Bringing Closure to a Disruptive Decade

The death of Osama bin Laden during a raid by US commandos on his refuge in Pakistan should not, on its own merits, be considered an era-ending event, but it has ended the notorious terrorists' ability to thumb his nose at the West, especially the US, merely by staying at large and alive for so long. As such, his death inflicts a psychological blow on his supporters. As material seized in the raid reportedly confirms, however, bin Laden had not been organizing and directing terrorist operations for some time; he was not exercising command and control. Instead, his role in recent years had been mostly an inspirational and ideological one. Terrorist operations either in training or yet to be organized are not going to end simply because he is gone. And whatever function bin Laden performed as a source of inspiration and ideology, he can continue as a dead man.

And yet the public response, especially in the US, to bin Laden's demise was enormous. It was an outpouring of emotion and celebration rivaling that seen at the conclusion of great wars. As with any other instance in which public perceptions and emotions diverge from reality, there is the hazard that those perceptions and emotions may push the policies of governments into ill-advised directions. In this case, a mistaken view that counterterrorism is like chess, in which trapping the king ends the game, may reduce vigilance against terrorist threats that remain.

But the exaggerated view of the significance of bin Laden's departure also can be the basis for correcting some of the exaggerated reactions to the chief reason he became such a huge bête noire for the West in the first place: the 9/11 terrorist attack ten years ago. That horrifying event formulated attitudes and set into motion policies that went far beyond any well-tailored response to the attack itself. Those attitudes and policies represent a diversion from, and a disruption of, western values and prudent policies to protect western security. If the excessive reaction to bin Laden's death can be used to reverse some of the excesses in the reaction to the dramatic event ten years ago, then this would be a case of two wrongs making a right.

Iraq and Afghanistan - wars of excess

9/11 was an attack against the US, and so naturally most of the excesses in response have occurred in the US. By far the biggest and costliest mistake was the Iraq War - which had nothing to do with 9/11 but was made politically possible only by the huge change in the American public mood that the terrorist attack engendered. The launch of a major offensive war was a break with American tradition, and the proponents of the war were able to sell their idea only because 9/11 had so enraged Americans who wanted to lash out at "bad guys" and were far more willing than before 9/11 to assume risks and burdens in the name of national security. The enormous costs of the Iraq War - to Iraqis most of all but also to Americans and others - have been well documented. This misadventure also became a great diversion of American attention and resources for the better part of a decade.

The war in Afghanistan began as a justified attack on the group that perpetrated 9/11 and on the Afghan movement that sheltered the group. Since then, however, the war has transformed into a different sort of military mission - one involving counterinsurgency and an effort to prop up an unpopular government being challenged by several domestic Afghan interests. The NATO expedition has perpetuated instability in Afghanistan as much as it has quelled it, given the number of Afghans who have taken up arms largely out of opposition to foreign military occupation and to the collateral damage from foreign military operations. Helping to sustain support for this expedition is the Bush administration's unfortunate concept of a "war on terror". The current US administration has deleted this term from its official vocabulary, but the concept lives on in an overly militarized view of what counterterrorism is all about.

More distortions and ripple effects

Beyond the two big wars, an American preoccupation with terrorism has distorted policies and priorities in countless other ways, involving both foreign and domestic matters, ranging from limitations on visas for foreign visitors to powers exercised by police. Most measures have been well-intentioned efforts to make Americans safer from terrorism, but the dominance of emotion over careful thinking about effectiveness has meant wasted or misused resources. It also has meant straying from important values, most notably in the resort to torture.

Other countries have not exhibited as much of this misdirection as the US, but America's weight has meant that other western states have been dragged off course to varying degrees as well. Besides participation in the wars, bilateral relations between the US and many other states have been distorted by American preoccupations related to the reaction to 9/11. The notion of a global "war on terror" also has provided cover for other states to deal harshly with neighbors or minorities they don't like, whether in China dealing with Uighurs, Russia with Chechens or Israel with Palestinians.

Let us recognize the terrorist threats that persist even after bin Laden's death. But to the extent that the popular response to this event, however mistaken, provides a political opportunity to mitigate some of the earlier mistakes of the past decade, it will be to the good.