Dear Ambassador Bolton …

Your recent opinion article in the Wall Street Journal, external pageIsrael, Iran and the Bombcall_made, makes the case for a preventive Israeli air strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. In the article, you state that doing so will buy the West some much needed time.

I agree with you that a nuclear Iran is a decidedly unpleasant subject and would constitute a direct violation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  All the same, your approach is dangerously myopic. This response argues in favor of an alternative approach, one that more carefully considers Iran's perspective.

I do believe the Islamic Republic aims to develop a nuclear weapon: Why otherwise the obstinacy surrounding IAEA inspection requests? Yet Iran's grounds for desiring a nuclear weapon are not altogether irrational.

Iran has an extensive history of foreign interference. The Qajar dynasty (1781 – 1925); the Russians (1911); the British and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1925 – 1953); the 1953 CIA-led Operation Ajax, which ousted the democratically elected prime minister Mohammed Mosaddeq; and finally, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a figure widely regarded an agent of US interests (1953 – 1979). This legacy, vivid in many Iranians' memories, serves as political ammunition for the theocracy in Tehran.

More immediately, however, Iran finds itself encircled by the US military in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, surrounded by the external pagedisproportionate mightcall_made of the US.

The buyback contract Iran uses in its petroleum sector exemplifies this fear of foreign interference. The contract is a financing agreement that obliges any international oil company (IOC) to pay, upfront, the costs of exploring and drilling in Iran's oil and natural gas fields. The National Iranian Oil Company then extracts the product and rewards the IOC a predetermined return on any profits realized. This arrangement prevents any IOC from establishing deep-seated influence in Tehran by way of foreign direct investment. 

The plurality that exists within Iranian politics also requires mention, which you fail to appreciate. The best, and external pageunfortunately squanderedcall_made, example of this was the Iranian-led negotiation effort of 2003. At the time, reformist president Seyyed Mohammad Khatami made an overture to the US by way of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran.

Regrettably, the Bush administration offhandedly dismissed Khatami's offer at a time when Iran's leverage, with respect to today, was limited. It is curious to note that back then you were in the influential position of undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security.

In 2005, the radical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president and Iran's foreign policy became increasingly antagonistic. Hawkish ideologues seem to compliment one another.

Throughout your piece, you emphasize the immediacy of the Iranian nuclear threat. Here again, your analysis overlooks a critical factor. Israel, the purported target of an Iranian bomb, has its own nuclear deterrent.

You also openly call for regime change in Iran. The US tried this in 1953 and it backfired 26 years later, giving rise to the theocracy now ruling Iran. (Saddam's 1980 invasion, admittedly, solidified the regime's power.) With the US military standing at Iran's doorstep, it is no wonder Tehran is hesitant to compromise on its nuclear program. No rational actor, under such hostile conditions would sacrifice its prime source of leverage.

Finally, you touch on the EU-3's efforts. They have been ineffective. However, it is again hard to see how they could be effective if the US position is so openly hostile. By spearheading the dispute, Washington's word is decisive. Why cut a deal with Brussels if Washington is going to dupe you anyway?

A preventive strike by Israel would gravely damage US-Iranian relations. Forget any plans for Iranian assistance in Iraq. Expect, rather, a deteriorating Iraqi security situation.

Sino-US relations would also suffer. China imports billions of dollars worth of oil from Iran every year and has other multi-billion dollar contracts with the National Iranian Oil Company. The largest, which materialized in 2004, is worth US$75-$100 billion and has a shelf life of 25 years. A strike would likely cause international oil prices to skyrocket and China would be exceedingly displeased. Additionally, the US economy could hardly cope. This unfortunately seems not to concern you: "We will be blamed for the strike anyway, and certainly feel whatever negative consequences result, so there is compelling logic to make it as successful as possible."

To curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, direct US-Iranian dialogue is necessary. The nuclear question must be on the table and confidence-building steps, endorsed multilaterally, should be taken early on. For example, the US could pledge to refrain from using force until a renewed diplomatic effort is exhausted.

Ultimately, however, the US must be willing to compromise. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, other US restrictions against Iranian banks, the US' list of state sponsors of terrorism as well as assistance with Iran's civil nuclear program, as already offered by the EU-3, are all options. Brazenly advocating for regime change is not a sound negotiating platform.

The Israeli limited-strike option is viable even after a new US president takes office on 20 January 2009. By toning down the virulent rhetoric, the US may find in Iran a more amenable partner than it expects.