

Synthesis Report

# Policing in Peace Operations in Africa

A research project by the Training for Peace (TFP) research network



# Acronyms

<b>ACCORD</b>	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission in Somalia
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>AUPOL</b>	African Union Police
<b>FGS</b>	Federal Government of Somalia
<b>FPU</b>	formed police unit
<b>IDP</b>	internally displaced person
<b>ISS</b>	Institute for Security Studies
<b>IPO</b>	individual police officer
<b>KAIPTC</b>	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
<b>MINUSMA</b>	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
<b>NUPI</b>	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
<b>PoC</b>	protection of civilians
<b>PSO</b>	peace support operation
<b>SGBV</b>	sexual and gender-based violence
<b>SPF</b>	Somali Police Force
<b>TfP</b>	Training for Peace
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAMID</b>	United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
<b>UNPOL</b>	United Nations Police
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>UNSOM</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission for Somalia
<b>VIP</b>	very important person

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# Introduction

The police component has begun to play a much greater role in peace support operations (PSOs) in recent years. It is a critical component that supports the development and implementation of PSOs' mandates, yet there are still major gaps in understanding how it is effectively designed and deployed, and what areas need improvement. This is particularly relevant in the context of the African Union (AU), which sees an increasing role for policing from a policy perspective and in the terrain of peacekeeping.

Whereas United Nations (UN) PSOs tend to be deployed in post-conflict situations where there is, in fact, some peace to keep, the AU more typically deploys in more unstable situations where one of the main objectives is to contribute to creating some form of stability. As a result, the security situation in which it operates may be very different to that which the UN faces; something that in turn may have implications for how it is able to operate and what it can do, let alone accomplish.

This report draws from comparative research developed by the Training for Peace (TfP) research network.<sup>1</sup> Between 2014 and 2015, TfP partners investigated the overarching question of if, and how, AU policing differs from UN policing. If there is a difference, is the difference significant enough to warrant special preparation and training beyond the standard UN Police (UNPOL) courses that the TfP currently uses for pre-deployment training? The TfP also asked other important questions: Should these differences affect the role of the police in operations conducted by the two organisations; and what would the comparative advantages of AU policing be in this regard? How should the AU relate to the UN approach to policing, and are there particular ways in which the police dimension of AU PSOs should be structured in order to accommodate the different environment in which they operate?

The information in this report is based on and draws from comparative research studies by TfP partners in the policing dimension in<sup>2</sup> the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization

Mission in Mali (MINUSMA);<sup>3</sup> the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID);<sup>4</sup> and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).<sup>5</sup> By studying these missions in Somalia, Darfur and Mali, this synthesis report will compare the roles of the police in an AU mission, a hybrid AU–UN mission and a UN mission. The mission in Darfur has a protection-of-civilians mandate in the context of a larger dispute without a ceasefire or peace agreement. The missions in Mali and Somalia assist the respective governments in dealing with Islamist insurgencies. All three missions thus have shared elements in their mandates that may facilitate comparison of their police roles.

This report is the product of a team of researchers drawn from four TfP partner institutions: the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). Under the umbrella of the TfP they have collaborated in ensuring that there is increased analysis of the particular needs of, challenges to and opportunities for policing within African peace operations. Fieldwork was conducted in the three countries and was largely based on semi-structured interviews, focus groups and the analysis of primary and secondary data. The report also relied extensively on feedback from senior members of staff of the different missions, who provided invaluable inputs on the overall accuracy of the information presented.

*The Police Training and Development Unit of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) conducts a two-week training programme in criminal investigation at General Kaahiye Police Academy in Mogadishu, for 160 policemen and policewomen of the Somalia Police Force.*  
(UN Photo/Tobin Jones)

# Gap analysis

One of the areas that are currently under researched is the particular role played by the police in PSOs. This relates to the general role of the police as well as the specific roles of formed police units (FPUs) and individual police officers (IPOs). There is a need to produce research that systematically studies the role of the police dimension and highlights its contribution to the overall impact of peace operations. In order to address this gap, this research project mapped these roles as they are performed in AU, UN and hybrid operations. Moreover, related to the lack of documented knowledge on the role of police in PSOs is the lack of common guidelines for police personnel in such operations. While there is an ongoing process addressing this through the development of the Strategic Guidance Framework, there is a need for research into the question of how to develop and utilise

such guidelines while avoiding the pitfalls of template use.

