

# GLOBAL MILITARIZATION INDEX 2017

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**bicc**

## SUMMARY

Compiled by BICC, the Global Militarization Index (GMI) presents on an annual basis the relative weight and importance of a country's military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The GMI 2017 covers 151 states and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases data for 2016). The index project is financially supported by Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The ten countries that have the highest levels of militarization for the year 2016 are Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Russia, South Korea, Kuwait, Jordan, Cyprus, Greece and Brunei. These countries allocate particularly high levels of resources to the armed forces in comparison to other areas of society. For some countries that are included in the top 20 militarized countries in the world, the sharp decline in the price of oil has led to a reduction in military expenditures: Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia but also Azerbaijan.

In South American countries too, especially in Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Mexico, the drop in oil prices caused military spending to fall more or less significantly. One regional focus of the GMI 2017 is the Americas: The two most militarized countries in the region are Cuba and the United States. US military spending increased again for the first time since 2009 and, at US \$611 billion, was the highest in the world. While the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, with the exception of Cuba, show a relatively low level of militarization, the South American states can be found more in the upper mid-range.

This year's GMI also positions the degree of militarization relative to Transparency International's (TI) Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI). The defence sector is particularly opaque and vulnerable: Corrupt elites negotiate arms deals which, even though they frequently make little sense from a military point of view, help to make them rich. The comparison of the indices shows clearly, however, that corruption does not by any means only occur in highly militarized countries but also in many countries with comparatively low levels of militarization, indicating deficits in the security sector and weak state institutions.

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## THE METHODOLOGY OF THE GLOBAL MILITARIZATION INDEX (GMI)

The Global Militarization Index (GMI) depicts the relative weight and importance of the military apparatus of one state in relation to its society as a whole. For this, the GMI records a number of indicators to represent the level of militarization of a country:

- \ the comparison of military expenditures with its gross domestic product (GDP) and its health expenditure (as share of its GDP);
- \ the contrast between the total number of (para)military forces and the number of physicians and the overall population;
- \ the ratio of the number of heavy weapons systems available and the number of the overall population.

The GMI is based on data from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and BICC. It shows the levels of militarization of more than 150 states since 1990. BICC provides yearly updates.

In order to increase the compatibility between different indicators and to prevent extreme values from creating distortions when normalizing data, in a first step every indicator has been represented in a logarithm with the factor 10. Second, all data have been normalized using the formula  $x=(y-\min)/(\max-\min)$ , with min and max representing, respectively, the lowest and the highest value of the logarithm. In a third step, every indicator has been weighted in accordance to a subjective factor, reflecting the relative importance attributed to it by BICC researchers (see Graph below). In order to calculate the final score, the weighted indicators have been added up and then normalized one last time on a scale ranging from 0 to 1,000. For better comparison of individual years, all years have finally been normalized.

The GMI conducts a detailed analysis of specific regional or national developments. By doing so, BICC wants to contribute to the debate on militarization and point to the often contradictory distribution of resources.

### GMI indicators and weighing factors

Category / Indicator Factor



#### Expenditures

Military expenditures as percentage of GDP 5

Military expenditures in relation to health spending 3



#### Personnel

Military and paramilitary personnel in relation to population.<sup>1</sup> 4

Military reserves in relation to population 2

Military and paramilitary personnel in relation to physicians 2



#### Weapons

Heavy weapons in relation to population 4

1 \ The main criterion for coding an organizational entity as either military or paramilitary is that the forces in question are under the direct control of the government in addition to being armed, uniformed and garrisoned.

## BICC GMI 2017




Numerous conflicts and rivalries drive global militarization. While in this respect, the different threat perceptions of states influence the amount of resources they devote to their armed forces and their equipment, their economic situation is also important. Thus, for example, the low oil price in the last few years led to military expenditures in some of the oil-exporting countries that are significantly lower than in previous years. This particularly affected Venezuela, Iraq and Saudi Arabia as well as Azerbaijan, although the latter still retained their top positions despite these cuts. But not all oil-exporting countries share this trend. Both Iran and Russia, for example, actually increased their military spending. This illustrates that militarization is not a monocausal phenomenon. Indeed, the degree of militarization in a society is dependent on different factors and conditions. The lack of transparency and lack of societal monitoring could also affect, via procurement policies, on the degree of militarization. Hence, countries like Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia are to be found high up in BICC's Global Militarization Index (GMI) and on low, i.e. critical, positions in Transparency International's (TI) Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI). For the first time, the GMI will investigate this—somewhat ambivalent—link between corruption and militarization in more detail.

