Central Asia: Beyond Jihad

It is imperative to examine the reasons behind radicalism in Central Asia by assessing the responses of the local governments to the issue and scrutinizing the regional economic situation, which is closely connected to the booming narcotics trade. 

While radical Islamic groups have been involved in several insurgencies, regional governments attempt to use the connection between terrorism and Islamic ideology to strengthen their unchallenged positions. By lumping all of these groups together, they fail to recognize the differences in their strategies. A closer look at the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) illustrates this point.

Holding Salafi beliefs, the IMU has continuously called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan and attempted to install sharia in some parts of Ferghana valley. Having conducted several violent incursions in 1999 and 2000 in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the IMU allegedly metamorphosed into the Islamic Party of Turkestan, aiming for the creation of an Islamic state in Central Asia. The IMU is also known for having had bases in Taliban-controlled northern Afghanistan and adopting an anti-US and anti-Jewish rhetoric, calling the Uzbek president “external pageJewish and unbelievercall_made” and kidnapping US and Japanese citizens for ransom.

In addition to its goal of re-establishing a Muslim Caliphate, HuT also believes that sharia should regulate all aspects of human life. HuT is however against any gradualism and prefers radical, revolutionary change: the takeover of state by the means of jihad after completing the initial two stages of member recruitment and Islamization of the society. For over 50 years, the group has therefore kept its mostly non-violent strategy; claiming that “external pagemilitary struggle is not the method of reestablishing the Caliphatecall_made.” Although there were several splits within the movement, some of which resorted to violence, violent strategy is not the predominant characteristic of HuT itself.

The Uzbek government, however, does not take into account the differences between such groups in its own response. It has made every effort to eradicate these groups, blaming them for virtually all terrorist attacks on the state. Such behavior is rooted in the past, when in the 1990s there was a crackdown on all Islamic groups which did not support official Muslim administration, leading to multiple unfair trials.

Even though the situation in Tajikistan has been different due to the civil war, renewed repression has been reported, with the government using war-like methods to get rid of the opponents it has labeled as ‘terrorists’. Even the traditionally more lenient Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan recently toughened their attitudes towards radical groups. The 1999 and 2000 incursions and hostage takings were followed by counter-measures, part of which was to label HuT a ‘terrorist organization’, despite uncertain evidence. Turkmenistan also undertook a more repressive path after the 2002 assassination attempt on then-president Niyazov, which was labeled a ‘terrorist attack’.

In most cases, there is almost no distinction between the use of violent threats and the promotion of radical but non-violent ideas. There is also no division between political violence and general criminality.

This can be exemplified by the case of Uzbekistan’s 2000 draft Bill on Terrorism, which defined terrorism as “external pagesocially dangerous wrong doingcall_made,” while its Criminal Code puts together “external pagethe activities of religious organizations, movements, sects, and others which support terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crimecall_made.” Furthermore, in the early 2000s, several governments issued lists of clandestine radical organizations in addition to IMU and HuT that were often only nicknames for devout Muslims.

Such measures can therefore become governmental tools to ensure the continuity of their rule. However, the fact that they often lead to the infringement of human rights and brutally repressive measures brings to the forefront a question whether such policies will actually lead to the eradication of radical groups, or to their resurgence; especially if people have few other channels to express themselves.

In the meantime, it is not ideology alone that fuels radicalism. Economic issues, and particularly the narcotics trade, are just as relevant. Despite some increase in most countries’ GDPs in recent years, the lack of governmental reforms and corruption leaves a majority living below the poverty line. Radical movements lure people in with promises of communal, ideological and material security.

Resulting in addiction, crime and disease, the illicit drug trade also exacerbates the existing corruption. Furthermore, there is evidence that the 1999 and 2000 IMU incursions in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were motivated primarily by facilitating the drug trade. In fact, according to Kyrgyz security officials, by 2000, the IMU was involved in the majority of heroin operations entering Kyrgyzstan. The proximity of Afghanistan, which produces about 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium, is crucial in this respect. According to some UN estimates, 80-120 tons of heroin per year are channeled from Afghanistan through Tajikistan to Russian and European markets.

Drug trafficking is not only linked to insurgencies, though; the smuggling routes are also used to bring terrorists across the borders. Except for Turkmenistan, all Central Asian countries have reacted to this threat either by closing borders or by hardening border controls. This has led not only to the desired outcome, but also to paralysis of some local economies, indirectly forcing people to get involved in trafficking.

While radical Islamic ideology should not be ignored as a potential element that fuels terrorism in Central Asian, the heavy involvement of radical groups in the narcotics trade suggests that increased attention should be paid to combating this phenomenon.