Rebuilding Kyrgyzstan
7 Oct 2010
By Roman Muzalevsky for ISN
When the Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes this June threatened to undermine the regional security system, neither the regional security organizations (OSCE, CSTO, SCO) nor regional actors (Russia, the US, China, etc.) intervened militarily in Kyrgyzstan to restore stability. This, despite requests by the Kyrgyz Interim Government, which came to power following the government's overthrow in April, and dismal security conditions that left hundreds dead and led to the displacement of up to external page400,000 people. Some external page2,500 homes, more than external page100 commercial buildings and external page10 government structures were either destroyed or severely damaged, with the overall financial damage estimated at external page$71 million.
The rehabilitation of infrastructure and housing may well take years. Inter-ethnic healing and trust-building will take decades. Fresh memories of the 1990 bloodshed between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz – when the Soviet Union was nearing its demise – are a testament to the difficulties that lie ahead. Currently, external pagethousands of people of all ethnic affiliations are leaving either temporarily or permanently to settle in other countries.
Dealing effectively with the humanitarian catastrophe is therefore of paramount importance, not least because deteriorating living conditions will invite more instability, subverting the already weak national security system. Miroslav Niyazov, the former secretary of the Kyrgyz National Security Council, has emphasized the utter external pageinadequacy of the national security system in Kyrgyzstan, where authorities still struggle to exercise full control.
Meanwhile, weak government institutions and daunting sociopolitical problems might yet enable regional terrorist and extremist organizations, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, to vigorously promote their radical agenda amidst ongoing uncertainty. About external pageone-third of the population in the country now lives below the poverty line. The already pronounced unemployment in the south is external pagerising further following the global economic crisis and the Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes, expanding the pool of potential recruits.
Defining the Future
In these conditions the people of Kyrgyzstan should answer three questions when pondering the country’s future: how Kyrgyzstan wants to organize itself internally; in what regional environment it wants to live; and what it needs to do to achieve the first two. Failure to do so will put the country’s sovereignty at risk. As Kyrgyzstan seeks to pursue enduring stability, it should concentrate on the following short and long-term tasks.
The alleviation of the humanitarian catastrophe is indispensable, just as rehabilitation of infrastructure and reconstruction of the cities of Osh and Jalalabad is vital, with costs estimated at external page$230 and external page$245 million respectively. Ensuring food and energy security, with price tags of external page$50 and external page$170 million respectively, represent additional challenges in light of the projected budget deficit of external page$619 million, external debt of external page$145 million in the next two years and a external page30-48 percent reduction of the GDP in the country’s southern areas by the end of this year.
The external page$1.1 billion in donor’s assistance for humanitarian support and long-term development is therefore timely. Such aid, while tailored to local conditions, should come with strict oversight, to avoid widespread corruption. In 2009, Transparency International placed all Central Asian countries high on their corruption index, including Kyrgyzstan with a rank of external page162, close to Somalia – the world’s most corrupt country with the rank of external page180.
Ethnic reconciliation should be pursued vigorously as well. Engaging Kyrgyz and Uzbek community leaders, clamping down on abuses of power, relying on the OSCE police advisory group and cooperating with the recently formed international inquiry commission will promote a sense of justice and trust between the ethnic groups on the one hand, and the population and government institutions on the other.
Yet, all these efforts are ultimately for naught without a long-term national development plan and a commitment to democratization. Here, Kyrgyzstan must pursue military and educational reforms, as well as robust national ideology and economic integration programs.
Building the nation-state
Military institutions should not only be made more transparent and accountable to civilian control, they should also be freed from corruption, which leads to under-recruitment of minorities and ethnic Kyrgyz alike. The latter now constitute external page95 percent of all military servicemen. The Uzbeks' distrust of military and law-enforcement institutions in general, and during the June clashes in particular, has partially stemmed from the proportionally low presence of Uzbeks within these structures. Yet, the military has traditionally served as a vehicle for promoting state loyalties everywhere. And so has education.
While educational policy is designed to serve the purposes of national development, in Kyrgyzstan it does not do so effectively. Financial constrains, lack of strategic vision and corruption have stood in the way. School textbooks printed in the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan and Russia are still used in many schools, while the ethnic Kyrgyz living in the north and south speak varying dialects of the Kyrgyz language.
Kyrgyz tribalism and weak state loyalties of ethnic minorities have further undermined national cohesion. The former creates north-south tensions both among the Kyrgyz clans struggling for power and the common people, while the latter makes any vision of a modern nation-state a fiction. The Uzbeks, who external pagemostly live in the south and comprise about external page14.3 percent, represent the largest minority group, followed by Russians who number around external page7.8 percent. Some Uzbeks are even known to adhere to Uzbekistan’s time zone; the one hour time difference might seem a minor issue, but it signals a significant distinction in perceived reality.
People in the south also tend to appeal to Islam as their source of identity, unlike the people in the north who tend to exhibit secular orientations. All of these identity splits further exacerbate and feed on the country’s geographical and economic divisions. The relatively well-off north and poor south have been turned into frameworks distinguishing the advantaged from the disadvantaged.
Pursuing a visionary and constructive national ideology centered on the titular ethnic group and effective educational policy is therefore necessary to ensure national integrity.
Economic integration programs – focusing on trade, infrastructure investments and transportation – should also be utilized to facilitate nation-building. Some of the $1.1 billion in assistance should be used for this purpose where possible. Ironically, despite calls for Central Asian economic integration, no adequate progress has been made, even within Kyrgyzstan’s own borders. Currently, there are only external page424.6 km of railways, with separate networks running in the north and south. The overall rail network is one of the smallest in the region and the least dense as well. Plans already exist to expand it, thereby connecting the north and south and opening an additional transit and trade corridor for Eurasian rail traffic. It is time to implement them.
The road system is no better, partly because of the mountainous terrain that extends over 90 percent of the country’s territory, and partly because of corruption, lack of vision and funding. Roads cover merely external page34,000 km, with unpaved ones constituting external pagenine percent. Four major roads occupy external pagealmost half of all roadways, with transport contributing just external pagetwo-to-three percent to the country’s GDP.
The north and south are not sufficiently integrated. There is also only one usable yet poorly maintained highway linking the two regions, limiting trade and inter-regional interaction. This makes the country less successful in terms of internal development as a whole, and also highly vulnerable to potential secession. It is no coincidence that Uzbek calls for autonomy have resurfaced from time to time in the south. Yet, roads and economic integration programs – just as military and educational policy – can facilitate much needed national development and cohesion.
A recent World Bank external pagereport, for instance, indicates that road upgrades alone can expand trade substantially, promoting internal and regional economic integration. From the earliest times roads served as indicators of development. It was true in Egypt, Rome and the US. This can be equally true for Kyrgyzstan whose territory formed the Great Silk Road, which extended from China through Central Asia to Europe and saw prospering population centers. Throughout history, roads have enabled armies to move more quickly, people to trade and prosper faster and authorities to govern more fully. All three elements are absolutely necessary for attaining stability, prosperity and legitimacy in Kyrgyzstan.
The Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes and recent political instability have underlined the imperative of rebuilding Kyrgyzstan. But such urgency is not confined solely to the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure. Nor does it exclusively entail ethnic reconciliation. The task of rebuilding is much bigger, and so are the stakes – the integrity and sovereignty of the Kyrgyz state. Only democratization, the fight against corruption, reforms in the military and educational sectors and strategic initiatives promoting internal economic integration and national cohesion hold the key to Kyrgyzstan’s lasting future.