



## UKRAINIAN STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

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## Research(ers) in Times of War

Gwendolyn Sasse (Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) and Humboldt Universität zu Berlin)

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Comparative social science research on the effects of war tends to be characterised by an empirical vacuum for ongoing wars, while the aftermath of wars is often well documented. Reflection on war in retrospect is also of great importance, but at both the individual and political level, memory intervenes and (re-)orders events and their implications. Arguably, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is captured in images and text more immediately and intensively than any war that preceded it. The omnipresence of smartphones and messaging services like Telegram enables bottom-up documentation. In the coming years and decades, this abundance of data will provide a wide variety of entry points for scholars from different disciplines within and beyond the social sciences. However, not all images or text data automatically become the basis of academic research or legal proceedings. Therefore, the collection, processing and archiving of 'usable' data is an important and challenging task.

In addition to the documentation and analysis of the data collected amidst war, research communication also has a significant and visible role to play. The boundaries between the communication of academic expertise, the analysis of the unfolding events against the backdrop of regional expertise, expressions of opinion and policy preferences, and activism are fluid in an extreme situation such as war. Each academic draws the lines for herself/himself, but a perceived need to communicate is shared widely.

The developments preceding Russia's war against Ukraine are well documented in social science research (even if, for structural reasons, country-specific expertise has often been undervalued by the mainstream in disciplines such as political science). Quantitative and qualitative research on Ukraine and Russia has provided a sound basis for understanding the increasingly divergent political systems and societies of the two countries. This tension between Ukraine's democratization and Russia's increasing autocratization is at the heart of this war.

History is often reconceptualised by critical contemporary junctures. In this case, historians are also already effectively drawing attention to the longer-term developments shaping the present. With a certain time lag, sources on key decision-making processes in and around the war and currently inaccessible data, for example on the death toll, will increasingly become available. Based

on sound research ethics, it is or will be possible to ask individuals about their personal experiences of war and displacement, their engagement, networks and attitudes in surveys, focus groups and in-depth interviews.

During war, access to the "field" is difficult. The legal framework of Western research institutions restricts access to Ukraine or prohibits it altogether. The war context however, also requires a realistic assessment of what can really be researched on the ground, should access be possible. Western scholars may overestimate their role and importance in empirically documenting what is happening on the ground. In addition to personal risks, there are ethical issues to consider. Research with vulnerable or traumatised individuals during or after war goes hand in hand with a duty of care on the part of the researchers. This applies equally to research in the field and to research with displaced individuals. Ukrainian researchers in Ukraine or abroad also face practical and ethical challenges. What issues can they (and do they want to) address at this point in time? How do both citizens and decision-makers in Ukraine react when they are being interviewed by Ukrainian researchers currently living abroad?

The "field" becomes much more complex through war—it simultaneously becomes more local and more transnational. Something similar is happening within academic structures. The strong presence of Ukrainian researchers in Western and Central European institutions as a result of the war expands existing networks and cooperation. The virtual space also helps to regularly include voices from Ukraine in events and projects. These networks have the potential to establish a sustainable exchange about the challenges of research in war times and to tackle big questions related to this war and its consequences.

Direct everyday contact and numerous virtual connections across research environments and academic disciplines strengthen the mutual understanding of the logics and parameters of academia in different locations. Documentation, communication, and continued university education are part of Ukraine's current struggle for survival. In Ukraine's pre-2022 academic system, the norms and expectations did not always coincide with Western (especially Anglo-Saxon) practices, e.g., in terms of decision-making hierarchies, publications in international (i.e., mostly English-language) journals, or third-party funding. The range of scientific excellence

in Ukraine beyond a small number of internationally visible institutions is currently being recognised. This trend goes beyond the disciplines that deal directly with the war and its consequences. This process is also part of the necessary decolonization of East European studies and a more differentiated public perception of the region.

The focus on Russian history in teaching and public discourse and the central role of Russian language and literature in Slavic studies have mirrored Russia's colonial view of its neighbouring countries, underpinned a one-sided orientation of the public discourse and political misjudgements. Other countries, languages, and cultures in the wider region of Eastern Europe were by and large ignored. On the basis of a now more differentiated perspective of the region, tragically honed during the war, and the numerous personal and institutional connections, a more long-term research agenda and multi-local cooperation can and need to be conceived now.

#### *About the Author*

Prof. *Gwendolyn Sasse* is the Director of the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) and Einstein Professor for the Comparative Study of Democracy and Authoritarianism at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. She is the author of "Russia's War against Ukraine", Polity Press 2023 (German edition, C.H.Beck 2022).

An important prerequisite for this are opportunities for researchers inside and outside Ukraine that go beyond short-term support measures. Basic practical issues that are unfortunately too often overlooked are part of this rethinking, such as access to expensive international conferences and academic journals.

With the war, the academic landscape in Ukraine is changing. The extent of the destruction, the military and civil engagement of academics and their students, displacement, and the precarious socio-economic situation make a reorganization of academic structures necessary. The many new and intensified networks and the tireless commitment of Ukrainian academics provide the basis for this. Science will play an important role in the reconstruction of Ukraine, which makes it all the more important to anchor support and reforms of academic structures in the plans for recovery.

## **Brief Overview of the State of Ukraine's Higher Education and Science in Times of War**

By Yuliia Yevstiunina, Philipp Christoph Schmädeke, Tetiana Folhina (Science at Risk Emergency Office—Academic Network Eastern Europe, Berlin)

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**I**n 2014, Ukraine clearly chose the European direction of development, but faced many challenges to its territorial integrity and national security as a whole, as well as to specific spheres of society. The outbreak of hostilities in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea caused significant damage to higher education and science, including significant destruction of infrastructure, forced relocation of higher education institutions to safer territories, and the loss of scientific and pedagogical staff and students. All of this significantly hampered the implementation of European standards of higher education and the implementation of the new Law of Ukraine "On Higher Education" adopted in 2014.

A new set of challenges was introduced by Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. Under conditions of military aggression, the sphere of higher education and science was again forced to find new ways and forms to continue its activities. The main challenges were the constant bombing and destruction of higher educa-

tion and research institutions, the need to move them to safer areas, the temporary suspension of educational activities, the displacement of educational staff and students both within Ukraine and abroad, the occupation of some territories, and the moral and psychological stress and trauma resulting from direct threats to life.

