Israel's political fragmentation

The electoral silly season has again descended on Israel with a record 34 electoral slates vying for the attention of a largely indifferent and somewhat bemused voting public.

Held against the backdrop of the recent Gaza conflict, the elections look set to return a right-wing majority to the Knesset.

With polls showing the race between the Likud and Kadima to emerge as the largest party tightening, the election prospects of the two major players hang in the balance.

To Ben Gurion University political scientist Dr Neve Gordon, "Regardless of who wins it will have to be a right-wing government; centrist right if not totally right and a government that will not be able to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians."

Personal politics

There has been a distinct lack of policy elaboration from all three major parties during the campaign, with the Likud, Labor and Kadima focusing on the personal qualities of their party leaders. This obsessive focus on personality over policy has fostered a wave of scurrilous character assassinations.

In reference to Kadima head and Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, the Likud has argued that the responsibilities of leadership are "too big for her," while Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu has been portrayed as an inveterate liar by both the Kadima and Labor campaigns, with the former hammering the phrase: "Bibi, I don't believe him."

For the Likud, a winning electoral strategy was always going to be premised on keeping the focus off Netanyahu, who remains a divisive figure, and on the alleged failings of Kadima in office and purported weakness of Livni on security issues.

These efforts received a significant boost through the recent military operation in Gaza which effectively froze the election campaign in mid-flow with the Likud ahead in polling. The conflict also encouraged a rightward shift in the large floating voting center where the election will be decided.

As foreign minister, Livni's prominent role in ending the Lebanon War of 2006 and in discouraging broader international condemnation of the Gaza operation have been effectively lost in campaigning.

Asked if Kadima could still emerge as the largest party, Tel Aviv University's Professor Gideon Doron told ISN Security Watch, "This is politics so anything is possible, but I don't think so. Kadima made a mistake by concentrating too much on Mrs Livni and I don't think she is experienced enough; she can't carry a campaign on her shoulders."

With the Gaza conflict coinciding with a boost in the polls for Labor from around 10 to as many as 17 seats, the Labor campaign has appeared directly aimed at securing a return to the defense ministry in the incoming government for leader Ehud Barak.

"Barak personally has come out with a bit more credit than he had before," Gordon said referring to the Gaza conflict, while cautioning, "Whether Labor will actually see the results we don't know yet."

Race and security central issues

The campaign spotlight has remained firmly focused on security and domestic race relations, to the benefit of the right.

Labor leader Barak's campaign has largely eschewed the shaky social-democratic credentials of his party in promoting the image of the victorious commander who will offer a hand in peacemaking and a "fist" to Israel's enemies.

The obsessive concentration on security has been profoundly damaging to Livni who has been forced into hawkish positions, such as intimating a willingness to re-enter Gaza, out of kilter with her initial campaign agenda of promoting her future administration as one with which the US can do business.

The Likud appears to be paying the price for not attacking Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu earlier. The two parties are directly competing for the same pool of secular rightist voters. While Lieberman's party is more strident on race relations; places a stronger emphasis on secular marriage or civil unions (a political non-starter); and has wavered on territorial concessions to the Palestinians there is little practical difference between the two parties. Lieberman has been a close associate of Netanyahu's in the past.

Noting that the Likud came out strongly for the first time against Yisrael Beiteinu on 4 February, Gordon said, "If Netanyahu wants to position himself as a centrist, as opposed to a right wing ideologue, he has to attack Lieberman."

"The Likud is more stable and known as an establishment party," Doron noted. "Lieberman is more the voice of, I wouldn't say racists, but people that are already tired of the conflict and they want a clear cut solution to a very complex situation."

Yisrael Beiteinu's campaign has focused almost completely on the alleged threat posed by the Arab-Israeli populace and its political representatives to the security and Jewish nature of the state, utilizing the catchphrase: "Only Lieberman understands Arabic."

This campaign may yet prompt a greater turnout in Arab-Israeli towns and villages on election day. However, the effective sidelining of the three lists in the Knesset that draw the most support from the Arab public, Hadash, Ra'am-Ta'al and Balad, means that they are unlikely to snare more than 10-12 seats between them.

Turnout key

With all surveys showing the Likud enjoying a slight lead, Netanyahu remains in pole position to reassume the mantle of prime minister after an almost decade-long hiatus. Nevertheless, the race appears to be tightening in a manner that may spring a surprise when initial exit polls are announced next Tuesday night.

Officials of the dovish Meretz party (polling 4-6 seats) external pagereportedlycall_made fear a trend whereby women supporters, motivated by the likely inability of the party to play an important role in the incoming coalition, are migrating toward Kadima.

The big fear for the Likud is that this will create a late surge in support for Livni, particularly amongst secular Jewish middle class women who could well hold the key to the election should they turn up to vote in large numbers.

