Ten counterinsurgency commandments from Afghanistan

From Afghanistan to Sri Lanka, Colombia to Kashmir, Congo to Iraq, the question of how to deal with insurgency is being asked. Finding the answer has so far involved scrutinizing past campaigns from Algeria to Zimbabwe, and especially Malaya and Vietnam.

These have produced a set of lessons, centering at their most creative on the importance of public diplomacy in winning hearts and minds, and the need to slowly extend governance and prosperity through "ink spots" of relative stability, employing unity of effort by nations and institutions. In Afghanistan, during the tenure of the ninth International Security Assistance Force (ISAF IX) deployed between May 2006 and February 2007, this evolved into Afghan Development Zones (ADZs), providing a focus of development spending and security effort.

But scrutinizing the past has limited benefit in dealing with the modern, complex insurgency. The nature of the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan has changed from the time of Malaya and Vietnam, for example, from two dimensional (national/colonial government vs. the insurgent) to three dimensions, where the insurgent faces a national government but with a complex range of multinational governmental and nongovernmental actors involved in the security and development effort. Additionally, the globalized, media-savvy nature of today's insurgents contrasts with their bottom-up, cellular organizational structure. The former allows them unparalleled access to sources of support, recruits and marketing, while their operational structure both provides security and assists it in replicating itself and its actions without active leadership oversight. Thus domestic insurgencies have to be confronted internationally and in many dimensions with unprecedented demands for intelligence gathering and analysis, interoperability and flexibility, and cultural sensitivity and understanding.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, security, governance and development instruments are unlikely by themselves to offer the solution to end the ongoing violence. Both countries increasingly serve as a magnet and spark for radical Islamists. While there is a need to employ such instruments towards wider objectives, it has not been made clear what those objectives are beyond winning the war on terror.

Contemporary constraints

Although the nature of the modern insurgency is generically different from the historical experience, some of the problems faced by security agencies in dealing with it remain the same as those of an earlier generation.

Putting boots on the ground: Past insurgencies have been won by troop saturation, ensuring a visible force presence and enabling borders to be sealed. While high-tech surveillance offers a modern force multiplier, there remains no substitute for boots on the ground. In Afghanistan as in Iraq, in an insurgency you cannot afford to concentrate and sequence combat power as you can do in general war. The enemy has shown that it can instantly react to adjustments and exploit the opportunities that arise when force levels are reduced or when coalition troops move out of an area. It is what officers refer to as the balloon effect: You squeeze one end, and the enemy moves to the other.

Securing adequate intelligence: To paraphrase George Orwell, today we have information on everything but knowledge about much less. High-tech capability helps the intelligence-gathering exercise and can be a force-multiplier, but has its limits. The lack of knowledge of the situation in remote areas such as the Panjwayee district in Afghanistan's southern Kandahar province illustrates the limitations of digital Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) systems such as eavesdropping, satellites, Predator and other "eyes in the sky." The modern insurgency is, in the words of an American officer stationed in Afghanistan, "a bottom-up human intelligence fight" in spite of all the digital assets.

Operating in a multinational environment: In Afghanistan many of the European nations simply pay lip service to their commitment. This is reflected in resource constraints and political operating caveats. The adverse impact of this on operations has been limited by the redundancy within the coalitions. But it requires searching for the golden thread of expertise within the multinational environment, usually found among those native English-speaking countries.

Unity of effort: Having a single actor with the authority to direct effort down all the lines of operation remains key to success today, as it was when the British used a committee system to achieve unity of effort in Malaya. In Afghanistan there exists a complex web of influence, with detailed and ongoing funding and development interaction between donors, the Government of Afghanistan, NGOs, and the international military. Iraq initially offered a much easier situation, where the US was the clear leader, prior to Iraq's national elections. Even then, however, the required synergy was not achieved, owing to the dual military (answerable to the Department of Defense) and civilian (answerable to the administration) reporting lines, the interagency process notwithstanding.

Public diplomacy and development: Getting the right message across with cultural nuances, and linking security and development, is as important - and difficult - to do today as it was in Vietnam. Moreover, as King's College scholar-soldier John Mackinlay has observed, one needs to exploit and dominate the virtual war zone, merging the strategic and tactical realms of operation with the same ease as one's opponents.

Some military commanders are aware of these challenges and trying to address them. While he was the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan (a role he served in from May 2006 until February 2007, when he was replaced by US General Dan McNeill, COMISAF X), General David Richards observed:

We have to deal with the strategic disjuncture between commitments and resources, between postmodern plans and the needs of a largely feudal society, and between the need for close cooperation between the governmental and nongovernmental communities and the reality of dealing with vested institutional interests; and also with the discontinuity between short-term Western political ideals and the importance of long-term, sustained commitment. Hence our strategic, but pragmatic approach to deal with Afghanistan's insurgency, linking development and security intent.

