

ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT



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ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2018

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Executive Summary

A stable global presence ranking

The countries in the top positions of the global presence ranking maintain or strengthen their positions. The United States tops the list with a global presence index value of 2,494 points. It still trebles that of China, which is second, with 841 points. Then come the United Kingdom (637 points), Germany (619) and France (532). There is still a large gap between the global presence of China and that of the United States, which makes it unlikely for China to climb to the first position in the short or medium terms. However, the distance between China and the United Kingdom / Germany cluster has widened with respect to last year's edition. China is therefore in the process of consolidating its second position and distancing itself from all the other countries.

The first 10 positions are still dominated by 'old' and/or Western powers (with the remarkable exception of China). Japan, Russia, Canada, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain follow France in the ranking. However, positions 10 to 20 include several emerging and, particularly, Asian countries such as South Korea (12th), India (13th) and Singapore (17th). There is only one Latin American country among the 20 countries with the highest global presence, namely Brazil (19th in the global presence ranking), the largest country in its region in geographical, economic and demographic terms. Likewise, only one large Gulf country appears in the ranking in this year's edition, Saudi Arabia, which is 20th with a global presence of 113 points.

Globalisation or regionalisation?

The foreign policy space has been almost stagnating since 2012. The aggregate value of the 110 countries included in this series (which could be deemed the foreign policy space – an indicator of the globalisation process) is at 11,065 index value points in 2017, down from 11,239 points in 2016. With small positive or negative variations over the past few years, the average growth for the 2012-17 period is only 0.65%. This figure contrasts with its evolution in previous years. A first phase of slow globalisation that coincided with the geopolitical reconfiguration of Europe (1990-95) was followed by a period of rapid globalisation (1995-2011) with a foreign policy space 42% greater than at the beginning of the period.

The Index can contribute to the debate on regionalisation and globalisation by showing the relative participation of different regions in this world process since 1990. The foreign policy

space can be broken down into regions in order to track the intensity with which different areas participate in the globalisation process and, therefore, to what extent globalisation is concentrated in a number of specific regions and whether (de)concentration has evolved over the past three decades. 88.4% of globalisation occurs within and/or between North America, Europe and Asia and the Pacific. This figure has dropped from 90.9% in 1990, indicating a strong but weakening regionalisation in global flows.

Africa lags behind in global presence

Compared with the other regions in this Index, Africa shows a low volume of external projection. With a global presence of 408 points in index value in 2017, it ranks 6th out of six regions, after Europe, North America, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Middle East.

Four countries (South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria) account for 53% of the region's aggregate global presence. When adding Uganda and Kenya to the list, the share increases to almost 67% of the continent's global presence.

Not all countries rank highly for the same reasons. South Africa is an outlier in the economic dimension. It accounts for 35% of the region's foreign economic projection. It also tops the soft presence ranking with an index value of 74 points in 2017. This contrasts with its situation in the military sphere, where it drops to the 11th position.

There are perceptions that Nigeria has lost ground on the African and global stage over the last decade due to weak leadership. Although the Index does not seem to reflect dramatic shifts over that period, perhaps largely because of the higher oil price, the country dropped six positions from 39th to 45th from 2016 to 2017. Moreover, despite important losses in the economic dimension, these are offset by Nigeria's performance in the soft realm (that went up to 56% of Nigeria's global presence in 2017).

In 2017 Egypt's profile is rather different but more balanced by dimensions (it is in the top five in both the global and the specific domains): despite being second in the region's overall ranking, it falls to third position in both the military and the soft rankings, and ranks 4th in the economic dimension.

Of the top five African countries, Ethiopia is the military strongman; its regional leadership in terms of global presence is explained entirely by the military dimension, where it ranks first with an index value of 232 points in 2017. Indeed, it falls to 9th position in the soft presence ranking and is 16th in the economic ranking.

Different countries project themselves outside their borders to different extents and also for very different reasons (from the military, prominent in the case of Ethiopia, to a vibrant cultural sector in Nigeria). In this respect, the Elcano Global Presence Index aims to capture the very complex reality of all regions, including the African continent.

Frequently asked questions about the Elcano Global Presence Index

What does the Elcano Global Presence Index measure?	The index measures global presence. By global presence we understand the effective positioning, in absolute terms, of the different countries (in terms of products sold, tourists welcomed, victories in international sports competitions...).
Does the Elcano Global Presence Index measure power?	No. A country may have a strong international projection and a weak regional or global influence (or vice-versa). The relationship between presence and power depends on the foreign policy of each country or on the limiting factors of the exercise of influence depending, for instance, on the presence of another regional leader.
Does it reflect the effort of countries attempting to achieve greater internationalisation?	No. This Index measures the results of internationalisation, not its means. For example, a country may have deployed a significant number of troops abroad with a defence expenditure that is relatively smaller than that of another country with a smaller military presence.
Does it measure the openness of countries?	No. The Elcano Global Presence Index considers the external projection of the different countries and not so much the way in which they absorb the external action of other countries in their national territory. That is why the Index considers, for instance, the exports of manufactured goods but disregards the imports. It does not measure world interdependence, though it may help to analyse it.
Is it calculated with objective or subjective data?	Objective. Its purpose is not to ascertain how a country is perceived by certain elites or by public opinion as a whole. The Index is calculated to determine the effective external projection of the different countries, regardless of their reputation or image.
Does it measure merely the 'quantity' of a country's presence or also its nature?	Both. The Elcano Global Presence Index comprises three dimensions – economic, military and soft presence–, which in turn comprise variables of a different nature (ranging from energy to development cooperation, troops deployed or tourism). It is therefore useful in revealing not only how present countries are in the global order but also the nature of their presence.
How are the variables of the Elcano Global Presence Index selected?	First, presence is reflected in a single direction, which could be deemed its unidirectionality. Secondly, the results of presence are measured and not the means to achieve them. In addition, all the variables have an explicitly external component in the sense that they reflect cross-border presence. Presence is given in absolute and not relative terms; in other words, the indicators are not proportional to the demographic or economic size of the country. Likewise, as for any other index, the best explanatory capacity is sought with the fewest variables or indicators possible. Finally, hard data on presence are taken and not data based on judgments or opinions.


Frequently asked questions about the Elcano Global Presence Index

And how are they combined in a synthetic index?	Weights assigned to variables and dimensions are based on experts' criteria. Two surveys were conducted in 2012 and 2015: questionnaires were sent to specialists in international relations and answers were combined to determine the weights of variables and dimensions.
What about missing cases? How are they estimated?	In these cases we have also referred to expert opinion. A total of 2,595 data items have been estimated from 48,592 observations. The number of estimations accounts for 5.3% of the base.
The Index has been calculated for what years?	For 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010-17. Since 2010 the calculation is performed annually.
Why those years?	To reveal the transformations in the world order since the end of the Cold War.
For what countries?	The Elcano Global Presence Index is calculated for 110 countries: the first 103 world economies (with the exception of Bahrain), the countries not listed in these positions that are nonetheless members of the OECD or the EU and Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Senegal (in order to increase the representativeness of the African region in the time series).
Can the presence of different countries be combined to reveal the joint presence for a chosen group or region?	Not exactly. The presence of different countries can be combined, showing regional trends of global presence. Moreover, as new editions include an increasing number of countries, for some regions (ie, Latin America or East Asia) the number of countries selected for the Index is high enough to consider the aggregated index value as a fair reflection of the external projection of the whole region. However, it is important to note that, in these cases, the total index value records the relative presence of some countries in others of the same group or region (ie, the global presence index value of Latin America includes the relative presence of Argentina in Brazil). Thus, the adding together of global presences should not be considered a metric of a given region's external projection outside its boundaries.
Can the presence of European countries be combined and can it be assumed that that is the presence of the EU?	No, for the reason mentioned above. It must be borne in mind that the global presence of the member states is partly reflected in other member states of the Union. In order to apply the Index to the EU, intra-European presence has been deducted. The intra-European presence of the member states is precisely what the Elcano European Presence Index measures.

1. A stable global presence ranking

Iliana Olivé & Manuel Gracia

There are no major changes in the top 20 positions of this year's edition of the Elcano Global Presence Index. The United States tops the ranking with a global presence index value of 2,494 points. It still trebles that of China, which is second, with 841 points. Then come the United Kingdom (637 points), Germany (619) and France (532). There is still a large gap between the global presence of China and that of the United States, which makes it unlikely for China to climb to the first position in the short or medium terms. However, the distance between China and the United Kingdom / Germany cluster has widened with respect to last year's edition. China is therefore in the process of consolidating its second position and distancing itself from all the other countries (Graph 1.1).




GRAPH 1.1.
2017 Global presence ranking top 20
(in index value)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).


The first 10 positions are still dominated by 'old' and/or Western powers (with the remarkable exception of China). Japan, Russia, Canada, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain follow France in the ranking. However, positions 10 to 20 include several emerging and, particularly, Asian countries such as South Korea (12th), India (13th) and Singapore (17th).

There is only one Latin American country among the 20 countries with the highest global presence, namely Brazil (19th in the global presence ranking), the largest country in its region in geographical, economic and demographic terms. Likewise, only one large Gulf country appears in the ranking in this year’s edition, Saudi Arabia, which is 20th with a global presence of 113 points.

Two of the global presence dimensions, the economic and the soft, usually show very similar patterns and trends to those of the aggregate global presence (Graphs 1.2 and 1.4). For this reason, the top 20 countries’ ranking according to the economic dimension values is also mostly made by developed countries in its first 10 positions (again, with the exception of China) and of emerging Asian countries between positions 10 and 20. There are, however, some minor changes in these global and economic presence rankings. In the economic realm, Germany and the United Kingdom switch places, as Germany’s global presence is strongly economic. France and Japan also swap their positions. Russia, which is 7th in global presence terms, falls to the 17th position in the economic dimension as the nature of its foreign projection is strongly linked to the military sphere.




Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).



GRAPH 1.3.
2017 Military presence ranking top 20
(in index value)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).



GRAPH 1.4.
2017 Soft presence ranking top 20
(in index value)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).

Indeed, the military presence ranking varies greatly compared with those of the global, economic and soft presences. It should be noted that military presence takes into account not only the troops deployed internationally but also the capacities for such a deployment (and mainly, among these, naval capabilities such as, for instance, frigates or aircraft carriers). As in the other three rankings, the United States is in first place. With an index value in military presence of 1,042 points in 2017 (and at a significant distance from the first position) Russia ranks second in military presence. China is third, with an index value of 505 points. That is, the foreign military projection of China is half that of Russia and less than a fifth that of the United States. Therefore, it is unlikely that, despite recent military developments, China will reach second or first position in the next few years (Graph 3.3). Perhaps surprisingly, there are more emerging and developing countries among the top positions of the military presence ranking than in the global, economic or soft rankings. For instance, India is 7th (13th in global presence, 16th in the economic dimension and 14th in the soft domain); Ethiopia is positioned in 9th place in the classification, while it ranks 36th in global presence, 103rd in the economic dimension and 77rd in the soft domain;¹ Pakistan is 10th (33rd in global presence); Turkey 12th; Saudi Arabia 14th; Uganda 16th; and Bangladesh 19th. Moreover, all these are countries with specific strategies for military modernisation, expansion or foreign projection, which is linked, in some cases, with their geostrategic location. For instance, Bangladesh (now within range of three nuclear powers' missile arsenals: India, Pakistan and China) is currently renewing its military capacities in the framework of the 'Forces Goal 2030' roadmap.

As mentioned above, the soft presence ranking is similar to the global presence and the economic dimension classifications (Graph 1.4). There are slight changes compared to the global presence ranking, such as Canada and Russia switching places. More significant changes are those of Spain, which is in 9th position (12th in the global presence ranking) due to its soft profile based on tourism (mostly), culture and science.² Also, Australia, an attractive destination for international students, is placed 12th in soft presence while it holds the 15th position in the global presence ranking.

¹ The global presence profiles of Ethiopia and Uganda are explored in further detail in the third Chapter of this report.

² For more details, see Iliana Olivé, Manuel Gracia & Maria Dolores Gomariz (2017), 'Spain in the world: an analysis of the Elcano Global Presence Index 2016', *ARI*, nr 103/2017, Elcano Royal Institute.

MAP 1.1. Elcano Global Presence Index 2017 (in index value)



Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).

2. Globalisation or regionalisation?

Iliana Oliví & Manuel Gracia

Stagnating aggregate global presence

Since the 2014 edition of this report,³ we have been tracking the aggregate value of the global presence of all the countries included in the Elcano Global Presence Index. To some extent, this aggregation (that could be deemed the foreign policy space) gives a sense of the development of the globalisation process itself: whether it is expanding or contracting, or to what extent the economic, military or soft dimensions are its driving forces at different periods of time. As the number of countries included in the project have been increasing by 10 per year, the aggregation has been gaining explanatory capacity for this phenomenon. In last year's report we noted that the aggregate value of all 100 countries included at that moment in the Index had dropped for the first time since the beginning of our time series, which goes back to the end of the Cold War, in 1990. We also wondered to what extent this would be an exceptional event or if it would be the start of a de-globalisation phase.


This year's results seem to confirm the latter possibility. The aggregate value of the 110 countries included in this series is at 11,065 index value points in 2017, down from 11,239 points in 2016. This slight 1.55% decrease with respect to the previous year is not an entirely new phenomenon. Although the variation is positive between 2015 and 2016 (an imperceptible 0.78% increase), the aggregate global presence had decreased by 1.56% between 2014 and 2015. In short, the foreign policy space has been almost stagnating since 2012. With small positive or negative variations over the past few years, the average growth for the 2012-17 period is only 0.65% (Graph 2.1).

This figure contrasts with the evolution in previous years. Indeed, we can differentiate two previous periods. Between 1990 and 1995, in a first phase of slow globalisation that coincided with the geopolitical reconfiguration of Europe, global presence increased by only 1.2%. Then came a second phase of rapid globalisation that started in 1995 and ended in 2011, with a foreign policy space 42% greater than at the beginning of the period.

Different variables and dimensions (economic, military and soft) have contributed differently to the speed of globalisation over the years. Graph 2.1 shows throughout the 1990-2017 period an expansion of the economic and soft aggregate presences and a contraction of the military presence. While the economic and the soft areas have increased at an average annual rate of 3% and 2.6%, respectively, during these years, the military dimension has

³ See, for instance, Iliana Oliví & Manuel Gracia, *Elcano Global Presence Report 2017*, Elcano Royal Institute; and Iliana Oliví, Manuel Gracia & Carola García-Calvo (eds.) (2015), *Elcano Global Presence Report 2014*, Elcano Royal Institute.

retrenched at a pace of 1.4% per year. Here again, we can identify different phases for each of the three dimensions in this period of nearly three decades.



Note: left axis for global presence values and right axis for HHI values.
 Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).


The economic dimension exploded with the fall of the Berlin Wall and up to 2000. It then kept on expanding (although at increasingly lower rates) until 2011 (Graph 2.1). In terms of cumulative variations, there was a 56.3% rise in 1990-2000 that contrasts with the 34.9% increase recorded between 2000 and 2011. Finally came a third phase of mild increases or decreases. As a result, the annual change rate of the economic dimension in the 2012-17 period is of -0.1%.

The performance of the military dimension is quite the opposite during the first two decades. Military presence on a world scale has been dramatically retrenching at an average annual rate of 1.8% between 1990 and 2010. However, since 2011 there have been several ups (a 9.7% increase in 2011) and many downs (a 10.6% decrease in 2014 and a 9.2% drop in 2017). As a result, the military dimension is at a sort of plateau, with a 0.2% contraction between 2012 and 2017.

As for the soft dimension, it follows a similar pattern to that of the economic presence (as already pointed out in the previous Chapter). Soft international relations substantially increased between 1990 and 2000 (by 25.9%). However, unlike economic presence, they then kept on increasing at a high rate, with the exception of a mild contraction in 2013 (Graph 2.2).

In just a few words, although the expansion of the foreign policy space (or of the globalisation process itself) was initially led by an exploding economic dimension that offset a

retrenchment in the military sphere, during the past few years the steady expansion of soft international relations is balancing the continued contraction of the military sphere and the de-globalisation of the economic realm.



Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).

Concentration and regionalisation

As mentioned in previous editions of this report, the foreign policy space is concentrated in a small number of countries. For instance, the United States alone accounts for over 22% of the added global presence of all 110 countries. The years of rapid globalisation came hand in hand with a certain de-concentration, as shown in the evolution of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) plotted in Graph 2.1.⁴ The HHI declined from 1,002 points in 1990 to a minimum of 687 in 2012. The current period of stagnation has resulted in a mild increase in this concentration record, which now stands at 745, the level recorded in 2010.

Such a concentration level means that different countries participate to very different extents in international relations and the globalisation process. In global presence terms, this implies that single countries' quotas or shares of added global presence of all 110 countries can vary greatly. For instance, the shares of the United States (22.5%, as mentioned above), China (7.6% in 2017), the United Kingdom (5.8%) and Germany (5.6%) contrast with those of Ethiopia (0.5%), Latvia (0.0%) and Uruguay (0.1%). Given the very gradual decline of the

⁴ The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is a statistical measure of concentration that accounts for the relative size of all firms in a market. It is here applied by squaring and aggregating the share of global presence of all countries (s_i). It can range from 0 to 10,000. An increase shows concentration. $HHI = \sum_{i=1}^N s_i^2$.

old powers and the impressive rise of the Asian emerging economies shown by the evolution of global presence figures since 1990, this uneven participation of countries in the global presence space probably comes hand in hand with an uneven participation of different regions in the globalisation process.

The literature on globalisation has already addressed the issue of regionalisation. The debate on globalisation and regionalisation is strongly limited to its economic aspect and, more precisely, to international trade (which actually constitutes four out of 16 variables of the Elcano Global Presence Index).⁵ It is most likely that this narrow focus is due to the scarcity of data of bilateral exchanges in a number of facets of globalisation such as those of culture or security.

Studies in this field have mainly dealt with four topics: (1) whether the globalisation process is slightly more than the addition of different clusters of regionalisation processes;⁶ (2) connected to this, whether there is a trade-off between globalisation and regionalisation (that is, if regionalisation acts as a trigger of globalisation or if, on the contrary, it hinders extra-regional relations);⁷ (3) how to define different regions (geo-economic regionalisation does not necessarily match the political division of countries); and (4) how to measure the extent of regionalisation *versus* globalisation.⁸

According to these studies, there is evidence of international trade exchanges being concentrated in intra-regional flows (*versus* inter-regional exchanges) and, also, of some regions (notably Europe and Asia) being substantially more active than others (like Africa or, to a lesser extent, Latin America).⁹ Indeed, Asia is found to be a driving force of globalisation.¹⁰ Approaching the study of globalisation from network theory shows that density (meaning trade intensity) is higher within continental trade sub-networks than average world density, with the exception of Africa. However, regionalisation might have decreased between 1980 and 2000,¹¹ a feature consistent with the consolidation and evolution of global value chains (GVC) that have a strong regional component but that are also, however, becoming more truly global.¹²

How can the Elcano Global Presence Index contribute to this debate? The Index has the advantage of going beyond the sphere of trade, including foreign projection in other economic fields (mostly investment) as well as in the military (troops, military equipment) and

⁵ Some exceptions are those of Rowan Wilken & John Sinclair (2011), 'Global Marketing Communications and Strategic Regionalism', *Globalizations*, vol. 8, nr 1, p. 1-15, on communication strategies; and of Virgil Balaceanu (2010), 'Security Regionalisation in South Eastern Europe', 16th *International Conference on the Knowledge-Based Organization, Management and Military Sciences*, Sibiu, Romania, on security issues.

