The Israeli Community in the United States: A Public Diplomacy Asset for Israel

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Executive Summary

1. The erosion of support for Israel among the American liberal population and the placing of Israel at the heart of the political controversy between the Republicans and Democrats could endanger the special relationship between Israel and the United States in the medium and long term.

2. Maintaining the special relations between the two countries entails solidifying Israel’s positive image in the eyes of the American public so that it can work to reverse the erosion of support among the liberal target population.

3. The Israeli community in the United States is an asset that has the potential to contribute significantly toward achieving this goal: It includes a large number of “field players” who are involved in both Israeli and American society and who can bridge between the two.

4. In the interest of tapping this unexploited potential, a model is proposed here for building and managing an Israeli community that will promote a pro-Israeli agenda aimed at bridging between Israel and the American public. This model requires the strengthening of the Israeli community on three levels:
   - **The personal level:** Imparting knowledge, tools, and skills for improving the messages and conducting dialogues with different target groups;
   - **The community level:** Creating a mechanism that will encourage the community’s involvement and guide the activity on the basis of a clearly defined approach, while enhancing the sense of community;
   - **The intercommunity level:** Holding joint forums with the American Jewish community and other pro-Israeli groups while also engaging in learning processes with the leaderships of other Israeli communities.

5. The State of Israel has an important role to play in realizing the potential contribution of the Israeli community. This role entails boosting the
community’s activism and improving the learning processes of the pro-Israeli network:

• Establishing a framework to help the pro-Israeli community conduct dialogues and partnerships with the neutral groups—in coordination with the already existing framework for defensive activity;

• Imparting professional knowledge to those active in public diplomacy;

• Adopting a feedback mechanism for assessing and improving the pro-Israeli activity as a whole.

6. Promoting a policy to encourage an Israeli presence in settings that are more prone to adopt anti-Israeli messages (youth, elite universities, and social science and humanities faculties as well as Middle Eastern Studies departments).

7. Presenting the insights to the decision makers in Israel through an advisory mechanism for the struggle against the delegitimization threat—a mechanism that does not currently exist.
Introduction:
The Israeli American Community—An Asset for Israel?

Israel’s Challenge in the United States: Reversing the Current Trend
In 2012, in a discussion held by the National Hasbara Forum, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that “Israel is subject to a delegitimization campaign aimed at infringing the IDF’s (Israel Defense Forces) freedom of action and the right to self-defense.”¹ According to the state comptroller, the campaign is being waged by international organizations whose goal is to undermine Israel’s right to exist or preserve its Jewish character. In pursuit of that goal, they incite against Israel and work to strengthen the image that has been created for it: a violent country that regularly violates international law.² The notion of a “delegitimization campaign” does not include criticism of Israeli policy nor efforts to change its policy without threatening its existence or Jewish character. “Delegitimization” refers to undermining Israel’s right to exist in its current form.

In recent years, the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) movement has been at the forefront of the anti-Israeli campaign. The objective of this movement is to increase the attacks on Israel’s legitimacy and use them to promote a boycott of Israel’s economy, society, culture, and academia, thereby forcing Israel to alter its policy and accede to measures that endanger its existence (for example, agreeing to the return of the descendants of the Palestinian refugees, who would alter the Jewish-Palestinian demographic balance).
In its efforts to respond to the overall phenomenon and the trends that support it, Jerusalem views the delegitimization threat and the anti-Israeli activity primarily in global terms. This broad perspective is indeed a requisite for grappling with this multidimensional and multiregional threat. However, this monograph is based on the assumption that, along with the global outlook, the delegitimization threat in the United States needs to be addressed specifically. There are several reasons why that is the case:

First, the United States is Israel’s most important and closest ally. US aid to Israel extends across different domains—security, economic, and diplomatic—and is vital to the Israeli economy, the IDF, and the defense of Israel’s status in the world. A significant reduction in US support would likely cause great damage to Israel—more than the loss of support from any other country.

Second, as Professor Abraham Ben-Zvi explains, the US-Israeli alliance has two main components: the ideological one and the national-interest one. The first component is based on the perception that Israel and the United States have common values as societies of pioneering immigrants who succeeded despite adverse physical and political conditions to create a flourishing economy and a liberal-democratic regime. The second component is based on the overlap between the two having shared national interests in contending with common enemies: the Soviet-Arab bloc during the Cold War; Iran, Iraq, and global terror since the Soviet Union’s collapse. Professor Ben-Zvi underlines the fact that the US-Israeli alliance depends on both components. Damage to either of them could weaken the alliance, and ultimately even lead to its demise, even if the other component remains strong.

This state of affairs explains why the special relationship between the two countries did not come to fruition until 1967. Despite the two societies’ ideological affinities, there was a gap between their national interests stemming from the US-Soviet competition for support in the Arab world, which controlled the oil market. After the Six-Day War, Israel was left without an ally after France imposed an embargo on it. The United States, for its part, gave up the effort to weaken the ties between Egypt and Syria on the one hand and their Soviet patron on the other; the two Arab countries now worked to upgrade their relations with Moscow so that it would help with their postwar rebuilding. It was only at that point, when the US-Israeli ideological basis
and national interest converged, that the relationship ripened to the strategic level, and later to that of a de facto alliance.

The international delegitimization campaign could undermine this strategic alliance. Anti-Israeli organizations, which exploit the criticism of Israeli policy primarily toward the Palestinians in order to incriminate Israeli society, work to damage the foundations of the special relationship between Israel and the United States. Even if these organizations fail in their attempts to get sanctions imposed on Israel or to subject it to an American boycott, they are endangering the alliance by striking at its ideological basis. Indeed it already appears that these organizations’ propaganda is falling on attentive ears in the American liberal population, and this poses an increasing threat to the special relationship. Recent public opinion surveys show a dramatic erosion in support for Israel among liberal groups, the college-educated, and young people in the United States. Thus, for example, surveys by the Pew Research Center indicate an ongoing decline in support for Israel among the liberal population, which is now significantly lower than its support for the Palestinians. Furthermore, about half of the Democratic respondents (46 percent) in the latest survey in October 2017 said President Trump was too partial to Israel. Only about one-fifth of the Democrats (21 percent) responded that his policy was balanced.

The Pew surveys also point to an unprecedented polarization on Israel between the Democratic and Republican camps. Whereas the Republican camp’s support for Israel has climbed dramatically since the 9/11 terror attack in 2001, support has moderately declined among the Democrats, and it has fallen more sharply among the liberal group. What this trend means is that Israel is at the heart of the political divide in the United States. Gallup polls, too, show a waning of the Democrats’ support for Israel, with a widening gap between the two parties when it comes to attitudes toward Israel (it should be noted, however, that Gallup polls find a higher rate of support for Israel than the Pew polls). In such a situation it will be very difficult for Israel to achieve the goal it has set for itself for many years: to bolster the bipartisan support for it.

Furthermore, within the US Democratic camp, the liberal sector is growing and now constitutes close to 50 percent of it. This sector mainly comprises college-educated whites aged 18 to 35, many of them students, with serious potential to form the future leadership of the Democratic Party. Alongside this group are others, such as the African American and Latino leaderships,
that also have a weak tie to the older American population. In fact, the liberal group is also expected to include a considerable share of the Jewish leadership in the future. The most recent survey by the American Jewish Committee found that more than 50 percent of American Jews define themselves as liberals or as leaning toward the liberals. These trends are also reflected in studies that were done in Israel by, among others, Dr. Amnon Cavari and the Brand Israel Group.

Figure 1: The US population’s support for Israel and the Palestinians from 1978 to 2017: Overall support and segmentation by parties. Source: Pew Research Center Survey

The trend of declining liberal support for Israel also corresponds with the results of an in-depth study by the BAV (Brand Asset Valuator) consulting firm, which has monitored the “Israel” brand and its perception among the American public since 2004. Although the findings show a very positive perception of the “Israel” brand on average (similar to how Japan, Britain, Australia, and Canada are perceived as a “strong brand” among Americans), a comprehensive look shows significant disparities in how US groups with different political positions perceive Israel. In general, the esteem for Israel decreases as one moves “leftward” on the liberal axis: from the Republicans to the Democrats to the liberal Democrats. The BAV model indicates that most Democrats do not hold Israel close to their hearts and even less so do the liberal Democrats. The Democrats who took part in the study said
that they feel distanced from Israel. This is also the attitude toward Israel’s “sub-brands,” namely, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

Traditionally, the economic and political leadership (usually the Democratic Party), as well as the academic rank that is entrusted with educating the future generations, have emerged from these liberal groups. Even if these groups do not support a boycott of Israel, and even if the negative trend weakens, the ideological basis of the relations between the two countries is likely to erode when these groups become part of the US leadership. Reinforcing that ideological basis entails reversing the trend among these groups. In other words, if countering the anti-Israeli activity is enough to prevent dramatic damage to Israel in other western countries, there is a need to reverse the existing trend in the United States.

The organizations and entities that promote pro-Israeli activity take three complementary approaches to achieving the necessary change in American public opinion. The first approach focuses on stopping the expansion of the anti-Israeli camp, which strives to spread its doctrine, embed the negative image of Israel, and delegitimize the notion of a Jewish state. The goal of those who espouse this approach is to counteract the anti-Israeli activity and curb its influence. For that goal, they maintain, the support for the anti-Israeli camp must be diminished.

The second approach focuses on intensifying pro-Israeli activity. According to this approach, the pro-Israeli camp must be encouraged to increase its strength, activity, and exposure.

According to the third approach, the focus should be on groups not currently active in the struggle, whether they do not take any position for or against Israel or have no interest in the subject. Those espousing this approach seek to make the Israeli discourse available to an indifferent, non-Israeli audience in order to “immunize” it from anti-Israeli propaganda on the one hand and expose it to other aspects of Israel—beyond the political-security domain—on the other. Those other aspects—such as Israel’s high-tech industry or its movies, literature, and music—are likely to be more relevant and interesting to these groups. Thus, these groups can be “immunized” from anti-Israeli messages without any connection to their attitudes toward Israeli policy.

None of these three approaches suffices alone to effect a turnabout in Israel’s image in American society; rather, they must be combined into an overall strategic framework in which all the existing tools can be deployed for bringing about a change.
This document will consider the potential contribution of the Israeli community in the United States. It proposes ways to activate this community and promote the desired change by boosting pro-Israeli activity, more effectively appealing to neutral groups, and reducing the ability of the anti-Israeli groups to expand. Until lately, the Israeli American community has remained in the margins of the struggle against the delegitimization threat, leaving the leadership role to the American Jewish community. Only in recent years has the Israeli community begun to act more vigorously against organizations and individuals who work to delegitimize Israel, conducting this activity in parallel to that of the American Jewish community.

This work explores the question of how the Israeli community can contribute to the overall Israeli effort against the delegitimization campaign and against the anti-Israeli activity in the United States. It also looks at two other questions: What encourages activity among members of the community and what are the obstacles to such activism? This monograph comprehensively analyzes to what extent the Israeli community can be a political asset in the struggle against the delegitimization campaign, which is a central concern of Israeli public diplomacy (or hasbara as it is better known in Israel). This analysis is based on the understanding that the fight against the delegitimization campaign is waged by a pro-Israeli network in which Israel is only one of the active elements. Thus, in addition to offering insights and recommendations on how to maximize Israel’s contribution to the networked activity and to reduce its negative impact, one must consider how to improve the activity of the pro-Israeli organizations in the network.

Already at this stage, before the overview and the analysis, it is worth presenting the main conclusion: The Israeli community in the United States is an unused asset for Israeli public diplomacy.

The Israeli Community in the United States
Who is an Israeli American, and what is the Israeli American community? There is no contention that an Israeli American is someone who was born and grew up in Israel and holds Israeli citizenship, while his life now centers on the United States. However, some researchers claim that this group can also include American citizens who feel a special bond to Israel and see themselves as part of the Israeli community in the United States. 12

By the narrowest definition, Israeli Americans are citizens of Israel who lived in Israel and emigrated to the United States as well as their children
Introduction: The Israeli American Community—An Asset for Israel?

who emigrated with them. Broader definitions also include a third generation of offspring to Israeli parents, as well as American Jews who hold Israeli citizenship and who feel a deep attachment to Israel even though they do not live there and do not intend to do so in the future. It is clear that the broader the definition, the larger the number of Israeli Americans. In any case, this is a group within the Jewish community that maintains an Israeli identity alongside of an American one and is immersed in Israeli culture and society. Thus, for example, a 2015 survey of the Jewish community in Boston by researchers from Brandeis University found that the Israeli community there has the strongest attachment to Israel. This was manifested, among other things, by reading news from Israel, visiting Israel, and reading Israeli literature. 13

According to different estimates, which are based on the different definitions, the Israeli community in the United States numbers 400,000 to 800,000 people. 14 This community is concentrated in the large cities, especially New York, Los Angeles, Miami, Boston, and Chicago. Its members are not cut from the same cloth as the community includes, among others, individual students, couples whose children were born and educated for a few years in Israel, and couples whose children were born in the United States and educated only there.

