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# MONITORING UKRAINE'S SECURITY GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES

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PROCEEDINGS FROM THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
“SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE:  
THE ROLE OF MEDIA”

5-6 October 2016, Kyiv, Ukraine

KYIV-2017

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CONFERENCE



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**Proceedings from the Fourth International Conference  
“Security Sector Governance: The Role of Media”  
5-6 October 2016, Kyiv, Ukraine**

Media Partners



KYIV-2017

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This publication offers the proceedings of the Conference IV “Security Sector Governance: The Role of Media”. Following to the previous conferences findings and recommendations, the forth multi-stakeholder conference was to examine current Ukraine’s security sector governance challenges by highlighting the role of media and the international best practices. This conference aimed to examine the role played by the news media in governance and oversight of the security sector – the area of public policy concerned with the security of an individual, community and state.

This publication offers presentations by key speakers and selected remarks during Q&A sessions as well as the summaries of the working groups’ discussions.

General assessments, conclusions and proposals are those of the participants and do not necessarily coincide with the positions of DCAF, the Razumkov Centre or the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

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# INTRODUCTION

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The “Monitoring Ukraine’s Security Governance Challenges” Project funded by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and implemented jointly by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Razumkov Centre, to which this publication owes its existence, aims at raising public awareness and wide discussion and communication on democratic oversight and good practices in the management of the security sector of Ukraine.

The Project’s objective is to facilitate public discourse and public access to Ukrainian and international best practices in security governance while making pertinent information in both the Ukrainian and English languages available in printed publications, via dedicated website [www.ukrainesecuritysector.com](http://www.ukrainesecuritysector.com), and through mass media coverage of public events. Two opinion polls were designed to establish whether and to what degree democratic governance of the security sector is understood, and implemented.

This event is unique because journalists have been invited to be not just reporters but rather active participants. The objective here was not lecturing but doing things together as well as formulating recommendations based on our joint assessments, our collective experience and knowledge.

In a mature democracy the four powers i.e. executive, legislative, judicial and media work together. It is important to bring together all the stakeholders of security sector reform, to hear each other out. Group ego-centrism, tribal thinking is not going to work. Laws, capacity-building, free media, well-defined freedom of expression are needed to define the boundaries. There was a proposal to develop a memorandum of understanding or code of conduct to transfer the relationship between the media and security sector into a real partnership.

Media and press play a key role. In this quickly changing world it seems that social media is missing. A wholesome approach is required. As was mentioned above, a security sector reform website was launched. This has been done to ensure transparency and make the international experiences and lessons learned available to everyone. There is a need to have the Ukrainian experience documented and need to know good practice. One problem, in the past, was that there were too many websites. Stakeholders can refer to this newly created website as a one-stop-shop, since it offers information on the existing legislation, what is important, what has been done well, and, what has gone wrong.

The level of access to information, legislation and good practice has been improved by this website. It is there to be used by the general population and professionals alike. 260 hacking attempts in the first two weeks of its existence indirectly demonstrate the value of this website. The best practices and recommendations are available for viewing and will not disappear regardless of what gets done or not.

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The Forth International Conference “Security Sector Governance: The Role of Media”, the proceedings of which can be found in this volume, sought to examine current Ukraine’s security sector governance challenges by highlighting the role of media and international best practices. This conference aimed to discuss the role played by the news media in governance and oversight of the ‘security sector’ – the area of public policy concerned with security of an individual, community and state.

Carefully selected speakers and topics allowed to cover a comprehensive degree of SSR issues and represent different points of view by Ukrainian and foreign officials, journalists, media and security experts, scholars and civil society activists.

*Dr. Philipp H. FLURI,  
Head, Eastern Europe,  
South Caucasus,  
Central Asia Division, DCAF*

*Oleksiy MELNYK,  
Co-Director,  
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Security Programmes, Razumkov Centre*

# SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN UKRAINE: THE ROLE OF MEDIA

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## KEY MESSAGES AND OUTCOMES

Cooperation in the promotion of security sector reform in Ukraine between DCAF (Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces), the Razumkov Center and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands resulted in two-day high-level roundtable discussions and workshops in Kyiv. Interactions focused on the relationship between mass media and the security sector. Fruitful insights and key messages are summarized below with the goal of facilitating the development of an effective relationship between the security sector and mass media which is aimed at promoting peace and democracy.

This particular security sector reform meeting was unique because journalists were invited to be active participants. The dialogue carried a multi-dimensional, multi-levelled character which touched upon national and international questions of security as it pertains to hybrid information warfare, particularly in Ukraine.

In mature democracies, channels of communication are established between the four pillars of power i.e. the executive, legislative, judicial and the media. Engagement between the security sector and representatives of the media is a crucial foundation for the guarantee and protection of human rights and freedoms. The realization of freedom and peace requires professional cooperation and verification between the security sector and mass media; as a renowned speaker noted, “It is important to bring all stakeholders of SSR together to hear them out; group ego-centrism and tribal thinking isn’t going to work.”

The word “truth” was referred to most frequently, followed by “trust”. “Truth” and “trust” are of utmost importance as they lay the foundation for effective cross-sectoral, domestic and international strategic communication and cooperation. In reference to the current relationship between the security sector and mass media in Ukraine, a participant from the security sector noted, “The level of trust is reflected in the results.” Whereas the result of this cooperation remain wanting, the information and commentary stemming from the discussion provided below provide solid building blocks for Ukraine’s democratic future.

In a time of global hybrid warfare (which targets trust through the denial of the role/notion of truth), the onus lies heaviest on communicators; particularly, professional journalists from within the mass media and the messages coming



from those working to protect national security. In this case, trust between the mass media, security services and general public can be built by reporting on facts; describing reality.

Trust between agents of the state and professional journalists must be developed and nurtured. To this end, it is necessary to identify, understand and respect boundaries. As one visiting speaker noted, "That pertains to calling a spade a spade, a journalist a journalist, a press officer a press officer, an agent an agent, a lunatic a lunatic."

Fact-based reporting is the professional journalist's key instrument and responsibility. Whereas journalism ought not be politicized, even in times of war, a balance can be created with objective contextualization.

Interstices between the inherent right of a state to defend itself against threats to its national security stemming from targeted informational war, and, the freedom of the press, right to expression and access to information served as the main focus point of what was – at times – an epistemological discussion. The need to develop laws, guidelines and frameworks, build capacity, free media, clear definitions and boundaries was recognized.

Effective strategic communications from the security sector depend on: a) identifying the set goal; b) the knowledge of how to create effective messaging to attain the identified goal, and; c) which information can and should be shared with the media or made public. Strategic Communications did not exist in Ukraine before 2014. As a result, "Each agency speaks its own language and there is a lack of informational coordination." Information sharing between ministries, executive, legislative and judiciary must be enabled and enforced.

Hybrid warfare defence requires clearly defined terms, frameworks and codes of conduct. The identification of facts and development of common terminology allows for the promotion of effective cooperation, despite the disparities between the defence sector and mass media, i.e. the need for secrecy, clear philosophy and hierarchy, command/control lines, over-regulation vs. media timeliness, openness, ratings, and readership/viewership. To further relieve problems caused by the disparities between the mass media and security sector it has been suggested that the power ministries must train personnel – from the very beginning – about the importance of strategic communications and their relationship with mass media.

In Ukraine, the social contract remains unrealized and the population is weary of power structures, both, administrative and legislative on the one hand, and of media structures owned and used by oligarchs for their own strategic purposes on the other. The mistrust of power can be partially relieved through the development of professional, independent media sources.

Understanding, trust, and cooperation between the security sector and mass media could be improved through the development of a unified professional journalist

association. This need is inferred from the statements made by two speakers. Whereas a member of parliament claimed, “I do not know what to say about the role of parliament in relations with mass media. To have an effective role, we need to have a clear demand from society.” A government advisor noted, “There are no associations of journalists, no platform to raise ethical standards, no platform to protect, to form truly professional journalists.”

Professional journalists, associations and groups need to be formed and trained. One parliamentarian stated, “It is for the media to demand it”. Members of the mass media were encouraged to unite and “demand” professional training for cooperation with the security sector.

Whereas the *lack of professional media unions and cooperation* complicates the adoption and implementation of legislation which promotes and protects media rights and freedoms, stove-piping and a *lack of transparency within government structures* complicate the development of coherent strategic communication, particularly within the security sector. The development of a MOU or code of conduct between the security sector and the mass media would help transform the relationship into a real, professional partnership.

When developing frameworks of cooperation and guidelines more attention must be paid to existing national and international legal infrastructures. These infrastructures include The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms (particularly articles 10 & 19), The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (particularly art. 10), the 1971 Munich Declaration of the Duties and Rights of Journalists (Munich Charter) and the Sofia Declaration on Media and Press Pluralism (1997). The UK Green Book guide to UK Ministry of Defence procedure for working with the media could also serve as a reference.

The lingering post-Soviet, authoritarian culture of government institutions being closed and not transparent maintains the top-down approach to communication in Ukraine. Empowerment of government officials to speak/comment to the media is still lacking. An example was given that many mandated civil servants fear speaking/commenting to the press when the responsible minister is unavailable for comment. This communication vertical could be alleviated by promoting transparency and communication between officials and their subordinate institutions and actors. “Social media has improved communication on some level – government officials are starting to understand liaising with mass media is a part of their job.”

Social media networks were also identified as an instrument of hybrid information warfare. The suggestion was made that accounts deemed to be promoting hate and distrust should be blocked (albeit with or without cooperation with the likes of Twitter and Facebook).

Ukraine is having difficulties protecting its communication space both inside and outside its occupied territories. These problems are closely, if not directly, related to

access and technical issues such as radio frequencies, radio towers. The perception by western democracies that, by protecting its information space, Ukraine violates democratic values and principles through censorship is also disconcerting.

Access to frequencies is hampered by both technical matters and bureaucracy; “tons of red tape.” Thus, access to and provision of information to citizens in or near the conflict lines remains limited. Much of the competency/responsibility lays with National Council of Radio Frequency. The strategic territory of Mariupol was used as an example with no radio frequency available for the MoD FM radio (due to unclear reasons). An additional 10 cities applied for Army radio but were formally denied due to a lack of frequency space.

