NK: Frozen, but not still

Nearly five months after the August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict that culminated in Moscow's recognition of the self-declared independence of Georgia's two separatists regions, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains as the last "frozen conflict" in the South Caucasus.  While international mediation of the Karabakh conflict continues to pressure the rival Armenian and Azerbaijani sides to maintain the peace process, the new post-August geopolitical landscape in the region suggests that a resolution to this conflict remains a long way away. 

The outlook for progress in mediating this conflict is only further complicated by Russia's newfound consolidation of power and influence in the region, as well as by Azerbaijan's threats to settle the conflict by force, a militant rhetoric that has been only bolstered by a massive increase in defense spending in recent years.  But with the EU now directly engaged in the region - with monitors deployed in Georgia - and an incoming US administration eager to make its mark on a new post-Bush foreign policy, this region may very well devolve into an arena for strategic competition.

Conducted through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) tri-partite Minsk Group, co-chaired by the US, Russia and France, this ongoing mediation effort has only increased in the wake of the Georgian war, even driving the three disparate powers into a closer alignment on the Karabakh issue.

But commenting on the US view of the new post-August landscape in an 29 December interview 29 December with Armenia's Hetq Online, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza noted that "Russia's invasion of Georgia has had a major impact on regional developments," with Russia demonstrating that it was "willing to use overwhelming force" and "take military actions that threaten the flow of Caspian energy to global markets and of vital goods to Armenia via Georgia."

Yet Bryza also asserted that the war in Georgia also "showed that the international community is willing and able to impose serious costs on Russia for such belligerent behavior."  Tracing Russia's current "constructive response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" as at least in part due to those "costs," the US officials stressed that Russian President Dmitri Medvedev's November summit meeting in Moscow with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts "made an important and positive contribution to the Minsk Group peace process."

Weighing volatility

Pointing to the need for even greater coordination between Moscow and Washington, Bryza was optimistic, adding that the signing of a joint statement by the three leaders during the Moscow summit reaffirmed "the need for a political and, therefore, peaceful settlement of the conflict." 

Somewhat ironically, prior to August, the three so-called "frozen conflicts" in the South Caucasus were commonly viewed as irrefutable elements of the post-Soviet regional landscape.  Although the unresolved conflicts over South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh were the subject of institutionalized international mediation, the lack of open hostilities fostered a sense that despite the need for resolution, none of these conflicts posed an insurmountable impediment to stability or security in the region.

While such a view tended to promote a seemingly stable process of conflict management over conflict resolution, one of the more significant lessons from the conflict in Georgia this past August was the demonstration of the inherent danger of underestimating the volatility of such lingering and unresolved issues.  And although the Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has effectively imposed a one-sided resolution to those conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh now stands as not only the region's sole remaining frozen conflict, but may emerge as the most serious threat to regional stability and security.

Moreover, the potential for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to emerge as a new threat to regional security stems from two key factors.

First, Russian policy toward the Karabakh issue is markedly different from its approach to the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  For Moscow, Nagorno-Karabakh is unique and reflects a very different correlation of interests.  Unlike the Georgian conflicts, Russia's ever-close relationship with Armenia, the only country in the region to host a Russian military presence, prevents Moscow from seeking any real resolution, maintaining the unresolved nature of the conflict as a very effective means of leverage. 

In this way, Russia favors the "status quo" of active mediation, but always well short of the pressure needed to push the parties toward a lasting solution.  But at the same time, again unlike the Georgian model, Russian preference for the status quo also necessitates close cooperation with the US within the OSCE mediation process. 

But Armenian journalist David Petrosyan, writing for the English-language Noyan Tapan weekly, also argues that Russia is key and cites Azerbaijani analyst Arif Yunus as seeing Moscow's assent as a prelude to "the realization" of any negotiated resolution.  Yet Yunus is also quoted as expressing doubt over Russia's sincerity, adding that "if the Kremlin has some plan, for sure it does not envisage a complete and final settlement of the conflict."  Moreover, Yunus is cited as arguing that in the event of a settlement, Armenia's "dependence on Russia will weaken" and "the issue of withdrawal of the Russian military base from Armenia will be on the agenda."