The experience of organizing distance learning and further scientific and pedagogical online activities during the COVID-19 pandemic proved to be very useful in this extreme situation. In a fairly short time, it was possible to implement the primary tasks to ensure a safe environment and resume the educational process. This was supported not only by administrations and management departments, but also by academic and teaching staff. A large number of academic and teaching staff found themselves in extremely difficult living conditions in Ukraine, within occupied territories, or abroad. Unfortunately, there are no exact statistics on the loss of staff caused by the war and forced migration,

but partly due to the opportunity to work remotely (according to the Letter of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine) higher education in Ukraine managed to conclude the 2022/23 academic year, and to ensure the further functioning of the sphere of higher education and science in Ukraine.

In reaction to this situation, in 2023 the Science at Risk Emergency Office of the Academic Network Eastern Europe, in cooperation with a team of researchers in Ukraine, initiated a study to obtain more detailed information and a better understanding of the current needs of higher education and science in Ukraine under the conditions of full-scale war. The study, consisting of a survey of Ukrainian academics, is currently ongoing. Moreover, the start of the new academic year this September will provide additional information, including quantitative indicators, of the general state of the country's institutions of higher education and academic research, including current needs and activities. However, first data of our study already gives the opportunity to identify the main needs and risks for the sphere of higher education and science in Ukraine today.

According to the Unified State Database of Ukraine on Education, as of 01 January 2023 a total of 736 institutions of higher education are active, of which 439 are run by the national state, 49 by local public entities and 248 by private institutions. In respect to regional distribution, the largest number of higher education institutions is located in the city of Kyiv (133) and the regions of Kharkiv (61), Dnipropetrovsk (55), Lviv (48) and Odesa (46).

One of the most urgent problems is the support of higher education institutions that suffered directly from military aggression and/or had to move to safer regions of Ukraine. According to the information of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, as of 01 September 2023 (and including the first wave of relocation in 2014), 31 higher education institutions and 65 separate structural subdivisions of such institutions were relocated from the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, Crimea and Sevastopol (a city with special status). Most of the relocated universities or subdivisions moved to higher education institutes with a similar profile in other regions: in total, 11 regions of Ukraine received relocated higher education institutions.

According to a report on higher education in Ukraine, most universities relocated in 2014 scored lower after their move (based on the unofficial rating "Top-200 Universities of Ukraine"). It can be assumed that such a negative trend will also show for institutions relocated in 2022. The forced change of location, the need to quickly re-establish the educational process, and communication with academic and teaching staff as well as students are just some of the many challenges for uni-

versities for which they need the support of the state, partners, and the public.

At the same time, the destruction and damage to the infrastructure of the education sector is constantly increasing. When the full-scale invasion started, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine created the online platform "Освіта під загрозою" (Education under Threat), which documents the scale of destruction and damage to all educational institutions in Ukraine caused by the war. According to the resource and information provided by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, as of 01 September 2023, four institutions of higher education have been destroyed in Ukraine (all of them located in the Donetsk region) and 84 institutions of higher education have been damaged. The most affected regions are Kharkiv (23), Donetsk (9), Odesa (9), Zhytomyr (5), Zaporizhzhia (5) and Mykolaiv (5), as well as the city of Kyiv (6). Unfortunately, the bombing and shelling continues, and new destruction is recorded on a weekly basis.

Despite this widespread damage and destruction, according to the Unified State Database of Ukraine on Education, as of 01 January 2023 there were 1,077,685 applicants for higher education degrees (covering all levels, from BA and MA to doctoral degrees). Of these, more than a third study at the expense of the state and local budgets, while the remaining 63% utilize personal or private funding for their studies. Of all applicants for higher education, 75% are enrolled for full-time study, while 0.4% opted for evening studies and 24% for distance learning. Soon, it will be possible to sum up the results of the admissions cycles for the academic year 2023/24, which will allow us to draw further conclusions about the current functioning of the Ukrainian higher education system.

Next to teaching, the other important function of higher education and science is academic research. Again based on data from the Unified State Database of Ukraine on Education, as of 01 January 2023 we have analysed the profiles of 119,533 members of the academic and teaching staff working in institutions of higher education in Ukraine. About 59.5% of them have academic degrees: Doctor of Science degrees (second doctoral degrees)—13.5%, Candidate of Sciences or PhD degrees (first doctoral degrees)—46%, while the remaining 40.5% are without academic degree. If we analyse the gender balance, about 60% of the academic and teaching staff are women, 40% are men. Among women the proportion of holders of a scientific degree is 62.3%: Doctor of Science degrees (second doctoral degrees)—9.2%, Candidate of Sciences or PhD degrees (first doctoral degrees)—53.1%, without academic degree—37.7%. Among men, the proportion of holders of a scientific degree is 77.2%: Doctor of Science deg-

rees (second doctoral degrees)—20%, Candidate of Sciences or PhD degrees (first doctoral degrees)—57.2%, without academic degree—22.8%.

These and other data can be extremely important when analyzing the state of the scientific sphere and the needs of Ukrainian scientists in the context of the war in Ukraine. For example, the gender of staff is an important aspect in the context of mobilization and restrictions on the exit of men of military age from the territory of Ukraine, which in turn directly affects the quality of research activities of male Ukrainian scientists, etc.

Further important aspects to be considered are:

- Reduction of state funding for higher education and academic research—more than 20% of higher education institutions have delayed payment of salaries and scholarships, and the National Research Foundation of Ukraine did not receive appropriate funds to continue grant funding for research and development projects because the state was forced to sequester previously allocated budget funds for the defence of the country against military aggression;
- Institutions of higher education and academic research have suffered significant financial losses as a result of destruction of and damage to infrastructure;
- The demand for higher education is expected to decline—demand by the state for the training of spe-

cialists and academic and teaching staff is reduced; higher education will become less accessible to a large number of Ukrainians due to factors like the fall in real incomes of the population, business's lack of interest in training specialists, the underdevelopment of the market for commercial loans to finance education, and life in conditions of uncertainty due to the war;

- Under these conditions, many of the nearly two thirds of students who rely on personal or private funding for their studies will find it increasingly hard to pay in full for their education;
- Within Ukraine, many students are moving to higher education institutions located in relatively safe parts of the country, while both Ukrainian and foreign students currently studying in Ukraine may also move to foreign universities;
- Declining attractiveness of work as academic or teaching staff in higher education due to the significant payment gap in comparison to both the business sector in Ukraine and academic institutions abroad, as well as a general decline in the prestige of academic and teaching professions.

*Translation: Heiko Pleines*

#### *About the Authors*

Dr. *Philipp Christoph Schmäddeke* is Director of the SCIENCE AT RISK Emergency Office, a project of the Academic Network Eastern Europe (akno e.V.).

