

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2018

Measuring the impact of terrorism



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**NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE
STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM**

A CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
LED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

SPECIAL THANKS to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence led by the University of Maryland, for their cooperation on this study and for providing the Institute for Economics and Peace with their Global Terrorism Database (GTD) datasets on terrorism.

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Executive Summary

This is the sixth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 20 years, covering the period from the beginning of 1998 to the end of 2017.

The GTI is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. The GTD contains over 170,000 terrorist incidents for the period 1970 to 2017.

Deaths from terrorism fell for the third consecutive year, after peaking in 2014. The total number of deaths fell by 27 per cent between 2016 and 2017, with the largest falls occurring in Iraq and Syria. Iraq recorded over 5,000 fewer deaths from terrorism in 2017, while Syria recorded over 1,000 fewer deaths. The fall in deaths was reflected in scores on the GTI, with 94 countries improving, compared to 46 that deteriorated. This is the highest number of countries to record a year on year improvement since 2004 and reflects the increased emphasis placed on countering terrorism around the world since the surge in violence in 2013.

The large falls in the number of deaths in Iraq and Syria is mainly the result of ISIL's continuing decline. The number of deaths from terrorist attacks attributed to ISIL fell by 52 per cent in 2017, with total incidents falling by 22 per cent. There was a corresponding decrease in the lethality of attacks, highlighting the weakening capacity of the organisation. ISIL has now lost most of its territory and sources of revenue and is actively redirecting resources away from the Middle East and into North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia.

Despite its reduced capacity, ISIL remained the deadliest terrorist group globally in 2017. The decline of ISIL has also been reflected in the level of terrorist activity in Europe, with the number of deaths falling by 75 per cent, from 827 in 2016 to 204 in 2017. Preliminary data for 2018 suggests this trend will continue, as less than ten deaths from terrorism have been recorded in Western Europe from January to October 2018. Afghanistan was the country that recorded the highest number of terrorism deaths in 2017. The number of deaths was approximately the same as the prior year.

Angola and Spain had the largest deteriorations in score in the GTI. Angola's score deteriorated because of a gas attack on a Jehovah's Witnesses convention which left 405 people injured, but resulted in no fatalities. Spain's score deteriorated because of the attacks in Barcelona in August 2017. Spain also recorded one of the five largest deteriorations on the Global Peace Index for 2017, highlighting broader concerns related to social unrest.

Somalia and Egypt recorded the largest increases in the number of deaths from terrorism in 2017. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab was responsible for the single largest terrorist attack in 2017, when a truck bomb detonated outside a hotel, killing 587 people. Egypt experienced the second largest terrorist attack of 2017, when the Sinai Province of the Islamic State attacked the al-Rawda mosque, killing 311 people and injuring 122. The attack was the deadliest in Egyptian history.

Europe was the region with the biggest improvement from the impact of terrorism and recorded a marked fall in terrorist activity, despite the threat of returnees and online radicalisation. The number of deaths in Western Europe fell from 168 in 2016 to 81 in 2017. Turkey, France, Belgium, and Germany recorded the most significant falls, with only the UK, Spain, Sweden, Finland, and Austria registering increases.

Despite the fall in deaths, the number of terrorist incidents increased to 282 in Europe, up from 253 in the prior year. Furthermore, eight countries in Western Europe recorded at least one death from terrorism in 2017, the highest number in the past twenty years. The decreased lethality of terrorist attacks in Western Europe indicates that ISIL's ability to plan and coordinate larger scale terrorist attacks has reduced, and that increased counterterrorism measures are working, at least in the short term.

Although the total number of deaths from terrorism has fallen, the impact of terrorism remains widespread. In 2017, 67 countries experienced at least one death from terrorism, which is the second highest number of countries recording one death in the past twenty years. However, it is a fall from the peak of 79 countries in 2016. There were 19 countries that recorded over a hundred deaths from terrorism in 2017, and five that recorded more than a thousand.

The global economic impact of terrorism was US\$52 billion in 2017, 42 per cent lower than in 2016. Compared to other forms of violence such as homicide, armed conflict, and military expenditure, terrorism is a small percentage of the total global cost of violence, which was equal to 14.76 trillion dollars (PPP) in 2017. It should be noted that the figures for terrorism are conservative as they do not account for the indirect impacts on business, investment and the costs associated with security agencies in countering terrorism. Terrorism also has wide-ranging economic consequences that have the potential to spread quickly through the global economy with significant social ramifications.


Conflict remains the primary driver of terrorism in most countries throughout the world. The ten countries with the highest impact of terrorism are all engaged in at least one conflict. These ten countries accounted for 84 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2017. When combined with countries with high levels of political terror the number jumps to over 99 per cent. Political terror involves extra-judicial killings, torture and imprisonment without trial.

In countries with high levels of economic development, factors other than conflict and human rights abuses are more strongly correlated with the impact of terrorism. Social alienation, lack of economic opportunity, and involvement in an external conflict are the major factors associated with terrorist activity in Western Europe, North America, and other highly economically-developed regions.

There is a growing body of evidence which indicates that people in Western Europe with a criminal background may be especially susceptible to alignment with extremist beliefs, radicalisation, and possible recruitment by terrorist groups. Most of the studies conducted in Western Europe find that more than 40 per cent of foreign fighters and those arrested for terrorist activity have some form of criminal background. This pattern of recruitment is of particular concern for countries in Western Europe, with the number of returning foreign fighters expected to grow in the years ahead as ISIL continues to crumble in Iraq and Syria.

Although the fall in the impact of terrorism has been consistent for the past three years, there are areas in which the threat of terrorism looks set to increase in the near future. The collapse of ISIL in Iraq and Syria has moved the group's activities elsewhere, in particular to the Maghreb and Sahel regions, most notably in Libya, Niger, and Mali, and Southeast Asia, most notably the Philippines. Additionally, there has also been a resurgence of the pastoral conflict in Nigeria over the past year, with Fulani extremists carrying out a number of high-profile attacks in the past six months.

Elsewhere, the threat of far-right political terrorism is on the rise. There were 66 deaths from terrorism caused by far-right groups and individuals from 113 attacks for the years from 2013 to 2017. Of those, 17 deaths and 47 attacks occurred in 2017 alone. In Western Europe, there were 12 attacks in the UK, six in Sweden, and two each in Greece and France. In the US, there were 30 attacks in 2017 which resulted in 16 deaths. The majority of attacks were carried out by lone actors with far-right, white nationalist, or anti-Muslim beliefs.



“Deaths from terrorism fell for the third consecutive year, after peaking in 2014. The total number of deaths fell by 27 per cent between 2016 and 2017, with the largest falls occurring in Iraq and Syria.”

Key Findings

1

Results

- Deaths from terrorism decreased by 27 per cent from 2016 to 2017. There were 18,814 deaths in 2017.
- Ninety-four countries improved their scores on the GTI, while 46 deteriorated.
- Afghanistan had more deaths from terrorism than any other country in 2017, overtaking Iraq.
- Despite severe territorial and financial losses, Islamic State remained the deadliest terrorist group in 2017, even though deaths attributed to the group fell by 52 per cent from the prior year.
- Iraq had the largest reduction in the number of deaths in 2017, with deaths falling from 7,368 to 3,554, a 56 per cent reduction. This was the lowest number of deaths from terrorism in Iraq since 2012.
- Egypt and Somalia had the largest increases in deaths from terrorism, with deaths increasing by 123 per cent and 93 per cent respectively.
- Al-Shabaab committed the deadliest attack of 2017, which killed 587 people. In Egypt, the Islamic State-Sinai Province carried out the second deadliest attack, which killed 311 people.
- 67 countries recorded at least one death from terrorism in 2017. This is the second highest number of countries since 2002, but a significant fall from the 79 countries that recorded at least one death in 2016.
- Europe had the biggest year on year percentage improvement, with total deaths falling by 75 per cent. France, Germany, and Belgium all recorded significant falls in deaths from terrorism.
- The estimated economic impact of terrorism in 2017 was US\$52 billion. However, the true economic impact of terrorism is likely to be much higher.

2

Trends in Terrorism

- This is the third consecutive year that number of deaths from terrorism has decreased. Deaths are now 44 per cent below their peak in 2014.
- When compared to the peak of terrorist deaths in 2014, the largest falls in the number of deaths occurred in Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan, with falls of 6,466, 5,950, and 912 deaths respectively.
- Every region in the world recorded a higher average impact of terrorism in 2017 than in 2002. The increase in the impact of terrorism was greatest in the Middle East and North Africa, followed by sub-Saharan Africa.
- The lethality of terrorist attacks has declined as the operational capacity of groups like ISIL has fallen over the past three years. Twenty per cent of terrorist attacks were unsuccessful in 2017, compared to just over 12 per cent in 2014.
- Bombings and armed assaults have been the most common form of terrorist attack every year for the past twenty years.
- Over 99 per cent of all deaths from terrorism have occurred in countries involved in a violent conflict or with high levels of political terror.
- Battle deaths and deaths from terrorism have moved in tandem in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and Pakistan.
- Terrorist attacks have been more lethal on average in conflict-affected countries than countries not in conflict for every year bar one since 2002.
- In 2017, terrorist attacks in conflict-affected countries killed an average of 2.4 people per attack, compared to 0.84 in countries without conflict.
- In Western Europe, deaths fell by 52 per cent, from 168 in 2016 to 81 in 2017. From January until October 2018, fewer than ten deaths were recorded in the region.
- Despite the fall in deaths, the number of incidents rose in Western Europe. Increased counter-terrorism spending and security measures have reduced the lethality of attacks.
- Far-right terrorism is a growing concern. The number of deaths from terrorism associated with far-right groups and individuals has increased from three in 2014, to 17 in 2017.

3

Emerging Hotspots of Terrorism

- The level of violence and terrorist activity in Iraq and Syria has fallen considerably in the last two years. Iraq recorded the biggest fall in 2017, a trend which seems to have continued in 2018.
- ISIL has lost most of its territory and sources of revenue in Syria and Iraq. However, affiliate groups in other regions are becoming more active.
- In the Maghreb and Sahel regions of Northern Africa, there has been a resurgence of terrorist activity in the past two years, most notably of Al-Qa'ida. As of March 2018 there were more than 9,000 members of terrorist groups active in the region, mostly concentrated in Libya and Algeria.
- In Nigeria in 2018, there has been a dramatic increase in violence involving Fulani extremists even as deaths committed by Boko Haram are falling.
- In Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Myanmar recorded the highest number of deaths from terrorism in 2017 since 2002.

4

Patterns in Terrorist Recruitment

- Conflict and political terror are the primary drivers of terrorist activity.
- In countries with high levels of economic development other factors are more closely linked to terrorism, such as social cohesion, alienation, and involvement in external conflict.
- In Western Europe, individuals with a history of criminality are especially susceptible to recruitment. Best estimates suggest that between 40 and 60 per cent of ISIL foreign fighters have a criminal background.
- Extremists groups provide a 'redemption narrative' for alienated young people with a criminal background, whilst also allowing them to use their illicit skills and networks.
- The number of returnee foreign fighters is expected to increase in the coming year. Some estimates suggest that over 40,000 foreign fighters have joined ISIL in Syria and Iraq since the beginning of 2013.
- Different countries place different emphases on punishment and rehabilitation for foreign fighters. Countries with majority Muslim populations are more likely to focus on de-radicalisation and rehabilitation while Western countries are more likely to rely on punitive approaches.

About the Global Terrorism Index

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive study analysing the impact of terrorism for 163 countries and which covers 99.7 per cent of the world's population.

Given the significant resources committed to counter terrorism by governments across the world, it is important to analyse and aggregate the available data to better understand its various properties.

Examples of the information contained in this study are:

- The differing socio-economic conditions under which it occurs.
- The longer term trends and how terrorism changes over time.
- The geopolitical drivers associated with terrorism and ideological aims of terrorist groups.
- The types of strategies deployed by terrorists, their tactical targets and how these have evolved over time.

In this context, one of the key aims of the GTI is to examine these trends. It also aims to help inform a positive, practical debate about the future of terrorism and the required policy responses.

The GTI is based on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD): the most authoritative data source on terrorism today. The GTI produces a composite score so as to provide an ordinal ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism. The GTD is unique in that it consists of systematically and comprehensively coded data for 170,000 terrorist incidents.

The GTI was developed in consultation with the Global Peace Index Expert Panel. The GTI scores each country on a scale from 0 to 10; where 0 represents no impact from terrorism and 10 represents the highest measurable impact of terrorism. Countries are ranked in descending order with the worst scores listed first in the index.

Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is no single internationally accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism and the terrorism literature abounds with competing definitions and typologies. IEP accepts the terminology and definitions agreed to by the GTD and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

The GTI therefore defines terrorism as 'the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.'

This definition recognises that terrorism is not only the physical act of an attack but also the psychological impact it has on a

society for many years after. Therefore, the index score accounts for terrorist attacks over the prior five years.

In order to be included as an incident in the GTD, the act has to be 'an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.' This means an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

1. The incident must be intentional - the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence - including property damage as well as violence against people.
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism.

In addition to this baseline definition, two of the following three criteria have to be met in order to be included in the START database from 1997:

- The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.
- The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience other than to the immediate victims.
- The violent act was outside the precepts of international humanitarian law.

In cases where there is insufficient information to make a definitive distinction about whether it is a terrorist incident within the confines of the definition, the database codes these incidents as 'doubt terrorism proper'. In order to only count unambiguous incidents of terrorism, this study does not include doubted incidents.

It is important to understand how incidents are counted. According to the GTD codebook, 'incidents occurring in both the same geographic and temporal point will be regarded as a single incident, but if either the time of the occurrence of the incidents or their locations are discontinuous, the events will be regarded as separate incidents.'

Illustrative examples from the GTD codebook are as follows:

- Four truck bombs explode nearly simultaneously in different parts of a major city. This represents four incidents.
- A bomb goes off and while police are working on

“Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is no single internationally-accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism, and the terrorism literature abounds with competing definitions and typologies.”

the scene the next day, they are attacked by terrorists with automatic weapons. These are two separate incidents as they were not continuous given the time lag between the two events.

- A group of militants shoot and kill five guards at a perimeter checkpoint of a petroleum refinery and then proceeds to set explosives and destroy the refinery. This is one incident since it occurred in a single location (the petroleum refinery) and was one continuous event.
- A group of hijackers diverts a plane to Senegal and, while at an airport in Senegal, shoots two Senegalese policemen. This is one incident since the hijacking was still in progress at the time of the shooting and hence the two events occurred at the same time and in the same place.


2018 GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

MEASURING THE IMPACT
OF TERRORISM

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE
1	Iraq	9.746	↔	29	Saudi Arabia	5.479	↓ 3	57	Canada	3.527	↑ 9
2	Afghanistan	9.391	↔	30	France	5.475	↓ 7	58	Chile	3.454	↑ 2
3	Nigeria	8.660	↔	31	Palestine	5.330	↓ 1	59	Paraguay	3.443	↓ 2
4	Syria	8.315	↔	32	Burundi	5.316	↓ 4	60	Jordan	3.404	↓ 9
5	Pakistan	8.181	↔	33	Nepal	5.295	↑ 11	61	Rep of the Congo	3.368	↓ 14
6	Somalia	8.020	↑ 1	34	Russia	5.230	↓ 1	61	Tanzania	3.368	↓ 3
7	India	7.568	↑ 1	35	Lebanon	5.154	↓ 6	63	Cote d' Ivoire	3.276	↓ 10
8	Yemen	7.534	↓ 2	36	China	5.108	↓ 5	64	Kuwait	3.126	↓ 14
9	Egypt	7.345	↑ 2	37	Burkina Faso	4.811	↑ 6	65	Ireland	3.045	↓ 1
10	Philippines	7.181	↑ 2	38	Chad	4.752	↓ 4	66	Peru	2.950	↑ 6
11	Dem. Rep Congo	7.055	↑ 2	39	Germany	4.601	↓ 1	67	Japan	2.926	↓ 9
12	Turkey	7.036	↓ 3	40	Mozambique	4.579	↓ 1	68	Australia	2.827	↓ 3
13	Libya	6.987	↓ 3	41	Israel	4.578	↓ 5	69	Italy	2.736	↔
14	South Sudan	6.756	↔	42	Indonesia	4.543	↔	70	Malaysia	2.700	↓ 9
15	Central African Rep	6.719	↑ 4	43	Angola	4.473	↑ 76	71	Kosovo	2.694	↔
16	Cameroon	6.615	↓ 1	44	Iran	4.399	↑ 8	72	Madagascar	2.613	↓ 9
17	Thailand	6.252	↓ 1	45	Greece	4.291	↑ 1	73	Finland	2.501	↑ 3
18	Sudan	6.178	↔	46	South Africa	4.263	↑ 1	74	Tajikistan	2.233	↓ 4
19	Kenya	6.114	↑ 3	47	Tunisia	4.088	↓ 6	75	Kazakhstan	2.228	↓ 8
20	USA	6.066	↑ 12	48	Belgium	4.060	↓ 8	76	Rwanda	2.177	↑ 5
21	Ukraine	6.048	↓ 4	49	Sri Lanka	4.048	↑ 19	77	Papua New Guinea	2.040	↑ 86
22	Mali	6.015	↑ 3	50	Spain	4.024	↑ 36	78	Netherlands	1.960	↓ 5
23	Niger	6.004	↓ 3	51	Sweden	3.936	↑ 3	79	Austria	1.852	↑ 10
24	Myanmar	5.916	↑ 13	52	Uganda	3.926	↓ 7	80	Kyrgyz Republic	1.719	↓ 1
25	Bangladesh	5.697	↓ 4	53	Bahrain	3.883	↑ 2	81	Haiti	1.714	↓ 8
26	Ethiopia	5.631	↓ 2	54	Algeria	3.763	↓ 5	81	Honduras	1.714	↑ 6
27	Colombia	5.611	↔	55	Venezuela	3.665	↑ 1	83	Armenia	1.692	↓ 8
28	United Kingdom	5.610	↑ 7	56	Mexico	3.533	↑ 6	84	Argentina	1.680	↑ 13



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	RANK CHANGE
85	Laos	1.675	↓ 5	113	Bulgaria	0.315	↓ 19	138	Benin	0.000	↔
86	Zimbabwe	1.569	↑ 30	114	New Zealand	0.286	↓ 11	138	Botswana	0.000	↔
87	Czech Republic	1.562	↓ 3	114	South Korea	0.286	↓ 11	138	Costa Rica	0.000	↔
88	Ecuador	1.471	↓ 5	116	Moldova	0.229	↓ 11	138	Cuba	0.000	↔
89	Georgia	1.422	↓ 12	116	Estonia	0.229	↓ 10	138	El Salvador	0.000	↔
90	Brazil	1.388	↓ 3	116	Serbia	0.229	↑ 9	138	Equatorial Guinea	0.000	↔
91	Bosnia & Herzegovina	1.339	↓ 12	119	Liberia	0.210	↑ 2	138	Eritrea	0.000	↔
92	Cyprus	1.206	↓ 9	120	Guatemala	0.205	↓ 14	138	Lithuania	0.000	↔
93	Gabon	1.198	↑ 70	121	Lesotho	0.191	↓ 11	138	Mauritania	0.000	↔
94	Jamaica	1.091	↑ 32	122	Ghana	0.162	↓ 11	138	Mauritius	0.000	↔
95	Sierra Leone	1.066	↑ 7	123	Norway	0.153	↑ 40	138	Mongolia	0.000	↔
96	Senegal	1.012	↓ 11	124	Switzerland	0.134	↓ 12	138	Namibia	0.000	↔
97	Albania	1.008	↓ 6	125	Trinidad and Tobago	0.124	↓ 12	138	North Korea	0.000	↔
98	Azerbaijan	0.957	↓ 3	126	Slovakia	0.115	↓ 12	138	Oman	0.000	↔
99	Taiwan	0.943	↑ 6	127	United Arab Emirates	0.105	↓ 12	138	Portugal	0.000	↔
100	Denmark	0.817	↓ 10	128	Guyana	0.076	↓ 10	138	Romania	0.000	↔
101	Nicaragua	0.747	↓ 9	128	Panama	0.076	↓ 10	138	Singapore	0.000	↔
102	Poland	0.719	↑ 8	130	Iceland	0.057	↓ 10	138	Slovenia	0.000	↔
103	Djibouti	0.705	↓ 7	130	Qatar	0.057	↓ 9	138	Eswatini	0.000	↔
104	Vietnam	0.663	↑ 58	132	Montenegro	0.038	↓ 9	138	The Gambia	0.000	↔
104	Zambia	0.663	↑ 58	132	Morocco	0.038	↓ 9	138	Timor-Leste	0.000	↔
106	Macedonia (FYR)	0.649	↓ 13	132	Uzbekistan	0.038	↓ 9	138	Togo	0.000	↔
107	Latvia	0.458	↑ 55	135	Bhutan	0.019	↓ 5	138	Turkmenistan	0.000	↔
107	Malawi	0.458	↑ 55	135	Cambodia	0.019	↓ 5				
109	Dominican Republic	0.382	↓ 11	137	Croatia	0.014	↓ 5				
110	Hungary	0.363	↓ 11	138	Belarus	0.000	↓ 32				
111	Uruguay	0.344	↓ 11	138	Guinea-Bissau	0.000	↓ 32				
112	Guinea	0.324	↓ 11	138	Bolivia	0.000	↓ 30				

TERRORIST INCIDENTS


The twenty most fatal terrorist attacks in 2017

● All attacks in 2017 scaled by number of fatalities

○ Worst attacks in 2017



					DESCRIPTION
1	COUNTRY SOMALIA	CITY MOGADISHU	DEATHS 588		A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden truck outside the Safari Hotel at the K5 intersection in Hodan neighbourhood, Mogadishu, Somalia.
	DATE 14/10/2017	GROUP AL-SHABAAB			
2	COUNTRY EGYPT	CITY BEIR AL-ABD	DEATHS 311		Assailants detonated an explosive device and opened fire on Al-Rawda mosque in Al-Rawda, Beir al-Abd, North Sinai, Egypt.
	DATE 24/11/2018	GROUP SINAI PROVINCE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE			
3	COUNTRY IRAQ	CITY MOSUL	DEATHS 230		Assailants stormed a residential building and took civilians hostages in Maawsil al-Jadidah neighbourhood, Mosul, Nineveh, Iraq.
	DATE 17/3/2017	GROUP ISIL			
4	COUNTRY IRAQ	CITY TAL AFAR	DEATHS 200		Assailants abducted 200 Turkmen civilians from Tal Afar, Nineveh, Iraq. The hostages were executed on July 4, 2017.
	DATE 4/6/2017	GROUP ISIL			
5	COUNTRY IRAQ	CITY MOSUL	DEATHS 163		Snipers opened fire on fleeing civilians in Zanjili neighbourhood, Mosul, Iraq.
	DATE 1/6/2017	GROUP ISIL			
6	COUNTRY LIBYA	CITY BRAK	DEATHS 141		Assailants attacked Brak al-Shati Airbase near Brak, Wadi Al Shatii, Libya.
	DATE 18/5/2017	GROUP MISRATA BRIGADES			
7	COUNTRY CAR	CITY ALINDAO	DEATHS 133		Assailants attacked civilians in Alindao, Basse-Kotto, Central African Republic (CAR).
	DATE 8/5/2017	GROUP UNION FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AFRICA (UPC)			
8	COUNTRY SYRIA	CITY QARYATAYN	DEATHS 128		Assailants overtook the town and abducted approximately 128 residents in Qaryatayn, Homs, Syria. All 128 hostages were executed.
	DATE 2/10/2017	GROUP ISIL			
9	COUNTRY SYRIA	CITY ALEPPO	DEATHS 127		A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle near an evacuation bus convoy in Rashidin neighbourhood, Aleppo, Syria.
	DATE 15/4/2017	GROUP JAYSH AL-ISLAM (SYRIA)			
10	COUNTRY CAR	CITY BANGASSOU	DEATHS 108		Assailants armed with projectiles and firearms attacked Muslim civilians and a UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR base.
	DATE 13/5/2017	GROUP ANTI-BALAKA MILITIA			



					DESCRIPTION		
11	COUNTRY	IRAQ	CITY	MOSUL	DEATHS	100	Assailants detonated explosives at the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul, Nineveh, Iraq.
	DATE	21/6/2017	GROUP	ISIL			
12	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	KABUL	DEATHS	93	A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden sewage tanker near Zanaq Square in Wazir Akbar Khan, Kabul, Afghanistan.
	DATE	31/5/2017	GROUP	IS - KHORASAN CHAPTER			
13	COUNTRY	PAKISTAN	CITY	SEHWAN	DEATHS	91	A suicide bomber detonated at Lal Shahbaz Qalandar Sufi Shrine in Sehwan, Sindh, Pakistan.
	DATE	16/2/2017	GROUP	IS - KHORASAN CHAPTER			
14	COUNTRY	SOMALIA	CITY	AF URUR	DEATHS	77	A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle near a Somali National Army (SNA) base in Af-Urur, Bari, Somalia.
	DATE	8/6/2017	GROUP	AL-SHABAAB			
15	COUNTRY	SYRIA	CITY	DEIR EZ-ZOR	DEATHS	76	A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle at a refugee centre between Deir ez-Zor and Jafrah in Deir ez-Zor governorate, Syria.
	DATE	4/11/2017	GROUP	ISIL			
16	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	GARDEZ	DEATHS	74	Suicide bombers detonated explosives-laden vehicles outside a police compound and training centre in Gardez, Paktia, Afghanistan.
	DATE	17/10/2017	GROUP	TALIBAN			
17	COUNTRY	NIGERIA	CITY	ZAKI BIAM	DEATHS	73	Assailants opened fire at a market in Zaki Biam, Benue, Nigeria.
	DATE	20/3/2017	GROUP	FULANI EXTREMISTS			
18	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	GOMAL DISTRICT	DEATHS	72	Assailants attacked police posts and the district centre in Gomal, Paktika, Afghanistan.
	DATE	2/8/2017	GROUP	TALIBAN			
19	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	MIRZA WULANG	DEATHS	72	Assailants attacked civilians and security personnel in Mirza Wulang, Sari Pul, Afghanistan. Clashes ensued that lasted until August 5, 2017.
	DATE	3/8/2017	GROUP	TALIBAN			
20	COUNTRY	NIGERIA	CITY	JIBI	DEATHS	69	Assailants opened fire on a Frontier Exploration Services team convoy.
	DATE	25/7/2017	GROUP	BOKO HARAM			



Results

TERRORISM IN 2017

A fall in the intensity of conflict in the Middle East, the decline of ISIL, and an increase in counterterrorism activity has meant that the total number of deaths from terrorism declined for the third consecutive year, falling by 27 per cent to 18,814 deaths in 2017. This compares to 25,774 the year before. The number of deaths has now fallen 44 per cent from its peak in 2014.