Censorship and self-censorship were mentioned as solutions to issues which may arise between the security sector and mass media, particularly as it relates to covering war and conflict situations.

Self-censorship was propagated by a number of participants who stressed that professional journalists know what information must be kept secret and when it should be exposed. Whereas this level of professionalism can be achieved through training, enhanced cooperation/communication between representatives of the mass media and security services (as provided further below), the risk of self-censorship out of fear was identified as a serious matter, particularly in light of “directives” and the recent killing of the journalist Pavel Sheremeta.

As with censorship and self-censorship, a fine line exists between whistleblowing and treason. “If done responsibly, journalists shouldn’t be in court for exposing information they should not have had and shared”. It was asserted that in Ukraine, journalistic independence, critical thinking and verification skills are lacking. The development of journalist institutions and frameworks of conduct would aid matters in this regard.

Due to the fine line existing between rights and freedoms related to mass media and the incitement to hate and war crimes, there is a need for the development of a clearer understanding of the role of the media in (striving) democracies in which violent conflict is taking place. Furthermore, there is a need for the development of a framework of propaganda analysis, particularly propaganda which targets national security, through the promotion of discord and hate. In this regard, a methodological system for analysis is needed, which will show how the state’s national security is targeted systematically and in a widespread manner to provide justification for acts of censorship, which may otherwise be perceived as limitations of the aforementioned democratic rights and freedoms.

Operating in an environment with opaque transparency and a weak rule of law creates a lacuna of trust and cooperation, particularly for professional journalists working in (or with a desire to work in) Ukraine’s non-government controlled areas (NGCA).

Information sharing and cooperation can partially be improved by providing improved access to NGCA journalists. The armed forces need to generate own, credible content, sharing of videos and photos.

There is a need for Ukraine to develop coordinated messaging in regard to the war in the east as well as the Minsk agreement. The lack of coordinated effort, messaging and awareness-raising across government agencies results in a lack of clear understanding of the situation both inside Ukraine and externally. An example was given in which a Swedish Embassy information request to Ukraine on the Minsk negotiations resulted in the Ukrainian side providing less information to the Swedes than Germany or France.

The term “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) has been identified as a stumbling block to effective communication on both the national and international levels. The term is difficult to explain and causes mistrust, confusion and disinterest.

There is a need for systematic analysis and monitoring of events in the conflict area, what is being done to prevent the conflict, and the creation of effective messages to be shared with both domestic and external audiences. The lack of clarity, cooperation and understanding leads to more mistrust and instability between the security sector press services, mass media and general populations.

Trust can be built by targeted training for both members of the security sector and mass media. The need for training not only pertains to the development/rearing of professionals. It also extends to training on information sharing. Meetings (albeit closed) between representatives of the security sector and mass media help create a shared vision and understanding of the goal. An example of such a meeting was an event organized by former Head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) Valentyn Nalyvaichenko with journalists meeting before Slavyansk/Kramatorsk were liberated.

A call was made for the need of strategic communication to be included in the curricula of academies of the power ministries – as well as – civilian universities. Political discourse analysis and strategic communication must be professionalized through access to education and by providing effective examples of how mass media functions to ensure democratic oversight, what transparency is meant to be and how institutions work in an environment that is not corrupt.

Whereas Ukraine has been at the forefront of Russia’s informational hybrid warfare, despite the conflict and structural weaknesses, Ukrainian experts are available to train and cooperate with other democratic states in developing frameworks of analysis and understanding of how this element of hybrid warfare targets national security. One speaker noted; “Ukrainians have become experts in Russia’s hybrid warfare, particularly as it pertains to information warfare. Great Britain and France, most likely, will become trail blazers.”

## **Conclusions and recommendations following the conference discussions:**

1) A multi-level approach is needed which addresses strategic communications between the security sector and mass media on both the national and international levels. Particularly:

- a. Between citizens living in both governments controlled and non-government controlled areas (GCA & NGCA' respectively).
- b. Between the population and the authorities.
- c. Between local and foreign journalists, foreign media outlets and governments.

2) A code of conduct is needed which balances transparency and accountability between the security sector and mass media.

3) A framework of analysis is needed through which informational threats to national security are methodologically organized and evidenced. This would facilitate the defence of the state's communication space within the limits of democratic values and principles. i.e., the inherent right of a state to defend itself against threats to its national security stemming from informational warfare on the one hand, and the freedoms of expression, mass media and the right to information on the other.

4) It is necessary to develop a framework/code of conduct for media operating in a democratic state with an on-going armed conflict within its territory.

5) Codes of conduct and frameworks of analysis must be developed based upon existing national and international legislation, including the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, European Convention, Sofia Convention and Munich Charter.

6) The level of trust towards press secretaries and spokespersons from state institutions is low and can be raised through training and employing high-ranking professionals i.e. commanders who visibly have an understanding of the situation being reported.

7) Terminology, particularly in hybrid war must be well defined, understood and communicated.

8) Journalists are not state agents nor press secretaries. Professional journalists should have the right to access and cover both GCA and NGCA's without being embedded or converted into agents of the state.

9) Special training and information meetings (albeit closed) are needed between the state authorities and members of the media. Strategy, tactics and situation must be briefed to build trust between media and the state.

10) Journalism is about informing the public – there is a need to increase professionalism by incorporating strategic communications into curricula of post-secondary educational institutions.

11) Social Media sites require monitoring and when accounts are found to target the national security of the state, they may be considered for blocking. There is potential room here for state cooperation with Facebook, Twitter, etc.

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# OPENING REMARKS

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## **Philipp FLURI, Head, Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, Central Asia Division, DCAF**

What we would like to do is outline the role of media oversight in the reform of the security sector. The status of the role between media and security and defence agencies in Ukraine, in the current framework of broad challenges facing Ukraine's security governance, is of great importance. We will try to identify shared approaches and differences regarding media objectives and priority issues across the entire security sector.

It is worth reiterating the role of media in security sector oversight in democracies. Mass media is meant to play a key element and role in democracies; shaping public debate in policies and decision-making. Where else would citizens, voters, tax payers hear how their institutions are meant to function? The public needs to know what democratic oversight is, what transparency is meant to be, how institutions work in an environment that is not corrupt. Where else would they hear about it or learn about it, if not from you? The media is a tool for informing and educating the public, not only informing, but educating; explaining what is happening in the light of good practice, not just sharing information. That is an important part, but it goes beyond that and into educating the public. It is therefore not unexpected, that the relationship between the media and policy makers is often complicated.

No-one likes to be criticized, no one likes to be criticized in public, and no one likes to be told that they do not understand what they are talking about. And, yet, that is the role of the media, so, the media needs to rely, on the one hand, on information that is shared with them officially, that is one reason why there is a need for a strategic communications policy; not only a policy which is on paper, but a strategic communication policy that actually works and is professionally handled. Yet, to have that is not enough, there is a need to have a law and/or a policy. To have that, you need to have professionals, and enforce the sharing of communication amongst the various agencies and ministries; the executive, administrative and judiciary. This makes strategic communications possible.

Strategic communication does not happen "in itself". It needs to be planned, enabled – in law and in policies, and, it needs to be enforced. Otherwise, if one just waits, like the farmer waits for rain, then, it will not happen and it may not happen for years. It needs to be planned. Professionals need to be trained, they need to be enabled and empowered. The lines of communication need to be defined. It is like freedom; freedom is never given; freedom is always taken. So, you need to organize that, it is for the authorities to organize strategic communications policy, but it is for the media to demand it.

Media work in a context of tensions is complicated, because what you need is not always given, it needs to be taken. This is especially true in relations with the

security sector. The security sector has traditionally been a sector in which secrecy reigned. It is a sector in which the sharing of information was always problematic, even within the power structures. To enable strategic communication, professionals need to be trained, they need to be enabled to access and share information.

Importantly, there is a need to know which information can be shared with and by the media. This is no longer the Soviet Union. These are also not the “happy years” of post-Sovietism. If this is to be a new society and a new beginning, there is a need to know which information can be shared publically. If media specialists are professionals and know what can be shared, they will not end up in a court for sharing information they should not have shared – or had – in the first place.

Recently, a security sector reform website was launched. This has been done to create transparency and make the international experiences and lessons learned available to everyone. There is a need to have the Ukrainian experience documented and need to know good practice. One problem, in the past, was that there were too many websites. Stakeholders can refer to this newly created website as a one-stop-shop, since it offers information on the existing legislation, what is important, what has been done well, and, what has gone wrong.

The level of access to information, legislation and good practice is improved by this new website. It is there to be used by the general population and professionals alike. The value of this website could be indirectly indicated by the fact that there were 260 hacking attempts in the first two weeks. The best practices and recommendations are available for viewing and will not disappear regardless of what gets done or not.

What we need to look into is the role of the relationships between the main security providers, not only cooperation with the authorities, but, the obstacles. This work, when it comes to reporting on the security sector and educating the public on the security sector, does not take place in a void. The role of the media has been regulated in the Sophia Convention (1997). The role of the media is addressed in the light of experiences gained in the 90's with the fall of the Soviet Union and the Balkans. It is not by chance that the convention was signed in Sofia.

Media, in times of troubles can be a device in the hands of totalitarian interests, as is well known, however, it can have a positive influence. At the end of the Cold War, the vacuum of information policies was filled by the media; not in every country, but in many countries which are now democracies. Media can be a facilitator of positive social change. By holding the authorities responsible, by bringing out information, by contextualizing it, by making it useful for the national context. This is why journalism training is important.

Media can also work as a mediator – as the word suggests – by mediating, correcting misconceptions about the intentions of international organizations, for example. Media can help in educating the public and contributing to a better understanding of a situation.

# SESSION I. SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE: MEDIA OVERSIGHT AND FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION



This session outlined the role of media oversight of the security sector, status of relations between media and security and defence agencies in Ukraine in a current framework of broad challenges facing Ukraine's security governance. The session aimed to identify shared approaches and differences regarding the media objectives and priority issues across the whole spectrum of the security sector.