Just this profusion of factors which can affect militarization suggests that caution is needed when evaluating the phenomenon of militarization. The GMI is deliberately designed to avoid the normative assumption that militarization always means an excessive emphasis on military power, or that a high allocation of resources for the military generally has a negative impact on security or the development of society as a whole. This differentiated view of state militarization is of great importance when examining the problems of organized violence which are the focus of BICC's research agenda. BICC analyses on militarization have shown that there are a number of cases in which it is precisely the comparatively low level of militarization that appears to indicate a weak security sector, not uncommonly in the context of fragile statehood or violent conflict. Also, the phenomenon of corruption by no means occurs only

in especially highly militarized countries, but also in many states with a relatively low level of militarization, as will be described later.

In the following text, the GMI 2017 presents and analyses selected trends in militarization. Most of the data relates to the year 2016.

**Table 1**  
**Top 10**

Country				GMI Score	Rank
Israel	5.9	6.2	3.5	<b>888.6</b>	<b>1</b>
Singapore	5.7	6.4	3.2	<b>867.1</b>	<b>2</b>
Armenia	5.8	6.1	2.9	<b>832.7</b>	<b>3</b>
Russia	5.9	5.3	3.2	<b>805.6</b>	<b>4</b>
Korea, Republic	5.4	6.0	2.9	<b>798.1</b>	<b>5</b>
Kuwait	6.2	5.0	3.1	<b>794.3</b>	<b>6</b>
Jordan	5.8	5.4	3.1	<b>789.2</b>	<b>7</b>
Cyprus	5.2	5.8	3.2	<b>784.9</b>	<b>8</b>
Greece	5.4	5.5	3.2	<b>784.0</b>	<b>9</b>
Brunei	5.9	5.4	2.8	<b>780.2</b>	<b>10</b>

### The top 10

The ten countries that have the highest levels of militarization for the year 2016 are Israel, Singapore, Armenia, Russia, South Korea, Kuwait, Jordan, Cyprus, Greece and Brunei. These countries allocate particularly high levels of resources to the armed forces in comparison to other areas of society.

For some other countries, however, we have no reliable data to make this comparison. We must assume, however,—for example based on earlier surveys—that their level of militarization is also very high. This includes Syria, North Korea and Eritrea in particular.

## Focus on regional militarization

At US \$611 billion, almost 39 per cent of global military spending came from the United States in 2016. China's portion lies at about 13,7 per cent; in absolute terms at US \$215 billion.<sup>2</sup> However, these high values are put into perspective when compared to the GDP or the total population of the United States or China. Following the United States and China, Russia, with a military spending in the amount of US \$69.2 billion takes position three. It is striking that Russia (position 4 in the GMI), besides South Korea (position 5), is the only country in the top 10 of the GMI which also belongs, in terms of absolute numbers, to the countries which invest a great deal of resources in the military. It has a large number of military personnel and over 76,000 heavy weapons systems—more than any other country. South Korea, in turn, at US \$36.8 billion, takes position 10 on the list of countries with the highest military expenditure in the world. The other countries in the GMI top 10, in contrast, lie far below, even if they, such as Israel, have very well equipped, modern armed forces. Israel (position 1) only spent just under US \$18 billion on the military in 2016. The Sultanate of Brunei (position 10), used only US \$403 million for its military in 2016 and employs a military force of somewhat over 9,000 people—though with a GDP of only US \$11.4 billion and a total population of just over 423,000 people. All countries in the top 10 in the GMI have in common that, in relation to other areas in society, they spend a great amount of money on the military (see above).

### The Americas

#### Top positions in the Americas

The two most militarized countries in the region are Cuba and the United States. Both countries have similarly high values in all three GMI sub-indices and thus occupy position 27 (Cuba) and position 31 (USA) globally. At more than US \$611 billion, the United States spent by far the most money for its military in 2016, accounting for almost 3.3 per cent of its GDP. In Cuba, which takes first position from the United States in the regional comparison, the portion of military spending in the last few years lay between 3.1 and 3.5 per cent of GDP.<sup>3</sup> The Caribbean country has, however, in relation to its population, a relatively high number of military and paramilitary personnel, in addition to a large amount of heavy weapons systems. These numbers do not, however, reveal much about the actual fighting power of the individual armies.