The year on year fall in deaths was mirrored by a fall in the number of attacks, which fell 23 per cent from 2016 to 2017. Preliminary data for 2018 suggests that despite the intensification of conflict in some areas, most notably Nigeria, the downward trend will continue.

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) found that the decrease in the impact of terrorism was spread across many countries, with many more improving than deteriorating. Ninety-four countries improved their score, compared to only 46 that deteriorated. Similarly, there was a fall in the number of terrorist attacks in 61

countries, while 51 countries had a reduction in the total number of deaths from terrorism.


The single greatest improvement occurred in Iraq, where the number of deaths fell from 9,783 in 2016 to 4,271 in 2017, a 56 per cent improvement. This fall in deaths in Iraq meant that the highest number of deaths from terrorism in 2017 was recorded in Afghanistan, marking only the third time in the last 15 years that Iraq did not have the highest number of deaths from terrorism.

Figure 1.1 shows the composition of deaths from terrorism by country for 2016 and 2017. Of the countries that experienced the most deaths from terrorism, only Somalia saw a significant increase, with a small increase also occurring in Afghanistan.

Although the number of deaths from terrorism is now at its lowest level since 2013, it is still a major global threat. Deaths remain substantially higher than a decade ago, and are still nearly three times as high as the number recorded in 2001. Terrorism also remains a widespread problem, with 67 countries experiencing at least one death in 2017, and 19 countries recording over 100 deaths.

FIGURE 1.1
Total terrorism deaths by country, 2016–2017

Total deaths from terrorism fell 27% from 2016 to 2017.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

CONFLICT AND TERRORISM


Just ten countries accounted for 84 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2017. All ten of these countries were classified as being ‘in conflict’ by the UCDP’s Armed Conflict Dataset, meaning that they had at least one conflict which led to 25 or more battle-related deaths. Furthermore, of these ten, eight were classified as being involved in at least one war, meaning a conflict that resulted in over 1,000 deaths in a calendar year. Only Egypt and India were classified as having ‘minor conflicts’.

Conflict continues to be a major driver of terrorist activity. Battle-related deaths and deaths from terrorism are closely correlated across countries. In 2017, just under 95 per cent of total deaths from terrorism occurred in countries involved in at least one violent conflict. When countries in conflict are combined with countries with high levels of *political terror*, the number climbs to 99 per cent. Terrorist attacks in conflict-affected countries are also more lethal, killing 2.4 people per attack on average, compared to 0.84 people in non-conflict countries in 2017.

FIGURE 1.2

Deaths from terrorism by country, 2017

Ten countries accounted for 84% of deaths from terrorism.




Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

FIGURE 1.3

Largest decreases in deaths from terrorism, 2016–2017

Iraq recorded over 5,500 fewer deaths from terrorism in 2017.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

One of the major factors behind the improvement in terrorism is the fall in the level of violent conflict in the Middle-East and North Africa, most notably Iraq and Syria. Figure 1.2 shows the composition of deaths from terrorism for 2017.

For the first time since 2013, Afghanistan accounted for the highest percentage of deaths from terrorism, with a quarter of total deaths, although the number of deaths remained steady from 2016 to 2017. Both battle-related deaths and deaths from terrorism have risen considerably in Afghanistan since 2012, with the former increasing 151 per cent and the latter just under 70 per cent over that period.

Battle-related deaths and deaths from terrorism have also fallen in tandem in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria, which comprise 23 per cent, eight per cent, and six per cent of deaths from terrorism respectively.

INCREASES AND DECREASES IN TERRORISM

Figure 1.3 highlights the countries that experienced the largest decreases in the number of deaths from terrorism from 2016 to 2017. Iraq and Syria experienced the biggest falls, with the territorial losses suffered by ISIL severely restricting its ability to carry out terrorist attacks in these two countries.


Turkey also had a significant fall in ISIL activity, along with fewer attacks from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). The fall in deaths in France was indicative of a broader trend in Europe, where the level of ISIL and ISIL-inspired terrorist activity fell significantly, despite high-profile attacks in Barcelona and the United Kingdom. This trend of decreased terrorist activity in Western Europe has continued into the first nine months of 2018.

The fall in terrorism deaths in Iraq is all the more striking given

FIGURE 1.4

Largest increases in deaths from terrorism, 2016–2017

Deaths from terrorism increased by 93% in Somalia from 2016 to 2017.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

its recent history. In 2016, Iraq was the country that experienced the greatest increase in terrorism, with deaths rising 40 per cent from 2015 to 2016.

Since the peak of violence in 2014, deaths from terrorism in Iraq have fallen by just over 60 per cent, with a concurrent 24 per cent reduction in conflict-related deaths. The decrease in the impact of terrorism can be attributed to the near total defeat of ISIL in Iraq, the consequent decrease in internal conflict and a rise in political stability. Notably, Iraq was one of biggest improvers in peacefulness on the 2018 Global Peace Index, although it remains one of the five least peaceful countries in the world.

Figure 1.4 highlights the countries with the largest increases in deaths from terrorism in 2017. While the increases were overshadowed by much more significant decreases elsewhere, there were a number of countries with worrying rises in terrorism deaths.

The country with the largest total increase in terrorism compared to the prior year was Somalia where the number of deaths rose by 708, a 93 per cent increase. The terrorist group Al-Shabaab was responsible for the single largest terrorist attack in the world in 2017, which killed 588 people and accounted for most of the increase in Somalia.

There was also a worrying increase in the number of deaths from terrorism in Egypt, where deaths rose by 123 per cent. The

“The total number of deaths from terrorism declined for the third consecutive year, falling by 27 per cent.”



majority of these deaths were caused by the Sinai Province of the Islamic State, reflecting the shift in IS activity away from Iraq and Syria.

Half of the countries with the largest increases in terrorism are located in Africa, with rises also occurring in the Central African Republic, Mali, and Kenya. The intensification of conflict in Afghanistan resulted in a slight increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, alongside a much more considerable increase in the number of battle-related deaths. In Europe, the United Kingdom was one of only five countries that experienced an increase in terrorism, with the ISIL suicide bombing in Manchester being the highest-profile terrorist attack.

TERRORIST GROUPS

Determining which terrorist groups are the most active and responsible for the most deaths can be difficult, as many groups have regional affiliates and other groups working in partnership or partially under the same command. For the purposes of this section, IEP does not include affiliates in its definition of a terrorist group. For example ISIL refers only to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and does not include the Khorasan chapter or Sinai Province of the Islamic State, despite the strong connections between the two groups. Similarly, Al-Shabaab is counted as a single group, rather than an affiliate of Al-Qa'ida.

The four terrorist groups responsible for the most deaths in 2017 were the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Taliban, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. These four groups were responsible for 10,632 deaths from terrorism, representing 56.5 per cent of total deaths in 2017. In 2012, just prior to the large increase in terrorist activity around the world, these four groups were responsible for 32 per cent of all deaths from terrorism. A decade ago, they accounted for just six per cent.

The past decade has experienced the largest surge in terrorist activity in the past fifty years. These four groups are responsible for 44 per cent of the deaths in the decade. However, all of the groups other than Al-Shabaab have experienced falls in terrorist activity in the past few years.

Islamic State of Iraq & the Levant (ISIL)

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, often referred to as ISIL, ISIS or Daesh, was the most active terrorist organisation in 2017, a position it has held since 2015. Primarily active in Iraq and Syria – the countries in which it sought to create a

caliphate, or autonomous Islamist state, ISIL's presence and impact decreased substantially in these countries in 2017.

Changes since 2016

ISIL-related deaths are at their lowest point since 2013. ISIL suffered severe losses in 2017, leading to a reduction in the number of attacks carried out by the group. International coalitions, Syrian and Iraqi rebel forces successfully reclaimed the cities of Mosul and Raqqa, two of ISIL's strongholds and claims to territorial legitimacy. Having lost 60 per cent of its territory and 80 per cent of its revenue since 2015, ISIL's capacity to create a caliphate has diminished greatly. The turn-around in its fortunes is remarkable as 2016 was its deadliest year on record.

Deaths committed by the group decreased from 9,150 to 4,350 in 2017, a decline of 52 per cent. Injuries which they inflicted in their terrorist attacks fell similarly by a margin of 57 per cent, and the number of attacks fell by 22 per cent. The lethality of ISIL attacks, or deaths per attack, also dropped from eight to 4.9 deaths per attack.


Despite its decline, ISIL is still active in ten countries in 2017, highlighting the spread of their operations. ISIL committed attacks in 286 cities around the world in four different regions: Asia-Pacific, Europe, MENA and the Russia and Eurasia region. Of all ISIL attacks, 98 per cent of incidents and 98 per cent of deaths occurred within the MENA region. Ninety per cent of all terror attacks and 81 per cent of terror-related deaths from ISIL occurred in Iraq alone. Deaths from ISIL attacks in Europe decreased by 68 per cent, from 198 in 2016 to 64 in 2017.

In 2017, 1,524 deaths and 254 attacks confirmed by ISIL occurred

FIGURE 1.5

Four deadliest terrorist groups in 2017 (1998–2017)

ISIL, The Taliban, and Boko Haram have all seen falls in terrorist activity over the past two years.



in the Iraqi city of Mosul, compared to 1,851 deaths in Mosul in 2016. The four deadliest attacks committed by ISIL were all in the Iraqi province of Nineveh and resulted in a total of 693 deaths.

In MENA, terrorism deaths committed by ISIL also substantially decreased, falling from 8,930 in 2016 to 4,264, indicating a decline in the group's activity both in the Middle East and elsewhere. As its strength has dwindled in its Iraqi and Syrian strongholds, ISIL has looked to shift resources into other countries and regions. ISIL and its affiliates were active in 25 countries in 2017, up from 14 in 2014.

Despite territorial, financial, and logistical losses in 2017, ISIL's status as the world's deadliest terror group still poses a major threat through both its ideological profile around the world and numerous affiliate chapters based in neighbouring regions. For example, ISIL was responsible for 18 deaths in the Asia-Pacific region in 2017, all of which occurred in the Philippines.

Tactics Favoured by ISIL

Sixty-nine per cent of attacks staged by the Islamic State were bombings or explosions, 80 per cent of which resulted in at least one fatality. These attacks resulted in 2,387 fatalities in 2017. The next most common forms of attack were hostage takings and assassinations, which made up 12 per cent of ISIL attacks in 2017, killing 988 people. In 2017, 479 attacks were targeted specifically towards private civilians, down from 663 attacks in 2016.

ISIL's attacks on military and police personnel became less deadly. Despite staging only ten fewer attacks in 2017 towards police and military personnel, these attacks resulted in 1,293 fewer deaths than the prior year, a 60 per cent reduction. The weakened success rate of ISIL's attacks in 2017 is another sign that the group's capacity is declining.

Taliban

The Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in 1994 as a reactionary group that combined both mujahideen that had previously fought against the 1979 Soviet invasion, and groups of Pashtun tribesmen. The Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996. The group declared the country an Islamic emirate and promoted its leader to the role of head of state. Following the 2001 NATO invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban was ousted, but it has since been steadily regaining control of its lost territory. As of mid-2017, it was estimated that the Taliban controlled over 11 per cent of the country and contested another 29 per cent of Afghanistan's 398 districts. However, these estimates are likely to be highly conservative. While the Taliban's activity is similar to the prior year, it maintains a highly active presence in over 70 per cent of Afghani provinces.¹ In recent months, the Taliban has appeared receptive to peace talks, however, the fighting has continued.²

Changes since 2016

The number of deaths from terrorism caused by the Taliban remained steady in 2017. However, the years 2015 to 2017 have also seen much higher levels of terrorism committed by the

Taliban than in the preceding decade. In total, 82 per cent of deaths from terrorism committed by the Taliban since 2002 have occurred in the last five years.

Unlike ISIL, the Taliban is active solely in a single country. All of the 3,571 deaths and 699 terrorist attacks in 2017 occurred within Afghanistan. However, the Taliban's Pakistani affiliate group, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), was responsible for 233 deaths and 56 attacks in Pakistan in 2017, demonstrating a Taliban-related presence outside of Afghanistan. As a whole, terror attacks by the Taliban are becoming more deadly with attacks in 2016 killing an average of 4.2 persons per attack, rising to 5.1 persons in 2017.

The deadliest attack committed by the Taliban was from a suicide explosion in Gardez, Paktika, killing 74 people and injuring an additional 236 people. The majority of terrorism by the Taliban is committed in Afghanistan's southern provinces, but almost all districts in the country experienced attacks at some point in 2017.

Tactics Favoured by the Taliban

In 2017, the Taliban switched focus from attacks on civilians, towards attacks on police and military personnel. The Taliban killed 2,419 police and military personnel in 2017, up from the 1,782 deaths in the prior year. The number of attacks also increased from 369 to 386 in 2017.

The increased focus on the military was offset by a large reduction in civilian deaths with the Taliban being responsible for 548 civilian terrorism deaths in 2017 compared to 1,223 deaths in the prior year. Attacks on civilians also fell, dropping from 254 attacks in 2016 to 138 in 2017.

Armed assaults and bombings were the most common type of attack used by the Taliban, accounting for 54 per cent of all attacks. Although the number of bombings decreased 18 per cent, total deaths from bombings increased by 17 per cent.

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab, a Salafist militant group active in East Africa, first emerged in a battle over Somalia's capital in the summer of 2006. As an Al-Qa'ida affiliate terrorist group based in Somalia and Kenya, Al-Shabaab pursues Islamist statehood aspirations in Somalia.

In more recent years, Al-Shabaab has gained global recognition following many years of deadly attacks concentrated around the capital city of Mogadishu and attacks in the neighbouring states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. African Union peacekeeping forces known as AMISOM have been fighting Al-Shabaab since 2007 with the help of US and UN support. In 2017, the first wave of US troops and airstrikes were deployed in Somalia to fight against Al-Shabaab.³

Changes since 2016

In 2017, Al-Shabaab overtook Boko Haram as the deadliest terror group in sub-Saharan Africa for the first time since 2010. The total number of deaths increased by 93 per cent from 2016 to

2017. Of the 1,457 deaths committed by Al-Shabaab in 2017, 67 per cent took place in the capital city of Mogadishu. The total number of terror incidents between 2016 and 2017 increased by only ten attacks, meaning the lethality of Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia increased from 2.2 deaths per attack to 4.1 deaths per attack, mostly as the result of a single attack that killed 588 people. This was the deadliest terror attack globally in 2017.

Al-Shabaab activity in Somalia is scattered throughout the whole country. Although 67 per cent of deaths occurred in the Banaadir region where Mogadishu is located, terrorist activity is scattered around the southern and eastern regions of Bari and Shebelle and the northern Puntland. To this day, Al-Shabaab holds significant organisational and territorial capacity against Somali and AMISOM forces.⁴

On 14 October 2017, Al-Shabaab committed the deadliest terror attack of the year through a suicide and truck-bombing targeting a hotel and highway intersection in Mogadishu, killing 588 and injuring 316 individuals. This bombing was the world's deadliest terror attack since 2014 and the fifth-deadliest terror attack since the year 2000.

Terrorism deaths committed by Al-Shabaab in Kenya in 2017 also increased to 100. However, this is much lower than 2014, when the group killed 256 people. The deaths in 2017 occurred in the Lamu, Garissa and Mandera counties. Half of deaths in Kenya during 2017 occurred in the Lamu County.

Tactics Favoured by Al-Shabaab

The fragility of Somalia's political and security institutions has allowed Al-Shabaab to mount a number of highly-destructive terrorist attacks. Two of the twenty largest terrorist attacks of 2017 were carried out by Al-Shabaab and the group was able to carry out 17 successful attacks that killed ten or more people. The lethality of its bombing and explosive attacks was the highest of the four terrorist groups examined in this section.

Al-Shabaab targeted many different groups in 2017, with the highest proportion of attacks directed at government targets, followed by private citizens. However, Al-Shabaab's deadliest attacks were directed against business targets, including the suicide bombing which killed 588 people.

Boko Haram

Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, more popularly known as Boko Haram, once the world's deadliest terror group, has experienced a significant decline since its peak in 2014. However, the group remains the most active terrorist organisation in Nigeria and until 2017 was the deadliest terror group in sub-Saharan Africa.

Originally formed in Northeast Nigeria bordering the Lake Chad region, the terror group has spread into Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Recently, internal tensions have led to multiple Boko Haram splinter groups forming. The largest splinter group is the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP),⁵ which has claimed responsibility for a number of brutal attacks on midwives and aid workers in 2018.⁶ Both Boko Haram and ISWAP have sworn allegiance to the Islamic State.

"The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram were responsible for 10,632 deaths from terrorism in 2017."

Nigeria's counterterrorism response in combatting Boko Haram has been interrupted by the emergence of other extremist groups, most notably the Fulani extremists. The Fulani extremists have attacked civilians and military forces in the country. However, the sizeable drop in deaths and terror incidents since 2014 indicate the success of Nigeria's Civilian Joint Task Force and international coalitions.⁷ Alongside its counterinsurgency plan, the Nigerian government also struggles with negotiations and reintegration efforts regarding its long-term strategy to deal with Boko Haram and its associates.⁸

Changes since 2016

After a significant fall in activity between 2014 and 2016, Boko Haram increased its activity in 2017. It committed 40 per cent more attacks and was responsible for 15 per cent more deaths in 2017, carrying out 272 attacks and killing 1,254 people. Their attacks have been slightly less successful in 2017, with the average number of people killed per attack falling from 5.6 to 4.6.

Deaths committed by the group have gone down substantially since the group's peak in 2014 when it killed 6,612 people, in part because of the intra-group dissolution weakening the group's capacity. Deaths committed are down 83.2 per cent since their peak in 2014.

Of all the deaths committed by Boko Haram in 2017, 81 per cent occurred in Nigeria, the remainder in Cameroon and Niger. This is up from 70 per cent in 2016 and highlights the decreased reach of the organisation. Eighty-two per cent of deaths in Nigeria took place in the country's Borno State, and another 17 per cent occurred in the Adamawa State. Boko Haram has concentrated its activity in the Lake Chad region in the past year.

Of the ten deadliest attacks Boko Haram committed in 2017, all were in Nigeria and nine were in the Borno State. The group's deadliest attack was an armed assault against a Frontier Exploration Services convoy that killed 69 people, most of whom were civilians.

Tactics Favoured by Boko Haram

Boko Haram has specialised in maximum-impact bombings and explosions since its initial insurgency in 2009.⁹ It is well known for its use of more uncommon terrorist tactics, including mass hostage takings and the extensive use of children and women as suicide bombers. Nearly four in five bombings in 2016 were suicide bombings with one in five committed by women.

10

COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Table 1.1 highlights the ten countries most impacted by terrorism according to the 2017 GTI and how they have ranked on the GTI since its inception in 2002. Of these ten, eight were ranked in the ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2016, with Egypt and the Philippines replacing Turkey and Lebanon in 2017.

Despite a significant fall in the number of deaths from terrorism in Iraq, there was no change in the five countries most impacted by terrorism. All of these countries have been ranked in the worst five every year since 2013.

The impact of terrorism decreased for six countries in the

worst ten, while the other four experienced an increase in the impact of terrorism: Somalia, India, Egypt, and the Philippines.

Conflict continued to be the primary driver of terrorist activity for the countries most impacted by terrorism in 2017. Eight of the ten countries were classified as being in a state of war, with the remaining two (Egypt and India) involved in multiple minor conflicts. Specific drivers of terrorism among these ten countries include the shifting activity of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), exacerbated tensions between splinter terror groups and national governments in Yemen, the Philippines and Egypt and prolonged insurgencies in Nigeria and Somalia.

TABLE 1.1

Ten countries most impacted by terrorism, ranked by number of deaths

In 2017, Afghanistan recorded the highest number of deaths from terrorism globally for the first time since 2012.

Country	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Afghanistan	43	24	16	6	14	10	6	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	1	2	3	2	2	1
Iraq	19	17	30	29	24	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2
Nigeria	24	15	57	35	23	17	18	29	7	14	18	6	11	4	4	4	2	3	4	3
Somalia	43	28	21	35	28	24	32	30	20	5	5	7	7	6	7	6	6	8	6	4
Syria	43	54	57	51	52	41	29	44	31	46	27	56	50	11	5	5	5	4	3	5
Pakistan	9	7	12	13	10	9	5	6	6	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	4	6	5	6
Egypt	27	45	57	51	52	41	16	10	21	46	53	47	50	18	24	11	19	7	13	7
Congo, DRC	15	30	15	23	22	12	23	22	18	15	7	4	10	14	15	17	15	14	9	8
Central Afr. Rep.	43	54	57	51	52	41	40	44	45	38	46	19	17	33	46	18	9	20	17	9
India	3	2	1	3	3	1	4	2	3	4	4	5	4	5	8	7	13	15	12	10

Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Iraq

GTI RANK
1


GTI SCORE
9.746

4,271 DEAD
4,086 INJURED
1,956 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



Despite a significant drop in deaths from 2016 to 2017, Iraq remains the country most impacted by terrorism, a position it has held since 2014.


The total number of deaths from terrorism in Iraq fell from 9,783 to 4,271 between 2016 and 2017, a 56 per cent decline and the country's lowest number of deaths since 2012. There was also a fall in the number of incidents, dropping to 1,956 from 2,969 in 2016. There was also a substantial drop in the lethality of attacks with 2.2 deaths per attack compared to 3.3 in 2016.

ISIL was responsible for 83 per cent of terror-related deaths in Iraq in 2017. In line with the overall decrease in terrorist activity, deaths cause by ISIL decreased by 52 per cent from 2016 to 2017, dropping from 7,368 deaths to 3,554.

ISIL experienced severe territorial and financial setbacks in 2017 as a result of international and Iraqi-led coalitions. After the government reclaimed major Iraqi cities such as Mosul and al-Qaim, there was a substantial drop in terrorism.¹⁰ A clear indication of the improvement was that there were only 60 attacks in Mosul in the second half of 2017, compared to 334 attacks in the first six months of 2017.

ISIL controlled its largest amount of territory in August 2015, and the group's current territorial hold in Iraq is at its lowest point since the group's inception. The remaining 17 per cent of terror deaths were committed primarily by unknown groups. The second most active group in 2017 was Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, which was responsible for 20 deaths in 2017.

Worst attacks



“The total number of deaths from terrorism in Iraq fell from 9,783 to 4,271 between 2016 and 2017, a 56 per cent decline.”

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Afghanistan

GTI RANK

2

GTI SCORE


9.391

4,653  DEAD


5,015  INJURED

1,168  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



In 2017, Afghanistan was the country that recorded the highest number of deaths from terrorism, replacing Iraq which had held the position since 2013.


Afghanistan had 4,653 fatalities and 1,168 terrorist incidents in 2017, with the Taliban being responsible for 77 per cent of these fatalities. Although deaths in Afghanistan rose less than one per cent from the prior year it was still the second-deadliest year on record, with 2015 being the deadliest. Both terrorism and battle-related deaths have risen steadily over the past decade.

Kabul was the province with the highest death toll for both 2016 and 2017, with 424 and 549 deaths respectively. The Helmand, Kandahar and Ghazni provinces were the next deadliest provinces, experiencing 367, 360 and 325 deaths respectively. Thirty per cent of all deaths in Afghanistan occurred in these four provinces, with the Taliban accounting for 76 per cent of the deaths or 1,218 people.

With the Taliban reportedly active in up to 70 per cent of Afghanistan, its threat to Afghanistan remains strong.¹¹ Conflict-related deaths have risen every year for the past five years, with the conflict environment remaining precarious in 2018. Bombings in Kabul have remained constant, and the Taliban stormed the city of Ghazni in August 2018.

“In 2017, Afghanistan was the country that recorded the highest number of deaths from terrorism.”

Worst attacks



The Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State, the ISIL-affiliate active in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was responsible for 14 per cent of terrorism deaths, or 658 people in 2017, a 26 per cent increase from the prior year. It is Afghanistan's second most active terrorist organisation, with 2017 being its deadliest year on record. The majority of the deaths caused by the group were in Kabul, at 387 deaths.

Despite opposing attitudes between the Khorasan Chapter and the Taliban, both groups recruit from former Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan members, the Taliban's affiliate group that operates along the Afghani-Pakistani border.¹²




The Taliban has been changing tactics with less focus on civilians and more focus on the police and military. The Taliban launched 55 per cent fewer attacks on civilians and property in 2017. However, it was responsible for 34 per cent more deaths against police personnel when compared to the prior year.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Nigeria

GTI RANK
3


GTI SCORE
8.66

1,532  DEAD
852  INJURED
411  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



Total deaths from terrorism in Nigeria fell to 1,532 in 2017, a decrease of 16 per cent from the prior year. The decline follows the 63 per cent drop in deaths in Nigeria in the preceding year, and a 34 per cent drop in 2015. This highlights the effectiveness of the counter-insurgency operations undertaken in Nigeria and its neighbours, Cameroon, Niger and Chad.