*Chair: Philipp FLURI, Head, Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, Central Asia Division, DCAF*

## Speakers:

- Serhiy VYSOTSKYI, Deputy Chair, Verkhovna Rada Committee of Freedom of Speech and Information Policy
- Vilyen PIDHORNYI, Presidential Administration Adviser on Strategic Communications in Power Structures
- Alina FROLOVA, Adviser to Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine



# ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN FACILITATING MEDIA AND SECURITY SECTOR COOPERATION

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**Serhiy VYSOTSKYI, Deputy Chair, Verkhovna Rada  
Committee of Freedom of Speech and Information Policy**

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Looking at the role of mass media in other war situations, the media came under complete control of the state. A comparison can be drawn to Israeli policy. As to the role of the parliament – I do not know what to say on this matter because the Verkhovna Rada represents the interests of the people. In order to obtain an effective policy in the sector, there must be a well formulated request or a consolidated consensus from the nation in regard to the situation of the war and external aggression.

Unfortunately, we see that there is a section of Ukrainian society which does not consider there to be an on-going war in Ukraine or Russian aggression. A section still lives in the Soviet Union, and, there is a part of the elite which serves and believes Ukraine should surrender to the Russian aggressor.

When one considers the role of the mass media in all world wars, we see that the mass media came under full control of the state; particularly when its national security or survival was at threat. This is particularly well-exemplified by the role of the British, or the policy of wartime censorship in Israel – which is supported by a full societal consensus. Because, the Israeli society understands that if the state will not be in control of military news, national security and defence will be at risk. They understand that if mass media is not regulated, a rocket will fall on their heads. Every Israeli understands this.

I am not so busy with information policy or communications legislation; we are doing a lot in the committee in regard to liberalization; the law on public broadcasting has been accepted. We are doing a lot to deal with aggressive content.

In the security and defence sphere there is a lot of manipulation by journalists – I am not even sure that the journalists realize the ramification of some of their work. There have been instances where journalists, may very well have been working in the belief they are acting in the best interest of a given warrior or situation but then it turns out that they were actually giving effect to Russian political policy operations. These consequences comes from the lack of understanding from journalists that we are operating in very sensitive situations where journalists should if not (at least) trust state organs fully, they should – at the very least – try to cooperate with them at some level. This is natural in other states.

Before the Ukrainian Parliament and the Ministry of Information Policy can move effectively, a consensus is needed. Before we are able to codify the relationship between the security sector and media, we need to have a consensus in Ukraine’s society and mass media on what “responsibility” is. I see a deficit of responsibility here. There is responsibility which is connected to the understanding of the threats facing the state today. There is a lack of understanding that, at times, aggressive states abuse journalists, or compromise them. Thereby, they negatively influence the national security of the state. This needs to be regulated and laws need to be created which will protect the military on the one hand and the journalists on the other.



# MEDIA AND SECURITY SECTOR RELATIONS IN UKRAINE

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**Vilyen PIDHORNYYI, Presidential Administration Adviser  
on Strategic Communications in Power Structures**

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When considering the relationship between the security sector and mass media it is clear that on the one hand we have the state, on the other, the media. First, it is necessary to consider the things which unite us, and then to consider the disparities. There is a need to find solutions to the friction between the two.

What unites us are common values. We all support the freedom of speech (which is guaranteed by the constitution) and, considering the fact we are not in an official state of war, the freedom of speech is not limited. We are sincerely interested in the truth. Authentic media raises the level of trust in the society. We are interested in the true exposure of events in Eastern Ukraine. This facilitates the fight against Russian propaganda and lies. It is necessary to understand that Ukrainian society and media are equally interested in the success of Ukraine. There are many loyal friends and allies also interested in Ukraine's success. Thus it is the disparity between the two that requires attention.

In the midst of an armed conflict, the state and the media, have somewhat differing interests. Whereas mass media is interested in raising ratings, in expanding readership/viewership, the state is interested in the national interest and should take care of military secrets. Very often conditions are such that it is not possible to show or explain everything to the media. Possibly, because of this, some moments of friction arise. In as much as live battles are continuing to take place, the front continues to interest and attract the media. Journalists go there, they want to describe the realities of life, communicate with servicemen, ask how they live, how they are

clothed, and this is totally understandable. They want to teach Ukrainians and the international society about what is happening there. They want to explain the war as it is, and the power sector understands this. However, there are different motives here, they could be raising ratings or let's say, the creation of feelings of empathy and even fear and hysteria.

When speaking of the media, it must be stressed that the freedom of speech and independent media are key elements of democratic society. The power sectors are fully conscious of this. Journalists give information and offer the chance to be heard by all sides. They accept the discussion of various themes and importantly, they have a right and should evaluate state actors. In principle, journalism is a channel of communication within society which not only educates and spreads information, it facilitates the exchange of information between society and its leadership. This must not be ignored; it needs to be utilized.

It is important to note that journalists are not sociologists or historians; they are more interested in some details rather than the big picture. The goal is understood – to find a topic that is unusual to get attention. Often, they are assigned to make news out of a little interest story. At times these stories result in a nice headline. However, very often, the context is lost among the details and attention must be paid to this.

Our work aims to inform Ukrainian and Western audiences as to the situation in the East and Crimea, and we do this by way of the national voice or envoys. In virtually every power institution there is a cadre of envoys which give interviews, and attend briefings. The Ministry of Defence and General Staff, Military Intelligence and National Guard, the Ministry of Interior and SBU all do. We also deal with crisis management and engage (in various formats) the cooperation between states and those working in the communications sector and mass media. The thing is, we are not military, and, we are able to understand both sides and where they are coming from. This allows us to properly bring information to the journalist or government official. Following are some thoughts in regard to bringing specific information to light, or, partaking in conferences/events. There are a number of problems, but we have selected the main three:

*a) Lack of coordination of information policy among various branches.*

Oftentimes, (better nowadays) there is a feeling that a complete picture of events is missing. This is noteworthy, for example, one representative of the Swedish embassy in Ukraine turned to us and noted that he was able to receive more information regarding the Minsk negotiations from the French and German embassies than from the Ukrainian side. This is a problem. Apart from that, every branch of the security sector has its own view on one or another issue. This problem is made worse when numerous branches are involved in a single/specific matter. Journalists must understand that every branch speaks its own language. For example, the policing branch speaks the language of jurisprudence – statutes of the criminal codex; the military branch speaks the language of statutes – this is the language of special operations handbooks. This must be taken into consideration

to understand and inform on a specific situation. Earlier, the security sector did not speak at all, now we are speaking in accessible language. This, in itself, is a sign of progress.

Thus, to resolve this issue, it is necessary to expand horizontal ties between branches. There is a need for consecutive professional training sessions of the cadres. And, to constantly conduct professional analyses of the situation. Without this, it is impossible.

What we have in mind when speaking of horizontal ties, very often within the power structures, it is necessary to get all the way to the top echelons to get some sort of permissions/agreements to make a statement. This takes time and lowers effectiveness.

We have academic and sociological research centres. We consider that it would be very helpful for everyone if more methodological materials were to appear which would be able to explain in an accessible fashion what it is, exactly that is taking place in the East. How do we name our enemy? What does success look like after all of this for Ukraine? What is it that Ukraine is striving to achieve? What – from our point of view – are the Minsk Agreements?

*b) The lack of understanding of the details and what they mean to/for the internal and external audiences.*

There is a huge difference between the internal and external auditorium. For example, we have two messages which are constantly competing with one another, that is (1) Ukraine has a serious army, which is able to stand for itself, and; (2) We are a victim.

Another example is the use of the word “terrorist”. This term has a totally different meaning to the Western audience than to the national one. Then, explaining the term “ATO (Anti-terrorist Operation). This term causes serious problems, and, when someone as a part of an official delegation, is not aware of how to explain it abroad it weakens the position. Very often they cannot explain what the ATO is and why it is needed.

In regard to thematics, abroad, people are not very interested in the ins-and-outs of military actions. However, we do constantly face the question “What is Ukraine doing to stop this war?” So, from the one side we have (on the national level) continuous requests for information about what is happening on the front and why. And, from the Western audiences, these details are less interesting, they want to know what are we really doing with the ATO to get out of the situation. And, again, it all has to do with the manner in which we present our military; are we victims or a strong force, which is defending Ukraine and the European region?

Militarism frightens very many people in the West, and this repels them from us. How can we get out of this situation? A systemic monitoring/analysis of foreign information environment could offer some resolve. This small analytical service that could say which current themes are hot, and, consistently work with foreign journalists; explaining the point of view.

The development of a specific dictionary at first in the military/security sectors is one solution. It is necessary for listeners, journalists and representatives of the sector to be speaking one language. It is necessary to explain what the terms mean and why they are being used.

Constant training and interaction with foreign colleagues is clearly needed.

*c) The problem of closed state institutions and actors.*

Sometimes people simply do not wish to share information because of the centralized system of authority. Many decisions on the horizontal level must be approved by the highest director. This is problematic. If the director is away on a mission or is otherwise not available, or not aware of the situation, the communicators very often simply avoid the situation and avoid saying anything to the press because the message or answer was not approved.

This can be resolved through constant work with the authorities. Today, the changes are partially taking place naturally; we are experiencing a change of the political class; new people are coming in. These people have new values and understandings, for example, try to imagine that 5-7 years ago the director of the general staff would be Facebooking or Twittering. Today, we have this, Twitter and Facebook are constantly being updated.

Today, already, very serious progress has been attained because there is a clear understanding among civil servants that communications is a vital part of their work. Representatives of the defence and security sectors should pay attention to the fact that if they are being asked for commentary and you do not give it, the media will take comment regardless. However, it is highly likely that the commentary will be given by a much less qualified person. That is why it is important not to pass up the chance to give comment to explain your point of view or the view of your department.

Probably, the most important point is that the divergences between the state and mass media must be considered. There is the divergence in philosophy, take the mass media for example. This is openness, initiative, and operability. On the defence and security side, particularly during military times, war times, these are strict hierarchy, subordination, regulations. The understanding itself of the fact that despite differing philosophies we must work together, to better inform society is a challenging one. What is necessary for the armed forces? The armed forces require support from society, and this support is obtained through regular and true information about what is going on over there. The mass media only serve here as a mediator. It must be stressed that many countries have problems between the defence sector and mass media. Yet, we are the ones who should find a balance to get out of this situation, particularly in light of the war going on in the East. Considering the needs and expectations of our society, we must be more effective in our work.

