US: Russia, Iran or both?
By Mark N Katz for ISN
Washington says it is seeking to improve relations with both Russia and Iran. This, of course, is laudable; however, there is an important obstacle to achieving this dual rapprochement of which the Obama administration so far appears unaware.
US efforts to improve ties with either is likely to be seen as an unfriendly act by the other. Tehran already sees Washington’s claims that improved Russian-American ties would allow for more effective cooperation against Iranian nuclear ambitions as evidence that the Obama administration is not really interested in improving Iranian-American relations. This should not be a surprise.
Similarly, Moscow fears that improved Iranian-American relations will lead to US approval for and even investment in a natural gas pipeline from Iran to Europe. It also fears that Iran could serve as an alternative to Russia as a transit route for Caspian Basin oil and gas to reach the world market. This would not only undermine Russia’s growing importance to Europe for natural gas, but would also weaken Moscow’s political leverage over Europe, and to an even greater extent, over petroleum exporters Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan – which Moscow regards as belonging within its sphere of influence.
Some might argue that the Nixon administration’s simultaneous rapprochements with Moscow and Beijing in the early 1970s showed that improving relations simultaneously with two governments with which Washington previously had hostile relations is possible. There is, however, an enormous difference between then and now.
Sino-Soviet relations had grown extremely tense by the early 1970s. Neither Moscow nor Beijing liked the fact that Washington was improving its ties with the other. But they both feared each other to the extent that each saw an advantage in reducing tensions with the US.
At present, by contrast, Moscow and Tehran do not fear each other; nor does either seem particularly fearful of the US. Neither, then, can be expected to want to improve relations with the US if it sees Washington as trying to pursue rapprochement with the other. Instead, Moscow and Tehran are each likely to feel threatened by Washington’s intentions and doubt its sincerity.
As such, the Obama administration may have to choose which it values more: Russia or Iran.
Improving relations with Iran would go a long way to undermining Russia’s geopolitical ambitions in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Improving relations with Russia, by contrast, would probably come at the cost of accepting some of Moscow’s ambitions - especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. And despite the hopes of many in Washington, it is doubtful that Moscow would or even could help dissuade Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, Tehran’s incentive to acquire them might be increased if it believes that Russia and the US (as well as the EU) are ganging up on it.
Iran, of course, has geopolitical ambitions of its own. But since Iran is smaller and weaker than Russia, thwarting Tehran’s ambitions should be easier than thwarting Moscow’s.
It is possible that a rigorous cost-benefit analysis conducted by the Obama administration might determine that the US has more to gain, or at least less to lose, from improving relations with either Iran or Russia. But whichever it decides is more advantageous for rapprochement, Washington should concentrate on one at a time. It will be easier to deal with the other after an improved relationship with one is an established fact that clearly cannot be easily disrupted. Pursuing simultaneous rapprochement could result in undermining relations with both.