The future of the Colombian military

By Eliot Brockner for ISN

Increased military presence has translated into less crime in Colombia but questions have arisen as to the necessity of a large, expensive force and a third term for President Álvaro Uribe.

Since March 2008, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has experienced many setbacks, including the deaths of leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez, senior commander Raúl Reyes and the external pagevoluntary handing over of 15 valuable hostages in Operation Jaque on 2 July.

These victories would not have been possible without extensive and advanced collaborative military intelligence and cooperation. They are a testament to the improved strength and intelligence of the Colombian military, but also an indication of its renewed sense of power.

It wasn't more than seven years ago when former president Andrés Pastrana had to cede over a Switzerland-sized patch of Colombian soil just to be able to sit down at the negotiation table with FARC. Today, the prospect of that occurring seems implausible, and it has much to do with Uribe beefing up the Colombian military.

Defense spending, aided in part by external pageclose to US$5 billion dollars in aid from the US, represents to 6.32 percent of the annual GDP (over US$12 billion in 2008) according to a study done by the Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano. The Colombian newspaper El Espectador reports that in 2008 Colombia has external page254,300 soldiers, close to 100,000 more than when Álvaro Uribe assumed office in August 2002. By comparison, FARC is estimated to have 13,000.

Colombia's army has grown larger without external pagesignificant disapproval from the Colombian people. This could be partly due to a painful history and the decrease in violence. In a country with one of the world's largest homicide ratings and what used to be the external pagekidnapping capital of the world, safety and security are crucial issues.

Equally important are the economic issues. Via Plan Colombia, the US provides significant aid under the conditions that Colombia dedicates a large portion of that aid to the eradication of coca production. Another revenue generator is the free trade agreement between the two nations. Spending money on an army keeps the US and other investors happy, which in turn provides more revenue and security for Colombia.

A strong army is also necessary to do business with Colombia's second largest trading partner, Venezuela. In October, a strike over a 2,000 peso (slightly more than US$1) tax to cross the border of Norte del Santander in Colombia and Táchira in Venezuela resulted in losses of external pageUS$10 million per day in trade. It is important to control not only the lawless border but also the roads in and around the border on the Colombian side, which have been prone to FARC attacks and could severely hamper trade if there is no confidence in shipping through that corridor.

High approval ratings have convinced Uribe that he could change Colombia's Constitution to run for a third term. With external pagesome of the highest approval ratings in the country's history and a petition of 5,000,000 signatures already under review, Uribe may have the mandate to do just that. His approval ratings spiked to almost 90 percent after the Colombian military freed FARC hostage Ingrid Betancourt on 2 July.

The army is at the heart of Uribe's success, and as such the future of the Colombian army may largely depend upon what happens to him. There are other factors in play, however. As Andy Webb-Vidal points out in the September 2008 issue of Jane's Intelligence Review, a decreased security threat and potential loss of US funding due in part to the less-than-stellar results of Plan Colombia could mean that defense spending has peaked in Colombia.

History and precedent may be another predictor. Approval ratings are temporary, and sometimes the same policies that were once popular can run their course and actually be detrimental to the country and its leader. Uribe may have the mandate now, but he has his flaws. Investigations into impropriety, corruption and a spotty external pagehuman rights record have been overlooked because of his success at making Colombia a safer place, but these issues could come back to haunt him.

In spite of recent success, the military is not invincible. John Lindsay-Poland, the program director of the Latin America Program for the Fellowship of Reconciliation points out that the army has been implicated in narcotrafficking and hundreds of extrajudicial murders each year, many in tandem with paramilitary forces. Uribe has been quick to play these down. Some observers may see the president's spin, as well as his push for a third term, as abuses of power that will negatively affect the Colombian legal system over the long term.

Ultimately, increased military pressure on FARC will keep the revolutionary army on its back foot, which will resonate among Colombians. Continued pressure on FARC, combined with the boost in popularity Uribe receives every time the army mounts a major successful operation, will likely keep military spending at high levels. Yet the biggest predictor may be the president's own bid for a third term, which at this point is uncertain.