*Yuliia Yevstiunina* and *Tetiana Folhina* are members of the Ukraine team of the SCIENCE AT RISK Emergency Office, a project of the Academic Network Eastern Europe (akno e.V.).

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## How Russia's War Hits International Relations Studies

By Yulia Kurnyshova (University of Copenhagen)

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The full-scale Russia's invasion of Ukraine challenged international order in many ways. But the same is true for the discipline of International Relations studies (IR), as many of its paradigms are struggling to elucidate the effects of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. This essay discusses the main trends in International Relations studies (IR) resulting from Russia's full-scale invasion. In an attempt to reflect on this major international crisis, two foundational theories of IR, realism and liberalism, clashed once again. They are dominating much of the political commentary on the war (Patman, 2023), and their outsized presence in the media has further exposed the shortcomings of both approaches.

Realists in IR prioritize self-interest of states, emphasizing conflict and power politics in the international arena. As they accept war as a valid option in global politics, now they can rightfully claim they saw it coming for Ukraine as well. Amidst the ongoing fight, their fears are mostly about the use of nuclear weapons and the rise of Russo-Chinese alliance (Mankoff, 2023). To avoid these outcomes, John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent figure in contemporary realism, has called for a peace deal, even one without Ukrainian territorial integrity being restored (Mearsheimer, 2023).

His views are shared by a substantial number of realists in IR (Edinger, 2022; Ezra 2022), effectively making their stance an intellectual foundation for the aggressor's appeasement. By treating military might and physical control of foreign lands as a valid security strategy, they are playing into Russia's political narrative. And it's not only about moral ambiguity of such views. For realists, Russia's war of aggression is a "normal" act by the great power (Walt, 2022); they thus struggle to accept that Russian actions are, in fact, highly detrimental to the international order and undervalue the importance of a Western stand on Ukraine for preserving global peace and stability.

Conversely, the liberal approach is strong in justifying the collective support for Ukraine by all Western democracies—both as a part of mutual institutional interaction and as a means to defend liberal democratic order against authoritarian assault (Pietro, 2023). The West's firm stand to protect Ukrainian freedom and independence made liberal claims for the value-based international system much stronger (Way, 2022). Yet, while many Western liberal politicians are backing material efforts to make possible Ukraine's victory on the battlefield as the sole viable end to the war, the lib-

eral paradigm is yet to embrace the key importance of hard power for international security and for safeguarding democratic values.

Proponents of the liberal approach rightfully blame Russian authoritarianism for its aggression against Ukraine and advocate for a subsequent marginalisation of Russia on the international arena (Somin, 2023). But at the same time, liberal institutionalism underestimates other reasons for Russian hostility against Ukraine, some of which span across the centuries. If one needs to properly understand the causes of the war and come with strategies to restore peace and avoid new wars in the future, it is no less important to take into due consideration historical hostilities and clashing identities, not just current political institutions. Finally, there are many reasons to study interdependence and cooperation under the multi-order world (Flockhart, 2022), which is now seen as a more legitimate concept as we witness multiple views on the Russo-Ukrainian war across the globe, definitely more than only the Russian and pro-Ukrainian.

The viability of such a worldview is founded on the seemingly growing rift between the global South and the global North. Most non-Western countries are trying to remain neutral in the Russo-Ukrainian war: they criticize the Russian act of aggression, but do not join Western efforts to curb it. The postcolonial IR approach has elaborated on the global effects of colonialism and the different experiences of colonizers and colonised nations in the post-colonial world, so for scholars of this camp of IR this split would be viewed as natural (Askew, 2023).

But even though the postcolonial paradigm can help explain why international engagement with the Ukraine's resistance is so different across the globe, there are at least two issues it faces in the context of this conflict. First, scholars of postcolonial IR invested significant effort in proving that Eastern Europe is a legitimate part of the postcolonial space (Owczarzak, 2009), yet the region's strong alignment with the West is alienating it from the rest of the global South. Second, proponents of postcolonialism need to explain why, in the course of the Russo-Ukrainian war, most countries of the global South are prioritizing opposition to the West, as opposed to embracing the values of independence, non-interference, and sovereignty that postcolonialism has always defended as the paramount global good of our time.

One of the key challenges to IR as a discipline lies in the fact that Russo-Ukrainian war undermines the

international normative basis for preventing aggressive territorial conquest. In the post-WWII world, this norm was set by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and has been observed ever since by the vast majority of states, including all major powers (Fazal, 2022). Annexation of Ukrainian territories by Russia questions this norm, and ultimately challenges the conventional wisdom of IR studies.

Since most of contemporary paradigms in IR theory emerged after WWII, they reflected a reality in which wars were relatively rare, and the threat of 'state death' was very low. Security studies now needs to reassess the impact of possible wars of conquest on the international order, as well as the outcomes for IR of the ailing European security architecture, massive acts of state terrorism, and the growing threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

#### *About the Author*

*Yuliia Kurnyshova*, Ph.D., is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Copenhagen. Her current research project explores the political and security implications of Russia's war against Ukraine. A historian by training, she uses interdisciplinary approaches to analyze the political discourse of the war.

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## Studying Ukraine in Political Science: From Theory Testing to Theory Building

By Inna Melnykovska (Central European University, Vienna)

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Studying Ukraine in Political Science has been challenging due to the necessity of justifying Ukraine's case as being the 'best fit' in testing established theoretical paradigms and its potential—either as a single case or in comparison with other cases—to enrich the general theoretical knowledge. The main concern of social scientists who were eager to study Ukraine was to withstand the criticism that is usually expressed toward area studies of producing “too specific” and “less generalizable” (read: less valuable) knowledge, as well as being descriptive and non-methodological.

Their main challengers were so called ‘Westsplainers’ who treated the knowledge of regional, domestic and local context as redundant in understanding the workings of political systems, economies and societies, including Ukraine's. In reaction, Ukraine experts learned to combine their in-depth knowledge of the country with methodological excellence in their research practice. Country expertise was thereby represented as a guarantor of the rigorous research quality in producing more nuanced testing of political, economic and social (ir)regularities. In contrast to traditional Ukrainian Studies, which usually highlighted the specifics of Ukraine's language, culture and history, Ukraine experts in political science sought to highlight the country's ‘typicalness’ and its comparability with other countries across the world.