There are also a number of issues related to gender that are relevant to policing in African PSOs. It is important to interrogate the number of women police members in PSOs, as well as the possible impact of introducing more women into the operational environment. What impact does the number of women officers and units have on the prevention, detection and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)? Another question is whether there are differences in skills between female and male police officers, and whether one can observe gendered skills gaps when the male–female balance is changed. Findings on the possible impact of increased female participation may provide valuable insights for the overall training and recruitment of police peacekeepers.



# Overview of the conflicts in Somalia, Darfur and Mali

The collapse of the central government in Somalia in the 1990s and more than two decades of civil conflict have resulted in a fragile security situation. The country is in a state of low-intensity civil war; there are also instances of intensified levels of violent conflict, especially in parts of Mogadishu. Insecurity, disorder and drought have resulted in large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and slow economic growth. The Global Peace Index<sup>6</sup> ranks Somalia at 157 out of 162 countries, meaning that it is one of the least secure countries in the world. The country's internal conflict has placed a high cost on containing the violence. Somalia is a clan-based society, and therefore state and clanship is part of the same story and the same political dynamics.<sup>7</sup> The weak central government means that traditional systems continue to provide the mechanisms of justice, law and order. Customary justice or sharia laws and traditional non-state actors such as elders are used to resolve disputes instead of the police.<sup>8</sup>

In 2003 two Darfur rebel movements took up arms<sup>9</sup> when local perceptions of political and economic marginalisation by Khartoum spurred an attack on government forces. The Sudanese armed forces and government launched counterinsurgency operations that included targeting Darfur's civilian population. Since 2013 the security situation in Darfur has deteriorated, with more frequent clashes between the government and armed opposition groups, and the intensification of inter-communal conflict, especially over natural resources.

Rebel forces overthrew the Malian government in a military coup in March 2012. These forces were led by the Tuaregs, who perceived themselves as being marginalised and neglected by the state, especially during droughts and famines.<sup>10</sup> Insurgents capitalised on this power void, taking control of the sparsely populated areas in the northern regions. Three Islamist extremist groups seized control of all the major towns in the north.

The continued violence in all three these countries shows that peacekeeping missions should be adaptable to the situation. The police peacekeepers in each mission play a critical role in building local police capacity in weak and unstable states. The insecurity in these countries means that violence and conflict are central to the work of the police, instead of at the margins.



*Somali police officers take part in a training exercise at General Kahiye Police Academy in Mogadishu, Somalia. The African Union in Somalia (AMISOM) is currently training one hundred Somali Police officers in a programme aimed at equipping the Somali Police Force with the necessary skills to effectively arrest suspects, stop vehicles at checkpoints and cordon off areas.*  
(UN Photo/Tobin Jones)



# Mandate and function analysis

The mandates of each mission are different and will be discussed below. AMISOM's police duties include training, mentoring and advising the Somali Police Force (SPF) in order to make it reliable and effective, observing international standards. UNAMID's mandate, among others, is to take necessary action in terms of deployment and protecting personnel and facilities; and to support the effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. MINUSMA's mandate relates specifically to security-related stabilisation tasks and human rights monitoring.

## Nature of mandates

On 19 January 2007 the AU Peace and Security Council, with the approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC), authorised AMISOM to stabilise the situation in Somalia and create conditions conducive

to the conduct of humanitarian activities and transfer of authority to the UN after six months.<sup>11</sup> However, the UN did not take over the mission, and over the years its mandate has expanded. AMISOM has over 22 000 troops tasked with supporting the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, supporting the FGS in expanding its control over national territory, and assisting in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across south-central Somalia.<sup>12</sup>

The AMISOM police component is mandated to train, mentor, monitor and advise the SPF with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organisation that adheres to strict international standards.<sup>13</sup> As of December 2015<sup>14</sup> the component had 386 police officers, comprising 103 IPOs from Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra



# Mandate and function analysis continued

Leone and Niger; 280 FPU from Nigeria and Uganda; and three Senior Leadership Team officers from South Africa, Uganda and Nigeria.