⁶ Sangmoon Kim & Eui-Hang Shin (2002), 'A Longitudinal Analysis of Globalization and Regionalization in International Trade: A Social Network Approach', *Social Forces*, vol. 81, nr 2, p. 445-471.

⁷ Kim (2002), *ibid.*; Lurong Chen & Philippe de Lombaerde (2014), 'Testing the relationships between globalization, regionalization and the regional hubness of the BRICs', *Journal of Policy Modelling*, vol. 16, nr 1, p. 111-131.

⁸ Kim (2002), *ibid.*; Luca De Benedictis & Lucia Tajoli (2011), 'The World Trade Network', *The World Economy*, vol. 34, nr 8, p. 1417-1454.

⁹ Kim (2002), *ibid.*; Paulette Lloyd, Jan de Leeuw, Matthew Mahutga & John Galloway (2008), 'Measuring Economic Globalization: Exploring Methods to Map the Changing Structure of World Trade', preprint, Princeton University.

¹⁰ Peter Dicken (1992), *Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity*, Guilford Press.

¹¹ De Benedictis & Tajoli (2011), *op. cit.*

¹² Bart Los, Marcel P. Timmer & Gaaitzen J. de Vries (2013), 'Globalization or Regionalization? A New Approach to Measure International Fragmentation of Value Chains', preprint, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen.

the soft (culture, migration, sports, education, development cooperation...) dimensions. However, unlike other tools for weighing regionalisation *versus* globalisation (which are based on bilateral trade data), the Index does not yet allow us, in most cases, to differentiate between the geographical destinations of global presence. In this respect, the two exceptions are those of the foreign projection of Spain, which has been 'bilateralised' for all regions and 25 countries¹³ and, to a lesser extent, of EU member states, for which we calculate both global presence (extra-domestic projection) and European presence (projection limited to other EU partners only).

The Index can contribute to the debate on regionalisation and globalisation by showing the relative participation of different regions in this world process since 1990. The foreign policy space can be broken down into regions in order to track the intensity with which different areas participate in the globalisation process and, therefore, to what extent globalisation is concentrated in a number of specific regions and whether (de)concentration has evolved over the past three decades.

According to 2017 data, Europe accounts for almost 40% of added global presence of all 110 countries included in the Elcano Global Presence Index. Needless to say, a great deal of these exchanges might in fact correspond to intra-European flows (Graph 2.3). This region is followed by North America (25.6%), Asia and the Pacific (23.2%), Latin America (4.1%), the Middle East (3.8%) and, lastly, Africa (3.7%).¹⁴ In short, 88.4% of globalisation occurs within and/or between North America, Europe and Asia and the Pacific. This figure has dropped from 90.9% in 1990, consistently with the studies mentioned above that indicate a strong but weakening regionalisation in global flows. However, there has been a notable re-balancing behind the figure as Europe's quota has declined from 47% in 1990 while that of Asia and the Pacific has increased from 14.6% that same year.

The added regional global presence (and, therefore, the relative contribution of different areas to the globalisation process) has evolved since 1990. North America's global presence has almost stagnated since 2005, whereas foreign projection of or in Europe and Latin America has been steadily decreasing for some years now. In the case of Europe, it started declining in 2011 whereas for Latin America it started one year later, in 2012. Other regions have recorded drops in aggregate global presence. However, they are far milder. The Middle East lost global presence in 2016 for the first time and stood at roughly the same level the year after. It could be said that both Asia and the Pacific and Africa follow the opposite trend. Both regions lost global presence in absolute terms last year: Asian's external projection declined from 2,582 points in 2016 to 2,565 in 2017 while that of Africa decreased from 423 to 408 points.¹⁵ However, these declines come after a steady trend of increasing global presence, particularly during the years of stagnation or decline in the other four regions.


The evolution of added global presence by regions, both in terms of quantity and importance of each dimension, is related to the intensity of the globalisation process within each region

¹³ Iliana Olivé, Manuel Gracia & María Dolores Gomariz (2017), 'Spain in the world: an analysis of the Elcano Global Presence Index 2016', *ARI*, nr 103/2017, Elcano Royal Institute.

¹⁴ The geographical grouping follows that of Chapter 3 of this report. This is further explained in the corresponding section.

¹⁵ Africa had already recorded a decline in aggregate global presence in 2014 but it immediately rebounded the following year.

and the development of integration processes of greater or lesser intensity. This shapes both the internal and the external characteristics of the projection of each region.



Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).

As mentioned above, it should be borne in mind that the regional results are obtained by aggregating the individual records of the countries that form them. Therefore, the features of those countries' intra- or extra-regional projection define the regions' foreign policy spaces.

In this respect, the records for Europe are highly conditioned by the nature of the European integration process. They are strongly determined not only by its economic dimension but also by the soft dimension. A space of free mobility of people has encouraged, for instance, intra-regional tourism and migratory flows. Similarly, in the case of Africa, the high weight of the military dimension is explained by the participation of African countries in peacekeeping missions operated by the African Union.

The specificities of the participation of the region of Asia and the Pacific in the globalisation process through the lens of the Elcano Global Presence Index have already been addressed in previous studies.¹⁶ The following Chapter of this report is devoted to a deeper analysis of that of Africa.

¹⁶ See, for instance, Mario Esteban (2016), '[The New Drivers of Asia's Global Presence](#)', *ARI*, nr 9/2016, Elcano Royal Institute.

3. Africa lags behind in global presence

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Steven Gruzd,¹⁷ Iliana Olivié & Manuel Gracia

Africa in the Elcano Global Presence Index

The Elcano Global Presence Index can be used to understand the external projection of countries but can also be used to analyse regions. Aggregating countries into regions can give an idea of how different geographical areas behave in the globalisation process. However, when interpreting the results, it must be noted that aggregation is strongly determined by both the number of countries that comprise different regions (for instance, in our Index, North America is made up of two states while Asia and the Pacific has 19) and the intensity of the intra-regional economic and military dimensions and soft exchanges (the latter tend to be higher in developed regions in comparison with emerging or developing areas).

Countries included in the Elcano Global Presence Index are classified in six different areas: Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America, Maghreb and the Middle East, North America, and Sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁸ However, a clear understanding of Africa's behaviour in the Index and its role in the globalisation process probably requires a different classification and the aggregation of all African countries including both the North African and Sub-Saharan. For that purpose, and for this report, we have reconfigured the Global Presence Index into six slightly different regions. Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and North America remain unchanged. The Maghreb countries, however, are now grouped with sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East is a stand-alone region. The Africa group therefore comprises Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. According to World Bank figures, these 21 countries account for 87.3% of the continent's GDP and 75.4% of its population. Therefore, the aggregate analysis of these countries can give us a good sense of how Africa, as a region, is behaving in the globalisation process.

Africa, at the margins of globalisation

Compared with the other regions in this Index, Africa shows a low volume of external projection. With a global presence of 408 points in index value in 2017, it ranks 6th out of six regions, after Europe, North America, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Middle East (Graph 3.1). Its external projection has increased by 230 points since 1990 (when it stood at


¹⁷ Elizabeth Sidiropoulos is the chief executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), and Steven Gruzd is the head of SAIIA's African Governance and Diplomacy Programme.

¹⁸ The list of countries included in each region can be found in the [Explora](#) section, at the project website www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org.

178 points). This variation seems low when compared with those of 'big players' such as Europe (with an 864 point increase), or North America (up 647 points) and especially with that of the most dynamic developing region, Asia and the Pacific (1,471 points higher). However, during that period, the increase of Africa's global presence in absolute terms, is similar to that of the Middle East (214 points) and higher than that of Latin America (152 points).

In general terms, the regional rankings on the global presence index are strongly determined by the economic dimension. Consistently, in that dimension, regions are positioned in the same order as in the global presence ranking (Graph 3.2). However, the gap between Africa (which ranks 6th, with 264 points) and the Middle East (5th, with 556 points) is higher in economic records than in global presence values (292 points vs 9). In addition, the economic presence gap between Africa and other regions has widened during the past two-and-a-half decades. This 292 point difference with respect to the Middle East has increased from only 10 points in 1990. Something similar happens with other developing regions. For instance, the difference between Latin America's and Africa's economic presence has widened from 95 points in 1990 to 345 in 2017. This increasing divergence in economic presence between the two regions is mainly explained by two indicators. First, a faster increase of primary goods and manufactured exports from Latin America and, secondly, a higher presence in investment, due to the expansion of Latin American transnational companies (*translatinas*) in recent years. Africa has benefited from the commodity boom of the first decade of the 21st century, which also popularised the term 'Africa Rising'. The commodity boom is also linked to China's double-digit growth over many years, which contributed to the growth in primary exports of many countries on the continent. However, Africa still occupies a marginal position in the international economic sphere, despite its efforts to converge with the global economy.

