Accountability and Discretion of the Russian Courts

Accountability and Discretion of the Russian Courts

Autor(en): Alexei Trochev
Herausgeber: Stephen Aris, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perovic, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder, Aglaya Snetkov
Serie: Russian Analytical Digest (RAD)
Ausgabe: 147
Seiten: 6-10
Verlag(e): Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich; Research Centre for East European Studies, University of Bremen; Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University
Publikationsjahr: 2014

Judges are much more likely to rule against the government in non-criminal cases than they are in lawsuits brought by state procurators. The difference lies in the relationship between judges and the law enforcement agencies and other agencies of the government. Their closer ties with the law enforcement agencies makes it harder for the judges to oppose their requests, whereas judges have fewer connections to other parts of the government and therefore have greater freedom in opposing them.
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