## ROLE OF MEDIA IN SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE

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**Alina FROLOVA, Adviser to Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine**

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First, the question of the role of mass media in relation to the security of citizens and the state is more complicated than the relationship between the security sector and the media. Ukraine has inherited a system where, only now, we are starting to build a communications structure and a culture of transparency. We have also inherited a mass media which lacks a culture of thinking about the good of the country and responsibility. We are all aware of the type of world we used to live in here; a world where the state was separated from the people and was not interested in the nation. That is why media outlets who were interested in the national good and its people had a different approach to resolving/revealing problems. Thus, it is natural that both the state and media are trying to transform. We see this transformation reflected, in particular in the drastically dropping level of trust expressed by society to the media.

Oftentimes we talk about the mass media as one of the pillars of the state, but, today it seems to be that the feeling of power is really missing inside the mass media. This power relates to the belief that one can influence the situation, improve it, and carry professional responsibility in this regard. This feeling of power is lacking because the media often requires justification/accountability from the state authorities but is not prepared to be accountable for its own actions. This is not a tragedy; rather, this is an opportunity to build a prime model.

We tell our foreign partners that as soon as our army will have the proper support, protection and arms, it will be the best army in the world because we are the only country in the world with direct/constant battle experience. We also say our media could become a benchmark example to the world of how a system of self-regulation can be created. We are in a unique situation, whereas two years ago there was complete desperation within the state and its institutions. This, in essence, brought about a sort of positive “Makhnovism”.

A very large system of self-regulation plugged on in civil society, and in many cases inside state organs as well. The same mechanism started inside the media. The way it worked during the Maidan was impressive. It is then, where it became apparent that society understood what media should look and work like.

The feeling of urgency has likely dropped in the past couple of years probably because – although we are living in an environment of continuing war – it is not possible for humans to live in a constant state of heightened emotion. Even professionals are unable to keep up with it, because it is not normal and should not be that way. This lowered sense of urgency is probably working to save the psyche of the people of our nation. At the same time, it lowered that apparent actuality of the situation within the media sphere. But, the actuality remains.

There is a lack of a system of self-regulation, there are no quality unions/organizations that unite journalists, organizations that would support and develop professional journalistic standards, but also support and protect journalists in potential conflicts arising from editorial policies. We have very few journalists who withstand the manipulative technologies. These are all problems which should be resolved by government institutions on the one hand, (the parliament and specialized ministry on the one hand). Proposing legislation and/or changes to it is a juridical problem. No single law will be able to foresee all the nuances. Media reform is such that the media can create its own architecture, new rules. They are able to produce this and propose it to other states. Other states are mentioned here because there is a very big hole in the international context. Everyone is talking about hybrid war and recognizes that Russia is (ab)using its resources for propaganda and influence. It attacks all sides. But, in the international legal sphere there is no legal understanding of what informational warfare or informational occupation is. This question is not being raised in Minsk, it is not on the parliamentary agenda, basic NATO documents do not foresee a common reaction to it. This is an unregulated sphere because the need had previously not arrived.

There are historical precedents where states recognized the threat of informational aggression. For example, in 1936 the League of Nations prohibited the use of radio resources for propaganda. The understanding that media can be abused was already present there. Now there is no understanding of how to combat it. We are currently not only on the physical front, but also on the front lines of the development of such rules. That is why the Ministry of Information Policy has spent a lot of time during the last year studying how mechanisms of self-regulation work in other countries; Great Britain, France; countries with the most similar governance models. However, we understand that we are going to become such a lawmaker within these new tendencies. This is very difficult because it is a very fine line between freedom of speech and the development of this new system.

Is there something like the right to “informational sovereignty” which deserves to be protected? Is there an understanding of something like “informational occupation”? Are we able to compare informational occupation or aggression to physical aggression? Nobody has the answers. We are probably going to have to be the ones to develop them. This is not going to be easy, the rules are probably not going to be ideal, but, it is unavoidable. And apart from the fact that we are going to be creating this here, we also need to bring these questions forth to the international arena.

Participating directly in the development of state organs, from the perspective of openness, transparency, cooperation with society, it is possible to say that the steps are enormous. The level of professionalism of the communicators in all power structures



is pleasing; many are thirsty for advancement/improvement. They are lacking many skills because they were never required from them. That is why the cooperation between these upcoming professional within state structures and mass media will stimulate further openness, transparency, cooperation. The media is invited to share its experience and lessons learned with state organs.

The media is also requested to try and not manipulate, particularly in regard to socially important matters. This is going to be difficult because we have grown accustomed to this sort of manipulation in the media sphere. Nevertheless, it is worth trying because the discussion is about the development of new rules. The change of culture/tradition is probably one of the most difficult things. That is why it will not occur in one or even two years.

I am very disturbed by the words spoken by the representative of the parliament in regard to censorship. The word itself is frightening and I will do everything I can to ensure the only kind of censorship will be self-censorship. As bygone times show, Ukrainian journalists have proven themselves to be proficient at self-censorship. Whereas in the past it was perhaps more related to not criticizing the authorities, today it pertains more, perhaps, to the manners in which certain events are unfolding. There is a lack of knowledge of how to select facts, how to think critically. These are things we were never taught in schools or in higher education. This reality can be felt everywhere, with journalists, civil society. These are traits which need to be developed from all sides.

There is a very interesting graphic which was presented in the social poll conducted by Razumkov Centre here on how society views civil-democratic control over power structures. This is very important data because we see that within our society, even professionals do not fully understand the notion of democratic control or armed forces. This information shows us that the majority of Ukrainians believe that civil control must be conducted by the president of Ukraine – this speaks volumes. Mass media comes in at 5<sup>th</sup> or 6<sup>th</sup> place with only 5%. This is a dangerous situation because citizens do not understand the role of the mass media in relation to civil control. This is a double-edged situation because the media controls itself and then it exercises control over citizens and power structures. This is important because currently, we are operating in a theatre with no clear rules of engagement. The way these rules are going to look and the role they are going to play in the future very much depends on the media today. It is unlikely that in the coming years parliament will be able to fulfil the role of democratic control. The role of the media in this regard will be key in the coming years.

It is necessary for us to be less categorical towards one another. To see the people we coexist with, communicate with, and work with as humans who may hold a different position, use different terminology, possibly a different language. But, it seems that we have proven to the international community that our nation has a right to exist. It is not necessary for us to be proving it to ourselves or proving who is the bigger patriot. We are all doing tremendous work and it is possible we ourselves do not realize how big it is. There is a need for more communication, informal and helpful cooperation.

## SESSION II. MEDIA OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY SECTOR: PROGRESS MADE AND PROBLEMS REMAINING



The objectives of the session were: to identify key achievements and problems remaining in the media oversight of security sector in Ukraine; to share the best national and international practices, and to identify a set of practical recommendations how to facilitate the journalists' work, strengthen relations between the media and the security sector institutions. A distinctive matter to elaborate was how to reach a balance between specific requirements for confidentiality and universal issues of freedom of press and information.

***Moderator:** Mykola SUNGUROVSKYI, Director of Military Programmes, Razumkov Centre*

### **Speakers:**

- Volodymyr POLEVYI, Strategic Communications Expert
- Vadym SKIBITSKYI, Defence Intelligence Department, MOD Ukraine
- Oleksandr KLUBAN, Professor, Military Journalism Chair, Kyiv State University

# MEDIA COVERAGE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF CONFLICT IN DONBAS

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**Volodymyr POLEVYI,**  
**Strategic Communications Expert**

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This is the third year we are looking for answers to the question of how to resist Russian propaganda. If one were to lay out this global problem into smaller components a number of other questions without answers arises:

- Is the ATO zone a unique region requiring special approaches to broadcasting (territory with a special broadcasting regime)?
- Which instruments should Ukraine use for broadcasting within the ATO zone (propagandistic or those based on democratic values of freedom of speech? If both, then how should they be combined)?
- Is the current mass media prepared for self-censorship, or is the establishment of strict rules regulating what is and is not permitted needed?
- Who and which resources will ensure the production of informational materials?
- What are the distribution channels for the developed products?

My expert view is that:

- The ATO zone is a territory under the influence of Russia's information space and requires a special broadcasting regime. This includes a ban on the broadcasting of Russian propaganda, an emphasis on strategic communications of Ukraine's central, local and military authorities, and, prompt coverage of local hot topics": the shelling, working hospitals and schools;
- Ukraine should stand firm on democratic broadcasting standards, but with clearly outlined limitations of free speech within the ATO zone i.e. what is the secret? What are the procedures for checking collected content? How to deal with the media representatives of the aggressor? etc.

- Clear limitations and open communication explaining the limitations should be provided for in a clearly defined framework for journalists operating in the ATO zone. It should be borne in mind that Western journalists and Russian propagandists have no motivation to self-censorship.
- The state must continue to make concerted efforts to block the broadcasting of the aggressor state.
- The state has resources and experts within the Ministries of Defence and Information Policy (plus potentially the State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting). The development of “democratic broadcasting” in the format of regional public broadcasters;

Television and radio are the main channels for transmitting information to those in the area designated for the special broadcasting regime. Particular attention should be paid to:

- points of contact with internally displaced persons (social security departments);
- checkpoints;
- trade and logistics centres;
- places providing administrative services (housing office, centres of administrative services, executive agencies).

Key Performance Indicators of Ukrainian information policy in the territories of special regime are:

- quality and quantity of Ukrainian content;
- delivery/accessibility of “Ukrainian” content channels;
- Russian propaganda channel availability.

In order to build trust and confidence toward the Ukrainian media, the user should have access to objective information and receive answers to the most actual/relevant questions. Local broadcasters should also be platforms for discussions with the opposition with the aim of finding solutions to the region’s pressing problems.

For the development of a pro-Ukrainian public opinion – patriot content should be made available. It is important for the user to have the possibility of choice between these approaches. The resolution of the first is to rely upon the regional public broadcaster, which is in the process of being developed (based on local television and radio committees and in accordance to the Law “On Public Television and Radio in Ukraine”). This process requires technological, organizational, personnel support. The second task should be to consider the possibilities of a fully functional military television and radio broadcasting inside the ATO zone. This military resource should have appropriate capacity, experience and human resources.