Terrorist activity in Nigeria is dominated by two groups: Boko Haram and Fulani extremists. In 2017, Boko Haram was the deadliest group in Nigeria, with both terrorism deaths and attacks increasing over the prior year. Deaths increased by 34 per cent to 1,022 while attacks increased by 62 per cent to 222.

Fulani extremists were less active in 2017 than the prior year with terrorism deaths dropping by 60 per cent to 321, and attacks dropping by 51 per cent to 72. However, preliminary data for 2018 suggests that there has been a significant increase in violence committed by Fulani extremists.

Together, Boko Haram and Fulani extremists are responsible for 63 per cent of terror attacks and 88 per cent of terror-related deaths in Nigeria. The third deadliest terror group in Nigeria in 2017 was the Bachama extremists, who were responsible for four attacks and 30 deaths.

Boko Haram has increased both its armed assaults and bombings as a percentage of its attacks, with deaths increasing by 33 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. Boko Haram is also notorious for its use of female and child suicide bombers. Of the 434 suicide bombers between April 2011 and June 2017, 244 were women.¹³

Worst attacks



The Borno State is home to Boko Haram. It has experienced the highest level of terrorist activity in Nigeria with all deaths caused by Boko Haram. In 2017, 62 per cent of deaths in Nigeria occurred in the Borno State. The group is also active in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, and has disrupted Foreign Direct investment and humanitarian efforts in Nigeria and its neighbouring countries.¹⁴

In 2016 Boko Haram splintered into two groups. The newer Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) declared allegiance to ISIL in 2015.¹⁵ Both groups see themselves as affiliates of ISIL.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Syria

GTI RANK

4

GTI SCORE


8.315

1,096  DEAD


1,055  INJURED

144  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target




With the level of violence caused by the Syrian civil war on the wane, deaths from terrorism in Syria decreased by 48 per cent to 1,096 in 2017. ISIL was responsible for 63 per cent of these deaths. However, despite the decrease in the impact of terrorism, Syria remains the fourth ranked country on the GTI.

After ISIL, Hay'at al Tahrir al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam are the next two most-deadly groups in Syria in 2017 and were responsible for 176 and 127 deaths respectively. The former group once operated as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and al-Nusra before that, but rebranded as Tahrir al-Sham in January 2017 as an affiliate of Al-Qa'ida and is now operating in the country's Idlib province.¹⁶

Four provinces in Syria recorded 73 per cent of all terror deaths in 2017: Aleppo, Damascus, Deir-ez-Zor, and Homs. In the first half of 2017, 60 per cent of the attacks occurred in these four provinces. The number of active terror groups in Syria also dropped significantly since 2016, from 22 groups in 2016 to nine groups in 2017.

In October 2017, the international coalition against ISIL successfully reclaimed Raqqa, the Syrian city that served as ISIL's de facto capital¹⁷. With ISIL's remaining territory now scattered around Deir-ez Zor province and the Euphrates Valley, ISIL is being forced to resort to guerrilla attacks.¹⁸

Worst attacks



QARYATAYN

Assailants overtook the town and abducted approximately 128 residents in Qaryatayn, Homs, Syria. All 128 hostages were executed by the assailants over the next 19 days before the town was retaken by security forces on October 21, 2017.




“With the level of violence caused by the Syrian civil war on the wane, deaths from terrorism in Syria decreased by 48 per cent.”

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Pakistan

GTI RANK
5


GTI SCORE
8.181

852  DEAD
1,830  INJURED
576  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



In 2017, Pakistan recorded its lowest number of terror-related deaths since 2006. Deaths declined eleven per cent from 2016 to 2017, falling from 957 to 852. Deaths are now 64 per cent lower than the peak year of 2013.


Pakistan's three most active terror groups, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were responsible for 67 per cent of all deaths in Pakistan in 2017. The TTP and the Khorasan Chapter were both responsible for 233 deaths each, making them the deadliest groups in Pakistan. Deaths committed by TTP declined by 17 per cent from 2016, but were offset by increases in deaths by the Khorasan Chapter, which rose by 50 per cent and deaths by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which rose by 17 per cent.

The most-impacted province was Balochistan, which recorded 296 terrorism deaths, or 35 per cent of the total in Pakistan. The next deadliest province was Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which recorded 226 deaths, or 27 per cent the total. Sindh province was the third deadliest with 16 per cent of the total terrorism deaths occurring in the region.

Terrorism increased substantially in the FATA and Sindh regions, with deaths increasing by 117 and 104 per cent respectively in 2017. Deaths in the Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces decreased by 31 and 60 per cent respectively.

In May 2018, the Pakistani parliament passed a constitutional amendment to have the FATA region absorbed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in an effort to crack down on the high

Worst attacks



level of terrorism in the region.¹⁹ Prime Minister Imran Khan, the newly elected leader of Pakistan, has also pledged to assist Afghanistan in efforts to stymie terrorism along its shared border.²⁰

The year 2017 was the deadliest on record for the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State (ISKIP), highlighting the group's migration into South Asia following military setbacks in Iraq and Syria. The group committed over half of its attacks since 2014 in 2017. ISKP was also responsible for the deadliest terror attack in Pakistan in 2017, a suicide bombing attack in the Sindh Province that resulted in 91 deaths and over 250 injuries.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Somalia

GTI RANK


6

GTI SCORE


8.02

1,470  DEAD
 1,100  INJURED
 372  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



Somalia recorded the largest increase in terrorism globally in 2017. Deaths from terrorism rose by nearly 93 per cent, increasing from 762 in 2016 to 1,470 in 2017. The number of terrorist incidents also rose significantly, rising from 248 to 369, a 49 per cent increase. Terrorist activity in Somalia is dominated by Al-Shabaab, a group responsible for 92 per cent of all terror-related deaths in 2017. The only other active terrorist group in Somalia in 2017 is Jabha East Africa, a group responsible for 25 terrorism deaths in 2017.


The year 2017 was also Somalia's and Al-Shabaab's deadliest, with the group responsible for 95 per cent more deaths than in 2016. Killings committed by Al-Shabaab have risen consistently since 2014. Al-Shabaab's presence in Somalia is predominantly felt in the country's lower provinces. Of the 372 terror incidents committed by Al-Shabaab in 2017, 137 took place in the capital city of Mogadishu. Next to Mogadishu, the city with the highest number of terror-related deaths was Af Urur with a total of 87 deaths in 2017.

Al-Shabaab was also responsible for the world's deadliest terror attack in 2017, a truck bombing attack in Mogadishu that resulted in 588 deaths and more than 300 recorded injuries. Al-Shabaab employs suicide bombings as a tactic against civilian and military targets. The group has seized numerous AMISOM and Somali government bases and equipment throughout 2017, controlling highways and ports into major cities such as Kismaayo, Baidoa and Mogadishu²¹.

Despite the increase in terrorist attacks from Al-Shabaab, its activity has been mostly restricted to the capital, with 68 per cent of deaths occurring in Mogadishu. The Al-Qa'ida affiliate has shown limited signs of scaling back its activity in Somalia and its neighbours Kenya and Uganda.

As a country plagued with political instability, Somalia remains vulnerable to terrorism and an escalation of the already existing violent conflict.

Worst attacks



“Al-Shabaab was also responsible for the world’s deadliest terror attack in 2017, a truck bombing attack in Mogadishu that resulted in 588 deaths.”

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


India

GTI RANK
7


GTI SCORE
7.568

384  DEAD
601  INJURED
372  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target




Deaths from terrorism in India rose to 384 in 2017, a 12 per cent increase. India is now ranked seventh on the GTI. The scope of terrorism and violent conflict in India is particularly broad, with 51 different terrorist groups being responsible for at least one terrorist attack in 2017 and 25 groups being responsible for at least one terrorism death.

While deaths from 2016 to 2017 increased by 12 per cent, deaths in India have been on a downward trend since they peaked in 2008 at 775 deaths. However, incidents in India are on the rise, with 2017 having the second highest number of terrorist incidents on record with 886 attacks. Only 2016 had more terror incidents. These attacks were carried out by a number of smaller Islamist and nationalist terrorist groups, with 35 separate groups being responsible for five incidents or fewer in 2017.

The deadliest group in India is the country's communist party - The Communist Party of India (Maoists). Maoists were responsible for 205 deaths and 190 terror incidents in India, or 53 per cent of deaths in 2017. The Maoists, otherwise known as the Naxals after their first appearance in the village of Naxalbari, directly oppose Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration and the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)²². The group has been active for several decades with 2010 its deadliest year on record. Maoist assailants frequently stage attacks against the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and other armed forces throughout the country's northern and central territories.²³

The north Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir had the most deaths in 2017, with 102 deaths committed by five different terror groups, most notably Lashkar-e-Taliba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).

Worst attacks



Lashkar-e-Taliba, the most active Islamist terror group in India, was responsible for 10 per cent of deaths in 2017. The same group was also responsible for the 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai that killed over 160 people in the siege of the Oberoi-Trident Hotel. The remaining 37 per cent of terror deaths were committed by 21 different groups, further highlighting the wide distribution of terrorist groups in India.

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Yemen

GTI RANK

8

GTI SCORE


7.534

378  DEAD


417  INJURED

141  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target




Deaths from terrorism in Yemen fell by 41 per cent between 2016 and 2017. Yemen has experienced a 75 per cent decline in deaths since they peaked in 2015, falling from 1,519 to 378. Despite the fall in deaths from terrorism, Yemen remains mired in a brutal civil war. An estimated 50,000 civilians have died as a result of the famine caused by the war, with a further 13 million civilians at risk of starvation, according to UN estimates.²⁴

The most active terror group in Yemen is the Houthi Extremists, or Ansar Allah. Following them are Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State affiliate Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State. Ansar Allah has been the deadliest terror group in Yemen since it overtook AQAP in 2015. Terrorism carried out by these three groups is concentrated primarily in the northwest and southwest of Yemen. Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State is primarily active in the southern coastal province of Adan, while AQAP is active in the provinces of Abyan and Lahij, and Ansar Allah in Taizz and Marib.

Ansar Allah, Yemen's Houthi movement, currently controls the Yemeni government in the capital city of Sana'a and has been facing a Saudi-led bombing campaign. Following their 2011 uprising, the Zaydi Shi'a Houthi movement continues to wage war against the Saudi-backed Hadi government with assistance from Iran.²⁵

Of the Islamic State factions that have been active in Yemen over the past four years, the Adan-Abyan Province is the only remaining affiliate in Yemen. Additionally, AQAP, which is ideologically at odds with the Houthis, had its least deadly year since 2009, the year it first emerged in Yemen.²⁶

Worst attacks



ADEN

Two suicide bombers detonated explosives-laden vehicles outside the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) building in Khur Maksar neighborhood, Aden, Yemen. Following the blasts, additional assailants then stormed the compound, set the building on fire, and took an unknown number of hostages. Overnight four additional suicide bombers detonated as security forces attempted to retake the building.

“Despite the fall in deaths from terrorism, Yemen remains mired in a brutal civil war.”

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


Egypt

GTI RANK
9


GTI SCORE
7.345

655 DEAD
481 INJURED
169 INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target




Egypt had a resurgence in terrorist activity in 2017 after a significant fall in the previous year. Deaths from terrorism increased by 123 per cent to 655 deaths, slightly fewer than the peak in 2015 when 683 terrorism deaths were recorded. In 2017, Egypt had 169 terror incidents compared to 539 in 2015, highlighting the increased lethality of terror attacks in the country.

The Sinai Province of the Islamic State (ISIS-SP) was the deadliest group in Egypt and was responsible for the second deadliest attack globally in 2017. Also known as Wilayat Sinai, the Sinai Province of the Islamic State has targeted Egyptian security forces and soldiers²⁷, as well as mosques and churches of Egypt's Coptic Christian minority. In November 2017, ISIS-SP detonated explosives and opened fire against a mosque in Beir al-Abd, killing 311 and wounding an additional 127. This attack resulted in 47 per cent of all deaths in Egypt in 2017. There were several other instances of ISIS-SP targeting mosques and churches of Egypt's Coptic Christian minority. The second deadliest attack in Egypt, in comparison, was committed by the Islamic State in Egypt and resulted in 31 deaths.

The North Sinai province was the region most impacted by terrorism, with 522 deaths in 2017, including 457 deaths committed by ISIS-SP. The next deadliest group in 2017 was the Islamic State in Egypt, which was responsible for 98 deaths throughout the Gharbia, Minya and Alexandria regions. The Islamic State of Egypt operates in Egypt's northern and mainland territories²⁸.

Other active terror groups in Egypt include the Hasam Movement, an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood that committed 7 attacks, resulting in 14 deaths in 2017. This nationalistic militant group only emerged in Egypt in 2016, acting in resistance to the Egyptian government and its officials.²⁹

Worst attacks



BEIR AL-ABD

Assailants detonated an explosive device and opened fire on Al-Rawda mosque in Al-Rawda, Beir al-Abd, North Sinai, Egypt. At least 311 people were killed and 127 people were injured in the attack.

“In November 2017, ISIS-SP detonated explosives and opened fire against a mosque in Beir al-Abd, killing 311 and wounding an additional 127.”

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Philippines

GTI RANK


10

GTI SCORE


7.181

326  DEAD
 297  INJURED
 486  INCIDENTS


Total deaths since 2001



Deaths by group



Attacks by target



In 2017, the Philippines recorded the highest number of deaths from terrorism in more than a decade, with a total of 326 fatalities. This was 18 per cent higher than the previous year. The Philippines is the only Southeast Asian country to be ranked in the ten worst-performing countries on the GTI.

The communist New People's Army (NPA) committed 35 per cent of the total deaths in the Philippines in 2017. The NPA was designated as a terrorist group in December 2017. They were responsible for 235 attacks in 204 cities across the Philippines in 2017, resulting in 113 deaths. Seventy-eight per cent of those deaths occurred during attacks on government officials and military targets. The group was most active in the provinces of North Cotabato and Bukidnon.


Abu Sayyaf, otherwise known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - Philippines Province, recorded its second deadliest year on record and was responsible for 37 deaths, 18 per cent more than the prior year. The third deadliest group was the Maute Group who were responsible for 26 deaths, eight per cent of the total in 2017. The Maute Group is a manifestation of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which was formerly the Philippines most active Islamist organisation.

Thirty-three per cent of deaths were committed by unknown groups in the Philippines. It is likely that many of these deaths were from Abu Sayyaf or the Maute Group.

Both Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group have declared allegiance to Islamic State. In May of 2017, both groups participated in the siege of Marawi City, a five-month battle between the terror groups and the Filipino government. The siege highlighted the effectiveness of the groups and the lack of government control of the region.

While no terror attack in the Philippines killed more than ten people in 2017, the impact of terrorism was spread across the

Worst attacks



nation. Over 170 cities in the Philippines experienced at least one terror-related death. Marwai was the city with the most terrorism deaths in the Philippines with 27 deaths, or eight per cent of the total, followed by Magsaysay with 14 deaths, or four per cent.


“In 2017, the Philippines recorded the highest number of deaths from terrorism in more than a decade, with a total of 326 fatalities.”

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM

FIGURE 1.6

The economic impact of terrorism, US\$ billion, 2000–2017

The global economic impact of terrorism peaked in 2014 and has since declined in line with the decline of terror-related deaths committed by ISIL.



Source: IEP

The global economic impact of terrorism was US\$52 billion in 2017, a 42 per cent decline from 2016. This is the third consecutive year of decline in the cost of terrorism from its peak in 2014 of US\$108 billion. The economic impact in 2017 was less than half the impact seen in 2014.

Figure 1.6 shows the economic impact of terrorism from 2000 to 2017 in billions of US dollars. The impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 is shaded separately.

Countries suffering from armed conflict experience a significantly higher economic impact from terrorism. Afghanistan is the country most affected by the economic impact of terrorism as a percentage of GDP at 12.8 per cent. Afghanistan has experienced a consistent increase in the level of violence from terrorism and *ongoing conflict* over the past three years. Iraq is the only other country that experienced costs of terrorism greater than ten per cent of its total economic activity, with the economic impact of terrorism equivalent to 10.8 per cent of Iraqi GDP. Table 1.2 shows the ten countries with the highest economic impact from terrorism as a percentage of their GDP in 2017.

The economic impact of terrorism model includes costs from deaths, injuries and property destruction. The model also includes losses in economic activity, where terrorism causes more than 1,000 deaths.

Deaths from terrorism accounted for 72 per cent of the global economic impact of terrorism. Indirect GDP losses are the second largest category at 15 per cent of the total. Property destruction is estimated at two per cent of the global economic impact of terrorism. However, property cost estimates are missing for a large number of incidents. Figure 1.7 shows the

TABLE 1.2

The ten worst affected countries by economic impact of terrorism as percentage of GDP, 2017

The countries with the highest economic impacts of terrorism are all suffering from ongoing conflict.

Country	% of GDP
Afghanistan	12.8%
Iraq	10.8%
Syria	5.8%
Somalia	5.0%
South Sudan	3.9%
Central African Republic	3.6%
Nigeria	2.6%
Libya	1.8%
Egypt	0.8%
Yemen	0.7%

Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

breakdown of the economic impact of terrorism by category.

The economic impact of terrorism is smaller than many other forms of violence, accounting for approximately 0.4 per cent of the total global cost of violence in 2017, which was an estimated \$14.76 trillion, equivalent to 12.4 per cent of global GDP.

This is a very conservative estimate of the costs associated with terrorism and only calculates globally quantifiable and comparable costs. It does not take into account the costs of counterterrorism or countering violent extremism, nor the impact of diverting public resources to security expenditure away from other government activities. Nor does it calculate any of the longer-term economic implications of terrorism from reduced tourism, business activity, production and investment.


Studies from developed and developing countries have tried to quantify at a more granular level the adverse effects of terrorism on the economy. For example:

- After the outbreak of terrorism in the Basque country in Spain in the late 1960s, economic growth declined by ten per cent.³⁰
- A study of the economic impact of terrorism in Israel found that per capita income would have been ten per cent higher if the country had avoided terrorism in the three years up to 2004.³¹
- Results from research on Turkey show that terrorism has severe adverse effects on the economy when the economy is in an expansionary phase.³²

The level of economic disruption is relatively large and long-lasting for small and less diversified economies. In contrast, advanced and diversified economies are economically more resilient and have shorter recovery periods from incidents of terrorism. These effects are mainly explained by the ability of the diversified economies to reallocate resources, such as labour and capital, from the terrorism-affected sectors. Advanced and more peaceful countries also have more resources and better institutions to avert future terrorism.

FIGURE 1.7
Breakdown of the economic impact of terrorism, 2017

Deaths account for 72% of the economic impact of terrorism.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

BOX 1.1

Estimating the economic impact of terrorism

The economic impact of terrorism is calculated using IEP's cost of violence methodology. The model for terrorism includes the direct and indirect cost of deaths and injuries, as well as the property destruction from incidents of terrorism. The direct costs include costs borne by the victims of the terrorist acts and associated government expenditure, such as medical spending. The indirect costs include lost productivity and earning as well as the psychological trauma to the victims, their families and friends.

Unit costs for deaths and injuries are sourced from McCollister et al (2010). To account for the income differences for each country, the unit costs are scaled based on country GDP per capita relative to the source of the unit costs.

The analysis uses data on incidents of terrorism from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) that is collected and

collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The data provides the number of deaths and injuries for each incident as well as the extent of property destruction.

In addition, the data provides estimated dollar values of property destruction for a sample of incidents. The property destruction estimates from the GTD are then used to generate costs of property destroyed by various types of terrorist attacks. Each of the different property costs is further calibrated by country income type; OECD, high income non-OECD, upper middle income, lower middle income and lower income country groups.

Where countries suffer more than 1,000 deaths from terrorism, IEP's model includes losses of national output, equivalent to two per cent of GDP. Terrorism has implications for the larger economy depending on the duration, level and intensity of the terrorist activities.

2

Trends in Terrorism

GLOBAL TRENDS

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, there have been four distinct trends in global terrorism. Between 2002 and 2007, terrorist attacks increased steadily, correlating with an increase in violent conflict in Iraq. This trend peaked in 2007, corresponding with the US troop surge, after which terrorism steadily fell, with deaths from terrorism dropping 35 per cent between 2007 and 2011.

The third trend from 2011 to 2014 saw the level of global terrorism surge, with deaths from terrorism increasing by more than 350 per cent in just three years. This surge coincided with the aftermath of the Arab Spring, increased violent conflict in Iraq, the rise of ISIL, and the start of the Syrian civil war, as well as the re-emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The fourth trend, from 2014 onwards, has seen a substantial decrease in deaths from terrorism, with the most dramatic reductions occurring in Iraq and Nigeria. Increased counterterrorism coordination at both the state and

international level, increasing political stability, the winding down of the Syrian civil war, and the collapse of ISIL have all played a role in reducing the impact of terrorism around the world.

As the intensity of terrorism has increased over the last two decades, its impact has also spread to more countries around the world, as shown in figure 2.1. In 2001, 50 countries experienced at least one death from terrorism. This number dropped to 39 in 2004. However, since then the number of countries has grown steadily, with more than 60 countries experiencing at least one fatal attack in every year since 2012. This number peaked in 2016, when 79 countries had at least one death from terrorism. The distribution of terrorist deaths has remained widespread even though the total number of deaths has decreased considerably.

The increase in attacks and deaths across more countries has meant that the impact of terrorism is becoming more

FIGURE 2.1

Deaths from terrorism, 1998-2017

Since peaking in 2014, deaths from terrorism have fallen 44%.




Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.2

Distribution of deaths by terrorism, 1998–2017

Terrorism has remained widespread even as total deaths have declined.




Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.3

Failed and successful terrorist attacks, 1998–2017

Almost 20% of attempted terrorist attacks in 2017 failed.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

widespread, even as deaths from terrorism are decreasing. In 2002, the first year for which there was sufficient data to produce the GTI, 44 countries recorded no impact from terrorism, meaning that there had not been a single death or attack in the previous five years. In 2017, that number had decreased to 26.

The number of countries affected by more than 1,000 terrorism deaths rose to four in 2012. This figure has not decreased even as the number of overall deaths has been falling. Between 1998 and 2006, there was never more than one country in a year that recorded more than a thousand deaths from terrorism. However, since 2012, there have been at least four countries every year. In 2017, five countries recorded more than a thousand deaths from terrorism. There has also been a similar trend in countries with a slightly lower intensity of terrorism, with the number of


countries recording between 100 and 1000 deaths increasing from 10 in 2002 to 23 in 2017.

The lethality of attacks has decreased as the major terrorist groups weaken. As the number of deaths and attacks have declined over the past three years, the percentage of unsuccessful attacks has increased, as shown in figure 2.3. In 2002, eight per cent of all terrorist attacks were unsuccessful, with the percentage of failed attacks remaining under ten per cent for every year bar one until 2012. As the total number of attacks began to rise, the percentage of failed attacks also increased. However, this percentage has continued to rise even as the total number of attacks has declined. In 2017, just over 20 per cent of attacks were unsuccessful, rising from just over 12 per cent in 2014, the year in which the highest number of total attacks was recorded.

FIGURE 2.4

Types of terrorist attack, total and indexed trend, 2002–2017

Bombings and explosions have been the most popular terrorist tactic since 2002.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

The rise in the percentage of unsuccessful attacks has occurred in both conflict and non-conflict countries, although the rise in failed attacks has been slightly greater in non-conflict countries, reflecting the improved security situation and greater certainty of counterterrorism measures being successful in more peaceful environments. In 2017, just under a quarter of all terrorist attacks in non-conflict countries were unsuccessful, compared to 20 per cent in conflict countries.

There has been a rise in all forms of terrorism since 2002, as shown in figure 2.4. Bombings and armed assaults made up the majority of terrorist attacks in 2017, accounting for 47 per cent and 19 per cent of total attacks respectively. However, bombings were more common in conflict-affected countries, accounting for just under 50 per cent of attacks, compared to 34 per cent of attacks in non-conflict countries.

Although bombings and armed assaults were the most common forms of attack in 2017 and had the greatest total increase in incidents from 2002, they had the lowest relative increase of any type of attack. Incidents involving hostage-taking, assassination, and attacks on facilities or infrastructure all increased over tenfold from 2002 to 2017.

In the United States, attacks on facilities and infrastructure were the most common form of terrorist attacks between 2002

“As the intensity of terrorism has increased over the last two decades, its impact has also spread to more countries around the world.”



and 2017, with 239 total attacks. The largest number of attacks were carried out by animal rights and environmentalist groups. These types of attacks result in very low casualties and rarely have loss of life as the main goal. There were almost three times as many facility and infrastructure attacks as armed assaults and bombings in the US.


Assassination attempts made up a small percentage of total attacks in all regions other than Central America and the Caribbean, where they accounted for over a quarter of all terrorist attacks between 2002 and 2017.

REGIONAL TRENDS

FIGURE 2.5

Attacks and deaths from terrorism by region, 2002–2017

The largest number of deaths were recorded in the MENA region, with over 90,000 deaths from terrorism since 2002.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

The impact of terrorism decreased across five of the nine regions in the world in 2017, in line with the global trend, which saw a significant drop in both deaths from terrorism and terrorist attacks.

The largest improvement occurred in the Russia and Eurasia region, where every single country recorded an improvement on their GTI score over the last year. North America had the biggest deterioration, with both Canada and the US recording increases in the impact of terrorism from 2016 to 2017. Table 2.1 shows the regions of the world by their average GTI score for 2017, as well as the change from 2016, and also 2002, the first year of the GTI.

South Asia had the highest impact of terrorism on average in 2017, and has had the highest average score on the GTI of any region for the past 16 years. Bhutan was the only country in South Asia not to record a death from terrorism in 2017 and is the only South Asian country to have less than a thousand deaths from terrorism since 2002.

Conversely, Central America and the Caribbean recorded the lowest impact of terrorism for the past sixteen years, although it has suffered greatly from other forms of violent conflict in the past decade. Just 184 deaths from terrorism have been recorded in the Central America and the Caribbean since 2002.