Over the years, the Israeli community has created organizations that operate in different domains, primarily in the academic and business spheres. The last decade witnessed the establishment of the Israeli American Council, which has taken upon itself to consolidate the Israeli community in the United States and provide it with a leadership. The Israeli American Council grew out of an initiative in 2007 to form an Israeli leadership in Los Angeles. In 2013 the council began to work in other countries, and today it has ten centers in the United States and is active in twenty-seven countries. 15

The Structure of the Study

The first chapter outlines the field of public diplomacy and discusses the question of what can be considered an asset in this field, although this is a relatively new subject that still does not have a clear conceptual foundation or broad agreement about its defining components. The discussion sets forth some approaches to this field and surveys the existing literature, which can serve as a shared conceptual basis for assessing the potential contribution of the Israeli American community.
The second chapter analyzes the benefit that lies in activating the Israeli American community as part of Israel’s fight against delegitimization. This chapter also outlines the development of the public diplomacy apparatus in Israel, notes its weaknesses and strengths, and discusses how the Israeli community can become part of this framework and help close the existing gaps.

Following the theoretical discussion on making the Israeli community part of Israel’s public diplomacy apparatus, the third chapter explores the question of how this can best be done. The chapter includes an analysis of a test case: the organized activity of the Israeli community in Boston. The findings of the analysis make it possible to test the theoretical hypotheses and offer a basis for a broader discussion on activating the Israeli community across the United States, despite that the Boston community is a unique one whose attributes differ in part from those of other American Israeli communities. By considering the findings and lessons of this research, subsequent research can enhance the relevant knowledge and fulfill the goal of this study as a whole: to provide a basis for a far-ranging discussion of the nature of the Israeli American community and the ways it can be incorporated into the struggle against the delegitimization campaign.

The concluding chapter of this monograph sums up the main findings that emerge from the analysis of the test case and consider these findings given the theoretical discussion and draw conclusions and insights from them. The chapter ends with organizational recommendations for activating the community, as well as recommendations that are directed at the State of Israel so that it can exploit the potential advantage of integrating the Israeli community into the existing pro-Israeli framework. The conclusions point to the need for Israel to develop additional capabilities, which so far have not come to fruition but are vital to achieving one of its cardinal goals in the United States: establishing a positive perception of Israel among the American population so that it can provide a basis for changing the current trend among the liberal target groups. Although the analysis focuses only on activating the Israeli community, it can help Israel to cooperate more effectively with other components of the pro-Israeli network, including different groups in the Jewish community that are characterized by having a bond to Israel.
On Public Diplomacy:
Developing the Concept and Putting it into Practice

Diplomacy is one of the world’s most ancient professions. Moses, the Greek
strategos Pericles, St. Peter, the Prophet Muhammad, and the first emperor
of China Qin Shi Huang engaged in diplomacy thousands of years ago. In
the first half of the twentieth century, the field began to develop rapidly and
incorporate new elements. One of those is public diplomacy. This chapter
explains what public diplomacy is, who engages in it today, what tools it
uses, and what goals it seeks to achieve. The chapter’s theoretical nature is
meant to provide a kind of opening to a new field that is still emerging both
practically and conceptually. The conceptual framework presented in this
chapter is important both for developing critical thinking about the field as
a whole and for deepening the understanding of the context in which the
American Israeli community’s potential contribution is assessed.

What Is Public Diplomacy?
According to diplomatic history scholar Alan Henrikson, diplomacy is “the
organized conduct of relations between states.”16 According to Henrikson,
at the heart of diplomatic activity are efforts to promote the goals of State
A by influencing the policy of State B (effectiveness) and conducting
dialogue between the states on behalf of the state that the diplomat represents
(expressiveness). Asking for military support in a struggle against a common
enemy is an example of the first aspect of diplomatic work. Publicly
condemning an attack on another state is an example of the second aspect.

Like classical diplomacy, public diplomacy is a tool aimed at affecting the
policy of other states. There are, however, some basic differences between
classical diplomacy and public diplomacy, the latter which can be defined as
“the process by which a state creates communication with foreign populations so as to gain their sympathy and support.” For this purpose, the state tries to draw those populations closer to it—to its values, institutions, culture, goals, and policy.17

The first difference is that whereas classical diplomacy typically involves negotiations between official representatives, in public diplomacy the representatives need not have an official function. At the same time, official representatives can engage in public diplomacy and convey messages to unofficial actors. For example, Israeli members of Knesset meet with members of the American Jewish community as part of Israel’s public diplomacy. An example of public diplomacy conducted by unofficial actors is the hasbara work of young Israelis whom the Jewish Agency sends to many American campuses each year. These emissaries represent Israel in discussions held on the campuses. In addition, unofficial representatives operate independently, of their own volition, to build support for their country. One example is the ICC (Israel on Campus Coalition), an organization that brings together pro-Israel students who advocate for Israel on American campuses.

The second difference between classical diplomacy and public diplomacy stems from the first difference: Public diplomacy enables various groups to engage in public activity. One does not have to be a diplomat, minister, or member of Knesset to take part in Israeli diplomatic activity. Thus, for example, students who have been recruited as Jewish Agency emissaries to American universities and colleges participate in the Israeli effort alongside Israeli diplomatic and public representatives. Another example is of Israeli citizens who take part in Israel’s public diplomacy by sharing on Facebook a hasbara video produced by the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit during a military crisis.

The third difference between public and classical diplomacy concerns the diplomatic tools that they use and the processes that they conduct. In classical diplomacy, a process of formulating agreements and points of disagreement enables an official policy to be adopted within a relatively short time after the agreements are reached. Diplomatic measures usually come to the fore quickly, and it is relatively easy to see the connection between the diplomatic process and its outcome, including its effect on the other state’s policy. For example, the international coalition against Iran’s nuclear program that was assembled during Obama’s presidency is a clear outcome of US diplomatic efforts.
Public diplomacy, however, usually involves an ongoing process of persuading and cultivating opinions and perceptions. The connection between the diplomatic effort and the achievement of its objectives—affecting the foreign policy of the target state—is rarely clear and rapid. The campaign that Brazil conducted through public diplomacy to encourage tourism by changing its image from a dangerous country to a safe one is said to be an example of public diplomacy. The campaign was waged during two major sports events hosted in Brazil—the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016—and presumably one of its aims was to prevent a situation in which the sports fans would forgo these events out of fear for their safety. Indeed, Brazil succeeded in increasing the number of visitors. It is, however, impossible to ascribe this to Brazil’s public diplomacy, as several other factors contributed to the increase in tourism, and no one can determine the role of each factor. It is certainly possible that the sports fans decided to attend these two major events regardless of what they thought of the safety conditions in Brazil. Some also believe it was Brazil’s economic recovery that was behind the resurgence of tourism.

In sum, public diplomacy is a subfield of classical diplomacy, and it is growing. Its goals do not differ from those of classical diplomacy: to affect both public opinion and the elite in the target state in order to maintain its support or to shift its foreign policy in favor of the state engaging in the diplomatic effort. Public diplomacy emerged as a result of the political changes over the past century and the technological changes especially over the past two decades, posing new political challenges and opportunities for states, as discussed in the next chapter.

How Public Diplomacy Became a Weapon in the Cold War
During the Cold War, for the first time public diplomacy became a tool for states to spread their ideology. As part of the ideological and strategic struggle between them, the United States and the Soviet Union turned public diplomacy into a propaganda tool, without fearing that it would lead to a military escalation. Each of the two superpowers used public diplomacy to increase its influence over its adversary’s population and thereby to weaken it. Gifford Malone, a former senior State Department official, defined this kind of public diplomacy as “direct communication with foreign peoples with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments.”

This definition focuses on the purpose of public diplomacy, not on the identity
of the diplomatic representative. That is apparently because of the dominant notion at the time that only governments employed public diplomacy. This definition highlights two chronological processes: first, State A creates communication with a population in State B to muster public support for its policy and its interests. Second, the population in State B pressures its government to adopt a policy that serves the interests of State A.19

The term “public diplomacy” was officially adopted in the United States in 1970, replacing the term “propaganda” in order to downplay its manipulative aspect. At the end of the Cold War, the United States concluded that it no longer needed to influence the international arena through public diplomacy, and seemingly, this tool then was marginalized.20

The Return of Public Diplomacy
Public diplomacy in the United States returned to the center of the political stage after the Twin Towers attack on September 11, 2001. In response to the terror attack, perpetrated by the al-Qaeda organization, the US administration launched a war on terror that included a resumption of the public diplomacy strategy, to which abundant resources were allocated. The approach was different than in the past because the goals were more ambitious. The first goal of this new public diplomacy was to eradicate global terror and its roots by mounting an ideological and religious offensive against the radical messages that the Islamist terror groups propagated. This even included an attempt to forge a counternarrative that would create comity between the United States and the world’s Muslim communities.21 Although this campaign heralded the return of public diplomacy, it differed from the activity that had prevailed during the Cold War, mainly because of the rapid development of communication technologies at the start of the twenty-first century.

The essential difference between public diplomacy during the Cold War and the new public diplomacy of today concerns the actors who engage in it. Whereas during the Cold War, official representatives appealed to the various populations in different countries, in the new public diplomacy nongovernmental actors also take part in the effort to gain support for their country from within other countries.

The new public diplomacy adapted the fundamentals of diplomacy from the Cold War era to the reality of the twenty-first century, which was forged by two major transformations: the information revolution and the democratic revolution.22 The “information revolution” refers to the development of new
communication technologies, particularly the internet as well as cable and satellite broadcasts, which expanded and accelerated the flow of information and enabled people all over the world to be in contact with each other. The new technologies provided the infrastructure for social networks that physical borders cannot obstruct. Individuals can now conduct diplomatic activity in these social networks and build virtual communities based on common attributes or goals. The “democratic revolution” refers to the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the rise of new democratic societies based on freedom of information and access to information. In many countries the political as well as technological changes have encouraged citizens to become politically involved in various ways, such as by electing government, influencing foreign policy, and building economic, cultural, and social ties with foreign actors.

Although the state indeed lost its monopoly on relations with other states, it gained opportunities to affect foreign governments by directly communicating with their civil societies and with powerful economic and political entities that operate within these countries and influence their national policy. As the American campaign against Islamic terror illustrates, the new channels of communication created access to local populations in weak states where the central government was not functioning or even collapsing, as in many Arab states following the Arab Spring, such as Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and others. Public diplomacy has tools to contend with the threat of radicalization processes in these faltering societies and to encourage democratic reforms.

At the same time, the tools that serve a country’s public diplomacy also enable radical organizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to operate outside the societies where they originated and communicate directly with citizens of other countries. The Islamic State, in particular, understood the potential of these tools and established departments for communication, which were meant to encourage individuals in the Middle East and the West to join its ranks or perpetrate terror attacks inspired by its ideology. The conclusion, therefore, is that public diplomacy tools help terror organizations improve their operational capability, but it also enable states—both weak and powerful—to advance their goals with non-military means that are seen as extremely effective and particularly economical. These new means are part of what is now commonly called the “soft power” of a state.
On Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

According to Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, power is the ability of Actor A to cause Actor B to behave in a way that not would not happen without the effect of Actor A. In classical international politics, it was commonly thought that the way for Actor A to affect Actor B was through temptation (promising a gain) or by employing hard power (using force or threatening to use force). In actuality, international politics was conducted by using both of these tools (in what was known as the “carrot and stick policy”). In this way, hard power enables strong states to solve problems when interests clash with those of other states. A clear-cut example of the use of hard power is the United States’ behavior after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Washington threatened Saddam Hussein that if he did not withdraw from Kuwait immediately he would incur sanctions, and, if that did not suffice, his army would be driven out by force of arms. On January 17, 1991, after the American ultimatum had expired, the first Gulf War began; it ended with a crushing defeat of Iraq and its complete withdrawal from Kuwait.

Today, at least in the West, the use of hard power to achieve political goals is considered less morally desirable and less militarily and politically effective than in the past. From the moral standpoint, it is seen as contravening western liberal values, which dictates that problems should be solved nonviolently. From the military and political standpoint, its main disadvantage is that photographed wars do not “look good”: In an era in which the horrors of war can reach every living room in the western world, western governments that go to war risk a rapid loss of popularity and increasing difficulty in carrying out the military mission.

As hard power’s stock has fallen in the West, soft power is taking its place. Soft power is a range of nonviolent means aimed at persuading other actors to cooperate and promote common objectives or values. The keywords for soft power are persuasion and attractiveness (of the state, its culture, the values it represents, or the vision it expounds). Like hard power, soft power is meant to advance national interests but by methods that are “soft” in nature: they do not involve coercion and violence but rather the pursuit of cooperation out of a mutual desire. Joseph Nye, who coined the term “soft power,” explained that a state seeking to affect the policy of other states can do so by making its own policy, values, and vision attractive. At the same time, Nye pointed out that soft power is not necessarily more
moral than hard power because it can involve various manipulations (such as persuasion by presenting bogus or distorted facts). Or, as Nye put it, hard power “twists arms” while soft power “twists minds.”

Nye suggests balancing between the two different kinds of national power by using what he calls “smart power”: a combined use of hard power and soft power that reinforce each other as effectively as possible. Thus, for example, in a discussion of American policy after the 9/11 attack, Nye proposed, on the one hand, using military power and economic sanctions to strike at terror and destroy its foundations, and on the other, using public diplomacy and highlighting positive American values among moderate Muslim communities.