Being attacked by Russia, Ukraine now has a chance to switch from being a case for theory testing to a case for theory building. In pre-war times, studying Ukraine was mainly embedded into the theoretical paradigms of transformation and democratization studies. Occasionally it was addressed by the approaches dealing with modern (competitive) autocracies. The research questions concentrated on the transformative powers of external actors (e.g., the European Union, NATO) and their effectiveness in democratization processes in Ukraine, while local forces were ascribed no causal power and rendered as ‘contextual conditions’.

The value added of Ukraine's case for both theoretical paradigms was controversial. The transformative powers of Western democracy promoters were limited, and the country landed in the gray zone of hybrid regimes between democracy and autocracy. Nevertheless, the explanatory powers of autocratic approaches fell short as well, as the attempts at power consolidation in Ukraine failed and its political regime was assigned

to the group of ‘defective democracies’, where political pluralism was assured through competition of rival elite groups and not by functional democratic institutions. According to these theoretical paradigms, Ukraine's political and state institutions would have been too weak to counter Russia's aggression. They both were wrong.

Collaborative and (self-)coordinated efforts of society, business and state actors at national and local levels have resulted in Ukraine's resistance. Explaining this puzzle has the potential to generate a new theory of democratic and collaborative resilience, which would be relevant for both democratizing regimes and advanced democracies. Furthermore, refugee flows and building of new communities in Ukraine and abroad, as well as modern interstate war with its hybrid warfare tools, among other topics promise to bring new impulses to contemporary theoretical and conceptual discussions and provide the ground for interdisciplinary academic collaborations.

Eventually, and living up to the comparative nature of political science, Ukraine will be in search of a new family of cases to be compared with. Ukrainian refugee academics currently hosted by Western universities could extend their academic networks and initiate new research collaborations with traditional ‘Ukrainists’, as well as with researchers from different (sub)disciplines and with varying regional expertise. In this way they could pioneer a true ‘decolonization’ of studying Ukraine in political science from the previous theoretical paradigms and the restraint of the universal knowledge.

Russia's war brought methodological challenges, but did not eliminate the ways we can study Ukraine. Doing field work in Ukraine is not secure. Furthermore, the war context has made some topics (e.g., corruption) politically sensitive and introduced new ethical considerations. Digital ethnography, remote observations and online interviewing, among other qualitative and quantitative methods that are booming in political science since the Covid-19 pandemic offer novel ways to collect necessary data in the war-torn research field. Initiatives to create depositories of Ukraine-related data (e.g., Discuss Data, <https://discuss-data.net/>) will not only consolidate the efforts of data collection and generation, but will also enable and sustain the interest in Ukraine and its study in academic communities across the world. Ukraine-related data depositories could serve as incubators of methodologically rigorous research on Ukraine.



All in all, Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine opens many opportunities for social scientists with Ukraine expertise to meaningfully integrate into the discipline's search for new theoretical paradigms, jump on the bandwagon of contemporary methodological trends,

overcome divisions with traditional Ukrainian studies and generate new collaborative interdisciplinary and cross-/trans-regional research. Those who study Ukraine should grasp these opportunities in order to move from the periphery toward the core of political science.

#### *About the Author*

Dr. *Inna Melnykowska* is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Central European University, Vienna.

## Scholars' Attention to Ukraine: the Same Problems as in the Mass Media

By Artem Zakharchenko (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and NGO 'Communication Analysis Team – Ukraine' – CAT-UA)

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### Introduction

There are two main problems with scholarly research on Ukraine, and they are roughly the same as the problems with the attention to our country from the mainstream world media.

The first of these is common to most other non-leading countries: most publications remember them only when something extraordinary happens there. For example, the largest war in Europe since World War II.

The second problem is more specific: Russian strategic narratives, or, in other words, Russian propaganda, can infiltrate scientific articles. After all, scientific journals are also media. They disseminate information about the real world, and therefore they can also set an agenda or present one's own interpretation of events.

### The First Problem

Taking as an example my own field, communication studies, the first problem is very pronounced. Research in this area has largely revolved around the phenomenon of Ukrainian activism. In other words, foreign researchers have paid little attention to the peculiarities of the Ukrainian media system, the mediatization of Ukrainian society, censorship and self-censorship, and other similar topics. Although there have been several important works by Ukrainian researchers published in international journals (for example, Orlova, 2016, Fedirko, 2020 and others), there exist far more extensive bodies of work on the following topic areas:

The Revolution of Dignity, and the role of media and social media in the self-organization of citizens. There are studies in this area based on the principles of political science, communication science, sociology, linguistics, and other disciplines. The surge of these studies occurred at a time when the world was still pinning its hopes on social media services, considering them

to be a driver of democracy. Accordingly, the focus of scholars at that time was on how horizontal self-organization helped to overcome dictatorships. However, this surge of attention was not too high, as it was overshadowed by the study of the Arab Spring, which occurred chronologically earlier.

The study of Ukrainian resistance to Russian armed and information aggression since 2014. To a large extent, attention was also focused on activism. This included volunteers who used social media to provide soldiers with medicine and military equipment as well as civil society organizations that have learned to effectively counter Russian propaganda, substituting themselves for the state structures that are supposed to take care of this. However, there has also been intensive study of the Russian propaganda itself, its features and effectiveness. Ukraine acted as a "testing ground" for observation, and it was on the basis of Ukrainian material that it became possible to find out how to effectively resist this propaganda.

The third, somewhat less popular area of research was feminist activism: some communication researchers drew attention to the fact that the #янебоюсьсказати (#IAmNotAfraidToSayIt) flash mob in Ukrainian social media took place a year earlier than the similar global movement under the slogan #metoo.

### The Second Problem

As for the second problem, the presence of a Russian imperial perspective on events in Ukraine in academic articles, two factors contribute to this.

Firstly, the activity of Russian scholars with an imperial outlook, both those who still work in Russia and those who have settled in Western universities. Without a doubt, this is not about origin or ethnicity; I personally know many people from Russia who have a very democratic

outlook and support Ukraine. However, the imperial machine has a significant impact on people worldwide, especially those in the Russian information space.

Secondly, many scholars, as well as journalists and politicians, are still accustomed to perceiving Eastern Europe through the prism of Russia. For a long time, they considered Russia to be the most interesting country to study in the region; the majority of their budgets were allocated for its study, they had personal contacts with Russian functionaries, and therefore they borrowed many views on this part of the world directly from Russians. For these reasons, many continue to perceive Russia as dominant in the region, and Ukraine as a failed state. Even if there are no imperial influences, one can often see a lack of understanding of the Ukrainian context among Western researchers, and a tendency to draw conclusions about Ukraine based on American or British logic, etc.

