation. Bringing military force and threats to bear is expected and accepted there, and only this approach enabled us, as for example in the case of Orahovac, to gradually improve our negotiating success. Even more important is the guideline that promises and pledges must be strictly kept. Only by demonstrating absolute credibility was I able to overcome the Serbs’ initial mistrust of a German general. From the start, I promised Bishop Artemje and Oliver Ivanovic, president of the Executive Council of the Serb National Council of Kosovska Mitrovica, that I would look after their security. I integrated them into our security measures, and, as a consequence, one Albanian newspaper castigated me as a “friend of the Serbs.” In the end, however, this approach, along with lengthy talks and negotiations, brought about gradual rapprochement, and allowed the Serbs to return to the various political bodies without losing face.
In Kosovo, KFOR has been responsible not only for enforcing law and order. As part of the ongoing “hearts and minds” process and to aid the return to normality, KFOR also arranged the first concerts in Kosovo to be broadcast live on TV across the country. We held the first art expositions with oeuvres from both Kosovar artists and KFOR soldiers, and it proved to be a big success. As a token, KFOR was also engaged in collecting rubbish from the streets of Pristina to promote the population’s own initiative to this effect. The soldiers of the German contingent in Prizren and the French in Mitrovica, together with the men of the Kosovo Protection Corps, spent days clearing city roads of large amounts of rubbish. In so doing, they provided a role model – particularly for the younger generation – that was readily accepted.

Conclusion

Peaceful coexistence of the various ethnic groups essentially depends on greater tolerance. We tried to promote tolerance – we even took to the streets to impose tolerance – and yet there is still a lot of hatred among this traumatized population. For the time being, people are only hesitatingly willing to coexist in peace. KFOR will, therefore, be required to remain in place in order maintain the peace support operation for quite some time.

As for the violence by ethnic Albanian insurgents in Serbia’s Presovo Valley and in western Macedonia, instigators should be treated as insurgents and dealt with accordingly. During my tenure as Commander KFOR, these people chose the Ground Safety Zone as a safe haven from which to operate against the Serbs in the area. We tried to force them out by drying up their logistic support, preventing their training, destroying their weapons and closing their bases and trails into the Ground Safety Zone. I believe that the only way to make these people understand the situation is to use force against them. There is hope, however, as in Orahovac, where the Albanian and Serbian vintners went back to the vineyards to work next to each other. Another
promising sign was the “Day Against Violence”, a joint demonstration against violence organized by local leaders in Kosovo on 9 September 2000.

The political future of Kosovo is a key decision that remains open. While UNSCR 1244 calls for “substantial autonomy” for Kosovo, the Albanians still strive for full independence. These positions are mutually exclusive, and the upcoming elections in 2001 are likely to become, de facto, a referendum for the Kosovars on this question. I fervently hope that the new political leadership in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and, indeed, Serbia will demonstrate its good intentions to the international community by helping to find a suitable solution to this issue. From a personal perspective, I believe that the quickest way to restore normality to Kosovo is to reconstruct and sustain its economy. Apart from a few extremists, most Kosovars are keen to gain meaningful employment and are focusing more on rebuilding their lives than on political or violent action. Part of the problem in the Mitrovica area, to take one example, is that unemployment is so high, around 85 percent, that many people, especially the young, have nothing to do except demonstrate and instigate violence against other ethnic groups. The means to this end are available, but they must now be translated quickly into visible programs and assistance. If this happens, I am certain that Kosovo will have a bright future ahead. I am also convinced that KFOR will continue to provide a stabilizing and important contribution to this objective.
Humanitarian Aspects
of International Peace Support Operations:
The Experience of the International Committee
of the Red Cross

Introduction

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) works in situa-
tions of armed conflict and internal violence on a daily basis, all around
the globe. It is active in 60 countries, including 25 countries where
armed conflicts are taking place. With a staff of 12,000 world-wide, the
ICRC protects and assists victims of armed conflict and internal vio-
ence. “Protection” involves visiting prisoners, reuniting separated
family members and searching for missing persons. In the first nine
month of 2000 alone, delegates of the ICRC visited some 202,000 peo-
dle detained in 68 countries, including Myanmar, Afghanistan, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Algeria, Peru and the Russian Federation. “Assistance” covers a vari-
ety of activities, including providing food for internally displaced per-
sons in Angola and Indonesia, distributing seeds and tools in Sierra
Leone, maintaining water supply systems in Chechnya and keeping
hospitals in Afghanistan operational.

At the heart of the ICRC’s operational philosophy lies the notion of
proximity. The ICRC attempts to be as close as possible to the men,
women and children in need. In Colombia, for instance, delegates oper-
ate not only out of the central office in Bogotá, but also from a network
of 15 sub-delegations, spread throughout the country. In Afghanistan, there are ten such offices. The ICRC aims to seek contact with all parties involved, including state and non-state actors, paramilitary units and so forth. The ICRC stays in a country for as long as it is needed. It is also present in many countries which rarely make media headlines.

Two questions are particularly important for the ICRC concerning the lessons learned from former peace support operations (PSO) and the future development of PSO: which players should have which tasks, and the best way to cooperate between international, national, non-governmental, civilian and military organizations.

The Nature of Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era

The ICRC has been a prime witness to the changing nature of conflict and the development of peacekeeping and peace support operations in the decade following the end of the Cold War. Contrary to what is often stated, the 1990s have not seen an increase in the number of wars fought world-wide, except in Africa. Today, a vast majority of wars are no longer fought between states, but within their borders. In 2000 this was true in all but one of the 25 armed conflicts mentioned above. Intra-state wars are not fuelled by ideological motives of former East-West confrontation. Political, economic and identity-related factors are predominant.

It is striking how many so-called ethnic conflicts occur in regions and countries where different national or religious groups once lived together peacefully. Historian Eric Hobsbawm warns us to “distinguish between what comes from below and what is imposed from above.”\(^1\) Inspired by the article “Les Conflits Identitaires” by François Thual,\(^2\) a crucial question regarding so-called identity-related conflicts is: who ignites and fuels the fire of the sacred “identité,” and for which

---

reasons? Economic and social instability, weakened state structures and the real or imagined discrimination of a specific group of people have proven to be a very explosive combination. Easy access to weapons and modern communications allow small groups to operate independently and without much external political support. They are thus largely insensitive to outside pressure. Today’s conflicts are characterized by their lengths and, in several cases, by their limited prospects for early political solutions. One thinks here of Afghanistan, Angola and Colombia. The recent agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and developments in the Balkans, however, have given rise to some hope.

This combination of factors has influenced the consequences of conflict. Civilians are no longer just the victims of “collateral damage.” They are increasingly the direct targets of violence. Such conflicts impact populations far beyond the number of deaths. People are displaced by the tens of thousands from land their families have inhabited for generations. Relatives are separated from each other. Thousands are missing, often presumed killed. Internal conflicts often have significant spill-over effects and draw neighboring countries and their populations into instability. Western Africa and Angola are examples.

The International Community’s Response

The international community’s security framework has undergone a transformation of its own. After the fall of the Berlin Wall there were new prospects for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This revival stemmed from a reduced use of the veto power on the part of the five permanent members. It lead to enhanced possibilities for the UNSC to authorize both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Faced with the changing nature of wars, however, peacekeeping itself evolved. Traditionally, its scope included monitoring cease-fire or armistice agreements in the contexts of international armed conflicts, observing frontier lines and assisting in troop withdrawals. The closest example
One region which has experienced almost the entire range of these developments is the Balkans. This has had a variety of implications on humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC. The break up of Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Province of Kosovo represented the first major conflicts on European soil since the end of World War II. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular, threw into question the international community’s ability to respond to the issues at hand and meet the needs encountered. Present since the very outbreak of violence in the early 1990s, the ICRC endeavored to alleviate the impact of widespread population displacements, targeting civilians, and blatant disrespect for
essential norms of humanity. The ICRC visited some 47,000 prisoners during these different conflicts. It exchanged over 18 million Red Cross messages between persons separated by the fighting and reunited some 10,000 families. It also carried out a range of assistance programs.

With the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, known as the “Dayton Peace Agreement,” in December 1995, the ICRC entered into a distinct phase of its involvement. It has since focused on helping the different communities address some of the lasting consequences of the conflict. The search for missing persons is a crucial aspect of post-war reconciliation. One of the ICRC’s most significant challenges in the aftermath of Dayton was dealing with the implications of the broad and highly complex international implementation mechanisms set up under the provisions of the peace agreement. First and foremost, this related to the deployment of the 60,000-strong Implementation Force (IFOR) under the command of NATO and the establishment of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The ICRC’s Experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Much has been written about how the international community addressed the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. If conflict management is defined as a combination of political-military action aimed at either preventing or resolving a conflict on the one hand, and humanitarian action seeking to deal with the consequences of that conflict on the other, then quite clearly the dividing lines between these two forms of intervention were not clear-cut in the case of Bosnia. Indeed, for much of the war, the international political community appeared unable to agree on how to apprehend the conflict and on the type of responses required. The deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was an expression of this reality. While the presence of this multinational force did undoubtedly help countless civilians and save numerous lives, it also contributed to the militarization of humanitarian aid. Most significantly, it seemed to underline the international community’s hesitancy to back political
action with military means and, in contrast, its eagerness to provide relief, an issue where consensus among states was easy to foster. On several occasions, the ICRC and other humanitarian organizations were compelled to call for the political and humanitarian responses to remain clearly distinct. An important lesson learned from that period was that humanitarian action is no substitute for decisive political action, and it should never be considered an alibi. This situation changed during the summer of 1995, when the members of the Contact Group on Former Yugoslavia pressed ahead with a proposal for a political settlement, and the community of states authorized NATO to carry out air strikes against Bosnian-Serb positions in August and September. This resolve proved decisive in bringing the parties to meet at Dayton and ending the conflict.

Interaction and Independence

The arrival of the IFOR’s first units signaled the start of the first major NATO deployment in history. For the many actors already on the ground – including a significant number of humanitarian organizations – this was an entirely new factor to deal with. For the ICRC, the opportunities for dialog and interaction came within days of the deployment. Two of the most concrete examples were:

1. The Release of Prisoners

The operation to release and transfer prisoners was the ICRC’s first specific task in the post-war environment. As foreseen in international humanitarian law and confirmed in the Dayton accords, the ICRC was to organize and oversee the release and transfer of detainees held in relation with the conflict. This operation, coming early after the cessation of hostilities, was regarded as a test of the willingness of the parties to implement the agreement reached in Dayton. The security provision proved to be an important dimension of the process. Indeed, the tension on the ground in the early days after the agreement cannot be underestimated. The presence of IFOR units at the designated crossing points along the inter-entity boundary line was instrumental in establishing an appropriate
security framework. On the other hand, it was similarly significant that at all times IFOR respected the ICRC’s independence in organizing and carrying out the process. The ICRC’s long experience of the context and the parties, as well as its presence in both of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s entities during the war, contributed to the necessary confidence on all sides to carry out the releases. The process ended with the release of some 1,100 prisoners and was considered a successful early example of interaction. Dialog and cooperation also took place in the search for missing persons and in dealing with the threat of land mines.

2. The CIMIC Structure and Security Dialog

One area that was new to the ICRC was the participation in the structures of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). Indeed, a direct result of the NATO-led deployment throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo, was the establishment of central and regional CIMIC structures in different areas of responsibility. As one of the organizations referred to in the Dayton accords, the ICRC was invited to take part in these forums of civil-military coordination. The ICRC took part as an observer in the exchange of information on humanitarian issues. It also attended the regular security updates provided by IFOR and SFOR. It proved important for the ICRC to convey to NATO that participation in these sessions did not amount to being bound by security decisions taken within them. The reason for this was the need not to be seen as subordinate to NATO.

To sum up, the key challenges for the ICRC in this first-of-its-kind interaction with a NATO-led peace support operation were: to preserve its distinct operational capacity, while entering into an open dialog with NATO and with the civilian implementation mechanisms under the High Representative; to demonstrate that its mode of operating offered a distinct added-value in the peace support environment; and to develop into a predictable counterpart for the NATO command, with a view to establishing stronger dialog between NATO and the ICRC.
Both the quality of the interaction in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the maintenance of the ICRC’s independence had implications in the spring of 1999. When the Kosovo conflict intensified, the international political community and the Western military alliance seemed determined to act more decisively and rapidly to curb ethnic violence than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The member states of NATO set themselves the goal of ensuring a swift return home for the Kosovo Albanians who were being expelled in large numbers. They would do so by using force.

When the NATO Secretary General authorized the use of air strikes against Yugoslavia on 23 March 1999, the ICRC was drawing up its plan of action. First, it was preparing to notify the different member states of NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the full applicability of the four Geneva Conventions and their obligations. Second, it decided to remain fully operational throughout Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. Regrettably, a combination of security-related factors forced the ICRC to withdraw its team from Pristina on 29 March. Despite this setback, the ICRC, cooperating closely with its partners in the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, retained throughout the war the valuable ability to operate in Serbia, Montenegro and outside Yugoslavia. This was the ICRC’s distinct added value. In Kosovo itself, the ICRC resumed operations on 24 May 1999.

The Militarization of Aid

In the early days of the conflict, providing assistance to the fleeing refugees was an immediate priority. Responding to that need was one of the most critical issues in that phase. It also brought with it a new trend. Indeed, the militarization of humanitarian assistance in the case of Yugoslavia and Kosovo went further than anything experienced with UNPROFOR in Bosnia. NATO contingents in Albania and FYR
Macedonia established camps for refugees. Military personnel were engaged in attempts to reunite families and several other forms of relief provision. NATO made some of its logistics available to humanitarian organizations for the transport of goods. This development prompted much debate. There are those who claim that without this mobilization on the part of NATO, many people in need would not have been reached. There are also those who express a concern about the lack of distinction between humanitarian and political forms of intervention.