In Nye’s view, smart power is effective when it comes to mobilizing the private sector and nongovernmental organizations and including them in policy implementation alongside the governmental entities. This is a basic and important difference between the two kinds of power: Whereas hard power is primarily exercised by official actors, soft power is also exercised by private civilian actors with the methods that they use. As Nachman Shai noted, “One of the key advantages of soft power is that nonstate entities can employ it.” Nonstate entities indeed have begun to gain international power based mainly on soft power and have become significant actors in the international diplomatic arena and in interstate relations. Public diplomacy, then, is an important tool for enhancing the soft power of the state, diminishing the power of hostile entities, and mobilizing parts of civil society to promote those goals.

Public diplomacy, which is derived from the field of diplomacy, can be distinguished from other terms that are sometimes associated with this field. The differences between public diplomacy and public relations activity, for example, are sometimes misunderstood. The two endeavors are similar in their purpose: to affect people’s perceptions about a policy pursued by an organization or state. Nevertheless, these are two different endeavors. Eytan Gilboa explains that the goal of public relations is to improve the image of organizations, whether governmental or nongovernmental, and that mainly business firms engage in public relations activity. In contrast, public diplomacy mainly involves advancing governmental objectives. While those who engage in public diplomacy can make use of tools and capabilities from the realm of public relations, the framework of activity belongs to the diplomatic domain. Israel, for example, uses tools taken
from public relations to improve its image among different target groups around the world; however, Israel does so as part of a diplomatic campaign aimed at affecting the government policy of the targeted countries in order to promote its interests.

In other words, even though the techniques of public relations are always similar, there is a great difference between the aims of a business firm and of a state when engaging in public relations. This difference can be illustrated “branding,” a major term from the realm of public relations and publicity. As Gilboa observes, branding involves imparting an emotional content to products and services so that people can identify with them.31

A business firm strives to become a brand in order to gain the loyalty of its customers; states use branding techniques in order to connect with different target groups and particularly to gain their support. Thus, for example, Israel seeks to become a brand in the technological field (“startup nation”) with the aim of recruiting support and promoting its economy. However, while successful branding can elevate a business firm to new heights, it cannot be a substitute for public diplomacy but rather only an aspect of it. Thus, branding can increase support for Israel but alone cannot “sell” its foreign policy.

Public Diplomacy in Practice
Public diplomacy is a tool for enhancing the soft power of the state by bolstering its support among the population in the target state. Public diplomacy seeks to strengthen the connection between the state and the civil society of the target state, to increase its influence on the target state’s public and—through it—on the government, and to expand the basis for cooperation in the international arena. Understanding how the idea is translated into policy requires analyzing the various objectives that public diplomacy can achieve as well as the tools and strategies that it can employ.

Public diplomacy strives for achievements in the short, medium, and long term. In the short term, it seeks to immediately affect the behavior of other actors in a time of crisis: to quickly gain the support of other states, create a positive image, and damage the adversary’s image.32 During a military clash in Gaza, for example, Israel’s public diplomacy strives to damage Hamas’ image and its basis of international support and to prevent it from generating support within international public opinion that could
lead to international pressure on Israel and efforts to restrict Israel’s ability to wage its military campaign.

Whereas the goals for the short term are always limited to a specific, narrow context, public diplomacy aims to improve the state’s status on key issues in the medium term; these issues have larger scope and require a far-reaching, organized campaign to change attitudes among the populations of the target states. An example is Israel’s campaign to reduce the international support for pro-BDS activity and organizations.

In the long term, the state uses public diplomacy to augment the affinity of groups in the target states vis-à-vis the state and to reduce their opposition to its policy (or to increase support for the state and decrease support for its adversaries). An example is Israel’s ongoing effort to denigrate Iran—especially in the West—so as to isolate it and lessen the strategic danger it poses as it works to develop nuclear weapons, entrench itself in Syria, and turn Syria into another base—along with Lebanon—from which to threaten Israel.
The Public Diplomacy Toolbox

The Five Tools of Public Diplomacy

According to Nicholas Cull, public diplomacy can take one or more of these tools: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international news broadcasting.33

**Listening** is a tool with which the state or its representatives can gather data and learn about the target groups in other states. The gathering, analysis, and translation of the data into trends is critical for determining which are the most relevant target groups and for maximizing the effectiveness of the communication channels between them and the state. Thus, for instance, one can learn what are the most effective means of communication with the different groups, their ideological foundations, the worldviews to which they are exposed, the moral principles they espouse, the topics that most interest them, and their overall position on the state and its policy on different issues. For example, in the visit of US president Donald Trump to Israel in May 2017, he took pains to convey the message that he understood Israel’s apprehensions about terror and the Iranian threat and that during his presidency the United States would act to eradicate both those threats.34 Like previous American presidents, he thereby showed an understanding of the prevailing mood in Israel, as a result of, among other things, a listening process in the US administration.

**Advocacy** is a proactive effort by the state and its representatives to affect the agenda of other states by promoting a certain idea or policy in the international arena. One can thereby influence the discourse in other states as well as its citizens’ perceptions of what is important, urgent, moral, and requires action. For example, the anti-Israeli boycott movement strives to promote its policy among different groups throughout the world. It seeks to
place Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians on the public agenda, portray Israel in a negative light, and convince people that it is an urgent problem that requires strong countermeasures. The aim of this campaign is to get citizens to pressure their country’s political leadership to support a boycott of Israel and thus force Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians without the Palestinians having to make any concessions in return.

**Cultural diplomacy** is an effort to market the state’s culture and thereby appeal to the target groups and enhance their connection to the state. The logic behind this approach is that identification with the state’s culture increases its ability to exert influence. A worldwide network of Goethe Institutes for learning German serve as centers for spreading German culture to foreign states and societies. Cultural diplomacy also bridges cultural gaps between different societies, making it more likely that the target groups will understand the messages of the state, while lessening the risk that representatives of the state will err in their behavior toward the target groups.³⁵ A state can make use of its unofficial representatives, including artists and businesspeople, to strengthen connections with the target group. Thus, for example, cultural performances, such as by the Batsheva Dance Company or Idan Raichel, and business activity, such as by Netafim or Mobileye, can expose target groups to both Israel’s culture and its high-tech industry and thus augment its image as a successful western country.

**Exchange diplomacy** involves exchanges of civilian delegations with the aim of increasing amity in general or promoting specific political objectives. Thus, for example, the Israel Institute supports Israeli researchers and staff members when they travel abroad for study or research. The assumption is that the Israeli presence in foreign universities will expose the target groups in those countries to Israel and strengthen ties with it.

**International news broadcasting** refers to spreading information by radio, television, and the social networks in order to convey to and receive messages from the target groups. This tool is based on the assumption that the news is civil society’s main source of knowledge. Therefore, conveying messages via several such public opinion shapers can influence the perceptions of sizable populations. This is why some companies establish a news company or support an existing one. Qatar’s Al Jazeera network is one of the clearest examples of a news company that has become the voice of a state.
The Three Strategies of Public Diplomacy

The five tools discussed above overlap and complement each other. Those who engage in public diplomacy can use these three methods—monologue, dialogue, and collaboration—to promote their objectives in the short, medium, and long term. These methods do not detract from one another and indeed can complement each other. A successful monologue can encourage the opening of a dialogue, which can eventually develop into fruitful collaboration between the state and the target group. Although collaboration is the most advanced method in the public diplomacy toolbox, it is not necessarily the ideal solution because it requires resource allocation and greater involvement than the other strategies. In cases where the goals can be achieved through monologue or dialogue, the state most likely will prefer those approaches in which it can invest fewer resources than collaboration would entail. The test is the cost-benefit and the aim is to use the public diplomacy method that will achieve the requisite results at the lowest cost.

Monologue is unilateral communication that can be conducted in many ways: speeches, posters, news releases, or cultural works, such as movies, books, and poetry. A monologue can form the basis for dialogue and for later collaboration between states. Monologue is meant to persuade a population to support an idea, a vision, or a certain outlook. It can be used to pressure the senior political echelons of the target state to advance an issue or remove it from the public agenda. Speeches by Israeli leaders to the US Congress are an example of monologues aimed at boosting support for Israel and mobilizing American society to promote a US policy that corresponds with Israel’s interests on major issues. The main challenge in creating a monologue is to devise effective messages and convey them through appropriate representatives who will know how to address different target groups. Thus, for example, there is a debate in Israel on whether to focus the messages primarily on foreign policy and defense issues, which are the most politically fraught and appeal to wide audiences, or instead to promote messages about social and cultural issues, which are less loaded. Because this involves only the crafting of Israeli messages, the debate actually pertains to the Israeli method of monologue. Such monologue is a relatively easy tool to use because it requires only teamwork between actors from the same state. Its main disadvantage is its limited ability to build new relationships between the state and the various target groups and to alter the positions of individuals who do not support the state’s policy. When one side is invited to meetings in which it is requested
only to listen, its involvement is meager. If that side does not support the state’s message in the first place, the chances of getting it to bond with the state or of influencing its positions and perceptions are significantly lower than the chance of success with more collaborative strategies.

**Dialogue** is bilateral communication. Two sides—representatives of the state and of the target group—meet so that they can set forth their positions and their perceptions on certain issues. Martin Buber drew a distinction between “technical dialogue,” in which people exchange ideas and information, and “real dialogue,” in which the participants are prepared to listen to others and are open to changing their views. Although both kinds of dialogue can effectively promote a public policy, only “real dialogues” can build deep relationships. When one side senses that the other respects its opinions and listens to them, that side, too, will be inclined to listen and to develop a personal relationship. When it comes to affecting the positions of the target group and getting it to change its stance or support a new idea, interpersonal connection is much more effective than a persuasive argument. At the same time, dialogue has two notable disadvantages: First, sometimes it remains “only words”; and second, even if through dialogue one succeeds to change opinions, doing so does not always lead to action.

**Collaboration** is needed in certain cases when monologue and dialogue promote understanding and mutual respect between the state and the target group but alone they do not sufficiently translate the support and affinity into pressure on the political leadership of the target state. There are several forms of collaboration, including conflict resolution between two sides, joint problem solving, implementing a common vision, and conducting common projects in specific areas. Thus, for example, in March 2017, Israel signed a memorandum of understanding with China for collaboration on environmental issues. Collaborative projects involve dialogue between participants and stakeholders, the identification of common goals, and the creation of a database on the results of the collaborative activity that can provide a basis for further collaborative endeavors and for long-term strengthening of the relationship. In many cases, collaboration between two sides creates mutual respect and support. During the collaboration, each side is exposed to the various dimensions, which enable the use of cultural diplomacy. The trust that is fostered between the participants usually reinforces the bond between them, and the aspiration is that this will affect the relationship between the state and the target group.
Israel’s Public Diplomacy and the Israeli American Community

As an extension of the theoretical discussion of public diplomacy and its foundations, this chapter focuses on the Israeli public diplomacy apparatus over the past decade and its current trends. It has undergone changes that have expanded its responsibility but weakened its ability to operate. Specifically, a gap has emerged between recognition of the importance of the delegitimization threat to Israel and the ability of the Israeli administration to handle it. Hence, there is a need for activism by nongovernmental organizations that can buttress Israel’s official political efforts. The potential response of the Israeli American community to Israel’s need for grassroots organizations in the United States, Israel’s strategic ally, will be discussed subsequently. This chapter includes a theoretical discussion, which serves as the basis for the empirical research presented in the next chapter.

The Development of Israeli Public Diplomacy over the Past Decade

Israeli public diplomacy—hasbara as it is commonly called—is a special case because it does not have to deal with the typical needs of small countries, neither in the field nor within the population. As the authors of a comprehensive study by the Samuel Neaman Institute published in 2009 noted, “Israel is always singled out; undergoes frequent crises; draws fire; casts a giant shadow far beyond its size; always has to fight for its positions; has many messages and few images, even though it needs different images; is replete with problematic aspects (such as the occupation and human rights); has difficulty presenting attractive traits and needs constant legitimization.”

In the United States, Israel’s image is mainly one of military power or of...
being the cradle of Judeo-Christian civilization for groups with a strong religious orientation. As discussed in the introductory chapter, Israel’s status in the United States is eroding, and this exacerbates the challenges to its public diplomacy. Several factors have contributed to this erosion, including Israel’s growing association with the Republican Party, which has detracted from the bipartisan support it always had enjoyed in the past; its policy toward the Palestinians, which has distanced the liberal public from it; and the widening public rift between the Israeli government and the non-Orthodox Jewish communities in the United States (constituting 80 to 90 percent of American Jewry) over the status of these communities in Israel. In addition to these challenges and constraints, Israeli hasbara has to address organizational defects originating in the first sixty years of its activity. At issue here, of course, is its decentralized structure.

In his book *Milhamedia* (Media War), Nachman Shai provides a historical survey of Israeli public diplomacy. During the first six decades of the state, it was not institutionalized, lacked a strategic vision, and was not attuned to the hasbara challenges that Israel faced. At the same time, even in the absence of guidance from above, processes began that improved Israel’s capability and eventually led to the creation of an established, centralized body to take the reins of Israeli hasbara. Thus, for example, alongside the traditional hasbara organizations, such as the IDF and the Foreign Office, other official organizations were added, such as the General Security Service, the Interior Ministry, the police, and the Mossad. Nonstate organizations also began to take part voluntarily in the diplomatic activity without government coordination. Examples include NGO Monitor, which took upon itself to monitor nongovernmental organizations, or the IsraAid NGO, which amalgamates thirty-five Israeli organizations that work together to extend aid during humanitarian crises all over the world. The IDF’s growing involvement in the sphere of perception and media, the security crises that have generated hasbara challenges and failures, and the need to maintain legitimacy for military activity have impelled the Israeli decision makers to establish a national hasbara apparatus.