UNAMID was established on 31 July 2007 by UNSC Resolution 1769, passed with unanimous approval, including the provision pertaining to its 'predominantly African character'.<sup>15</sup> UNAMID became the largest peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN.<sup>16</sup> The current<sup>17</sup> police component strength is 3 169 police officers, including FPUs. The contributing countries are Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC initially authorised UNAMID

[t]o take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to: (i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers, (ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.<sup>18</sup>

Despite eventually receiving the government's consent, and its robust mandate to protect civilians, UNAMID encountered significant challenges from the beginning. Problems related initially to the lack of adequate

personnel and the failure of Western governments to provide essential materials, in particular attack and transport helicopters.<sup>19</sup>

MINUSMA was established on 25 April 2013 through UNSC Resolution 2100. Its mandate includes security-related stabilisation tasks, protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, support for the extension of state authority in northern Mali and the preparation of free, fair and inclusive elections.<sup>20</sup>

Paragraph 12 in UNSC Resolution 2100 discusses the creation of the police component with a personnel strength of 1 440, comprising FPUs<sup>21</sup> and IPOs. MINUSMA's police component consists of 974 police personnel as of September 2014, including IPOs and FPUs deployed to implement this mandate, out of the 1 440 authorised police strength.<sup>22</sup> The specific mandates of the police component are defined in paragraph 16 of the resolution. The roles outlined for the police component include:

[t]o support national and international efforts in the reform of the Malian security sector, in particular the Police, the Gendarmerie, and the National Guard through technical support, capacity building, as well as mentoring; protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; and promoting and protecting human rights as well as monitoring, investigating and reporting human rights violations and abuses.<sup>23</sup>

As of February 2016,<sup>24</sup> MINUSMA has a police component of 1 097 police officers, including FPUs. Contributing countries include Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Jordan, Madagascar, the Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen.



# Overall analysis



Charles Makono, Police Commissioner of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), addresses a ceremony inaugurating AMISOM's two-week training programme for Somali national police officers at General Kaahiye Academy, Mogadishu. (UN Photo/Tobin Jones)

In order to better understand these missions, the duties of the police need to be analysed. Considering that each mandate is demonstrative of the country in which the relevant component is deployed, the duties and responsibilities of each police component will differ. This section looks at the different roles, tasks and challenges of the police components in the three missions.

## The roles of IPOs vs FPU

UNSC Resolution 2093 (2013) authorises AMISOM Police to advise and mentor the SPF. The AMISOM IPOs are working on capacity building and are engaged in activities such as advising and mentoring in core policing areas such as police operations, crime investigation, administration and training. Some IPOs are also advising and supporting the reform of the SPF through developing policies, strategic action plans, guidelines and other working documents, some of which have been adopted by the Somali Parliament.

The role of the FPU in AMISOM is twofold: providing protection and supporting the SPF. They provide protection to AMISOM personnel via escorts and VIP protection where necessary; and they accompany IPOs in order for them to perform their duties. They also provide protection to other international staff and visitors, including those from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Somalia, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia and other UN agencies, via escorts and VIP protection where necessary, in addition to providing VIP protection and escorts for senior FGS figures. The FPU also support the SFP in public order management; patrols; and operations, e.g. roadblocks, cordon and search operations; and act as a quick reaction force in response to terrorist incidents and other crisis situations.

Like AMISOM Police, UNAMID's police component is composed of three core elements: FPU, IPO and the police core command/senior leadership group. One of the roles of the FPU is to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel by providing armed escorts for IPOs and civilian personnel. FPU support the physical protection of civilians through high-visibility targeted and interactive patrols in camps for IDPs in which they identify key actors such as community leaders whom they can meet. They also provide crowd management, respond to public disorder situations and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to IDPs.

The work of IPOs focuses on monitoring, mentoring and building the capacity of the local government police, and supporting community-oriented policing in Darfur through building the capacity of community policing volunteers in IDP camps. Through these activities, UNAMID IPOs attempt to act as a bridge between the local police and IDPs, especially in areas where there is deep mistrust between the two.

MINUSMA's police component is expected to perform two core functions. Firstly, it provides support for the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of the Malian police and other law enforcement agencies. Secondly, it operationally supports the Malian police in terms of protecting life and property, maintaining public order and effectively preventing, detecting and investigating crimes. Other functions include protecting civilians and protecting and promoting human rights and the rule of law.