This shows that Africa has remained marginal in the international economic sphere over the years, despite its efforts to 'catch up' with the global economy. A similar situation applies to Africa's soft dimension, where the region remains at the bottom, although in 1990 it was marginally ahead of the Middle East. This contrasts with its position in the military dimension, where the continent jumps from last in 1990 to 4th position in 2017, behind Asia and the Pacific and before Latin America and the Middle East (Graph 3.3). Europe, North America, Latin America and the Middle East have contracted their international military outreach between 1990 and 2017, while only two areas (Asia and the Pacific, and Africa) have increased theirs. The growth of foreign military projection during this period is significantly higher in Africa than in Asia and the Pacific both in absolute (626 points vs 265) and relative (210% vs 14%) terms. The biggest index value variation in the military dimension in Africa occurred between 1990 and 2000; another strong increase followed again between 2010 and 2017. At the end of 2017 there were 15 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions globally and the troop contributions of the African states in the Index amounted to some 30% of the total. In addition, the latter period between 2010 and 2017 saw a proliferation of peacekeeping missions in Africa. In 2017, there were eight active UN peacekeeping missions: MINURSO (Western Sahara), MINUSCA (Central African Republic), MINUSMA (Mali), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan), UNISFA (Abeyi, Sudan), UNMIL (Liberia) and UNMISS (South Sudan), in addition to AMISOM (African Union) in Somalia and the Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo.



Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).

Lastly, Africa’s soft dimension, as pointed out before, is more similar to the dimensions of global and economic presence. Africa now ranks last, falling from 4th position in 1990 when it recorded a soft presence slightly higher than that of the Middle East and substantially higher than that of Latin America (Graph 3.4).

Africa’s lions of global presence


On a world scale, global presence tends to be concentrated in a small number of countries. The trends toward (de)concentration have been depicted previously (Chapter 2 of this report) by means of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) applied to the Elcano Global Presence Index. Despite a mild de-concentration during the period of fast globalisation (shown by a fall of the HHI from 1,002 points in 1990 to a minimum of 687 in 2012), the HHI now stands at 745 points (approximately the same level it recorded in 2010), proving a certain re-concentration when compared to 2012.

As we have analysed elsewhere,¹⁹ this concentration tends to replicate at the regional scale and Africa is no exception (Map 3.1). Four countries (South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria) account for 53% of the region’s aggregate global presence. When adding Uganda and Kenya to this list, this share increases to almost 67% of the continent’s global presence.

¹⁹ Iliana Olivié & Manuel Gracia (2018), ‘The discrete role of Latin America in the globalisation process’, *LSE Global South Unit Policy Brief Series*, nr 1/2018, London School of Economics and Political Science.

These outliers also show a prominent presence in the overall world rankings but only South Africa has consistently been in the top 30 in 2015-17. Egypt and Nigeria are among the top 50 in the same period, although Nigeria dropped from 33 to 45, and Egypt up-scaled from 41 to 35. Uganda and Kenya are ranked in the top 60.

MAP 3.1. African countries' global presence (in index value, 2017)



Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).

Not all countries rank highly for the same reasons. South Africa, the African country with the highest global presence, is an outlier in the economic dimension (Graph 3.5). With an economic presence of almost 94 points in 2017, it accounts for 35% of the region's foreign economic projection. There is a remarkable gap between this index value and that recorded by Angola, which is second with an index value of less than 24 points. South Africa has strong exports not only in the primary sector but also in manufacturing and services. Furthermore, its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock in the rest of the continent is among the largest. In 2016, South Africa had a 20.6% share of African FDI projects, and an 8.1% share of the total amount of FDI in Africa.²⁰

South Africa's position in the ranking is similar in the soft domain (it tops the ranking with an index value of 74 points in 2017) (Graph 3.7). This contrasts with its situation in the military sphere, where it drops to the 11th position (Graph 3.6). This profile is similar to that of Nigeria, which ranks 4th in global presence, 10th in the military dimension and second in the soft realm.

South Africa's political transition in the 1990s was lauded internationally, and the country initially fostered its image as a bridge-builder between South and North, before more squarely aligning itself with the developing world. Despite criticism that the country's global standing has suffered in the last decade due to high-profile corruption scandals, serious allegations of 'state capture' and political in-fighting, the Index still puts South Africa comfortably ahead of its continental counterparts. It moved from 38th in 1990 to 29th in 2017, with very little movement in fact in the 2010s. This shows that countries' image or reputation may not immediately translate into the economic, military and soft indicators that determine global presence.

In the soft dimension, South Africa is considered a leader on the continent in education, technology and science. Its universities feature in the top 500 in the world in the Academic Ranking of World Universities (2017), while it also has a high proportion (28.9%) of patent filing applications abroad out of its total applications, according to WIPO's 2017 report. This indicator reflects the desire to commercialise technology in foreign markets, key to an assessment of external presence.²¹

Both Angola (second in economic presence) and Nigeria (ranked after Angola with 23.1 points) are huge energy exporters but have less diversified economies than South Africa.²² As for Angola, its global-presence increase since last year is the result of a higher volume of FDI stock, despite its loss in the energy variable. Indeed, the contribution of the energy indicator to Angola's global presence has fallen from 79.3% in 2013 to 42.1% in 2017.


Nigeria's has largely remained static (50th in 1990, 45th in 2017, and a high of 30th in 1995). There are perceptions that the country has lost ground on the African and global stage over the last decade due to weak leadership. Although the Index does not reflect dramatic shifts over that period, perhaps largely because of the higher oil price, the country dropped six positions from 39th to 45th from 2016 to 2017. Despite important losses in the economic

²⁰ Ey (2017), 'Connectivity Redefined', EY's Attractiveness Program Africa, Ey.

²¹ WIPO (2017), *World Intellectual Property Indicators 2017*, World Intellectual Property Organisation, p. 34.

²² It should be noted that the Elcano Global Presence Index shows a certain lag in relation to world events. For instance, figures of energy exports incorporated in this 2017 edition refer to 2016 international trade published by UNCTAD.

dimension, these are offset by Nigeria’s performance in the soft realm (that went up to 56% of global presence in 2017) and, more specifically, in culture and information. Nigeria’s booming cultural sector (especially, the ‘Nollywood’ film industry) is 41% of the country’s global presence, making Nigeria the top-ranking country in the region in this variable. As for information, its high ranking is due to the presence of Boko Haram in world media.




GRAPH 3.5.
2017 Economic presence ranking of African countries (in index value)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).

In 2017 Egypt’s profile is rather different but more balanced by dimensions (it is in the top five in both the global and the specific domains): despite being second in the region’s overall ranking, it falls to third position in both the military and the soft rankings, and ranks 4th in the economic dimension.


Of the top five African countries, Ethiopia is the military strongman; its regional leadership in terms of global presence is explained entirely by the military dimension, where it ranks first with an index value of 232 points in 2017. Indeed, it falls to 9th position in the soft presence ranking and is 16th in the economic ranking.

Ethiopia has seen significant change. From the 63rd spot in 1990 it dropped to 86th in 2000, but by 2017 had moved up to 36th, largely as a result of its high military presence (moving up 20 places between 2014 and 2015). Ethiopia is a significant troop contributor to international missions and was the single largest contributor to UN missions in 2017, with 8,409 troops. Ethiopia also has among the largest defence forces in sub-Saharan Africa. Both the history of the regime and the chronic instability of its region have been key factors in its military presence.



GRAPH 3.6.
2017 Military presence ranking of African countries (in index value)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).



GRAPH 3.7.
2017 Soft presence ranking of African countries (in index value)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, [Elcano Global Presence Index](#).

Ghana has shown a steady rise, from 100th in 1990 to 64th in 2017. This country is regarded as a consolidating democracy, with several close elections that resulted in peaceful alternations of the two main political parties. It is one of the most stable states in West Africa and a significant contributor to international peacekeeping. It had nearly 2,700 troops on UN missions in 2017.

In African states beset by conflict, such as Libya and Sudan, and political and economic turmoil such as Zimbabwe, their global presence has declined steadily. The decline of Libya is mainly explained by the economic dimension and related to the post-Gaddafi export embargoes. Sudan's presence has always been low. However, there is a loss of military presence over the past year mainly due to the withdrawal of troops deployed outside its territory. In the case of Zimbabwe, the very mild drop in global presence is mostly due to a decrease in primary goods exports and to a fall in soft presence. As for the latter, the weakening relates to its sporting performance. Olympic medals dropped from four (in 2008, in China) to zero (in 2012, in London, and, again, in 2016, in Rio). All the Maghreb states show some slippage after the Arab Spring (except for Egypt, which has marginally up-scaled from 43rd in 1990 to 35th in 2017, perhaps reflecting stability under the al-Sisi regime).

This analysis shows how, also in Africa, different countries project themselves outside their borders to different extents and also for very different reasons (from the military, prominent in the case of Ethiopia, to a vibrant cultural sector in Nigeria). In this respect, the Elcano Global Presence Index aims at capturing the very complex reality of all regions, including the African continent.

Methodological Annex

Brief history of the project

The first version of the Index, published in 2011, ranks 54 countries according to their 2010 global presence.²³ That edition and, therefore, the design of the Index itself, was coordinated by Ignacio Molina and Iliana Olivé –both senior analysts at the Elcano Royal Institute– and was the result of nearly three years of methodological discussions. These discussions were conducted in the framework of a working group composed by the above-mentioned coordinators of the Index, Narciso Michavila and Antonio Vargas (from GAD3), Émerson Correa (Olympus Consulting), several Elcano senior analysts and other staff members (Félix Arteaga, Carola García-Calvo, Carmen González, Jaime Otero, Juan Antonio Sánchez, and Federico Steinberg), and external experts (Alfredo Arahetes –Pontificia University of Comillas–, Ángel Badillo –University of Salamanca, currently also senior analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute–, José Fernández Albertos –Spanish National Research Council, CSIC–, and José Ignacio Torreblanca –ECFR Madrid–). We also received methodological suggestions from Philip Purnell (Clarivate Analytics), Santiago de Mora-Figueroa, Marqués de Tamarón (Ambassador of Spain), Teresa G. del Valle Irala (University of the Basque Country), Ángel Vilariño (Complutense University of Madrid), Cristina Ortega, Cintia Castellano and Amaia Bernara (from the FECYT of the Ministry of Science and Innovation).