The year 2007 marked the turning point in Israel’s hasbara policy. After the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the state comptroller examined the role of hasbara during the war, and his report underlined that it was not in working order and suffered from serious defects of planning and management. The report recommended setting up an overarching entity in the Prime
Minister’s Office to coordinate the *hasbara* activity at the national level, detail the aspects of its activity, and formulate planned and orderly work patterns. In the wake of the report’s publication, the government decided on July 8, 2007, to establish a national *hasbara* apparatus that would be managed by a national headquarters. What actually emerged was a National *Hasbara* Forum with several components: the head of the national *hasbara* headquarters in the Prime Minister’s Office, the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, the police spokesperson, the Foreign Ministry *hasbara* representative, the spokespersons of the Foreign, Defense, and Interior Ministries, the Foreign Ministry departmental spokespersons, the ministries’ media advisors, and representatives of the Government Press Office.

In 2009 Israel had to contend with the report of the Goldstone Commission, which accused it of using excessive force in Operation Cast Lead. This was an investigatory commission of the United Nations, and the UN General Assembly adopted the report. It was a document that illustrated the price to be paid for failed public diplomacy.

In the Marmara incident of May 2010, in which the Israeli navy prevented a convoy of six Turkish ships from breaching what the Palestinians called the “blockade of Gaza,” Israel only partially succeeded in its efforts to persuade the world—especially its allies—that its actions were justified and appropriate. During the raid on the convoy’s flagship, the Mavi Marmara, a violent clash ensued, resulting in the killing of nine passengers and the wounding of about twenty. Although Israel’s investigations revealed that all the fatalities and most of the wounded were terror operatives of a Turkish organization, and that they had engaged in extreme violence toward the IDF soldiers, most of international opinion believed that Israel had violated international law and that it was another example of Israel’s use of excessive force. The Marmara affair was another failure of Israeli diplomacy and additional proof of the need for an effective public diplomacy apparatus.

In 2012, the state comptroller examined the conduct of the *hasbara* forces in the Marmara affair and pointed to many shortcomings that had also been found in earlier assessments. The report’s main finding concerned the gap between the authority of the *hasbara* headquarters and the Foreign Ministry—the main entities responsible for *hasbara* activity—and their ability to fulfill their tasks. The comptroller emphasized the need “to formulate, complete, and implement as soon as possible a comprehensive national emergency plan for the required overhaul and improvement of the
national hasbara directorate.”46 This recommendation still has not been implemented. According to Nachman Shai, the existing hasbara headquarters suffers from two main defects: First, it is not a directorate but an entity with a lower status that is in charge of coordination and cannot supervise the relevant bodies; second, its director is not independent and does not have a suitable professional background, instead serving as a media advisor to the prime minister.47

From the beginning, the establishment of the hasbara headquarters resulted from the need to concentrate Israel’s public diplomacy activity, which traditionally had been divided between two ministries: the Hasbara Ministry, which was responsible for leading the public diplomacy and the Foreign Ministry, which manages the public diplomacy abroad.48 In 2013, the government authorized the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs to supervise the fight against antisemitism abroad in tandem with the Foreign Ministry’s Diaspora and Religious Affairs Division, which deals with the same domain; however, the lack of coordination between the ministries involved in Israel’s public diplomacy only worsened. This problem was exacerbated after the government decided to launch a campaign against the boycott and delegitimization threats that would be led by still another entity, the Ministry of Strategic Affairs.

Along with the upgrade of the hasbara headquarters, an attempt was made to institute a mechanism that would coordinate between the different entities fighting the delegitimization campaign and the boycott movement. In the process, the Foreign Ministry, which carries out the hasbara policy abroad, lost its dominant role to the Ministry of Strategic Affairs. The Hasbara Ministry, then called the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs, was closed in 2013, and was reestablished in 2015 as part of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, and then finally it was determined that it would lead the public diplomacy effort from within Israel. In 2009, with the reestablishment of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, the prime minister said it would play “a central role in coordinating the government efforts to fight the attempt to damage Israel’s legitimacy.”49 At the same time, however, it was decided that the Ministry of Strategic Affairs would not detract from the powers of the other ministries involved in this endeavor, most of all the Foreign Ministry. In 2012, the powers were divided between the Foreign Ministry, which was put in charge of the Israeli government’s activity abroad, and the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, which was entrusted with the activity within
Israel. The 2015 state comptroller’s report, however, asserted that these decisions were not implemented.\textsuperscript{50}

In 2013, the prime minister delegated to the Ministry of Strategic Affairs the overall responsibility for countering the delegitimization efforts.\textsuperscript{51} Although the decision required the Foreign Ministry to coordinate with the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, in practice, the Foreign Ministry was subordinated to it,\textsuperscript{52} further eroding the Foreign Ministry’s status. This situation was reinforced by the political-security cabinet, which determined that the Ministry of Strategic Affairs would be responsible “for guiding, coordinating, and integrating the activity of all the government ministries and civil bodies in Israel and abroad on the issue of fighting the efforts to delegitimize Israel and the boycott movements.”\textsuperscript{53} This decision was made even though the Foreign Ministry remained the main entity engaging in \textit{hasbara} abroad. The state comptroller’s report stressed that the Foreign Ministry still enjoyed clear operative advantages that could facilitate government activity in this field, including an infrastructure of 106 representative offices around the world and a deep, long-standing social and cultural familiarity with the mindsets of the residents of each country. Such familiarity is essential to conducting an effective anti-BDS campaign. The Foreign Ministry also had an additional advantage in that its emissaries had unmediated access to, among others, people in sympathetic organizations and their counterparts.\textsuperscript{54}

The diplomatic apparatus abroad and the public diplomacy in Israel, both affiliated with the Foreign Ministry, have faltered in their tasks, and their level of coordination with the Ministry of Strategic Affairs is not high even though the latter ministry leads the struggle against delegitimization. This lack of coordination is unfortunate; these arms of the Foreign Ministry were built gradually over time, which makes them especially well-suited to function in today’s international community.

\textbf{“Hasbara 2.0”}

The establishment of the national \textit{hasbara} apparatus reflected the realization that international public opinion had become another sharply conflictual arena in which Israel’s opponents sought to exploit criticism of its policies in order to establish a negative image of Israel and undermine its right to exist in its current configuration. Since 2005, the delegitimization efforts have gained the support of the BDS movement, whose goal is to ostracize Israel (boycott), penalize it (sanctions), and economically stifle it (divestment).
BDS works for a boycott of not only Israel’s state institutions but also its cultural and scientific entities and even private businesses. Given the severity of the threat, the Foreign Ministry decided to tailor the *hasbara* activity to the threat of BDS and to the new conditions of the struggle over international public opinion. In this context, three major reforms were implemented.

Firstly, the Israeli *hasbara* agencies began to use online *hasbara* and disseminate messages on social media networks, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter—and in various languages according to the target audience. The messages explain Israel’s policy, expose manipulations and lies that are propagated as part of the anti-Israeli activity, and present other, noncontroversial aspects of Israeli society. For the *hasbara* activity in the social media, the Foreign Ministry established the Division of Digital Diplomacy, which develops new media tools to disseminate the Israeli narrative in dozens of languages. The ministry also founded the Spokesperson’s Division for Arabic.

Secondly, in addition to the government activity, the *hasbara* apparatus began to include organizations and people from outside the establishment, in order to boost the credibility of the messages. In 2009 the Foreign Ministry began to consider adding Israeli citizens and diaspora Jews to its diplomatic arm so that they could help spread Israel’s messages. This initiative was meant to increase the credibility of the messages and make it possible to reach new audiences who are not always receptive to the messages of official actors. In this context, two projects were promoted.

The first project was called “Presenting Israel” and envisioned about three million Israelis flying abroad each year to represent Israel along with partners who would be recruited from the diaspora. The aim was to build a network of private representatives who would be coordinated and managed by the Foreign Ministry via a website that would feed the activists information in various languages. In addition, groups were chosen and given professional guidance and training for their work. According to Shay Attias, former director of the *Hasbara* department of the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, the project succeeded beyond expectations. Thus, for example, more than three million people visited the project’s website from February 2010 to July 2012, and more than 100,000 instruction pamphlets were distributed to Israelis at Ben-Gurion Airport. Although Attias indeed provides impressive data on the project’s activity, he does not describe the impact of this activity, and it is hard to assess whether the success in recruiting citizens to the Israeli
diplomatic arm helped to improve its international status; nevertheless, the importance of this project lies in its successful recruitment.

The success of the Presenting Israel project encouraged the launching of another civilian project that was dubbed “Faces of Israel.” It involved sending delegations of Israelis to selected North American campuses. These delegations were representative of Israeli society as a whole, including the LGBT community, as well as Israel’s Arab and Ethiopian Jewish communities. The delegations underwent special training on how to show Israel’s “real” and diverse face. According to Attias, the program exposed the delegations to more than 2,000 students from different sectors in the United States and Canada and created a basis for future cooperation at the campuses.55

The successes of these two projects encouraged further investment in initiatives to incorporate citizens in Israel’s arm of public diplomacy, such as Taglit and Masa, in which young American students are flown to Israel, and Eye2Israel, a collaborative effort with the Ort educational network that encourages Israeli high school students to make themselves heard in the social networks on issues that concern them. Other examples include collaboration with the El Al company, which sends its crew members—when between flights in foreign countries—to tell their personal stories to local groups, and the Situation Room, which was established at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya during the Gaza wars of 2012 and 2014 and disseminated pro-Israeli materials on the social networks. The project became a permanent part of the Act.IL program, and in 2017 it began to operate its first media rooms outside of Israel, in Boston and New Jersey.56

Thirdly, while attuning the media strategy to the target audiences, Israel began to alter its messages to make them more effective among liberal groups. Thus, for example, a directive was given to allow a limited amount of criticism of Israel’s policy after it was agreed that Israel had the right to exist. This approach replaced the classical tactic of the Israeli hasbara apparatus, which posed a dichotomous choice: either for or against Israel. This new approach seeks to tailor the messages to the Democratic Party supporters who believe in pluralism and criticism. A further example is the use of pro-Israeli quotations from liberal leaders and thinkers, such as Martin Luther King, to enhance ties with the liberal public. In parallel, the “Brand Israel” project was launched; its aim is to present positive aspects of Israel that are unrelated to foreign and defense issues. Generally these aspects are less familiar to people in western countries and provide a more
congenial basis for identification than the Palestinian issue, which dominates the international coverage of Israel. Thus, for example, the projects shines a spotlight on Israel’s success in the high-tech field, the humanitarian aid it provides to disaster areas, its contributions to science and the humanities, the pluralism that prevails in Israel, and so on.  

An analysis of the changes in Israel’s public diplomacy apparatus reveals the need to make use of “field” organizations in a way that will continue to enhance the reforms that have been carried out so far. This is a process that dovetails with the changes in the international arena, the new challenges that it poses, the opportunities that it creates, as well as the current trend in Israel’s _hasbara_ apparatus. The need to use field organizations is made all the greater by the decentralization and absence of organizational coordination between the ministries in charge of different aspects of the Israeli diplomatic activity. The weakening of the Foreign Ministry and the limited role abroad of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs increase the need to better incorporate civil organizations at large. This is the broad organizational context in which the debate on involving the Israeli American community in the diplomatic activity should be held.

**The Israeli American Community in the Service of Israel’s Public Diplomacy**

Three trends are now apparent in Israel’s public diplomacy activity: the Israeli decision makers’ growing understanding of the seriousness of the delegitimization threat; the weakened ability of official institutions to operate among foreign audiences; and the increasing demand for collaboration with nonofficial actors as part of the diplomatic efforts. Together these three trends point to the potential contribution of local organizations acting in coordination with the Israeli public diplomacy apparatus. The opportunity to mobilize the Israeli community that lives in the United States is especially important.

Generally, the involvement of the Israeli American community belongs to the domain of the new public diplomacy and specifically, citizen diplomacy. This kind of diplomacy has two main definitions. In its broad form, citizen diplomacy encompasses all the citizens involved in the relations between societies and states. This entails a subjective definition of the concept: A citizen is considered a diplomat if he sees himself as a representative of the country and believes his activities contribute to the public diplomacy effort. According to a narrower definition, public diplomacy includes only those
whom the state has formally recruited to it. In other words, a citizen will be considered a diplomat only if the state sees him as one. For those who have adopted the narrow definition, voluntary activity by citizens that is not coordinated with the state constitutes cultural diplomacy or an attempt to promote cultural cooperation. This includes endeavors such as student exchanges, joint scientific studies, and international conferences.