# CONFIDENTIALITY MEASURES AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

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**Vadym SKIBITSKYI, Defence Intelligence  
Department, Ministry of Defence, Ukraine**



The relations of the security sector and the media are very important, particularly in light of the exchange of information with the aim of victory in the informational sphere.

Legally, the requirements pertaining to confidentiality and the freedom of press are clearly codified by the law of Ukraine and Ministerial position papers. They clearly stipulate what is secret information, what is confidential. However, there is a war going on and what was created for peacetime very often does not work in the current situation.

Here, the focus will be on two aspects: openness of power structures, particularly intelligence organs of Ukraine during 2014-15, and, the type of information which is being passed to Ukraine's citizens, the international community, that what is going on is not a civil war but armed aggression by the Russian Federation against our state.

First, what does openness mean in the power structures, in the security sector? Starting in 2014 when the law of Ukraine was established to determine internal and external policies, the objective of our nation was clearly noted and the direction in which we are heading. After this, a number of legislative acts were passed, a row of strategic documents, in particular special and intelligence services. Firstly, this was the National Security Strategy, the War Doctrine, Concept Paper on the Development of the Defence Sector, and the Strategic Defence Bulletin. It is in these documents that the public can see the structure, mission, direction of reform, the development of power structures and intelligence organs. It is remarkable that here, one can see that one of the priorities for the development of military intelligence foresees possibilities of agents, a marked improvement of radio-electronic intelligence, development of strategic partnerships with foreign colleagues, acquisition of NATO standards and other questions which are brought to light in the aforementioned documents. This is open information; our citizens and mass media should be working to control these developments. A very

effective mechanism is parliamentary hearings. About three hearings took place last year, particularly in regard to the development of the intelligence sector. All this has been done in the past two years.

Now, let's consider the second point. The provision of information regarding Russian armed aggression and its activities in Crimea and the occupied territories. It is possible to summarize a little bit, the manner in which military intelligence was working during the past year. On 15 September 2015, a new project was launched and our website was totally renewed and an evidence-database was created to prove to the public that what is happening is war.

The assignments before the military intelligence have changed significantly. In accordance with the law, military intelligence was not assigned to operate inside its own territory. However, the occupation changed matters and the realm of our mission. Now, there is constant monitoring of open source information, social media because in today's world these are the most used forms of communication among people. We also use this information in pursuit of our goals. Next to this, another assignment was the creation of an evidence-data base. We are not an organ of the prosecutor's office; we are the military intelligence. We are collecting information on the weaponry being continuously delivered and used on the territory of Ukraine, on the cadres of Russian military servicemen partaking in the war on our territory. We work with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, turn to international agencies to provide the database. We understand that here, the principle of confidentiality comes into play because every bit of information is backed by a person or a source which provided it.

Our job as military intelligence – just like that of the General Staff – is to ensure that confidential information does not make it into the hands of our enemy. It is a fine line we are walking to prevent the deaths of our people, not to expose our plans, but simultaneously provide the public with the whole truth on the events taking place on our territory.

Various elements of mass media have started to work intensely. These include internet resources, television and radio. Together with the Presidential Administration we launched a weekly briefing in the Crisis Media Center in order to bring this information out. This is complicated because it requires firstly, the will of the commander, second, it should be a professionally prepared person capable of effectively providing the information the way that it is. Third is the level of trust of the public. The Ukrainian people feel what is the truth and what is not.

Our website had over 300,000 visitors up to this point of 2016. We carried out 22 weekly briefings, opened a Facebook page with over 5,000 subscribers, we gave over 2015 commentaries to national and international representatives of the media, prepared 16 analytical papers, held 116 meetings with press services. This is an achievement. We are working very closely with journalists and patriots and make it clear that the information we are sharing is unmissable. At this time, we are continuing to work without problems with the mass media. Regarding confidentiality of information – we openly stipulate what is an open and what is an operation-sensitive information and people understand.

# USE OF THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SPACE IN SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE

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**Oleksandr KLUBAN, Professor, Military  
Journalism Chair, Kyiv State University**



There are a number of hypothesis which must be considered to avoid misunderstanding between the state and media. In the current situation, the development of a strategy, use of public information resources, with the aim of realizing government responsibility and duties, the state, unfortunately cannot claim leadership or even competitiveness in effective informational policy. Particularly in the fields of security and defence which form the basis of the state. There is a need for well-developed, long-term communication policies.

Current officials are often seen using some short-term communication services. These services are limited by specific areas/topics and, as a rule, are connected to some personal interests. They should function professionally, upon a solid foundation, with the aim of realizing strategic decisions, which take into consideration best practices, and risk assessments. The assignments must be clearly understood in the context of current realities.

With this aim, it is necessary to correct, (re)educate those working in the information sphere. This includes professional monitoring which, once again, usually works in favour of a particular person, there needs to be a professional audit of public life. This way it will be possible to monitor the social processes and make recommendations for improvement and guarantee quality realization of duties and communication policies. There is a need to improve the manner in which already existing communication forms are used, regardless of the current situation. Effective information and communication must be secured for every institution within the security sector. Without effective communication it is impossible to count on the success of any operation.

Other countries like the USA and Great Britain regulate their military information policies in long-term strategic documents. In regard to Ukraine's armed forces, the use of media and communication has always been problematic. Directors of all levels, starting with the highest echelons and the planning of defence – unfortunately operations at both the tactical and strategic levels and daily development – rarely consider the demands of the developments of the informational sphere.

Furthermore, ignoring the necessity to employ modern communication instruments is dangerous. Partially responsible for this are long-developed Soviet stereotypes (which we are all aware of) which continue to drag us down. Then, there are some new reasons, both objective and subjective ones standing in the way. Despite the

development within Ukraine's defence structures – during the past two decades – of a multi-level communication support system securing the activities of the army and fleet, rarely had the support of the ruling echelons.

The necessity to employ these instruments is exacerbated and multiplied around the world as a result of the Russian experience these past few years, particularly as it pertains to its aggression against Ukraine and hybrid warfare; the basis of which is informational of a propagandist fashion. To successfully counter it requires prompt reaction which is possible only through the employment of new technologies, using all available strengths; not only in the security sector, but maximizing the mobilization of the whole society. This is exemplified by the rise and work of volunteer groups on social media. Civil engagement has been key in combating Russian engagement. However, the real success, systematically lies in clear strategy, employment of current arsenal of current scenarios and innovative decisions. It requires flexible governorship realized by a single centre of a clearly defined vertical. It requires professional realization of defence assignments. It requires relevant content, expertly organized cooperation of all levels of the informational system countering the aggressor. This is something we can only be dreaming of today. Unfortunately, this has not yet become a norm during the planning of various events (on all levels in the army).

Effective dialogue with society is complicated by the lack of working agreements or MOUs which exist in many other countries between the army as mass media; particularly when reporting on operations during a war. An example of this is a document called The Green Book in Great Britain which laid the ground work for cooperation between the media and armed forces after the Falkland wars 1982 when the army, the fleet of her Majesty won the war, but the media lost it. Following this, parliamentary hearings were held to create such a book. It contains well defined gentlemen's agreements which are followed by journalists and servicemen. Unfortunately, Ukraine does not have this.

Every so often we really do feel misunderstanding from the side of the journalists in the processes taking place in the army. Their incapacity to evaluate certain information, to make a correct prognosis of possible consequences of exposing information. These are matters of a lack of experience from so-called war correspondents or frontline photographers.

On the other hand, we have a low level of officials responsible for the work with mass media and this ruins relations with the media. Rather than reporting events operationally and with deep knowledge, these people either try to avoid contact with journalists or share outdated information; causing a disbalance of interest between the necessity to inform the public and abiding by existing demands required by military secrecy. This simply does not reflect the principles of a democracy which we started implementing in the army back in 1991.

These values and principles were included to the foundation of the development of the armed forces. Unfortunately, realizing positive change is very difficult here. It should be stressed that this problem is not exclusive to the Ministry of Defence and General Staff which is responsible for the state's information policy in the defence sector and sections under its jurisdiction. This should, firstly, be the responsibility of commanders and directors of sections of all levels.



There is a simple rule. If the army does not inform society in a timely fashion, then people find the necessary information themselves. Oftentimes, this information is held by the enemy. Turning to the press is simply unavoidable. Furthermore, principle matters shouldn't be presented by a regularly assigned press officer, who himself doesn't understand the value of what they are voicing. Rather, this should be done by directors of a higher level. Starting with the head of the general staff. In order to demonstrate to the public adequacy, competence, and foster trust with society. It is necessary to demonstrate to the public that one takes responsibility for one's decisions. And if it is necessary to gain support for a given decision it, well formulated argumentation is needed in this regard.

High-ranking commanders must be prepared to communicate with the mass media. Because, this is the core of the problem. Canada and Germany serve as examples with effective communications training in their armed forces. It is important to engage colleagues and partners in communications training.

Every Ukrainian officer should understand the place, role and importance of mass media, communications and societal support. All military schools and academies in Ukraine should train their students/cadets in army-media relations. So that they would all understand the value and meaning and value of the press because lieutenants become generals.

An important part of strategic communications is a constant audit of informational policies with follow-up analysis which could fine-tune decision making in regard to directions and particular projects of informational support. Informational Support Operations are important because this is where clear decisions are required from the Minister of Defence and the General Staff . In relation to the organization of informational support of the armed forces, which was standing on the grain of amateurism – are an important part of battles in this current war. This type of work must be brought to the frontlines. This is particularly important where problems begin to arise in regard to countering informational aggression. Often, the press officer of a brigade or battalion ends up alone with his problems, despite the fact that nowadays his role is critical to the proper functioning of the entire informational section of the armed forces. Informational support operations are a key element to any military operation.

Life does not stand still and the public develops according to its own rules and new tendencies. Priorities change. Informationally we see this with the development of local and regional media outlets. Slowly, step-by-step, localities are taking on informational responsibilities in regard to informational and content spheres. It is difficult to overestimate the role which these locals are taking upon themselves in securing content.

The local sphere is pivotal. Russia's hybrid war and aggression against Ukraine which has been squeezed into the term "ATO" exposed to the public many holes in information policy; on the front lines and operations. Local newspapers, radio and television need to be revived, for they provide an important informational hub which could also work with armed forces; particularly for the population living near the frontlines. Today, newspapers are not making it to their destination. Our soldiers do not have access to television or information to follow what is going on. This is a very important fact.

