France, Brazil Defensive Dedication
By Andrew Rhys Thompson for ISN
Much of this strategic partnership between France and Brazil is due to the latter's desire to remain flexible and not solely dependent on US suppliers, plus the former's eagerness to find additional takers for the products of its expensively maintained military industrial complex, as tight international competition and varying price ranges have recently led many traditional French clients to shop with different vendors.
Especially in those areas of defense technology development, where France has taken a protectionist approach toward its industry or insisted on different technical and operational priorities, in turn developing and producing advanced 'go it alone' solutions and systems, it has found it increasingly difficult to compete with the other products available on the global market.
As the majority of French weapons systems and military equipment have always been developed first and foremost for the French armed forces and in line with French defense doctrine and government policy, such gear in turn has not always been compatible with the requirements of foreign buyers.
The external pageRafale fighter jet is probably the prime example of these circumstances. Developed as a French divergence and breakaway from the Eurofighter joint venture, the Rafale has been built in far fewer numbers and has not been sold to any export customers. Particularly the lack of international orders for the Rafale has long nagged the French defense establishment, even though the aircraft has otherwise received substantial technical praise from within NATO circles and has operationally proven itself in combat missions over Afghanistan.
As a clever add-on to a external pagemassive defense deal between France and Brazil, involving the sale of four French Scorpène class diesel-electric submarines, the joint development of Brazil's first nuclear sub based on the French Rubis and Triomphant classes, plus the sale of 50 French SuperCougar military helicopters to the Brazilian armed forces, the Rafale however now also seems poised to land in Brazil and finally break through on the global stage.
Even without the potential value of the $10.2 billion fighter jet transaction, the other Franco-Brazilian defense deals are already worth in excess of $11.5 billion.
The single most important factor in this far-reaching Franco-Brazilian defense technology pact has been the Brazilian requirement of comprehensive know-how transfer and predominantly local assembly, plus the French willingness to comply with these stipulations.
As Samuel Logan,external pageiJET Security Systems Americas analyst, told ISN Security Watch: “The idea of 'made in Brazil’ is very important to the Brazilian military.”
Sarkozy, Lula go it alone, together
While the submarines and the helicopters are already in the pipeline, the Rafale is on the cusp of becoming a done deal, primarily due to French President Nicholas Sarkozy and his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva investing much personal prestige into the matter and directly attaching their own egos to the prospect of the French jet becoming the new showpiece of the Brazilian air force.
In September 2009, Sarkozy made a brief visit to Brazil and announced together with Lula that the two governments had entered into direct negotiations for the sale of 36 Rafale jets, bypassing an ongoing technical evaluation by the Brazilian air force, which included testing of the Rafale as well as the external pageSaab Gripen NG and the external pageBoeing F/A-18. While this short-circuiting of the formal evaluation and acquisition process especially angered exponents in the Brazilian air force, it was also characteristic of the generally difficult and often contentious relations between Lula and the military.
Not surprisingly, when the final results of the 30,000-page fighter jet evaluation report were released by the Brazilian air force in early 2010, initially by leaking them to the press, the Rafale placed last among the three aircraft and the Saab Gripen was the jet of choice for the military brass.
While this raised some eyebrows in the media and particularly with some Brazilian politicians, the release of the air force’s evaluation report was not really able to impact or change the dynamics working in favor of the Rafale.
In mid-January 2010, the Brazilian government reiterated that the final choice of a fighter jet would be based on political and strategic considerations and not guided primarily by technical aspects. Even though Saab and Boeing were also offering substantial know-how transfer and varying degrees of local assembly, the French bid clearly had the inside track.
Some observers have indeed suggested that the non-discrete publication of the Brazilian evaluation report was primarily intended to put pressure on French manufacturer Dassault to lower the final sales price for the 36 Rafale jets. If that was the formal Brazilian tactic, it seems to have worked, as by early February 2010 and following a visit by Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim to Paris, Dassault was rumored to have agreed to cut $2 billion off the final sales price and to restructure the total package to come in at $10.2 billion, 6.2 billion for the aircraft plus 4 billion for life-cycle costs over the next three decades.
As Logan, who is also ISN Security Watch's senior Latin American correspondent, stated: “Dassault really need this deal.”
While Dassault’s purported discount should make the Rafale even more palatable to the Brazilian side, it still makes the aircraft the most expensive of the three, as Boeing’s total package was valued at $7.6 billion and Saab's at $6 billion.
Brazil's clipped wings
Much of the Brazilian inclination for the Rafale is likely based on the circumstance that Brazil’s leaders see it as the aircraft that the Brazilian industry will be best able to reproduce at a later stage on its own and in turn offer to other interested buyers in Latin America.
Because both the Gripen and the F/A-18 rely heavily on many US built components, more stringent export restrictions by US Congress would apply to both of them and in turn would not allow the Brazilian industry to sell derived products without US approval. A desire to be free of such technological dependency and political control from the US can therefore be seen as a key driver in the Brazilian preference for French technology.
If technically and tactically, the expensive Rafale is the optimal fighter jet for the Brazilian air force, or whether it represents a certain level of 'overkill' is hard to say. Certainly, the Brazilian government and military are keen to achieve new levels of power projection, also with an eye toward Venezuela and matching the recent armaments shopping spree that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has embarked on, stocking up his armed forces with Russian-made equipment.
If the Rafale deal does succeed, it is because it offers benefits to both sides, but even more so, because the French really were willing to do what it takes.