A well known example of the recruitment of citizens for diplomatic activity by the state was President Eisenhower’s decision to invite American and Soviet citizens to discuss the relations between the two countries at the Dartmouth Conference in 1959. These citizen encounters continued, and in the 1980s they became regular, official meetings between the countries via citizen representatives who discussed issues directly related to the policies of the two countries and conveyed messages from officials. Conley and Beyerinck maintain that the United States conducts citizen diplomacy especially toward states with which it does not have strong official relations, such as North Korea at present and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Israel’s case is different. In recent years its official policy has been to invite Israeli citizens to take part in the diplomatic effort and serve as “ambassadors” firstly to the civil societies in the West, which are exposed to media portrayals of Israel as violating liberal and democratic values in its control of the Palestinians. Israeli citizens can participate in public diplomacy in five ways: as emissaries who coordinate with different officials abroad; as representatives of a local or regional economic interest; as lobbyists; as activists working subversively against the government or one of its policies; or as independent agents. The use of Israeli citizens as “ambassadors” belongs to the last kind of activity. In this case, the state totally gives up control of its “ambassadors,” incurring a risk when it cannot supervise the “ambassador’s” activity, as the latter can deviate from its messages or undertake initiatives that contravene the state’s interests. For that reason, Ilan Manor warns against the trend of increased citizen involvement in Israel’s public diplomacy apparatus and claims that numerous communication channels with the target groups and an incoherent set of messages will harm its effectiveness. This challenge grows when a large number of citizens are recruited. The training programs that the Foreign Ministry has offered to only small groups of “ambassadors” are irrelevant when it comes to a large number, as in the case of the Israeli American community. The conclusion that emerges is that a program to recruit the Israeli American community to
Israel’s public diplomacy efforts will have to confront a challenge that is not simple: how to maintain a high level of effectiveness and professionalism without being able to train large numbers of activists and supervise in a centralized manner all their activities.

At the same time, Manor recognizes the fact that recruiting citizens makes it possible to reach new audiences, which are receptive to messages that are seen as authentic but are not responsive to messages associated with official actors. By increasing the autonomy of the citizen, Israel enhances its authenticity and ability to find a sympathetic ear in the target group. Hence, when it comes to recruiting citizens to public diplomacy, Israel faces a dilemma between controlling the citizens’ activity so as to prevent damaging messages on the one hand and not detracting from the citizens’ authenticity on the other by turning them into mere propagandists in the eyes of the target audience.

Another advantage of involving citizens is that their personal relations can serve as a platform for conveying messages. Whereas the state must create channels of communication with the target audience, the citizens already have existing social circles that facilitate the communication of messages without having to invest resources in new channels. These communication channels are usually more effective because people are more receptive to ideas when friends, rather than strangers, express them. Finally, citizens often have significant knowledge that can help the state in its efforts. Thus, for example, religious leaders have the right jargon and skills to address a religious population. Likewise, businesspeople can help improve the diplomatic activity directed at the private sector. One of the most organized forms of this kind of diplomacy involves unofficial delegations of professionals, or delegations that represent a common interest and discuss it in track two meetings.

From Israel’s standpoint, recruiting Israeli citizens who live in the United States to the Israeli public diplomacy apparatus in a centralized, orderly fashion has several advantages. These advantages exist at all three levels of public diplomacy activity: monologue, dialogue, and collaboration. First, the Israeli community can convey and present the Israeli positions and perspectives to American society. From the quantitative standpoint, the number of Israelis living in the United States is much greater than the number of official Israeli representatives there, and these Israeli residents presumably interact with larger segments of American society. The interactions of the
Israeli community with other communities in the United States have yet to be researched and are worthy of investigation. At any rate, the prevailing view is that it is a very active community in the context of the Jewish community in the United States, and it can be assumed that its members regularly interact with numerous and varied groups. Thus, for example, a survey in 2015 found that Israeli Americans were most dominant in the activities of the Jewish community in the Boston area.63

Israelis who live in the United States are involved in American society and quite knowledgeable about the cultural codes of its different groups. Hence they are able to craft the Israeli messages in a way that dovetails with the values of the different American groups and to transmit them in a manner that encourages openness and identification among the target audience. Israelis living in the United States are in constant interaction with large parts of American society and can take advantage of this connection to tell “the Israeli story.” Indeed, the Israelis in the United States can also engage in “cultural diplomacy” on Israel’s behalf and act as a cultural bridge to the American target audiences.

The Israeli community is not the only one that can forge links between Israel and American society. Jewish organizations and pro-Israeli Christian organizations do so as well, and they are, of course, as closely involved with American society as the Israeli Americans. However, the Israeli community has an advantage over the American organizations because of its intimate familiarity with Israeli culture; Israeli Americans can more effectively bring the Israeli perspective to the American public.64 The conclusion from this analysis, then, is that the Israeli American community can be a unique asset both in terms of crafting the messages and transmitting them.

The Israeli American community’s contribution is not limited to monologue. Indeed its greatest advantage is that it engages in an ongoing dialogue with American society. This dialogue is made possible by the fact that Israeli Americans are present, on the ground, in the United States. As discussed in the first chapter, dialogue is critical if one wants to improve the communication of messages because it gives the target group the feeling that they are being listened to, which causes them, in turn, to be more receptive to new messages. Conducting a dialogue also enables the diplomatic apparatus to understand how its messages are understood and to assess their effectiveness vis-à-vis the different target audiences.
And there is another reason that dialogue is critical: it encourages the target groups to prefer Israeli information sources to alternative ones. Thus, for example, in the case of a military conflict between Israel and Hamas, the chances increase that the target group will turn to sources on the Israeli side—with which it has a dialogue—to understand what is happening instead of looking to other information sources that do not offer the Israeli perspective and most likely will present an anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian stance.

Still another contribution of dialogue is that it enables social trends within different American sectors to be identified before they fully emerge. When such trends are identified in time, the Israeli diplomatic apparatus can prepare in advance and devise an appropriate response. Creating dialogue is also an effective way to forge channels of communication with new sectors that are not yet exposed or receptive to Israeli messages. Thus, for example, one can seek dialogue with groups from the African American community or groups belonging to different churches.

The Israeli community in the United States can also contribute to the third method of public diplomacy, namely, collaboration. The Israelis living in the United States share a common basis with other groups in the country. This basis can be, for example, geographic, communal (particularly with regard to the Jewish community), or professional. A common basis can serve as a lever to promote joint initiatives with non-Israeli groups. Such initiatives can be directly related to Israel’s interests, such as supporting legislation against the boycott movement, or supporting a declaration against religious discrimination or against antisemitism. Possible joint initiatives can also, however, address “softer” concerns such as educational, scientific, or cultural collaboration. The initiatives directly related to Israeli interests are of supreme importance because they translate the worldviews of non-Israeli groups into pro-Israeli activity. But “soft” initiatives, too, are of great importance because they create an established, effective channel of communication and can thereby serve many vital objectives: overcoming prejudices, forging personal ties between Israelis and non-Israelis, strengthening the sense of identification between the various American communities and the Israeli population, and so on.

Other ways in which the Israeli community in the United States can contribute to Israel’s public diplomacy in general and to the fight against the delegitimization campaign in particular include:
Digital diplomacy involves using the internet and the social networks to disseminate the messages of the Israeli diplomatic apparatus. This new medium changes diplomacy from a vertical activity practiced by the state to a horizontal activity, networked and decentralized, in which the state plays a secondary role. Eytan Gilboa and colleagues explain that the digital apparatus traditionally has three target audiences: the organizations involved in digital activity, the local audience, and the foreign target audience. In the case of the Israeli American community, digital public diplomacy connects it with the pro-Israeli organizations that operate in the United States; it also makes it possible to disseminate the messages to the members of the community and from them to target audiences in American society. Nowadays the digital diplomacy apparatus is a basic and required tool for any group that engages in diplomacy in general and public diplomacy in particular. Its special contribution is its speed: It can give rapid responses to a wide audience. Hence, it is of critical importance—first and foremost—when it comes to managing crises and quickly conveying messages in response to new events.

Peer-to-peer diplomacy is based on end users who conduct the diplomatic activity (spreading messages, engaging in dialogue, or initiating collaborations) toward other people. The state can train the citizens who perform the activity to some extent, provide them with an infrastructure and resources, and even feed them the messages, but the interface with the target audience is carried out solely on the interpersonal level by the end users. There is a clear link between this channel and the digital activity as the state’s messages can be disseminated on the social networks by private individuals. However, unlike digital activity, which aims to generate exposure in the short term, interpersonal diplomacy forges and strengthens communication channels that are effective for the long term. Hence this kind of diplomacy—especially when it comes to the American arena—contributes primarily to the strategic communication array that Israel wants to construct vis-à-vis the target audiences in the United States.

Diaspora diplomacy, the third aspect of the Israeli American community’s diplomatic activity, is not completely volitional. Many Americans see the Israelis who live in the United States as representatives of Israel, and they form an opinion about Israel, Israeli society, and Israelis according to their impression of these representatives. In other words, the Israelis living in the United States become representatives of Israel even if they do not want to. Such representation can, of course, be more effective if discussions take place
in which the Israeli expresses his view, particularly on issues concerning Israel and its policy. However, even if the “Israeli representative” does not take part in such discussions, his daily behavior is a kind of test, and Americans are likely to draw a conclusion from it regarding Israeli society as a whole.

This type of representation is characteristic not only of Israelis who live in the United States. Mark Leonard, who studied the Indian immigrant community in the United States and Britain, reached the conclusion that the local community’s image of the immigrants substantially influences this community’s image of the country of origin. Thus, it is not unwarranted to conclude that the image of Israel in the eyes of Americans is shaped by the image of the Israeli community in the United States, whether or not the community’s members are actively involved in public diplomacy. This involuntary connection between the Israeli diaspora and the state of Israel makes it a potentially important intellectual tool. In Gilboa’s view, this tool’s special potential contribution should be exploited to craft a proactive communication strategy toward the target audiences. This entails disseminating the “Israeli story” and making it accessible to the American public. It does not necessarily entail creating personal ties but rather making use of the existing interaction with the community to affect how Israel’s image is formed. This is not a rapid process like that of digital diplomacy nor is it suited to crisis management; rather it is more focused and organized than interpersonal diplomacy and this process makes it possible to score achievements in the medium term.

In sum, this chapter indicates that the Israeli American community can contribute much to improving Israel’s image and to the struggle against the delegitimization campaign. This community has a unique advantage in its ability to bridge between Israeli and American societies, help attune the Israeli messages to different American audiences, improve the transmission of the messages, and translate this improvement into joint activity with American groups that are not Israel supporters. The community thus is an asset to all the methods in the public diplomacy domain: monologue, dialogue, and collaboration. These can be used to increase pro-Israeli activity and reduce the danger that the anti-Israeli organizations will expand. Furthermore, dramatically changing Israel’s image among various American groups can reinforce the ideological basis of the Israeli-US alliance.
Test Case:  
The Israeli Community in Boston

The trend of incorporating private actors into Israel’s diplomatic apparatus and the growth of the organizational power of the Israeli American community suggest the need to consider this community’s potential contribution to the diplomatic efforts directed at American society, which is one of the main targets of Israel’s diplomatic apparatus. That entails pondering the unique contribution that this community can make and ensuring that such a vital resource does not go to waste. Furthermore, because the community is a civil entity, it should be understood how civil involvement can be encouraged and maximized to fulfill a clearly defined purpose that will dovetail with the other efforts of pro-Israel diplomacy.

In developing the discussion of these questions, a study conducted among the Israeli community in Boston in the summer of 2016 is presented here. Those who carried out this study adopted the definition of Israeli Americans used by researchers at Brandeis University: those who were born and grew up in Israel, hold Israeli citizenship, and view themselves as Israelis for whatever reason. This is the first study of its kind to deal with the Israeli American community, and despite the study’s geographical and social limitations, its findings provide a foundation for devising a policy to recruit and manage the Israeli community as a whole for diplomatic activity vis-à-vis American society. This is made possible by the fact that the various Israeli communities in the United States have a common denominator. At the same time, other Israeli communities, different in nature from the one in Boston, need to be researched in order to test this chapter’s conclusions.
The Research Process

The research was conducted from June to August 2016, and its aim was to understand the inner sentiments of the Israeli community in Boston. There were several reasons for the choice of this city. First, Boston (or, more precisely, Greater Boston) is home to one of the larger Israeli communities in the United States, numbering—according to a survey conducted in 2015—about 24,000 Israelis. Second, the Boston area is a teeming academic hub with more than sixty universities, including the elite universities Harvard and MIT. The general population’s proximity to the academic institutions means the Israeli community is relatively highly exposed to anti-Israeli notions that are very prominent in the academic sector and nourished by academic liberal thought. Finally, community activity in the public diplomacy field has been launched in Boston, led by the local branch of the Israeli American Council. This activity includes frequent meetings of researchers and faculty members from universities in the area, volunteer-led workshops for improving skills in communicating messages, and collaborations with the Jewish community, other pro-Israeli organizations on the campuses, and local government officials. The community activity, which is led almost solely by volunteers from the Israeli community, provides an opportunity to assess what is effective in practice and what is needed to further enhance the effectiveness of this activity.

At the same time, it is difficult to extrapolate conclusions from the Israeli community in Boston to other Israeli communities in the United States; each community is unique in its attributes and its ways of interacting with its surroundings. Clearly, then, the analysis of the Israeli community in Boston can at best yield a partial picture of the Israeli American community as a whole. For example, the community in Boston is young compared to the other Israeli communities (which sometimes already include a third generation of families who define themselves as Israeli). Another unique characteristic of the Boston community is that many of the Israeli families include at least one person who works either in the academic institutions or the local high-tech industry. In addition, the prevailing assessment is that—like the American population that lives in the vicinity—the Israeli population has a pronounced liberal character compared to most of the other Israeli communities in the United States.

Given the uniqueness of the Israeli community in Boston and the variance of the other Israeli communities, the main contribution of this analysis is to
offer a basis for discussion and comparison between the different communities in terms of pro-Israeli activity. The principal objective is to provide insights and findings that future studies can use to deepen the exploration of specific Israeli communities. Another goal is for the work on the Boston community to contribute to finding a common denominator for the entire Israeli American community, assuming that such a common denominator exists.