Operationally, FPU and IPO perform different kinds of roles within MINUSMA's mission. However, in terms of comparative advantages, IPOs have more intense contact with the population than FPU as they work more directly with the local population. IPOs are mainly engaged in reforming,

## Overall analysis continued

restructuring and rebuilding the Malian police, gendarmerie, civil protection and national guard through operational and technical support. The Malian law enforcement agencies conducted performance gap analyses and training needs assessments. IPOs build the capacity of these local law enforcement agencies through training in criminal investigations, election security, traffic policing, professional behaviour, intelligence gathering, countering an ambush or terrorist threats, public order management and riot control.<sup>25</sup>

FPU provide protection for all UN personnel and facilities. Specifically, FPU provide security to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of all UN personnel and associated personnel, installations and equipment within the mission area. They also undertake joint patrols with the Malian police and gendarmerie in the major population centres in the country and perform public order management and VIP escort functions.<sup>26</sup> During the legislative elections on 24 November 2013, FPU provided technical and logistical support to Mali's Independent National Electoral Commission.

### Common challenges

From the analysis it is evident that the missions face very different working environments. But there are certain common challenges that make it difficult for police officers to implement their mandate in peace operations.

All three missions are operating in areas where there is little or no peace to keep. Somalia lacks a holistic peace agreement. In Darfur, the peace agreements did not ensure a lasting ceasefire. In Mali, peacekeepers deployed when there was no peace agreement.

Mentoring the host nation's police is another challenge that both the AMISOM and

MINUSMA missions encountered. AMISOM's mentoring model creates an unequal working relationship between the mentor and mentee and should rather be steered towards a model of cooperation and collaboration. The advisory and mentoring function of the MINUSMA police component has also proven to be difficult. Most senior Malian police officials consider themselves knowledgeable because they are experienced police officers who have served on several UN missions. Therefore, for MINUSMA police to provide mentoring to police officers with whom they previously served in other missions is highly problematic.

The capacity and quality of the police officers is another critical challenge for peacekeepers. Not all police-contributing countries provide adequate instruction in the UN's mandatory pre-deployment training before sending their police officers to a peace operation. The Training Section of AMISOM Police noted the challenge involved in getting the right people, with suitable backgrounds and skill sets, into the right positions. Likewise, UNAMID faces a situation where 70% of IPOs have not received pre-deployment training. UNAMID also has had problems linked to substandard contingent own equipment and the inadequate training of FPU, which indirectly affect the work of IPOs because of their reliance on armed escorts. Within the MINUSMA police component, almost all the police personnel interviewed had gone through pre-deployment training. However, the majority had undergone the training long before the mission was established.

Another challenge that all three missions encounter is funding. The total cost per year of the AMISOM mission is estimated at approximately US\$ 900 million,<sup>27</sup> about half that of UNAMID.<sup>28</sup> A major difference in costs between these missions is that UNAMID has a large aircraft fleet, which AMISOM also desperately needs but for which it does not have the resources.

UNAMID's barrier to success in achieving its protection of civilians (PoC) mandate is the lack of funding to implement relief activities. Funding for the implementation of quick impact projects and training programmes is also limited. MINUSMA sometimes lacks the funds to provide coffee breaks, per diems and other minor costs associated with training, with the result that people are not encouraged or motivated to attend.

### Common opportunities

All three missions would benefit from more effective training that could equip police officers with the necessary skills and knowledge to perform their mandated duties. This training should be specific to each mission and move away from the generic courses.

It is also crucial for the missions' police components to work closer and better with local police in host countries in order to achieve their mandate. This will help host nations' police to start community-policing projects and therefore better understand communities' needs and security challenges. Of the three different components of the mission the police are the most visible, especially through their interaction with local communities and IDPs.

### Engagements with other mission components

As missions are made up of three components – the police, military and civilians – the interactions between the various components are critical for the success of the mission.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addresses the 26<sup>th</sup> African Union summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe).