The 2011 edition of the Index included a re-designing of the military equipment variable. This change, led by Félix Arteaga, was based on previous methodological discussions with several experts in that field: Francisco Asensi (Ministry of Defence), Alberto de Blas (Ministry of Defence), Amador Enseñat (Ministry of Defence), Dagmar de Mora-Figueroa (NATO), Pablo Murga (Ministry of Defence), Diego Ruiz Palmer (NATO), Andrés Sanz (Ministry of Defence), Steven R. Sturn (NATO) and Federico Yaniz (Ministry of Defence).


The 2015 edition of the Index updated the weights of variables and dimensions by means of a new survey to 150 experts in international relations (representing think tanks in all continents) conducted in mid-2015. The results of the survey were added to previous responses obtained in 2012. These combined results aimed at mitigating particular time and geographical biases. Also, the information indicator was made more sophisticated by including, in addition to the Internet band-width, explicit references to countries and their citizens in news of global news agencies (AP, AFP, Reuters, Xinhua, ITAR-TASS, EFE, ANSA and DPA).

Last year's edition also incorporated the conclusions of the statistical audit conducted by the Competence Centre on Composite Indicators and Scoreboards (COIN) of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. Individual indicators are now denominated firstly by

²³ Iliana Olivé & Ignacio Molina (2011), 'Elcano Global Presence Index', *Estudios Elcano*, nr 2, Elcano Royal Institute.

countries' Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or population and later re-scaled by a scaling factor that takes into consideration the relative share of a country in global GDP or population. Also, weights of variables and dimensions were rounded up or down.

Graph A.1. Structure of Elcano Global Presence Index



For the design of both the Elcano European Presence Index, an initiative led by Manuel Gracia, and the calculation of the EU's global presence, several external experts were consulted anew: Alfredo Arahuetes, Marisa Figueroa (ECFR Madrid), Narciso Michavila, and José Molero (Complutense University of Madrid).

Moreover, the project and its methodology have been presented to and discussed with the Institute's Board of Trustees, the Executive Committee, the Media Committee, the Management Committee, and, on several occasions, the Institute's Scientific Council

(including its 2015 meeting and the 2015 experts' survey). We have also received useful comments and suggestions over the years, as a result of numerous meetings to present and discuss progress on the Index. At the national level, these discussions have taken place with members of the Spanish Parliament (2011), officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (2011) and of Economy (2011), analysts and officials from the Presidency of the Government (2011), experts from Accenture Spain (2013), members of the Central Bank of Spain (2014) and both professors and students at different universities (Saint-Louis University of Madrid in 2015, Rey Juan Carlos University in 2014 and 2015, Deusto University in 2016 and 2018, Salamanca University in 2015 and 2017, International University of Andalucía in 2017, and Coruña University in 2017). The Index has also been presented to the general public (once a year) and to foreign diplomats based in Madrid (twice in 2014) and discussed at the Matías Romero Institute in Mexico (2011), at the GIGA Institute in Hamburg (2011), at the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (2018), at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra (2017 and 2018) and at the Elcano Royal Institute's Brussels office (2016 and 2018).

Throughout the life of the project, the final calculation of the Index has been made possible thanks to the generous aid provided in data-gathering by several people and institutions, as well as to those who have participated in the weighting survey and in the statistical audit: Ángel Aguado (EFE, Spain), Hayden Allen (Accord, South Africa), Marcos Álvarez Díaz (Joint Research Centre), Alejandro Anaya (Centre for Research and Teaching in Economics, Mexico), Barbara d'Ándrea (World Trade Organisation), Nisha Arunatilake (Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka), Bruno Ayllón (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain), D Shyam Babu (Centre for Policy Research, India), John Blaxland (ANU Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australia), Amelia Branczik (Crisis Group, Belgium), Gordan Bosanac (Centar za mirovne studije, Croatia), Chiao-Ling Chien (UNESCO), Alba Çela (Albanian Institute for International Studies), Alistair D.B. Cook (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore), José Miguel Cortés (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Marie Cross (Institute of International and European Affairs, Ireland), Jean-François Daguzan (Foundation for Strategic Research, France), Rafael Domínguez (University of Cantabria, Spain), Marcos Domínguez-Torreiro (Joint Research Centre), Jorge Gómez Arismendi (Fundación para el Progreso, Chile), Christine Ma. Grace R. Salinas (Philippine Institute for Development Studies), Charles Jebuni (Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana), Katie Jost (GAD), Gape Kaboyakgosi (Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis), Guillermo Kessler (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Changsu Kim (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Republic of Korea), Anna Koós (Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, Hungary) Carlos Latorre (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation), José María Lladós (Argentine Council for International Relations), Luis Martí (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Pauline Massart (Security & Global Europe, Belgium), Salvador MasPOCH (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Fernando Mier (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Ramón Molina (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Manuel Moreno (Spanish delegation to the United Nations and other international organisations based in Geneva), Said Moufti (Royal Institute for Strategic Studies, Morocco), Franklin Oduro (Ghana Centre for Democratic Development), Anna Orłonek (demosEUROPA, Poland), Eleni Panagiotarea (Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, Greece), Roderick Parkes (Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden), Rodrigo Perera (Borde Político, Mexico), Moisés Pérez (Spanish Ministry of

Economy), Juan Pita (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation), Henry Plater-Zyberk (Prague Security Studies Institute, Czech Republic), Anton du Plessis (Institute for Security Studies, South Africa), Rosario Pons (EFE), Arantxa Prieto (World Trade Organization), Philip Purnell and Sébastien Velley (Clarivate Analytics), Charles P. Ries (Rand, US), Robert Robinson (Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, Spain), Ventura Rodríguez (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation), Pep Ruiz (BBVA Research, Spain), Michaela Saisana (Joint Research Centre), Verónica Samper (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Manuel Sánchez (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Patrick Sandoval (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Paul Saunders (Center For the National Interest, US), Katarzyna Sidlo (Centre for Social and Economic Research, Poland), Pedro Sosa (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Gabriele Schwarz (Spanish Ministry of Economy), David J. Theroux, (The Independent Institute, US), José Tregón (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Yan Vaslavsky (MGIMO-Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Russia), Antonio Villafranca (Italian Institute for International Political Studies), Marija Vuksanovic (Centre for Democracy and Human Rights, Montenegro), Bibian Zamora (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), María Pilar Zaragüeta (EFE, Spain), Mario Abou Zeid (Carnegie Institute, Lebanon) and Ann Zimmerman (OECD).

Lastly, several collaborators and intern students have contributed both to data leverage (including experts' surveys in 2012 and 2015) and to analyses of the results of the Index (Datamérica Global, tweets, blogposts, or ARIs): Nacho Álvarez, Pablo Balsinde, José Ignacio Díaz, Mariola Gomariz, David Hernández, Marcos Ochoa, Carlos Raya, Roberto Ryder and Manuel Sainz.

Main elements of the Elcano Global Presence Index

This year's edition covers the global presence of a selection of 110 countries. The selection includes the first 103 world economies (with the exception of Bahrain) according to World Bank data as well as countries that are smaller in their size but that are nonetheless members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the European Union, and, finally Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Senegal (table A.1). For this 2017 edition, ten new countries have been added to the selection. These are Botswana, Cameroon, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For the first time this year, new countries are not added on the basis of their GDP only. Rather, we have aimed at incorporating countries of regions under-represented in the Index, such as Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Within those two regions, new countries have been added according to our traditional criterion of their GDP size.

Finally, in terms of country selection, it should be borne in mind that by making calculations at time intervals that go back to 1990, the project's intention is to show the two-bloc world, even if in decline. Thus, Russia's 1990 values refer to those of the Soviet Union, those of Germany to the Federal Republic of Germany, those of the Czech Republic to Czechoslovakia and those of Serbia to Yugoslavia. Moreover, Eastern European countries that became independent after 1990 have no value assigned in that year. This is the case for Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and

Uzbekistan as part of the Soviet Union, Slovakia as part of Czechoslovakia, and Croatia and Slovenia as part of Yugoslavia.