Between 2002 and 2017, the largest number of deaths from terrorism was recorded in the MENA region at 91,311 deaths. South Asia recorded just under sixty thousand deaths over the same period, with a further forty thousand occurring in sub-Saharan Africa. Between them, these three regions accounted for 93 per cent of all deaths from terrorism since 2002. Figure 2.5 shows total deaths and attacks for all regions from 2002 to 2017.

TABLE 2.1

Average GTI score and change by region

South Asia has the highest average impact of terrorism in 2017.

Region	2017 average GTI score	Change from 2016	Change from 2002
South Asia	5.743	0.208	0.617
North America	4.797	0.593	0.202
Middle East and North Africa	4.475	-0.182	2.126
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.774	0.089	1.092
Asia-Pacific	2.282	0.049	0.651
South America	2.189	-0.012	0.721
Russia and Eurasia	1.816	-0.315	0.029
Europe	1.756	-0.072	0.555
Central America & the Caribbean	0.799	-0.076	0.369

As well as accounting for the highest number of total deaths, MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa also had the most lethal terrorist attacks on average, with 2.75, 1.85 and 4.35 people killed per attack respectively.


Of the other regions, only Russia and Eurasia and Central America and the Caribbean recorded more deaths than attacks. In Asia-Pacific, Europe, South America, and North America, there were more terrorist attacks than total deaths from terrorism between 2002 to 2017.

There were also variations in the type of terrorist attacks most commonly employed by region. In most regions, the majority of attacks came from bombings and explosions, followed by armed assaults. Bombings and explosions were the most common tactic

FIGURE 2.6

Type of attack by region, 2002–2017

Bombings and armed assaults are most common forms of terrorism in most regions.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

in the Middle East, where they accounted for just under 68 per cent of all attacks. Although there were far fewer total attacks in the Central America and the Caribbean, assassinations as a percentage of total attacks were higher there than in any other region.

In Europe and North America, attacks on infrastructure targets were more common than in any other region, with 23 per cent of attacks in Europe and 48 per cent of attacks in North America aimed at facilities or infrastructure. Figure 2.6 shows the types of attacks as a percentage of total attacks for each region.

“The impact of terrorism decreased across five of the nine regions in the world in 2017, in line with the global trend, which saw a significant drop in both deaths from terrorism and terrorist attacks.”

South Asia

TABLE 2.2

GTI score, rank & change in score 2002-2017

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2017	Change 2016-2017
Afghanistan	9.391	2	3.846	-0.012
Pakistan	8.181	5	2.158	-0.185
India	7.568	7	0.225	0.055
Bangladesh	5.697	25	0.463	-0.463
Nepal	5.295	33	-0.802	0.924
Sri Lanka	4.048	49	-1.589	1.156
Bhutan	0.019	135	0.019	-0.019
Regional average			0.617	0.208

Four countries in South Asia improved on the GTI from 2016 to 2017, compared to three that deteriorated. On average, the impact of terrorism worsened in South Asia over the past year.

South Asia experienced a deterioration in its GTI score from 2016 to 2017. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India are all ranked amongst the ten countries most impacted by terrorism, with Afghanistan now overtaking Iraq as the country with the most terror-related deaths.

Over the past 16 years, only two countries in South Asia experienced a decrease in the impact of terrorism: Sri Lanka and Nepal. Although both deteriorated in 2017, they have improved significantly since their peaks in terror-related deaths in 2006 and 2004 respectively. The decline in terrorism in Sri Lanka is largely the result of the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil in Eelam (LTTE) following the Sri Lankan Civil War.

Many countries in South Asia have seen an increase in terrorist activity from ISIL and its affiliates in the past few years. In Bangladesh, the largest recent terrorist attack occurred in 2016,

when an armed assault in Dhaka killed 28 people. ISIL later claimed responsibility for the attack. In 2017, the two deadliest attacks in South Asia were committed by the Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State in Afghanistan and Pakistan, killing 93 and 91 persons respectively.

The deadliest terror group in the region remains the Taliban, who were responsible for 3,571 deaths in 2017, all of which occurred in Afghanistan.

Violent conflict between the Taliban and government forces in both Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past decade, along with anti-government terrorist activity in India, has meant that much of the terrorist activity in the region has been directed at the police and military. In 2017, 52 per cent of deaths from terrorism in the region were of police and military personnel.

North America

TABLE 2.3
GTI score, rank & change in score 2002-2017

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2017	Change 2016-2017
United States of America	6.066	20	-1.983	0.603
Canada	3.527	57	2.387	0.582
	Regional average		0.617	0.208

Both Canada and the USA deteriorated on the GTI from 2016 to 2017, meaning that the impact of terrorism in North America as a whole increased. North America is the region with the second-highest average impact of terrorism in 2017. The majority of terrorist activity in North America has taken place in the US, which had 95 per cent of deaths from terrorism and 88 per cent of total terrorist attacks from 2002 to 2017.

North America has had a higher proportion of attacks directed at infrastructure than other regions, owing to attacks by eco-terrorist organisations. However, these attacks were not responsible for any deaths. In the past decade there has been very little activity from eco-terrorist groups, with a concurrent change in the predominant type of terrorism. Most attacks in the past decade have been either armed assaults, or bombings or explosions.

Although the majority of deaths from terrorism in North America since the turn of the century have been related to Jihadist groups, there has been a resurgence of far-right political terrorism in the past few years. In 2017, white power extremists were responsible for nine attacks and seven deaths in North America. The most notable terror attack committed by white extremists in 2017 occurred in August 2017 during the 'Unite the Right' rally in Charlottesville, North Virginia, during which a white extremist drove a car into a crowd and killed one person. In October 2018, a white power extremist shot and killed eleven people at a Pittsburgh synagogue. Canada experienced six terror-related deaths in 2017, all of which were the result of an armed assault at the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City by a right-wing extremist.

Middle East and North Africa

TABLE 2.4
GTI score, rank & change in score 2002-2017

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2017	Change 2016-2017
Iraq	9.746	1	6.04	-0.254
Syria	8.315	4	8.305	-0.282
Yemen	7.534	8	4.666	-0.312
Egypt	7.345	9	6.968	0.175
Libya	6.987	13	6.987	-0.245
Sudan	6.178	18	-0.386	-0.247
Saudi Arabia	5.479	29	3.474	-0.315
Palestine	5.33	31	-0.716	-0.205
Lebanon	5.154	35	1.937	-0.465
Israel	4.578	41	-2.212	-0.469
Iran	4.399	44	2.105	0.698
Tunisia	4.088	47	0.509	-0.524
Bahrain	3.883	53	3.883	0.228
Algeria	3.763	54	-3.4	-0.189
Jordan	3.404	60	1.387	-0.369
Kuwait	3.126	64	2.782	-0.66
United Arab Emirates	0.105	127	0.105	-0.105
Qatar	0.057	130	0.057	-0.058
Morocco	0.038	132	0.038	-0.038
Oman	0	138	0	0
	Regional average		0.617	0.208

Sixteen countries in MENA had improvements on their GTI scores from 2016 to 2017, with only three countries deteriorating. The impact of terrorism improved on average in MENA, although it remains much higher than it was in 2002.

The last five years in the region have been dominated by ISIL activity. Despite heavy territorial and logistical losses, ISIL was still the most active terror group in 2017. Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates have been the second most active terror group since 2002; however, their presence has greatly reduced and shifted towards sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. Excluding ISIL and its affiliates, the second deadliest terror group in the region was Hay'at Tehrir al-Sham, formerly Al-Nusra, in the Syrian province of Idlib.

Although the MENA region has had the highest number of deaths from terrorism since 2002, it has only the third highest average GTI score of any region, owing to a number of countries with very low levels of terrorism.

The region has also seen a decline in terrorist activity in the past year, as a result of the fall in the level of conflict in Iraq and Syria. MENA experienced the largest total drop in deaths from terrorism in 2017, falling by 6,714 deaths. The majority of the improvement was in Iraq and Syria, with the two countries having 5,512 fewer deaths and 1,014 less deaths respectively. Since 2002, Iraq has accounted for 72 per cent of all terror-related deaths in MENA.

While only four countries improved their GTI scores in 2016, this trend reversed in 2017 with 16 countries improving and only three deteriorating: Egypt, Iran and Bahrain. However, MENA still had the highest number of deaths of any region in 2017, and has four countries ranked in the GTI ten most impacted countries.

Egypt experienced the largest increase in deaths in the region, increasing from 294 in 2016 to 655 in 2017. The primary driver of this uptick was increased activity by the Sinai Province of the Islamic State. An armed assault and bombing attack by the group in Beir Al-Abd in November 2017 resulted in 311 deaths, the second largest terrorist attack in the world in that year.

Sudan, Algeria and Israel have all experienced the largest declines in terror-related deaths since 2002. Libya, which had the tenth highest GTI ranking in last year's report, experienced 233 deaths in 2017, down from 378 in 2016. In 2017, 141 deaths were caused by the revolutionary group Misrata Brigades, all of which occurred in a single attack. Prior to 2017, the group had been responsible for only four deaths from nine attacks.

Bombings and explosive attacks accounted for the majority of attacks in MENA, with 60 per cent of terror-related deaths resulting from explosive attacks. Private civilians and their property made up the largest proportion of targets of terrorism in 2017, with 42 per cent of terror incidents in MENA targeting civilians. The deadliest attacks in MENA, however, were those that targeted police and military personnel. These attacks killed an average of 4.04 persons per attack, while civilian attacks killed 3.22 persons per attack.

Sub-Saharan Africa

The average impact of terrorism increased in sub-Saharan Africa in 2017, despite improvements in 20 of the 44 countries and no change in ten countries. Over the past year, total deaths from terrorism increased by five per cent. There were 4,996 deaths and 1,371 terror incidents in 2017.

Since 2002, there have been 40,601 deaths from terrorism in the region, although the last three years have seen a significant decline in total deaths per year, mainly because of the decrease in activity of Boko Haram.

Deaths from terrorism have gone down 52 per cent in the region since their peak in 2014.

There are two Sub-Saharan African countries amongst the GTI ten most impacted: Nigeria, and Somalia, ranked third and sixth respectively. The most notable deterioration in Sub-Saharan Africa came from Angola whose GTI ranking deteriorated by 76 places in 2017. The reason for this deterioration came from a chemical gas attack against a regional convention of Jehovah's Witnesses in Luanda, Angola that injured 405 people. The attack was carried out by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

The countries with the biggest improvements in Sub-Saharan Africa include Senegal, the Republic of Congo and Chad. Terrorism in Chad peaked in 2015 when 22 attacks killed 206

TABLE 2.5

GTI score, rank & change in score 2002-2017

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2017	Change 2016-2017
Nigeria	8.66	3	5.152	-0.312
Somalia	8.02	6	4.947	0.374
Dem. Republic of the Congo	7.055	11	2.999	0.113
South Sudan	6.756	14	6.756	-0.038
Central African Republic	6.719	15	6.719	0.347
Cameroon	6.615	16	6.567	-0.152
Kenya	6.114	19	1.482	-0.035
Mali	6.015	22	6.015	0.14
Niger	6.004	23	5.737	-0.304
Ethiopia	5.631	26	4.251	-0.282
Burundi	5.316	32	-0.181	-0.315
Burkina Faso	4.811	37	4.811	0.303
Chad	4.752	38	3.744	-0.497
Mozambique	4.579	40	4.493	-0.233
Angola	4.473	43	-1.882	4.32
South Africa	4.263	46	1.178	0.183
Uganda	3.926	52	-1.742	-0.376
Tanzania	3.368	62	-0.226	-0.03
Republic of the Congo	3.276	61	-0.302	-0.675
Cote d' Ivoire	3.368	62	0.606	-0.412
Madagascar	2.613	72	1.15	-0.662
Rwanda	2.177	76	-0.183	0.257
Zimbabwe	1.569	86	-1.674	1.369
Gabon	1.198	93	1.198	1.198
Sierra Leone	1.066	95	-2.794	0.403
Senegal	1.012	96	-2.659	-0.776
Djibouti	0.705	103	0.705	-0.41
Zambia	0.663	104	-0.899	0.663
Malawi	0.458	107	0.458	0.458
Guinea	0.324	112	-3.886	-0.395
Liberia	0.21	119	-1.83	0.086
Lesotho	0.191	121	0.191	-0.191
Ghana	0.162	122	0.162	-0.162
Togo	0	138	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	138	0	0
Namibia	0	138	-2.746	0
Eritrea	0	138	0	0
The Gambia	0	138	-0.076	0
Guinea-Bissau	0	138	-0.076	-0.038
Botswana	0	138	0	0
Mauritius	0	138	0	0
Mauritania	0	138	0	0
eSwatini	0	138	-0.124	0
Benin	0	138	0	0
Regional average			1.092	0.089

people. All of the attacks were carried out by Boko Haram. However, in 2017 Chad experienced only four terror attacks and 13 deaths, due to the crackdown on Boko Haram by an international coalition. Since 2002, Boko Haram has caused 42 per cent of the terror-related deaths in the entire region.

In 2017, Al-Shabaab overtook Boko Haram as the deadliest terror group in Sub-Saharan Africa. The other most active terror groups in the region in 2017 were Fulani extremists, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) and the Union for Peace in Central Africa (UPC). These three groups were collectively responsible for 15 per cent of deaths throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017.

The deadliest terror attack in the world in 2017 occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa, following the Al-Shabaab suicide-bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia that killed 588 people. The second and third deadliest terror attacks both occurred in the Central African Republic, following two armed assault attacks in May 2017 that killed 133 and 108 people each. The former attack was carried out by the splinter-Seleka Fulani faction UPC, while the latter was carried out by Anti-Balaka Christian extremists.

Asia-Pacific

TABLE 2.6

GTI score, rank & change in score 2002-2017

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2017	Change 2016-2017
Philippines	7.181	10	1.176	0.075
Thailand	6.252	17	2.207	-0.337
Myanmar	5.916	24	2.685	0.981
China	5.108	36	2.003	-0.419
Indonesia	4.543	42	-1.848	0.006
Japan	2.926	67	1.382	-0.658
Australia	2.827	68	2.712	-0.254
Malaysia	2.7	70	2.204	-0.621
Papua New Guinea	2.04	77	1.582	2.04
Laos	1.675	85	-0.068	-0.28
Taiwan	0.943	99	0.943	0.392
Vietnam	0.663	104	0.358	0.663
South Korea	0.286	114	0.133	-0.321
New Zealand	0.286	114	0.21	-0.321
Cambodia	0.019	135	-3.108	-0.019
Singapore	0	138	0	0
Timor-Leste	0	138	-0.21	0
North Korea	0	138	0	0
Mongolia	0	138	0	0
Regional average			0.651	0.049

Nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region improved their GTI score in 2017, while six countries recorded deteriorations. The average impact of terrorism increased over the past year, in large part due to deteriorations in Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, and Myanmar.

The year 2017 was the third deadliest year for the Asia-Pacific region since 2002, with 617 deaths from 774 terror attacks. The Philippines and Myanmar had the largest yearly increases in terrorism in 2017. These countries accounted for over 87 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region in the last year.

The three deadliest terror organisations in the Asia-Pacific in 2017 were the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), New People's Army and Abu Sayyaf Group. ARSA is active in Myanmar and formed following the Myanmar government's crackdown on the Rohingya population.

The New People's Army and Abu Sayyaf are both active in the Philippines and have been ranked in the region's three deadliest groups since 2002, with the latter group responsible for spearheading the Marawi Siege in May 2017.

The two deadliest terror attacks in the region took place in Myanmar, with 45 and 30 deaths committed by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) respectively.

Philippines, Myanmar and Thailand experienced the highest number of deaths in the region for the second year in a row. Thailand, however, experienced a decline in terror-related deaths by 57 per cent in 2017, falling from 92 in 2016 to 40 deaths in 2017. This is the lowest death toll in Thailand since 2004.

Four countries in the Asia-Pacific experienced no terror attacks in 2017, down from six in 2016. Papua New Guinea, which had no terrorist incidents last year, experienced a series of explosions and infrastructure attacks against schools and government buildings in July 2017 that resulted in three injuries. The attacks were not claimed by any group.

South America

TABLE 2.7

GTI score, rank & change in score 2002-2017

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2017	Change 2016-2017
Colombia	5.611	27	-1.172	-0.027
Venezuela	3.665	55	1.228	0.039
Chile	3.454	58	2.165	0.091
Paraguay	3.443	59	3.19	-0.159
Peru	2.95	66	-0.459	0.413
Argentina	1.68	84	1.059	0.709
Ecuador	1.471	88	-0.543	-0.415
Brazil	1.388	90	0.93	-0.257
Uruguay	0.344	111	0.344	-0.431
Guyana	0.076	128	0.038	-0.077
Bolivia	0	138	-0.458	-0.019
Regional average			0.575	-0.012

Seven countries in South America improved on the GTI in 2017, compared to four that deteriorated. This led to a small improvement in the region's average GTI score.

Total terrorist activity increased in South America in 2017, with a total of 145 terror incidents and 73 terror-related deaths, up from 136 attacks and 49 deaths in 2016. However, the impact of terrorism was limited to a small number of countries, with only four countries recording any terrorist deaths at all in 2017, compared to eight in 2016.

Colombia experienced the most deaths in the region from terrorism in 2017 with 59 deaths, up from 32 deaths in 2016. The country with the second highest number of deaths in South America was Peru with seven deaths. While Colombia is the country in the region with the highest GTI score, the number of deaths has decreased 80 per cent since 2002.

The deadliest terror group in South America in 2017 was the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN), the most active Marxist rebel group in Colombia following the ceasefire and peace treaty signed between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government. The ELN was responsible for 21 deaths from 49 incidents in 2017, including the deadliest attack in the region that left five dead after an armed assault in El Carra. The ELN has seized upon the vacuum left by FARC's demobilisation and has taken control over portions of the San Juan River. FARC, on the other hand, is now a political party operating under the same name. Militant remnants of the FARC are still active and were responsible for eleven terror-related deaths in 2017.

Of the 73 deaths in South America in 2017, 55 per cent occurred during attacks on civilians and 35 per cent during attacks on police and the military. Armed assaults were the deadliest form of terrorist attack in South America, killing an average of 3.37 people per attack.

Russia and Eurasia

TABLE 2.8

GTI score, rank & change in score 2002-2017

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2017	Change 2016-2017
Ukraine	6.048	21	4.462	-0.49
Russia	5.23	34	-1.603	-0.08
Tajikistan	2.233	74	-0.502	-0.328
Kazakhstan	2.228	75	1.846	-0.709
Kyrgyz Republic	1.719	80	-0.088	-0.304
Armenia	1.692	83	0.572	-0.672
Georgia	1.422	89	-1.411	-0.685
Azerbaijan	0.957	98	-0.609	-0.192
Moldova	0.229	116	0.191	-0.239
Uzbekistan	0.038	132	-2.049	-0.038
Belarus	0	138	-0.229	-0.038
Turkmenistan	0	138	-0.229	0
Regional average			0.029	-0.315

Russia and Eurasia experienced the largest improvement in its GTI score of any region in 2017, with every country recording a decrease in the impact of terrorism. There were 73 deaths and 80 terror incidents in 2017, down from 87 deaths and 109 incidents in 2016.

For four consecutive years to 2017, Ukraine has been the country in the region most impacted by terrorism. However, deaths in the country have decreased by 96 per cent since its peak in 2014 following the rise of separatist activity in the country's eastern states.

Russia recorded 47 deaths in 2017, the highest of any country in the region. Together with Ukraine, the two countries experienced 99 per cent of deaths over the past year. Since 2002, Russia has accounted for 68 per cent of deaths in the region, with Ukraine recording 28 per cent of regional deaths.

The deadliest terror group in Russia and Eurasia over the past 16 years was the Chechen Rebels. However, the group has not been responsible for any terror-related deaths since 2009. The second most active group since 2002 has been the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR), which was also the deadliest terror group in the region in 2017. The DNR is a Ukrainian separatist militant group that has been at war with the Ukrainian government alongside Luhansk People's Republic (LNR). Both groups were most active in 2014 during the height of the separatist insurgency and have decreased their activity in the region since. The LNR has not been responsible for any terror-related deaths since 2015. Despite the decreased activity of both groups, the separatist conflict in Donbass continues to this day.

In 2017, the next two deadliest groups in the region were the Caucasus Province of the Islamic State, and Imam Shamil Battalion, an Al-Qa'ida affiliate. Both groups were responsible for 16 deaths each, all of which occurred in Russia. Both groups had their deadliest year on record in 2017, indicating an increased presence of Islamist-related terrorism in the Russia & Eurasia region.

Europe

Twenty-one countries in Europe recorded improvements on their GTI score in 2017, with eleven registering deteriorations in their scores. The impact of terrorism fell for the region on average.

Europe recorded the largest percentage decrease in deaths from terrorism of any region in the world in 2017, with total deaths falling by 75 per cent. The majority of this fall in terrorist activity occurred in Turkey, where deaths from terrorism fell from 659 in 2016 to 123 in 2017, an 81 per cent decrease. Increased counterterrorism efforts also had an impact on the lethality of terror attacks in Europe, with the average number of people killed per attack falling from 1.23 to 0.50.

Many Western European countries have been the target of ISIL-inspired terror attacks since 2014. France, Belgium and Germany were the countries, after Turkey, with the highest death tolls in 2016, largely because of the series of vehicular and explosive terror attacks in Nice, Brussels and Berlin, all of which were claimed by ISIL and its affiliates. France is the third most

TABLE 2.9

GTI score, rank & change in score 2002-2017

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2017	Change 2016-2017
Turkey	7.036	12	2.868	-0.461
United Kingdom	5.61	28	1.307	0.517
France	5.475	30	1.736	-0.466
Germany	4.601	39	2.138	-0.318
Greece	4.291	45	0.872	0.166
Belgium	4.06	48	3.631	-0.58
Spain	4.024	50	-0.975	2.33
Sweden	3.936	51	3.841	0.252
Ireland	3.045	65	2.959	-0.085
Italy	2.736	69	0.115	-0.004
Kosovo	2.694	71	-1.318	0.153
Finland	2.501	73	2.501	0.169
Netherlands	1.96	78	0.547	-0.442
Austria	1.852	79	1.842	0.335
Czech Republic	1.562	87	1.333	-0.319
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.339	91	-0.427	-0.684
Cyprus	1.206	92	0.796	-0.68
Albania	1.008	97	0.394	-0.471
Denmark	0.817	100	0.817	-0.69
Poland	0.719	102	0.28	0.337
Macedonia (FYR)	0.649	106	-3.428	-0.533
Latvia	0.458	107	0.267	0.458
Hungary	0.363	110	0.334	-0.468
Bulgaria	0.315	113	-1.274	-0.858
Estonia	0.229	116	0.172	-0.229
Serbia	0.229	116	0.229	0.186
Norway	0.153	123	0.153	0.153
Switzerland	0.134	124	-0.459	-0.133
Slovakia	0.115	126	-0.038	-0.114
Iceland	0.057	130	0.057	-0.067
Montenegro	0.038	132	-0.267	-0.038
Croatia	0.014	137	-1.019	-0.015
Portugal	0	138	0	0
Slovenia	0	138	0	0
Romania	0	138	0	0
Lithuania	0	138	0	0
Regional average			0.555	-0.072

impacted country in Europe behind Turkey and the United Kingdom, chiefly as a result of the truck attack in Nice and the series of attacks in November 2015 in Paris that killed over 130 people.

Despite high-profile attacks in Barcelona and Manchester in 2017, the surge in terrorism over the past few years has abated. France recorded seven deaths from terrorism in 2017, down from 162 in 2015. Germany experienced 26 deaths in 2016, but just one in 2017. There was also a large improvement in Belgium, where the number of deaths fell from 36 in 2016 to two in 2017.

The deadliest terror attack in 2017 was an armed assault against civilians at the start of the new year at a nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey, which killed 39 civilians. The next deadliest attacks were a suicide bombing in the United Kingdom at an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, England that killed 23 people and injured an additional 119 and a vehicular attack in Barcelona, Spain that killed 23 people and injured 101 more. All three of these attacks were claimed by the Islamic State.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was the deadliest terror group in 2017 in Europe; however, no attack by the group killed more than four people. The PKK is the militant Kurdish nationalist group primarily active in Turkey and Iraq. The group killed 71 people in Europe, down from 268 last year.

The PKK staged only one attack outside Turkey in 2017, an arson attack on a mosque in Germany in which there were no deaths or injuries. There have been a number of similar incidents in 2018, which have also resulted in no fatalities or injuries. The second deadliest group in Europe was ISIL, which committed 64 deaths in Europe, down from its peak in 2015 when 284 deaths occurred.

Decreased activity from ISIL and other jihadist groups in Europe has occurred alongside significantly stricter counterterrorism and security measures throughout Europe and loss of territory in Iraq and Syria.

Central America and the Caribbean

TABLE 2.10

GTI score, rank & change in score 2002-2017

Country	Overall Score	Regional Rank	Change 2002-2017	Change 2016-2017
Mexico	3.533	56	1.635	0.254
Honduras	1.714	81	1.561	0.157
Haiti	1.714	81	-0.246	-0.676
Jamaica	1.091	94	1.091	1.034
Nicaragua	0.747	101	0.728	-0.683
Dominican Republic	0.382	109	0.382	-0.505
Guatemala	0.205	120	-0.828	-0.297
Trinidad and Tobago	0.124	125	0.124	-0.124
Panama	0.076	128	-0.019	-0.077
Cuba	0	138	0	0
Costa Rica	0	138	0	0
El Salvador	0	138	0	0
Regional average			0.369	-0.076

In the Central America and the Caribbean region, six countries improved their scores on the GTI in 2016, with only three countries registering deteriorations. This resulted in an overall improvement for the region on average.

As the region consistently least impacted by terrorism, Central America and the Caribbean recorded only 14 deaths from 11 terror attacks in 2017, up from 12 deaths and 6 attacks in 2016.