# WORKING GROUP I. MEDIA OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY SECTOR: PROGRESS MADE AND PROBLEMS REMAINING



The objective of the WG was to elaborate the key issues identified in the previous session, share the best national and international practices in order to develop a set of practical recommendations to facilitate the journalists' work, and strengthen relations between the media and the security sector institutions in Ukraine.

This theme is extremely important and often discussed in small circles. The time has probably now come to hold slightly more tangible discussions regarding the problems of cooperation between the security sector and mass media. Since the war, many new questions have arisen. Unfortunately, many of the problems have increased and concern a few fields; communication between journalists and giving light to the events taking place in the ATO zone; communication during peacetime – there certainly are very many problems here as a result of lack of understanding of each other's roles; how to establish the balance between the freedom of speech and security.

*Chair:* Diana DUTSYK, *Detector Media, Ukraine*

*Co-Chair:* Joris van BLADEL, Journalist, The Netherlands and Serhiy KARAZYL, Reuters, Ukraine

*Keynote speech:* Valeriy KOROL, Associate Professor, Military Journalism Chair, Kyiv State University

# **FEATURES OF MEDIA-SECURITY SECTOR COOPERATION IN COUNTERING INFORMATIONAL AGGRESSION: GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF HYBRID-MESSIANIC AGGRESSIONS**

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**Valeriy KOROL, Associate Professor,  
Military Journalism Chair, Kyiv State University**

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Governance challenges in the security sector of Ukraine we first perceive as a problem of understanding of processes and phenomena occurring in the information area of the country. Thus, first of all, I would like to highlight some features of the functioning of the current information space in the country. The flow of information has now reached such a level of intensity, consistency and globalization that it can now influence events directly, particularly in the defence sector, the state of public administration, national security and defence.

The quality characteristics of the public information space are directly coordinated with the state of public opinion which is a key influencer of content and communication, lobbying and direct pressure on both the executive and legislative branches, and, an effective instrument of global influence in international and diplomatic relations. This force is much more powerful when compared to the threat of direct military aggression. In this configuration, military action can be segmented and ineffective, thus is lowered to an effective simulation of reconciliation. This is currently exemplified in the actions of the aggressors in the Minsk talks. This scientific hypothesis is the subject of research scientists of the Military Institute of Kyiv National University. Particularly, we are interested in applied creative and technological theme hybridity because, in our view, the traditional interpretation within the

category of “hybrid warfare” is not only outdated, but obstructs the attainment of new solutions to the Kremlin’s informational aggression (the tradition of counter-propaganda is excluded here).

Hybrid warfare, as the most used term, is complex (historic-technological) phenomenon which to date has not been terminologically defined. On the one hand, it is clear what is meant by the term. On the other, the lack of scientific interpretation results in multitudes of conceptual modifications and responses. It would seem logical for Ukrainian military scientists to cooperate with leading analytical institutions, and develop an algorithm for the categorization of the phenomenon, which could then be used at the international level and in international law. This would greatly facilitate counteraction to hybrid aggressors – Putin’s Russia, ISIS and other terrorist-state groups and organizations.

The attempts of some authors to portray the action of Putinites in Ukraine as elements of a hybrid war are indicative of a narrowing of the problem, which has already grown into a complex and technically innovative system on a global scale. Its effectiveness of public influence must be characterized by a new categorical definition – **“global hybrid terrorism”** (GHT), which is part of the technologically-strategic model to change the global world order. At this stage, we consider that an acceptable definition of GHT would be **“the instrumentalisation of the potential of dynamic-streaming of content and communication influences on global scale; employing hybrid manners and creative-military means to attain dominance for terrorist stylistics in the international arena.”**

GHT attains the level of geostrategic discourse when repeated acts of (Putin’s) Russian hybrid-terrorism (or quasi institutions such as the terrorist republics of Donbas) operate the problems of the world by integrating them into their socio-cultural history of civilized democratic institutions of international law through parliamentary policy, international media systems, NGOs and others.

As for the theme of my speech, the particularities of the interaction between the authorities and mass media power – are the prerogative of the central executive. It is responsible for the establishment of appropriate rules, regulations, mechanisms and procedures and tending of their efficiency in the realms of national security. The matter of lawful privatization of the mass media plays a particularly important role in this regard. Here, the question arises whether the state’s regulation of a large number of media will be exchanged/replaced by a monopolized influence of the public opinion by private holdings (an usurpation of the right to the public opinion). And, will the state have a legislative tool for defending national state interests?

Here, the state’s power structures, particularly the Department of Defence require special attention. In our view, the Armed Forces should not stand to lose their own media. This is substantiated by the experience of NATO states.

As for the security agencies, they must have relevant regulations and clear instructions for public relations for all possible situations. The instructions for appropriate action by appropriate departments in times of crisis – albeit the ATO, man-made disaster, local military conflict, war – must be developed in peacetime and be on standby for implementation.

Without attempting to speak for all security forces, it is well-known that at least at the Ministry of Defence the aforementioned instructions had been developed. This notwithstanding, with the commencement of hybrid-messianic aggression – especially informational and later physical – these documents were never used.

In our view, the reasons for the inertia was the psychological unpreparedness of the authorities – both high-level to counter-information functionaries – to go public and proclaim the hybridized aggression stemming from Putin's Russia. In fact, the same psychological unpreparedness (but on the necessity to shoot) of the officers and soldiers was observed at the beginning of combative action.

As for the confusion and lack of understanding of how urgent and critical the situation was during the occupation of Crimea by Putin's army, *a high official of the NSDC at a meeting in the Defence Ministry advised the military (including journalists) to search for relevant information about the events on the internet.* This was suggested despite the fact that the carriers of the pertinent information were present in the meeting room.

In today's circumstances of armed confrontation with Putin's military-terrorist forces in the east, publicity, realized by **outstripping** the reporting and explanation of information becomes the dominant factor determining victory in both the information and battle spaces. It follows that the provision of information from the security sector to the public through the media should take into account such factors as lack of time for managerial decision-making and accurate (desirably comprehensive) information about events, facts or statements regarding specific activities. These managerial problems carry a global character. Immediately, it should be noted that in this statement, information relating to secret and not subject to disclosure has not been referred to.

Leading in publicity is the result of comprehensive measures related to:

- predictive analysis information field (daily);
- multi-variation development of scenario management models for managerial decision-making;
- multi-format supply of relevant information (implementation of the approved action models);

In this case, mass media will receive detailed information on most of the issues and problems that interest them. The positive effect is reinforced by the fact that in this case, members of the media will not use information originating from the Russian side (which can be used for analysis and proof of distortion by the Russian informational technologists).

The initial period of Russia's hybrid-messianic war against Ukraine was characterized by the failure to combine information by scale and functionality. This, in turn, led to the stigmatization of the information space by Kremlin technologists and, accordingly, the imposition of definitions and terms used in the media; particularly Ukrainian media.

The characterization of the situation, clear definition of the phenomena and processes that we have encountered during Putin-terrorist aggression, the timely launching of appropriate language/terminological rules for use by the mass media – must all be produced from a single communications and content coordinating centre of the security sector.

**In this regard, it is advisable for the security sector to work out a common approach to issues related to interaction with the media, and establish it legislatively.**

As an example, we can cite the experience of the British military establishment, which faced a critical situation with the media during and after the Falklands War in 1982. The deterioration of relations between the UK Defence Ministry with journalists was so apparent that it became the subject of parliamentary hearings. Then, the Defence Committee came up with over two hundred recommendations for the organization of relations between the military and mass media.

These recommendations formed the basis for the collection of rules, called “Working arrangements with the media during emergencies, tension, conflict or war,” and is known in the field as the “Green Book” (the colour of the cover).

The main chapters include:

- first meeting with publishers and media organizations;
- safety tips;
- public relations;
- assistance with travel/accommodation;
- registration;
- securing opportunities for reporting;
- selection of accredited correspondents;
- military correspondents;
- combining mass media (pools) to work on the frontlines;
- transfer of materials and communication;
- conditions for accredited media on the theatre of operations;
- reliability test;
- prohibitions;
- reporting casualties;
- POWs and others.

In our view, such a coordination and application centre in Ukraine should be the responsibility of the National Security and Defence Council. Alternately, a special analytic-prognostic body could be created and subjugated to the NSDC for the purpose of communication and content design.

# IS IT POSSIBLE TO PLAY A DEMOCRACY IN WARTIME?

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**Joris Van BLADEL,**  
Journalist, The Netherlands

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It is interesting to be here in Ukraine, a country which is at war. It is strange to hear the question “is it possible to play a democracy in wartime?” There is some truth in it.

More and more we see political parties stretch the limits of free press, of what is publically available and so on. A society which is under this kind of stress will undergo such developments. To a very large extend, the public does understand this issue, when police or intelligence services say something is confidential, it is understood “no questions asked”. In operations, some things are confidential and journalists and the public do understand.

A democracy is a kind of ideal state. Your society or my society is not reaching that ultimate state. Democracy, it is a “state of becoming”, it is constantly under threat and is constantly developing. For these reasons we need journalists permanently questioning. In the ideal, there is only one rule that leads journalists, and this is the truth. The truth has become problematic, if one follows the presidential campaign in the United States we know that 80% of statements of one of the candidates are lies. The truth as a reference has become a problematic issue. Therefore, we need journalists to hammer once again on the same nail, which is a lie. This has become a very controversial issue nowadays – “the truth”, particularly in a society which is in a revolution, including a technological revolution. This is the situation we are dealing with. In the ideal space where journalists are going for the truth, they do not have a mission. Journalists do not have a mission for anybody, they direct themselves. He does not need to be fed with information, he is looking for it – neither engineered nor modelled.

There is a bit of an impression here (and to some extent understandably so, because this society is under threat) that in Ukraine everybody is trying to get everything in rules, have everything engineered in regulations and laws and so on. While in a democracy you have a public space that is developing organically. Of course, one has to rely on reason, on reasonable people (a difficult issue). Democracy is a very difficult issue; a totalitarian state is much easier. Democracy goes with responsibility and trust and reliance upon reason.

A responsible journalist knows that some information is not to be shared, or waited to be shared later. This is very important to know.