NATO’s humanitarian operations “Allied Harbour” and “Shining Hope” had important implications for the ICRC. From the very outset of the international armed conflict between NATO and Yugoslavia, NATO headquarters agreed to establish direct and separate communication lines with the ICRC. This gave the ICRC a channel to review security concerns and intervene with NATO on the conduct of hostilities. There were important differences in the type of relations existing with IFOR/SFOR and those with the NATO units involved in operation “Allied Force.” These resulted from the distinct nature of the operations carried out. NATO units engaged against Yugoslavia were not in a peace-implementation mode. They were parties to an international armed conflict, and that had an impact on the type of relation that could be envisaged by the ICRC. If it wanted to continue to operate inside Yugoslavia throughout the NATO air campaign, the ICRC had to remain separate from the different forms of state-driven humanitarian intervention.

The Kosovo conflict has at times been called a “just war” or a “humanitarian intervention.” This explains why the ICRC’s insistence on referring to an international armed conflict was not always well understood. The community of states gave the ICRC a responsibility to act in wars on all sides. This adherence to neutrality and impartiality, however, is viewed on occasion as making concessions to the party held responsible for countless violations of international humanitarian law in Kosovo. This perception – or misperception – might stem partly from the fact that humanitarian action is often reduced to the mere, albeit important, provision of relief. This is where the ICRC is different. Its delegates, in addition to relief, also carry out the broad range of protection activities described at the beginning of this chapter. They seek
access to prisoners of war, intervene with authorities to report violations, and seek to reunite families and search for the missing. The former ICRC president, Cornelio Sommaruga, was the first to confront the highest Yugoslav leadership with findings concerning the behavior of armed and security forces in Kosovo in April 1999. It is likely that the ultimately successful outcome of negotiations in Belgrade for the ICRC to return to Pristina – from where expatriate staff was withdrawn on 29 March 1999 for security reasons – was due in large part to the independence of the ICRC’s operation. Delegates resumed activities in Kosovo three weeks before the deployment of the NATO-led Kosovo force.

The interaction between KFOR and ICRC had a variety of characteristics. KFOR’s mandate is based on UNSCR 1244 of 10 June 1999 and the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) signed with the Yugoslav Army on 9 June 1999. This placed the dialog on a footing very similar to the one existing with SFOR in Bosnia. UNSCR 1244 and the MTA, however, contrary to the Dayton Peace Agreement, do not include provisions for the release of detained persons and the search for missing persons. This forced the ICRC to negotiate with the parties in an initially more unfavorable environment. The KFOR deployment and the UNMIK operate in a situation different from the one in Bosnia. Indeed, their mandate concerns only a part of the country. For more than a year, this resulted in a situation where the ICRC was essentially alone in having a structured and permanent presence in both Pristina and Belgrade. An added-value that allowed the ICRC to act as a useful intermediary in a number of instances.

The most visible of these is related to the negotiation carried out with the Serbian Ministry of Justice in July 1999 to obtain access to the Kosovo Albanian detainees transferred out of Kosovo at the end of hostilities. Consent was given, and the ICRC visited some 2,000 and restored contact with their relatives in Kosovo. This eased the tension that was building up around their fate, particularly since over 1,000 of those visited had been reported to the ICRC as missing. The formal ICRC presence in Belgrade was viewed as a useful asset by UNMIK, which recognized the lead role of the ICRC in both the prisoner and missing persons issues. More recently, ICRC delegates twice secured
the release of Serb civilians held captive by Albanians rebels (UCPMB) in the so-called ground safety zone bordering Kosovo. Trust in the ICRC on the part of KFOR, the Serb police and the Albanian fighters was essential for the operations to succeed.

The Development of Peace Support Operations and Lessons Learned by the ICRC

These examples illustrate how complex and demanding interaction in the Balkans has been. The ICRC has learned many lessons from this and other peace support environments:

1. Principles of Cooperation

In a peace support environment, engaging openly with others, be they political or military actors is crucial. It is the only way to be heard and to have one’s added value recognized. At the same time, the ICRC is intent on retaining its operational independence and preserving its own identity. There is no contradiction between a strong sense of identity and a willingness to cooperate. There is, however, a distinction between “cooperating with” and “being coordinated by” or “subordinated to.”

2. Interaction with Peace Support Missions

This last observation sets the framework for the type of interaction the ICRC foresees with peace support missions. The cooperation can range from dialog on security, to exchange of information on humanitarian issues, to logistics support. The interaction can be very concrete and operational. The Bosnia and Kosovo experiences have also contributed to broader inter-institutional dialog between NATO and ICRC. ICRC leadership has been regularly invited to address NATO structures,
including the North-Atlantic Council. Delegates have also increasingly taken part in NATO training, making presentations that combine ICRC operational modalities and principles with the basics of international humanitarian law. Such contributions range from ad-hoc input at NATO colleges or regional command centers, to more formal and long-term arrangements, as is the case with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). Once again, an important objective has been to become a predictable counterpart for peace support missions.

It is important to make reference to the comprehensive review of UN peace operations, as set out in the *Brahimi Report*. The emphasis on more robust short-term and long-term conflict prevention activities is particularly welcomed by the ICRC. There may, however, be situations where humanitarian action faces significant limits, and where a resolute response, which may include a range of political and military instruments, is required. Particularly important recommendations are that operations should be based on a precise mandate and provided with adequate means. The ICRC seeks the same open interaction with future missions in accordance with these recommendations. It is, however, important to take note of the report’s suggestion that the United Nations must at times make a distinction between aggressors and victims. To this end, it is proposed that “impartiality” be defined as “adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles.”3 For the ICRC, as a humanitarian actor, “impartiality” has a different meaning: assistance and protection of victims of a conflict without any form of distinction based on political, religious, racial or other grounds. Here, as elsewhere, it is important to be clear about words and notions.

---

3. Humanitarian Intervention

The Kosovo conflict generated much debate about the limits of independent humanitarian action. Humanitarian agencies were criticized for their slow response to the needs of the fleeing Kosovo Albanians. Without military involvement, it was suggested, their misery would have been even greater. Why, therefore, do a number of humanitarian organizations oppose the involvement of armed forces in humanitarian responses? Let it be clearly stated: the military can render important humanitarian services, as the Balkans and East Timor have shown. Creating a positive security environment for humanitarian agencies to operate in is one such service. The military can do this without turning into a humanitarian enterprise. Humanitarian action and political/military interventions are fundamentally different in nature. The primary objective of military operations is to establish peace and security, and to contribute to the settlement of a conflict. Humanitarian action aims to protect human dignity and save lives. Managing conflicts effectively requires both dimensions. It is the attempts to merge these concepts that the ICRC resists.

In addition, in the Balkans, the same contingent that deployed in a peacekeeping mode in Bosnia was mobilized in a combat function against Yugoslavia, only to revert later to a peace support role in Kosovo. Clearly independence is required. It has allowed the ICRC to interact with peacekeeping units while preserving its ability to act on all sides of the conflict whereas NATO member-states became entangled in it. NATO achieved its zero-casualty objective in this conflict. When three US servicemen were seized by the Yugoslav army early in the conflict, however, the presence of the ICRC in Belgrade was considered useful. Negotiating and obtaining access in such a situation is possible only if the detaining party, in this case the Yugoslav authorities, perceives the separate nature of the humanitarian mandate.
4. Universality

Another characteristic of the ICRC’s operational philosophy which is relevant to the future of independent humanitarian action is the principle of universality. Political and military action may be selective, whereas the ICRC’s mandate requires it to be active on all fronts. As indicated at the outset of this article, the ICRC is present and active in over 60 countries world-wide. It works in conflicts far from Western or other television cameras, including places like Colombia, Fiji, Sierra Leone and Algeria. Many of these places have not witnessed – and are unlikely to witness – such massive military intervention as was the case in Kosovo or any international military operation. The people affected, however, are just as much, or even more, in need of support.

Conclusion

It is important to get the proportions right. Situations of armed conflict and internal violence, where international military forces and humanitarian organizations are active at the same time, represent the minority. They will remain the exception to the rule for quite some time. The European context, compared to others in which the ICRC works, is special due to its relatively high concentration of security-related international organizations and similar frameworks. NATO, for security in military terms, and the European Union, for security in the wider sense, are the main players.

The ICRC’s main experience in the field of civil-military cooperation stems from work with UN and NATO-led forces in the Balkans. This experience can – possibly in a wider context than Europe – become particularly valuable to cooperation with the European Union. The so-called Petersberg tasks are fully integrated in the Treaty on the European Union which reads: “Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”

At the end of 1999, in Helsinki, the European Council decided to set up an intervention force of 60,000 members by 2003, with a mission to carry out the tasks laid down in Article 17, paragraph 2.

Moreover, last December the Council of General Affairs adopted a proposal in favor of more decisive and better coordinated EU action in the field of conflict prevention. The ICRC is referred to in this document as a candidate for an effective partnership. What is certain is that, as a result of these developments, the European Union and its member states could also become important players in the field of peace support operations. As in its relations with the UN and NATO, the ICRC shall, in its relation with the EU, establish a cooperative approach, based on maintaining its independence and underlying the advantages of clear lines being drawn between humanitarian and political-military action.

---

Introduction

Fifty years ago, the debate club of the high school I attended argued whether, after the dreadful experience of World War II, people could hope that such an abhorrent thing would never again happen. Despite the fact that the debate took place only six years after the end of the war and just two years after the end of the Greek civil war, the answer was a pessimistic one: this would happen again. And, unfortunately, it did: not on a global scale, but on a regional one, all over the world and with equal ferocity.

The EU’s Future Role in International Crisis Management

The European Union is an impressive example of post-war cooperation and understanding, and has thus led to prosperity and stability in Europe. The Union has always been very sensitive to armed conflicts and has always reacted and tried to prevent them, stop them, or alleviate suffering and damage. When conflicts occur, the human costs in lives and suffering are high. Conflicts also unavoidably force back the clock of economic progress and eliminate any achievement in this
field. Furthermore, since conflicts are usually recurring, all efforts towards reconstruction are set back. My experience shows me that crises are dealt with on an ad hoc basis. There is no specific strategy. This is quite normal, since specific situations of potential conflict present unique challenges. Policies aimed at diffusing tensions in one part of the world can certainly be quite different from policies deployed to contain rising tension in another region. Subsequently, the only common element in dealing with crises is political will. In the case of the European Union, this political will has found a new form of expression since the 1999 Cologne European Council meeting in the strengthening of the Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). It aims to give the Union the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises, both in conflict prevention and conflict management.

Conflict prevention is not a new issue for the European Union. For at least the last decade, it has tried continuously to bring its foreign policy in line with the needs of an ever-changing international security environment, where conflicts become more frequent. It has constantly highlighted the importance of effective early action to prevent escalation and violent conflict. A great deal of what the Union has done in its external relations is conflict prevention regarding, for example, human rights, the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, good governance, trade and economic development. The consequences of conflict, however, have shown that a more effective and responsive Common Foreign and Security Policy is required. This has led to the development of civilian and military crisis management capabilities, which offer – or will offer – to the Union a full range of tools which can be used to prevent conflict from materializing.

The decision to develop a European Security and Defense Policy was taken against the background of globalization and increasing interdependence. The Union would no longer be able to sustain a foreign policy, which did not have access to the full range of capabilities to meet its objectives. There can be no doubt that the conflict in the Balkans has played a major part in accelerating the development of ESDP. It was the only credible response to meet the challenge of giving the European Union the ability to engage effectively in crisis management and peace-
making operations. As stated in a report prepared for the Council by the SG/HR Solana and Commissioner Patten:

[T]he European Union is well placed to engage in conflict prevention. Its capabilities include trade policy instruments, cooperation agreements, development assistance and other forms of economic cooperation, social and environmental policies, humanitarian assistance from both ECHO and the member states, civilian and military crisis management capabilities, diplomatic instruments and cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. In many of these areas, the Union has very considerable influence. It is the world’s largest provider of development and humanitarian assistance and the biggest trading partner.1

The primary challenge of the Union is to address the root causes of tension and prevent their culmination in violence. In order to achieve this, the Union must make conflict prevention an integral part of its foreign policy and not consider it a separate task. This again requires the political will of member states on a permanent and not on an ad hoc basis. This would give the Union the ability to develop targeted common approaches to countries and regions at risk of conflict, taking account of the set of instruments to which I referred before. An idea worth pursuing, for example, would be building the objectives of peace and democratic stability into all assistance programmes, encouraging beneficiary governments to pursue these objectives as an integral part of their overall development.

The Need for Close International Cooperation in Peace-Building

Recent events have made it clear that a comprehensive peace-building strategy, involving all actors in the field, is indispensable. The causes of conflict are, in most cases, complex and require, therefore, policy responses that can only be delivered by a broad range of actors. Moreover and where needed, a coordinated international response addressing the root causes of armed conflict would be necessary. The last decade presented us with many threats, each of them creating their own challenge, and each calling for a different response. From them, we can draw lessons, the main one being that no single state, institution or organization is able to meet these challenges and risks on its own. This should be the strategy. It is only through working together that future challenges can be effectively addressed. Our ability to protect our collective interests calls for the creation of a network of interlocking international organizations and institutions.