In AMISOM, the security of IPOs is a critical challenge. At the time of the field research in Mogadishu in January 2014, approximately 97% of AMISOM's police officers were concentrated in Mogadishu while 15 IPOs were deployed to Baidoa, in the Bay region. As there was no FPU presence in this area, these 15 officers were dependent on their military counterparts for escorts. Initially FPUs were deployed to relieve the pressure on the military component. The logic was that if the police could assume responsibility for VIP protection and escort in Mogadishu, the military could focus on liberating and controlling more territory. Each FPU unit deployed on its own must be able to provide its own security. Although close cooperation with its military counterparts is required, it must, as a last resort, be able to operate independently. Due to the restricted capacity of the civilian component of AMISOM, police engagement has been limited.

Following a review by the UN Secretary General in consultation with the AU, the UNSC in 2014 decided to reduce UNAMID's uniformed components and reconfigure

them to focus on the areas in Darfur that presented the highest security threats. The UNSC authorised up to 16 200 military personnel and 2 310 police personnel, and 17 FPUs of up to 140 personnel each.<sup>29</sup> Accordingly, the military component was reconfigured to focus on areas of armed conflict and the provision of area security, whereas the police component focused on threats of criminality in areas where IDPs were highly concentrated, and on capacity building to support the return of IDPs.<sup>30</sup>

In providing armed escorts, FPUs share their responsibilities with UNAMID's military component. FPU patrols are not heavily armed; they can cover a maximum of 40 km from base in a patrol and must return on the same day. The military component is equipped with heavy weaponry and conducts long-distance patrols and escorts of more than 40 km.

However, IPOs have expressed a preference for FPU escorts. This was mainly attributed to the difference between military and police culture. FPUs, which are composed of



## Overall analysis continued

armed police officers, were seen as having a better understanding of IPOs' need to interact with community members. They were seen as having a less rigid approach than military escorts.

UNAMID's police component has capacities in place to facilitate the protection of civilians. These capacities include FPUs, IPOs and the police gender cell, working in collaboration with military and civilian components and the government police. Although FPUs are not directly involved in the physical protection of the civilian population, they act as enablers who create the possibility for PoC work to be carried out by police advisers. They also enable the work of the civilian component in the delivery of humanitarian aid, mediation, conflict management, reconciliation, human rights protection and rule of law.

MINUSMA struggles to extend its presence beyond Bamako, especially since its approved deployment capacity (comprising military, police and civilian personnel) is not being realised. The military deployment attained 74% of capacity in the first year,<sup>31</sup> while the police had reached just 38% of full deployment of the authorised strength of IPOs by May 2014.<sup>32</sup> The wide gap between the military and the police deployment can be explained in particular by MINUSMA's limited capacity and infrastructure for accommodating the mission's full police component. As a result, the mission has great difficulty in providing the necessary capacity-building support to the Malian police, particularly in the north of the country. The collaboration between the military and MINUSMA police did ensure that the president could visit Timbuktu in 2014. However, coordination efforts among the various components must be improved to avoid the duplication and overlap of activities.



UNAMID troops on patrol in Khor Abeche, South Darfur (Albert González Farran/UNAMID).



## Gender approaches

Integral to any mission is UNSC Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security,<sup>33</sup> which calls for more women to be involved in peacekeeping. In Africa men dominate peace operations, with on average only 3% women in uniform and 17% women civilian staff.<sup>34</sup> However, an increase in women personnel would not necessarily lead to a more gender-sensitive mission or gender mainstreaming – it would require more targeted measures to change mindsets and perceptions.

When AMISOM was deployed in Somalia in 2007 gender mainstreaming was not incorporated into the mission. AMISOM's first gender officer was deployed in 2012. AMISOM has a very low number of women personnel: in 2013 only 1.49% of its military personnel were women.<sup>35</sup> However, the proportion in the police component is

higher: 24% of AMISOM's IPOs are women, and women constitute 12.5% of FPUs.