Table A.1. Countries listed in the Elcano Global Presence Index

Algeria	Egypt	Lithuania	Slovenia
Angola	El Salvador	Luxembourg	South Africa
Argentina	Estonia	Malaysia	Spain
Australia	Ethiopia	Malta	Sri Lanka
Austria	Finland	Mexico	Sudan
Azerbaijan	France	Morocco	Sweden
Bangladesh	Germany	Myanmar	Switzerland
Belarus	Ghana	Netherlands	Syria
Belgium	Guatemala	New Zealand	Tanzania
Bolivia	Greece	Nigeria	Thailand
Botswana	Honduras	Norway	Trinidad and Tobago
Brazil	Hungary	Oman	Tunisia
Bulgaria	Iceland	Pakistan	Turkey
Cameroon	India	Panamá	Turkmenistan
Canada	Indonesia	Paraguay	Uganda
Chile	Iran	Peru	Ukraine
China	Iraq	Philippines	Uzbekistan
Colombia	Ireland	Poland	United Arab Emirates
Congo DR	Israel	Portugal	United Kingdom
Costa Rica	Italy	Qatar	United States
Côte d'Ivoire	Japan	Republic of Korea	Uruguay
Croatia	Jordan	Romania	Venezuela
Cuba	Kazakhstan	Russia	Vietnam
Cyprus	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia	Yemen
Czech Republic	Kenya	Senegal	Zambia
Denmark	Latvia	Serbia	Zimbabwe
Dominican Republic	Lebanon	Singapore	
Ecuador	Libya	Slovakia	

Table A.2. Variables, indicators, and sources of the Elcano Global Presence Index

Variable	Indicator	Source
Economic presence		
Energy	Flow of exports of energy products (oil, refined products and gas) (SITC 3)	UNCTADStat
Primary goods	Flow of exports of primary goods (food, beverages, tobacco, agricultural commodities, non-ferrous metals, pearls, precious stones, and non-monetary gold), excluding oil (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 68 + 667+ 971)	
Manufactures	Flow of exports of manufactured goods (chemical products, machinery, transport equipment, other manufactured products) (SITC 5 to 8 minus 667 and 68)	
Services	Flow of exports of services in transport, construction, insurance, financial services, IT, the media, intellectual property, other business services, personal, cultural and leisure services, and public services	
Investments	Stock of foreign direct investment abroad	
Military presence		
Troops	Number of military personnel deployed in international missions and bases overseas	IISS – The Military Balance Report
Military equipment	Weighted sum of aircraft carriers, big ships, destroyers, frigates, nuclear-powered submarines, amphibious ships, medium and heavy strategic aeroplanes, and air tankers	
Soft presence		
Migration	Estimated number of international immigrants in the country at mid-year	United Nations Population Division
Tourism	Thousands of arrivals of non-resident tourists at borders	United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) – Statistics Database
Sports	Weighted sum of points in the FIFA world ranking and medals won at summer Olympic Games	FIFA and IOC
Culture	Exports of audiovisual services (cinematographic productions, radio and television programs, and musical recordings)	WTO – International Trade Statistics
Information	Number of mentions in news of main international press agencies (Associated Press, Reuters, AFP, DPA, ITARTASS, EFE, ANSA, Xinhua) Internet bandwidth (Mbps)	Factiva database International Telecommunication Union
Technology	Foreign-oriented patents: number of inter-related patent applications filed in one or more foreign countries to protect the same invention	World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) – Statistics Database
Science	Number of articles, notes, and reviews published in the fields of the arts and humanities, social sciences, and sciences	Clarivate Analytics – Web of Science, Primary Collection
Education	Number of foreign students in tertiary education on national territory	UNESCO – Institute for Statistics, OECD – iLibrary
Development cooperation	Total gross flows of official development aid or comparable data	OECD and official national sources
Scaling factors		
Economy	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices in US dollars	World Bank
Population	Number of inhabitants	World Bank

The variables, indicators and sources for this 2017 Elcano Global Presence Index are the same as for [the previous edition](#). Several criteria guided the selection of these variables. First, presence is reflected in a single direction, or what could be deemed its unidirectionality. Secondly, the results of presence are measured and not the means or assets needed to achieve these results. In addition, all the variables have an explicitly external component in

the sense that they reflect cross-border presence. Presence is given in absolute and not relative terms; in other words, the indicators are not proportional to the demographic or economic size of the country. Likewise, as for any other index, the best explanatory capacity is sought with the fewest number of variables or indicators possible. Finally, hard data on presence are used and not data based on perceptions or opinions.²⁴

In this 2017 edition, 2,595 cases have been estimated. Thus the proportion of missing and estimated cases represents only 5.3% of a database of 48,592 observations. Again, estimations are based on experts' knowledge. Those observations allow us to obtain 81,192 results, which are available at our website (www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org).

This year, as for previous editions, the performance of the variables is assumed to be linear with the exception of the sports variable. As regards normalisation, the 'min-max' approach is applied; that is, global maximum and minimum values (across all countries and periods). It should be noted that when adding data for this new 2017 edition, a review of figures corresponding to previous years was also conducted, on the basis of data availability in each source. As a result, some records for the past few years (including 2010) have changed, thus modifying the maximum value that is referenced in the scaling. Moreover, the inclusion of new countries systematically affects the Index values for the variables that are built on the existing spatial sample. This is the case for sports and military equipment, where the addition of new countries to the Index leads to a lower record for each of the 110 countries. Changes caused by updates in original sources or by the enlargement of our selection of countries are added to changes resulting from the methodological improvement applied in this 2017 edition. Therefore, new results may not match those of previous editions of the Index.

The inclusion of the EU in the Elcano Global Presence Index

One of the features of 2012's edition was the composite calculation for the 27 EU member states. This was undertaken in order to try to quantify the global projection of the Union, as if it were a political and economic union with its own identity.

The foreign presence of the EU is measured starting in 2005 and considering that the varying composition of the Union should be reflected in the Index. Both the Union's global presence and the Union as the sphere of external projection calculated in the European Presence Index do change with every new enlargement. As a consequence, the Union's presence corresponds to that of the 25 members in 2005, 27 members from 2010 to 2012, and 28 members since 2013.

To measure the EU's presence in the world we stick to the components of the Elcano Global Presence Index. For each of these components and for every member, the intra-European and extra-European flows must be differentiated, since a mere totalling of their results would be recording their projection in other member states (ie, consider the intra- and extra-European trade in German goods). This distinction between flows has been made feasible by using additional sources of data, especially Eurostat (Table A.4).

²⁴ For more details on the debates and criteria that guided this selection, see Iliana Olivé & Ignacio Molina (2011), *op. cit.*

Since the 2012 edition we also calculate the presence of the individual member states within the Union itself: the Elcano European Presence Index.²⁵ To some extent, methodologically, this indicator is the flip-side of the Global Presence Index for the EU. In a similar way to the latter, it shows the cross-border presence of the member states, which in the case of the Elcano European Presence Index is limited to the European (and not global) space. It facilitates a comparative analysis of the current situation and recent evolution of the positioning of European countries within the Union. It can also provide relevant information on the position of the member states in the calculation of their European as well as their global presence.

The Elcano European Presence Index aims to be an Elcano Global Presence Index on a European scale, so the structure and methodology of the latter has been respected as far as possible, although some slight modifications have occasionally proved to be essential (Table A.4). Thus, in general terms, the calculation of European presence modifies the calculation of global presence by reducing the measures of presence on a global scale to the intra-European scale (for example, intra-European migration flows, exports to the rest of the EU or European foreign students). For that reason three indicators compute a zero value, as they are not part of European countries' projection inside the EU: troops, military equipment and development cooperation. Moreover, given the indivisibility of some variables, there was no possibility of distinguishing the extra- from the intra-European component, so we stick to the values of global presence and re-scale them considering only the European countries. This is the case of sports, science and information (in its Internet component).

It almost always does so by using Eurostat data, just as for the calculation of the global presence of the EU. Obviously, the change in scale also reduces the scaling: the value of 1,000 assigned to the maximum indicator in the Elcano Global Presence Index is given, in the case of European presence, as the maximum value registered in 2010 by a member state and for the intra-European presence series. Finally, just as in the index for the EU, the reference area for which European presence is measured is the Union as it has been composed in different moments of time, variations being the result of the enlargement process.

²⁵ Results of the Elcano European Presence Index are available at www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org.

Table A.3. Variables, indicators, and sources of the Elcano Global Presence Index calculated for the European Union

Variable	Indicator	Source
Economic presence		
Energy	Extra-EU flows of exports of energy products (oil, refined products, and gas) (SITC 3)	Eurostat
Primary goods	Extra-EU flows of exports of primary goods (food, beverages, tobacco, agricultural commodities, non-ferrous metals, pearls, precious stones, and non-monetary gold), excluding oil (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 68 + 667 + 971)	
Manufactures	Extra-EU flows of exports of manufactured goods (chemical products, machinery, transport equipment, other manufactured products) (SITC 5 to 8 minus 667 and 68).	
Services	Extra-EU flows of exports of services in transport, construction, insurance, financial services, IT, the media, intellectual property, other business services, personal, cultural and leisure services, and public services	
Investments	Stock of foreign direct investment outside the EU	
Military presence		
Troops	Number of military personnel deployed in international missions and bases outside the EU	IISS – The Military Balance Report
Military equipment	Weighted sum of aircraft carriers, big ships, destroyers, frigates, nuclear-powered submarines, amphibious ships, medium and heavy strategic aeroplanes, and air tankers	
Soft presence		
Migration	Estimated number of immigrants from outside the EU	United Nations Population Division and Eurostat
Tourism	Thousands of arrivals of tourists from outside the EU	Statistics database of the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) and Eurostat
Sports	Weighted sum of points in the FIFA world ranking and medals won at summer Olympic Games for each EU member state Corrective variable: European audience at the World Cup Final and the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games	FIFA and ICO Reports by Kantar Media and Nielsen
Culture	Extra-EU exports of audiovisual services (cinematographic productions, radio and television programs, and musical recordings)	Eurostat
Information	Number of mentions in news of main international press agencies (Associated Press, Reuters, AFP, DPA, ITARTASS, EFE, ANSA, Xinhua) Internet bandwidth (Mbps)	Factiva database International Telecommunication Union
Technology	Foreign-oriented patents for the total EU member States: number of inter-related patent applications filed in one or more foreign countries to protect the same invention Corrective variable: patents registered for each member state in other member States	World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) – Statistics Database
Science	Number of European articles, notes, and reviews published in the fields of the arts and humanities, social sciences, and sciences	Clarivate Analytics – Web of Science, Primary Collection
Education	Number of non-EU foreign students in tertiary education in the EU	UNESCO – Institute for Statistics, OECD – iLibrary and Eurostat
Development cooperation	Total gross flows of official development aid for all member States	OECD
Scaling factors		
Economy	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices in US dollars	World Bank
Population	Number of inhabitants	World Bank

Table A.4. Variables, indicators, and sources of the Elcano European Presence Index