Although distinct and different actors on the international scene, the United Nations and the European Union could combine their means and have at their disposal a whole range of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention. The global legitimacy provided by the United Nations is essential. Furthermore, the UN has access to extensive information networks, an element that can greatly contribute to addressing the specific problems related to the conflict in question. Lastly, its institutional framework, broad as it is, is best placed to help address the root causes of conflict and can largely contribute to preventive measures. In this respect, the SG/HR of the EU has already had several meetings with UNSG Kofi Annan, and these meetings initiated a new phase of cooperation and dialogue. The identification of possible areas and modalities of cooperation between EU and UN in crisis management is part of the mandate given by the European Council in Nice to the new Swedish Presidency of the EU. The notion that the development of ESDP should enable the EU to respond more effectively to requests from a leading organization like the UN has been reiterated in all reports submitted by the various EU presidencies to European Councils since Cologne. The development of the discussion
on EU-UN relations/cooperation is a logical consequence of the development of ESDP. With its existing range of instruments as the world’s largest provider of development and humanitarian assistance and as the biggest trading block, the EU is an important partner for the UN. The emerging EU military and police capabilities open many new possibilities for cooperation and coordination with the UN on crisis management. As ESDP gradually develops, the density of EU’s relations with the United Nations in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management will grow. The EU’s current work on its emerging ESDP instruments as well as on conflict prevention is echoed in several ways in the UN’s own debate on how to improve conflict prevention and crisis management performance. The EU has lessons to learn from the UN’s experience, especially as the UN itself is about to draw lessons from this experience. The UN debate and, in particular, the follow-up to the Brahimi Report is, therefore, of direct relevance to EU’s future instruments.

All presidency conclusions of European Council meetings since Cologne have adopted the general principle that the development of ESDP will enable the EU to better contribute to international peace and security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The Union recognizes the primary responsibility of the UNSC for maintaining peace and international security. At present, the United Nations and the European Union are envisaging consultations to determine the areas and issues for possible cooperation and coordination.

Regional cooperation and regional or sub-regional organizations can also play valuable roles in conflict prevention. Organizations like ECOWAS, SADC, the OAU, OAS, ASEAN and the ARF have been adopting operational roles in their respective areas. The European Union maintains close contact with them and considers them valuable partners.

Key partners for the EU in Europe are the Council of Europe, of particular importance through its Parliamentary Assembly and its role in human rights and standard setting; the OSCE, through its field missions; and the High Commissioner on National Minorities, through its emerging mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts. EU cooperation with OSCE is rapidly becoming a permanent feature of security in Europe. Above all, in regard to the civilian aspects of crisis management, recent developments of the past year are paving the way for closer and more operational cooperation. Hopefully, this will eventually increase the capacity to respond to future crises and, wherever possible, to prevent them. Last but not least, dialogue between the EU and various important regional partners, like the ones I have just referred to as well as the ICRC, the academic and NGO communities, and international partners such as Canada and Japan, should be deepened or initiated. Their input could then be incorporated into EU policy formulation and practical cooperation established.

NATO and the EU: an Essential Partnership

At the Nice European Council on ESDP, the member states confirmed their commitment to put at the disposal of the Union the necessary forces to meet the objective of 60,000 person capacity for rapid action set in Helsinki, as well as the other capabilities deemed necessary for the implementation of the Petersberg tasks. By the year 2003, the member states will be able to deploy these troops within 60 days and sustain them for at least one year. Furthermore, the member states committed to provide, by way of voluntary cooperation, up to 5,000 policemen by 2003, 1,000 of which will be deployable within 30 days for international missions across the full range of conflict-prevention and crisis-management operations. The situation in Kosovo clearly demonstrated the difficulty of deploying sufficient numbers of properly trained police and civilian staff when needed. Troops cannot be expected to carry out civilian or police duties, and that is why we also need to focus on developing resources such as police, prosecutors, judges, legal experts and
human rights experts. These resources are essential if we are to rapidly establish the rule of law and strengthen the democratic institutions. These people will also train and put in place local authorities and strengthen local administration.

The development of ESDP has inevitably raised questions about the EU-NATO relationship. From the very beginning, the European Union has answered that it is not in the business of collective defense, nor does it have the intention of creating a European army. The creation of ESDP intends to strengthen transatlantic ties and not to weaken them, and the EU has acted upon these principles in practice. Since Helsinki, the United States has supported ESDP. Continuing the development of a close cooperation with NATO is and must remain a priority. There have been a number of high level meetings between the two organizations, and, as we move into detailed discussion on cooperation both on a permanent basis and in crisis situations, these meetings will become a permanent feature of the relationship. This relationship is essential if the EU is to maintain the confidence of its allies and, in particular, of the United States.

Conclusion

Some statements have been made that create the impression that we are returning to an era of suspicion. ESDP has been called a “worrisome development,” “a bumpy ride,” and “going to the very core of our existence as an Alliance.” The good news is that the transatlantic dialogue is still on, and I for one believe that it will lead to the same common understanding of our goals that we have seen in the last two years. The Swedish EU Presidency and SG/HR Solana have already been meeting with members of the new administration, and there is, I believe, good will on both sides to remove any misunderstandings and sort out the issue.

For the greatest part of the last decade, the EU attitude in cases of crises or conflicts has essentially been reactive. It can only be advantageous
if, instead of reaction, the Union adopts an attitude of action or, even better, of “pro-action,” meaning acting before something happens. Early warning must lead to early action, and the Union should gradually shift from an attitude of reaction to a culture of prevention. Effective action in the area of conflict prevention will require sustained political will and, wherever possible, close international cooperation.
Peace Support Operations in the Balkans: The NATO Experience

Introduction

As we enter the 21st century, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is almost unrecognizable from what it was prior to 1989. Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has been fundamentally transformed, in terms of mandate, missions, structure and relations with the international community. This transformation has, of course, been driven by a variety of factors. Above all, however, NATO has been, and continues to be, transformed by its experience in the Balkans.

During the Cold War, NATO concentrated almost exclusively on preventing the worst case: a major attack on Western Europe and North America by the Soviet Union. The geopolitical circumstances necessitated something of a bunker mentality, whereby the Alliance focused primarily on maintaining the military security of its own members. As long as the Iron Curtain was up, problems within Warsaw Pact countries could only be observed and condemned. Very little in the way of active measures could be taken to influence events in the East (with rare but important exceptions, such as the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). As defined as late as 1991 in NATO’s Strategic Concept, the Alliance therefore basically had two jobs: the Article V commitment to collective defense, and to act as a “strategic balance” against the Soviet Union.

This defensive policy translated into a military force structure designed for defense. Armies were built around heavy armor for the anticipated
tank battle in the Fulda Gap. Air forces were heavy on fighters, and, except for the United States, light on transports. Navies prepared for blue-water battles to protect sea lanes of communication from North America to Europe. For 40 years, NATO focused on making sure its own house was secure. Indeed, as late as 1988, when Manfred Wörner took on the job of Secretary General, NATO’s business was still business-as-usual. Essentially, it was about the stately management of the Cold War. The post of NATO Secretary General did not exactly seem like a case study in excitement. Indeed, when Wörner met with his predecessor Lord Carrington, Carrington joked: “Now its up to you to bore yourself for the next four years, Manfred.”

Manfred Wörner was not bored for long. One month after the 1991 Strategic Concept (with its residual Cold War orientation) was published, the Soviet Union collapsed. This clearly obviated the requirement for NATO to provide a “strategic balance” in Europe. Similarly, the Article V commitment to collective defense quickly began to have reduced salience, as the major existential threat to NATO territory disintegrated. Very quickly, however, new challenges emerged, because the Soviet Union left in its wake instability and insecurity. When empires collapse, nations and countries feel alone and nervous. In an unpredictable environment, they make fragile and dangerous security pacts with their immediate neighbors. The result is often a volatile security system, with no solid foundation or structure, and a real possibility of violent conflict. Conflict which always leads to tides of refugees and asylum seekers, which spreads the tension to neighboring countries. Conflict which spawns ethnic hatred, instability, corruption, drug-running, human trafficking and money laundering. Conflict which can spread.

It was to address these challenges that NATO began its post-Cold War adaptation in 1991. The Alliance moved quickly to reach out to the newly independent countries and to engage actively in building security through cooperation. The result was a new set of defense relationships across the continent, with NATO at the hub through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).
The results speak for themselves: Forty-six countries – NATO members, former Warsaw Pact countries and even neutrals, including Switzerland, which is not even in the United Nations – now train together, talk about security issues together and even carry out peacekeeping operations together. The value of this inclusive framework is very clear. Every country in Europe has a structure through which it can enhance its security interests. No small, rigid regional alliances are necessary. No unilateral solutions are required. Through PfP and EAPC, security across Europe has been structured towards inclusion and cooperation. European countries that are choosing a new path are included in Euro-Atlantic institutions. In NATO's policy and actions, inclusiveness and cooperation have replaced defense and deterrence – a massive change from the past and a major contribution to the stability of the continent.

Bosnia-Herzegovina: Forcing NATO Out of Its Shell

It is unfortunately true, however, that dialogue and cooperation are sometimes not enough to prevent conflict from breaking out. Such was the case in former Yugoslavia. BBC journalist Misha Glenny once described the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the rebirth of history.” Even as some countries were focusing on the future and building peace, the early 1990s also saw the resurgence of old battles, old scores and old passions that had been frozen by the Cold War. Nowhere was this clearer than in the Balkans. The slow disintegration of Yugoslavia throughout the past decade embodied so many of the darkest elements of Europe’s past: ethnic nationalism, often based on paranoid national mythologies; a sense of historical grievance; irredentism; and an almost casual willingness to use force to accomplish political aims. In Yugoslavia, it would seem, time had truly stood still. It is somewhat ironic, then, that it was the anachronistic wars of Yugoslavia that compelled NATO to adapt itself for the future. Like an oyster knife, Bosnia-Herzegovina pried NATO out of its Cold War shell, and forced the Alliance to adapt to a much wider world.
When the Bosnian war began in 1991, NATO had never fired a shot in anger. It had never conducted an operation outside its own territory. It had never even considered taking on robust peacekeeping operations. It had never had significant relations with other institutions. Indeed, in the minds of many, NATO had less and less reason to stay in business at all. Bosnia-Herzegovina made it clear why NATO had to remain in business. It also made it clear how NATO had to change the way it did business, if it were to continue to make an effective contribution to international peace and security in a radically new international security environment.

The first important lesson of Bosnia-Herzegovina for NATO was that it could not remain disengaged from the rest of Europe. In the early 1990s, the Alliance was still suffering from what Manfred Wörner called “NATO’s out-of-area syndrome.” At that time, many observers argued that NATO could not act outside the borders of its members. In Secretary General Wörner’s view, the bloody wars in Yugoslavia showed how absurd this self-inflicted restraint had become. Having been raised amid the ruins of post-war Germany, Wörner regarded the Yugoslav war as a moral challenge of the highest order. He believed that the values with which he personally identified, and which NATO represented, were under threat. In his personal capacity, he supported various efforts at helping victims of the war. As Secretary General of NATO, he chastized the international community for its hesitation to become more fully engaged, for its unwillingness to learn from mistakes made in the earlier phases of the crisis, and for its tendency to measure progress by yardsticks which he believed were morally indefensible. Only after Wörner’s death did NATO finally heed his advice and fully make the cause of Bosnia-Herzegovina its own. This change of philosophy had its roots in three profound realizations on the part of NATO members:

First, the Allies finally acknowledged that half-hearted measures were not sufficient to bring an end to hostilities. The tragedy of Srebrenica, amidst so many other horrors, made it abundantly clear that the United Nations simply did not have the military resources to back up the ongoing diplomatic efforts, and that only NATO could bring to bear the necessary military resources. While it is an inaccurate expression, there is
some truth, at least, to the statement that NATO “bombed the Serbs to the table” – and the Allies recognized that only NATO could do it.

Second, NATO’s members finally came to agree that massive violations of human rights in the center of Europe could not be allowed to continue. To tolerate ethnic cleansing, concentration camps and deportation trains in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have been to undermine the long-term project of building a new Europe, built on common values of peace and tolerance.

Third, NATO’s members realized that conflicts outside of territory could still damage Euro-Atlantic security, including their own. The Bosnian war was causing massive destabilization throughout Southern and Central Europe. It led directly to a refugee flow of three million people, of whom hundreds of thousands fled to Western Europe. The war also transformed the region into a center of illegal activity, particularly the trafficking of arms, drugs and people – many of which (or whom) ended up in Western capitals. Even in the post-Cold War world, NATO’s members were forced by Bosnia-Herzegovina to recognize that they still had security interests that might require a military response.

Transatlantic Cooperation: Still Essential

Bosnia-Herzegovina also made it clear that transatlantic defense cooperation was not a relationship that could be dispensed with. Neither those Europeans who wanted Europe to play a more independent role (such as then Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, who in 1991 uttered the famously hopeful line, “The hour of Europe has come”) nor those Americans who wanted to avoid involvement in European conflicts (such as then Secretary of State James Baker, who claimed that “We ain’t got no dog in this fight”) could, in the end, avoid the realization that their common interests and common values were at stake. Both also came to understand that, in the end, Europe and North America had to work together, through NATO, if the Bosnian war was to be stopped for good. Only the combined military and political resources of North America and Europe were sufficient for the task,
both for the air strikes on the Bosnian Serb position, and in the post-
Dayton NATO-led Implementation Force that deployed into Bosnia-
Herzegovina to help keep the peace. Simply put, transatlantic coopera-
tion through NATO was the sine qua non of military and political
success. This realization not only helped bring about an end to hostili-
ties, it also helped overcome any lingering doubts about the post-Cold
War relevance of NATO. NATO was no longer seen as a relic of the
past – suddenly, it was at the center of Euro-Atlantic security. This
meant, by definition, that transatlantic defense cooperation continued
to make sense on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Importance of Partners

Bosnia-Herzegovina also revealed another major change in Euro-
Atlantic security: the new importance of non-NATO countries to
Alliance operations. Conversely, the cooperation between NATO and
non-NATO countries in the Implementation Force also illustrated the
value to NATO’s partners of cooperation with the Alliance. There have
been, since its creation, over 20 non-NATO countries in the NATO-led
force in Bosnia-Herzegovina – first the Implementation Force (IFOR),
then the Stabilization Force (SFOR). The value to NATO is clear. The
Alliance would have had enormous difficulty supplying and sustaining
enough troops for these operations. NATO’s partners have helped fill
any shortfall. Furthermore, because of PfP’s focus on interoperability
and joint training, partner forces have integrated into the NATO struc-
ture with very little difficulty. From NATO’s perspective, the operation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina has fully vindicated all the investments in
building cooperative security partnerships with non-NATO countries.