The presence of Russian narratives in scholarly articles is not fictional. Sometimes it is quite obvious, as in (Baysha, 2017), who studied the ‘rhetoric intervention’ of the Ukrainian ‘nationalists’ in the East of Ukraine. Sometimes, though it is no less harmful, the narratives are less pronounced, as in (Roman et al., 2017), in which the defense against Russian propaganda and debunking Russian myths are called ‘bias’ of Ukrainian media in the war coverage.

## Conclusion

Both problems can be overcome if we pay closer attention to the Ukrainian context. After all, there is a lot of talk about: the fact is that right now in Ukraine, many new meanings are being created that will influence the development of society on a global scale. And it is the Ukrainian resistance that offers an opportunity to completely renew the focus of research interests in the humanities.

Recently, the fashion for fighting fake news in global communication research has passed, a trend developing after 2016, when the West was shocked by the Trump election and Brexit. Once again, research focused on

the future, not the present, is becoming trendy—for example, those focused on artificial intelligence-mediated communication. But I would advise not forgetting about the present. The war in Ukraine shows that we need to learn the lessons we have missed in the fight against propaganda, especially in the context of current and future global conflicts. And the current conflict, which is still localized in Ukraine, is far from over and may affect many more people before it is resolved.

There are several new themes that are worth paying attention to and exploring in the Ukrainian case study. The first is the “new connectivity” of citizens in the context of a war that affects the entire country rather than a limited conflict: in these conditions, people have expanded their self-organization and engagement in resistance. Secondly, the power of strategic narratives: attention to this phenomenon decreased after the 2010s when they did not help to win in Afghanistan, but the Ukrainian experience shows that high-quality strategic narratives can work wonders in times of war. Thirdly, we should pay attention to the structure of propaganda, which is far from being limited to fake news: disinformation constitutes a first, basic level of destructive information influence, with much more complex information operations possible.

Here are my tips on how to make the image of Ukraine in scientific research more reliable and independent of Russian influences:

For Western scholars: involve Ukrainian researchers in working groups that study Ukrainian realities.

Also for them: to separate the study of Russia from the study of other Eastern European countries. If it is not possible to open a separate center for Ukrainian studies, then at least do not use the traditional term “post-Soviet countries” but study Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and other neighboring countries together with Poland, Slovakia, etc.

For Ukrainian scholars, it is important to actively engage with global platforms to publish their materials. Otherwise, if you do not do so, it is more likely that your place will be taken by Russians with an imperial outlook.

### *About the Author*

*Artem Zakharchenko* holds a PhD in social communications. He is currently affiliated with the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Institute of Journalism and the NGO ‘Communication Analysis Team – Ukraine’ (CAT-UA).

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## Visibility of Ukrainian Studies: Mission Possible

By Tamara Martsenyuk (University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Leuphana University, Lüneburg)

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As a public sociologist and educational activist in Ukraine, I am a member of the Public Council of the Inter-Factional Deputy Association “Equal Opportunities” and head of the Group on Education Issues. In the context of this work, I prepared a public statement that was shared worldwide on the current situation with education and Ukrainian studies. Some parts of the text from this statement, originally published in March 2022, have been adapted and updated and are provided below:

Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, our academic, research, and educational institutions have been forced to stop or suspend their activities. Educators, both men and women, have, just like other citizens of Ukraine, either joined the defense efforts or been forced to evacuate to other regions of Ukraine or other countries.

I am among this group of refugee scholars, sharing my experience of evacuation and my academic mission from exile in Berlin (Martsenyuk, 2022a). The war has caused the deaths of teachers and students, turned many of them into refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and caused the destruction of university buildings (e.g., Karazin Kharkiv National University, Taras Shevchenko National University).

In parallel with the military aspects, the Russo-Ukrainian war is also being waged in science and education. The Russian government controls science and culture within its borders, seeing them as practical tools for, at first, the made-up “de-Banderization” and “denazification” of Ukraine and, eventually, for destroying the Ukrainian nation. The Russian Union of Rectors issued a letter expressing support for the war and the actions of the Russian president.

In this context, universities are used as so-called “soft power” for influencing Western societies. In Western universities, studying post-Soviet societies is often reduced to studying Russian society and applying the results of these studies to other post-Soviet societies, including Ukrainian society. It is not by chance that the regional centers dedicated to the research of our region are called, among other things, Centers of Russian, Eastern European, or Eurasian studies (like, for example, the Stanford University Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies). The international community holds on to the idea that Slavic studies are inseparable from Russian area studies, which enjoy the leading role there. Western universities have long enjoyed many connections with Russian Universities and academic struc-

tures that actively promote a discourse that serves the Russian government.

What would be an appropriate response of international academic structures to support Ukrainian science and education?

- To support Ukrainian studies as separate direction of regional studies (not as a component of Slavic or Eastern European studies). Such programs already exist in some Western Universities, for example, at Harvard (Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, HURI). It is also essential to allocate more resources to studying the Ukrainian language within such programs, and in international universities in general.
- To support Ukrainian researchers, especially within the context of long-distance programs, as comparatively few of us are able to leave Ukraine and to move to the location of a Western university. For this reason, the facilitation of nonresidential programs is particularly important. A positive example here could be the joint program from the Institute of Human Sciences (IWM, Vienna) and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI).
- To support and develop Ukrainian research and educational international partnerships, research projects, magazines, publication of books and results of research, as well as cultural and art projects, etc.

But there remains one question—how could sociology in Europe in general, and Eastern European studies particularly, benefit from more attention to Ukrainian studies? I can reply from my personal research perspective. My research interests are connected with a sociology of gender that also intersects with Ukrainian studies. Using this example, we can ask ourselves the question: why is it important to study Ukraine when we analyze gender structures, and vice versa? Understanding Ukraine, and the fierce resistance of the Ukrainian society against the Russian war, can be based on analytically deploying the gender perspective (Martsenyuk, 2023).

First of all, empirical data collected over the last years in Ukraine, especially concerning the issues of gender equality and diversity, provide the possibility to rethink the Western concepts of gender and nation-building, gender and war. For Ukrainian women and men, their national identity is important, as they have for centuries been fighting for their independence. At the same time, people with strong national identity are supporting ideas of gender equality and rights for LGBT people (Martsenyuk, 2022b). Within the context of existing West-

ern sociological theories on gender, nationalism and war, these two are difficult to reconcile. But the case of Ukraine over its last nine years of war could contribute to the European debates on democratisation and gender equality implementation, processes that are not always necessarily incremental or step-by-step. Certainly, more time is needed to develop further theories to better explain sociological data collected during times of war.

