Pyongyang’s Relations with Moscow and Beijing
An increasingly capable nuclear North Korea is seemingly growing closer to both Russia and China. While converging interests between the three states exist, there are limits to how deep their partnership runs and consequently risks of overestimating the extent of their coordination and cooperation. Nevertheless, security threats arising from these developing relationships are increasingly important and have implications for not only Northeast Asia, but also Europe.
In April 2024, Russia voted against the extension of the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts that monitored international compliance with sanctions imposed on North Korea over the last 14 years. While sanctions will remain in place under various UN Security Council resolutions, they will become even more difficult to enforce, providing Pyongyang with further space to continue its nuclear and ballistic missile developments. Given that Russia now uses North Korean ballistic missiles in its war of aggression against Ukraine, the veto does not come as a surprise to many observers. It also follows a summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September 2023, which foreshadowed closer engagement between the two states. China, for its part, abstained from the vote on the Panel of Experts, following a joint veto with Russia in 2022 to impose further sanctions on North Korea following ballistic missile tests.
China’s and Russia’s apparent disinterest in further restraining North Korea’s nuclear program highlights an emerging alignment of interests between the three states and directly undermines past efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region. Since the failure of US diplomatic efforts to rein in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities at the Hanoi summit in February 2019, Kim Jong-Un has overseen significant efforts to develop, modernize, and diversify North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile arsenal. He has also set aside longstanding goals to normalize relations with the US in favor of closer external pagestrategic alignment with both Russia and China.
Consequently, the Biden administration has placed a strong focus on relations with allies in the region such as South Korea and Japan, including by strengthening extended nuclear deterrence mechanisms and encouraging allies to reinforce conventional defenses. These developments reinstate the Korean Peninsula as a focal point of escalating geostrategic tensions between the US and its allies on one side, and the strengthened partnership of Russia, China, and North Korea on the other. However, much remains uncertain as to what the depth and breadth of increased cooperation and coordination between Russia China, and North Korea concretely implies. Differences in the scope of each bilateral relationship and how they influence each other also caution against overestimating the impact of this emerging trilateral partnership. This analysis will examine the implications of North Korea’s nuclear developments and evolving relationships with Moscow and Beijing for international security and global non-proliferation efforts.
The author:
Névine Schepers is the Team Head and a Senior Researcher in the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. She is also co-editor of the monthly policy brief series CSS Analyses in Security Policy.