It is not just NATO, however, that has benefited from cooperation in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, its partners, too, see enormous
advantages. To them, participation in NATO-led peacekeeping pro-
vides invaluable on-the-job training for personnel in the requirements
of modern multinational operations. There is also a political advantage
for NATO Partners. By working alongside NATO and EU countries in
challenging circumstances, these countries demonstrate that they are
committed to common Euro-Atlantic goals. They thus have an
opportunity to burnish their applications for membership in both NATO and the EU, and their contributions have certainly not gone unnoticed by Western capitals.

New Cooperation between Military and Civilian Institutions

IFOR and SFOR also engendered an entirely new phenomenon in international peacekeeping, namely deep, daily cooperation between security institutions. Indeed, it is safe to say that Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the catalyst for what is now sometimes called “the new peacekeeping partnership.”

Bosnia and Herzegovina was merely another tragic example of an unfortunately common post-Cold War phenomenon: the failed state. As such, it required an entirely different international approach than classic conflicts. In those cases, as in the case of the Persian Gulf War, military and civilian roles and responsibilities were clearly delineated. The military was to win the battle; the civilians were to deal with the consequences. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and now Kosovo, that line was shattered. Success can no longer be measured in classical terms, that is, surrender of the adversary. For failed states, success is measured in political and economic terms. Success is achieved when civil society is reconstructed, and when peace, security and economic activity are self-sustaining. The requirement for cooperation is therefore clear. Civilian organizations cannot work without a secure environment, and NATO cannot withdraw until the civilian organizations have created a self-sustaining society.

In practical terms, this has required qualitatively new levels of cooperation between civilian agencies and the military. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a variety of inter-governmental and non-governmental bodies are working closely with the NATO-led force at all levels, on a daily basis, towards common goals. In broad terms, NATO provides the secure environment the organizations need to do their work. The United Nations provides legitimacy to the oversight and overall coordination of the High Representative. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe helps to train police officers and to run
elections. The European Union provides financial and technical assistance. In essence, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the model for what is sometimes called “the new European Security Architecture,” in which each organization applies its comparative advantage towards common solutions. Indeed, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, all of these organizations cooperate closely, at an operational and tactical level. This is fundamentally new. Bosnia-Herzegovina has broken down walls of mistrust and miscommunication that had existed between military and civilian organizations for decades, if not much longer. It has engendered entirely new training for militaries to acclimatize them to the requirements and advantages of cooperation with civilians. It has also led to joint military-civilian pre-deployment peacekeeping training and efforts to make civilian peacekeepers more familiar with the military and its ways of working.

The Bosnian experience has fundamentally transformed modern peacekeeping. It has broken down cultural barriers between military and civilians. It has fostered new training and education programs that bring together all parties involved in rebuilding a failed state. It has been a model for entirely new peacekeeping partnership where it matters: on the ground.

Engagement Can Deliver Results

Perhaps the most important lesson for NATO of the Bosnia-Herzegovina experience is that robust engagement can make a difference. NATO debated for three years before intervening, and the results were terrible: three million refugees, 220,000 killed, and the worst human rights violations in Europe in 40 years. When NATO finally took action in support of the will of the international community, the diplomatic process that had, until then, been spinning its wheels began to deliver, and led to the Dayton Peace Accords that laid out some fundamental requirements for post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. The signatories to the document – Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – agreed to create a secure environment for all residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to allow refugees to return to their homes, to turn over indicted war criminals to the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and, in general, to uphold the values shared by the rest of Europe. After the agreement was signed, the Alliance took on a major responsibility to enforce it. Through these measures – the Dayton Peace Agreement and the decision by NATO to provide a secure environment – Bosnia-Herzegovina took a first step away from its dark past, towards a brighter future within Europe.

The English say that “the proof of the pudding is in the tasting.” Today, the positive effects of determined action are obvious. First and foremost, the security environment has improved dramatically over what it was just a few years ago. Ethnic divisions remain, but there is no longer a sense that getting on with daily life poses risks to personal safety. The palpable sense of increased security throughout much of Bosnia-Herzegovina has led to an acceleration in the rate of refugee returns. Furthermore, most are now returning to areas in which they are minorities without international assistance or sponsorship. Minorities are even returning to formerly notorious sites of ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, the different Bosnian entities are now working together more effectively and in a more cooperative spirit. The Standing Committee on Military Matters has been established to act as an important common security institution, and possibly as the nucleus for a future joint staff or defense ministry. There is now a common currency, a single license plate and a single telephone area code for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Multi-ethnic Bosnian Olympic teams are now even competing in the Olympic Games. Even the shared Bosnian presidency, once a cauldron for ethnic tension, is showing signs of moderation, with the three presidents meeting regularly and adopting a common rhetoric to address mutual problems. The Tri-Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in a declaration issued in New York on 15 November 1999, agreed on measures for the full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, including: the creation of a multi-ethnic state border service, provision of adequate resources to central state institutions, establishment of a joint commission to speed up returns of displaced people, the creation of a single national passport, and an intensified fight against corruption.
All of this is real progress. Although a truly self-sustaining peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still a long way off, the international community has created the conditions for the people there to work towards reconstruction and reconciliation, if they have the will. As a reflection of the improvement in the security environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the NATO-led force has been reduced from about 60,000 troops in 1995 to about 20,000 in 2001, and restructured to be even more flexible and capable of carrying out its many missions. Slowly but surely, the international community is continuing the process of giving “ownership” of Bosnia-Herzegovina back to the Bosnians. To NATO, this is the ultimate illustration that determined, patient engagement can lead to a decisive change for the better in Euro-Atlantic security.

Kosovo: Learning the Lessons of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Kosovo crisis, like Bosnia-Herzegovina before it, challenged the Euro-Atlantic community to uphold 21st century values. Thousands of innocent people had been killed in Kosovo, and hundreds of thousands made homeless, by the armed and paramilitary forces of the Yugoslav government. In the days before NATO decided to act, Serb security forces moved closer to ethnic cleansing, with new deaths and new floods of refugees.

Kosovo also posed a direct threat to stability and democracy in South-Eastern Europe. First, Kosovo sits at a vital strategic point in Europe, a volatile powder-keg that could easily ignite the whole region. The ongoing repression of Kosovar Albanians caused hundreds of thousands to flee to safety in neighboring countries – new democracies that simply did not have the capacity to cope with them. Indeed, even two years ago, in the spring of 1998, after a series of massacres by Serbian forces, over 400,000 Kosovars were forced to leave their homes, and more and more were on their way. Had this process continued without a response from NATO, the fragile democracies of the region could
never have withstood the strain. Further destabilization could have made this a much larger and even more intractable regional conflict, and could easily have destabilized the still-fragile progress in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Simply put – NATO took action because it had to. As was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo, values and security interests converged.

In taking on this operation, the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina proved its value very clearly. First, NATO understood much more quickly that diplomacy sometimes needs military backing if it is to be effective. What took years for Bosnia-Herzegovina took only months during this crisis. Second, the Alliance was able to work even more effectively with its partners. In the early days of the crisis, the countries surrounding Kosovo quickly called on NATO to provide support for their efforts to manage the huge influx of refugees. They then, in turn, provided support for NATO’s efforts to manage the conflict, including during the difficult days of the air campaign. These were difficult and courageous decisions for countries in an historically turbulent region. Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were filled with hundreds of thousands of refugees. Bulgaria and Romania had transportation and commercial routes along the Danube destroyed. Sofia was even hit by two NATO missiles that accidentally went astray. Yet none of these countries wavered in their support for NATO’s operation. The experience of working with NATO in Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, helped ensure mutual trust and smooth cooperation throughout the crisis.

As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the NATO-led force in Kosovo supported the work of the civilian organizations: UNMIK, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and many others. The experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina helped ensure that this cooperation is now taking place smoothly and automatically. As with SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR will have to stay in Kosovo for as long as it takes to get the job done. Such a long-term military presence will have its costs. Yet these costs pale in comparison to Cold War spending levels. Security in Europe still comes with a price tag, but it remains
affordable. Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that the price of indifference can be far higher than that of engagement. Kosovo demonstrated that timely intervention can preclude worse disasters. This lesson cannot be forgotten.

Kosovo and NATO’s Internal Transformation

As NATO enters the 21st century, the principle of active, forward engagement is almost axiomatic. Kosovo merely served to reinforce the principle. Kosovo has, however, engendered an entirely new evolution within the Alliance: if Bosnia-Herzegovina forced NATO out of its shell, Kosovo forced NATO to look inward once again, and to adjust the way it will do business in the future. Like all crucibles, the Kosovo operation exposed the deficiencies that lie hidden in less difficult times. In NATO’s case, Kosovo revealed that NATO must make major internal adaptations if it is to remain capable of, and credible at, carrying out its mission in the future.

Defense Capabilities

Each and every one of the Allies must make the necessary investments in appropriate military capabilities and technologies. Military capability is the heart and soul of the Alliance. To carry out all of NATO’s missions – from crisis management, to peacekeeping, to partnership and cooperation, to collective defense – NATO’s forces must be effective and able to work together effectively. This means that NATO’s forces must remain interoperable. Kosovo made it impossible to ignore that imbalances are growing within the Alliance, between those countries that are investing more quickly in new technologies and capabilities, and those that are proceeding at a slower pace. Increasingly, this poses challenges to interoperability, as some Allies move to higher-tech command, control, communications and intelligence equipment (C3I). C3I is the core of any operation, let alone combined and joint operations.
NA TO’s members must ensure that technology enhances cooperation between their forces, rather than letting technology get between them.

Having effective forces in the modern security environment also means structuring and equipping NA TO’s forces for modern operations. The days of planning for massive armored clashes in the Fulda Gap are long gone. Kosovo, however, revealed that too many of NA TO’s armed forces have not yet made the adaptations necessary to meet modern peacekeeping requirements. Too many of NA TO’s armed forces are still designed, structured and equipped for the past. Today, the Alliance needs forces that can move fast, adjust quickly to changing requirements, hit hard, and then stay in theater for as long as it takes to get the job done. This means that NA TO’s military forces must be mobile, flexible, effective at engagement, and sustainable in theater. Kosovo demonstrated, however, that only some of the Allies are making the necessary investments. Indeed, Kosovo showed the worrying first signs of a growing division of labor within NA TO, whereby the high-tech Allies provide the logistics, the smart bombs and the intelligence, and the lower-tech Allies provide the soldiers – what a NATO official once called “a two-class NATO, with a precision class and a bleeding class.”

This two-class NATO would be politically unsustainable. The burdens, the costs and the risks of military operations must be shared as equally as possible, if the political health of the Alliance is to be maintained.

NA TO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is designed to address these challenges. Put in place at the Washington Summit of April 1999, the DCI identifies the 58 areas of military capability in which all Allies must make improvements. This is not purely an issue of finding new money for defense. It is about getting a good return on investment – literally “getting more bang for the buck.” The European Allies spend about 60 percent of what the United States spends on defense, but nobody would suggest that the European Allies have 60 percent of the capability. That return on investment must be improved, through innovative management techniques, identification of priorities and courageous decisions. Where necessary, it will mean new investments of new money. Wherever the resources are found, however, NA TO’s future effectiveness as a security body will rest, to an important degree, on the extent to which NA TO’s members make the necessary
improvements in capability. Kosovo made it clear that the current state of affairs cannot be sustained.

European Security and Defense Identity

The Defense Capabilities Initiative will support the other major transformation taking place in the Alliance today – the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Kosovo taught the Euro-Atlantic community an important lesson: it is no longer possible to avoid the requirement for Europe to take on a greater share of the burden of maintaining security.

There are three main reasons why Europe must play a stronger role. First, the United States needs a better military partner. During the Kosovo campaign, US forces had to fly a disproportionate share of the missions, including some of the most dangerous ones, because only they had the necessary capabilities. This created imbalances in leadership, and raised resentments on both sides of the Atlantic. A stronger Europe will be able to take on a greater share of the heavy lifting, and thereby be a more equal political and military partner for North America in NATO operations. Second, a more effective Europe is also a necessity because, in the post-Cold War world, NATO and the United States may not always want to take the lead in addressing every security crisis in or around Europe. If Europe has the capacity to take the lead on at least some operations, it will not resent having to ask the United States to do something it does not really want to do, and the United States and NATO will not get dragged into operations simply for lack of an alternative. It will not be “NATO or nothing.” Third, it is also worth noting that a stronger European capability is also a logical evolution in Europe’s development. A Europe that is as rich as the United States, and that has common goals in peace and security, must be able to back up its words more effectively with deeds. For all of these reasons, the development of European capabilities makes sense. It will make Europe a better partner for North America in preserving Euro-Atlantic security, and ensure that no resentments about burden-sharing distract North America and Europe from working together towards common goals.
Kosovo shone a harsh light on how much work remains to be done. Even though Europe has two million soldiers in uniform, half a million more than the United States, it still struggled to scrape together 40,000 for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. This represents about two percent of the forces Europe has on paper. If Europe can only use two percent of its forces when they are really needed, what are the other 98 percent for? Kosovo ensured that the EU heard the wake-up call. At its Helsinki summit, it set itself an ambitious military target. By the year 2003, it wants to have the capability to deploy about 60,000 troops within 60 days of the order being given, and that that force should be able to remain in the field for at least one year. The EU has taken important steps to meet this goal. It has begun to identify the assets and capabilities it needs to reach this target. In November 2000, the EU held a Capabilities Commitment Conference to determine what each EU member can contribute to the headline goal, and what shortfalls must be rectified. It has established military and political committees to give guidance on security issues.