Twelve of the deaths in 2017 took place in Mexico and the other two occurred in Honduras. The region has experienced 184 terror attacks since 2002, with the most deaths occurring in 2013 with 49 victims.

All terror-related deaths in Central America and the Caribbean in 2017 were carried out either by unknown groups or the Union of Peoples and Organisations of the State of Guerrero (UPOEG), an anti-government criminal network that controls certain municipalities in Mexico's Guerrero State. UPOEG carried out only one attack in 2017 – an armed assault in San Pedro Cacahuatepec, Mexico, that killed seven civilians.

The deadliest terror group in Central America and the Caribbean since 2002 is the Individuals Trending Toward Savagery (ITS), a terror group that opposes technological advancement and industrialisation, that carried out an attack

with explosives that killed 37 civilians in Mexico City in 2013; the group has not been active since this attack.

In 2017, private civilians were the main target of terrorism, with nine of 14 deaths being civilian casualties. An additional four deaths occurred in attacks on media and NGOs. Since 2002, 29 per cent of terror incidents have targeted this type of outlet. Armed assaults have been the primary tactic used by terror groups in Central America and the Caribbean, with 57 per cent of attacks since 2002 carried out through these means.

TERRORISM & CONFLICT

The last decade has seen a significant increase in both the level of conflict and the impact of terrorism around the world. In 2014, battle-related deaths reached a 25-year high and deaths from terrorism also peaked. While the impact of terrorism has been increasing slowly for most of the past 30 years, the number of battle-related deaths has fluctuated with the onset of different conflicts.

Although the number of battle-related deaths has risen in recent years, it has not come close to the 200,000 deaths per annum recorded in 1985. Figure 2.7 shows the trend in battle deaths and deaths from terrorism over the past 20 years, as well as an index chart of the change in both variables since 2001. While the total number of deaths from terrorism is much smaller than the total


number of battle deaths, the percentage change in both has been very similar, particularly from 2011 onwards. From 2011 to 2014, battle-related deaths increased 356 per cent, while deaths from terrorism increased 353 per cent. The downward trend over the past three years has also been remarkably similar, with battle-related deaths falling 34 per cent between 2014 and 2017, and deaths from terrorism falling just under 44 per cent over the same period.

The same trend can be observed by looking at violent conflict deaths and deaths from terrorism, for the countries with the highest level of terrorism. The relationship between these two variables is shown in figure 2.8 for the six countries most affected by terrorism.

FIGURE 2.7

Deaths from terrorism and conflict, 1998-2017

Both terrorism and conflict deaths rose nearly 400 per cent between 2001 and 2014.




Source: UCDP, START GTD, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.8

Deaths from terrorism and battle deaths, 2002–2017

The countries with the highest levels of terrorist activity also have a high number of battle deaths.



Source: UCDP Georeferenced Event Database, START GTD, IEP Calculations

In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Nigeria, there is a very strong relationship between violent conflict deaths and deaths from terrorism. The relationship is closest in Iraq and Nigeria, where deaths from terrorism were almost as high as violent conflict deaths for every year between 2002 and 2017.

In Afghanistan, conflict deaths were much higher, but increases in conflict deaths were usually concordant with increases in deaths from terrorism. This can also be seen in a more exaggerated form in Syria, where a very large percentage increase in deaths from terrorism was completely eclipsed by the enormous increase in battle-related deaths. In Somalia and Pakistan, the relationship was less clear between 2007 and 2012, but in the last five years, the two variables have moved in tandem.

Battle deaths and deaths from terrorism correlate not only across time, but also across countries as well. There is a strong statistical relationship between the intensity of conflict and terrorism ($r=0.73$). Countries with more intense conflicts also have higher numbers of deaths from terrorism, and the majority of deaths from terrorism occur in countries in a state of war (over 1,000 battle-related deaths in a calendar year), compared to countries in either minor violent conflicts or without any conflicts at all, as shown in figure 2.9.

There have been just over 200,000 recorded deaths from terrorism since 2002. Of these, 94 per cent occurred in countries

“There is a strong statistical relationship between the intensity of conflict and terrorism. Countries with more intense conflicts also have higher numbers of deaths from terrorism, and the majority of deaths from terrorism occur in countries in a state of war.”


suffering from violent conflict, with 74 per cent of total deaths occurring in countries in a state of war.

Although there has been a considerable percentage increase in deaths from terrorism in non-conflict countries since 2002, it does not come close to the increase in countries affected by violent conflict. No country not in conflict has ever recorded more than 850 deaths from terrorism in a single year, or recorded a GTI score of over seven out of a possible ten.

FIGURE 2.9

Deaths from terrorism by conflict type, 1998–2017

74% of deaths from terrorism occurred in countries in a state of war.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

Countries not in conflict that have higher levels of terrorism tend to be post-conflict countries such as Colombia or the Central African Republic. In recent years, a number of European countries not involved in conflict have experienced higher levels of terrorism.

The Central African Republic is the only country ranked in the 25 most impacted countries on the 2017 GTI that is not involved in a conflict. Only three countries involved in conflicts were ranked outside of the 50 most impacted: Azerbaijan, Uganda, and Algeria.

Countries involved in conflict are more susceptible to terrorism in part because of the lack of a fully functioning state. Terrorism is also one of many tactics employed by insurgencies and paramilitaries in a civil conflict. For example, terrorist groups like ISIL, Boko Haram and the Taliban all carry out conventional military attacks in the context of their respective conflicts as well as undertaking extensive terrorist activity.

While there can be large differences in the political stability and general security environment between conflict and non-conflict countries, there is little difference between the mixture of who and what is targeted by attacks. In non-conflict countries, 57 per cent of terrorist attacks target civilians. This figure is slightly higher than in countries experiencing conflict, with 51 per cent of attacks targeting civilians.

Attacks in non-conflict countries on government targets accounted for 27 per cent of total terrorist incidents, which is slightly more than the equivalent figure of 29 per cent for conflict countries.

“Terrorist attacks in conflict countries lead to more fatalities than attacks in non-conflict countries.”


Terrorist groups in conflict and non-conflict countries share similar targets, but there are significant differences in the deadliness of attacks. On average, terrorist attacks in conflict countries lead to more fatalities than attacks in non-conflict countries, and countries in war have more fatalities per attack than countries involved in minor conflicts. This trend has continued for every year bar one since 2002, as shown in figure 2.10.

In 2017, terrorist attacks in conflict countries averaged 2.4 deaths, compared to 0.84 deaths in non-conflict countries. Terrorist attacks are more lethal on average in countries with a greater intensity of conflict. In 2017, countries in a state of war averaged 2.97 deaths per attack, compared to 1.36 in countries involved in a minor armed conflict. There are numerous possible reasons for this difference. Countries in conflict have a greater availability of more military-grade small arms and bomb-making capabilities. Countries that are not in conflict tend to be more economically-developed and spend more on intelligence gathering, policing and counterterrorism.

FIGURE 2.10

Average fatalities per attack by conflict type, 2002–2017

Terrorist attacks in conflict countries are significantly more lethal on average.



Source: UCDP ACD, START GTD, IEP calculations

The difference in lethality between terrorist attacks in conflict and non-conflict countries can also be clearly seen by the distribution of deaths from terrorism. In non-conflict countries, 74 per cent of terrorist attacks from 2002 to 2017 resulted in no fatalities. By contrast, in conflict countries, less than half of all terrorist attacks resulted in no deaths, and there were 84 attacks that killed more than 100 people.

However, terrorist attacks that killed high numbers of people have remained relatively rare in both conflict and non-conflict countries since 2002, with only 2.2 per cent of attacks in non-conflict countries and 4.5 per cent of attacks in conflict countries killing more than ten people.

TRENDS IN WESTERN EUROPE & NORTH AMERICA

The number of deaths from terrorism fell in Western Europe for the second year in a row and is now 53 per cent lower than its peak in 2015. There were 81 deaths from terrorism in Western Europe in 2017, down from 168 a year earlier. Preliminary data for 2018 suggests that this trend will continue, with less than ten deaths from terrorism recorded between January and October in 2018. However, while the total number of deaths has decreased, the number of incidents has increased, up to 282 in 2017, compared to 253 in 2016. Improved counterterrorism measures and the decline of ISIL in Iraq and Syria were the main drivers of the fall in the lethality of attacks in Western Europe and North America.

Deaths from terrorism fell 93 per cent in France, 94 per cent in Belgium, and 96 per cent in Germany. The UK, Spain, Finland, Sweden, and Austria were the only countries to experience increases in deaths from terrorism in Western Europe. However, in North America, both Canada and the US had increases in total deaths.

Terrorism remains a serious security concern in Western Europe, with eight countries recording at least one death from terrorism in 2017. Figure 2.11 shows the trend in the number of deaths from terrorism for Western Europe and North America for the past 20 years.

In North America, the number of deaths from terrorism increased for the fourth successive year, rising from 65 deaths in 2016, to 85 deaths in 2017. Deaths rose in both the US and Canada, with Canada having its second deadliest year since 1998 with six deaths.

In the US, total deaths rose from 64 to 86, primarily as the result of the Las Vegas shooting in October 2017 that killed 59 people. The number of incidents per year in North America has tripled in the past five years, with 61 recorded terrorist incidents in 2017, up from just 19 incidents in 2012.

Despite the increase in the number of deaths from terrorism in the past few years, the level of terrorist activity in Western Europe and North America is not without precedent. The US had over 3,000 deaths from terrorism in 2001, owing to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In Western Europe, terrorist organisations such as the IRA and ETA were responsible for hundreds of deaths. The UK recorded over 2,400 deaths from terrorism between 1970 and 2016, the majority of which were caused by various Irish separatist organisations. In Spain, ETA was responsible for nearly 700 deaths from 1970 to 2016.


In 2017, the number of countries experiencing at least one terrorist incident fell from 16 to 15. However, the number of

“Deaths from terrorism fell 93 per cent in France, 94 per cent in Belgium, and 96 per cent in Germany.”

FIGURE 2.11

Deaths from terrorism in Western Europe and North America, 1998–2017

Deaths rose every year in both Western Europe and North America from 2013 to 2016.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

countries experiencing at least one death rose from nine to ten, meaning that 66 per cent of the countries that experienced terrorist activity also experienced at least one death from terrorism.

Although the total number of deaths has fallen and no single attack caused more than 25 deaths in 2017, the threat of terrorism remains widespread throughout Western Europe. More countries in the region experienced at least one death in 2017 than at any other point within the last 20 years. Cyprus, Iceland, Portugal and Switzerland were the only countries in Western Europe not to record at least one death from terrorism in the past 20 years. Figure 2.12 highlights the distribution of terrorism over time in Western Europe and North America.

The five years from 2013 to 2017 account for just over 50 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the past 20 years and just over 47 per cent of all terrorist incidents in the region. In 2017, that trend began to reverse and in 2018 there have been fewer than ten deaths from terrorism recorded in Western Europe.

Despite the fall in total deaths from terrorism, the level of terrorist activity remains high, with the total number of incidents remaining constant in North America, and increasing 11 per cent in Western Europe, from 253 attacks in 2016 to 282 attacks in 2017. Of the last twenty years, only 2015 had more terrorist incidents than 2017.


The impact of increased public security measures, higher counterterrorism spending and a greater political emphasis on the threat posed by terrorism meant that even though the number of incidents increased, the number of deaths dramatically decreased. As a result, the average number of people killed per attack in Western Europe fell from 0.66 in 2016 to 0.29 in 2017. The fall in lethality was highest in Belgium, where deaths per attack fell from nine to 0.67, and in France, where the rate fell from 3.92 to 0.18. Of the 39 terror attacks in

France in 2017, no attack killed more than three people. In Germany, 27 terrorist attacks in 2017 resulted in only a single death in total.

In the last five years, the vast majority of terrorist activity in Western Europe and North America has been carried out by ISIL, ISIL affiliate groups, or individuals directly inspired by ISIL, as shown in figure 2.13. IEP estimates that 75 per cent of deaths from terrorism from 2013 to 2017 were carried out by ISIL or ISIL-inspired groups or individuals. Looking back further, this equates to 46 per cent of all deaths from terrorism from 2002 to 2017.

FIGURE 2.12
Number of West. Europe & Nth. American countries that experienced terrorist activity, 1998-2017


Ten countries in Western Europe and North America experienced at least one death from terrorism in 2017.



Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 2.13
ISIL activity in Western Europe and North America, 2013-2017

46% of all deaths from terrorism between these regions over the past 15 years were committed by ISIL.



Source: Start GTD, IEP calculations

FUTURE TRENDS IN VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Although 2017 saw a sharp decline in deaths from terrorism in Western Europe, terrorist activity still poses a significant security threat. Potential future sources of terrorism include foreign fighters returning to Europe after the collapse of ISIL in Iraq and Syria, as well as the threat of a resurgence of politically-motivated extremist violence in both Western Europe and North America.

Recent events have heightened the fear of future far-right terrorism. On 27 October 2018, anti-Semitic gunman Robert Bowers killed 11 people in a Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.¹ While the gunman had no criminal history prior to this attack, his online profile shows a history of anti-Semitic radicalisation.

Online platforms have amplified far-right messaging substantially throughout North America and Western Europe,

with elements of Islamophobia and xenophobic sentiments found across 50 different far-right organisations.²

Although Islamist terrorism is more common, there have been a number of high-profile terrorist attacks carried out by far-right individuals in the last decade. In 2011, Anders Behring Breivik carried out a car bombing and armed assault on Utøya Island in Norway that killed 77 people, many of them minors.

Table 2.11 gives a summary of deaths and incidents by far-right terrorist groups from 2002 to 2017. The year 2017 has been the second-deadliest year for North America with regards to far-right terrorism since 2002, with 16 deaths from 31 incidents, the deadliest being an armed assault against a mosque in Quebec City that left six dead in January 2017. The number of incidents in Western Europe is also on the rise. In the 13 years to 2014 there were 20 attacks, whereas in the three years to 2017 there were 61 attacks.

TABLE 2.11

Far-right extremism terrorism deaths and incidents, 2002-2017

Year	DEATHS			INCIDENTS		
	Western Europe	North America	Total	Western Europe	North America	Total
2002	0	0	0	0	1	1
2003	0	0	0	2	0	2
2004	0	0	0	0	3	3
2005	0	0	0	1	2	3
2006	0	0	0	0	4	4
2007	0	0	0	1	1	2
2008	0	0	0	0	2	2
2009	0	2	2	3	3	6
2010	0	4	4	0	3	3
2011	79	0	79	4	0	4
2012	0	7	7	0	10	10
2013	1	0	1	6	3	9
2014	0	11	11	3	7	10
2015	4	22	26	16	10	26
2016	11	0	11	17	6	23
2017	1	16	17	28	31	59
Total	96	62	158	81	86	167

3

Shifting Landscape of Terrorism


OVERVIEW

Although the number of deaths from terrorism has fallen considerably over the last three years, new threats keep emerging. Islamic terrorist organisations have proven to be highly resilient and fluid, splintering and forming new groups and alliances at a rapid rate. Of the 169 terrorist groups responsible for at least one death in 2017, 42 were new groups that had not caused any deaths in previous years.

Increased local and global efforts to combat terrorism have reduced the capacity of the world's deadliest terrorist organisations. However, the threat of terrorism has not diminished in many countries, with over 300 terrorist groups still committing at least one attack in 2017, and over 100 countries experiencing at least one terrorist incident.

FIGURE 3.1
ISIL revenue and territory, 2015–2017

ISIL reportedly lost 60% of its territory and 80% of its revenue from 2015 to 2017.




Source: IHS Markit, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 3.2

ISIL average quarterly revenue by stream, 2015–2017

ISIL's revenue from oil and gas shrank 88% from 2015 to 2017.



Source: IHS Markit, IEP calculations

“Although the number of deaths from terrorism has fallen considerably over the last three years, new threats keep emerging.”

As the level of terrorist activity has fallen in Iraq and Syria, new threats are beginning to emerge elsewhere. Through the spread of regional sleeper-cells and affiliate or ‘wilayat’ chapters outside of the MENA region, organisations like ISIL and Al-Qa’ida have transformed from territory-based groups into broader ideological movements.

ISIL

ISIL's control of territory and associated revenue streams have both plunged over the past two years, as shown in figure 3.1. Following the Iraqi and U.S.-led coalition's success in reclaiming Mosul and Raqqa, two pivotal economic centres for ISIL's operations, the group suffered significant losses in both its annual revenue and territorial hold.

ISIL lost 60% of its territory and 80% of its financial capacity between 2015-2017, from 90,000 sq/km to 36,200 sq/km and \$81 million per month to \$12 million per month respectively by the end of 2017. Latest estimates as of September 2018 suggest that ISIL now holds just one per cent of its former territory. The main financial losses suffered by the group consisted of foregone

FIGURE 3.3

Syrian provinces with at least partial ISIL control, 2015 and 2018

2015



2018



tax and oil revenue as shown in figure 3.1. Currently, the group's primary revenue stream is extortion.

ISIL had significant territorial gains between 2014 and 2015. At its peak, ISIL was able to levy taxes and seize oil fields across Iraq and Syria to generate revenue and provide utilities for those living under its control, garnering support and legitimacy. The group's loss of land has reduced its ability to provide basic services for those living under its control.

The weakened capacity of ISIL is reflected in the fall in incidents and deaths from terrorism in Iraq and Syria. Today, ISIL holds control over only scattered territories along the Syria-Iraq border. As the prospects for a territorial caliphate have diminished severely, so has the feasibility of ISIL-related recruitment to Iraq and Syria. However, the group's ideology, frequency of attacks and the underlying reasons for its existence continue to persist.


AL-QA'IDA

Over the last decade, Al-Qa'ida has shown a consistent ability to adapt, with its operations having successfully decentralised and its affiliate chapters becoming more active. The group first gained global notoriety for staging the 9/11 attacks in New York City, followed by a series of major attacks in Bali, Madrid, London and Islamabad in the subsequent decade. While the lethality of the group was overshadowed by ISIL's rise to prominence in the Middle East over the past five years, Al-Qa'ida has spent recent years strategising and rebuilding. With upwards of 30,000 active fighters dispersed throughout MENA and sub-Saharan Africa and active in at least 17 countries, Al Qa'ida's renewed presence poses a continuing threat.

Once the deadliest terror group in the world, Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates have been responsible for three of the world's five deadliest terrorist attacks in recorded history: the two attacks against the World Trade Centre in 2001 and Al-Shabaab's car bombing in Mogadishu in October 2017. Excluding Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya, the deadliest chapters in the past decade have been Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, which was responsible for 2,362 deaths, Al-Nusra Front who were responsible for 1,902 deaths and Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) who were responsible for 1,652 deaths. These three groups have been most active in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

Although historically the group has been most active in the Middle East, its focus has turned towards Africa. Between 2015 and 2017, 69 per cent of terror-related deaths caused by the group occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa.

FIGURE 3.4
Deaths from terrorism in Iraq, 2016 & 2017



Seizing on the power vacuum left by the Arab Spring, Al-Qa'ida's movement into Africa has been the result of careful planning under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Outside of the Middle East, the group's affiliates have gained traction throughout Africa, most notably in the Maghreb and Sahel regions and at the Horn of Africa. Often characterised as more patient and covert than the Islamic State, Al Qa'ida's apparent resurgence outside of the Middle East poses a significant threat to governments in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. Already, notable mergers between its affiliates, the growth of Al-Shabaab and the inability of many African governments to combat rural terrorist networks have strengthened Al-Qa'ida's core capacity.



EMERGING HOTSPOTS OF TERRORISM

While the territorial losses incurred by ISIL stopped the group's ability to create a Caliphate between Iraq and Syria, the group's radical Islamist ideology still resonates in the MENA region and other parts of the world. ISIL's affiliate groups have spread beyond MENA into sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. IEP has identified three existing and emerging hotspots of both Islamist-inspired activity and grievance-based terrorism based on upticks in terrorism in recent years.

In their efforts to frame local and regional grievances in the broader context of global extremist narratives, terror groups such as ISIL and Al-Qa'ida have expanded their operations into regions outside of MENA. Although ISIL in particular has suffered territorial losses, its level of membership has hardly changed since the group's formation in 2014, with estimates hovering between 20,000 and 30,000 affiliated fighters. It still has the capacity to carry out attacks through sleeper cells and retains a strong online presence. Furthermore, the re-emergence of Al-Qa'ida affiliates and the marginalisation of nomadic Sahelian populations have increased terrorist activity throughout Africa.



The Sahel

As terrorist activity has shifted away from the Middle East and southward into Africa, the impact of terrorism has begun to increase in Africa's Maghreb and Sahel regions. The Maghreb includes northern African countries such as Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, while the Sahel refers to the region directly below Africa's Sahara Desert. The shared borders between these two regions, particularly between Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are an emerging hotspot of terrorism.

Alongside the Islamic State's migration into Africa, Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates have contributed to the concentration of radical Islamist extremism in the Sahel. Originating in Algeria, AQIM committed its highest number of terror-related deaths in the region between 2007 and 2009. It has re-emerged as a threat in the past few years, with 2016 being its deadliest year on record since 2009. With many of the countries in the Maghreb having been heavily impacted by the Arab Spring, most notably Libya and Algeria, terror groups seized upon this political unrest to further destabilise the region. The re-emergence of Al-Qa'ida poses a serious threat to security in Africa.

As of March 2018, upwards of 9,000 terrorists are estimated to be active in the Sahel, most notably in Libya and Algeria. As the gateway between Islamist extremist groups and dispersed desert communities, the Sahel has long been home to scattered jihadist terror groups that have more recently improved their capacity to coordinate attacks and disrupt central governments.

The movement of Islamist-affiliated terror groups from the Maghreb into the African Sahel can also be seen through the decreased activity of ISIL-affiliates in Maghrebi countries such as Libya and Algeria, but increased activity in countries further south such as Mali and Niger, although the increase in these countries has been small so far. The vast, often under-resourced desert regions in the Sahel have been exploited by terrorist organisations. Jihadist groups are strategically protecting neglected herders and nomadic Fulani and Tuareg communities in these rural regions. Following the 2012 uprising of the Tuareg in Mali, the marginalisation of this population has provided AQIM the opportunity to frame their struggles as part of a broader ideological movement. Terrorist groups are seeking to use their activities in this region to amplify recruitment and radicalisation.

Many countries in the Sahel experienced major increases in terrorism in 2017. Mali had its deadliest year on record, with 141 deaths and 77 incidents. The largest portion of these deaths were caused by Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the militant Islamist group that formed following the merger in March 2017 of AQIM fighters, the Fulani Macina Liberation Front, Ansar al-Dine and Al-Mubrabitoun. This group killed a total of 57 people in Mali in 2017 and an additional 27 in Burkina

Faso. Data on attacks against civilians for 2018 finds that the conflict in Mali has intensified, with 568 fatalities recorded from January to November 2018.


Neighbouring countries have also seen a spillover of terrorist activity with 13 deaths in Niger caused by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and five deaths in Algeria by the Algeria Province of the Islamic State. ISGS was also responsible for the ambush attack on an American military base in Niger in October 2017 that left four American service members dead.

Al-Qa'ida's presence in the Maghreb and Sahel regions can be clearly seen in the coordination and political communication between Al-Qa'ida affiliates such as Ansar al-Dine, AQIM and al-Murabitoun. Just days after the formation of JNIM, the group staged an attack between the Malian-Burkinabe border killing civilians and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) soldiers. Al-Qa'ida's strategy to infiltrate the African Sahel through Mali has been known for over half a decade following the release of the group's playbook for the region in 2013, a plan that came to fruition following the JNIM merger and the group's public declaration in 2018 of Mali as the Timbuktu Emirate of Al-Qa'ida. While Mali holds strategic significance for the expansion of Al-Qa'ida, both Niger and Algeria have also seen increases in violence following the 2017 merger. ISIL and Al-Qa'ida affiliated forces have deliberately aligned themselves with regional grievances in order to undermine local governments and to sustain a support base.

“As terrorist activity has shifted away from the Middle East and southward into Africa, the impact of terrorism has begun to increase in Africa's Maghreb and Sahel regions.”

FIGURE 3.5

Deaths from terrorism and other violence against civilians in the Maghreb & the Sahel, 2003-2018





Southeast Asia

Over the past three years, many Southeast Asian countries have experienced a second wave of Islamist terrorism. The first wave came between 2002-2008 when the Philippines' Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiya (JI) were responsible for 301 and 274 deaths respectively. The second wave has come from ISIL-affiliated groups and separatist movements in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines and Thailand, with 292 deaths across 348 incidents recorded in 2017 alone. The Philippines and Myanmar both experienced their deadliest years on record in 2017, and Southeast Asia as a whole recorded a 36 per cent increase in deaths from terrorism from 2016 to 2017. Just under 97 per cent of deaths in the broader Asia-Pacific region occurred in Southeast Asia.

Figure 3.7 depicts the number of terrorism deaths from 2001 to 2017 in Southeast Asia by group type. Deaths from both Islamist and separatist groups increased over the past two years. It is likely that deaths from Islamist groups are much higher than recorded, as a high percentage of deaths in Southeast Asia were attributed as 'unknown', but took place in areas with high levels of Islamist terrorism. Figure 3.7 only includes deaths attributable to terrorist groups and does not include 'unknown'.

The rise in deaths from Islamist groups in the last five years reflects the spread of ISIL affiliate groups into the region. Groups in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia formally pledged their allegiance to ISIL in 2016. The expansionist objectives of ISIL in Southeast Asia came to prominence when ISIL-affiliated militant groups Abu Sayyaf, the Maute group, and Bangsamoro Liberation Front seized control of Marawi City in the Philippines. This resulted in a five-month siege that ultimately failed, highlighting ISIL's ability to seize territory and the difficulty of the Philippines government had in responding to this new threat.

The Marawi siege was a defining moment in Islamist terrorism in the Philippines. Many of the remaining fighters have regrouped and continued training. ISIL propaganda online has urged foreign fighters to travel to the Philippines and other Southeast Asian outposts. The Philippines is particularly threatened by ISIL-sympathisers and radical Islamist groups. Many of the leaders responsible for the Marawi siege came from Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, and a number of these same leaders remain active.

Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand have also experienced increases with either radical Islamist extremism or other forms of violent attacks. In Indonesia, the ISIL-linked group Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) was responsible for 16 deaths, surpassing its record in 2016 of 11 deaths. In May of 2018, JAD was also responsible for a series of terror attacks in Indonesia that left dozens dead and is on track to carry out its deadliest year on record.

ISIL-linked radicalisation and recruitment is also a concern among the Rohingya populations in Myanmar's Rakhine State and the insurgency of Muslim Malays in Thailand's southern provinces. However, these examples differ from Indonesia and the Philippines in that their terrorist activity is fuelled more by ethnic-separatist grievances than ideological ones. The Arakan Salvation Rohingya Army (ASRA) in Myanmar, comprised of Rohingya militant fighters, caused 142 terror-related deaths in 2017, positioning the group as one of the region's deadliest just two years after its formation, although preliminary data for 2018 suggests the group has not been as active in the last nine months.

Similarly, the Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Thailand's southern provinces, while distinct from ISIL-linked jihadist movements, is seeking autonomy from the country's Buddhist government. In response, insurgent groups have employed terrorism as part of their demands for autonomy, and separatists have been responsible for 189 terror-related deaths since 2011, of which eight occurred in 2017. In Thailand, some Patani-Malay commanders see affiliating with ISIL as detrimental to their long-term goals of political autonomy.

“Just under 97 per cent of deaths from terrorism in the broader Asia-Pacific region occurred in Southeast Asia.”

FIGURE 3.6

Deaths from terrorism in Myanmar and the Philippines, 2010-2018

MYANMAR
2010-2012



2013-2015



2016-2018



PHILIPPINES
2010-2012



2013-2015




2016-2018



FIGURE 3.7

Proportion of deaths in SE Asia committed by Islamist & separatist groups, 2001-2017

In 2017, deaths from Islamist and separatist-related terrorism reached their highest point since 2002.



Source: START GTD, IEP calculations



Nigeria's Middle-Belt

For nearly a decade, the Fulani cattle-herder population across Nigeria and the sedentary farmers in Nigeria's southern states have been engaged in violent conflict over grazing practices and the use of fertile land in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. Although tension between the groups dates back centuries, the more recent outbursts of violence have been exacerbated by increases in population, desertification and the distribution of arms throughout Nigeria. Land scarcity, the over use of resources, and climate change have dried up fertile land in Northern Nigeria which the Fulani have historically used for grazing, driving many further south into states inhabited by farmers.

At its core, the herder-farmer violence occurring in Nigeria revolves around the economic plight resulting from the worsening drought and land degradation in Nigeria's northern regions. The livelihood of Nigeria's Fulani population is threatened as desertification of their land pushes them south. Crop yields of Nigeria's central and southern-based farmers, on the other hand, are threatened as grazing practices destroy crops due to the increased presence of cattle. As such, the deterioration of land in both Nigeria's northern and southern states has the long-term potential to disrupt the Nigerian agricultural and livestock economy and devastate the region even more.

In 2018 alone, deaths attributed to Fulani extremists are estimated to be six times greater than the number committed by Boko Haram. In 2017, 327 terrorism deaths across Nigeria and Mali were reportedly committed by Fulani extremists, along with 2,501 additional deaths in the three years prior with the vast majority of these deaths being civilians. While deaths attributed to Fulani extremists decreased following the peak of 1,169 deaths in 2014, violence from the group in 2018 is expected to surpass that peak. According to ACLED data, nearly 1,700 violent deaths have been attributed to Fulani extremists from January to September 2018. An estimated 89 per cent of those killed were civilians. Figure 3.9 shows the ACLED data for Nigeria from 2011 to September 2018.

Fulani herders are primarily Muslim while the southern farmers are predominantly Christian, which adds a religious dimension to the conflict over resources. Christian farmers in the south perceive the influx of Muslim herders as an Islamisation of the country at a time when Boko Haram's presence in the country is still strong. Violence is perpetrated by both sides who engage in mass village raids and burnings. 78 per cent of the deaths

attributed to Fulani extremists since 2010 have been carried out as armed assaults.

The deadliest states in Nigeria for these clashes are Benue, Plateau, Kaduna and Taraba, located in the eastern portion of Nigeria's Middle Belt. Of the 2,998 terror-related deaths attributed to Fulani extremists, 74 per cent took place in these four states.

Through an aggressive campaign of anti-grazing policies and military deployment, the Nigerian government has attempted to curtail the herder-farmer violence, but the government has yet to devise a solution satisfying both the Fulani and the farmers. The Nigerian government has had difficulty in governing effectively in less-populated rural areas where Fulani militants have been most active.

“Nearly 1,700 violent deaths have been attributed to Fulani extremists from January to September 2018.”

FIGURE 3.8


Deaths from terrorism, 2010-2018

BOKO HARAM

2010-2012



2013-2015




2016-2018




FULANI EXTREMISTS

2010-2012



2013-2015



2016-2018





FIGURE 3.9

Violent deaths perpetrated by Boko Haram and Fulani extremists in Nigeria, 2011-2018



Source: ACLED, IEP calculations

4

Patterns in Terrorism Recruitment

THE DRIVERS OF TERRORIST RECRUITMENT

To better understand the underlying drivers and causes of terrorism, IEP analysed more than 5,000 different datasets, indexes, and attitudinal surveys across multiple country groupings to see which factors were most strongly correlated with terrorism.

There are many factors which correlate with the level of terrorism, however, two factors are of especially high significance: The presence of an armed conflict, and extensive human rights abuses. In 2017, over 99 per cent of deaths occurred in countries with either an armed conflict, or high levels of *political terror*. Political terror is defined as extra-judicial killings, torture, or imprisonment without trial.

However, drivers of terrorism can vary significantly for different groups of countries, for example by region, level of economic development, or socio-economic factors. Countries with high levels of economic development, such as those in Western Europe and North America, are more likely to suffer from terrorism if there is low social cohesion, alienation, a lack of economic opportunity, or involvement in external conflict. Figure 4.1 shows how the various factors correlated with terrorist activity are systematically related.

There are multiple paths to radicalisation, however, there are some factors that appear to be common amongst individuals who turn to terrorism. There are often links to exclusion, poor governance structures and forms of discrimination.¹ Much of the drive behind the motivation to join terrorist groups parallels other group formation: individuals may seek companionship, survival and security, status, power, control and achievement.² Important elements of group dynamics include an interdependence, perception of collective group identity and a shared purpose or goal. Group dynamics and behaviour enable individuals to do things they otherwise might not, such as commit acts of violent extremism.

While individuals have unique paths to radicalisation, there are some broader factors that lead to alienation, such as perceived discrimination. This needs to be considered along with the fact that congregations of like-minded individuals radicalise together.³ The radicalisation process is most potent in group settings, as individuals ‘cluster’ around an influential personality, group of friends or established structure.⁴ Group radicalisation through in-person social interaction is at the heart of recruitment in most highly economically developed countries as well as in many other countries.⁵


Recent research on the rapid growth of ISIL and the emergence of the ‘foreign fighters’ phenomenon suggests that individuals with a criminal background are not only more susceptible to radicalisation, but also more highly-prized recruits for terrorist organisations. This phenomenon has been described as the ‘new crime-terror nexus’.⁶

“There are multiple paths to radicalisation, however, there are some factors that appear to be common amongst individuals who turn to terrorism.”

FIGURE 4.1

Systems map of GTI correlates

This is a visual representation of the key correlations with the GTI from over 5,000 socio-economic datasets. Arrows depict flows of influence.



Source: IEP

THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS

The crime-terror nexus refers to the overlap between criminal and terrorist organisations. The relationship between organised crime and terrorism can be categorised in three ways:⁷

- Coexistence: when groups share geographical space
- Cooperation: when groups are able to serve mutual interests via temporary partnerships
- Convergence: when groups mesh and absorb each other's methodologies.

The link between criminal organisations and terrorist groups is not new. However, the rise of ISIL has given rise to a 'new crime-terror nexus' in which individuals with criminal backgrounds move into terrorist organisations. Their skills and connections in the criminal world make them more valuable terrorists, and the ideology of groups like ISIL provides a justification for past and present criminal activity.

Table 4.1 shows a summary of eight studies which have looked at the percentage of terrorists in Europe who have a prior criminal background.

Of the 13 country-year pairings with data, ten of the studies found that over 45 per cent of recruits had a criminal background. The study with the largest sample is a profile of ISIL foreign fighters who came from Germany, which found that 66 per cent of the 778 foreign fighters had a prior criminal conviction. The second largest study had a very similar finding. Of the 319 foreign fighters and 'would be' foreign fighters from the Netherlands, 64 per cent had a criminal background.

These studies raise a number of important questions:

- Why are individuals with a criminal background more susceptible to radicalisation?
- Where does this radicalisation take place?
- What skills do criminals possess that make them attractive recruits for terrorist groups?

Figure 4.2 provides a summary of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR)'s database of jihadists with a criminal background.⁸ Whilst the database cannot be considered to be a random sampling of terrorists with a history of criminality, it does provide an indicative account of the characteristics of terrorists.

Of those in the database, 67 per cent were foreign fighters in Iraq or Syria, while 38 per cent were involved in a terrorist plot in Europe. Fifty-seven per cent of the individuals in the database had spent time in prison, and 18 per cent were radicalised while

“The rise of ISIL has given rise to a ‘new crime-terror nexus’ in which individuals with criminal backgrounds move into terrorist organisations.”

TABLE 4.1


Percentage of terrorists with criminal backgrounds by country

Source	Country	Sample size	Time period	% with a criminal background	Notes
GlobSec Crime-Terror Nexus Database	Belgium	13	2017-2018	46%	Arrested for terrorism offences
Federal Prosecutor's Office	Belgium	Unknown	2013-2017	~50%	Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq
Coordination Unit of the Fight Against Terrorism (UCLAT)	France	265	2013-2016	48%	Foreign fighters who died in Syria and Iraq known to the police for delinquency
Oliver Roy database of jihadis	France	~100	1994-2016	almost 50%	Arrested for terrorism offences
GlobSec Crime-Terror Nexus Database	France	58	2017-2018	50%	Arrested for terrorism offences
Federal Police	Germany	778	2012-2016	66%	Foreign fighters with a criminal conviction
GlobSec Crime-Terror Nexus Database	Greece	28	2017-2018	46%	Arrested for terrorism offences
GlobSec Crime-Terror Nexus Database	Italy	27	2017-2018	7.40%	Arrested for terrorism offences
Anton W. Weenik, Senior Researcher Dutch National Police	Netherlands	319	Unknown	64%	Foreign fighters, failed travellers, potential foreign fighters
Norwegian police officers quoted in the CTC Sentinel	Norway	Unknown	Unknown	at least 60%	Arrested for terrorism offences
GlobSec Crime-Terror Nexus Database	Spain	31	2017-2023	6.40%	Arrested for terrorism offences
GlobSec Crime-Terror Nexus Database	UK	31	2017-2018	32%	Arrested for terrorism offences
Unpublished Metropolitan Police Study	UK	143	1992-2016	52%	UK citizens or residents who converted to Islam

FIGURE 4.2

Characteristics of terrorists with criminal backgrounds

Over 60% of terrorists with a criminal background were involved in either petty or violent crime.




Source: ICSR, IEP calculations

FIGURE 4.3

Percentage of terrorists with prior petty and violent criminal behaviour

France had the highest percentage of criminal terrorists with a history of violent crime.



Source: ICSR, IEP calculations

in prison. The majority were involved in either petty crime or violent crime or both. Only six per cent had been involved in white-collar crime.

The pattern of involvement in either petty crime or violent crime is consistent across countries, as shown in figure 4.3.

In every country other than Denmark, over 50 per cent had been involved in petty crime, whilst in every country other than the Netherlands, over 50 per cent had been involved in violent crime. For the group as a whole, 70 per cent had been involved in petty crime, and 67 per cent had been involved in violent crime.

For disaffected youth with a criminal background, joining a violent extremist group can provide a ‘redemption narrative’.⁹ ISIL propaganda has made explicit use of this narrative, with one image posted online bearing the slogan ‘sometimes people with the worst pasts create the best futures’.

The radical extremist redemption narrative differs from traditional religious, spiritual, or political redemption pathways in that it provides an outlet for the dangerous, risk-seeking activity that was central to their lives as criminals and people on the margins of society. It also provides a justification for continued criminal activity, in order to finance the group’s activities.

It is difficult to know whether individuals with a criminal background are being deliberately targeted by terrorist recruiters. However, there is little doubt that there is considerable synergy between the needs of disaffected young criminals, and the needs of terrorist organisations. People with criminal backgrounds are better able to raise funds through illicit activities such as selling drugs, have fewer concerns about using violence and more experience in using it, and have access to networks that terrorist groups need to engage in illegal activity, such as buying weapons and counterfeit documents, or laundering money.

Prison radicalisation is one area of particular concern when

examining the new crime-terror nexus. Prison radicalisation can be the by-product of more typical prison behaviour such as ‘religion seeking, defiance, and the need for protection’.¹⁰ This leads to the potential for ‘unholy alliances’ between ideologically driven terrorists and offenders with criminal skills and experience. There is also the risk of terrorists acquiring followers who are experiencing periods of vulnerability and are susceptible to violent extremism.¹¹ Prisoners can be radicalised by external means including books, videos, websites and visitors, or by internal sources such as fellow inmates.

In a case study of French prisons, radicalisers were found to actively seek out one or two vulnerable people with whom they can develop a strong emotional relationship and attempt to change their worldview.¹² In some prisons in France, Muslim inmates comprise up to 70 per cent of the prison population. This imbalance means that an ‘us-versus-them’ rhetoric can emerge in prisoners and also contribute to new prisoners or those struggling with life in prison to seek out jihadist ideology in the hope of attaining both protection and a sense of belonging.¹³ A challenge for authorities is to ensure there are limited options available to convicted terrorists who are undertaking long sentences who may seek to radicalise other inmates.

Radicalisation may also occur outside of prison, through direct contact with ‘gangster-jihadi’ networks.¹⁴ In Belgium, the Zerkani network in Molonbeek operated like a criminal organisation, drawing on the criminal backgrounds of members to obtain weapons and move operatives to Syria and back. A similar pattern has been observed in connection to terrorist attacks in France and the Netherlands. Of the European countries covered in the GLOBSEC database of arrests for terrorism offences, only Spain and Italy had a low percentage of arrested terrorists with a criminal background.

FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Despite significant territorial and financial declines in the last two years, ISIL has remained the terrorist group with the broadest global reach and foreign support, reflected in the number of foreign fighters who have flocked to its banner. Although most of the group’s recruits have come from within Iraq and Syria, over 40,000 fighters are estimated to have travelled to these two countries since 2013. Of these foreign fighters, over 7,000 have returned to their home states. Reasons for returning include having completed their specified missions, feelings of disillusionment with ISIL, or a desire to espouse extremism elsewhere.¹⁵


While thousands of foreign fighters have returned to their home countries and even more expected to do so over the next year, the threat of battle-hardened and skilled returnees carrying out terrorist attacks remains a serious security concern. These fears have already been realised in some countries: French and Belgian returnees were involved in terror attacks in 2015 and 2016.¹⁶ In total, an estimated 18 per cent of terror attacks staged in the West between 2014 and 2017 were carried out by foreign fighters who had returned home.¹⁷

Figure 4.4 shows ICSR estimates for the number of foreign fighters and returnees by country. According to the latest available ICSR data, there were 41,490 fighters from 80 countries who joined ISIL between April 2013 and June 2018, of which 7,366 have returned to their home country.¹⁸ Just over 11 per cent of foreign fighters have been minors.

The three regions with the highest level of recruitment are

FIGURE 4.4
Foreign fighters by country

There have been over 40,000 foreign fighters join the conflict in Iraq and Syria over the past five years.



Source: ICSR, IEP Calculations

MENA, Russia & Eurasia, and Europe, accounting for 92 per cent of all recruits over the past five years. There were 48 countries with more than 100 recruits, with a further 33 countries having at least one recruit as of June 2018.

The five countries with the highest number of foreign fighters are Russia, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. There were roughly 5,000 recruits from Russia since 2013. In the broader region of Russia and Eurasia, an estimated 12,000 fighters joined ISIL, of which only 784 have returned home.

The region with the highest number of returnees from Iraq or Syria was the MENA region with 3,006 returnees, followed by Europe with 3,003 returnees. These two regions account for 81 per cent of the total number of returnees globally.

The high levels of radicalisation and migration of fighters from the Caucasus to ISIL can be attributed to the marginalisation of

Russian and Central Asian Muslims and the proximity of Turkey and Syria for migrants to flee to.¹⁹ As Russian-speaking recruits, largely composed of Chechens and Dagestani, have climbed the ranks of ISIL, countries in the Russia and Eurasia region have become increasingly vulnerable to Russian language ISIL propaganda.²⁰

REINTEGRATION OF RETURNEES

With the number of returnees among ISIL foreign fighters expected to increase in the coming years, the countries of origin are tasked with the difficulties of the reintegration, rehabilitation and prosecution of fighters. There are wide variations in the way countries attempt to manage foreign fighters, ranging from heavy prison sentences to reintegration into their communities.²¹ Table 4.2 outlines the approaches taken by a number of European and non-European countries towards the issue of foreign fighter returnees.

Most European states have adopted a prosecutorial approach to the issue of foreign fighters. In Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and France, imprisonment and prosecution of returned fighters have been favoured over a rehabilitative approach.²² While some of these states also incorporate rehabilitative monitoring into the parole periods of returned fighters, their responses are more punitive than Muslim-majority countries.

Many Muslim-majority states such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Jordan have placed an increased focus on ideological de-radicalisation and rehabilitation. Muslim-majority states have attempted to prioritise opportunities for returned fighters to reframe their interpretations of Islam and to avoid future violence.

“With the number of returnees among ISIL foreign fighters expected to increase in the coming years, the countries of origin are tasked with the difficulties of the reintegration, rehabilitation and prosecution of fighters.”

TABLE 4.2

Strategies for dealing with foreign fighter returnees by country

Country	Rehabilitation	Deradicalisation programs	Criminalisation and prosecution	Imprisonment	Revocation of citizenship and passport
France			✓	✓	
Germany			✓	✓	✓
Netherlands	✓		✓	✓	
United Kingdom			✓	✓	✓
Egypt		✓			
Indonesia	✓	✓			
Jordan		✓			
Morocco		✓		✓	
Saudi Arabia	✓	✓			
Tunisia			✓		✓
Yemen	✓				



EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

Preventing Violent Extremism: Global Investments for National Security

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INTRODUCTION

Over the past year, a number of states that have traditionally supported global efforts to prevent violent extremism have reduced their political and financial commitments, emphasising instead the domestic counterterrorism agenda.

There are in fact powerful reasons to increase investment in prevention – to preserve the gains that have been made in reducing the global impact of terrorism and violent extremism, for example; to guard against future risks; to transmit knowledge, or to realise the significant potential of global initiatives that have already been established.

But such arguments are unlikely for the moment to turn the tide on a trend that reflects a much deeper contemporary retreat from globalism and multilateralism.¹ Instead, in this article we argue that at least sustaining global investments in preventing violent extremism are critical even if only in order to achieve national security goals.

GLOBAL INVESTMENTS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

One reason why global investments can advance national security is that the source of violent extremist threats is transnational, even when it manifests itself locally. An example is the spread of violent ideological propaganda. Preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives that seek to engage religious leaders, or promote non-violent ideologies, are attempting to respond to this challenge at its source, and are therefore relevant beyond their specific context. In Bangladesh, for example, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) is supporting training in digital literacy among madrasa (religious school) students, helping promote critical thinking, and limit the traction and dissemination of online fake news and messages.

At the same time, the argument of a globalised threat to national interests needs to be deployed with care, as it can be – and has been – mobilised for example to justify restrictions on migration and asylum. These arguments persist despite overwhelming evidence that most violent extremists and terrorists are in fact nationals or citizens.² This is not of course a reason not to manage migration; and it may be a reason to direct PVE interventions to countries or sub-regions that are significant sources of migration, asylum, and in particular irregular migration or have become transit countries.

Second, just as violent extremist and terrorist threats to national security may be transnational, so domestic interests are increasingly defined beyond national boundaries. Trade, aid, investment, tourism, international security, and development all put significant numbers of citizens, resources, and reputation at risk. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office only recently lifted its advisory against tourism to Tunisia, for example, three years after a terrorist attack in Sousse killed 30 British citizens and eight others. A recent report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) makes the case that ‘...with rising risks to Australian nationals, businesses and foreign investment through the mining industry, violent extremism in Africa is a direct threat to Australian national interests.’³ In both examples, global PVE interventions can protect national interests, while also benefitting the host economy.

There is also a significant opportunity cost where states and corporations cannot sustainably invest or operate in particular countries or sub-regions because of the threat of violent extremism and associated insecurity. These costs probably outweigh the already significant direct economic costs of terrorism estimated in this report. By engaging communities, and in particular building greater confidence between communities and local authorities through activities that are directly preventing violent extremism, it has proved possible to stabilise communities and build the ‘social contract’ required to facilitate a local

presence. In Mali, for example, through intercommunal dialogues, community members have requested local authorities and community leaders to engage in local mediation to prevent violent extremist groups exploit existing conflicts and mobilise young people for recruitment into violent extremist groups. Thirdly, in even the most economically advanced countries, domestic approaches to counterterrorism and countering and preventing violent extremism need constant improvement. Australia's countering violent extremism strategy, for example, has been criticised for being focused too much on policing and prisons and too little on longer-term community solutions,⁴ precisely the focus for many international PVE interventions. Similarly, while it has been welcomed that the new US counterterrorism strategy seeks to engage international partners, the strategy has also been criticised for not learning lessons from elsewhere in the world, for example the risk of backlash in response to heavy-handed and security-focused interventions that do not explicitly respect human rights.⁵

In addition to promoting better domestic policies by understanding what does not work elsewhere, there is also more scope to learn positive lessons. While they should be subject to significant scrutiny and criticism, international PVE interventions have succeeded in focusing on local actors, engaging civil society, and promoting bottom-up responses from within local communities, all aspects on which domestic strategies in advanced economies are often criticised as failing. An important component of global PVE investments in recent years, for example through the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), has been to share good practice and develop regional and global guidelines, and it is important that sharing good practice is not considered a one-way street – Kenya's national counterterrorism strategy, for example, has been acknowledged as ground-breaking in advancing youth, faith leaders and their congregations, and civil society engagement.

CONCLUSIONS

The nub of the argument briefly developed here is that even if global investment in PVE may not at the moment be viewed as an end in itself, it is still a means to achieve a narrower ambition to boost national interests. The transnational character of the threat, the 'deterritorialisation' of national interests, and the potential to increase the effectiveness of domestic policies by learning global lessons are all reasons to maintain (and increase) commitments to the global effort to prevent violent extremism.

Indeed, there is good reason to suppose that each of these arguments will become more relevant in the coming years. The globalised threat is likely to be increased through growing cybersecurity risks, global and increasingly more

sophisticated networks of terrorists and their tactics, the financing and recruitment of these networks, and digital and information warfare.⁶ Globalisation is accelerating. The global collation and dissemination of good practice and lessons learned in preventing violent extremism is still in its infancy.

Ultimately to make the case of greater global investment in PVE, even if only to pursue national interests for the time being, PVE efforts and effectiveness need to improve. Greater coordination between existing initiatives is required; the field should be more clearly defined; linkages to other global matters such as migration and climate change needs to be better articulated; more convincing empirical evidence is needed and should be widely communicated; and a sustainable source of funding has to be identified and nurtured that is in the interest of both international and domestic PVE efforts.

“Just as violent extremist and terrorist threats to national security may be transnational, so domestic interests are increasingly defined beyond national boundaries. Trade, aid, investment, tourism, international security, and development all put significant numbers of citizens, resources, and reputations at risk.”

The Challenges and Opportunities of Preventing Violent Extremism through Development

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The 2016 United Nations Secretary General's Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism underscored international recognition of the development sector's role in tackling violent extremism.

Fragile and conflict-afflicted countries provide conditions conducive to violent extremism.¹ Conflict afflicted countries suffer greater levels of violent extremism than more stable environments,² and, in turn, violent extremism can feed and deepen existing conflict.³

Violence, violent extremism and conflict also threaten development. The 2011 World Bank Development Report concluded that violence in its many forms is the main constraint to meeting the Millennium Development Goals⁴. As a result, the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include a specific goal relating to violence, justice, and peace.⁵

Development actors are under intense pressure from the international donor community to address violent extremism and work more closely with the security sector. Traditionally, development and security actors have had little interaction on this issue. How, and to what extent, countries should develop a long-term development response against what is perceived to be a pressing security threat is an urgent policy question.

THE CHALLENGES

Development responses to violent extremism are increasingly associated with the term 'Preventing Violent Extremism' (PVE) to describe how longer-term development measures can address governance failings and the socio-economic grievances that often lie behind extremism at a local level.^{6,7}

Developing and implementing PVE development programming is not straightforward. For example, rebranding governance and development activities under

the banner of PVE is not recommended. These programs have intrinsic value in and of themselves, and bannerizing them under PVE would entail unnecessary risk.

Central to the development-PVE challenge is the familiar issue of the conceptual weakness of violent extremism. Even at the most basic level, all the key concepts are complex, contested and highly politicised. That terrorism, radicalisation and violent extremism are often used as synonyms is indicative of just how deep this problem runs.

Obviously, it is difficult to discuss development solutions to problems and terms that are both poorly defined and often disputed. This conceptual problem filters down to programming. 'Preventing' or 'countering' violent extremism are often used as synonyms, and de facto programming can include just about anything.