It is what one senior American officer in the Combined Joint Task Force 76 based at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul described in 2006 as a "Clear, Hold, Build and Engage" strategy - clear the area from the enemy, hold the territory, build infrastructure and resources, and engage with the local community. The success of this approach will depend on ensuring better coordination and faster delivery among international and local actors, realizing political and capacity constraints, and, ultimately, allowing Kabul to take responsibility and control on its terms.

Strategy formation

First, one needs to ask the right questions. For example, accepting that most people would aspire to a better life in the same way we define that presupposes the existence of a civil society within which political, social and economic bargains can be negotiated and struck. This is much less likely where societies are divided along racial, religious, ethnic, geographic and rural-urban schisms.

Political acceptance of such realities is key in convincing Western electorates of the stakes and in accepting the inherent risks and developing policies that allow soldiers to carry out their tasks. Risk-aversion undermines the effectiveness of the multinational forces much more than the (lack of) equipment at their disposal. Countries have to contribute enough - in both policy and materiel terms - to ensure not just the safety of their troops, but the success of the overall mission.

It is therefore imperative to take stock of our instruments and limits. The containment and armored mindset of international forces in Somalia in 1992, for example, created a contradiction of perceptions: The forces were simultaneously feared but appeared fearful, creating resentment, anger and vulnerability.

The greatest asset the West has in Afghanistan is its long-term commitment. Yet the longer it remains front-and-center in the campaign against the Taliban and other antigovernment forces, the longer it will be part of the political landscape and the focus of Afghan ire, a sentiment based less on rationality and the record of ISAF than on deep-rooted national chauvinism and frustration at the inevitable slow pace of delivery.

In this, the military and aid workers alike have to take care not to look like the new imperialists. Unlike the diplomatic imperialists of old, today's versions are often products of a hyper-competitive world, brash and pushy to a fault. In a country such as Afghanistan where servility is required, this does not go down well. Foreigners anxious to get the job done have to take extreme care not to get ahead of and out of step with local politicians, slowed as they are by a bargaining, consensus-seeking culture. To move these politicians at a faster rate could only isolate them from their local constituents. And there is a constant need to balance short-term action (e.g. infrastructure spending) with longer-term needs (e.g. education and gender rights) and to manage both this tension and public expectations.

Aid workers vigorously oppose what they view as the militarization of development. Many are reluctant to permit the military to carry out development tasks, even though they cannot themselves operate in many areas of Afghanistan (or Iraq for that matter) without a military presence and protection. The contradictory nature of this relationship is complicated by the paramilitary attitude and apparel adopted by many aid workers. The irony is that the military is trying to facilitate development while mindful that this is not its core business. Unlike their aid counterparts, almost all military leaders are sensitized to accede to local ownership. This is more the role and spirit of proconsuls of old, always aware of the need for subtly and guile.

Use soft power wisely

In counterinsurgency, any action taken in one area will have an effect in another. Attacking the drug trade in Afghanistan will ratchet up insurgency activity. Therefore, instead of embarking on an all-out war on drugs, which could undermine President Hamid Karzai's administration, we have to recognize that this sector drives Afghanistan's political economy. Dealing with it goes beyond just providing sequenced alternatives to entrepreneurs. Blundering ahead on narcotics and efforts to demobilize the drug-funded militias will assuredly destabilize the government in a country where drugs make up more than half of the economy. Indeed, opium is the only commodity in which Afghanistan is currently globally competitive. An alternative plan would aim to separate counternarcotics and counterinsurgency strategies, by reducing pressure on small-time farmers (thus not forcing them into the hands of the insurgents) and allowing Kabul to take the lead in a manner that avoids creating further problems and undermining its already limited power and credibility. One method to assist the latter is to offer an amnesty period, with a carefully sequenced public diplomacy campaign in the build-up to the deadline, and then begin high-profile prosecutions of the barons rather than the small-time farmers.

The death of one insurgent creates many more in societies where blood ties and nationalist zeal are stronger than ideology. This demands understanding what security means for local communities, which relates directly to the manner in which soft power is employed.