NATO is supporting the development of Europe’s capacities for three simple reasons. First, the EU’s desire to be more effective is sparking real improvements in capability that can only enhance NATO’s overall effectiveness. Second, if the EU is capable of acting, it means NATO will not be the only option available to the Euro-Atlantic community in times of crisis. It will not be “NATO or nothing.” And finally, NATO has assets that the EU will need to borrow for larger operations – assets like deployable headquarters, strategic lift and satellite intelligence. These must be available to the EU if serious European-led operations are to take place. NATO will therefore make its essential assets and capabilities available to the EU when the Alliance is not in the lead, but the EU chooses to be. NATO will also provide regular access by the EU to NATO defense planning, even in peacetime, to ensure that defense planning between the two institutions is fully coherent. This will ensure that NATO and EU forces are structured and equipped to perform NATO and EU operations, not “either-or.”

The advantages are clear. A stronger Europe will be a better partner for North America in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security. A more equitable balance of labor will quell any lingering resentment about burden-
sharing. Flexible institutional arrangements between NATO and the EU will provide more options to the Euro-Atlantic community, so that Europe or NATO can take the lead in managing crises – but always in a transatlantic context, with North America and Europe working together. Kosovo demonstrated that the old ways of doing business are no longer sustainable for the Alliance. As such, the operation has been a vital catalyst for necessary change – for improvements to NATO’s defense capabilities, and to Europe’s capacities as a security actor.

Conclusion

Today, NATO is outward focused, actively engaged in building security outside its borders, with new partners in peace. This is the legacy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, the Alliance is working hard to adapt itself internally to the requirements of today’s security environment – to be more capable of maintaining peace, and to ensure that the transatlantic balance of burdens is fair and sustainable. This is the legacy of Kosovo. The NATO of the 21st century is, in almost every sense, fundamentally different than what it was during its first four decades. More than anything else, the Balkans have been the crucible of that change.
Part III
National Views:
The Experiences of Neutral Countries with Peace Support Operations
Recent Experience with Peace Support Operations: Austria’s View

Introduction

Austria’s experience in peacekeeping goes back to 1960, when Austrian troops were sent to the United Nations operation in the Congo. Since then, Austria has taken part in 26 international peace support operations (PSO). Over 40,000 Austrian soldiers have served under the blue helmet. Together with their relatives and friends, they constitute a large community in the Austrian society, which therefore, in one way or another, has direct or indirect experience with peacekeeping operations. Austria’s longstanding involvement has created a tradition of peacekeeping which goes beyond the military and which helps to ensure solid public support for the country’s ongoing and costly engagement in international operations.

Austrian Participation in Peace Support Operations

The beginning of our international military engagement in the Congo was not easy. In 1960 the Austrian Armed Forces of the Second Republic were only five years old and still struggled with organizational and logistic problems. Military advice spoke clearly against participation in an operation that was considered risky and that lay
beyond the logistic capabilities of the Austrian Armed Forces. Moreover, there was no national legal framework in place to allow the dispatch of Austrian soldiers abroad. At that time, however, shortly after Austria had regained its independence and had requested the United Nations to mediate in the dispute with Italy over South Tyrol, it was in the country’s best national interest to show “the flag” in support of the United Nations. The political leaders decided to participate and opted for the dispatch of a small medical contingent.

At the beginning of the Congo operation, all the anticipated problems seemed to come true. Information about the mission area was scarce and insufficient for proper military preparation and planning. There were still a great number of unresolved problems when the contingent was finally deployed in an environment of uncertainty. Upon arrival of the contingent in the mission area, the soldiers were immediately taken prisoner, and were only liberated through a counterattack by the Nigerian UN-troops. Eventually, the first Austrian participation in a peacekeeping operation ended up being a great success. The success was more due to luck than design. We did, however, learn some basic lessons on decision-making and mission planning the hard way. These basic lessons have not been forgotten and they still govern our thinking in the military-political framework of decision-making processes.

At present, Austria is actively participating in 16 peace support operations. It is engaged in four operations with troops and in the remaining 12 either with military observers, police officers, or military and civilian experts. The current sum total of personnel is 1,200 (see a complete listing of Austria’s military engagements in the appendix). A comparison of our present participation with our involvement ten years ago shows the dramatic changes in the field of peacekeeping. Ten years ago we were exclusively engaged in UN-led operations of the so-called “traditional” type, which characterized peacekeeping during the Cold War period. I am putting traditional in quotation marks, because in my opinion there is no such thing as “traditional peacekeeping.” It is essential to realize that peacekeeping is a way to manage conflict situations and needs to maintain its flexibility. One of the basic lessons we learned is that each operation has its own unique circumstances and must be judged on its own merits. Our first engagement in the Congo
was definitely not “traditional.” It is, however, true that during the Cold War period the nature of the crises was such that peacekeeping was often a matter of interpositioning military forces between two parties. We are now participating in operations led either by the United Nations, by NATO, OSCE, WEU or by the European Union. We are facing a new type of crises that require complex responses in the political, diplomatic, military and civilian fields. We are dealing with internal strife, with failing states and with gigantic humanitarian problems. This has also changed the role of the military in peacekeeping. There is no doubt in my mind that the principles of consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defense should remain the basic essentials of peacekeeping. As was done in the past, a peacekeeping doctrine and strategy must be adapted to suit new circumstances. Peacekeeping is not – and has never been – a fixed set of rules; it is and should remain an evolving art.

A New Environment for Peacekeeping

The nature of crises has changed following the end of the Cold War bipolar world. International conflicts have repercussions beyond national borders, thus endangering international peace. Such crises are complex and multifaceted. The absence of hegemonistic powers that could have a mitigating influence on the parties to a conflict makes these parties hard to control; this results in an increased risk for peacekeeping forces. Back in the 1980s, the blue helmet or an UN ID card were sufficient to grant freedom of movement and respect. This is not the case any longer and security has become a pressing issue. A high level of force protection and a comprehensive strategy of conflict resolution are now required.

The United Nations has elaborated the Agenda for Peace to serve as a doctrine for comprehensive action in such crises, and this is in itself a historic achievement. The idea of the Agenda for Peace is to pursue, as early as possible, a complex strategy consisting of political, military,
civil and humanitarian measures in order to prevent conflict and to be as effective as possible in fulfilling the tasks of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-building. Under this doctrine, military forces can have a role in every stage of a developing crisis and can make a useful contribution in all areas of peace support operations.

Because the security situation for the peacekeeping forces in action may change suddenly – as happened in places like Rwanda or East Timor – the military equipment and the preparation of the forces must be the same in the future, regardless of whether a mission is mandated under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. In practical terms, it does not make a big difference for the military, whether Chapter VI or Chapter VII applies. More important is how the application of military force is defined. In this respect, the use of force policy and the rules of engagement are decisive factors. As far as the use of force policy is concerned, there are three categories:

1. the use of weapons exclusively for self-defense;
2. the use of weapons for self-defense and defense against forceful attempts to prevent the execution of the mission; and
3. the use of weapons for the military enforcement of the mission, usually referred to as the use of all necessary means.

This differentiation is much more important for a decision on whether to take part in a peace support operation or not, than the question whether the mandate for an operation is governed by Chapter VI or Chapter VII. The use of force policy and the rules of engagement require careful evaluation and have practical repercussions on the deployment of the national contingent. It is, however, possible to take part in a mission that allows the use of “all necessary means” without agreeing to the use of force policy in all instances. Until recently, Austrian participation in the Kosovo mission was conducted under such a proviso.

In Kosovo, Austria's use of force policy was the same as in previous peacekeeping operations. The use of weapons was only allowed for extended self-defense; this included the protection of persons and property (escorts and guards), and countering the use of force that
would have prevented Austrian soldiers from performing their tasks. Notwithstanding these restrictions, Austria could accept 25 out of 27 rules of engagement when participating in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. In the meantime, Austria has dropped the above-mentioned proviso. It has become obvious that in the present circumstances, the credibility of the peacekeeping forces also requires the capability to enforce a mission. This is not to say that Austria is now keen to engage in peace-enforcement. Rather, it is a recognition of the fact that it often takes a show of force to command the necessary respect and to avoid being drawn into uncomfortable situations. In other words, the show of force should avoid the use of force. Showing one’s resolve is similar to the policy of dissuasion that was pursued by Switzerland and Austria during the time of the Cold War: by demonstrating the will to defend themselves, Switzerland and Austria hoped to avoid being drawn into a conflict.

In the future, Austrian troops will be in a position to employ “all necessary means” in the fulfillment of their missions. Of course, a small country like Austria has its limitations. There are certain tasks that lie beyond its capabilities because neither the structure nor the equipment of the units that can be dispatched allow the performance of complex military operations. In international operations, Austrian units will, therefore, be put under Austrian operational control and not under the operational command of an international headquarter. This ensures that they do not receive tasks they cannot fulfill and that the final responsibility rests with the Austrian contingent commander. It is, however, worth mentioning that in Austria’s 40 years of experience in the field of peacekeeping there has been no situation in which the country’s forces would not have performed their tasks.

The new peacekeeping environment has required a review and an adaptation of the Austrian concept for international operations. In addition, Austria has also had to follow the development inside the EU. The decisions taken in Nice will enable the EU to provide a substantive military component for crisis management after 2003. Austria will also contribute to the pool of EU forces. There will only be one set of forces for international operations; this set will perform a wide range of tasks. The previous concept of prepared units (“VOREIN”), as enacted by the
federal government on 25 May 1993, no longer meets the requirements of the current situation. It envisages units that are raised at short notice, with a manpower of no more than 2,500, and to be deployed internationally for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, including search and rescue missions. The capabilities in future missions will require preparation of national contingents for a higher level of conflict intensity.

International comparisons show that the training level of the Austrian Armed Forces is sufficient to meet the requirements of international operations. With respect to equipment and long-term availability, however, there is a fair bit of pent-up demand; this calls for reorganization and additional financing so that the Austrian Armed Forces can meet the evolving requirements. The following measures will be implemented by 2003:

- setting of an organizational framework with about 3,500 soldiers on active and reserve duty; of these, flexible contingents can be dispatched with a strength of about 2,000 soldiers;
- training and equipment to cover the whole spectrum of the Petersberg missions;
- availability for action in the mission area within 60 days after call-up (certain parts of the contingent within 30 days); this means the forces must be available within 30 days;
- sustainability of battalion-strength forces in peace-enforcement scenarios for up to one year, including the required personnel reserves for a rotation after six months;
- ability to perform long-term peacekeeping missions with battalion-strength forces, and to provide short-term missions of humanitarian nature or, in case of nuclear accidents, to provide adequate task forces;
- setting up a contracting system for about 6,000 soldiers for as long as only volunteers may serve abroad, so that the required numbers can be reliably maintained.
The above-listed measures are intended to secure adequate Austrian participation in international peace operations within the limitations of Austria’s resources. With an overall strength of up to 2,000 soldiers, who can be dispatched at any given time, the following units may be formed:

- one battalion-strong armored infantry unit to cover the whole spectrum of the Petersberg missions, organized as a battle group with a tank and/or a mechanized infantry unit, and reinforced with an air defense unit;
- one battalion-strong light infantry unit, exclusively for peacekeeping missions;
- one unit for NBC protection;
- one unit for humanitarian missions; and
- support elements (e.g. a logistic company) for the above units.

It must be possible for all these units to be integrated into larger international formations. Interoperability is a key factor. In this respect, the opportunities offered by the Partnership for Peace will be fully utilized.

Before listing some of the specific lessons learned from Austria’s participation in recent operations, I would like to stress that most of these have been relearned often. It seems to be very difficult to take corrective action even on a national level. We will always make mistakes, and quite often we seem to keep making the same ones. For my part, I am quite happy if we are at least developing a common culture of peacekeeping which allows us to operate together and to avoid the most detrimental mistakes.
Some Specific Lessons Learned in Recent Operations

Planning for Peace Support Operations

International or regional organizations mandating or directing PSOs should involve potential Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) during the earliest stage of planning. The present PfP Pol-Mil Framework foresees the full involvement of TCNs only after they have decided to participate. I believe it is necessary, however, to involve potential contributors, for example, through an “Ad-hoc Group” of interested nations. This would be helpful for the national decision-making process regarding participation.

The mandates of PSOs are often unclear or ambiguous. They therefore need authoritative interpretation. This is an important responsibility of the authority that directs the operation. A frequently neglected aspect of the operational concept is related to humanitarian assistance. The military component of a PSO will always have to perform additional protection and peace-building activities other than those explicitly designated in the mandate. The more any “non-military services” are anticipated, the more necessary additional resources beyond a traditional Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) are. Increased capabilities in this field (e.g. construction engineers, water purification, equipment, medical resources, etc.) would also serve the purpose of good relations with the local population and contribute to a peaceful environment.

On a national level, time for planning is crucial. Every effort to initiate the planning process, as well as participating in it as a potential contributor, must be pursued. Nevertheless, planners always have to keep in mind that the national political decision to participate in a specific PSO will always come late. Contingency planning must be initiated long before the political go-ahead is given. An agreed upon national PSO doctrine may help facilitate the necessary rapid decision-making. In 1993, the Austrian government passed a resolution on PSO participation and introduced a standby concept of pre-established PSO units. As mentioned before, this concept was adopted in 1999 in order to meet new challenges.
To muster public support for political decision-making and to recruit volunteers, the involvement of the media plays an important role. Only timely and accurate information will allow the media to inform the public and to rally support. This again stresses the importance of already involving potential troop contributors in the international planning and decision-making process. Experience shows that critical reports or exaggerated risk scenarios cause a substantial drop in the number of volunteers. TV reports on the other hand are the best advertising in order to attract volunteers.