The gap between the Likud and Kadima in polls released 2-4 February is down to 3-5 seats. If the 2006 election, which saw an unprecedented low of 63.6 percent of eligible electors casting their votes, is anything to go by "undecideds" may stay away in droves, a fact that seemingly favors the Likud.

However, it is important to note that the 2006 election turnout low was caused in large part by the low turnout from the right-wing base with polling stations in poorer, traditionally Likud and Shas-supporting neighborhoods and towns virtually deserted in some cases.

The rise in support for Yisrael Beiteinu – which is now enjoying cross-over appeal with this demographic - and a distinct lack of election buzz in many impoverished Jewish towns and neighborhoods means that this election race is far from over.

Firm majority

Netanyahu would appear to enjoy significantly greater options in cabinet formation through a predicted circa 65-55 right-religious majority in Knesset.

According to a poll released Wednesday, a Likud-Labor-Yisrael Beiteinu axis would provide Netanyahu with an absolute majority of 61 seats. However, with the Labor left unlikely to be whipped into line on key votes, Netanyahu will certainly look right for other parties to provide offsetting support should he win.

Here there are no good options, with Shas' involvement certain to create problems for both Labor and Yisrael Beiteinu. Like Shas, fellow ultra-Orthodox party, United Torah Judaism (UTJ), will demand massive handouts to strengthen its institutions and is an untrustworthy coalition partner.

For the Likud leader, Shas' early embrace in campaigning has emerged as something of an albatross around his neck with the rise of Yisrael Beiteinu.

Shas is loathed by a significant sector of the secular Jewish-Israeli populace. This is particularly true of the Russian-Israeli base of Yisrael Beiteinu which may choose to punish their party if it again agrees to sit with Shas, the party that placed roadblocks in the paths of thousands of prospective Russian immigrants in the 1990s while in control of the Interior Ministry.

Netanyahu may be inclined to deal with one or both of the small pro-settlement national-religious parties, Jewish Home and National Union, which look set to win around seven seats in the incoming Knesset.

Their involvement in the coalition will be premised on government disavowal of the peace process, a move that despite election bluster may prove impolitic for Netanyahu given the change in administrations in the US. The Likud leader will also be wary of relying on national-religious parties' support given his ouster at the hands of the radical right in 1999.

Despite the difficulty of pulling together the fractious right in coalition formation and governing, Netanyahu faces an easier task than Livni.

Limited options

For Kadima, the coalition formation equation will prove far more difficult should it pull off a surprise on election night. As with the Likud, Labor is again the first port of call, with Yisrael Beiteinu a close second.

Given that Shas forced these elections, openly supports Netanyahu, and has campaigned on the dangers of an agreement with the Palestinians (while moderating this stance this week), it will be difficult, but not impossible, for Livni to bring the Sephardi party into government.

On the left, Meretz will not sit in government with Lieberman, while Livni has openly rejected coalescing with the non-Zionist Hadash, Ra'am-Ta'al and Balad. However, all will provide support for peace moves.

On the right, the UTJ are in play but will probably only agree to provide support from outside the coalition. As for Netanyahu, the national-religious lists are out of the question should Livni decide to push ahead with peace talks.

The foreign minister looks unlikely to agree to play second fiddle to Netanyahu in a grand coalition, which would blur the hazy lines between the Kadima right and Likud, from whence it emerged.

In light of the dissolution of all previous center parties, Livni's success in maintaining a large support base on 10 February will be crucial in staving off an eventual second challenge for the Kadima leadership from rightist Shaul Mofaz.

To Gordon, should the party lose, "Strategically Kadima should probably stay outside the government if it wants to win [the next election] and wants to remain a power worth considering in future."

Instability and crisis

Ultimately, the failure to raise the threshold for Knesset representation from two percent, and inherent fragmentation of the Israeli polity along ethnic, racial and religious lines will prevent the formation of stable national governments for the foreseeable future.

"We cannot plan for the future," Doron lamented. "It's terrible because every 18 months the government changes so there is no incentive for ministers to act for change because they know they are not going to be there."

The fragmentation of the Israeli party system has only increased in recent years with polls showing that the incoming Knesset could boast an unmanageable 12-14 factions.

The results of this are all too clear: the shortening of electoral cycles; the holding hostage of successive governments by minor parties; the efflorescence of dangerous racial politics in the resultant vacuum; and a fundamental inability to push ahead on a clear track with the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Gordon believes Israeli society is in a state of crisis: "We are seeing lower voter turnout over the years. There is a kind of disenchantment and a crisis with the political leadership."

He argues that this creates a desire for renewal that can foster the emergence of a "less corrupt politics." Conversely, "It can also go in the neo-fascist direction. And that is what I think we see […] a move towards a xenophobic politics."