On Littoral Warfare

15 Apr 2015

According to Milan Vego, littoral warfare requires a reliable theory if it’s to be done properly. Indeed, without an overarching conceptual framework to orient naval planners, it won’t be possible to organize and train littoral forces, work with other services, or ally with other nations.

This article was external pageoriginally published by the external pageUS Naval War College in its external pageNaval War College Review, Spring 2015, Vol. 68, No. 2.

Naval warfare in the littorals has much in common with war conducted on the open ocean. However, there are also some significant differences, due to the extremely complex, dynamic, and challenging physical environment of the former. The peculiarities of the physical environment in the littorals offer many challenges—but also opportunities—in the employment of naval forces and aircraft. Distinctions between characteristics of war on the open ocean and in the littorals must be thoroughly understood; otherwise, commanders and their staffs simply cannot plan or employ their forces properly.

Perhaps the most important prerequisite of success in littoral warfare is a solid theory developed ahead of time; otherwise it is not possible to organize and train forces properly. Littoral warfare requires the closest cooperation among the services, or “jointness.” It also often requires close cooperation with forces of other nations.

The objectives of warfare in the littorals are generally similar or identical to those of war on the open ocean. Yet there are substantial differences in how these objectives are accomplished. In contrast to war on the open ocean, the most prevalent method of employment of combat forces in the littorals is tactical action; opportunities to plan and execute major naval/joint operations are relatively rare. Because of the rapidity and possibly drastic changes in the tactical and operational situations, warfare in the littorals requires a highly decentralized command and control (C2). This means a true application of German-style “mission command”—otherwise, success will be wanting

Importance

The political, military, demographic, and economic importance of the littorals has steadily increased over the past two decades. In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact brought an end to the Cold War. This in turn had a major impact on the international political and security environment. Animosities between various nation-states that had been held in check during the Cold War came into the open. An era of global certainty and predictability was replaced by one marked by uncertainty, turmoil, and chaos.[1] The threat of war between major powers has been reduced, but lesser threats to international order have proliferated, in growing scope, diversity, and frequency.[2] During the past decade Southwest Asia, the Greater Middle East, North Africa, the western Pacific, and most recently Eastern Europe have emerged as the new areas of tensions, conflict, and potentially even major regional wars. It appears that in case of a high-intensity conventional war, combat actions at sea would be predominantly conducted in the littoral waters.

About 80 percent of all countries border the sea, and approximately 95 percent of the world’s population lives within six hundred miles of the coast. Some 60 percent of the world’s politically significant urban areas are located within sixty miles of the coast, and 70 percent within three hundred miles.[3] About 80 percent of the world’s capitals are in the littorals.[4] The littorals account for about 16 percent of the world’s oceanic expanse.[5] Yet they are critically important because all seaborne trade originates and ends there. The sea remains the primary, and by far the most cost-effective, means for the movement of international trade. In 2013, about 80 percent of the global trade by volume was carried by ships.[6] The importance of the world’s oceans and seas to the economic well-being and security of nations and to the projection of power has perhaps never been greater than it is today.

A blue-water navy now faces much greater and more-diverse threats in the littorals than in the past. This is especially the case in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. The threat is especially acute within and near the world’s international straits, such as Hormuz and Malacca. The threat to one’s forces steadily increases as one approaches an enemy coast. The weaker, defending side can have integrated a widely distributed reconnaissance/surveillance system with seagoing platforms, land-based aircraft, air and coastal defenses, ground troops, and special operations forces into an effective multilayered defense. The defender can reach out much farther and more strongly than might be expected, catching the attacking force off guard.[7]

The primary antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the littorals are land-based aircraft, diesel-electric attack submarines (SSKs) fitted with air-independent propulsion (AIP), multipurpose corvettes, fast attack craft (FACs), coastal missile/gun batteries, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), midget submarines, sophisticated mines, and medium- and short-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs/SRBMs).

In addition, stealthy surface craft armed with small-caliber guns, short-range rockets, or even suicide boats can threaten not only one’s commercial shipping but in some cases even larger surface combatants. One of the most serious threats to survivability of large surface ships and merchant shipping, however, is posed by long-range antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The most advanced ASCMs can be used against either ships or targets on land. They can be fired by submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and concealed coastal missile sites.

For example, the People’s Republic of China is currently developing sophisticated A2/AD multilayered defenses extending several hundred miles from the coast. These defenses consist of space-, air-, and ground-based radars, and over-the-horizon radars, bombers, fighter-bombers, and multipurpose attack aircraft carrying air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) and ASCMs.[8] The Chinese navy is also introducing into service large numbers of modern surface combatants armed with ASCMs, as well as AIP SSKs armed with ASCMs, torpedoes, and mines. Approaches to the Chinese coast are defended by numerous coastal missile and gun batteries. The Chinese have very large inventories of highly advanced Mines. They also have at their disposal several hundred SRBMs and MRBMs for use against targets on land. They have developed antiship ballistic missiles with ranges of a thousand miles plus, as well as a highly integrated air-defense system (IADS) with sophisticated surface-to-air missiles and fourth- and fifth-generation fighter aircraft. The Chinese A2/AD assets also include highly advanced and hardened C2 networks, antisatellite weapons, and cyberattack capabilities.[9]