*Working Relations with the UN and Other Bodies in the Field*

It is important to identify the various bodies in the field and the desirable working relations with them right at the start of a PSO, and even before actual deployment. The identification of the desired working relations and of these bodies that are players in the field should result in standing operating procedures. A variety of players need to be brought together; these include the various components of the peacekeeping forces themselves, other UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, diplomatic representatives, and the media. Working relations will be facilitated at all levels by conducting meetings, maintaining permanent liaison, and by developing common contingency plans. Coordination and cooperation, support and resource sharing, information exchange, liaison, common planning and execution are desired activities of an integrated crisis management.

*Logistic Aspects*

Logistic planning cannot be separated from operational planning and must be aligned with it. A detailed listing of national responsibilities should be included in the guidelines for TCN, and the international interface must be defined in the concept of operations. Experience has shown that a lead nation for logistics or national self-sustainment is more effective than sharing the logistic responsibility under a force management. Small contributors will, however, always need a centralized logistic system for bulk items and food, something similar to what
can be found in UN operations. This becomes even more important when the distance from home increases.

The nomination of a lead nation also proved successful in multinational units. The cooperation in a transport unit for IFOR between Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Austria (“BELUGA”), in which Belgium was the lead nation, has worked very well. A pragmatic approach in decision-making, which has included national representatives at the commander’s level, has worked flawlessly. Collective decision-making has not really meant collective leadership.

Host nation support should be regulated in a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) and utilized wherever possible in order to keep logistic costs low. The use of local resources and the demand for self-sufficiency are no substitutes for each other. The use of local supply structures (local market, banking, etc.) will always be necessary in order to achieve a timely and cost-effective supply.

Common standards with regard to welfare, leave, living conditions and privileges are important in order to avoid competition among nations, cost explosions or unequal treatment. These welfare needs should be given thorough consideration before deployment. Otherwise it may be difficult to establish satisfactory welfare conditions in the mission area where welfare facilities are always lacking. Neglecting these problems could harm the morale of the personnel.

It is also important to maintain a long-term logistic perspective. The staff in the mission, who are subject to rotation, tend to deal only with immediate problems because these efforts “pay off” while they are still in the mission area. Short-term thinking does not turn out to be a cost-effective and successful solution for the full period of a mission, however. Logistic planners situated in the capitals or at the strategic level need to keep a watchful eye on logistic requests in order to avoid wasting money.
Communications, Command and Control

Standardization and central guidance by the mission headquarters (HQ) are important for communications management, voice procedures and reporting. The electronic exchange of information exacerbates this problem, not only with respect to equipment, but also for training. Clear lines of command help to avoid serious friction between the PSO directing authorities and the Troop Contributing Nations, and subsequently in the operation itself. This is a major concern, particularly in the field of personnel safety. While, on the one hand, the TCN must adhere to non-interference in the operational chain of command, the multinational decision-making staff in a PSO HQ must, on the other hand, comply with the requirement to consult the TCN in matters of national responsibility, as well as in sensitive issues such as security.

Training

Military skills are the basic requirement to meet the challenges in a PSO. A soldier’s skills, however, are not sufficient to cope with all the possible challenges. In PSOs, certain patterns of behavior are partly contradictory to the acquired military ones, and some of the techniques are not at all part of standard military skills. Austria meets these demands by a special training program for PSOs, using national and international resource staff with mission experience and up-to-date information from the mission area. All soldiers have to undergo this particular pre-mission training. Special attention is paid to the latest political developments and the conflict background knowledge in order to create the necessary awareness and understanding. Emphasis is also laid on the training of PSO techniques, language skills and the multinational aspects of the operation. The realistic simulation of mission conditions has had excellent results. One must keep in mind, however, that efforts and resources for practical exercises often go beyond the affordable dimensions in terms of material, exercise players, and trainers with the most recent mission experience.

A new set of problems is related to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A stress prevention training is now included as part of the
preparation. Recently, a mandatory debriefing questionnaire was introduced in order to diagnose any possible danger of PTSD and to get indications of the need for treatment. In addition, in the case of severe problems, psychologists are sent to the mission area in order to address the problem. This has proven to be very effective and helpful.

Conclusion

From our experience in PSO, we learned that unity of effort amongst all the components of a PSO and good cooperation among all bodies in the field must be ensured. Likewise, it is important to involve potential Troop Contributing Nations in the early stages of planning and fact-finding. Among TCN, the logistic concept of a PSO should be jointly tuned and balanced. As far as training is concerned, minimum standards must be ensured, as well as language skills. Another important lesson is that interoperability should be achieved, particularly in the field of communications, staff procedures and administration. And last but not least, the military should not be over-tasked with humanitarian and civil work.
Appendix:
Austrian Participation in Peace Support Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>Austrian participation since</th>
<th>Troop strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECMM</td>
<td>EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MONITORING MISSION</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>KOSOVO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE / GEORGIA MISSION</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE / BOSNIA MISSION</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACVIAC</td>
<td>REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ASSISTANCE CENTER</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR/SFOR</td>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION / STABILIZATION FORCE</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOVIC</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS MONITORING, VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION COMMISSION</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Experience as a Newcomer: Switzerland’s Contribution to International Peace Support Operations

Introduction

Switzerland’s international commitment is not exactly new: as early as 1953 the Swiss government decided to participate in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Korea. Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre described the decision as an expression of an active policy of neutrality. As the foreign minister at the time said in a programmatic speech on 22 November 1953 in Uster near Zurich, Switzerland should become involved in international efforts to secure peace. This step was, however, not yet part of a strategic concept. Such a concept was only written in 1973. The involvement in Korea was simply motivated by the four pillars of Switzerland’s foreign policy: neutrality, solidarity, availability and universality. Today the strategic situation is different; the fundamental question of whether and to what extent a neutral country like Switzerland should get involved in international peace initiatives, however, remains essentially the same.
Switzerland’s Involvement in International Peace Efforts

During the Cold War, Switzerland limited itself to diplomatic activities, mainly as part of the CSCE process. Not being a member of the UN, Switzerland did not participate in blue helmet operations. It was only in 1989 that the Federal Council decided to provide a medical unit to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. The Federal Council made the right decision, as the initial outlines of a strategic change were already apparent. From 1991 to 1994 Switzerland was also involved in a UN mission in the Western Sahara, again with a medical unit. In addition, unarmed officers of the Swiss armed forces have been used as UN military observers in the Middle East, Georgia and elsewhere since 1990. The decisive factor has been the 1990 security policy report’s emphasis that participation in international peace operations is an important responsibility.

Despite some personnel problems, the overall experience from the missions in Namibia and the Western Sahara were positive and encouraged the Federal Council in 1994 to hold a referendum, which would allow Swiss troops to participate in blue helmet operations. Partly because of concerns about neutrality, but also because of the difficulties that UNPROFOR was encountering in performing its mission in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Swiss citizens voted against the Swiss armed forces engaging in such a way in UN-led peace operations. A trip to Croatia in February 1994 showed that the UN troops did indeed have their hands tied. The concepts that had been tested in the Middle East and on Cyprus for the use of blue helmets were totally unsuited to the realities of the Balkan war. Dutch Colonel Thom Karremans, who in the summer of 1995 commanded the battalion Dutchbat-3 deployed in Srebrenica, related his horrifying experiences in a newspaper interview. Like Captain Marlow in Joseph Conrad’s grim novel The Heart of Darkness, Karremans lived through indescribable horrors. Such experiences, as well as the problems which confronted blue helmet units in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, led UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to set up a working group that was chaired by former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi. I will briefly return to the ensuing expert report later, which was prepared with the participation of General
Klaus Naumann and the former President of the International Committee of the Red Cross Cornelio Sommaruga.

Despite the failure of the referendum, Switzerland decided to provide the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with the Swiss Headquarters Support Unit (SHQSU), the so-called yellow berets, for logistical missions, beginning in the summer of 1996. The yellow berets also served unarmed. During the two months I spent in the camp of the Swiss unit in Sarajevo in 1996, I was constantly reminded that the OSCE diplomats and the senior officers of what was then IFOR were well aware of this special Swiss arrangement. American, British and French professional soldiers did certainly not regard the yellow berets as equal partners. They often merely viewed these troops as members of some non-governmental organization (NGO). In other words, the Swiss Headquarters Support Unit was not perceived as part of the Swiss armed forces. Or to put it differently: foreign soldiers received a distorted picture of the Swiss military. They were surprised when it was explained to them that Switzerland in fact has an army of 400,000 soldiers, with 380 Leopard 2 tanks and 33 F/A-18 fighters.

At the same time, other neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden were serving in the Nordic brigade, that had its headquarters in the town of Doboj in central Bosnia. Switzerland thus missed its chance to gain the kind of experience in IFOR and SFOR which Finland, Sweden and also Austria had for some time been gaining in many UN missions. These countries have also had a big head start over Switzerland because they had been providing blue helmets for peacekeeping operations for decades. In NATO, the Nordic armed forces have won an excellent reputation. Several senior NATO commanders have commented on this. General Joachim Spiering, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces North Europe, for example, has said on a number of occasions in personal contacts at his headquarters in Brunssum that NATO could only profit from the experience gained by Sweden, Finland and Austria.

A new impetus for involvement was given by the Partnership for Peace, in which Switzerland has been engaged in since 1996. The intention of
becoming more seriously involved is consistent with the principle of “Security through Cooperation,” which is virtually the motto of the new Security Report 2000. It was, therefore, only logical that Switzerland decided to provide KFOR in Kosovo with a company, the so-called Swisscoy, in the summer of 1999. Even before this, Switzerland had supported the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with three Super-Puma helicopters. Yet again, a special solution had to be found. In principle, the Swisscoy performs its logistical mission unarmed. Since it has become clear that this arrangement is impractical in everyday work, Bern has found a special solution: assault rifles and pistols are kept in the Swisscoy magazine and are issued for special tasks and for a limited period of time. For soldiers of the fortress guard corps (a professional troop with police tasks), an exceptional solution was found. These soldiers perform their duties armed. Soldiers, however, who have to be defended by other soldiers (no doubt a unique case in today’s world) are sooner or later going to have problems with their military role. Which soldier is going to want to ride in an APC (armored personnel carrier) without a machine gun or a cannon? This became particularly obvious in late December 2000, when Federal President Adolf Ogi went to Sarajevo and was welcomed by an honor guard of yellow berets at the airport, while Italian carabinieri armed with automatic rifles were responsible for security.

Based on a special bilateral agreement with Austria, the Swisscoy has been incorporated into the Austrian battalion, which belongs to the Multinational Brigade South under German command. Between 150 and 160 Swiss soldiers are constantly on duty. The troop has the most up-to-date transport and water supply equipment. NATO commanders General Klaus Reinhardt and German Brigadier General Fritz von Korff have praised the performance of the Swiss soldiers. And indeed: a visit to the company showed that the Swiss had nothing to fear from being compared with other troops. The military policemen assigned to Kosovo have civilian experience. In addition, the public information officers have a high level of professional competence. Until now, those

sent on such missions have worked in television, radio or newspapers for many years. The main contingent of Swiss soldiers in Bosnia and Kosovo consists of militia soldiers. Precisely in crisis zones in which civilian-military cooperation is of crucial importance, members of the militia are particularly suitable because, unlike the professional military, they are used to behaving appropriately in a civilian environment. This was shown by the yellow berets in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In which other army would you, for example, find a military physician, who is a parachute reconnaissance officer as well as an experienced surgeon? Where else could you find an armored soldier, who in civilian life runs a radio store and is also a fireman service instructor?

As a result of the militia system, such people are not infinitely available. In addition, many officers do not yet have the experience necessary for missions in multinational peace operations. The Swiss have a lot of missed experience to catch up on in this area. The Cooperative Determination 2000 exercise, that was held in Switzerland last year, was certainly a major contribution to the Partnership for Peace. If one compares this exercise, an introduction for partner countries that are not NATO members, however, with the practice of military staffs in Bosnia and Kosovo, it obviously only serves as a beginning. Foreign assignments must form part of the career of professional officers. To summarize: in terms of material and organization, that is, in terms of hardware, Switzerland is quite up to international standards; in terms of being acquainted with the procedures commonly used in NATO, however, it lags behind countries such as Finland, Sweden or Austria. In other words, the main emphasis should lie on the software, on, for example, the know-how of the staff procedures that are used within NATO. This is because interoperability cannot be limited to the technical side of cooperation.
The Partial Revision of the Swiss Military Law: Armed Participation in Peace Support Operations

On 10 June 2001, the Swiss people decided in a referendum that Swiss armed troop contingents should participate in multinational peace operations. The parliament had passed the necessary revision of the Military Law\(^2\) by a clear majority. Swiss participation in a multinational peace operation requires a mandate from the UN or the OSCE. The quantity and type of weapons to protect personnel and to perform the mission is decided on by the Federal Council, and depends on the situation in the area of operations. Genuine combat missions continue to be ruled out. In addition, Switzerland only participates in peacekeeping, not in peace-enforcement operations.

The debate about the new orientation in Swiss security policy was difficult, as it revolved around two arguments. The advocates of a restrictive neutrality, the Swiss People’s Party and the Action for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland, are not concerned with weapons as such. Even they are well aware that it makes no sense to send military units unarmed into crisis zones. They do not support this kind of Swiss involvement at all. Instead, they support concentrating exclusively on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Swiss Disaster Relief Corps, as well as so-called good offices according to the traditional diplomatic model. They refuse to admit that peacekeeping missions based on the UN Charter are compatible with neutrality. Another group called “Switzerland without an Army” wants to follow an exclusively civilian peace policy and thereby emphasize preventive, and especially, social measures.