AMISOM's Gender Unit, which consists of one person, needs more human and financial resources. According to Gjelsvik,<sup>36</sup> funding for activities is irregular. The unit requires more staff if it wants to have greater impact. AMISOM is dependent on troop-contributing countries to provide women police officers. However, there are various reasons as to why there are not enough women in uniform. Firstly, there may be few women personnel in the relevant police force. Secondly, women may serve at a subordinate level in supportive roles. Lastly, due to societal norms and biases women are not encouraged to take an active role in combat. AMISOM has encouraged the Somali government to ensure gender mainstreaming and women's participation in politics.<sup>37</sup>

The high rate of SGBV in Darfur means that gender issues form a critical element of UNAMID's PoC mandate. Like any other mission, UNAMID police officers often receive little training on gender issues before deployment to the mission area, and the mission has also experienced hurdles in recruiting women police advisers, particularly from Arabic-speaking countries, which tend to have fewer women police officers in operational roles. Despite these challenges, the UNAMID police core command/senior leadership has made several notable achievements aimed at ensuring that police personnel deployed are appropriate to the mission's needs, are adequately trained and equipped, and have clear guidance that reflects revisions in their strategic priorities. Efforts to recruit women police officers continue and gender mainstreaming within the mission has both a community and in-mission focus.



## Overall analysis continued

Starting with the wider mission context in Darfur, the Gender Advisory Unit's mandate focuses on mainstreaming gender in all operations of the mission and providing training and capacity building as and when required. Generally, gender mainstreaming within the mission has shifted (due to the narrowing of the gender mainstreaming mandate) from a community-based focus to an in-mission focus.

The UNAMID Gender Advisory Unit aims to mainstream gender in all of the mission's operations, including policies, planning, procedures and reporting. It engages in building the capacity of the senior mission leadership, gender focal points and mission staff. The unit also provides technical assistance and policy advice to mission components. In this capacity, it trains UNAMID police officers on how to mainstream gender within the operations of the Sudanese police.

In Darfur, cultural beliefs, structural problems and efforts to protect family integrity make victims/survivors of SGBV reluctant to report these incidents to the police. In order to combat this, the police component aims to maintain a ratio of at least 20%<sup>38</sup> women police advisers among its personnel, although this fluctuates. Furthermore, there are relatively few female police officers in the employment of the Sudanese police. The government does not recruit women, and there are not enough efforts to raise awareness on the role of women in uniform.

Families in Darfur also do not consider policing a suitable occupation for women. Furthermore, women police officers prefer to stay in Khartoum or the major cities and refuse rotations to work in rural areas.

Within the police component of MINUSMA there are 925 (94.9%) men – the 49 women personnel represent only 5.1%<sup>39</sup> of the total police strength. In Mali gender relations remain one of the causes of the reoccurrence of conflict. SGBV crimes by armed groups or civilians against women and girls continue unabated in most areas of the country. Women are excluded from peace negotiations and are inadequately represented in governance structures, despite the fact that they make up 60% of the active labour force. MINUSMA has several tasks to mainstream gender both in the mission and in the country. The critical task for the gender unit is to build and support capacity for all MINUSMA personnel to develop benchmarks for mainstreaming a gender perspective in the priority peacebuilding operations of the mission.<sup>40</sup> The gender unit was instrumental in building women's capacity in peace advocacy, social cohesion and conflict mitigation. In particular, MINUSMA's gender unit organised capacity-building workshops for women in preparation for their participation in the Algiers peace process and to bolster their involvement in civil society's watchdog role in early warning mechanisms, participative democracy, and accountability in public management.

Police agents from the African Union mission AMISOM. The role of the police in AMISOM appears very similar to that of the police in UN missions (*AMISOM Public Information*).



# Do the AU police differ from the UN police?

The role of the police in AMISOM appears very similar to that of the police in UN missions, as the UN example has been closely followed in the design and structure of the AU Police (AUPOL) in AMISOM. AU IPOs have also been trained in line with the UN curriculum, and some have previously served in UN missions.

The most significant difference between the standard roles of the UNPOL and the AUPOL is that the UNPOL's role has evolved in the UN peacekeeping context, while that of the AUPOL evolves in all AU stabilisation missions. UN peacekeeping principles are consent, impartiality and non-use of force, while AU missions have been mandated to use force to protect a government against an insurgency and to create conditions conducive to a ceasefire or peace agreement.

The most significant implication for the police function is that some of the core

principles that inform UN peacekeeping do not apply to the AUPOL. In the AMISOM context, the implication is that the AUPOL, like the rest of the AU mission, is perceived as a legitimate target of al-Shabaab.