#### United States

For the first time since 2009, the United States' military spending rose again (from US \$596 billion in 2015 to over US \$611 billion in 2016). The Trump administration has not yet presented a national security strategy. Nevertheless, it has already made clear that it is aiming to strengthen the military and wants to significantly increase funds for the Pentagon. This would also appear to be necessary to implement the United States' ambitious armaments plans for the coming years. Thus, for example, the navy is supposed to grow from its current 171 ships to 350 ships in the longer term and at the same time also receive two additional aircraft carriers. The modernization of US-American nuclear weapons, in particular, is likely to tie up large amounts of money. Trump has signalled that he will not only continue the modernization of the nuclear arsenal, which Barack Obama already started but will expand it further. The army, too, is supposed to grow from its current 475,350 to 540,000 soldiers, while under Obama, a reduction to 450,000 soldiers was planned. If the Trump administration is able to implement its plans and the comparative

2 \ Unless otherwise indicated, all information on military expenditure in this publication has been taken from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.




3 \ SIPRI's Military Expenditure Database does not contain any data for 2016. For 2015, the figure lies at 3.1 per cent.

values (e. g. GDP or population size) do not rise at the same rate, this will likely result in a significant increase of the militarization of the United States.




### South America

While the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, except Cuba, show a relatively low level of militarization, the South American states can be found more in the upper mid-range. Nevertheless, none of them are found among the 30 most highly militarized countries in the world. And, in contrast to North America, military spending between 2015 and 2016 fell in both South America (by 7.7 per cent) and in Central America and the Caribbean (by 9.1 per cent). On the basis of a comparatively good international security situation, economic developments contributed first and foremost to this. For oil-exporting states, the drop in the oil price had a particularly negative impact on the budget available. Venezuela, which is heavily dependent on oil exports, and which already cut its military spending drastically in 2015, was most noticeably affected by this. In 2016, the country cut back military spending by a further three billion (56 per cent) compared to the previous year so that it now only amounts to 0.3 per cent of GDP. But Ecuador and Peru have also slashed their military expenditure as a result of low oil export revenues. Mexico is also affected. Military spending fell in 2016 after a continuous rise since 2004, not least as a result of the increasing use of the military in fighting drug cartels. In Colombia, on the contrary, military expenditure rose between 2015 and 2016 by almost nine per cent. The peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC rebels in November 2016 could lead to a reduction of the military sector.

**Table 2**  
*The ten most highly militarized countries in the Americas*

Country				GMI Score	Rank
Cuba	5.4	4.7	2.9	<b>695.6</b>	<b>27</b>
United States	5.4	4.5	2.8	<b>672.2</b>	<b>31</b>
Chile	5.2	4.8	2.5	<b>664.9</b>	<b>33</b>
Peru	5.0	5.0	2.2	<b>639.4</b>	<b>46</b>
Colombia	5.6	4.8	1.6	<b>622.1</b>	<b>53</b>
Uruguay	5.2	3.9	2.7	<b>618.3</b>	<b>56</b>
Ecuador	5.3	4.5	1.9	<b>605.9</b>	<b>58</b>
Paraguay	4.9	5.2	1.5	<b>590.1</b>	<b>67</b>
Bolivia	5.1	4.2	2.1	<b>585.9</b>	<b>71</b>
Brazil	5.0	4.7	1.7	<b>580.7</b>	<b>75</b>

**Table 3**  
**The ten most militarized countries in the Middle East**

Country				GMI Score	Rank
Israel	5.9	6.2	3.5	<b>888.6</b>	<b>1</b>
Kuwait	6.2	5.0	3.1	<b>794.3</b>	<b>6</b>
Jordan	5.8	5.4	3.1	<b>789.2</b>	<b>7</b>
Oman	6.8	4.3	2.7	<b>756.6</b>	<b>13</b>
Bahrain	5.9	4.5	3.2	<b>743.2</b>	<b>15</b>
Saudi Arabia	6.4	4.2	2.9	<b>736.7</b>	<b>17</b>
Lebanon	5.8	4.4	3.1	<b>714.8</b>	<b>20</b>
UA Emirates	6.1	4.0	3.1	<b>713.4</b>	<b>21</b>
Iran	5.5	5.1	2.5	<b>710.7</b>	<b>22</b>
Egypt	5.2	5.1	2.7	<b>694.2</b>	<b>28</b>

## Middle East

In international comparison, the countries of the Middle East are very highly militarized. Among other things, this can be seen in the fact that except Iraq, all countries in the region can be found in the top 30 most militarized countries. Having said that, in position 38 Iraq still shows a high level of militarization. States such as Qatar, Yemen and Syria are missing from the GMI 2017 ranking as there is no reliable data available for them. In previous surveys, however, Syria always ranked among the most highly militarized countries in position two to four.