The advocates of a traditional neutrality overlook the fact that Swiss neutrality has become increasingly irrelevant to the ICRC, which as an organization is neutral itself. In addition, more and more foreigners have been working in the ICRC, and they do not view the organization primarily from the Swiss national perspective. It is also difficult to understand the view put forward in such circles that the Disaster Relief

Corps should show international solidarity, but not the Swiss army, when we know that this humanitarian organization, as its representatives have repeatedly stated, needs a secure environment to work in. In a book entitled *The Warrior’s Honor*, Michael Ignatieff has, on the basis of personal observations, clearly shown that in present-day international wars, international law cannot be enforced through the Geneva Conventions alone. One gets a similar impression from reading *Deliver us from Evil* by William Shawcross. As I know from my visit to Grozny, the ICRC itself often has to operate in a more or less secure environment. Although the ICRC kept its distance from military units, the then head of the ICRC mission in Grozny had to be in close contact with General Anatoly Kulikov. They met regularly in order to discuss mutual problems.

Only states which offer a complete range of diplomatic, economic and ultimately also military services to contain and overcome crises can remain serious partners in international crisis management. To overstate it just slightly: if one wants to keep out of conflicts in the present prevailing strategic environment, one would have to renounce all foreign policy activity. From visits to Kosovo it is clear to me that it was not the use of Swiss troops that embittered the Serbian population – they were not even mentioned. It was in fact the Swiss chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in the Hague, Carla Del Ponte, who was subject to strong criticism. Withdrawing behind one’s own borders is also no solution; Switzerland has already been directly affected by the consequences of the Balkan conflicts. One need merely recall all the refugees and those many individuals seeking asylum in Switzerland. The increasingly close interdependence between internal and external security requires the kind of integrated approach to security that underlies the new concept as laid out in the *Security Report 2000*. Switzerland would not be understood were it to call for international police assistance while excusing itself from taking part in peace missions.

---


Based on Switzerland’s humanitarian tradition, a policy such as that proposed by the American strategist Edward Luttwak under the title *Give War a Chance* would be unacceptable. His view that wars should be left to burn out in order to achieve genuinely peaceful solutions cannot serve as a guide for Switzerland. This does not mean, however, that all-out interventionism should be the order of the day. Last year in Bern, Former Finnish Defense Minister Elisabeth Rehn declared that clear humanitarian goals must be the guiding principle in deciding whether or not to become militarily involved in a peace operation. The partial revision of the Military Law takes such considerations into account.

In the long run, Switzerland cannot concentrate exclusively on its traditional national defense which, for the foreseeable future, has become an extremely remote possibility. An army that concentrates most of its attention on a highly unlikely scenario, while only half-heartedly confronting far more immediate tasks, loses substance. Intervention abroad should not replace national defense; rather it should supplement and strengthen it. A convincing Swiss strategy – and a doctrine derived from it to guide the use of the armed forces – can ultimately be defined only in a European context. Switzerland should regard such a development as an opportunity, rather than as a threat.

Under what framework conditions should Switzerland intervene at all? In answer to this question, many people give priority to national interest. This view often reflects an ill-considered adoption of ideas formulated in American strategy papers. At least as important, however, is the maintenance of a global order of peace. In my personal view, this is the principle that should be paramount. For the time being, Switzerland intends to proceed very cautiously and continue limiting itself to logistical missions. It will take another ten years or so for a battalion to be available for a broader range of military tasks. For some time to come, Switzerland’s performance will therefore continue to lag behind that of Finland, Sweden or Austria. Austria is not the only country to have drawn conclusions from the new strategic situation, and it is now even

---

ready to provide some 3,500 soldiers to the planned European Corps for crisis intervention.

Greater Swiss involvement in peace operations will bring valuable know-how in training our own armed forces, including knowledge on the use of modern technology for the conduct of troops in difficult situations. It is, however, only possible to acquire such knowledge by occupying key positions on the KFOR and SFOR staffs. Switzerland will not have this opportunity if it continues to limit itself to relatively small troop units. The same applies to the restrictions in the Military Law. In crisis zones, a situation does not usually develop in the way foreseen by the articles of this law. Even if Switzerland refuses to participate in peace-enforcement operations for the time being, it must still be prepared to deal with difficult situations. This requires soldiers who, under certain circumstances, are also capable of combat. Switzerland would lose its reputation if it were to pull back in the event of an escalation, which always represents a potential risk. The recommendations in the *Brahimi Report* show that even blue helmet operations take place in a different environment than has previously been the case.

**Conclusion**

To be precise: Switzerland must also be prepared to gear itself for robust peacekeeping, which has nothing to do with peace-enforcement. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, argues similarly in an article recently published in *National Security Studies Quarterly*. In the future, Switzerland should therefore offer a full range of contributions to peace support operations. So far, Switzerland’s contributions under the motto of being “tailor-made”

---


have been limited to activities which, while consistent with the room for maneuver offered by neutrality, were less adapted to conditions prevailing in areas of crisis.

“Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion and perspective.” 8 This remark, which comes at the end of Max Weber’s seminal work Politics as a Profession published in 1919, has lost none of its relevance, particularly as regards security policy. Now the door is open to a modern security and defense policy. This is necessary, because Switzerland can only achieve its security policy concept as outlined in the Security Report 2000 because its people approved armed missions abroad.

---

Training Soldiers for Peace Support Operations: New Training Requirements and Switzerland’s Approach

Introduction

The late UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld said, “Peacekeeping is nothing for a soldier, but only a soldier can do it.” This quote has been repeated around the world time and again. However true it may be, this saying certainly serves a number of very useful purposes: First, it highlights the key role soldiers play in maintaining and preserving world peace, not just in waging war, as some people believe. Second, it helps to maintain and rebuild the morale of soldiers who have trained vigorously for war or defense, but have found themselves “patrolling in white cars with little military muscle” between former belligerents, quite often at their mercy, whenever those former warring parties chose not to comply with the terms of an armistice agreement. Third, it indicates that standard battle drills and procedures may not be sufficient for soldiers engaged in peacekeeping or peace support activities. In order to highlight new training requirements and to put the Swiss approach in perspective, it seems worthwhile to reflect briefly on some of the key requirements of a soldier’s trade.
Traditional Military Skills

Soldiers are trained for war, that is, for high-intensity combat. In strictly military terms, the enemy is well-defined. Intelligence efforts focus on the opponent’s order of battle. There are always uncertainties regarding the enemy’s intentions, but there is hardly ever any uncertainty as to who the adversary is. In both attack and defense, one must disguise one’s intentions, surprise the enemy, and destroy both his will and his ability to fight. To succeed, survive and endure the immense stress of insecurity, death and destruction on a modern battlefield, the common soldier must rely on battle reflexes that were drilled into him in peacetime.

Command structures are focused on military efficiency. Politically motivated compromises may be inevitable at the higher echelons, especially in alliances or coalitions, but in the field, they are not normally allowed to interfere with combat efficiency. Real time information flows lead to an increasing degree of centralized battle management by higher command and narrow down the choices of subordinate commanders to act within the framework of broadly defined missions. For successful combined arms warfare, multinationality is applied above the level of nationally homogenous brigades whenever possible.

One word concerning the civilian population: professional armed forces try to conduct military operations in such a way that the least possible harm comes to civilian populations and infrastructure. All measures are taken to ensure respect of the law of armed conflict. This does, however, not change the basic fact that military necessity takes precedence over the needs of the population in the combat zone, no matter what measures are taken to soften its harmful effects. One last aspect that I would like to mention here concerns the issue of casualties. A professional military leader always plans and conducts operations with the aim of minimizing losses in human life. Yet casualties are a fact of life – or death – in war and are accepted as such.
Peace Support Operations Requirements

Peacekeeping and peace support operations clearly must follow a different military rationale. Once the situation on the ground has stabilized, peace supporters must perform in ways which may run counter to their normal battle drills. They must have a high profile and deter any potential violator from being aggressive, yet in a manner that is non-provocative and builds trust in the local community. Peace supporters must appear impartial towards all sides – yet they must be perceived as being compassionate to the needs and sufferings of the local population.

Whenever possible, conflict must be defused with a careful mix of firmness and negotiation. Very often, the initial reactions of an ordinary soldier on the spot are crucial. The behavior of a squad manning a checkpoint can determine whether a confrontation can be defused or turns into a violent incident. Sound judgment and diplomatic skills of non commissioned officers (NCO) and junior officers are in high demand, far beyond the application of standardized battle drills. All soldiers involved in PSO must have a solid knowledge of the culture and customs of the host country. Violation of local customs can jeopardize a mission and put soldiers’ lives at risk. If the use of force is inevitable, it must stay within narrowly-defined rules of engagement. The principle of minimal force applies in terms of duration, tactics and means. Strict proportionality must be observed.

With regard to the cost of human life, standards apply which differ greatly from a traditional battle situation. Casualty awareness is clearly on the rise. While UNPROFOR suffered hundreds of casualties and soldiered on, operations to arrest war criminals in the Balkans were cancelled, because the risks to the intervention assets were considered too high. There seems to be a certain discrepancy between this risk sensitivity and the highly dangerous tasks which ordinary police officers are expected to accept in their normal day-to-day activities, such as arresting drug dealers or hostage takers. It is proof of the enormous political sensitivity in which modern PSO take place.
In peace support operations, soldiers are routinely confronted with international media. “No comment” as a response will usually not do. It is, however, unacceptable for every soldier to reveal his views and feelings to an international television team.

Headquarters and commanders must manage the integration of small national contingents, sometimes platoon size, into their order of battle. Very often representatives from smaller participating nations are not accustomed to the staff drills and procedures of the lead nation. To keep them on board, the staff work must acknowledge that.

Headquarters and units must perform a variety of tasks which are not normally performed in combat settings. Liaison with international organizations and NGOs requires a great deal of time, flexibility and tact. On paper, a division of labor between military and civilian actors often exists. Reality, however, tends to be less well-defined. Frequently, the military must take over duties of civilian agencies, because the civilian partners simply do not have the capacity or the organizational skills to do them.

Intelligence work differs greatly from normal wartime requirements. The enemy order of battle is not the most pressing problem; once a situation is stabilized, no enemy in the proper sense exists. A great number of actors, however, must be monitored, and their behavior analyzed. Human intelligence becomes far more important than aerial reconnaissance or signal intelligence. Knowledge about the personal histories and family ties of local leaders, formal and informal, plays a far greater role than the identification of command posts and solid military hardware.

These sketchy observations may lead to the conclusion that soldiers involved in PSO would benefit from forgetting all they have learned about classic soldiering and instead, transform into socially conscious police officers, especially since modern PSO suffer from a chronic shortage of international police. Yet such a conclusion would clearly be wrong. KFOR may serve as a good example. In June 1999, when KFOR moved into Kosovo, it was prepared to drive out the Serbs. Had there been organized Serb resistance, such effort would likely have resembled classic combined arms warfare. Fortunately, this scenario
did not materialize. There is one further reason to argue that soldiers engaged in PSO must be trained to fight. For a patrol, squad or platoon which comes under attack by whatever renegade elements, it makes little difference whether the operation is labelled “peacekeeping” or anything else. If worse comes to worst, the troops must be trained and equipped to fight it out. The challenge for those responsible for preparing peace supporters for missions is to take well-trained soldiers, maintain or improve their battle readiness, and teach them necessary additional skills which may run counter to their original training.

The Swiss Approach

Before any discussion of Swiss ways of training soldiers for PSO can take place, a few basic facts must be recalled:

Switzerland is a newcomer to the international PSO community. Our first exposure to modern PSO is still relatively recent. I therefore want to stress that we are in no position, and have no intention, of selling the Swiss way to any other nation or armed forces. So far, Swiss participation in PSO faced a number of restrictions due to current national legislation. As a general rule, Swiss contingents were not entitled to be armed. Strictly speaking, only certain individuals were permitted to be armed for self-defense. In a referendum held in June 2001, the Swiss people consented to the participation of armed Swiss contingents in PSO. By law, Swiss contingents are not entitled to participate in peace-enforcement operations. In the case of our contingent to KFOR, this leads to national rules of engagements that are more restrictive than those applying to the whole of KFOR.

Our participation in KFOR is relatively small. Swisscoy (from “Swiss Company”) consists of a combat service support company plus some exclusively national elements. Swisscoy is part of the Austrian Task Force Dulje in the area of responsibility of Multinational Brigade South (MNBS). All Swiss soldiers serving abroad are volunteers. Approximately 15 percent are regulars, and the rest comes from the
reserve. All have completed basic training and, depending on their age, have done a number of bi-annual or annual refresher courses. The majority of officers are also reservists. Swisscoy is an ad hoc unit. It is composed of individuals who have never before served together.

I have recalled these basic facts because they have considerable implications for the way we train our volunteers: The first implication is that pre-mission training must serve two basic functions: to train and familiarize individuals with the specific tasks they will have to perform, and to form a coherent unit from individuals who have just met. One of the key factors in successful team building is that the different platoons grow together under their platoon leader. It is, therefore, the platoon leader who must train his people. Mission-experienced instructors primarily assist the company commander and his platoon leaders in a predominantly advising and coaching role. The actual training is given by junior leaders. Teaching by outside instructors is limited to general knowledge and technical instruction. In order to make the leaders fit to train their own troops, they must be specifically prepared. They receive special instruction before the rank and file show up for training.

