US, Israel: Overstated Divergence

The usual pleasantries and platitudes of the public moments of Monday's White House meeting between US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu say little of the actual points of difference between the two governments as they warily negotiate their mutual relations.

Too much is made of the divergence of opinion between Israel and the US on the Iranian nuclear program. While Israel would prefer further, rapid moves toward the implementation of punitive measures on Tehran, it understands that these are largely off the table, as is a direct unilateral military strike against Iranian atomic facilities.

The formation of a predominantly right-wing Israeli government has no bearing on the possibilities for an Israeli attack, which would risk more than it would gain.

The Obama administration understands the limitations of its dialogue with Iran, while Israeli fears that the US will enter a quid pro quo agreement with Iran involving its own nuclear program are invalid.

The centrality of a Palestinian-Israeli peace to US strategic imperatives in the region is often overstated, but the resolution of the conflict is of import to Jordanian and Egyptian stability. Despite hopes for a new direction from Washington, the US and Quartet’s room to maneuver is greatly constrained by facts on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza.

There is no way to reinvent the wheel here. The US has tried both suasion and threats in the past to seek greater Israeli concessions on issues of concern such as the crippling impact of security strictures on the Palestinian economy and settlement construction, to little effect.

New US special envoy to the region George Mitchell is treading lightly in the early days of his posting, seeking to prompt the Saudis and others to make early normalization moves as sweeteners to Israel. Such moves are not mistakes but are of little interest to the Israeli government or public.

Netanyahu had until recently maintained the farce of not formally accepting the need for a two-state solution as his government looked to limit early pressure from Washington.

In reality, the Israeli leader understands that he will need to re-enter negotiations on this basis – a fact of little real importance to the Israeli government. Indeed, we may well see a repeat of the recently halted process whereby both the PA and Israel played for time in negotiations while seeking to counter Hamas.

Perhaps the most interesting potential point of conflict between the US and Israel is on relations with Syria and Hamas. The Obama administration is moving to reinstate diplomatic ties with Syria (despite the renewal of sanctions) and to allow the passage of aid funds to a future PA government involving Hamas.

A realistic and laudable initiative, the funding bill instigating the latter has been watered down significantly by congressional opposition. However, an important message was sent to Israel that the Obama administration is willing to diverge from fundamental Israeli positions beyond the impolitic diminution of bilateral security ties.

Ultimately, it will be the extent to which Obama chooses to utilize these points of leverage that will decide the prospects for meaningful change.