The high militarization in the Middle East is a result of a combination of two factors. First, the many, decades-long conflicts and rivalries in the region are important drivers of militarization. Second, the intensive use of resources for the military is made possible through the relatively generous financial room for manoeuvre which many states in the region have. Above all, income from the export of fossil fuels allows the Gulf States to spend a lot on the military, and at the same time to subsidize various services for their citizens to legitimize the autocratic power structures of the individual

regimes. This model could come under pressure following the sharp decline of the price of oil since mid-2014. This is reflected most clearly in the case of Saudi Arabia. Military spending there dropped by 30 per cent between 2015 and 2016, after previously having risen since 2002 (only interrupted by a small reduction in 2008). Military spending in Iraq also fell by 36 per cent whereas, in other states, the picture is less clear. While military spending in Bahrain, Egypt and Oman decreased slightly, it rose by 16 per cent in Kuwait and by 17 per cent in Iran, whose economic situation improved following the lifting of international sanctions.

With military spending of US \$63.7 billion, which corresponds to 10.4 per cent of GDP, Saudi Arabia still has the highest military expenditure in the region. Globally, it is in fourth place, behind the United States, China and Russia. Iran, conversely, at US \$12.7 billion, only spends three per cent of its GDP for the military. Nonetheless, the two rivals are not all that far apart from one another considering the total level of militarization. With over half a million soldiers and 350,000 reservists, Iran maintains a significantly larger military in relation to the total population than Saudi Arabia does with just 227,000 soldiers. When it comes to the number of heavy weapons systems, both states are almost on a par with somewhat over 7,000 in total. While in Iran the systems are partially outdated, Saudi Arabia possesses an arsenal of relatively modern weapons and thus, after Israel, has the best-equipped military in the region.



## Europe

### Eastern Europe

Despite a difficult economic situation as a result of low prices for natural resources and Western sanctions, Russia still invests a lot of resources in its military capabilities. Following an initial intention to lower military expenditure in 2016, it actually rose by 5.9 per cent to US \$69.2 billion. This corresponds to 5.3 per cent of GDP. Russia hence occupies—after the USA and China—position three in military spending worldwide. First and foremost, Russia's investment in the military is likely to be used for the continued modernization of military equipment to close gaps in its capabilities in comparison to the United States, for example in the area of drones and precision weapons. The military support for the Assad regime in Syria and for the rebels in eastern Ukraine also plays a role.

With a small change, the level of militarization in Ukraine remains high (2017: position 16; 2016: position 15), not least because of the conflict in Donbass. Since 2013, military spending and the number of military and paramilitary personnel has grown significantly. At the moment, military spending is at 3.8 per cent of GDP.




Due above all to the protracted conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia (position 3) and Azerbaijan (position 11) continue to invest huge amounts of resources in their armed forces. Azerbaijan falling by six places from its previous position five in the GMI is related to the impact of decreasing prices for natural resources on the state budget in this country of the Caucasus, which is heavily dependent on oil and gas exports.

### NATO and EU countries

As a result of the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Heads of State or Government of NATO agreed in 2014 that every member state should aim to spend two per cent of their gross domestic product on the military from 2024 onwards at the latest.<sup>4</sup> This corresponds to a demand that the United States had already made on its NATO partners for a long time; the country itself spends 3.3 per cent of its GDP. Currently, only a few European countries have reached