Second, the danger for renewed instability is rooted in a misreading of the lessons from the Georgia.  Specifically, Azerbaijan's steady stream of threats of military action to retake the Karabakh enclave reflects a very different view of the August war.  For some in Baku, the Georgian decision to resort to military means to resolve its frozen conflict was not necessarily wrong.  Rather, in this view, the Georgian mistake was to launch military operations before the Georgian forces were ready, reflecting an error in preparation that some in Azerbaijan assert will not be repeated in Baku.

Such militant rhetoric of Azerbaijan's leadership was renewed in President Ilham Aliyev's nationally televised New Year address, in which he laid claim to Nagorno-Karabakh as "an ancient Azerbaijani land" and vowed to "make every effort to restore Azerbaijan's territorial integrity," adding that "we can use political, diplomatic and, if necessary, military means."  And unlike his past posturing, Aliyev went further, saying that "only the first stage of the war ended, and we must be prepared to free our lands of occupiers by any means and at any moment."  He then noted that Azerbaijan has "demonstrated our military might to everyone."

The Azerbaijani leader's threats coincided with a visit to the frontline by his Armenian counterpart just days after the new year, although President Serzh Sarkisian made little reference to the conflict in his televised New Year's message to the Armenian people.  For his part, Sarkisian argued that Georgia's ill-fated attempt to restore its control over South Ossetia by military means had a "sobering impact" on Azerbaijan.

This has, in turn, fostered a reaction in both Armenia and Karabakh, driving militancy over moderation. In an interview with Armenpress conducted on 27 December in the Karabakh capital Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh President Bako Sahakian said that the "aggressive and anti-Armenian policy waged by the authorities of Azerbaijani, sharp drastic increases in military spending, frequent violations of the cease-fire regime require us to be more vigilant and purposeful in strengthening defense potential of the country."

Sahakian also warned that although the military posture of Karabakh forces was essentially defensive in nature, the "high level of combat readiness and fighting strength" meant that the Karabakh armed forces could, "if necessary," launch "military operations deep into the territory of an aggressor state."

Turkey warms to Armenia

On a broader level, Karabakh also represents an even greater obstacle to new opportunities for regional stability. As former deputy foreign minister of Nagorno-Karabakh Masis Mayilian asserted recently, the "Karabakh conflict is the key to any substantial progress in ensuring security and achieving agreement on cooperation in the South Caucasus."  He further argued that "ensuring security of the Karabakh people is the key issue in the settlement of the conflict with Azerbaijan," claiming that "Karabakh's security can be provided for only by recognition of the independent statehood of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic."

Such a stance seems to diminish the recent promise offered by the breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian diplomacy, however.  After launching this new diplomatic initiative, Turkey confirmed that its opening toward Armenia has reflected a realization that its prior policy of linking the Karabakh issue to any normalization of relations with Armenia has failed.  And in September, Turkish President Abdullah Gul became the first-ever Turkish head of state to visit Armenia, in a bold reversal of Turkish policy.

Turkey has also worked hard to reassure Azerbaijan, most recently demonstrated in a press conference on 1 December in Baku, where Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan defended Turkey's diplomatic efforts to improve ties with Armenia, arguing that "the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations would have a positive impact on the Azerbaijan-Armenia talks over Nagorno-Karabakh."

Regarding this Turkish-Armenian breakthrough, US official Bryza stated that "Turkey and Armenia have a chance to make an historic breakthrough by normalizing their relations" that "would mark a dramatic and positive development for the entire region."  Such a breakthrough would also "accelerate the Karabakh peace process by helping to change the psychology from one of pressure and threats to one of compromise and mutual gain."

Yet is seems more realistic to anticipate yet another missed opportunity, with the promise for regional security and stability remaining as elusive as ever.