We are undergoing a global revolution in technological innovation. For example, last week in Belgium there was hot news saying that IS was directly threatening individual soldiers from the Belgian army. Why that happened? These soldiers were putting information, pictures, their identity on the social media.

The social media is not a completely new element. Yet, when we are under threat or stress, we see how social media impacts us. Another example can be found in an incident which took place in the Balkans. When there was a casualty – a person was killed – the biggest problem was that the soldiers, the home front knew about it before the official military channels of what was happening on the ground. The military and security sector are too slow for these new developments. How do we cope with this? Not only Ukraine, but all states, even so-called ideal democracies share this problem.

Our structures are not organized in a way that they can cope with new technologies. As a soldier in the 1980s during the Cold War, it was normal to be prohibited from entering certain parts of a city; it was a forbidden area, a café for instance, because there were extremists living there for example. If one considers today's situation and what is shared on the mass media and Facebook, it is simply incredible. It is incredible in the first place that soldiers can be so stupid to share the kind of information they do in social media, and at the same time, it seems to be a normal thing. This “normal thing” becomes a source of information for the adversary; in Belgium, it is the IS; in Ukraine, it is Russia.

The main issue is not hybrid warfare; it is much broader. It is a technological revolution and the question is how do journalists reframe themselves in this new situation. It is totally new for all of us, the United States, Belgium, The Netherlands, etc.

Another term which can be difficult to understand is “military-journalist”. A journalist is a journalist, and a journalist who is worthy of the label and is specialized in that area, he is clever enough to work in that area. A lot of paternalistic talk is common – claims that “these people do not know what they are talking about. My experience is that these people, when we are talking about serious journalists, inform themselves, they are knowledgeable and are as courageous as the military are. Last Sunday, a good friend of mine, a war journalist was killed in Libya. A lot of military people could have learned about courage from him. These people, when they are worthy of the label “journalist”, they know what they are doing and their skills should not be underestimated. The distinction, that paternalistic



attitude that journalists know nothing about the military and need to be told about it all is the wrong attitude.

Another concept which is difficult to grasp is “mass media”. This is a concept from the 1950’s. They are so diverse today! For example, I know a lot of journalists who refuse to be embedded, who also in the American or British situation refuse to be embedded as a principle; they do not want to be told by the military what to think. The idea that the military can engineer and control everything is an illusion one better not even start with.

The new situation is very fast, complex and diverse. We must find solutions for these situations of the new world we are living in. There are untrustworthy players in the game who take advantage of the situation. In Ukraine it is called hybrid warfare, in Belgium it is IS who is living among us and is using a lot of skills, better than we have as far as propaganda on Facebook and the Internet.

In closure – a statement on the importance of journalists reflecting on the massacres in Rwanda. At that time, military intelligence was prohibited. I wish there were journalists asking the right questions at that time. There was knowledge – ahead of time – of what was going to happen in that country. Perhaps, at that time, had there been journalists asking questions, they could have prevented the genocide, the killing in that country. In this new situation, the relationship between the journalists and the state is very difficult. It is a learning process and journalists must play a role in that game. The military and journalist professions must be valued in the democratic sphere that is always vulnerable.



# MASS MEDIA CANNOT BE CONTROLLED, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE TO WORK WITH THEM EFFECTIVELY

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**Serhiy KARAZYI,**  
**Reuters Journalist**

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A very interesting finding has come out of the recent polls conducted by the Razumkov Center. It is surprising to see that among the top external threats to Ukraine, Ukrainians perceive economic debt to foreign and international institutions as the largest threat and Russian military aggression comes second. In my view, this is a prime example of the failure in media communications and particularly, strategic communication between the state and its population.

It is very good that citizens are concerned with the effectiveness of economic and financial management, but the priorities are/should be absolutely obvious. Is there a threat of physical annihilation of cities and people, life? Or, is the threat of ineffective governance which also brings about bad consequences? These questions are comparable with a situation where: you may have been stopped on an intersection and a gun is placed to your head, and you being shortchanged in the store.

The fact that these perceptions exist in the third year of armed conflict with Russia, then this is indicative of the fact that media and strategic communications are badly positioned. This calls even more attention to some additional sort of susceptibility of the authorities. The main threat has been washed out to the second level and is diluted somehow on the media playing field. There questions related to

economics, tariffs, are addressed. Although they are important questions, they are not comparable and do not threaten lives.

To understand how this is possible and what is going on, it is important to know that since 2014 not a single state institution busied itself with strategic communications. In 2014 the war started and Ukraine found itself in an absolutely unbalanced position with Russia. If one side entered the hybrid war totally prepared, and if we consider the informational component thereof, then information made up 60-70% of the hybridity on Russia's side. Ukraine was totally unprepared and did not even know it could do something in the field. Contrarily, Russia had great experience; it had already learned from its own mistakes. The manner in which Russia worked in Chechenia in 1994-1995 was a complete failure. Totally – to the extent that the whole world was on the side of the rebels, the Chechens. The war of 1999-2000 was already improved but there was still an ocean of errors made in the communications component. Now Russia has learned its lessons and entered this war with gained experience.

Ukraine, even under Yanukovich, was more democratic than Russia. After the Revolution of Dignity, the democratic course would and will not allow Ukraine to work in the direction of Russia.

Recent data shows that Russia spends about 500 million dollars on international media and Ukraine probably does not even spend so much for arms in this war. This is extremely important and there is nothing that can be done with it.

An important factor is that media in Russia is unprincipled propaganda while in Ukraine the mass media is either independent, or belonging to some financial groups or oligarchs who in principle are conducting themselves rather independently from the politics of government. This is good, but in the short term, it complicates matters. In this case, what can and should be done? The state, particularly the armed forces and SBU should give more attention to strategic communications. They should understand the necessity of communication, particularly in times of social media and when every person is a potential walking camera.

Whilst Russia is spending enormous amounts on its propaganda, it is impossible to think or believe that it is possible to create some single media source and that this is going to work. It will not work because we do not have money to exceed Russia's 500 million dollars.

What Ukraine and the security sector could be doing is work more effectively and in a goal-oriented fashion with the mass media. For example, it is pretty simple to identify the key (inter)national media outlets and it is necessary to work with them. Events and meetings should be held, including off the record ones. The last effective off the record meetings with foreign media services were held by the SBU in 2014. These were meetings which were held before the return of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. They seem to have had a positive effect.

If Ukraine wants to engage the international press to expose certain problems or events, it also means that it cannot provide them with an article which has been paid

for. It cannot invite their representatives to events regarding matters of little interest. They will not come. This is not the way they work. Ukraine cannot be so naïve as it was with the “Myrotvorets” Web-site, to think that journalist’s investigations can be satisfied by arranging meetings or information from/with intelligence.

The idea is that mass media cannot be controlled. But, it is possible to work with them very effectively. The point is to give them the information they are looking for, to give information and understanding of the situation, to be open. We are not talking about secret information here. Media should be seen as an outlet for information. If the [security sector] has nothing to say, or is afraid of saying something, this is a problem. Power structures should work more effectively in two ways. Firstly, it is in an open one, and with a clear understanding of the target audience, albeit the national or an international one. Second, “off the record” communication is very important. It gives some information which will allow editors to plan even (at least) elementary logistics. Sharing information for backgrounders and planning capability will be very helpful, particularly for foreign journalists whose logistics tend to be very complicated.

Mass media cannot live in an informational deficit. They have to have a good idea of what is going on in order to draw a good picture of it. Also, without sufficiently professional information which has been fact-checked and gone through some sort of editing, all of the void will be filled by social media which will certainly contain a lot of disinformation and misinformation. As a result, that information will be influencing the perceptions and behaviour of Ukrainian citizens and at some level externally as well.



## KEY STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS

There need to be clear working regulations and guidelines for those in the media sector working in the “grey” and ATO zones.

Despite the fact that the state should be initiating some specific approaches to communication, particularly in the occupied territories, it appears to be doing nothing effective in this regard.

When considering interaction between the state and mass media the two must work to meet in the middle. This requires an increased professionalism. On the one side, journalists writing on topics related to the occupation should have their standards elevated. Very often their experience is on a very low level. This is a problem. This having been said, there is also a problem from the other side. There is also a communication’s problem from the other side; journalists run into the problem of receiving quality commentary from the SBU, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The problem concerns who is communicating on behalf of the authorities.

It is likely that joint trainings, meetings and communication per se, even if in closed group settings, would be very helpful, particularly as it pertains to confidential and secret information and how it should be handled.

What sells? Everything that is important. The idea is that it is not necessary to conjure up news, the freedom to cover what is going on is enough. If access to a particular person is needed or specific commentary, it should be given in an expedited manner.

Talking about the role of media in the current situation, there is one little observation. There is one group of journalists that does not need to fact check or verify information – this is the Russians. They always “know” how to cover a story, to blame Ukrainians. No fact checking or truth interests them. Objective journalism has a right to function in Ukraine. But, there must be a system of checks-and-balances of approaches to a complete ban on Russian-propagandist media. This regulation is sorely missing in Ukraine. Ukraine’s services should have the right/capability to simply ban entire chains/networks; thousands of accounts on Facebook. All this needs to be done. Of course, it may violate certain democratic standards.

The trustworthiness of the state and its institution is the benchmark on how successful propaganda will be.

Ukrainian Special Forces are conducting operations to block certain information sources in the “grey” zone aimed to protect the citizens from propagandist messages coming from Russia. Russia then raises the issue to questions of European broadcasting standards and agreements claiming that they are broadcasting into Ukraine lawfully. Formally, Ukraine is obliged to allow broadcasting into its territory. This is a problem. And, Ukrainians have to do something to protect its media sphere and, at the same time, it can be accused of violating its obligations.

We see the lack of ethics in Russian media, which has turned out to be a weapon in informational warfare.

We are now in a polarized situation in Europe, when anything critical is said about Ukraine, we are told it is a result of Russian propaganda (and vice versa). There are independent, critical thinkers who do not use propaganda to be able to criticize Ukraine and Russia. This polarization however has led to the notion that if you say anything critical, you are an agent, either of Russia or of the US. This is problematic because there is no neutral room. There is no room for analysis.