**Table 4**

*The ten most highly militarized countries in Europe.*

Country				GMI Score	Rank
Armenia	5.8	6.1	2.9	<b>832.7</b>	<b>3</b>
Russia	5.9	5.3	3.2	<b>805.6</b>	<b>4</b>
Cyprus	5.2	5.8	3.2	<b>784.9</b>	<b>8</b>
Greece	5.4	5.5	3.2	<b>784.0</b>	<b>9</b>
Azerbaijan	5.7	5.5	2.8	<b>774.9</b>	<b>11</b>
Belarus	5.0	5.8	3.0	<b>761.3</b>	<b>12</b>
Ukraine	5.7	5.2	2.7	<b>738.2</b>	<b>16</b>
Finland	4.9	5.2	2.9	<b>706.5</b>	<b>24</b>
Turkey	5.3	5.0	2.7	<b>702.1</b>	<b>25</b>
Estonia	5.3	4.9	2.8	<b>696.7</b>	<b>26</b>

this target. According to figures provided by SIPRI, only Estonia, at 2.1 per cent of GDP, and Greece, at 2.6 per cent of GDP, did so in 2016. Data from NATO includes Poland at two per cent and the United Kingdom at 2.18 per cent.<sup>5</sup>

In total, however, an overall rise in military spending for NATO countries can be observed. Spending rose by 1.8 per cent in 2015 and 3.3 per cent in 2016 after having constantly fallen in the previous years. For 2017, NATO estimates a growth of 4.3 per cent. This corresponds to an increase of US \$45.8 billion in total for the three years from 2015 to 2017. Half of that is accounted for by the United States alone (see above).<sup>6</sup>

4 \ In its official documents, NATO always refers to “defence expenditure”, and the amounts given for that usually differ slightly from the data in the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Information on military expenditure, if not otherwise stated, was taken from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

5 \ NATO: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010-2017), June 2017, [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2017\\_06/20170629\\_170629-pr2017-111-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_06/20170629_170629-pr2017-111-en.pdf)

6 \ Ibid.

## Militarization and corruption

Among the European NATO countries, primarily those in the east have boosted their military expenditure in the last two years. Lithuania, with an increase of 34.6 per cent and Latvia at 43.5 per cent stand out while Poland reduced its military expenditure somewhat in 2016 after a significant rise in it in the two years previous.

In western Europe, only Italy showed a double-digit growth (10.6 per cent) while Germany (2.9 per cent) and France (0.6 per cent) experienced comparatively low budget increases.<sup>7</sup> The positions in the GMI ranking, however, only changed a little considering these overall quite moderate increases. Only Lithuania (from position 44 to 34) and Latvia (from 86 to 76) climbed ten places each in comparison to the previous year.

Turkey (position 25) can also be found in the European top 10. Due to its geographic proximity, it is severely affected by the violent conflicts in Syria and Iraq and also actively involved in the events of the wars. Since August 2016, the Turkish military has been officially supporting opposition forces in the struggle against Assad. In Syria, Iraq and in its own country, the military is taking action against the PKK and its associated groups. The attempted coup in July 2016 led to a reduction in armed forces personnel; however, its long-term effects on the country's degree of militarization are not yet clear.

In more than 120 of the 176 countries which Transparency International (TI) investigated for the 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), corruption was perceived to be a significant problem.<sup>8</sup> Corruption prevents inclusive growth and contributes to economic resources trickling away into dubious channels instead of being used for human development. Corruption can promote discontent in the population as well as mistrust in the government and established order and hence can reinforce conflicts and lay the groundwork for their violent escalation.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to other areas, for example, the construction- or the oil and gas industries, the defence sector is considered to be particularly vulnerable to corruption. This is not least because of the comparatively low level of transparency in this area. Many transactions take place in secret as it is argued that this is for reasons of national security. This makes it easier for corrupt elites to “capture” the defence sector and negotiate arms deals which, even though they frequently make little sense from a military point of view, help to make them rich. Consequently, defence budgets swell disproportionately at the expense of other areas such as health or education expenditure.

According to the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (GI), also compiled by Transparency International (TI), in 2015, 63 of 118 countries investigated (54 per cent) showed a critical or very high risk of corruption in the defence sector. Only 19 countries (17 per cent) were assigned to categories with a low or very low risk of corruption.<sup>10</sup>

Band A (“very low”), with countries such as New Zealand (GMI position 111) and the United Kingdom (GMI position 69), contains countries with an average level of militarization. Band B (“low”) also primarily consists of states that, in relation to their levels of militarization, are in the mid-range of the GMI 2017 rankings, for example Switzerland (position 51), Poland (position 65), Australia (position 87), Sweden (position 91) or Germany (position 104). Only two of the 30 most heavily militarized states in the world can be found here: Singapore (position 2) and Finland (position 24).

