Publication
2003
This paper examines the trade-offs between centralization and decentralization in public decision-making. According to the authors, the decision to allocate policy jurisdictions to different levels of government is related to a number of trade-offs between the advantages and disadvantages of centralized versus decentralized provision. They examine the trade-off between the internalization of externalities under centralization versus an "accountability" advantage of decentralization. They formalize this trade-off in the context of a class of principal-agent models known as "common agency."
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English (PDF, 28 pages, 267 KB) |
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Author | Mariano Tommasi, Federico Weinschelbaum |
Series | Leitner Program Working Papers |
Issue | 2 |
Publisher | Leitner Program in International & Comparative Political Economy |
Copyright | © 2003 Leitner Program |