Another issue facing development practitioners is that the study of violent extremism is often very limited in scope, focusing primarily on immediate security issues. Research into wider root causes remains nascent. While academics and security analysts have studied the radicalisation of violent extremists at great length, less attention has been paid to the impact and reaction of societies to sustained acts of terrorism.

This oversight is important. The response of states to acts of violence is often an overreaction, and it is this overreaction that the terrorists seek from acts of terrorism in order to divide and polarise societies. Outcomes have often involved increases in executive power at the expense of the legislature and judiciary, restrictions of civil and political freedoms, and gross violations of human rights and impunity perpetrated by increasingly powerful and often politicised security forces.

The reaction or overreaction to acts of terror can create a cycle of radicalisation between governments (society and the media) and terrorists, a cycle of repression that feeds

back into a cycle of deepening violence through a range of violent extremism drivers.⁸ Schmid describes this process as “government radicalisation” :

"[I]t is equally important to examine the role of state actors and their potential for radicalisation. The use of torture techniques and extra-judicial renditions in recent years has been a drastic departure from democratic rule of law procedures and international human rights standards. These are indicative of the fact that in a polarised political situation not only non-state actors but also state actors can radicalise".⁹

Globally and with differing levels of success, this wider concept of radicalisation explains why States have attempted to contain violent extremism with a focus on security and a preference for coercion, coercion that often exceeds and undermines international human rights norms and international humanitarian law.

The crossing of these normative lines tends to – at least initially – enjoy public support given the perception of profound crisis. But equally and tragically, there is good evidence that the widespread violations that occur in response to violent extremism can also act as a driver for violent extremism, and as UNDP's report of African violent extremism – Journey to Extremism in Africa – notes, may operate as a tipping point for individuals into violent extremism.

THE OPPORTUNITIES

This wider concept of radicalisation provides a compelling explanation of why security remains the dominant focus of attempts to tackle violent extremism and why examining root causes is often dismissed as apologising for terrorism.

But the evidence for understanding and addressing root causes is strong. Such evidence has found increasing support internationally. In 2016, UNSG's Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism concluded that the limited security focus and often abusive efforts to tackle violent extremism have been damaging, “and often made things worse.”

The report, among many others, encourages a wider, more holistic view and response to violent extremism. While still imperfect, PVE with its focus on root causes moves away from the focus and analysis that generates these results, with the caveat that applying a PVE approach implies significant recalibration of approach, programming and indeed funding modalities.

Additionally, addressing root causes shifts the paradigm, moving the focus from security to an analysis that examines underlying causes rather than the symptoms.

Dowd, in an analysis of Islamist violence in sub-Saharan Africa, underlines that a disproportionate focus on security will be unsuccessful over the long run.¹⁰ As she notes:

“Lasting and sustainable peace is achieved only through practices which address, in an integrated fashion, the wider context of violent domestic politics.”¹¹

If violent extremism is seen as a symptom, rather than the cause, of violent domestic politics, programming design becomes easier as goals can be clearer and circumvent violent extremism's intractable conceptual problems. PVE can also draw from the development sectors a much wider set of programming tools that can demonstrate improved empirical pedigree and results.

Importantly, PVE also allows the international community to deploy development tools to address the transnational nature of the threat. If transnational terror groups like Al-Qaeda or ISIS depend on local grievances and instability, development, which can address those local level issues, will ultimately narrow their support base. The result over the medium-term would appear to be the possibility of diminished local support for local groups and, in turn, diminished space for transnational terror.

The long-term key to victory for violent extremists is public support. Here, it is less about what the violent extremists do and more about either what the government is supposed to do or ought not do – particularly abusive treatment of civilian populations – but does in the name of counter-terrorism. As the joint UN-World Bank study Pathways for Peace notes, “exclusion from access to power, opportunity, services, and security creates fertile ground for mobilising group grievances to violence, especially in areas with weak state capacity or legitimacy or in the context of human rights abuses.”¹²

The failure to understand this political dimension of violent extremism is precisely what leads to an overly securitised view of violent extremism and why greater resources, research, and programming in development resources are needed.

Making Government work for CVE

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Since 9/11, we've done much to undermine major terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State. Governments have exercised critical global leadership, relying on kinetic strategies to craft their military responses while also disrupting terrorist financing. Nations have also looked beyond traditional counterterrorism tools and abandoned "hearts and minds" public diplomacy campaigns, devising more authentic and localised "soft power" approaches to help protect communities against extremist ideologies.

Despite these efforts, the extremist threat has grown increasingly ominous. Extremist groups now deftly navigate a complicated digital space, cementing alliances and spreading an "Us versus Them" ideology. Their goal: recruit legions of young people to their cause. Whether terrorist threats take the form of false caliphates or lone operatives devastating our athletic events, holiday celebrations, concerts, or train stations, they all rely on youth. As the extremists know, the pool of potential recruits is growing fast. Today, Muslims under thirty number nearly one billion. By 2030, this demographic group will more than double to 2.2 billion. Governments must reorganise themselves to address Muslim millennial and generation Z youth, a task that so far has proven daunting.

Governments' failure to undermine the ideology's appeal to youth stems from its failure to mount a serious and sustained CVE strategy. In the United States, CVE has been administratively bloated and largely ineffectual, siloed throughout Washington's departments and agencies, riddled with incoherent terminology, and massively underfunded. Since 9/11, the US government has allocated a mere one-tenth of one per cent of its annual budget to CVE.¹ With inadequate resources, government can't lead in the effort to diminish recruitment and radicalisation, nor can it prepare for future extremist threats now coalescing. Extensive research conducted after 9/11, for example, has revealed the many dynamics surrounding global youth recruitment, but America and other nations have failed to ignite multi-dimensional anti-recruitment efforts. We're even less prepared to address a central cause underlying

successful recruitment: the worrisome and pervasive identity crisis that afflicts Muslim youth throughout the globe.

There is reason for hope: we possess the knowledge and infrastructure necessary to confront the extremist threat. We just need the will. As I argue in this essay, government must go all in on CVE, not merely funding and developing it at scale, but improving its execution and coordinating better with other actors. If we reorient governmental priorities and policies in these ways, we can make significant headway in reducing recruitment.

SCALING CVE

Governments now understand that winning the war of ideas means collaborating with grassroots organisations, NGOs, civil society, and the private sector, actors that are uniquely familiar with local landscapes and capable of responding with real-time interventions. Serving as conveners, facilitators, and intellectual partners, governments have sponsored a wide array of partnerships with other nations, multinational organisations, private industries, NGOs, and foundations to create CVE initiatives over the past decade. Such experimentation has led to a diversity of promising programming both online and off, including peer-to-peer interaction, counter-speech programming, training and intervention initiatives, as well as influencer networks and idea laboratories. Unfortunately, these initiatives remain small, and many are "pilot" projects. They will have only local and modest impact until they are scaled.

Consider the Connecting European Dynamic Achievers and Role Models (CEDAR) network, which the State Department seeded in 2008 through a partnership with London-based counter-extremism NGO Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). The US Department of State took a deliberately light touch when sponsoring this first-of-its-kind platform, which united Muslim professionals and changemakers from across Europe to promote leadership, entrepreneurship, and positivity. Embassies, NGO partners, and civil society members scouted the initial talent and

curated the network, leaving it to local actors to build out needed projects, like mosque-based mentoring initiatives.

More recently, Norway took a similar approach to talent scouting and network curating when it partnered with ISD to support the Youth Civil Activism Network (YouthCAN). After serving as convener and facilitator, the Norwegian government exercised a similarly light and modest touch, allowing YouthCAN the necessary support and autonomy to develop organically, scale, and effect change. Since its founding in 2015, YouthCAN has emerged as the world's leading, youth-driven CVE organisation. Understanding technology's role in the lives of youth, YouthCAN has engaged tech entrepreneurs to host innovation labs, which train people in counter-speech campaigns and anti-recruitment efforts in a compelling, grassroots fashion.

Carefully curated and tested networks like CEDAR and YouthCAN are just two examples of promising CVE programming. Many more such programmes exist, and they employ a broad range of techniques including counter-speech interventions, education, trainings, and peer-to-peer networks. These programmes benefit from initial government sponsorship and assistance in attracting new partners and attention, but they also draw on the credibility and skills of non-government actors. With their legitimacy, skills, and cultural acumen, civil society and NGOs can develop programmes for youth that account for a range of nuances such as gender differences, behavioural habits, and regional trends. Youth remain suspicious of government programmes, but in their minds, programmes devised by these local actors feel credible and authentic.

Unfortunately, such initiatives remain one-off, pilot programmes without the necessary support and scale to make a vital impact. To respond to the next generation of extremist threats, our governments must move beyond the experimental phase of CVE and commit to replicating and scaling such programmes so they can achieve global saturation.

IMPROVING CVE EXECUTION

To understand which CVE programmes should be developed, let alone scaled, our governments themselves must also be reconfigured so as to adopt and coordinate a united set of CVE programmes at the local, national, and international levels. But even the US government, whose national security strategy expressly prioritises the ideological fight against extremism, has not redesigned the government to properly execute CVE initiatives.

At present, different parts of the US government enact CVE in overlapping and inefficient ways. We lack a centralised place to coordinate and deploy our entire

arsenal of tools, skillsets, and expertise (and other countries suffer from the same problem). For a more disciplined, streamlined and effective approach, one high-level government official must bear responsibility for responding quickly, appropriately, and in real time to events throughout the globe. This official would enable our CVE strategy to blossom domestically, allowing for better coordination among governors, mayors, and other elected officials. He or she would also ensure that CVE is coordinated throughout the interagency and onward to our embassies. With responsibility over the entire CVE "battle plan," this official would help to restore balance to counterterrorism operations, which now heavily favor kinetic approaches. It's time that we rebalance the resources and respect we afford to kinetic and non-kinetic approaches, recognising them as equally indispensable in the fight and allowing them to work alongside one another to achieve maximal impact.

Governments understand the need for such high-level leadership in other kinds of warfare, but they don't recognise the same imperative when it comes to the war of ideas. Imagine if the army, navy, air force, and marines were all undertaking their own independent initiatives, with no central principal overseeing everything. That's what's happening with CVE, and it's not nearly sufficient.

STRATEGICALLY COORDINATING CVE EFFORTS

Even with such strong leadership, scaling and systematising CVE strategies and organisations seems expensive and logistically burdensome. That's where coordination between governments comes in. We must devise a better global system for countering extremist ideology, one in which nations engage distinct strengths and share responsibility in new ways. Unfortunately, international coordination today typically takes the form of summits, convened throughout the globe to discuss best practices. This is a great first step, but inadequate on its own. With each government independently implementing an array of national and international programmes, CVE efforts remain uneven, uncoordinated, and redundant. Lacking a comprehensive view of the battlefield, we collectively fail to mobilise vital tactics in the fight, such as accurate global mapping of micro and macro CVE efforts, including their reach and principle practitioners.

Governments should reassess how they might build novel collaborations based on distinct national capacities and shared goals. In 2015, the United States, Denmark, and Norway partnered with ISD to launch the Strong Cities Network (SCN) at the United Nations.² SCN represents the first network of municipal policy-makers and mayors dedicated to keeping cities on the global vanguard of this ideological fight. SCN is especially promising because instead of merely sharing best practices at global summits,

SCN showcases them among its 120-member cities. If an education programme in Louisville, Kentucky (USA) helped successfully counter online extremist recruitment, mayors across the globe will now know about it, with similar programmes popping up in Melbourne, Australia or Amman, Jordan. The same goes for basic internet hygiene programmes, youth-oriented hotlines, the use of former extremists in film, and programmes fostering compassion.

Global collaborations like SCN affirm the value of systematising CVE. The basic idea is this: we all have a common goal and a common enemy, so we should all collaborate on programme innovation and design, sharing details of efforts that have succeeded or failed. Such collaborations should take place across different industries—media, education, social services, and entrepreneurship—and intellectual disciplines. The private sector is indispensable, and to date governments have inadequately mobilised such actors to implement CVE globally. We need companies to help NGOs design programmes, and we need government alliances fighting the ideological war. That way, we'll be able to determine "who can do what" best and mobilise resources accordingly.

What if we could harness an international and interdisciplinary collaboration to address how mental health, adolescent development, and behavioural psychology affect youth's susceptibility to extremism? Many governments face the challenge of reintegrating into their societies youth who fought in Syria and Lebanon, and all nations struggle to educate parents and young children about extremist ideology's appeal. What if we drew on the considerable talents of our leading NGOs and our private sectors to devise new interdisciplinary approaches to cultural listening, mental health, and rehabilitation? We could, for example, create a cutting-edge institution to which the world's returning foreign fighters would go before reentering their countries of origin—a Mayo Clinic-type facility, but dedicated to rehabilitation and offering best-practice interventions. Such global cooperation and coordination vis-à-vis CVE would also allow each country to best identify where to focus attention and deploy resources accordingly. It's a winning strategy.

WIN OR LOSE

Governments can no longer content themselves with existing approaches to fighting extremism. Terrorism continues to drain our economies, costing nations around the world a staggering \$90 billion in 2015. Meanwhile, the "Us versus Them" ideology has become normalised and pervasive. Extreme-right groups, including white supremacist, Alt-right, and neo-Nazi organisations, are on the rise in Europe, and they are even infiltrating North American law enforcement offices. As the Anti-Defamation

League reported, far-right groups and individuals accounted for nearly 60 per cent of extremist-related American deaths in 2017.³

In the near future, more nimble, adept, and dangerous groups than the so-called Islamic State, or the US white nationalist organisation Unite the Right will likely arise. What if such groups acquire human data and weaponise it to disrupt hospitals? What if they organise themselves to dramatically increase their appeal to women, who in turn raise ideologically sympathetic children? And what if they acquire chemical and biological agents and bomb densely populated urban centers, or a major global logistics hub like the Strait of Hormuz? Let's not find out. Let's do what it takes to win the war, recalibrating how governments engage with CVE, and applying CVE methods to deal with white nationalist ideology as well. The three government actions I've described here represent a powerful start.

"Extremist groups now deftly navigate a complicated digital space, cementing alliances and spreading an "Us versus Them" ideology."

Multi-Disciplinary & Multi-Agency Approaches to Preventing & Countering Violent Extremism: An Emerging P/CVE Success Story?

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In the more than seventeen years since 11 September 2001, much like the terrorist and violent extremist threats themselves, global conversations about how best to prevent and counter them have evolved. They have moved beyond an almost singular focus on military, intelligence, law enforcement, and national government-driven solutions focused primarily on the symptoms of the threat. Awareness that security measures alone and treating only the manifestations of the threat are not sufficient has grown. Similarly, the need for a more strategic, inclusive, and preventive approach to the challenge is more apparent than ever. This extends beyond national governments and security actors and recognises that cities, communities, and civil society are critical partners in preventing individuals from being radicalised to violence and recruited into terrorist groups and rehabilitating and reintegrating those leaving such groups and, more broadly, in addressing the drivers of violent extremist and building the societal resilience to prevent the polarisation that violent extremists are trying to sow. Spurred on by the high-level political attention generated by the 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism and the release of the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism, the notion of a "whole of society" approach to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE)¹ has continued to gain traction. Although there have been setbacks², they have not stood in the way of an increasingly diverse set of stakeholders and experts, particularly at the local level, becoming involved.³

While the P/CVE field has received its fair share of criticism,⁴ one particularly promising area of P/CVE practice – and where the "whole of society" approach has had some success in being operationalised – centers on the growing number of multi-disciplinary and multi-agency

collaborations, networks, and initiatives to prevent individuals from becoming radicalised to violence.

These pre-criminal efforts are generally led by a local government or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and involve representatives from different local agencies and local organisations, e.g., education, health, social welfare, youth, and, if suitable, police meeting on a regular basis to identify, design, and deliver tailored interventions or support programmes to benefit individuals and their families referred to the unit by a concerned member of the community, including, at times, the police. They are meant to complement the more prevalent, broader-based P/CVE programmes focused on particular stakeholders, e.g., mothers, youth, religious leaders, or police, or themes, e.g., counter-narratives, community engagement, inter-faith dialogue, or education.

Although the UK's Channel Programme and Denmark's SSP (schools, social work, and police) system are perhaps the most well-known examples of the multi-agency/multi-disciplinary preventative approach, these, "hubs," "situation tables," or "safe houses" or "intervention and support programmes" – as they are sometimes referred to – come in different shapes and sizes, becoming an increasingly popular tool for P/CVE.

MUNICIPALITY-LED MODELS

A number of cities across Canada use the multi-agency "situation table" model that has been developed for broader crime prevention purposes. Police departments in Calgary⁵, Ottawa⁶, Peel, and Toronto⁷ have relied on existing or created new "tables", whereby a person deemed at risk of extremism is referred by a police officer or non-law enforcement local official to a "hub" that

consists of medical professionals, faith groups, teachers, and housing and other local officials and NGOs, with the most appropriate members of the hub then designing and leading an intervention, which can include mental, vocational, or spiritual counselling. The idea is to identify people at risk and to intervene before they head down the path to violence. Because of their existing relationships and familiarity with the relevant communities, the local police in Canada often play the lead role in the table.

Some cities, such as Toronto, have layered P/CVE into an existing gang-prevention-focused hub (to avoid the stigma that a P/CVE or counter-radicalisation only programme might create), whereas Calgary opted to create a stand-alone programme focused on radical religious or political ideologies. Although locally-led, the federal government in Ottawa – involvement of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and funding and other support from the Public Safety's Center for the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violence – are often partners in these efforts.

Other notable initiatives include the Anchor Model⁸ in Finland, a multi-agency programme geared toward early intervention (and other prevention-focused work) in juvenile delinquency and domestic violence that, since 2015, also focuses attention on P/CVE. The Anchor teams in each Finnish municipality include a social worker, psychiatric nurse, youth worker, and police officer, as well as an “as needed” basis schools and NGOs. One challenge that the Anchor teams – and other multi-agency programmes that were designed to address other forms of violence or anti-social behaviour – face is ensuring team members receive the necessary training to enable the programme to address violent extremism cases.⁹

The “safe houses” in major Dutch cities offer another example of a locally-driven multi-purpose platform that includes P/CVE as among the concerns on its agenda. Representatives from social welfare, housing, and other municipal agencies sit with “street workers”, and the local police to discuss individuals who have been referred to them. The police role is limited and each safe house has clear information-sharing agreements that enable the sharing of information between non-law enforcement professionals and the police.¹⁰

NGO-DRIVEN MODELS

Although most of the existing approaches are government-led, generally but not always at the local level, there are some examples where NGOs play a prominent, if not leading, role. Examples here include the Center for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence in Montreal: with its staff of psychologists, social workers, and researchers, it looks at all forms of violent extremism, with a focus on providing counselling and psycho-social interventions to individuals exhibiting a risk of violence

rather than those who express “radical” ideas, some of which are referred to the centre via its 24-hour helpline. It also trains front-line workers and community partners to understand the different aspects of P/CVE and equips them to help address them.¹¹

Community Connect¹² is a community-based programme run out of a local children's hospital in Boston. It grew out of an existing partnership between researchers and the Somali refugee community and focuses on addressing the concerns of the community, which include violent extremism. It seeks to reduce stigma, promote engagement and strengthen the sense of belonging in the community and social connections with other communities and the government. It includes mental health providers, community leaders, religious leaders, and educators, who provide the necessary services after an assessment of the individual's needs. The programme also focuses on increasing the capacity of the service providers to support the community. Law enforcement is not at the table and the programme does not receive referrals from the police; however, the programme can share information, following agreed protocols with the police where there is an imminent security threat. Notably, it does not receive U.S. federal government funding but relies on financial support from state and non-governmental sources.

Another prominent example is in Germany, where the Violence Prevention Network (VPN)¹³ – and seven other large German NGO – partners with and receives referrals from the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees, which manages a national radicalisation hotline and conducts an initial assessment before deciding whether to pass the case to one of its partner NGOs. VPN offers individual, religious, and other forms of counselling, and organises workshops about Islam, democracy, and human rights. It also operates its own, direct, and independent hotline, recognising that many families are more likely to reach out to an NGO as opposed to the government for help.

EXPORTING THE APPROACH

Although these multi-agency/multi-disciplinary approaches have emerged primarily in contexts where local agencies, institutions, and NGOs have the requisite capacities and relationships with the local communities – North America, Europe, and Australia – this is beginning to change, as international donors look to support the development of intervention programmes for P/CVE in diverse contexts such as the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia.

For example, six local prevention networks have been developed in Jordan and Lebanon¹⁴ and represent first known attempt in the Middle East to create a locally-owned model for coordinating local non-law enforcement

and non-security driven P/CVE efforts. The LPNs include teachers, youth workers, religious leaders, and psycho-social intervention providers – law enforcement is not involved due to historic mistrust between the police and local communities. The networks meet monthly to identify risk factors and behaviours in the relevant community and to coordinate local P/CVE efforts and responses to local issues related to violent extremism and implement local outreach activities, such as awareness sessions for youth and families or roundtables for religious leaders on P/CVE and interfaith dialogue.¹⁵

In 2016 the municipality of Gjilan (Kosovo) – which saw a number of its citizens travel to Iraq and Syria – launched the first P/CVE multi-agency referral mechanism in the Western Balkans.¹⁶ According to those involved in managing the programme, it has so far handled eight cases, with all individuals having successfully been steered away from becoming turning to violence. Efforts are underway to develop such mechanisms in other parts of the region, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, although it remains to be seen whether the Gjilan or a broader-based model (one that incorporates violent extremism as among the issues to be addressed) is followed and what role law enforcement (compared to social services agencies and NGOs) will play.

CHALLENGES

Although the progress is notable, operationalising and sustaining the programmes, particularly in non-Western settings, are not without their challenges. For example, it is hard to strike a balance between privacy and information sharing, particularly between non-law enforcement professionals and the police, or sustain the necessary level of coordination among an often disparate team where the capacities and incentives for participation can vary considerably. Frequently there are issues in trying to gain, let alone sustain, the trust of local communities, especially if recipients have previous negative experience with security actors. Further, it is difficult to ensure participants in multi-agency teams have the necessary P/CVE expertise. Finally, there can be sensitivities around the process of identifying “at risk” individuals who should receive tailored interventions. Indicators used to identify such individuals need be carefully considered to avoid harmful implications, such as wrongful identification or marginalisation. The UK Channel programme, currently in its third iteration, has faced many of these obstacles.¹⁷

Nevertheless, the increased focus on these types of multi-disciplinary, locally-driven initiatives reflects a couple of promising trends. First, a growing emphasis on the importance of collaboration among professionals in developing tailored intervention and other support programmes to steer individuals away from extremist violence and second, growing awareness that these

programmes can fill a critical gap: between group-focused efforts to build social cohesion and resilience to violent extremism on the one-hand, that are often viewed as too “soft” or “long-term” in nature to have an discernable impact on the threat on the one hand and security-focused counterterrorism measures on the other that are too reactive or, worse, repressive in nature.

LESSONS LEARNED

Given the likelihood that this is an area of P/CVE practice that is likely to grow further, the development of multi-disciplinary or multi-agency intervention mechanisms or programmes for P/CVE should ideally be informed by the following ten lessons-learned to date.

First, careful consideration should be given to whether the mechanism or programme should focus on and be framed around the potentially stigmatising issue of violent extremism or include violent extremism as one among a wider set of violence-related and safeguarding concerns to the relevant community.

Second, a mapping of the resources and capacities of the relevant institutions, organisations, and actors involved in operationalising a multi-agency/multi-disciplinary approach should precede a decision to establish one and inform the decision as to what form (e.g., municipality-, police-, or NGO-led) such a mechanism, if developed, takes.

Third, any such mechanisms or programmes should not be imposed from outside the relevant communities and should emerge following consultations with them. The lead agency or organisation should be one that is trusted by the relevant communities and families and has the necessary capacities to spearhead the effort.

Fourth, team members should represent varied backgrounds and skill sets (e.g., mental health professionals, social workers, teachers, faith-based groups, youth workers), including, where appropriate, the local police. Team members should convene on a regular basis, in a neutral space (i.e., not in a police station) to identify, develop, and implement timely interventions with individuals and families.

Fifth, the mechanism/programmes should rely on evidence-based research to develop a clear understanding of the local context and a common understanding of risk among team members and include transparent criteria for determining which referred individuals merit an intervention. Team members should be trained on how to apply such criteria to individual cases.

Sixth, transparent information-sharing protocols should be put in place to protect individual and data privacy and

allay concerns that the police, if involved, might use information shared with the team for intelligence gather and law enforcement purposes. The instances when information on an individual case can be referred to the police should be clearly defined and limited, e.g., when there is a risk of imminent harm.

Seventh, any such programme/mechanism should include a communications strategy that helps ensure the relevant communities understand the scope of the initiative and what types of cases it will handle. In addition, statistical data related to referrals should be shared, when feasible, to inspire public confidence and incentivise sustained participation from relevant agencies in the intervention programme, in particular, those outside of law enforcement.

Eighth, participants in multi-agency or multi-disciplinary teams – as well as the individuals or organisations that might be called upon to deliver an intervention or support package on an ad hoc basis – should have the necessary P/CVE expertise and these programmes need to incentivise sustained engagement from the diversity of team members while avoiding “tokenistic” participation. Where necessary, training and other capacity-building support should be provided to the relevant professionals and services providers prior to the launch of the programme/mechanism.

Ninth, taking into account the local and cultural context is essential. For example, in some societies there are cultural

barriers to seeking professional help from mental health professionals or social workers, and in some contexts informal actors, such as family members, will need to assume a greater role, particularly in communities are more likely to support non-government led, family-based interventions.

And finally, there is a need to ensure sustainable funding from the government, or other sources, and support from the relevant agencies represented on the team, as well as the community. For example, while international donors are jump-starting the development of these mechanisms in different regions, their sustainability – and ensuring national and local ownership – will likely depend on host governments allocating funding to support them beyond the life of the donor grant.

“It is hard to strike a balance between privacy and information sharing, particularly between non-law enforcement professionals and the police.”

