Ambiguities of neutrality
By Myriam Käser for ISN
Right-wing Swiss People's Party (SVP) member Ueli Maurer, whom the Swiss parliament last week elected to the Federal Council, the country's seven-member executive authority, has vowed not only to tackle military issues, but to "try to exert influence on Switzerland's foreign policy," according to the SonntagsZeitung on 14 December.
Starting on 1 January 2009, Maurer will head the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports, and his intentions of mission creep are likely to lead to dissension with the social democratic head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Micheline Calmy-Rey, who has been working hard to shape the notion of active neutrality in foreign policy.
Neutrality is sticky terrain, and is often, well, not neutral at all. As such, the notion of Swiss neutrality has evolved over time. Since its defeat in the external pageBattle of Marignano in 1515, the Swiss Confederation has largely refrained from conflicts out of simple necessity. Marignano made it obvious that the multicultural and multilingual confederation would break apart if it interfered in European conflicts - particularly those between its French and German neighbors.
In the 1648 external pagePeace of Westphalia and again at the 1816 external pageCongress of Vienna, the European powers acknowledged Switzerland's "everlasting armed neutrality" - not least due to the strategic importance of the Alpine region and the demand for Swiss mercenaries.
After World War I, Switzerland adopted "differential neutrality," joining the League of Nations and supporting its economic sanctions. It abandoned this policy 1938 in favor of "integral neutrality," hence refraining from imposing economic sanctions. Armed neutrality was reaffirmed at the onset of World War II, and afterwards, then-federal councilor Max Petitpierre coined neutrality as a leitmotif of Swiss foreign relations. With the country having been largely successful in keeping out of the war, neutrality became a strong pillar of Swiss identity.
When the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Iraq following the country's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Swiss Federal Council supported the economic sanctions, declaring them to be compatible with neutrality. It hence returned to a policy of differential neutrality, although it did not label it as such.
In 1995, Switzerland allowed the transit of military personnel and equipment of the international peace force (IFOR/SFOR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it rejected requests for military overflights during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 due to the lack of a UN mandate, hence implementing classic neutrality law.
Neutrality policy and neutrality law are often confused. The former is executed in times of peace and encompasses all voluntary activities of a neutral state to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of its neutrality. Neutrality policy is hence very flexible and can be adapted to the circumstances.
As codified in the Hague Convention of 1907, neutrality law is to be implemented solely in the case of international armed conflict. It bars the neutral state from military involvement in a conflict, and in return offers it a right to territorial integrity. At any time other than during a conflict, the neutral state can give up its neutral status by unilateral declaration.
Neutrality law has not been updated in more than 100 years. The Hague Convention is based on an understanding of war as a legitimate means of politics – a notion that is outdated since the use of force has been outlawed by the UN Charter. As a result, customary law is all the more important - and essentially defined by Swiss practice since there are no other neutral states left (Sweden, Finland and Austria are non-aligned states and Ireland can arguably be understood as such too).
Neutrality has contributed to Europe's stability and allowed Switzerland to offer its good services in many instances. Today, however, neutrality mainly serves as a diffusely defined cornerstone of Swiss identity.
Already in 1993, the Federal Council stated in its neutrality report that the traditional formula of "security through neutrality and independence" was to be amended by "security through cooperation," since neutrality alone could not protect the country against new dangers such as terrorism, organized crime and environmental destruction.
The principle of a participative foreign and security policy to confront modern threats has been reaffirmed by the government's subsequent foreign and security policy reports. Only 10 days before 9/11, the partial revision of the Military Act entered into force, regulating Swiss participation in UN and OSCE peace support operations and providing the basis for arming Swiss peace support forces abroad for self-protection.
Calmy-Rey understood the tension between the myth of neutrality, which is important to Swiss identity, and the requirements of today's security environment; formulating a foreign policy based on neutrality admittedly understood as active neutrality, showing solidarity and adapting to the circumstances.
Maurer has a different understanding of neutrality. His right-wing SVP gained momentum in the 1990s and eventually became the country's biggest party in large part due to its isolationist course and old-fashioned neutrality policy. Naturally, Maurer sees the most important function of the Swiss Army in the area of national defense and opposes foreign involvement of Swiss troops.
Maurer will be able to make important decisions in the defense department. The main features of the country's foreign and security policy will, however, be defined by the entire Federal Council. To prevent the new defense minister from turning everything upside down, it reaffirmed earlier decisions such as its commitment to Swiss participation in peace support operations. After all, neutrality has never been a goal of Swiss foreign policy, rather always a means to an end.