Variable	Indicator	Source
Economic presence		
Energy	Intra-EU flows of exports of energy products (oil, refined products and gas) (SITC 3)	Eurostat
Primary goods	Intra-EU flows of exports of primary goods (food, beverages, tobacco, agricultural commodities, non-ferrous metals, pearls, precious stones, and non-monetary gold), excluding oil (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 68 + 667+ 971)	
Manufactures	Intra-EU flows of manufactured goods (chemical products, machinery, transport equipment, other manufactured products) (SITC 5 to 8 minus 667 and 68).	
Services	Intra-EU flows of exports of services in transport, construction, insurance, financial services, IT, the media, intellectual property, other business services, personal, cultural and leisure services, and public services	
Investments	Stock of foreign direct investment in the EU	
Military presence		
Troops	Value zero for all countries and years	
Military equipment	Value zero for all countries and years	
Soft presence		
Migration	Estimated number of immigrants from within the EU	Eurostat
Tourism	Thousands of arrivals of tourists from within the EU	Eurostat
Sport	Weighted sum of points in the FIFA world ranking and medals won at the summer Olympic Games	FIFA and IOC
Culture	Intra-EU exports of audiovisual services (cinematographic productions, radio and television programmes, and musical recordings)	Eurostat and national sources
Information	Number of mentions in news of main European press agencies (Associated Press, Reuters, AFP, DPA, and EFE) Internet bandwidth (Mbps)	Factiva database International Telecommunication Union
Technology	Number of patents registered at the European Patent Office (EPO)	Eurostat
Science	Number of articles published in the fields of the arts and humanities, social sciences and sciences	Clarivate Analytics – Web of Science, Primary Collection
Education	Number of EU foreign students in tertiary education	Eurostat
Development cooperation	Value 0 for all countries and years	
Scaling factors		
Economy	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices in US dollars	Eurostat
Population	Number of inhabitants	Eurostat

Statistical annex

TABLE B.1.
Elcano Global Presence Index 2017

Country	Index value	Position	Position by dimension		
			Economic	Military	Soft
Algeria	18.1	61	61	32	83
Angola	11.8	72	54	73	99
Argentina	44.4	39	42	30	38
Australia	185.5	15	15	15	12
Austria	89.4	26	23	48	22
Azerbaijan	10.1	77	66	87	68
Bangladesh	31.8	50	70	19	70
Belarus	13.2	68	68	93	52
Belgium	171.5	16	11	53	21
Bolivia	3.5	101	98	82	102
Botswana	3.0	104	95	90	107
Brazil	118.9	19	22	18	18
Bulgaria	14.6	65	64	58	58
Cameroon	6.0	91	104	55	90
Canada	337.4	8	7	21	7
Chile	46.1	38	37	40	46
China	840.7	2	2	3	2
Colombia	36.4	46	46	46	31
Congo, DR	4.9	95	101	61	95
Costa Rica	6.5	89	75	101	81
Côte d'Ivoire	6.5	88	90	99	65
Croatia	13.6	67	65	83	54
Cuba	7.2	83	82	95	69
Cyprus	6.4	90	72	100	86
Czech Republic	46.1	37	35	71	35
Denmark	76.7	28	26	47	24
Dominican Republic	6.8	86	79	101	76

TABLE B.1.
Elcano Global Presence Index 2017

Country	Index value	Position	Position by dimension		
			Economic	Military	Soft
Ecuador	8.4	79	77	77	73
Egypt	51.7	35	57	20	29
El Salvador	2.9	106	102	81	105
Estonia	7.3	82	74	89	79
Ethiopia	50.8	36	103	9	77
Finland	44.2	40	34	65	44
France	531.6	5	6	4	5
Germany	618.5	4	3	13	4
Ghana	15.3	64	80	33	78
Greece	43.6	41	43	26	36
Guatemala	4.4	98	89	79	100
Honduras	3.3	103	92	91	106
Hungary	41.7	42	39	59	33
Iceland	4.3	99	84	101	94
India	202.4	13	16	7	16
Indonesia	58.6	32	31	22	61
Iran	40.0	44	45	27	41
Iraq	12.8	69	53	68	93
Ireland	96.2	24	19	70	43
Israel	52.4	34	33	42	40
Italy	271.1	10	10	8	10
Japan	518.1	6	5	6	6
Jordan	12.1	71	87	86	50
Kazakhstan	20.7	59	51	94	49
Kenya	25.9	55	94	23	55
Korea, Republic of	225.8	12	13	11	11
Kuwait	20.4	60	48	67	56
Latvia	4.7	97	85	96	89
Lebanon	13.8	66	62	101	53
Libya	5.8	93	76	85	92
Lithuania	9.7	78	67	84	74
Luxembourg	17.0	62	44	97	82

TABLE B.1.
Elcano Global Presence Index 2017

Country	Index value	Position	Position by dimension		
			Economic	Military	Soft
Malaysia	82.2	27	25	37	25
Malta	3.6	100	86	101	104
Mexico	99.5	23	21	50	27
Morocco	24.3	56	59	28	60
Myanmar	6.8	84	83	56	108
Netherlands	297.3	9	8	25	13
New Zealand	29.1	53	50	62	39
Nigeria	39.3	45	55	36	28
Norway	70.1	30	27	41	37
Oman	12.6	70	63	64	63
Pakistan	52.6	33	73	10	51
Panama	6.8	85	69	101	87
Paraguay	3.4	102	96	88	103
Peru	23.8	58	56	29	75
Philippines	36.3	47	40	44	48
Poland	69.0	31	29	52	23
Portugal	40.1	43	38	49	42
Qatar	28.8	54	41	54	57
Romania	33.5	49	47	39	45
Russia	380.3	7	17	2	8
Saudi Arabia	113.3	20	28	14	15
Senegal	11.6	74	106	35	80
Serbia	10.5	76	78	72	59
Singapore	127.7	17	14	43	32
Slovakia	17.0	63	49	78	66
Slovenia	11.7	73	60	74	67
South Africa	74.8	29	30	38	19
Spain	233.7	11	12	17	9
Sri Lanka	6.5	87	81	66	98
Sudan	2.9	105	107	80	91
Sweden	126.4	18	18	63	17
Switzerland	190.4	14	9	75	20

TABLE B.1.
Elcano Global Presence Index 2017

Country	Index value	Position	Position by dimension		
			Economic	Military	Soft
Syria	2.0	109	110	101	85
Tanzania	11.3	75	97	34	97
Thailand	95.2	25	24	24	30
Trinidad & Tobago	2.7	107	99	101	101
Tunisia	7.8	81	88	69	72
Turkey	106.1	22	32	12	14
Turkmenistan	4.9	96	71	101	110
Uganda	29.5	51	105	16	64
Ukraine	29.4	52	52	60	34
UAE	106.7	21	20	31	26
United Kingdom	636.7	3	4	5	3
United States	2,494.1	1	1	1	1
Uruguay	7.9	80	93	51	84
Uzbekistan	5.9	92	91	101	71
Venezuela	24.1	57	58	45	47
Vietnam	33.5	48	36	76	62
Yemen	2.4	108	109	92	88
Zambia	5.0	94	100	57	109
Zimbabwe	2.0	110	108	98	96

TABLE B.2.
Global presence position (selected years)

Country	1990	2000	2010	2017
Algeria	56	51	53	61
Angola	61	63	69	72
Argentina	24	31	38	39
Australia	14	14	13	15
Austria	21	26	21	26
Azerbaijan	–	97	76	77
Bangladesh	64	54	43	50
Belarus	–	66	71	68
Belgium	10	12	12	16
Bolivia	99	89	92	101
Botswana	94	106	108	104
Brazil	16	18	18	19
Bulgaria	59	70	65	65
Cameroon	78	98	100	91
Canada	8	7	8	8
Chile	36	49	45	38
China	11	10	5	2
Colombia	51	58	58	46
Congo, DR	92	110	106	95
Costa Rica	77	82	93	89
Côte d'Ivoire	66	78	84	88
Croatia	–	69	66	67
Cuba	62	75	75	83
Cyprus	86	88	74	90
Czech Republic	55	48	40	37
Denmark	25	21	24	28
Dominican Republic	81	80	88	86
Ecuador	65	71	80	79
Egypt	43	42	33	35
El Salvador	98	99	110	106
Estonia	–	84	83	82
Ethiopia	63	86	63	36
Finland	34	30	36	40

TABLE B.2.
Global presence position (selected years)

Country	1990	2000	2010	2017
France	4	4	4	5
Germany	5	3	3	4
Ghana	100	67	62	64
Greece	22	28	37	41
Guatemala	87	102	97	98
Honduras	91	90	104	103
Hungary	47	44	42	42
Iceland	83	100	94	99
India	15	17	15	13
Indonesia	32	34	35	32
Iran	27	43	46	44
Iraq	49	52	70	69
Ireland	35	29	19	24
Israel	39	32	41	34
Italy	7	8	10	10
Japan	6	5	6	6
Jordan	68	53	56	71
Kazakhstan	–	62	55	59
Kenya	71	68	77	55
Korea, Republic of	18	13	16	12
Kuwait	57	60	50	60
Latvia	–	85	87	97
Lebanon	80	72	72	66
Libya	46	59	60	93
Lithuania	–	87	79	78
Luxembourg	75	64	54	62
Malaysia	37	27	27	27
Malta	95	105	99	100
Mexico	28	19	25	23
Morocco	29	57	52	56
Myanmar	101	109	109	84
Netherlands	9	9	7	9
New Zealand	48	45	47	53
Nigeria	50	35	34	45
Norway	23	25	23	30

TABLE B.2.
Global presence position (selected years)

