The Long Road To 'Chindia'
By Bernt Berger for ISN
So far, China and India have attempted to keep sensitive issues off the table while trade relations improve; however, maintaining a business-as-usual attitude is not enough to replace proactive trust-building and tackling critical issues between the two emerging regional heavyweights.
The latest bone of contention is the Chinese military’s alleged intrusions into Indian territory along the northern border of the Arunachal Pradesh state; the so-called Line of Actual Control (LAC). Chinese sources have officially external pagedenied such advances. Still, with Indian experts and commentators scaremongering and making conjectures about China’s strategic intentions, the Indian public is haunted by the spectre of Chinese hostilities.
In July, China attempted to external pageblock an Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan of over $2.9 billion including funds for water projects in Arunachal Pradesh. In the meantime, the Indian military has announced that it will boost its personnel along the border by two additional divisions of up to 30,000 troops.
The prospect of the Dala Lama of India external pagegranting the Dalai Lama access to Tawang in the contested region in November has additionally disgruntled Beijing.
Painstakingly slow rapprochement
China-India relations have been improving since Chinese Prime Minister Wei Jiabao’s historic visit to India in 2005. At the time, the two countries signed a statement that included guiding principles to reach a settlement on the border issue and laid the foundation for political and economic relations.
‘Chindia' was the brainchild of Indian politician Jairam Ramesh depicting the gradual rapprochement between the two emerging powers and the synergic potential of their economies.
Yet, rapprochement is setting in slowly, and even then, largely only on an inter-governmental level.
Ma Jiali, South Asia analyst of the external pageChinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), tells ISN Security Watch that the territorial dispute is a major stumbling block in Sino-Indian relations. However, the dispute, which was subject to its 13th dialogue in August, is only one among many issues straining Sino-Indian relations.
Both sides, according to Ma Jiali, have tried to adjourn a range of sensitive issues on the bilateral agenda until established economic relations have resulted in a sense of mutual trust.
These issues are not only related to the fact that both countries are emerging powers competing economically and for influence in the adjacent regions. China’s advances into South Asia with improving economic ties to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well as the traditionally close cooperation with Pakistan in all fields are anathema to New Delhi.
The list of relationship tensions is indeed a long one. Not least is external pageIndia’s alliance with the US and Washington’s supply of nuclear dual-use technology despite a possible arms race in South Asia - something that has raised eyebrows in Beijing, which regards this as proliferation.
Issues such as water supplies from the Himalayas, or the status of Tibet are ongoing problems that have had a negative impact on relations and public perception on both sides.
Scaremongering
Chinese scholars in Beijing have long deplored the fact that in Indian media and policy circles, China has become subject to various speculations and conspiracy theories and is often described as a commercial and strategic threat.
When placing external pageIndian alarmism under closer scrutiny, the present security situation loses its urgency, and official statements say that China is not a threat.
While Indian media has taken a belligerent attitude towards China, external pageIndian think tanks have recently predicted that China external pagemight attack India between 2012 and 2017. They even ranked China a greater security threat than neighboring Pakistan.
On the Chinese side, a self-proclaimed scholar who hosts a website on strategic issues caused some hubbub when he claimed that it would be in the region's interests to divide India up into smaller states.
The influence from the sidelines of the political spectrum on public debate beyond official positions is not without reason. The border issue paired with historic mistrust and wary national sentiment dating back to the border war in 1962 have made scaremongering among the Indian public a relatively easy task.
And the rapid growth of bilateral trade between India and China does not seem to have eased these perceptions.
Proxy debates
Some analysts argue that the frequent re-emergence of the irreconcilable border issue is little more than a proxy debate for all kinds of other issues, such as dealings with the Dalai Lama and India-US strategic cooperation.
In fact, any kind of military or diplomatic confrontation is neither in China’s nor India’s interest. China follows a policy of stabilizing its international neighborhood and connecting its landlocked provinces to international markets. A lack of stability in the periphery, so the sermon goes, has a negative impact on China’s own development.
While economic exchanges, synergies in production and growing trade networks have not yet helped to improve confidence among the public, common interest in global affairs might help to bring the policy community closer.