Cyberterrorism is the New Frontier

SERGE STROOBANTS, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS FOR EUROPE AND MENA, INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS AND PEACE

Europe has been thrust into the epicentre of the recent evolution of terrorism, with France, ranked 30th on the 2017 Global Terrorism Index, reflected in its exposure to novel attacks in recent years. France is one of the highest ranked countries on the index not directly involved in an armed conflict, which is the foremost driver of terrorism. It is ranked so high because it had been exposed to many first time attacks in the recent years: guerilla tactics, urban warfare, suicide bombers in Paris, and a lorry attack in Nice show a society and its security services untested and maladapted in covering vulnerabilities emanating from new threats of terrorism. Coupled with this was the hybridisation of terrorism and the cyber world, effectively weaponising propaganda and ideology, spreading extremist belief, facilitating recruitment and radicalisation, but also galvanising and directly prompting terrorist attacks.

Such was the case for the beheading of a French priest in Normandy in July 2016, where the perpetrators were not only radicalised online, but received their directives and were ordered to their respective assignments via mobile networks. This follows a greater trend, noted by the Financial Action Task Force in 2015: the internet is the most commonly used tool for recruitment as well as support for terrorist organisations.

While internal security services have responded to these terrorist attacks and events with assistance from military and intelligence units, terrorist organisations found a vulnerability which lies at the blurred border of internal and external security. Within this grey area between terrorism and insurgency, between conventional and unconventional techniques and targets, between the real and the virtual world, it is extremely difficult to come up with the right prevention and the right response.

Syria has been a trial by fire with regards to the nascence of the "remote command and control". Many European terror plots were not only planned in Syria, but were directed in live-time from Syria via internet and encrypted internet communication platforms. Despite the general defeat of groups such as ISIL on the ground, which are unable to plan and execute directed attacks against

European targets, homegrown terrorists remain a threat, especially as groups such as ISISL shift their focus from encouraging jihad by traveling to a region, and instead encourage followers to strike in their own countries.

This homegrown or lone-wolf terrorism can be inspired and controlled by external terrorist groups or operatives in the commission of their crimes, and state responses only develop following a first strike of this new type of attack. States should be proactive regarding cyberterrorism attacks, and should bring security back, particularly to Europe, by taking preventative measures by learning about available strategies, tools, and techniques regarding cyberterrorism. New wars should not be fought with the strategy of the previous one: cyberterrorism is the new frontier.

Cybersecurity is an emergent issue and focus for various states and organisations, commensurate with an increase in both awareness of cyber vulnerabilities, as well as noted exploitations, denial of service attacks, and malware. Due to the centrality of cyberspace to daily life, cyberattacks have become increasingly threatening, disruptive, and frequent.

Attacks on civilian utilities such as internet access, hospital systems and power grids have all occurred in the past years, from both state and non-state actors. The largest non-state attacks affected critical structures, such as the National Health System shutdown during the Wannacry attack of 2017. This undermines national and international security, can adversely affect critical infrastructure, and can thus threaten the safety of civilians, leading to the conception of cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism is an attack against electronic infrastructure for a political purpose, or to cause and inspire fear in the general public through electronic means.

Cyberterrorism has been a known strategy since the leader of the Al-Qa'ida affiliated Jemaat Islamiyah dedicated a chapter in his extremist literature to attacking US computer networks due to their susceptibility to money laundering and credit card fraud. Also included was a roadmap of sorts, with connections to hacker mentors and

sites which explained how to successfully carry out such a cyberattack as well as conceal their identities. Infamously, IS has used the relative lawlessness of the cyber realm to perpetuate their form of terrorism. IS has mobilised terrorist cells, using encrypted messaging to plan, recruit, and carry out their attacks, with a new focus on “homegrown terrorism”. This differentiates from their earlier strategy of encouraging supporters to travel directly to their conflict zones. IS has also participated in hacking, managing to hack into US Department of Defence databases, steal the information of military personnel, and publish this information as targets online, alongside detailed instruction manuals regarding homemade explosives and appeals for funding.

Terror organisations such as ISIL cannot exist without funding. Cyberterrorism plays a role here. One noteworthy Al-Qa’ida operative, tasked with publishing extremist and radicalising videos on the internet, had stolen over 30,000 credit card numbers, laundered the stolen money through online gambling portals, then transferred the laundered money to bank accounts used to purchase weapons for the terrorists and to support the organisation as a whole. This system of online credit card fraud was used to partially fund the 2005 London metro attacks, which shows the potential of this cyberterrorist nexus. The Al-Qa’ida operative, for instance, was able to use readily available tools to obscure his identity, including VPNs, proxies, and software to hide his IP address – even using US-based companies for the hosting of his terrorist propaganda.

Cyberattacks do not have to be so kinetic to inflict damage, nor do they have to be so lethal to harm or incite fear. Most cyberattacks being innocuously enough, with a simple phishing attack presented through an infected email attachment. The unsuspecting victim opens the attachment, which then downloads malicious code into the network, spreading to other computers on the network. This tactic was suspected to be behind the ISIS Cyber Caliphate takeover of the Central Command’s twitter profile, where strategies and personnel names were leaked. Phishing gives the attacker access to the same data available to the user – financial information, classified or sensitive information, the performance of a critical system, or even access to water or electric grids.

Financial institutions have long been targets of terrorism, and this is true online as well. In the case of the 2016 Bangladesh bank heist, malicious program, likely malware sent through an email, was installed on the bank’s computer system. The malware then collected passwords and usernames, and deleted evidence of its own presence, rendering it virtually invisible. These stolen credentials were then used to access SWIFT, the most secure global money transfer system. 81 million USD were lost in four transactions. One operative of Hizbut-Tahrir al-Islami

similarly defrauded banks on a much smaller scale, running false or double transactions at his Russia-based café, then using these illicit gains to fund his terrorist group.

Distributed Denial of Service attacks, or DDoS attacks, are also popular, easily available, and inexpensive ways to disrupt civilian life. DDoS attacks involve overwhelming the bandwidth of an institution by flooding the institution’s system with targeted and unrelenting communications and requests, which force the institution offline due to exceeding data capacity. This overload leaves the service or network unusable or inaccessible for the users. ISIS’s Cyber Caliphate used these attacks successfully against Yemeni and Iraqi government sites in January 2017, forcing the sites offline for two months, until they emerged with new hosting – which included DDoS protection.

“Many European terror plots were not only planned in Syria, but were directed in live-time from Syria via internet and encrypted internet communication platforms.”

Ransomware attacks are also popular methods which combine the disruption of a denial of service with an ability to gain profit by taking over an institution’s network infrastructure, and holding it ransom, forcing the affected entity to pay a fee to regain control of and access to their systems. Europe experienced a widespread ransomware event in May 2017, when the Wannacry attack took place. This attack especially effected the UK, where hospitals were unable to access basic medical records, causing for cancelled appointments, surgeries, and lead to the shutdown of sixteen hospitals. In the United States, the city of Atlanta had first responders unable to use their databases, and citizen services were taken offline as unidentified hackers deployed ransomware, demanding \$51,000 in Bitcoin to return control to the city.

Terrorism has emerged in cyberspace as a natural response to kinetic security responses and traditional military measures. International organisations have recognised this emergent war zone, as NATO recognised cyberspace as new battle environment, and an impetus for invoking collective defence at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. However, states generally pursue their own policies, and

international cooperation regarding cyberterrorism remains low. While the European Commission has recently directed the EU towards a single cybersecurity market with open communication between state entities, standards for certifying secure internet connections, and increasing intelligence sharing regarding cyberterrorism, there remains no global standardised approach to the cyberterrorism challenge. While both the United States and the United Kingdom have strong, well-funded institutions addressing specifically the issue of cyberterrorism, few other states are individually as prepared, and are attempting to address the challenge these cyber threats pose completely on their own.

The 2005 EU counterterrorism strategy focuses on four pillars: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response. Prevention aims to address the causes of radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. Protection emphasises defence of citizens and infrastructure, and reduction of vulnerability to attacks. This aims to secure external borders, improve transport security, protect strategic targets and reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. Pursuit intends to hinder terrorist capacity to plan and organise attacks, as well as to bring perpetrators to justice. Response comprises the preparation for and the management and minimisation of the consequences of a terrorist attack through improving capabilities in dealing with the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the coordination of a response and to address the needs of the victims. This pillar is the most international, emphasising the need for EU solidarity through crisis coordination arrangements, revising civil protection mechanisms, integrating political crisis response arrangements and sharing best practices in assisting victims of terrorism.

Some major approaches to tackling cyberterrorism are partnerships with corporate entities and major leaders in the cyberspace field, to creating cyberspace bootcamps for the offensive and defensive training of servicemembers tasked with cybersecurity. Others focus on global governance, with nations increasing not only their information sharing, but their attempts to create a standard response protocol to these cyber terroristic incidents, such as the formation of a database of known extremist imagery to be share with internet protocol providers to automatically remove such images from the internet.

Another issue is the popularisation of the blockchain, a cryptographic peer-to-peer exchange protocol usually accompanying cyber cryptocurrency transactions which occur openly, with no oversight, no restriction, global manoeuvrability, and with near anonymity. For this reason, Bitcoin and other untraceable internet-based currencies have also become desirable and anonymous ways to fund terrorism and its activities. Transactions can be in the form

of exchanges, cryptocurrency mining, and donations. The nature of the blockchain allows for the layering of funds, through purchases, electronic money transfers, of virtual currency accounts, giving the veneer of legitimacy, as well as obfuscating a trail already difficult to follow. The formation of front companies in purchasing cryptocurrencies in more regulated markets can avoid triggering reporting mechanisms and can further confuse legal and illegal income. Some large financial hubs have enacted laws around due diligence regarding cryptocurrency clientele, as well as identity verification procedures and mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions, but these countries are in the minority.

States need to regain the initiative in addressing cyberterrorism to maintain the advantage over terrorists and terror organisations who are hybridising their physical attacks with internet capabilities. Rather than waiting for the threat to become real and then responding to physical force of the attack, states should seek to avoid surprises to protect their citizens, as well as their interests. The confrontation between states and terrorists should be led by the state, with a would-be attack pre-empted by a strong, decisive plan or strike, which could serve as a deterrent. Stricter regulations on, and closer partnerships with companies which operate in cyberspace would help identify and prevent would-be terrorists, as well as better-trained personnel dedicated to handling cybersecurity and cyber threats. In this way, states will be able to recede from defensive strategies and instead deploy offensive ones, demonstrating their capabilities and securing a more peaceful nation overall.

“The 2005 EU counterterrorism strategy focuses on four pillars: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response.”



GTI Ranks & Scores, 2018

GTI rank	Country	2017 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2017-2018)
1	Iraq	9.746	0.254
2	Afghanistan	9.391	0.012
3	Nigeria	8.660	0.312
4	Syria	8.315	0.282
5	Pakistan	8.181	0.185
6	Somalia	8.020	-0.374
7	India	7.568	-0.055
8	Yemen	7.534	0.312
9	Egypt	7.345	-0.175
10	Philippines	7.181	-0.075
11	Dem Rep of the Congo	7.055	-0.113
12	Turkey	7.036	0.461
13	Libya	6.987	0.245
14	South Sudan	6.756	0.038
15	Central African Rep	6.719	-0.347
16	Cameroon	6.615	0.152
17	Thailand	6.252	0.337
18	Sudan	6.178	0.247
19	Kenya	6.114	0.035
20	USA	6.066	-0.603
21	Ukraine	6.048	0.490
22	Mali	6.015	-0.140
23	Niger	6.004	0.304
24	Myanmar	5.916	-0.981
25	Bangladesh	5.697	0.463
26	Ethiopia	5.631	0.282
27	Colombia	5.611	0.027
28	United Kingdom	5.610	-0.517
29	Saudi Arabia	5.479	0.315
30	France	5.475	0.466
31	Palestine	5.330	0.205
32	Burundi	5.316	0.315
33	Nepal	5.295	-0.924
34	Russia	5.230	0.080
35	Lebanon	5.154	0.465
36	China	5.108	0.419

GTI rank	Country	2017 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2017-2018)
37	Burkina Faso	4.811	-0.303
38	Chad	4.752	0.497
39	Germany	4.601	0.318
40	Mozambique	4.579	0.233
41	Israel	4.578	0.469
42	Indonesia	4.543	-0.006
43	Angola	4.473	-4.320
44	Iran	4.399	-0.698
45	Greece	4.291	-0.166
46	South Africa	4.263	-0.183
47	Tunisia	4.088	0.524
48	Belgium	4.060	0.580
49	Sri Lanka	4.048	-1.156
50	Spain	4.024	-2.330
51	Sweden	3.936	-0.252
52	Uganda	3.926	0.376
53	Bahrain	3.883	-0.228
54	Algeria	3.763	0.189
55	Venezuela	3.665	-0.039
56	Mexico	3.533	-0.254
57	Canada	3.527	-0.582
58	Chile	3.454	-0.091
59	Paraguay	3.443	0.159
60	Jordan	3.404	0.369
61	Republic of the Congo	3.368	0.675
62	Tanzania	3.368	0.030
62	Cote d' Ivoire	3.276	0.412
64	Kuwait	3.126	0.660
65	Ireland	3.045	0.085
66	Peru	2.950	-0.413
67	Japan	2.926	0.658
68	Australia	2.827	0.254
69	Italy	2.736	0.004
70	Malaysia	2.700	0.621
71	Kosovo	2.694	-0.153
72	Madagascar	2.613	0.662

GTI rank	Country	2017 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2017-2018)
73	Finland	2.501	-0.169
74	Tajikistan	2.233	0.328
75	Kazakhstan	2.228	0.709
76	Rwanda	2.177	-0.257
77	Papua New Guinea	2.040	-2.040
78	Netherlands	1.960	0.442
79	Austria	1.852	-0.335
80	Kyrgyz Republic	1.719	0.304
81	Haiti	1.714	0.676
81	Honduras	1.714	-0.157
83	Armenia	1.692	0.672
84	Argentina	1.680	-0.709
85	Laos	1.675	0.280
86	Zimbabwe	1.569	-1.369
87	Czech Republic	1.562	0.319
88	Ecuador	1.471	0.415
89	Georgia	1.422	0.685
90	Brazil	1.388	0.257
91	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.339	0.684
92	Cyprus	1.206	0.680
93	Gabon	1.198	-1.198
94	Jamaica	1.091	-1.034
95	Sierra Leone	1.066	-0.403
96	Senegal	1.012	0.776
97	Albania	1.008	0.471
98	Azerbaijan	0.957	0.192
99	Taiwan	0.943	-0.392
100	Denmark	0.817	0.690
101	Nicaragua	0.747	0.683
102	Poland	0.719	-0.337
103	Djibouti	0.705	0.410
104	Vietnam	0.663	-0.663
104	Zambia	0.663	-0.663
106	Macedonia (FYR)	0.649	0.533
107	Latvia	0.458	-0.458
107	Malawi	0.458	-0.458
109	Dominican Republic	0.382	0.505
110	Hungary	0.363	0.468
111	Uruguay	0.344	0.431
112	Guinea	0.324	0.395
113	Bulgaria	0.315	0.858
114	New Zealand	0.286	0.321
114	South Korea	0.286	0.321
116	Moldova	0.229	0.239
116	Estonia	0.229	0.229
116	Serbia	0.229	-0.186
119	Liberia	0.210	-0.086
120	Guatemala	0.205	0.297
121	Lesotho	0.191	0.191

GTI rank	Country	2017 GTI score (out of 10)	Change in score (2017-2018)
122	Ghana	0.162	0.162
123	Norway	0.153	-0.153
124	Switzerland	0.134	0.133
125	Trinidad and Tobago	0.124	0.124
126	Slovakia	0.115	0.114
127	United Arab Emirates	0.105	0.105
128	Guyana	0.076	0.077
128	Panama	0.076	0.077
130	Iceland	0.057	0.067
130	Qatar	0.057	0.058
132	Montenegro	0.038	0.038
132	Morocco	0.038	0.038
132	Uzbekistan	0.038	0.038
135	Bhutan	0.019	0.019
135	Cambodia	0.019	0.019
137	Croatia	0.014	0.015
138	Belarus	0.000	0.038
138	Guinea-Bissau	0.000	0.038
138	Bolivia	0.000	0.019
138	Benin	0.000	0.000
138	Botswana	0.000	0.000
138	Costa Rica	0.000	0.000
138	Cuba	0.000	0.000
138	El Salvador	0.000	0.000
138	Equatorial Guinea	0.000	0.000
138	Eritrea	0.000	0.000
138	Lithuania	0.000	0.000
138	Mauritania	0.000	0.000
138	Mauritius	0.000	0.000
138	Mongolia	0.000	0.000
138	Namibia	0.000	0.000
138	North Korea	0.000	0.000
138	Oman	0.000	0.000
138	Portugal	0.000	0.000
138	Romania	0.000	0.000
138	Singapore	0.000	0.000
138	Slovenia	0.000	0.000
138	Swaziland	0.000	0.000
138	The Gambia	0.000	0.000
138	Timor-Leste	0.000	0.000
138	Togo	0.000	0.000
138	Turkmenistan	0.000	0.000

B

50 Worst Terrorist Attacks in 2017

Rank	Country	Date	City	Organisation	Fatalities	Attack type
1	Somalia	14/10/17	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	588	Bombing/Explosion
2	Egypt	24/11/17	Beir al-Abd	Sinai Province of the Islamic State	311	Bombing/Explosion
3	Iraq	17/3/17	Mosul	ISIL	230	Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)
4	Iraq	4/6/17	Tal Afar	ISIL	200	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
5	Iraq	1/6/17	Mosul	ISIL	163	Armed Assault
6	Libya	18/5/17	Brak	Misrata Brigades	141	Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)
7	Central African Rep	8/5/17	Alindao	Union for Peace in Central Africa (UPC)	133	Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)
8	Syria	2/10/17	Qaryatayn	ISIL	128	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
9	Syria	15/4/17	Aleppo	Jaysh al-Islam (Syria)	127	Bombing/Explosion
10	Central African Rep	13/5/17	Bangassou	Anti-Balaka Militia	108	Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)
11	Iraq	21/6/17	Mosul	ISIL	100	Bombing/Explosion
12	Afghanistan	31/5/17	Kabul	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	93	Bombing/Explosion
13	Pakistan	16/2/17	Sehwan	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	91	Bombing/Explosion
14	Somalia	8/6/17	Af Urur	Al-Shabaab	77	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
15	Syria	4/11/17	Deir ez-Zor	ISIL	76	Bombing/Explosion
16	Afghanistan	17/10/17	Gardez	Taliban	74	Bombing/Explosion
17	Nigeria	20/3/17	Zaki Biam	Fulani extremists	73	Armed Assault
18	Afghanistan	2/8/17	Gomal district	Taliban	72	Armed Assault
19	Afghanistan	3/8/17	Mirza Wulang	Taliban	72	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
20	Nigeria	25/7/17	Jibi	Boko Haram	69	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
21	Iraq	11/5/17	Mosul	ISIL	64	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
22	United States	1/10/17	Las Vegas	Anti-Government extremists	59	Armed Assault
23	Nigeria	21/11/17	Mubi	Boko Haram	59	Bombing/Explosion
24	Niger	9/4/17	Gueskerou	Boko Haram	57	Armed Assault

Rank	Country	Date	City	Organisation	Fatalities	Attack type
25	Afghanistan	30/9/17	Chora district	Taliban	57	Bombing/Explosion
26	Afghanistan	20/10/17	Kabul	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	57	Bombing/Explosion
27	Dem Rep of the Congo	4/8/17	Lambukilela	Twa Militia	55	Unknown
28	Yemen	5/11/17	Aden	Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State	55	Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)
29	Afghanistan	8/3/17	Kabul	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	54	Bombing/Explosion
30	South Sudan	14/4/17	Raja	SPLM-IO	53	Armed Assault
31	Afghanistan	14/12/17	Sangcharak district	Taliban	52	Unknown
32	Afghanistan	28/12/17	Kabul	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	51	Bombing/Explosion
33	Afghanistan	7/5/17	Nawabad	Taliban	50	Armed Assault
34	Dem Rep of the Congo	17/5/17	Kinshasa	Bunda Dia Kongo (BDK)	50	Armed Assault
35	Nigeria	30/12/17	Mafa	Boko Haram	50	Unknown
36	Iraq	26/3/17	Khanukah	ISIL	49	Unknown
37	Afghanistan	26/7/17	Waygal	Taliban	47	Armed Assault
38	Iraq	14/9/17	Nasiriyah	ISIL	46	Bombing/Explosion
39	Iraq	16/2/17	Baghdad	ISIL	45	Bombing/Explosion
40	Myanmar	25/8/17	Ye Baw Kya	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)	45	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
41	Nigeria	6/11/17	Gulak	Boko Haram	45	Bombing/Explosion
42	Iraq	14/9/17	Nasiriyah	ISIL	44	Bombing/Explosion
43	Syria	7/1/17	Azaz	ISIL	43	Bombing/Explosion
44	Afghanistan	17/8/17	Gomal district	Taliban	43	Armed Assault
45	Iraq	3/6/17	Mosul	ISIL	41	Armed Assault
46	Somalia	19/2/17	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	40	Bombing/Explosion
47	Pakistan	23/6/17	Parachinar	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	40	Bombing/Explosion
48	Turkey	1/1/17	Istanbul	ISIL	39	Armed Assault
49	Dem Rep of the Congo	24/3/17	Kananga district	Kamwina Nsapu Militia	39	Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)
50	Pakistan	23/6/17	Parachinar	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	39	Bombing/Explosion



GTI Methodology

The GTI ranks 163 countries based on four indicators weighted over five years.¹ A country's annual GTI score is based on a unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of incidents in the year. The four factors counted in each country's yearly score are:

- total number of terrorist incidents in a given year
- total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given year
- total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given year
- a measure of the total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year.

Each of the factors is weighted between zero and three, and a five year weighted average is applied in a bid to reflect the latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time. The weightings shown in table C.1 was determined by consultation with the GPI Expert Panel.

The greatest weighting is attributed to a fatality.

The property damage measure is further disaggregated into four bands depending on the measured scope of the property damage inflicted by one incident. These bandings are shown in table C.2; incidents causing less than US\$1 million are accorded a weighting of 1, between \$1 million and \$1 billion a 2, and more than \$1 billion a 3 weighting. It should be noted a great majority of incidents are coded in the GTD as 'unknown' thus scoring nil with 'catastrophic' events being extremely rare.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY'S GTI SCORE

To assign a score to a country each incident is rated according to the four measures. The measures are then multiplied by their weighting factor and aggregated. This is done for all incidents and then all incidents for each country are aggregated to give the country score. To illustrate, Table C.3 depicts a hypothetical country's record for a given year.

TABLE C.1

Indicator weights used in the Global Terrorism Index

Dimension	Weight
Total number of incidents	1
Total number of fatalities	3
Total number of injuries	0.5
Sum of property damages measure	Between 0 and 3 depending on severity

TABLE C.2

Property damage levels as defined in the GTD and weights used in the Global Terrorism Index

Code/ Weight	Damage Level
0	Unknown
1	Minor (likely < \$1 million)
2	Major (likely between \$1 million and \$1 billion)
3	Catastrophic (likely > \$1 billion)

TABLE C.3

Hypothetical country terrorist attacks in a given year

Dimension	Weight	Number of incidents for the given year	Calculated raw score
Total number of incidents	1	21	21
Total number of fatalities	3	36	108
Total number of injuries	0.5	53	26.5
Sum of property damages measure	2	20	40
Total raw score			195.5

Given these indicator values, this hypothetical country for that year would be assessed as having an impact of terrorism of

$$(1 \times 21) + (3 \times 36) + (0.5 \times 53) + (2 \times 20) = 195.5.$$

FIVE-YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE

To account for the after effects of trauma that terrorist attacks have on a society, the GTI takes into consideration the events of previous years as having a bearing on a country's current score. For instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway will continue to have a psychological impact on the population for many years to come. To account for the lingering effects of terrorism, the prior four years are also included in the scoring with a decreasing weight each year. Table C.4 highlights the weights used for each year.

TABLE C.4

Time weighting of historical scores

Year	Weight	% of Score
Current year	16	52
Previous year	8	26
Two years ago	4	13
Three years ago	2	6
Four years ago	1	3

LOGARITHMIC BANDING SCORES ON A SCALE OF 1-10

The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout the world. There are a handful of countries with very high levels of terrorism compared to most countries which experience only very small amounts, if not no terrorism. Hence, the GTI uses a base 10 logarithmic banding system between 0 and 10 at 0.5 intervals.

As shown in table C.5 this mapping method yields a total number of 21 bands. This maps all values to a band of size 0.5 within the scale of 0-10. In order to band these scores the following method is used:

1. Define the Minimum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score of 0.
2. Define the Maximum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score 10.
3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores and calculate 'r' by:
 - a. $\text{root} = 2 \times (\text{Highest GTI Banded Score} - \text{Lowest GTI Banded Score}) = 20 \times (10 - 0) = 20$
 - b. $\text{Range} = 2 \times (\text{Highest Recorded GTI Raw Score} - \text{Lowest Recorded GTI Raw Score})$
 - c. $r = \sqrt[\text{root}]{\text{range}}$
4. The mapped band cut-off value for bin n is calculated by rn .

Following this method produces mapping of GTI scores to the set bands as defined in table C.5.

TABLE C.5

Bands used in the GTI

Band number	Bands	Band cut off values	Band number	Bands	Band cut off values
1	0	0	12	5.5	328.44
2	0.5	1.69	13	6	556.2
3	1	2.87	14	6.5	941.88
4	1.5	4.86	15	7	1595.02
5	2	8.22	16	7.5	2701.06
6	2.5	13.93	17	8	4574.08
7	3	23.58	18	8.5	7745.91
8	3.5	39.94	19	9	13117.21
9	4	67.63	20	9.5	22213.17
10	4.5	114.53	21	10	37616.6
11	5	193.95			

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