Moreover, police work in UN peacekeeping missions is devoted to building a new post-conflict police force or service as a prominent part of the peace process. For stabilisation operations taking place during conflict, the focus is not yet on building a new police force. Instead it is on strengthening the capacity of the police to contribute to defeating the insurgency that threatens the state.

UNAMID's hybrid nature creates a unique situation that influences the strategic environment of the mission. UNAMID is affected by the relations between the AU and UN on issues pertaining to Darfur

and Sudan, which range from 'meticulous collaboration and rivalry for leadership' to their different conceptions of the situation and the requirements for effective peacemaking.<sup>41</sup> The Sudanese government has subjected UNAMID to numerous obstacles, constraints and delays, impeding the mission's deployment and ability to implement its mandate to an greater extent than has been experienced by any other complex UN operation.<sup>42</sup>

At the operational level, the UNAMID police confronts difficult conditions in terms of climate, logistics, security and managing relations with government authorities and IDPs. The UNAMID police has established several initiatives that are unique to the mission. These include a recruitment system that is tailored to the mission's needs, a more rigorous performance management system and a central database management system.



# Conclusions and recommendations

As the situation on the ground changes, peace support operations will have to adapt. As shown by the three missions discussed, the police component is the most visible of any peace operation and therefore its role in implementing its mandates and managing the expectations of local actors is crucial. The police component also plays a significant role in supplementing the efforts of the military component and offers substantive support to the civilian component.

Moreover, the police need correct training that will ensure that those deployed understand the context in which they will work and the possible challenges they will face.

The changing nature of conflicts also has a major impact on the role and tasks of police in AU and UN peace operations. Not only is the AU deployed in volatile peace enforcement situations but it is also often equipped with more robust mandates than UN missions, and it faces significant asymmetric threats on the ground. An example of that is AMISOM, which is often considered to be deployed in a context where there is no peace to be kept, requiring robust action from the AU mission. While military action can stop the fighting it does not build civil society, which is mostly left to the civil police space. The police therefore have to respond to the complex nature of the conflict, and to criminal networks that stretch beyond IDPs.

Individual and comparative studies of the three missions show that there is a need to tailor the tasks of police to the mandates and robustness of the mission they are supporting. Similarly, the training, both pre-deployment and in-mission, that IPOs and FPU receive should be tailored to the context in which they are being deployed. The tactics and procedures of IPOs and FPUs should be standardised to facilitate easy coordination during patrols.

Considering that the UN High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations in 2015 strongly recommended that the UN should not engage in counter-terrorism operations, and that this stance has been supported by the new policy directive of the United States president on peace operations,<sup>43</sup> it can be concluded that regional and subregional organisations will increasingly be asked to take on such missions in Africa in the future. With this in mind, the AU should develop its own set of

guidelines, policies and training manuals that are based on the various scenarios police will face in AU and subregional peace operations.

The differences between UN and AU policing in peace operations have implications in broadly three areas:

## Substantive direction

The AU should develop guidelines, policies and training manuals for policing in a stabilisation context, taking into consideration the implications for the various types of police (IPOs, FPUs) and the tasks they are performing: reform of the police structure; capacity development and training; intelligence gathering and counter-insurgency; countering violent extremism; community policing in newly liberated areas (taking into consideration that clan-based systems of law and order may still be predominant), etc.

## Funding

UN police will normally be fully funded by the assessed contributions of the UN. AU missions are much more donor-dependent, and thus the AU needs to specify the needs it will cover with the funding provided, and how the activities conducted will contribute towards the goal of stabilisation and providing peace dividends for local populations.

## Training

Pre-deployment training for both AU and UN missions should be much more focused on the specific tasks and contexts that the police officers will be faced with in-mission, and as far as possible be conducted with police officers who have already been selected for deployment. In-mission, training should further capacitate police officers with the skills necessary to perform specific roles and tasks in the given mission. It is important to prepare AU police officers for the high-risk environment and the need to be a shoulder-to-shoulder mentor for their national police peers in the field.

# Notes

- 1 The Training for Peace (TFP) Research Network was established in March 2013 at the TFP's Annual General Meeting in New York to facilitate discussion and collaborative research on common topics of interest that fall under the TFP. In 2014 the TFP Research Network focussed on policing, specifically on the challenges related to policing in African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) peace operations in Africa.
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