The term "soft power" is American, used by those who want the US to better exploit its economic and cultural advantages in the battle for hearts and minds. But it is others, notably the Iranians, who are showing mastery at putting it into practice in places such as Lebanon and also among the Shia of Iraq. While the international community spends a fortune on inserting a massive peacekeeping force in Lebanon, Iran will likely continue to focus on funding the rebuilding of Hizbollah communities, captivating communities and ensuring religious patronage among Lebanon's Shia. While the Iranians assisted in arming Hizbollah with advanced wire- and laser-guided anti-tank weaponry and large numbers of ground-to-ground missiles in the August 2006 war with Israel, their real advantage will likely come through the use of soft power in the reconstruction phase.

Where the West would have elaborate procedures to ensure that its aid money was being properly spent, Iran can resort to blunt but likely more effective, and certainly faster, tactics. While the West speaks of "effects-based operations" in post-conflict societies, in reality it conducts value-based operations, focusing on delivering assistance in a manner that adheres to Western liberal governance norms and standards of transparency and accountability.

Nor are the Iranians alone in using soft power to win over communities. The Muslim Brotherhood has been doing it for years in Egypt. Where communities lack medical care, the Brotherhood offers free consultations. Its ability to exploit the government's failings and meet social needs, if only in part, explains why the Brotherhood is such a powerful political force in Egypt today.

By comparison, aid delivery in a country like Afghanistan is a tortuous affair. Bureaucratic procedures ensure that the ratio of expenditure (on security forces, consultants, administration etc.) to aid is higher and delivery tedious. Because the West spends according to its own rules, local actors are seldom able to use the money to their own advantage and in the way their system operates and understands, as patronage and for political power as much as for socioeconomic development. This is not, however, because all local politicians are corrupt: It's simply the way the system works. Without it there would be a much greater likelihood of systemic instability.

Another feature of so much Western aid is how little credit its donors receive from the recipients for what is, whatever its problems, genuinely massive assistance. The link between the new school or mini-power station and the foreign aid workers in their four-wheel drives is rarely made, and many in the aid community regard aid as something that is essentially neutral. This is not how Hizbollah and their backers see it, and they want and make sure they receive every drop of political credit. Such effective use of soft power is hard to counter. Arguing against the supply of guns to terrorist organizations is one thing, but, whatever their motives, if the Iranians also seek to influence societies by funding reconstruction, how can we protest? In the contest for hearts and minds, policymakers may be over-focussing on their opponents' guns rather than their butter. Also, foreign actors have to realize the advantages that accrue to Iran from allowing Hizbollah to take the credit, as difficult as this strategy may be, especially for those aid agencies and NGOs needing to demonstrate project roll-out to ensure funding flows and for those in the military geared towards delivering visible action and effect within a limited deployment timeframe.

Know your enemy

Finding the means to "outbid" insurgents and gain the support of the society in which they operate and find succor requires understanding the difference between their and your means and ends.

Among the military there is confusion between short-term tactical actions and the wider strategic counterinsurgency aim. Development, governance and security "effects" must be linked to a political objective, and there has been little clarity in this. This is the reason why, for example, officers in the Afghan theater are increasingly frustrated by talk of "anti-coalition forces" and the global "war on terror." Historically, insurgencies are countered through political deals that military means have helped to cut. Seldom, if ever, are they defeated militarily. A coalition of anti-Western forces is a rhetorical expediency waiting to be exploited. These shifting alliances are often little more than marriages of convenience. In Afghanistan, while the Taliban have loyalty predominantly to the Pashtun ethnic cause, Gulbuddin Hikmetyar's Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin movement seems geared less to its purported brand of radical Islam than gaining power for its veteran mujahiddin leader. For both, al-Qaida is likely less of an ideological soul mate than a cash-rich friend of convenience, not least given the lack of Afghan love for Arabs. Just as Afghanistan itself is riven by ethnic divisions, there are additional layers of complexity and fidelity within each group. Each of the groups has different, sometimes competing loyalties at the tribe, sub-tribe, clan and family level. Hence to counter insurgency, one must fundamentally split and co-opt these groups, all the time denying them sanctuary in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Reaching a political accommodation rests not only on a clear understanding of all these levels through bottom-up intelligence, but also on sophisticated political engagement by local and external leadership. Erudite statesmanship would envision and articulate a common good, and unpick the ties that bind the insurgents rather than conveniently lump them together as "terrorists."

Of course, political accommodation is much more difficult in an environment where violence is a condition of society and a way of life. Where the bearing of arms is not only commonplace but considered a sign of manhood and disarmament contrary to a way of life, security means different things. Where the West cannot play by the rules of the insurgent and wage terror against terror, the weak effectively deter the militarily strong.