Secondly, it's important to move away from studying the Ukrainian and Russian societies under a common post-Soviet umbrella. As data from the last years demonstrate, these societies are going in different directions. For example, according to public opinion research results in Ukraine, in the “civilizational battle” between “Russky mir” (which promotes patriarchal gender norms and the criminalization of “gay propaganda”) and European values that support diversity and equal rights, the latter is prevailing (Martsenyuk, 2022b). There is good reason to hope that the recent successes in implementing policies of equal rights and opportunities in Ukraine will continue, and prove beneficial for the ongoing Eurointegration process. Indeed, the emphasis on democratic values and a European present and future for Ukraine appears to have contributed to more favorable and accepting attitudes towards LGBT communities and increased respect for diversity in general. Russian society, by contrast, is going in a different direction: “If gender egalitarianism is framed as a failed policy of the past, then traditional family values can be seen as an alternative modernity of the future” (Solari, 2022). The idea of “traditional family values” is based on the patriarchal gender order with very gender-polarized perceptions of femininity and masculinity. As scholar of Russian politics and gender issues Jennifer G. Mathers notices, “Putin’s idea of a strong state requires an alpha male leader because the state itself is highly gendered. The most important, most powerful and most generously funded institutions of the state are those that are most closely associated with masculinity and the same sort

of tough and ruthless behavior that Putin celebrates—most notably the armed forces and the other security services” (Mathers, 2023).

Thirdly, in the sphere of public sociology, which I also represent, it is important to hear and understand the voices of the objects of study. Being a scholar from Ukraine, I need to explain to some Western scholars and feminist activist the gendered geopolitical aspects of war: why peace is not possible without victory and justice in the situation of Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine. In this case, again, the Ukrainian perspective needs visibility. According to Dr. Nataliya Chernysh, a Ukrainian sociologist at Ivan Franko Lviv National University, “new global social movements are emerging, first of all a movement expressing solidarity with Ukraine” (Chernysh, 2022). But Ukrainian scholars and activists ask for “more informed solidarity” (Ukraine Peace Appeal, 2023) and explain that “stopping weapon deliveries to Ukraine now would not lead to “peace by peaceful means,” but rather “offer a pause for Putin’s authoritarian regime to renew its aggression against Ukraine.” Ideas of victimhood of Ukrainian women in the context of the war have also been challenged: “in reality, women also play a key role in resistance movements, both at the front line and on the home front” (Feminist Initiative Group, 2022). Feminist scholars Iryna Zamuruieva and Darya Tsymbalyuk underline that in Ukraine, pacifism kills: “Calling for military support has not come as an easy decision for us. Yet, at this point, a pacifist stance perpetuates ongoing violence. Pacifism kills. Inaction kills. Each day of this war means more and more lives are lost—and not only human lives” (Tsymbalyuk & Zamuraieva, 2022).

To understand all the ideas mentioned above, you need to pay attention to Ukrainian studies. They will help to understand better the gendered dynamics of war, the resistance of Ukrainian society, and may more generally challenge the Western theories connected with the social structure of the relevant societies.

#### *About the Author*

Dr. *Tamara Martsenyuk* is Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology of University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and visiting scholar at the Leuphana University Lüneburg in Lüneburg, Germany.

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## Why Russian Studies in the West Failed to Provide a Clue about Russia and Ukraine

By Yuriy Gorodnichenko (University of California, Berkeley), Ilona Sologoub (VoxUkraine, Kyiv), Tatyana Deryugina (University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign)

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The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has brought the sobering realization that, even 30 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to be a brutal empire. At the same time, after expecting Kyiv to fall in three days, the world has been amazed by the Ukrainian resistance and resilience. How could the international community be so wrong about Russia and Ukraine? We argue that these failures can stem from the ways Russia, Ukraine, and the rest of Eastern Europe are studied in the West and call for a major review of both the quantity and quality of 'Slavic' studies.

As the first step, we collected data on course offerings in the academic years 2021/22 and 2022/23 at 13 top private and public US universities. We focused on courses in Eastern European, Russian and Eurasian (including Soviet and post-Soviet) studies. We selected only the courses offered by undergraduate programs (since they cover many more students than graduate courses) and only those that were actually scheduled (i.e., a sufficient number of students signed up for those courses). To compute aggregate statistics, we classified the courses into five subject areas (language, literature, culture, history, and politics) and several groups over time and space, e.g., Soviet and post-Soviet, Eastern European, Ukrainian, Polish, Baltic, etc. We then calculated the number of offered courses over the last two academic years and examined the share of courses devoted only to Russia, to Russia and other countries, and to Ukraine.


Figure 1 conveys the gist of our findings. 82% of 'Slavic' literature courses are in fact Russian literature courses (the share is even higher if we include Soviet and post-Soviet writings). We understand that Russia is a large country, but it does not account for over 82% of people or literature in Eastern Europe. In other areas the situation is better, but Russia still dominates. For example, just over a third of courses in history focus solely on Russia, but if we count courses that cover Russia together with other countries (e.g., Russia and Eastern Europe—the yellow bars in Figure 1), the Russian hegemony is apparent once again. In fact, some courses effectively treat the USSR as Russia (e.g. "Russia: History of the Soviet Union"). Furthermore, some courses are completely in line with Russian historical narratives, incorporating all East Slavs and the entire USSR into "Russian" history (although some Eastern European and Central Asian nations were occupied by Russia, their histories are quite distinct from Russia's).

These statistics are not driven by a particular university or group of universities. Figure 2 documents that these patterns apply broadly. For example, although the share of Russian literature ranges from a whopping 100% at Cornell University to a "modest" 52% at the University of Chicago, the median share is close to 90%.

Every classification is subject to judgment calls, and we tried to have the Russian share identified as unambiguously as possible to obtain conservative estimates. However, it is informative to examine courses that are related to Russia and group Russia with other countries. To this end, Figure 2 also shows that these courses further boost Russian dominance in all fields except literature, which already focuses almost entirely on Russia.