An adviser and analyst are completely different things. An adviser subscribes to the politics of the one he is advising. An analyst is in a different intellectual position. If one is in the military institution, it is quasi impossible to be critical. The role of the analyst and journalist is also different and must not be confused.

The problem does not lie in propaganda. It lies in the transforming of the world order, and the way life and the world are perceived. Too much attention is being paid to the mass media. This is only one channel of influence. Social media is the most powerful and every single person has become a source of information. A well trained individual is capable of influencing more than a given media outlet. Because, the mass media has become a heavy mechanism which is slow to react. Recall the Arab spring.

Truth – it is difficult to say – truth, what is it? Facts? It is possible to take the same facts and show it in many different lights. Truth is an accent. Even when then truth is delivered to the people, it will always be filtered through. A balance of facts, and truth and emotion is what will make people believe something. It is where the professionals choose what to accent.

The “grey” zone of hybrid terrorism is the greatest way for Putinism to destroy the world system the way we know it. Creative studies should be introduced to the security sector.

Television remains the most influential source of influencing. Just because new media sources have appeared not to reduce the impact of television. In the “grey” zone and occupied territories in particular, people are listening to the radio and television, they are not twittering.

Part of Russia's informational war against Ukraine is to convince people that the main threat to security are the state authorities which should be removed and replaced.

A main problem is that the most influential foreign media representatives are located in Russia and not in Ukraine. When they travel to cover the situation here, they come with their Russian interpreters. This is seriously a big problem. The interpreters communicate with one another and indicate how the story should be covered. This is one of the reasons the West has a very different picture of what is going on here. It may be a good idea to recommend to them our own interpreters to avoid this problem.

There is a need to create an atmosphere in which the foreign media will be interested to be dislocated and have established offices in Ukraine. Kyiv could establish a media hub.

When developing a memorandum of understanding or a code for Security Sector and Media relations, it should contain some recommendations, based on ethical moral principles. Fact-checking is a question of ethics. When looking at the media in Ukraine, it appears that in many ways this is what mass media has turned out to be. Perhaps, it is a result of that education which lacked an ethical foundation.

# WORKING GROUP II. OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY SECTOR, DEVELOPING PARTNERSHIP BASED ON RULES AND COMMON INTERESTS: INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES



The objective of the session was to share the best national and international practices, identify a set of practical recommendations to facilitate the journalists' work, and strengthen relations between the media and the security sector institutions in Ukraine with a particular focus on national defence institutions.

**Chair:** Viktor ZAMIATIN, *Leading Expert, Political and Legal Programmes, Razumkov Centre*

**Co-Chair:** Nicolas BOLSSEZ, *Fondation Hironnelle* and Stephan SIOHAN, *Correspondent of Le Figaro in Ukraine*



## KEY STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS

I am not going to compare what is happening in Ukraine with the situation in other conflict areas. These countries are very different from each other, but I think they have some common trends regarding the role of independent news, regarding the role of journalism and media in a conflict situation. This can give you some ideas of possible activities to help better connect the authorities and the media.

I believe that by providing impartial information and media platforms for dialogue, we support and help promoting constructive developments and peaceful resolution of conflict situations.

Our experience shows that professional journalism is only based on factual coverage of the news avoiding comments. Journalism we support should be based on factual coverage, be always honest and should not give own opinion. That kind of journalism contributes to raising confidence between the population and the media and between the population and the authorities.

Despite the difficult environment, good journalism is based on the very clear and basic principles of professional journalism. These principles are fact-based journalism, which is guided by ethical standards and codes of conduct.

We always remind journalists to avoid comments. We believe that the public is not interested in the opinion of journalists. The public is interested in facts and the journalist's job is about covering facts, not about getting their opinion.

We know that in today's society in Ukraine, so-called fact-based journalism is absolutely impossible, particularly in Crimea and the temporarily occupied territories because of the great threat to health and life, that anyone engaged in such work would be facing.

The experience of Fondation Hironnelle could be very useful upon the return of the occupied territories, and to start the work of reintegrating the people who live there.

A completely new approach is needed in seeing the relations between citizens, journalists, state bodies, security bodies – because there has been a revolution, there is a new regime. There are – in this new regime – people who have been working profusely under the previous regime. But there are new realities and there is a war going on.

Journalists have to renew their approach to security bodies and foreign reporters.

What is striking me in Ukraine is the very easy access to the high-ranking sources. In France or Germany, it is almost impossible to get high-ranking information. At the same time, it is very hard for journalists to deal with a very shaky relationship Ukrainian officials have with the truth and reality. It is very hard to access trust worthy information.

The amount of lies surrounding the conflict in Ukraine, the amount of lies about Maidan, Crimea and Donbas has complicated the job of journalists. There are a lot of lies about Ukraine generally.

A very honest relationship to the facts is the best attitude to take when knowing the amount of money which is poured into propaganda by the Russian government. An asymmetric war on information does not have to become symmetric – it is impossible.

Journalists have responsibilities towards their audience, but we do not have any responsibility towards the people who pay us, our companies and we do not have any responsibilities towards state authorities. We are here to work on journalism based on facts, not comments, which is very hard.

The duty of any journalist covering a conflict is the responsibility, before one's own country. Civil responsibility plays very strongly on objectivity and we cannot talk about being nonaligned here, in principle.

We cannot look at Russian media as mass media, we cannot extend to them the rights connected to Art 19; to connect them with the right of freedom of speech.

We have a real problem forming local radio in the regions – or wherever, this requires a lot of attention.

There is a need to know what kind of objective, balanced information is being brought to the people in Eastern Ukraine, from both sides of the frontline and also in the Ukrainian controlled territory.

One must consider how those populations from Eastern Ukraine are represented. A voice needs to be given to the population from Donbas to express themselves in media which can represent their opinions and not only the opinions from Kyiv.

The expert experience presented in regard to civil war coverage does not apply to Ukraine. We do not have a civil war, we have aggression, no matter what one names it.

Russian mass media working in occupied/annexed territories are an instrument of Special Psychological Operation. All of them are working against Ukraine and only professional, honest journalists can/should report on the reality there.

In regard to the population in occupied territories – they de facto do not have the right of expression. It is like slavery, the Soviet Union of 1937. To speak of freedom of speech there – is not possible.

Ukraine should not politicize the work of journalists within the conflict zone, especially in separatist controlled areas. It is necessary also not to politicize that what the people are thinking in pre-front line areas. They are stereotyped as morons, victims of Russian propaganda.

There is a need for Ukrainians to bring/explain facts to the people. A lot of stereotypes/ideas are a result of the Ukrainian side's failure to explain the situation. Simple facts should be used to de-myth.

The influence of propaganda which has nothing to do with fact-checking, with truth is so great that even affects rational thinking people in Mariupol and along the front lines zone. There is a need for the Ukrainian side to speak in a timely, true and loud fashion, otherwise it will lose out to a "big liar".

It is difficult for a journalist in the front lines to report without comments.

If you want to reconnect with the population in the warzone, you cannot provide them propaganda to counter the propaganda. They have already received a lot of "because" and they will just not listen.

The resolution of the propaganda problem and the restoration of trust with the population require vision and democratic principles. Not factual news that at times might not be in Ukraine's favour. But, it is the only way to gain their trust.

It is very important to keep the possibility for Ukrainian and foreign reporters to say things that do not please you ministers or your president.

President Poroshenko said foreign journalists have the duty to talk positively about Ukraine and not write negatively which is a complete misunderstanding of what is the work of the media.

Writing negatively about Ukraine might even help to bring facts and understanding within the society and the international community.

The factual paradigm of journalism is an illusion made up by journalists to avoid responsibility. Without contextualization a row of facts is meaningless. When we talk about cooperation, mass media, like a subject, like a specific publication, journalists are all conscious and subconscious subjects with responsibilities.

Each side has its own truth, obligations. All the conflicts between journalists, mass media and security services and between state institutions have both a public and private character; they all relate to the level of the state's communication policy, (internal) mechanisms of democratic control and culture of communication. The resolution of conflicts between them must be found in there.

Duties and responsibilities of professional journalists are codified in a number of texts and international treaties. The 1971 Munich Charter stipulates that journalists' responsibility towards the public exceeds any other responsibility particularly pertaining to employers and public authorities.

Journalists can only fulfil their duties if they have independence including professional dignity, salaries, and contracts. First duty of a journalist is to respect truth whatever the consequences may be to himself because of the right of the public to know the truth. Second, defend freedom of information. Third, journalists should only report facts of which they know the origin, not suppress essential texts and documents (Art. 7). Forth, journalists must respect professional secrecy and not divulge the source. Journalists should have free access to all information sources as well as the right to freely enquire on all events conditioning public life.

Secrecy of public and private affairs may be suppressed to journalists only in the exceptional cases and for clearly expressed motives.

The journalist has the right to refuse subordination to anything contrary to the general policy of the information organ with which he collaborates.

The defence sector in Ukraine should start thinking about new ways of communicating and connecting with the population and the various partners working in the military sector. Media and journalists work as a positive tool to develop connections.

Unfortunately, in our situation we need to critique the power establishment, security sector and other defence organs because the basic principle [access to information] is very often simply violated. And, this is accompanied by wild unprofessionalism.

Referring to freedom to information rights often results in nothing as representatives of the security sector often consider something confidential, although it is not. They refuse to give the information out without a formal decision from authorities i.e. the SBU.

Well documented cases of violence against journalists lay cold despite plenty of gathered evidence. This frustrates the hopes of the Maidan Revolution.

It is natural for the military to want to protect its own people and hide their violations of the law but that is wrong. Pure and simple you cannot defend people who are crossing the line on the law. It is very bad public relations, if you try to cover up things from your own "tribe". A crime is a crime and should go to court publically. This shows the public that you are really doing something to the problem. If you cover up it lingers and becomes a poison within your organization.

Ukraine has an unfortunate journalistic and mass media culture/tradition. We have the phenomenon of ordered articles, such as the abuse by journalists violating their own rights and obligations. In this light, how should government bodies react to this? These phenomena motivate institutional "closeness". There is a need for education and training in this regard.

Journalists' crossing to and from the frontlines in Ukraine is an aspect of hybrid warfare. A high level of mistrust develops as a result. It may be better to have journalists working in sets where one works from one side and another one on the other side; coordinating together could draw an objective picture and resolve the trust issues.