At its heart, countering insurgency demands dealing not only with asymmetric means but also asymmetric ends, which can be achieved by understanding the culture of the insurgent. This is a responsibility not only of the military, but of other elements of government, the NGO world and, critically, the media, which has to stop portraying progress in countering insurgencies as only a rising body count of which they are critical.

While incremental development and security progress is essential in maintaining morale and momentum, this aspect of change is the task of a generation.

Ten commandments for the future

These foregoing observations can be distilled down to ten counterinsurgency commandments:

First, do not confuse short-term tactical imperatives and process with longer-term goals. The difference is between tools (military, media, diplomatic, governance, and development) and the overall objective (political accommodation).

Second, focus on dealing with constraints to economic growth - not humanitarian assistance or the provision of security - as the essential condition for development. Thus, the military and other allied agencies always have to consider what the basis of growth in particular regions could be - what can be made and sold and how to remove constraints to realizing this. Countering insurgency means separating ordinary people from the warlords, drug lords and insurgents and giving them a viable economic choice.

Third, in identifying areas for development spending, reinforce existing success. As Jalalabad's thriving economy illustrates, the market never lies. Place resources where there is already activity and consolidate success. Don't attempt to plant things where they will never grow.

Fourth, understand the difference between asymmetric means (where one side uses its weakness to military advantage) and asymmetric ends (where both sides do not want the same thing). There is a presumption that both sides want the fighting to end. This may not be the case, and highlights cultural differences in the attitude towards war as a way of life. Messages need to be tailored accordingly.

Fifth, accept the way local systems operate: the international community might not like it, but it has to accept local solutions. Avoid coming in with a design and dogma that will "show" the locals how things should be done, which is too often a prerogative of new military commanders wanting to make a difference. Not only avoid trying to impose your own preferred solutions, but also do not attempt to impose images of your own society, for example as paragons of multiculturalism, even if such images coincide rhetorically with those of Kabul's elite - not least since these practices are often mythologized and, if not, are seldom successfully transplantable. Be aware of local political and capacity limits. Do not set too many operating guidelines (and then micromanage them), but rather a few clear "red lines" of transgression which should not be crossed. Since success will depend on Kabul's taking responsibility and setting the political parameters, we cannot make it politically awkward for them to do so. The most important red line is to prevent the use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorist activity.

Sixth, policies and the message to the local population have to capitalize on fatigue from war, economic and physical insecurity, and future anxieties. To do this and to undercut the appeal of the Taliban as a stability alternative, the benefits of the current system have to be both of widespread benefit and highly visible. Progress on signature development projects - wide-scale, well-delivered agro/irrigation projects that touch communities and spotlight leader/official involvement, for example—would be powerful examples.

Seventh, never confuse numbers with effects. Beware of the body-count trap, the mismatch between aid commitments and expenditure, and especially the difference between numbers of troops and police and those available for operations. The latter example applies notably to the Afghan security forces, which suffer from poor pay, a ghost payroll, and dubious methods of training, personnel recruitment and allegiance. As Robert Cassidy has argued, "There are no magic and inherently quantifiable metrics that we can slap on a PowerPoint matrix […] ones that might precisely measure our path to victory in counterinsurgency."

Eighth, understand the basis of local power beyond numbers. This demands understanding the intricacies and allegiances that bind local power structures and those who broker them.

Ninth, beware of international consultants bearing high-altitude plans that, for all the will in the world, scarcely ever survive the realities of local capacity. Development is more than just goals, targets, strategy, frameworks and plans. Kabul's capacity to deliver will never match up to needs, promises, and intentions. Avoid forcing local partners to agree to things they know they will never be able to deliver on, thereby undermining their standing. Development is more than top-down governance; rather, it centers on bottom-up realities.

Tenth, integrate but calibrate. Learn the lesson offered by officers such as André Beaufre and David Galula - don't try to do everything at once. The footprint of security presence, along with governance and development activity, should match the resources available. Be prepared to let some areas go while concentrating on those things and places you choose to. A "Clear, Hold, Build and Engage" strategy demands focus of effort and consolidation of gains, without which the insurgent "balloon" will simply distort and not, as intended, deflate.

All the above illustrates the critical importance of not just beating an insurgency and winning a battle of ideas, but the central role of leadership in managing myriad analytical inputs and weaving multinational and multiagency responses into a coherent whole. The theatre commander has to simultaneously manage military concerns with political sensitivities and development detail. The professional officer is also today's proconsul, tempering aggression with diplomacy, defaulting to politics and development needs. Command requires caring for the lowest ranks and politely enquiring after their welfare, and being polite yet honest with political masters. It is leadership not for ego's sake or to self-indulge, but to manage complex and difficult environments and find solutions.

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