**Figure 1: Share of “Russia” Courses in ‘Slavic’ Studies Departments of 13 Major US Universities, by Subject**




Note: The “other” category includes additional time/space combinations (e.g., Russia & Europe) and individual countries (Poland, Czechia, etc.). We classify courses according to their names and descriptions (e.g., ‘Russian language’ or ‘Russian history’ courses belong to the ‘Russia’ category, as well as courses focused entirely on Russian authors)

**Figure 2a: Share of “Russia” Courses by Category and University and Share of Courses that Touch upon Russia (e.g., refer to “Eastern Europe & Russia”, Soviet or post-Soviet space, Europe and Russia, or Ukraine and Russia) by Category and University**



Continued overleaf as Figure 2b

**Figure 2b: Share of “Russia” Courses by Category and University and Share of Courses that Touch upon Russia (e.g., refer to “Eastern Europe & Russia”, Soviet or post-Soviet space, Europe and Russia, or Ukraine and Russia) by Category and University**



Note: bars represent the percentage of “Russia” courses and courses that touch upon Russia in a specific category. For example, 56% of “Culture” courses and 92% of “Literature” courses at Harvard are devoted solely to Russian culture and literature, respectively, whereas at the same university only 6% of “Culture” courses and no “Literature” courses are in the grouping of courses that touch upon Russia. Percentages in “language” courses are low because such course offerings usually cover individual languages rather than “Eastern European” or “Slavic” languages.

Furthermore, when diving deeper into course descriptions, we see that Russian studies has appropriated contributions of nations subjugated by Russia. For example, Gogol is studied as a Russian author, although he considered himself Ukrainian (Gogol wrote in Russian, but recall that Oscar Wilde identified as Irish despite writing in English). Medieval Rus is classified as Russian history, although it is a part of Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Polish history and the polity was at war with Moscovia for hundreds of years. To appreciate how absurd this treatment is, imagine treating the history of Britain as part of French history just because the Normans invaded Britain. One “Russian literature” course covers Isaac Babel (a Jewish author from Odesa), Svitlana Aleksiyevich (a Belarussian author), and Andriy Kurkov (a Ukrainian author from Kharkiv). We believe Mr. Kurkov would be very surprised to learn that US universities label him as a Russian author while the Russians destroy his city.

For comparison, Table 1 reports Ukrainian course shares. The figure is largely populated by zeros. That is, Ukraine effectively does not exist in US academic instruction. Furthermore, these positive shares overstate the presence of Ukraine in the curriculum because the data are aggregated for two academic years, and in the 2022/23 academic year universities started to offer more Ukraine-related courses (Table 2)—special kudos going to the University of Michigan, which introduced its “Let Ukraine Speak” course. Ironically, although more courses on Ukraine were offered in 2022/23 than in 2021/22, more courses on Russia were offered too. Perhaps the thinking was “if we study Ukraine more, let’s study Russia more as well to be fair.” But this bothsidesism makes things less balanced.

**Table 1: Share of “Ukraine” Courses Offered by Category**

	Culture		History		Language		Politics	
Chicago	4%		6%		0%		0%	
Cornell	0%		14%		18%		0%	
Harvard	11%		13%		13%		0%	
Northwestern	0%		15%		0%		0%	
Princeton	0%		14%		0%		0%	
Rutgers	0%		0%		3%		0%	
Stanford	11%		0%		9%		8%	
University of California, Berkeley	0%		0%		8%		0%	
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)	0%		7%		0%		0%	
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign	11%		0%		9%		0%	
University of Michigan	15%		0%		19%		33%	
University of Virginia	0%		0%		0%		100%	
Yale	0%		8%		27%		0%	

*Note: One course in Ukrainian literature was offered at Harvard and two at Princeton in Spring 2023, but these courses were not scheduled—likely due to insufficient demand.*

We are not going to debate whether Aleksandr Pushkin is better than Lesya Ukrainka or Adam Mickiewicz, but the statistics clearly document a disproportionate focus on Russia. Is this Moscow-centric view a problem? We believe it is.

The current approach has made generations of US students largely unaware of anything but Russia in Eastern Europe. As a result, Samuel Charap and other Ukrainian “experts,” who are often Russian Studies graduates, predict the fall of Ukraine “in three days” and interpret Ukraine through a Russian lens. The same applies to the media coverage of Ukraine. For example, the New York Times admits that Andrew Kramer, the chief of the newly established New York Times bureau in Kyiv and another student of Russian in college, “... for years ... was the primary reporter covering Ukraine from his perch in the Moscow bureau.” The infamous Chicken Kiev speech of President George H.W. Bush (the speech was written by Condoleezza Rice, another student of Russian at Moscow State University) epitomizes the gross misunderstanding of Ukraine. How can one get Ukraine right without speaking Ukrainian, knowing Ukrainian history, or being in Ukraine? This lack of Ukrainian expertise and training has led to colossal mistakes.

We appreciate that academia can hardly turn on a dime, and that by now thousands of professors have invested much of their time into learning the Russian language and culture. But the case for a more balanced approach to Slavic studies is patently obvious. More resources should be directed to Ukrainian, Polish, Bulgarian, Czech, Slovakian

**Table 2: Number of Courses Offered in Academic Years 2021/22 and 2022/23**

Region/time	Culture		History		Language		Literature		Politics	
	2021/22	2022/23	2021/22	2022/23	2021/22	2022/23	2021/22	2022/23	2021/22	2022/23
Ukraine	2	10 ↑	0	8 ↑	22	37 ↑	-	-	0	3 ↑
Ukraine and Russia	0	1 ↑	0	4 ↑	-	-	0	1 ↑	-	-
Russia	36	34 ↓	16	27 ↑	162	174 ↑	78	94 ↑	10	12 ↑
Eastern Europe	15	25 ↑	12	17 ↑	4	2 ↓	7	5 ↓	3	2 ↓
Eastern Europe and Russia	6	11 ↑	0	1 ↑	0	2 ↑	0	4 ↑	0	4 ↑
Soviet and post-Soviet	6	7 ↑	4	10 ↑	-	-	3	0 ↓	-	-

Note: The data for tables and figures are available from the authors upon request

and other courses, especially in literature. How much money is needed? In his speech at the Kyiv Security Forum, Dr. Michael McFaul said that he needs a few million dollars to increase the number of Ukrainian studies courses at Stanford. With Stanford's \$8.6 billion budget and \$36 billion endowment, the required funding is clearly a matter of priorities rather than financial constraints.

In summary, knowledge is power. This includes the power to prevent wars by knowing who is capable of what, what to expect, and what is at stake. On the other hand, the price of ignorance is the largest land war in Europe since World War II. We can't help thinking that proper resources committed to Ukrainian and genuine Eastern European, rather than Russia-centric, studies in the previous years could have saved many lives and billions of dollars invested by the Western governments into supporting Ukraine today during the full-scale war. This tragic war should spur universities to revamp their Eastern European curricula, give their students a better education, and hopefully make the world a safer place.