The research began in the context of the community meetings, which discussed, among other things, the community’s unique potential contribution to the struggle against anti-Israeli activity given its members’ motivation to become involved in the endeavor. Various groups took part in the meetings: young students alongside veteran workers, single people and people with families, men and women, religious and secular, sabras and Israelis who were born in the United States, emigrated to Israel, and after some time returned to the United States. The aim was to create a foundation of knowledge about the community that would make it possible to formulate basic assumptions, which could then be translated into a survey that would be distributed to the whole community and serve as an empirical basis for research.

The survey was posted on the internet for three weeks starting on July 3, 2016 in two different channels. The main channel was the distribution list of the IAC branch in Boston, as it was assumed that most members of the Israeli community were registered in this branch, which includes about 15,000 people; the questionnaire was distributed once a week to the members of this list. In addition, the survey was disseminated to the leaders of the Israeli community’s activity, who were requested to respond to it and to distribute it further. The aim was to reach individuals who may not have been included in the large distribution list, using a personal appeal to increase the community members’ response rate. Because this distribution method almost precludes control of the survey’s distribution, it was printed in Hebrew to lower the risk that people who were not members of the community would respond to it. In addition, the questionnaire asked about the respondent’s place of residence so the Israelis who responded but did not live in the Boston area could be identified. After about three weeks the sampling included 177 respondents, or about 1.3 percent of the adult Israeli population of Boston. This is an extensive response both in absolute and relative terms and improves the ability to extrapolate from the sample results to the entire Israeli population in Boston.
However, this is not a random or representative sampling of the Israeli community in Boston. Because much data about the community’s characteristics is lacking, it is difficult, if not impossible, to produce a research population and to randomly sample or produce from it a sampling that includes a representation of subgroups in the community. The number of those surveyed in the present research allows one to assume an almost normal segmentation and to identify the main biases in the research that could distort its results. Thus, for example, among those who responded that they were involved in pro-Israeli activity (40 percent), about 16 percent said they were involved in an organized framework and 11 percent in sporadic activity. Eight percent said they were active on the social networks, and 5 percent were active in other frameworks. There is a basis for the claim that the size of the group involved in organized activity stems from both the sampling method of contacting people who were more involved in the community in the first place and the method of voluntarily filling out the questionnaire, which encourages responses, particularly among those for whom this issue is important. Thus, it is highly likely that the sample included a disproportionate representation of those engaged in pro-Israeli activity in organized frameworks.

Two observations can be made in this context. First, the size of the group that is involved (40 percent) indicates that even if there is a bias in the research, it is not dramatic. For comparison’s sake, a Brandeis University study in 2015 that surveyed the Jewish community of Boston found that 27 percent of the members of the Israeli community had been involved in Israeli hasbara activity during the year before the study. Organized community activity developed extensively among the Israelis there in 2015 and 2016, and the number of activists presumably grew substantially. Hence, even if the rate of activists in Boston in the survey (40 percent) is higher than the actual rate, it does not distort the reality in a way that detracts from the study’s conclusions. Even though the data presented here do not precisely reflect the Israeli community in Boston, and even though the size of the statistical deviation cannot be estimated, the data should be considered a good basis for discussion.

Furthermore, this study is not intended to mirror the reality of the Israeli community’s involvement in pro-Israeli activity but to determine how the Israeli community views its ability to contribute to the fight against the delegitimization of Israel as well as the willingness of its members to become
involved. Thus the representation of the two groups—those who are involved in the activity and those who are not—gives both an important voice in the conversation and does not compromise the objective of the research. A distortion in the size of the group—if indeed there is such a distortion—can, in fact, add to the discussion of the community’s contribution, because this group includes members who have some experience with activism and have learned lessons in the field. In light of all this, despite a certain bias resulting from the research method, the survey’s findings can be regarded as highly reliable.

The Results
The questionnaire’s two foci of interest—the community’s potential contribution to Israel’s diplomatic apparatus and the community members’ motivation—were explored with three questions. The second question was adapted in response to the first one, concerning the person’s involvement in pro-Israeli activity. For those who answered that they were involved, they were then asked an open question about their central motive. Those who answered that they were not involved were then given six possible reasons for not engaging in pro-Israeli activity. The six reasons emerged from an analysis of the meetings with the community members that had preceded drafting the questionnaire. Respondents were also free to add an additional reason.

Figure 2 below presents the three cardinal answers that were given to the open question on the main motive for pro-Israeli activity. The dominant motive, chosen by 64 percent of the activists, is Zionism and love of Israel. The sentiment that emerges from analyzing the content of the answers is that through pro-Israeli activity, they want to participate in the effort to defend Israel against those who seek to harm it. This theme of defense is also part of the second most important motive that the activists chose: activity on behalf of the next generation. The survey reveals that 11 percent of the activists feel that the anti-Israeli activity endangers their children and their children’s future attachment to Israel. In this case it is the family (personal motive) that is defended, not the country (national motive).

Another set of motives derives from a sphere of attachment to the Israeli American community. For 22 percent of the activists, the main motives are a desire to contribute to the community and a sense of comradeship with other Israelis. The emergence of an Israeli communal identity and its
contribution to bolstering Israelis’ civil involvement in pro-Israeli activity are interesting phenomena that reinforce the link between the formation of an Israeli community in the United States and its ability to activate its members to pursue a pro-Israeli agenda. This connection between the community and the desire to contribute also emerges from other findings of this study that are presented later.

The purpose of the question that was presented to the nonactivist group was to discern the main obstacles to involvement among community members. The suggested answers offered to the respondents were based on a previous study, which enumerated five main obstacles to community members’ involvement in pro-Israeli activity:

1. *The absence of an umbrella organization*. The wide dispersion of the community members, along with the varying nature of Israeli emigration (for example, many Israelis come to the United States for a short period and intend to return to Israel when it is over), has made it difficult to create an umbrella organization for the community. This situation detracts from the Israeli community’s ability to formulate an effective and comprehensive response to its specific needs, including the delegitimization threat to Israel. The experiences of the second generation of Israeli immigrants—including the encounters with anti-Israeli activities—have increased the awareness among their parents’ generation of the need for an umbrella organization, impelling them to take action. The establishment of the Israeli American Council is intended to fill the vacuum.
2. **The deficiency of hasbara tools.** Israelis feel that they do not have enough tools to contend with the anti-Israeli notions and arguments or with the difficult questions about Israeli policy (which some of them do not agree with at all). They complain about not having adequate and varied tools, such as access to data and facts that can refute or undermine the anti-Israeli claims; communication skills, especially the skill to hold sensitive conversations in accordance with the social code of the American community with which they interact. Thus, for example, many Israelis have difficulty contending with extreme claims that Israel is committing genocide against the Palestinian people and maintaining an apartheid regime. Others claim that they fail to convey their message to their American interlocutors, and that the debates descend into rancor and disputes. The lack of confidence in their ability to change the interlocutor’s view and the fear of ending up in a personal dispute and harming interpersonal relations deter many Israelis from challenging the anti-Israeli activity in the area where they live.

3. **The question of responsibility.** Many Israelis who live in the United States feel incapable of contending with the delegitimization threat due to its magnitude and because they see it as a problem that should be addressed by the Israeli government. One commonly heard claim is that the Israeli Foreign Ministry should grapple with this threat, since it is the official Israeli body that is most active in the United States and the one entrusted with the hasbara policy. This attitude apparently is due to the lack of community leadership as well as from cultural attitudes originating in Israeli society, that the government is responsible for a wide variety of matters, especially a threat of a political-security nature.

4. **Legal status.** Many Israelis are in the United States temporarily as students or researchers or have applied for permanent residency or citizenship. In other words, many are in a sensitive and unstable situation. For a student or researcher, remaining in the United States depends upon the approval of the department or the university. For those who are seeking to remain as immigrants, behavior in a controversial context can harm their chances of gaining permanent residency or citizenship. This fragile status deters them from taking part in public activity of a political nature. This factor is especially critical for Israelis in academia—as faculty members, researchers, or students—in an arena that poses a particular challenge to Israeli hasbara.
5. *The professional and personal price.* Another factor that deters Israelis from joining the struggle against anti-Israeli activity is the personal price they may have to pay. Israelis who publicly identify with Israel and engage in political arguments could encounter a frosty attitude from their superiors and colleagues, and this could harm their professional status at the workplace. Siding with Israel and actively participating in the fight against anti-Israeli activity can also identify people and their family members as Israelis and result in social ostracism by neighbors, non-Israeli members of the community, and friends at the children’s school or other activities. Israelis have even attested to hostility that has affected their family members’ sense of personal security. Although these are extreme cases and their frequency is not clear, many Israelis—not having the ability to defend against such threats—prefer to avoid political conversations, even when exposed to anti-Israeli messages.

These five obstacles can be divided into two groups: those related to community members’ ability to engage in pro-Israeli activity and those related to their motivation to do so. The first two obstacles—the lack of an umbrella organization and of knowledge and communication skills—mainly affect the ability of the Israeli community members (or more precisely, their confidence in their ability) to carry out effective pro-Israeli activity.

![Figure 3: Obstacles to pro-Israeli activity](image)
The other three obstacles—which concern the question of responsibility and the personal and professional price to be paid for taking part in such activity—mainly affect the community members’ motivation to become part of the pro-Israeli activity.

Among the respondents’ answers, two main factors stand out that prevent pro-Israeli activity in the community. First, 40 percent of the respondents to this question said their noninvolvement stemmed from a lack of knowledge and communication skills, which made it difficult for them to counter anti-Israeli claims. This finding is interesting given that in conversations, non-Israeli Americans from the pro-Israeli camp emphasize the advantage of the Israeli community in terms of knowing and understanding the Israeli reality compared to other pro-Israeli activists. The study conducted at Brandeis University also stresses this advantage. Especially evident in the survey is the sense of insecurity among inactive Israelis. This is not, therefore, a problem of motivation. When encouraging these people to act, there is no reason to try to improve their motivation; what should be enhanced is a sense of security that will enable them to put their motivation into practice.

The survey also reveals another obstacle to pro-Israeli activity among those Israelis who are inactive. Twenty-three percent claimed that the dearth of activity in their area prevented them from becoming involved, a finding that points to an organizational problem. Similar to the previous finding, it appears that the inactive group does not need motivation but rather a way of translating their willingness into activity. This finding, too, is supported by other findings to be presented later.

The overall significance given to the reasons for inactivity as related to issues of motivation (personal or professional price, shortage of time, political stance, and so forth) is relatively low. Only about 11 to 14 percent of the respondents explained their nonparticipation in pro-Israeli activity due to not having enough motivation. However, because the respondents did not have to choose a single answer to this question, it is impossible to estimate the overall importance for this group of factors. It may be that the people who chose these answers together constitute about half of the inactive group. But there could also be a large overlap between the answers, and a small inactive group that refrains from pro-Israeli activity because they do lack motivation. In any case, it is worth recalling that the motivation issue is particularly challenging when it comes to recruiting volunteers from the community. The survey shows that even before addressing this complex
challenge, there is much room for improvement by focusing on the inactive people who would like to engage in pro-Israeli activity. In particular, as the survey indicates, they should be offered ways of overcoming the obstacles they face.

The survey’s third question was intended to assess motivation from a different perspective. Both the activists and the nonactivists were asked what might encourage them to become more involved in pro-Israeli activity. The question was open, and the answers were classified by content. It turned out that the main motivating factor was to provide a remedy for the respondents’ insecurity: 34 percent of the respondents said that professional guidance and instruction would encourage them to increase their involvement. This finding strengthens the sense of insecurity that was evident among the nonactivists in their response to the previous question.

![Figure 4: Incentives for increasing involvement in pro-Israeli activity](image)

The survey revealed that a possible additional incentive would be to make pro-Israeli activity accessible both in terms of time and location (17 percent). Thus, for example, community members spoke of the need for flexible activity close to their place of residence, so that they could contribute at times that were convenient to them. This finding again points to the organizational shortcoming that makes it difficult for people who are motivated to become involved in pro-Israeli activity. One of the respondents put it well: “Most of the people are too busy to initiate and carry out independent activity, but if a few possibilities were provided to engage in well-defined tasks, they could give a lot and with all their heart.” About 12 percent said they would
increase their involvement only if the community increased its involvement. Such responses reinforce the conclusion regarding the Israeli community’s ability to incentivize its members and recruit them to pro-Israeli activity. Seven percent asked that the existing activity become more flexible from a political standpoint, so that they could then become involved and express their opinion without feeling that it was unacceptable. This request indicates that there is a need for ideological and political flexibility and that organizational flexibility is not enough.

The fourth question dealt with the unique contribution that the community members provide in fighting the delegitimization campaign and the boycott movement. The respondents were asked to choose one or more answers from a set of five that had been formulated following preparatory meetings with the community and prior to posting the survey:

1. Improving the credibility of the pro-Israeli messages by using a representative of the Israeli community who is not an official representative of Israel;
2. Cultural and social bridging between the Israeli and American societies in order to open a channel whereby messages can be conveyed and the bond between the societies can be strengthened;
3. Adding the Israeli perspective to the existing discourse in the United States, thereby enriching it and exposing the American public to debates and dilemmas with which it is unfamiliar;
4. Increasing the Israeli presence and expanding pro-Israeli activity by adding hundreds of community members to the small number of official Israeli representatives;
5. Providing political flexibility to conduct dialogues with groups and activists that are critical of Israel in an effort to dissuade them from their activities. Israel has difficulty turning to these groups out of fear of giving their messages and activities a stamp of approval, while these groups, for the most part, tend to be suspicious of official Israeli institutions.