Second, a combat service support company is composed of a great variety of functional specialists. All its members require special skills. Members of Swisscoy are selected based on their civilian background and skills. They bring vast knowledge from their civilian sphere with them. Let me offer some examples: lorry drivers in Swisscoy are military reservists with extensive hands-on civilian experience, and they most often also have experience in the international transportation business. Military police officers are military reservists and are experienced police officers in their civilian lives. The same goes for press and information officers (journalists) and construction engineers (civil engineers). Because of the professional knowledge that these people bring with them, we spend relatively little time preparing them for their required mission technical specialty.

Third, the large number of reservists results in a balanced age structure which reduces the mission fatigue often encountered in contingents composed predominantly of young conscripts. Many volunteers bring with them a considerable degree of maturity and stress resistance.
Fourth, reservists are disadvantaged because their traditional military know-how is lower than regular soldiers’ or conscripts’, who serve abroad immediately after basic and advanced training. We therefore face the paradox that the largest share of our mission-oriented training must be devoted to brushing up traditional military skills, despite the fact that the main mission of the contingent is combat service support.

Fifth, Swisscoy is part of an Austrian-lead battalion task force. We send our officers, as part of their preparatory training, and the entire contingent, at the end of their training, to Austria to become familiarized with their new partners.

Training Syllabus

The first to start training are the national contingent commander (NCC) and the company commander. They receive introductory briefings in Switzerland and then spend two weeks in Kosovo to familiarize themselves with their future tasks and the mission area. After one week there, they are joined by the platoon commanders and the company sergeant major. We have found that this familiarization greatly increases both the competence and credibility of these leaders when taking over the command of their troops. After their return, they receive a concentrated week of applied training in rules of engagement. After this sequence, they depart for Austria for a joint course with their future Austrian brothers-in-arms. They return to Switzerland for one week of preparation for the specific lessons and exercises that they will have to carry out with their troops.

Parallel to the leaders’ training, staff officers and functional specialists are trained in their respective trades. Such training includes driving armored personnel carriers, conversion to military lorries, etc. Engineer officers spend one week of joint training at the engineer school of the Bundeswehr near Munich, together with the German CIMIC staff of the German KFOR contingent. Training for the new contingents lasts a minimum of seven weeks. The first five weeks take place at the peacekeeping training center in Bière, Switzerland, and the last two weeks are held in Austria with the AUCON/KFOR contingent.
The training focuses on knowledge of mandate, mission area and local customs, mine awareness, NBC-drill and advanced first aid. Concentrated field rifle practice is combined with practical training in rules of engagement. Soldiers and officers alike become familiarized with Austrian radio convoy and escort procedures. Special briefings are given on coping with stress. Families, spouses and girlfriends are invited to the training area for one Saturday. The soldier in the mission is likely to get better psychological support from home when his or her loved ones have at least some idea what his future mission is. Naturally, we cannot bring the families to the mission area, but a family visit day during training helps. The feedback has been overwhelmingly positive, and we shall continue this practice.

It would be exaggerated to claim that the nature of training is selective. Approximately five percent of those undergoing training, however, are qualified unfit for mission at the end of this period. Naturally, they will not go. Selection is made in the phase of recruitment, when three candidates are normally screened for each vacancy available.

Conclusion

Reserve soldiers can be trained to become good peacekeepers. Anybody who has doubts is well-advised to read General Michael Rose’s account of his tour of duty as Commander UNPROFOR. Special tribute is paid to Nordic soldiers for their “civilian” competence not normally found in professional soldiers but very helpful in a peacekeeping context.

Unit cohesion is an essential requirement for successful performance of any military unit in war or peacekeeping. Any training syllabus must pay special attention to team-building aspects. Good team spirit, together with individual mental preparation, is a crucial factor in the individual soldier’s ability to cope with stress, uncertainty, and often boring daily routine. A peacekeeper must be prepared for the effects of
claustrophobic living conditions in abnormal environments where threat is permanent but all too often invisible.

Any good commander will spot deficiencies in the training of his troops and want them eliminated. Yet, at the same time, a certain balance must be found between the minimal time required to make a unit fit for mission and the maximum training time which reservists are ready to accept. Volunteers want to join a mission and accept specific training as a necessary must, but they will not commit themselves to disproportionately long training periods. The available training time must therefore be used as efficiently as possible.

Training must be realistic to be credible. Up-to-date mission experience must constantly be worked into the training syllabus. It is essential that NCO and officers who have recently completed their tours of operational duty are made available for the training of follow-up contingents. All too often, regulars who return with fresh experience are posted to new domestic assignments which are totally unrelated to peacekeeping activities. Valuable experience is lost.

Training is not over when a new contingent deploys. It must continue in mission area to maintain high standards. This is particularly vital in areas such as rifle practice, applied rules of engagement and individual battle drills. For this purpose, the second contingent Swisscoy built a rifle range within the camp perimeter.

To conclude, I dare to contradict the late Dag Hammarskjöld. I am fully convinced that, peacekeeping is definitely something for a soldier, but only a well-prepared soldier should do it.
Selected Bibliography


About the Authors

**James Appathurai** is Senior Planning Officer in the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section of the Political Affairs Division of NATO. His previous experience includes work within the policy sphere of the Canadian Department of National Defense and experience in peacekeeping operations of the Canadian forces. Among James Appathurai’s publications are *Lessons Learned from the Zaire Mission* (1997) and *NATO Intervention in Kosovo: Ethical and Legal Rationales and Lessons Learned* (2001).

**Mats Berdal** is director of studies and editor of the Adelphi Papers at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London. Since 1997, he has been responsible for *Strategic Survey*’s Strategic Geography Section. From 1997 to 2000, he was research fellow at the Centre for International Studies at Oxford University. At the IISS, he was research associate in 1992 and research fellow from 1994. Among his publications are *Lessons Not Learned: The Use of Force in Peace Operations in the 1990s* (2000), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (2000), and the two Adelphi papers *Whither UN Peacekeeping?* (1993), and *Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars* (1996).

**Wolfgang Biermann** has been international security and development adviser to the executive committee of the Social Democratic Party of Germany since 1981. In 1998 he was adviser to the Norwegian Human Rights House Foundation in Oslo. From 1994 to 1998 he headed the *Danish-Norwegian Research Project on UN Peacekeeping* (DANORP) at the Copenhagen Research Institute (COPRI). He published the results of the research project in *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia.*
Ambassador **Leonidas A. Evangelidis** was Director General for Common Foreign and Security Policy at the Council of the European Union from 1995 to November 2000, when he retired. In the course of his diplomatic career in the Foreign Service of Greece, which he joined in 1961, he was ambassador to Iraq, Poland and Germany, and served as Permanent Representative of Greece to the European Union. In 1994 he served at the European Commission as Chef de Cabinet of the Greek Commissioner. Ambassador Evangelidis holds a law degree from the University of Thessaloniki.

**Günther Greindl**, Lieutenant General, has been the Austrian Military Representative to the Military Committee of the European Union and to NATO since June 2000. He was commander of the UN Peacekeeping Forces on the Golan (UNDOF) in 1979, in Cyprus (UNFICYP) from 1981 to 1989, and in Kuwait (UNIKOM) in 1991/92. Lieutenant General Greindl also headed the UN Special Commission of Inquiry in the UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) in 1993/94. He holds a master’s degree in civil engineering from the Technical University of Vienna.

**Jakob Kellenberger** has been president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) since January 2000. He joined the Swiss diplomatic service in 1974 and held various posts at the Swiss embassies in Madrid, Brussels and London. From 1984 to 1992, Dr. Kellenberger was head of the Integration Office in Bern and was in charge of European integration. From 1992 to 1999 he was State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Political Director, serving as chief negotiator and coordinator for the bilateral negotiations between Switzerland and the European Union, which lasted from 1994 and 1998. He holds a Ph.D. in literature and linguistics from the University of Zurich.

**Bernard Kouchner** was Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from July 1999 until January 2001. Before taking over this assignment, he held a number of ministerial positions in different French governments. He served as France’s minister of health, and before that as minister of state for humanitarian action and
minister of state for social integration. A medical doctor by profession, Dr. Kouchner founded the non-profit humanitarian organization Médecins sans Frontières. He is the author of several books and co-founder of the news magazines “L’Evenement” and “Actuel”. He received several human rights awards, among them the Dag Hammarskjold Prize and the Prix Europa. Since February 2001, Dr. Kouchner is in his third term as minister of health in the French government.

Bruno Lezzi is editor for security and defense policy issues at the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London. From 1972 to 1983, Dr. Lezzi worked as a federal employee in the Swiss Ministry of Defense. In the Swiss armed forces, he holds the rank of a Colonel General Staff and belongs to the staff of the Chief of the General Staff. Apart from his articles on security and defense policy issues for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, he has published several essays on Swiss security and defense policy. Bruno Lezzi holds a Ph.D. in military history from the University of Zurich.

John Mackinlay is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies and senior lecturer at the Department of War Studies, both at King’s College London. He began his career as an officer in the British Army. In 1985 he was defense fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge. He researched the Arab-Israeli war zones extensively, completing his Ph.D. at King’s College London. In 1991 he directed a project on second generation multinational operations at Brown University, Rhode Island, before being appointed professor at the George Marshall European Center for Security Studies. In 1997/98 he was principle lecturer at the British Joint Services Command and Staff College. He has published several books, among them The Peacekeepers: A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations, and he has edited A Guide to Peace Support Operations.

Michael Pugh is director of the International Studies Research Centre at the Department of Politics, University of Plymouth, and editor of the quarterly journal International Peacekeeping. In 1999–2000 he was visiting associate professor at the Copenhagen Peace Research

**Klaus Reinhardt** was Commander Joint Command Center from April 1998 to March 2001. From October 1999 to April 2000 he was Commander of KFOR. During his long military career, Klaus Reinhardt held a variety of positions and commands in the German armed forces, among them Chief of the Personal Staff of the former defense minister Manfred Wörner. He commanded the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Hamburg. In 1994 he became commander of the Armed Forces Command in Koblenz, where he was responsible for the German deployment in Somalia and the contingents in UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR. General Reinhardt holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Freiburg.

**Bruno Rösli**, Colonel General Staff, is head of the Division for Peacekeeping Operations in the General Staff of the Swiss Ministry of Defense. Before taking up this assignment, Bruno Rösli was Military Adviser of the Swiss delegation to the OSCE in Vienna. In 1993 and 1994 he worked as a delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the Middle East and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His first experience in the field of international security cooperation was in 1985/86 as a liaison officer in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Panmunjom, Korea. Colonel Rösli holds an M.A. in history and political science from the universities of Zurich and Dundee; he graduated from the first International Training Course in Security Policy (1986/87) in Geneva.
Agenda of the Conference

“Peace Support Operations – Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives”

8 February 2001

10:30 Opening of the Conference by the CIS Managing Director
   Prof. Kurt R. Spillmann

10:45 Session 1 Chairman: Prof. Kurt R. Spillmann
   Overall Aspects and Strategies of International Stabilization and Peace Support Operations (PSO)
   • International Stabilization and Peace Support Strategies – What Europe Can Contribute
     Ambassador Leonidas Evangelidis, Former Director General for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Council of the European Union
   • From First Generation UN Peacekeeping to NATO-led Peace Support Operations – Definitions and Concepts
     Dr. John Mackinlay, Centre for Defence Studies London
   • Q&A with speakers

14:00 Session 2 Chairman: Prof. Jürg M. Gabriel
   International Division of Labor in Peace Support Operations and the Future of UN Peacekeeping
   • UN, OSCE; NATO: International Division of Labor in Peace Support Operations
     Dr. Wolfgang Biermann, Former Danish-Norwegian Research Project on UN Peacekeeping (DANORP)
   • Does Traditional UN Peacekeeping Have a Future?
     Dr. Mats Berdal, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) London
   • Q&A with speakers
16:00 Session 3 Chairman: Prof. Jürg M. Gabriel
Military Aspects and Lessons from the Kosovo
• Military Aspects of Peace Support Operations – Lessons Learned from KFOR
  Gen. Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, Joint Command Centre NATO
• A First-Hand Perspective from the Kosovo
  Dr. Bernard Kouchner, Former Head of UNMIK
• Q&A with speakers

18:00 Presentation of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
Reto Häni, IMSMA

9 February 2001

9:00 Session 4 Chairman: Prof. Thomas Bernauer
A NATO View
• Crisis Management in the Balkans: The NATO Experience
  James Appathurai, Political Affairs Division, NATO
• Q&A with speaker

10:00 Session 5 Chairman: Prof. Thomas Bernauer
Civilian Aspects of Peace Support Operations
• Humanitarian Aspects of International Peace Support Operations
  Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
• Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations
  Dr. Michael Pugh, Plymouth International Studies Centre
• Q&A with speakers
11:40 Session 6  
Chairman: Prof. Andreas Wenger  
National Experience with Peace Support Operations
  • Recent Experiences with International Peace Support Operations –  
    Austria’s View  
    * Lt. Gen. Günther Greindl, Austrian Military Representative to NATO*
  • Experience as a Newcomer – Switzerland’s Contribution to International  
    Peace Support Operations  
    * Dr. Bruno Lezzi, Neue Zürcher Zeitung*
  • Training Soldiers for Peace Support Operations –  
    New Training Requirements and Switzerland’s Approach  
    * Col. Bruno Rösli, Swiss Ministry of Defense*
  • Q&A with speakers

14:30 Session 7  
Chairman: Prof. Kurt R. Spillmann  
Panel discussion on “Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives  
for Peace Support Operations”
  • *James Appathurai, NATO*
  • *Lt. Gen. Günther Greindl, Austrian Military Representative to NATO*
  • *Dr. Winrich Kühne, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*
  • *Dr. Meinrad Studer, ICRC*

15:30 Closing remarks by the CIS Managing Director  
Prof. Kurt R. Spillmann