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#### *About the Authors*

Prof. Dr. *Yuriy Gorodnichenko* is an economist at the University of California, Berkeley.

Prof. Dr. *Tatyana Deryugina* is an Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

*Ilona Sologoub* is Editor-in-Chief of the analytical platform "VoxUkraine".

## Towards Post-Russian Studies: Decolonizing Imperial Knowledge in Western Academia

By Roman Horbyk (Örebro University)

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A year and a half ago, Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine and Russian missiles started raining on Ukrainian cities. The initial shock has now perhaps subsided, opening some space for the much-longed-for intellectual reckoning in the field of East European/Eurasian Studies.

I have been lucky and privileged to attend various conferences in East European Studies in this year and a half, and I will try to summarize my impressions from the recent conferences of British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES) and Center of Baltic and East European Studies (CBEEES) conferences, as well as expectations from the upcoming Aleksanteri and Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) conventions.

All of these conferences have had decolonization as their theme, and it seems that decolonization is becoming a new paradigm in the field. While this is a positive development, there are different drivers behind this decolonization movement. The first and vital driver comes from scholars of Eurasia and Central Asia who are showing solidarity with Ukraine. The decolonization approach, with tools developed by Franz Fanon, Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak and others, fits perfectly with the analysis of scholarship on Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The second driver comes from a different region, which I would call “greater Eastern Europe,” including Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, with strong links to the Baltics, Poland, Central Europe, and the Balkans. This second impulse is more immediately related to the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. It is particularly connected to the postcolonial moment in Ukrainian literature and cultural studies that has been going on since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Works by Marko Pavlyshyn, Tamara Hundorova, Ewa Thompson, Mykola Riabchuk, Vitaly Chernetsky developed the necessary optic over the 30 years.

When we look at these two different traditions, we see that they deal with somewhat different situations and challenges. They are still called forth by the same force, Russian imperialism, and they share countless parallels and the same paradigm. Yet many problems they are facing are vastly different. Central Asia and the Caucasus are coping with centuries of Russian colonial rule, while Ukraine is resisting an armed Russian attempt at re-colonization; Ukrainians are also yet to

face their responsibility for their role in the creation of the Russian Empire.

We are dealing with two different fields that are entangled in epistemic empathy and embrace each other in solidarity, but still constitute two (or more) fields rather than one single, unified field. This makes it all the more relevant to give up on the old field of “post-Sovietology,” as we are dealing with different situations that require different approaches within the same decolonization movement. It is simply no longer relevant. Let’s bury this corpse.

Another observation is that, while we see these two separate areas of greater Eastern Europe and greater Central Asia/Caucasus arise in solidarity and come into a vibrant dialogue with each other, Russian studies proper does not seem willing to change and is currently engaging in what could be considered self-marginalization.

The panels on Russia felt isolated and out of touch, and honestly not very interesting. The word “war” was rarely mentioned at all, there was little self-reflection and criticism of the old paradigms. Given the enormity of the shift underway in Russia as we speak, I was struck by the triviality of the Russian-themed panels. Many voices were surely decrying their loss of archive access and cozy funded field trips to Russia. Many junior colleagues certainly looked up to the “greats” in the field for guidance, but, in all honesty, have all the “greats” really spoken clearly, without stumbling and guilty silences over old papers about how Putin is actually a reformist/postmodernist/postcolonialist/you-name-it-ist, but certainly not as a bad as “the West” or the phantom of bloodthirsty Ukrainian nationalism?

This triviality is not bad per se. We need to provincialize Russia and Russian studies and put it on the periphery while centering the subaltern nations of the former Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and now also the federative Russia that is quite likely on its way to the next collapse. Russia, in this decaying field, has literally to become a “little Russia.” In a very literal sense—not the one we are used to hearing about.

My third observation is a warning that decolonization can be but a passing moment, a hype that may give way eventually to something else and not leave the mark that it should. Many scholars who have worked within the very traditional paradigm of Russian studies are now trying to jump on the bandwagon and move on



to the next trendy topic: Ukraine and subaltern nations and decolonization.

There is thus a risk that the true decolonization that many scholars from subaltern nations have been working on may be drowned in the flood of superficial “decolonizing” (in fact, “re-colonizing”) studies. By this I mean studies that apply decolonial language and schemes on the surface while aiming at recasting the Russian colonial experience as something almost benign (of this we have now seen enough!) and, above all, preserve the limits of the post-Sovietological field, this Gulag or kolkhoz of sorts where all the subalterns are forced to work on their petty fields within the barbed-wire fence of “Eurasian studies” heeding to the most recent party line from Moscow. The substitution of postcolonialism for Marxism-Leninism and the new and very liberal Muscovite ideologues now broadcasting from the beacons of New York and London are but a change of clothing for an outdated field, rather than the needed change in paradigm.

Finally, there is the question of responsibility. We have failed as a field of area studies, regardless of how we view knowledge epistemologically: whether we con-

sider it a representation of reality that must be true to it, or a constructive process through which we arrive at something and create new knowledge that changes the world. We have failed because our representations of reality were either crude, poor, and inadequate, or we failed to create the new knowledge that could have changed our reality enough that this war wouldn't have happened.

I am concerned that, without any tangible responsibility for the people who knowingly spread false narratives, inadequate theories, caricatures, and ideological rubbish disguised as expertise and knowledge, we will not be able to move forward and make decolonization a reality. I am not talking about legal responsibility, although suing for defamation and libel may make sense in some cases. As scholars, we are supposed to be autonomous and self-regulating, and we should be able to sort out these failures on our own. The question is more how we ensure that those who willingly became agents of influence for the Kremlin are held responsible and accountable for their actions, so that this can serve as a warning for future generations and the future of our very field(s).

*About the Author*

*Roman Horbyk* is a senior lecturer at the School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences of Örebro University.

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**Layout**

Matthias Neumann ([fsopr@uni-bremen.de](mailto:fsopr@uni-bremen.de)) (Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen)

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Research Centre for East European Studies • Country Analytical Digests • Klagenfurter Str. 8 • 28359 Bremen • Germany

Phone: +49 421-218-69600 • Telefax: +49 421-218-69607 • e-mail: [fsopr@uni-bremen.de](mailto:fsopr@uni-bremen.de) • Internet: [www.laender-analysen.de/uad/](http://www.laender-analysen.de/uad/)