In view of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen this December, Beijing and Delhi external pageshare similar outlooks on the demands of the developed countries. During a visit to Beijing by Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh, common grounds were indeed explored. The two countries could very well join forces in negotiating a fair deal on emissions for the emerging powers.
The latest bone of contention is the Chinese military’s alleged intrusions into Indian territory along the northern border of the Arunachal Pradesh state; the so-called Line of Actual Control (LAC). Chinese sources have officially external pagedenied such advances. Still, with Indian experts and commentators scaremongering and making conjectures about China’s strategic intentions, the Indian public is haunted by the spectre of Chinese hostilities.
In July, China attempted to external pageblock an Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan of over $2.9 billion including funds for water projects in Arunachal Pradesh. In the meantime, the Indian military has announced that it will boost its personnel along the border by two additional divisions of up to 30,000 troops.
The prospect of the Dala Lama of India external pagegranting the Dalai Lama access to Tawang in the contested region in November has additionally disgruntled Beijing.
Painstakingly slow rapprochement
China-India relations have been improving since Chinese Prime Minister Wei Jiabao’s historic visit to India in 2005. At the time, the two countries signed a statement that included guiding principles to reach a settlement on the border issue and laid the foundation for political and economic relations.
‘Chindia' was the brainchild of Indian politician Jairam Ramesh depicting the gradual rapprochement between the two emerging powers and the synergic potential of their economies.
Yet, rapprochement is setting in slowly, and even then, largely only on an inter-governmental level.
Ma Jiali, South Asia analyst of the external pageChinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), tells ISN Security Watch that the territorial dispute is a major stumbling block in Sino-Indian relations. However, the dispute, which was subject to its 13th dialogue in August, is only one among many issues straining Sino-Indian relations.
Both sides, according to Ma Jiali, have tried to adjourn a range of sensitive issues on the bilateral agenda until established economic relations have resulted in a sense of mutual trust.
These issues are not only related to the fact that both countries are emerging powers competing economically and for influence in the adjacent regions. China’s advances into South Asia with improving economic ties to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well as the traditionally close cooperation with Pakistan in all fields are anathema to New Delhi.
The list of relationship tensions is indeed a long one. Not least is external pageIndia’s alliance with the US and Washington’s supply of nuclear dual-use technology despite a possible arms race in South Asia - something that has raised eyebrows in Beijing, which regards this as proliferation.
Issues such as water supplies from the Himalayas, or the status of Tibet are ongoing problems that have had a negative impact on relations and public perception on both sides.
Scaremongering
Chinese scholars in Beijing have long deplored the fact that in Indian media and policy circles, China has become subject to various speculations and conspiracy theories and is often described as a commercial and strategic threat.
When placing external pageIndian alarmism under closer scrutiny, the present security situation loses its urgency, and official statements say that China is not a threat.
While Indian media has taken a belligerent attitude towards China, external pageIndian think tanks have recently predicted that China external pagemight attack India between 2012 and 2017. They even ranked China a greater security threat than neighboring Pakistan.
On the Chinese side, a self-proclaimed scholar who hosts a website on strategic issues caused some hubbub when he claimed that it would be in the region's interests to divide India up into smaller states.
The influence from the sidelines of the political spectrum on public debate beyond official positions is not without reason. The border issue paired with historic mistrust and wary national sentiment dating back to the border war in 1962 have made scaremongering among the Indian public a relatively easy task.
And the rapid growth of bilateral trade between India and China does not seem to have eased these perceptions.
Proxy debates
Some analysts argue that the frequent re-emergence of the irreconcilable border issue is little more than a proxy debate for all kinds of other issues, such as dealings with the Dalai Lama and India-US strategic cooperation.
In fact, any kind of military or diplomatic confrontation is neither in China’s nor India’s interest. China follows a policy of stabilizing its international neighborhood and connecting its landlocked provinces to international markets. A lack of stability in the periphery, so the sermon goes, has a negative impact on China’s own development.
While economic exchanges, synergies in production and growing trade networks have not yet helped to improve confidence among the public, common interest in global affairs might help to bring the policy community closer.
In view of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen this December, Beijing and Delhi external pageshare similar outlooks on the demands of the developed countries. During a visit to Beijing by Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh, common grounds were indeed explored. The two countries could very well join forces in negotiating a fair deal on emissions for the emerging powers.