7 \ Ibid.

8 \ Transparency International (2016), Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, [https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption\\_perceptions\\_index\\_2016](https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016).

9 \ Transparency International Defence & Security (2017), The Fifth Column. Understanding the Relationship between Corruption and Conflict, [http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The\\_Fifth\\_Column\\_Web.pdf](http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The_Fifth_Column_Web.pdf)

10 \ Transparency International Defence & Security (2015), Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, <https://government.defenceindex.org/>

In contrast, both the F (“critical”) and E (“very high”) bands, that is, those states with a particularly high risk of corruption, vary greatly with regard to the level of militarization. First, band F includes heavily militarized countries like Kuwait (position 6), Algeria (position 14), Oman (position 13) or Bahrain (position 15), while highly militarized states like Jordan (position 7), Azerbaijan (position 11) or Saudi Arabia (position 17) are found in band E. “The combination of rising arms imports, weak oversight and controls on strategy and spending, and low public engagement is dangerous and exacerbates the risks of future conflict”, was the GI’s assessment of the link between high levels of corruption and militarization in the Middle East. The GI furthermore considers this to be responsible for the arms race in the area: “The excessive secrecy involved in both the management of defence budgets in the region as well as the lack of transparency over capability and intent has obvious implications for fuelling regional arms races.”<sup>11</sup>

But at the same time, there are also countries in the F band such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (position 118), Cameroon (position 120), Equatorial Guinea (position 129) or Burkina Faso (position 132), which show a comparatively low level of militarization. A similar pattern applies to some countries from band E: here too, we find those with a low GMI figure, such as Sierra Leone (position 140), Malawi (position 146), Gambia (position 149) or Liberia (position 150).

Comparing the figures from the GI with those from the GMI, one cannot infer a clear link between high-level corruption and high militarization. In fact, they rather appear to indicate a similar direction as earlier examinations in which the GMI was set against the Human Development Index (HDI) and the World Hunger Index (WHI) did: According to these results, a particularly low level of militarization must not necessarily be viewed as something positive. On the contrary, it is often (not always) an indicator of deficits in the security sector that occur in the context of weak state institutions. Corruption and a lack of transparency should also be included here, which the GI also clarified looking at Africa: “In many cases, defence matters are

considered highly sensitive and evade vital scrutiny. This secrecy is often unjustified, and can be used to mask corruption, misuse, and incompetence”.<sup>12</sup>


Nevertheless, the findings indicate that corruption in the defence sector is a problem in the case of many very heavily militarized states, too. Yet, based on this examination, which is a first rough comparison, one cannot clarify whether this is indeed because military spending is inflated as a result of arms deals by corrupt elites. What is clear, however, is that Singapore, at position two in the GMI, is the only one among the 20 most heavily militarized countries in the world that shows only a low risk of corruption in the defence sector (band B).

11 \ Proliferation and arms control, <https://government.defenceindex.org/analysis/>


12 \ Regional results Africa, <https://government.defenceindex.org/downloads/docs/GI-Africa-results-web.pdf>

The depiction and use of boundaries or frontiers and geographic names on this map do not necessarily imply official endorsement or acceptance by BICC.

**Map 1**  
*Overview GMI-ranking worldwide*



Source conflict data: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Sources of administrative boundaries: Natural Earth Dataset



Rank 1-30   Rank 31-60   Rank 61-90   Rank 91-120   Rank > 120  
no data available   countries in armed conflicts

## MILITARIZATION INDEX RANKING

Rank	Country	45	Congo, Republic of	90	Indonesia	135	Lesotho
1	Israel	46	Peru	91	Sweden	136	Nigeria
2	Singapore	47	Sudan	92	China	137	Libya
3	Armenia	48	Namibia	93	Spain	138	Mauritius
4	Russia	49	Montenegro	94	Rwanda	139	Madagascar
5	Korea, Republic of	50	Denmark	95	Slovakia	140	Sierra Leone
6	Kuwait	51	Switzerland	96	Uganda	141	Seychelles
7	Jordan	52	Pakistan	97	South Sudan	142	Timor-Leste
8	Cyprus	53	Colombia	98	Canada	143	Ghana
9	Greece	54	Malaysia	99	Tanzania	144	Albania
10	Brunei	55	Georgia	100	Venezuela	145	Trinidad and Tobago
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