All five options received support from at least 30 percent of the respondents. These data indicate that the analysis preceding the survey was relevant to the community. At the same time, especially noteworthy are three answers that received the support of about half the respondents. According to 52 percent of them, the added value of the Israeli community in the United States lies in improving the credibility of pro-Israeli activity. Of those surveyed, 51 percent agreed that bridging the cultural gaps between the American and
Israeli societies was the added value that the community offered the existing efforts against the delegitimization campaign and the boycott movement. Some 49 percent agreed that the main significance of the Israeli community’s activity was in adding the Israeli perspective to the existing discourse in the United States. These three responses indicate that the members of the Israeli American community believe they can contribute primarily by conducting a dialogue with American society and not by leading a campaign against the delegitimization efforts and the boycott movement. The idea that the Israeli American community should lead the campaign against the anti-Israeli activity was hardly expressed in the meetings with community members that preceded the drafting of the survey and hence was not included in the answers that were offered. Nonetheless, 2 percent of the respondents added this opinion when choosing the item “Other.”

![Figure 5: The added value of the Israeli community](image)

The broad significance of this finding is discussed in the next chapter. It should already be clarified, however, that the respondents’ answers to the third question reflect a desire to contribute to the pro-Israeli effort by developing and improving the conversation with American society. At the same time, the three most common answers indicate the desire to add the “Israeli story” to the American discourse, apparently out of a sense that it is absent and the Israeli perspective is not adequately represented. According to the survey, the Israeli American community in Boston believes that the
most effective way to contribute to this effort is by enhancing the authenticity of the Israeli messages and attuning them to the social and cultural codes of American society. That is, there is a feeling that the story is not getting enough exposure in the American discourse, because, among other things, of an inability to attune it to the target audience in a credible way. The perceived shortcoming seems to lie with the emissaries of Israeli diplomacy (who affect the credibility of the messages) and in the content of the messages (the ability to adapt them to the American target audience). As we will see, the Israeli American community believes it can contribute to promoting the Israeli story more than the other actors. The implications of this conclusion are discussed below in the “Summary and Recommendations” chapter.
Summary and Recommendations

This study explored the question whether the Israeli American community is an asset to the Israeli public diplomacy apparatus. The findings and conclusions of the study indicate that this community has great potential value for the Israeli diplomatic efforts in the American arena, without needing to elaborate on its importance for Israel’s strategic interests. The main point of the study is that although the Israeli community is willing to act—the contribution of which would be substantial to Israel’s public diplomacy apparatus—the community primarily needs guidance on how to bridge between the Israeli and American societies and thereby strengthen the Israeli perspective in the American discourse. Moreover, as the study demonstrates, some shortcomings also undermine the community members’ self-confidence and deter them from acting.

The findings of the research provide a basis for organizational recommendations concerning two levels of activity within the context of Israeli public diplomacy: recommendations for organizing community activity by the local Israeli leadership; and for supporting community activity as part of the governmental effort against the delegitimization campaign. This chapter concludes the study by integrating the findings with the theoretical discussion presented in the initial chapters, offering a unique analysis of the potential of incorporating the Israeli community into the Israeli public diplomacy efforts.

This study was part of initial research efforts to gain familiarity with the Israeli community in the United States. Because the community and its relations with other groups in American society have yet to be researched in-depth, further studies should analyze the nature of the community and its contribution to other Israeli endeavors. The theoretical analysis and the test case of the Israeli community in Boston form a basis for this necessary
intellectual effort, although it should be noted that the community organization in Boston in the public diplomacy sphere is more developed than in most other Israeli communities. In other locations in the United States, the involvement of the Israeli community in this domain is apparently even less developed and requires further organizational effort. This assumption should be tested in future studies of other Israeli communities.

Additional studies should also explore the similarities and differences between the various Israeli communities in the United States, the ways in which they exert influence and its extent on American groups with which they have contact. Given the diverse nature of each community and society in which the Israeli Americans live, different relations with the various local American groups are to be expected. This, of course, also affects the extent of the contribution that each community can make. At the same time, this study was conducted on the assumption that the special nature of the Israeli community within the Jewish population as well as its bond to Israel will enable us to glean some insights that can provide a basis for discussing the nature of activity of the entire community, its support for Israel, and its potential contribution to Israeli public diplomacy. The greater the knowledge about the community and its interface with American society, the more likely we can acknowledge other possible contributions it can make beyond public diplomacy; thus, the community can shift from being only an asset for public diplomacy to having significance in other fields as well.

Organizational Recommendations for the Leadership of the Israeli American Community

_The will is there, but the ability is lacking._ The research findings indicate that the Israeli community in Boston is not in need of motivation when it comes to counteracting the anti-Israeli activity in its vicinity; rather the main obstacles to activity stems from the community’s inability to act, due to not having sufficient knowledge, skills, and access to the locations of activity. This conclusion was also supported by the survey conducted by Brandeis University in 2015, which found that the rate of involvement in _hasbara_ activity among members of the Israeli community was higher than that of other subcommunities of the Jewish community of Boston (27 percent compared to 20 percent among the Russian community and an average of 12 percent for the Jewish community as a whole). Although the Israeli community wants to be more active, it has difficulty doing so. Providing ways
to overcome the main obstacles would enable the community to act more independently, without having to convince its members of the importance of activism or having to encourage them to engage in it. The effort should focus on instilling capabilities in order to translate the high motivation into activities on the ground. That is the basis of this chapter and of all the recommendations presented in it.

A Three-Way Tension in the Israeli Community’s Activity

The survey’s findings indicate three tensions, at different levels, in the context of the Israeli American community’s efforts to counteract the anti-Israeli activity:

1. Organizational flexibility vis-à-vis a sense of communality: One of the main obstacles apparent in the survey’s findings is community members’ not having access to activity. “Not having access” means that both the location and the time of activity are inconvenient for the community members, who are mostly students or young parents. The conclusion, then, is that the activity must be made accessible to the community members both in terms of place and of time. At the same time, the survey revealed that the sense of communality has fostered motivation among the community members. This sense of communality results from meetings and collaborations among the community members. Thus, there is a need for flexible activity that provides leeway to community members who want to take part in pro-Israeli activity despite limitations of space and time, and at the same time, maintains the sense of communality. Internet and social network platforms that enable work from afar at different times are a good basis for flexible activity. Individual activity by community members, however, can detract from the sense of communality. Hence mechanisms should be developed that will preserve this feeling of communality within a virtual community and will encourage community members to participate in joint meetings that will sustain the sense of communality and encourage collaborations between the members.

2. The effective discussion test: Another obstacle that emerges from the survey is the community members’ apprehension that their political stance will not be accepted, such as if they criticize Israeli policy or Israeli society. Thus the community needs to be more flexible from an ideological standpoint and not only from the organizational standpoint. At the same time, the goal is to improve Israel’s image in American society and counteract the delegitimization activity. If Israelis share their frustration over developments in Israel too
openly, they may end up supporting the negative image of the country as well as the delegitimization endeavor, hence subverting the purpose of the community and its activity even if that is not their intention. What is needed then is the creation of a “safe space” in which activists can express their views in intracommunity discussions without fear of being attacked, even if they disagree with the views of most of the group members. To establish such a space, the community members should meet and reach agreements about the “community compass”: the aim of the discussions, their limits, the boundaries of disagreement, and the ability to harm or contribute to the community activity.

Dialogue with hostile groups: The main message that emerges from the survey is that the Israeli community in the United States has the ability to bridge between Israel and American society. Given that American society includes groups whose position toward Israel is extremely negative, this is a challenging task. Fear of giving their activity a stamp of approval has lead to doubts about whether to conduct dialogue with such groups. If the Israeli community is prepared to hold an ongoing dialogue with those who criticize Israel harshly and sometimes also support anti-Israeli activity, why should other communities not do so? In this way, the Israeli community could contribute to the spreading of the anti-Israeli message and activity, instead of moderating the opposition of the critics and weakening the anti-Israeli camp.

If, however, the Israeli community does not address the communities considered hard to crack, it will give up on them and simply leave them in the anti-Israeli camp. The “community compass” that sets the limits of effective discussion can also help with this tension. The community should send a team that is qualified to conduct initial meetings with “problematic” groups and determine according to the “community compass” whether these are moderate groups that have been exposed to extreme anti-Israeli activity or if they are anti-Israeli in their essence. Accordingly, the community will be able to decide about the future approach to be taken with these other groups.

Intensifying the Community Activity on Three Levels
The three tensions described above highlight the need to provide the Israeli American communities with training and tools that can enhance their ability to fulfill their diplomatic potential. This requires working on the following levels:
The personal level: The survey shows that the community members lack confidence in their ability to contend successfully with the arguments and activities of the anti-Israeli organizations. Hence the first and most important step is to provide them with the knowledge, tools, and skills to improve their messages to the different target audiences. Although this should empower the community members and increase their self-confidence, it is not sufficient in itself. It also has to be ascertained—through investigation and measurement—that this empowerment is being translated into increasing involvement in pro-Israeli activity. The training efforts must include providing the activists with the tools to conduct dialogue and leverage it into collaborations and joint projects with the target communities.

The community level: The activity of the Israeli American community is based ultimately on a spirit of volunteering among its members, along with the organized activity of the community leadership. The role of the leadership is critical in this context, since it is responsible for channeling the communal energy into organized and effective activity. To that end, the leadership must create a mechanism that encourages community involvement, activates members in a flexible manner, maintains a sense of communality, and gives rise to a community compass as well as cooperation with other communities. To meet all those objectives, the leadership needs to acquire advanced knowledge and skills in forming and managing a community, working with volunteers, and engaging in public diplomacy. Since it cannot be expected that all staff members responsible for the community activity will have all the relevant skills, some members of the leadership should be trained specifically to address the challenges of delegitimization and in a community mechanism that will activate the community. As explained earlier, the community mechanism must include virtual elements, but it must also facilitate interpersonal activity in order to sustain the sense of communality and preserve one of the main strengths of the community activity, the interpersonal meetings with other groups.

The intercommunity level: The Israeli community in the United States has the ability to bridge between Israeli society and American society. According to the existing literature on public diplomacy, the highest level of such activity is collaboration with other communities. The uniqueness of the Israeli American community enables it, in fact, to work with groups that take a hawkish position toward Israel. Thus the community leadership must strive to hold forums in which, among others, people who support Israel but
who are not Israeli will participate. These forums will facilitate learning, promote common interests (for example, vis-à-vis local-government agencies or private-sector companies), and try to influence the public discourse in their vicinity. In addition, the Israeli communities should conduct an ongoing internal dialogue in order to improve and learn, coordinate activities, and share abilities and skills, which, in turn, will render their efforts more effective. Thus, for example, the Israeli communities in New York and San Francisco can learn from each other’s experiences, coordinate positions toward the local governments in the two states, and bring in skilled speakers from the other communities or from Israel. Only a well-organized network of the Israeli community can deal effectively with the network of anti-Israeli organizations.

**Recommendations for Israeli Policy**

Should the State of Israel support the Israeli community’s efforts to counteract the anti-Israeli endeavor in the United States? The answer to this question is positive. Israel has an interest in supporting the Israeli American community’s fight against the delegitimization campaign because it must use every possible asset to maintain its strategic alliance with Washington. Can the State of Israel influence the Israeli American community’s activity? The answer to this question is positive as well: Israeli policy can bolster the Israeli community’s activity and help it to succeed. Israel can also improve the learning processes of the pro-Israel network by gleaning the insights that emerge from the interactions between the Israeli American activists in the field and their target groups. These insights can be shared with all who are associated with the pro-Israeli network. In addition, the Israeli government plays a decisive role—for better or worse—in shaping the conditions in which the Israeli American community operates. Promoting a policy that is seen as consonant with American liberal values will certainly help the Israeli community reduce the risk of liberal groups adopting anti-Israeli messages. At the same time, promoting a policy that is perceived as provocatively inimical to liberal values hampers the Israeli community’s approaches to liberal groups and could diminish the support of the liberals within the community. The question is, of course, to what extent the Israeli government is prepared to alter its policy in order to help the Israeli American community in its public diplomacy activities. This is primarily a political issue and is briefly discussed below.
The most important contribution Israel can make to the Israeli American community’s efforts is to establish a mechanism for conducting a dialogue between Israel’s formal institutions and those who want to defend Israel against anti-Israeli activity. Such a mechanism could, among other things, improve the joint learning processes and augment the sense of a common mission, as explained below. The professional personnel in Israel has a huge advantage over the other organizations in the pro-Israeli network; thanks to access to the foci of decision making, it can influence the crafting of Israeli policy. Thus, for example, the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, which is in charge of the fight against the delegitimization campaign and the boycott movement, can serve as a source of information and professional assessments of all proposed laws that could affect the ability of the pro-Israeli camp—and of the Israeli community within it—to operate in the United States. The knowledge and lessons that the Israeli community conveys can inform the decision makers when it comes to policy that is directly or indirectly related to Israel’s struggle against the anti-Israeli activity. Even if the information or these assessments do not actually change the policy, they can help in formulating messages that can reduce the damage to the Israeli assets in the United States.