Likewise, Iran is also trying to create multilayered defenses within the Strait of Hormuz and its approaches. Currently, the Iranian navy has in its inventory large numbers of ASCM-armed missile craft, several thousands of mines (both old and very advanced), and several quiet SSKs and midget submarines. ASCM batteries are deployed on the coast and islands within the strait. The Iranian A2/AD capabilities also include a number of land-based attack aircraft armed with ASCMs, UAVs, and several hundred SRBMs and MRBMs. They also have an increasingly sophisticated IADS.[10] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy operates a small number of ASM-armed boats, as well as stealthy torpedo boats; hundreds of small speedboats armed with machine guns, multiple rocket launchers, or ASMs; remotely controlled radar decoy and explosive-filled boats; and a small number of semisubmersible attack craft.[11]

Defining the term

The term “littoral” (from the Latin litus, “shore”) is often used but is not always properly defined or understood. In its simplest definition, “littoral” means a “coastal region” or “refers to a shore”.[12]

In geographic terms, the term pertains to a coastline zone between extreme high and low tides. The U.S. military defines the littoral as consisting of two segments of the “operational” environment: seaward (the area from the open ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore) and landward (the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea).[13] Yet this usage is on one hand too broad and imprecise, and on the other, it overlooks a fairly wide range of relevant geographical conditions. Littorals, properly speaking, encompass areas bordering the waters of open peripheral seas, large archipelagoes, and enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.

Littorals bordering open oceans, such as the coasts of North and South America, Africa, and India, extend outward to the farthest extent of the continental shelf. The width of the continental shelf varies from less than a hundred miles off the west coast of North and South America to nearly eight hundred miles from the Arctic coast of North America and Eurasia. The average width of the continental shelf, however, is between two hundred and five hundred miles. The depth of water on the continental shelf averages 250 feet.[14]

“Peripheral” (or marginal) seas are parts of an ocean bordering the continental landmass and partially enclosed by peninsulas, island chains, or archipelagoes, such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They lie on downward-sloping portions of the continental shelf and are uniformly deep. Littorals also include large archipelagoes completely or partially surrounded by open ocean, such as the Malay (or Indonesian) and Solomons Archipelagoes.

The most complex physical environments for employment of naval forces are those of “enclosed” and “semi-enclosed” seas. An enclosed sea, such as the Baltic or the Adriatic, lies wholly within the continental shelf and is surrounded by a landmass except for a strait connecting it to an ocean or another enclosed or semi-enclosed sea. Because of their restricted communication with the open ocean, enclosed seas have small tidal ranges or are tideless.[15]

Enclosed seas are also called “continental seas” if they rest on shallow depressions, as do the Sea of Azov and the Baltic. In contrast, a semi-enclosed, or partly enclosed, sea is contiguous to a continent and is linked by two or more straits/narrows to the open ocean; an example is the North Sea. Semi-enclosed seas are characterized by large tidal ranges.[16]

Enclosed and semi-enclosed seas are popularly called “narrow seas.”[17] In the military meaning of the term, a narrow sea is a body of water that can be controlled from either side. Hence, this term can be properly applied to all enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, as well as to their long and narrow entrances (such as the English Channel, or La Manche), or certain restricted areas within a narrow sea (such as the Sicilian Narrows). It is in a narrow sea that a blue-water navy, like the U.S. Navy, would likely have the most difficulty in projecting its power ashore.

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Notes

[1] U.S. Navy Dept, Expeditionary Operations, MCDP-3 (Washington, D.C.: 16 April 1998), p. 3.

[2] Ibid., p.5.

[3] Ibid., p.21.

[4] Richard Mills, “Littoral Combat Ship: The U.S. Needs to Prepare for More Operations along the World’s Coastlines,” Foreign Policy,1 November 2012, p.1

[5] Michael Lindberg and Daniel Todd, Brown-, Green- and Blue-Water Fleets: The Influence of Geography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002), p. 66

[6] United Nations, Review of Maritime Transport 2013 (New York: United Nations Conference

on Trade and Development, 2014), p. xi.

[7] Opher Doron, “The Israelis Know Littoral Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (March 2003), p. 67.

[8] Michael McDevitt, “The PLA Navy’s Antiaccess Role in a Taiwan Contingency,” in The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Enduring Roles, ed. Phillip C. Saunders et al. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ., 2011), p. 206.

[9] Mark Gunzinger, with Chris Daugherty, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-access and Area-Denial Threats (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011), p. 22.

[10] Ibid., pp. 26–43.

[11] Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008), p. 12.

[12] David F. Tver, Ocean and Marine Dictionary (Centreville, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1979), p. 182.

[13] U.S. Defense Dept., Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 March 2013), p. 173.

[14] Lindberg and Todd, Brown-, Green- and Blue-Water Fleets, p. 66.

[15] Enclosed seas, because of their restricted communication with the open ocean, are characteristically tideless or have small tidal ranges; they can be relatively fresh or highly saline. See Charles H. Cotter, The Physical Geography of the Oceans (New York: American Elsevier, 1966), p.71.

[16] Ibid., p. 72.

[17] The phrase “narrow seas” had its origins in the claims of the English kings to “sovereignty of the sea” around the British Isles in the thirteenth century; they had possessions in France and so directed their admirals to police the “narrow seas”—the Strait of Dover and the English Channel. In 1336, King Edward III reportedly referred to his predecessors as “Lords of the English Sea on every side”; see Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, trans. Michael Byers (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000), p. 131. The first written reference to “narrow seas” was apparently in Christopher Marlowe’s play King Edward II, written in 1590 or 1591. Edward II (reigned 1307–27) says, in the play, “The haughty Dane commands the narrow seas” (pertaining to the Strait of Dover); discussed in William Shakespeare, The Plays of William Shakespeare: First Part of King Henry VI (London: William Heineman, 1904), p. xi note.

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