Country	1990	2000	2010	2017
Oman	74	74	78	70
Pakistan	31	47	32	33
Panama	93	101	90	85
Paraguay	88	103	105	102
Peru	30	55	51	58
Philippines	58	50	59	47
Poland	45	37	29	31
Portugal	42	36	39	43
Qatar	72	79	61	54
Romania	53	56	49	49
Russia	2	6	9	7
Saudi Arabia	20	22	22	20
Senegal	84	108	81	74
Serbia	54	83	82	76
Singapore	33	20	20	17
Slovakia	–	65	57	63
Slovenia	–	77	68	73
South Africa	38	41	31	29
Spain	12	11	11	11
Sri Lanka	76	94	85	87
Sudan	73	91	96	105
Sweden	19	15	17	18
Switzerland	17	16	14	14
Syria	41	39	89	109
Tanzania	82	95	95	75
Thailand	40	24	28	25
Trinidad & Tobago	85	92	103	107
Tunisia	69	73	73	81
Turkey	26	23	26	22
Turkmenistan	–	107	101	96
Uganda	90	33	67	51
Ukraine	–	38	44	52
UAE	67	40	30	21
United Kingdom	3	2	2	3
United States	1	1	1	1

TABLE B.2.
Global presence position (selected years)

Country	1990	2000	2010	2017
Uruguay	70	76	91	80
Uzbekistan	–	81	86	92
Venezuela	44	46	48	57
Vietnam	13	61	64	48
Yemen	97	93	102	108
Zambia	89	104	98	94
Zimbabwe	79	96	107	110

TABLE B.3.

Global presence contribution by dimension (2017, in %)

Country	Economic	Military	Soft
Algeria	37.0	50.1	12.9
Angola	80.8	9.4	9.8
Argentina	40.9	23.9	35.2
Australia	53.0	13.7	33.2
Austria	66.6	4.5	28.9
Azerbaijan	57.6	4.5	37.9
Bangladesh	16.0	72.6	11.4
Belarus	39.3	2.0	58.6
Belgium	81.3	2.1	16.6
Bolivia	50.9	18.0	31.1
Botswana	63.3	11.0	25.7
Brazil	51.0	19.8	29.2
Bulgaria	41.5	19.6	38.9
Cameroon	20.6	52.4	27.0
Canada	68.9	5.3	25.8
Chile	59.8	15.2	25.0
China	56.2	12.0	31.8
Colombia	38.4	12.0	49.6
Congo, DR	28.0	45.8	26.3
Costa Rica	61.4	0.0	38.6
Côte d'Ivoire	36.7	0.4	63.0
Croatia	44.1	4.2	51.7
Cuba	45.5	3.1	51.4
Cyprus	70.8	0.1	29.1
Czech Republic	61.8	2.9	35.3
Denmark	64.6	5.5	29.8
Dominican Republic	54.7	0.0	45.3
Ecuador	46.2	11.5	42.3
Egypt	16.5	42.6	40.9
El Salvador	46.3	24.1	29.6
Estonia	57.1	5.1	37.8
Ethiopia	2.5	91.5	6.0
Finland	65.9	4.3	29.8
France	53.5	18.6	27.9
Germany	65.3	4.4	30.3

TABLE B.3.
Global presence contribution by dimension (2017, in %)

Country	Economic	Military	Soft
Ghana	23.3	58.6	18.2
Greece	33.9	29.5	36.6
Guatemala	56.6	18.6	24.8
Honduras	65.9	9.7	24.4
Hungary	52.1	6.7	41.2
Iceland	68.9	0.0	31.1
India	48.1	31.3	20.6
Indonesia	62.0	30.2	7.9
Iran	35.0	29.8	35.2
Iraq	76.0	13.0	11.0
Ireland	84.1	1.6	14.3
Israel	60.0	12.0	28.0
Italy	52.8	21.7	25.5
Japan	57.6	14.9	27.5
Jordan	22.0	3.9	74.0
Kazakhstan	51.8	1.2	47.0
Kenya	7.6	67.7	24.7
Korea, Republic of	55.2	16.1	28.7
Kuwait	61.7	8.9	29.5
Latvia	61.9	3.0	35.2
Lebanon	46.1	0.0	53.9
Libya	67.1	8.3	24.6
Lithuania	59.2	5.0	35.8
Luxembourg	85.1	0.6	14.3
Malaysia	62.6	9.6	27.8
Malta	76.2	0.0	23.8
Mexico	73.6	3.9	22.5
Morocco	31.9	48.6	19.5
Myanmar	43.6	45.1	11.3
Netherlands	76.4	4.9	18.7
New Zealand	40.6	7.5	51.8
Nigeria	23.6	20.3	56.1
Norway	68.7	9.0	22.3
Oman	49.2	16.6	34.2
Pakistan	8.1	76.4	15.5

TABLE B.3.

Global presence contribution by dimension (2017, in %)

Country	Economic	Military	Soft
Panama	75.1	0.0	24.9
Paraguay	56.2	12.8	31.0
Peru	37.1	49.6	13.3
Philippines	58.0	13.3	28.7
Poland	60.3	5.2	34.5
Portugal	55.1	10.0	34.9
Qatar	69.0	11.0	20.0
Romania	39.4	21.4	39.2
Russia	25.6	54.8	19.6
Saudi Arabia	39.7	22.5	37.8
Senegal	7.0	69.5	23.5
Serbia	35.6	11.5	52.9
Singapore	81.4	4.8	13.8
Slovakia	71.5	5.4	23.1
Slovenia	57.9	9.4	32.7
South Africa	50.1	10.2	39.7
Spain	58.3	10.2	31.5
Sri Lanka	52.9	29.0	18.1
Sudan	24.9	26.5	48.6
Sweden	67.4	1.7	30.9
Switzerland	84.0	0.6	15.4
Syria	0.0	0.0	100.0
Tanzania	16.0	73.6	10.5
Thailand	59.6	18.2	22.1
Trinidad & Tobago	59.8	0.0	40.2
Tunisia	33.6	20.4	46.0
Turkey	31.6	27.5	41.0
Turkmenistan	92.6	0.0	7.4
Uganda	2.9	82.9	14.2
Ukraine	33.3	9.0	57.7
UAE	69.5	9.2	21.3
United Kingdom	50.5	13.2	36.3
United States	47.6	21.6	30.8
Uruguay	25.5	46.2	28.3
Uzbekistan	39.5	0.0	60.5

TABLE B.3.
Global presence contribution by dimension (2017, in %)

Country	Economic	Military	Soft
Venezuela	33.7	20.1	46.1
Vietnam	83.6	2.9	13.5
Yemen	19.0	12.2	68.9
Zambia	28.7	57.9	13.5
Zimbabwe	34.8	2.3	62.9

TABLE B.4.
Global presence share (selected years, in %)

Country	1990	2000	2010	2017
Algeria	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Angola	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Argentina	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4
Australia	1.3	1.4	1.8	1.7
Austria	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.8
Azerbaijan	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Bangladesh	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.3
Belarus	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Belgium	1.7	1.7	2.1	1.5
Bolivia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Botswana	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Brazil	1.2	0.9	1.0	1.1
Bulgaria	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Cameroon	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Canada	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.0
Chile	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4
China	1.6	2.2	4.6	7.6
Colombia	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3
Congo, DR	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Costa Rica	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Côte d'Ivoire	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Croatia	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Cuba	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Cyprus	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Czech Republic	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4
Denmark	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.7
Dominican Republic	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Ecuador	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Egypt	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5
El Salvador	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Estonia	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Ethiopia	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.5
Finland	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4

TABLE B.4.
Global presence share (selected years, in %)

Country	1990	2000	2010	2017
France	6.6	5.7	5.8	4.8
Germany	6.4	6.1	6.4	5.6
Ghana	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Greece	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4
Guatemala	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Honduras	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hungary	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Iceland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
India	1.2	0.9	1.7	1.8
Indonesia	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5
Iran	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.4
Iraq	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1
Ireland	0.4	0.5	1.0	0.9
Israel	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.5
Italy	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.4
Japan	5.6	5.3	4.1	4.7
Jordan	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1
Kazakhstan	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Kenya	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2
Korea, Republic of	1.0	1.4	1.7	2.0
Kuwait	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Latvia	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Lebanon	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Libya	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.1
Lithuania	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Luxembourg	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2
Malaysia	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7
Malta	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mexico	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.9
Morocco	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2
Myanmar	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Netherlands	2.3	2.4	3.3	2.7
New Zealand	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Nigeria	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.4
Norway	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6

TABLE B.4.
Global presence share (selected years, in %)

Country	1990	2000	2010	2017
Oman	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Pakistan	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5
Panama	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Paraguay	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Peru	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2
Philippines	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3
Poland	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6
Portugal	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4
Qatar	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3
Romania	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
Russia	10.2	4.3	3.2	3.4
Saudi Arabia	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.0
Senegal	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Serbia	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1
Singapore	0.4	0.8	1.0	1.2
Slovakia	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2
Slovenia	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
South Africa	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7
Spain	1.4	2.0	2.8	2.1
Sri Lanka	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Sudan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sweden	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1
Switzerland	1.1	1.1	1.7	1.7
Syria	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.0
Tanzania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Thailand	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.9
Trinidad & Tobago	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Tunisia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Turkey	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.0
Turkmenistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uganda	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.3
Ukraine	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.3
UAE	0.1	0.4	0.6	1.0
United Kingdom	7.3	7.8	6.7	5.8
United States	26.1	29.9	22.5	22.5

TABLE B.4.
Global presence share (selected years, in %)

Country	1990	2000	2010	2017
Uruguay	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Uzbekistan	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Venezuela	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2
Vietnam	1.3	0.1	0.1	0.3
Yemen	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zambia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zimbabwe	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

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