One example concerns the dispute over the Western Wall plan. In January 2016, the Israeli government approved an arrangement whereby the Western Wall plaza would be expanded southward and a space in the plaza would be allotted for mixed prayer by women and men, without a mehitza (partition). The plan stipulated that the plaza would be run by a public council of twelve representatives. Six of the representatives would come from the Conservative movement, the Reform movement, and the Women of the Wall group, and the other six would come from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Diaspora Ministry, and the Israel Antiquities Authority. However, in June 2017, reportedly under pressure from the ultra-Orthodox parties, the government rescinded the plan. The cancelation sparked a crisis with Reform and Conservative Jewry in the United States and Israel. In a survey by the American Jewish Committee in September 2017, 73 percent of the American Jews who responded said they supported the arrangement that had been canceled. The survey also found that about two-thirds of the respondents fiercely opposed the power that the Orthodox Jewish movement in Israel has been granted on issues such as conversion, marriage, and divorce. The survey also makes clear that the tension between American Jewry and Israel on the religion and state issue
is even more severe than that from Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians. This situation endangers cohesion in the pro-Israeli camp and seriously hampers the Israeli American community’s efforts to bridge between Israel and the Jewish community in the United States.

Taking into account the stance of the Reform and Conservative Jews—who constitute the majority of Jews in the United States—would certainly have prevented the current crisis between Israel and American Jews; the crisis, however, could at least have been alleviated if a candid dialogue between the two sides had taken place before canceling the Western Wall plan. That did not transpire, and the rift that has been created between Israel and American Jewry could also endanger Israel’s future relations with the United States. It certainly is likely to seriously encumber the Israeli American community’s battle against the anti-Israeli trends.

The grave repercussions of the Western Wall dispute underline even more the vital need for a dialogue between the State of Israel and the Israeli American community in the United States. Such a dialogue can help clarify differences, while also enabling Israel to provide for the community’s needs and bolster its activity. The resources now at the disposal of the Israeli American community to contend with the delegitimization threat are quite limited. The research presented here shows, for example, that the Israeli American activists do not have the knowledge and communication skills to fight effectively the anti-Israeli activity. They are, after all, volunteers who have not been trained in public diplomacy. One way to solve this problem is to train the activists with the help of governmental officials who have been authorized to do public diplomacy work.

A further hindrance to the effectiveness of the Israeli American community is a dearth of representation in critical locations. Here, too, Israel can help to identify places where Israeli representation is insufficient and can promote a policy that will encourage Israelis to go to them. For example, the Israeli government can provide Israeli students with scholarships to study at the elite universities, which nowadays are seen as anti-Israeli strongholds. The situation is especially grave at the California campuses. In return, the Israeli students should be required to undergo professional training in public diplomacy and lead pro-Israeli activity on the campuses, in Jewish organizations, or local Israeli American organizations. Another example of the assistance that the state could extend is to organize student exchanges between Israeli and American high schools or between youth movements,
thereby bringing selected target groups into contact with Israelis and exposing them to the Israeli perspective at a young age. Enhancing the Israeli presence does not necessarily mean sending Israeli ambassadors. It can be done in other ways as well, such as, for example, promoting Israel studies that give voice to the Israeli narrative, as the Israel Institute does.\textsuperscript{80}

For Israel to enjoy productive collaboration with the Israeli American community, several changes need to occur within the cooperative work. The most important change is conceptual. Most of the resources that Israel now allocates to the battle against the delegitimization campaign are channeled into the struggle against anti-Israeli activity. This is so even though the Israeli campaign also includes appeals to neutral groups that are indifferent to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and do not take part in either anti-Israeli or pro-Israeli activity. Although counteracting the anti-Israeli activity is a worthy goal, the analysis presented here shows that, at least in the American context, there is a need for an additional, key effort to form a coalition among the groups that are inactive. The current trend in American society endangers the strategic relationship between Washington and Jerusalem, and the trend must be reversed, not merely contained. As this study demonstrates, in this domain the Israeli community in the United States can help: Its advantage lies in its ability to bridge between the societies and not to lead the struggle against the anti-Israeli activity.

A conceptual change, of course, has organizational implications. Forming a coalition and cooperating requires a completely different array of tools and skills from those needed to attack, tarnish, and thwart anti-Israeli activity. Although Israel has the ability to lead a campaign against the anti-Israeli groups, its ability to create and maintain coalitions is quite limited. The reason is clear: The state institutions have a hard time conducting an open dialogue with various social groups, especially with those that criticize Israel, are repelled by it, and are deeply suspicious toward it.

Therefore, alongside the apparatus that fights the anti-Israeli groups, a comparable one needs to be established, with the aim of developing capabilities to form and maintain collaborative coalitions with numerous and varied groups. Such capabilities are indispensable in achieving the strategic goal of changing attitudes toward Israel in American society. They can make it possible to expand the pro-Israeli camp, thwart the spread of the anti-Israeli camp, and even somewhat undermine the anti-Israeli activity by dissuading moderate elements who are active in organizations with an
extreme anti-Israeli agenda. The proposed apparatus will need to investigate the unique contributions Israel can make to all the relevant pro-Israeli actors, and how it can make them as effective as possible without detracting from their activity. The discussion presented here on the state’s contribution to the efforts of the Israeli American community can offer a basis for such an investigation. Israel must pursue a comprehensive strategy that will wisely serve the cause of both entities: the apparatus for thwarting anti-Israeli activity on the one hand and the apparatus for recruiting neutral groups on the other. This will require a coordination-and-control mechanism to ensure a flow of relevant information, along with high-level coordination between the two apparatuses so that they will not compromise each other’s efforts or end up with replicated results and wasted resources.

Each apparatus should include a feedback mechanism between the endpoint in the Israeli community and the relevant state institutions. Only such a mechanism can offset the limited presence of state officials in the field and make it possible to realize the potential contribution of the activity of the Israeli American community. In this manner, conclusions and insights of the activists in the United States can be conveyed to Israel, which will help upgrade the pro-Israeli network specifically and the public diplomacy effort as a whole. In certain cases, diplomatic activity between Israel and the United States may also benefit from the conclusions and insights. This mechanism can help the State of Israel understand the underlying sentiments of American society and scrutinize certain ideas and messages before they are made part of the formal activity. In any case, information that emerges from friction and interaction of the Israeli American community in the field should not be conveyed to other pro-Israeli actors. It is indeed natural that the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, being officially in charge of the war against the delegitimization campaign and having gained experience in the context of the apparatus that has been built, should be the one to lead this activity; however, nothing prevents activity from being carried out by other ministries as well, so long as it is not detached from the existing endeavor directed by the Ministry of Strategic Affairs.

Along with the feedback mechanism, periodic meetings must be held between officials and activists in the field. These meetings enable the state to express appreciation for the activity, which is mainly on a voluntary basis, and to sustain the activists’ motivation over time. These meetings also will allow the state to conduct quality control of the activity in the field, enable
the officials to offer assistance or professional guidance where needed, learn from the interactions with the various groups, and receive feedback about the officials’ activity so that it can be improved. Such meetings will also ensure that important insights and lessons from the field will not for any reason get stuck within the feedback mechanism. Given the presence of its officials in the field, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to be best equipped to conduct these meetings, although it must coordinate with the ministry that leads the overall official effort.

This monograph has focused on the challenge of activating the Israeli community in the United States as part of the fight against the campaign to delegitimize Israel. Its conclusions, however, may also be relevant to the effort to develop collaboration with other communities in the pro-Israeli network. Those organizations, too, operate in the public diplomacy arena, and their weaknesses are generally similar to those affecting the Israeli American community. At the same time, in order to construct a broader and better picture of the suitable relationship between Israel and the pro-Israeli network in the United States, a thorough analysis is needed of each community’s weaknesses, additional needs, special nature, and bond to Israel. The task of this network, as this monograph argues, is to reverse the existing trends within American society in its attitude toward Israel and not merely to prevent additional successes of the anti-Israeli endeavor. If this monograph serves as a basis for such a strategic discussion or merely inspires such a discussion, its publication will have fulfilled its purpose.
Notes

2 Ibid., p. 865.
3 Abraham Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama: The Rise and Beginning of the Fall of U.S.-Israeli Relations (Tel Aviv: Yediot Acharonoth, 2011), pp. 12–22 [in Hebrew].
8 Thirty-nine percent of those surveyed defined themselves as liberals and 15 percent as leaning toward the liberals. In the same survey, 22 percent defined themselves as conservatives or as leaning toward the conservatives. See “AJC Survey of American Jewish Opinion 2017,” American Jewish Committee, September 13, 2017, https://goo.gl/3ibDgr.
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was recently carried out by the Brand Israel NGO. See Brand Israel, “Sound the Alarm: The American Israel Relationship,” https://goo.gl/r9xgJm.

10 Saad, “US conservatives outnumber liberals by narrowing margin.”


13 Ibid., 47.

14 According to the most recent census in 2000, 106,839 Israelis were then living in the United States. Lacking a more updated census, researchers have made different conjectures about this community’s growth rate in the years since then. See, for example, Haim Handwerker, “How Many Israelis Live in America?,” Forward, June 20, 2014, https://goo.gl/kdZFwV.

15 For further information on this organization’s activity, see https://goo.gl/S6EiD4.


For the text of Trump’s speech on May 23, 2017, see https://goo.gl/QdhYb4.


Ibid., 13.

Ibid., 13–16.

Ibid., 16–20.


Shai, Milhamedia.

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43 Ibid., 456–457.
46 Ibid., 115–116.
47 Shai, Milhamedia, pp. 319–320.
48 Flora Koch Davidovich, “Israel’s Hasbara Apparatus and its Image in the World,” submitted to the Committee of Aliya, Absorption, and Diaspora, the Knesset, November 29, 2010 [in Hebrew], https://goo.gl/SPFZLB.
50 Ibid., 868.
51 Ibid., 869.
52 Ibid., 870.
53 Ibid., 861.
54 Ibid., 862.
56 For the official website of the initiative, see: https://goo.gl/k1tkVZ.
60 Tyler and Beyerinck, “Citizen Diplomacy,” p. 521.
64 See, for example, the survey in 2015 of the Boston Jewish community’s involvement in activity that includes Israeli content, Aronson and others, “2015 Greater Boston Jewish Community Study,” pp. 54–62.
70 Ibid.
71 For the website of the Boston branch of the Israeli American Council, see: https://goo.gl/Q7rUzM.
72 Indeed two such surveys were found, and they were removed from the sample before the findings were analyzed.
73 The survey by Brandeis University also emphasized that given the lack of data about the Israeli community in Boston, readers should take into account that the survey’s sample was based on a small number of adult Israelis. Aronson and others, “2015 Greater Boston Jewish Community Study,” p. 75.
74 On this question the respondents could choose from among several answers and were not required to mark the most correct answer.
76 Ibid., p. 45.
79 For example, a report by the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis University notes that on the campuses in California the rate of hostility toward Israel is substantially higher than average. See Leonard Saxe, Theodore Sasson, Graham Wright, and Shahar Hecht, *Antisemitism and the College Campus: Perceptions and Realities*, (Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University, July 2015), p. 15, https://goo.gl/v4paAt.
80 See the website of the Israel Institute at https://israelinstitute.org/.
INSS Memoranda, January 2018–Present


No. 180, August 2018, Gabi Siboni and Ido Sivan Sevilla, *Cyber Regulation* [Hebrew].

No. 179, August 2018, Udi Dekel and Kim Lavi, eds., *Separating from the Palestinians: A Framework to Improve Israel’s Strategic Posture* [Hebrew].


No. 176, June 2018, Udi Dekel and Kobi Michael, eds., *Scenarios in the Israeli-Palestinian Arena: Strategic Challenges and Possible Responses* [Hebrew].

No. 175, May 2018, Yotam Rosner and Adi Kantor, eds., *The European Union in a Time of Reversals: Challenges, Trends, and Significance for Israel* [Hebrew].


No. 172, February 2018, Meir Litvak, Emily B. Landau, and Ephraim Kam, eds., *Iran in a Changing Strategic Environment* [Hebrew].

No. 171, January 2018, Carmit Valensi, Udi Dekel, and Anat Kurz, eds., *Syria – From a State to a Hybrid System: Implications for Israel.*

No. 170, January 2018, Doron Matza, *Patterns of Resistance among Israel’s Arab-Palestinian Minority: A Historical Review and a Look to the Future.*
The erosion of support for Israel among the liberal American public and the positioning of Israel at the heart of the political dispute between the Republicans and the Democrats could undermine the special relationship between Israel and the United States in the medium and long term. To maintain the alliance between the two countries, Israel’s positive image among the American public must be strengthened, which will help reverse the trend of eroding support among the liberal target audience.

The Israeli community in the United States is an asset that has great potential to contribution to realizing this goal. The community includes a large number of “field players” embedded in both Israeli and American societies, who can serve as a bridge between them.

This memorandum proposes a model for the establishment and management of an Israeli community that will promote Israeli activity aimed at bridging the gap between the State of Israel and the American public.

Dr. Avner Golov was the director of Research Programs and a former research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), and was a fellow at the Israel Institute. He received the Peter Ackerman Award for outstanding doctoral work for 2017 from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and the Morris Abrams Award in International Relations. He was also a Harry Truman researcher at the Fletcher School and a visiting scholar at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).