Iran Watch: The Twin Crises
By Kamal Nazer Yasin for ISN
As has become clear, a massive voting fraud by incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his backers - possibly numbering in millions of displaced or bogus votes - has created the worst political crisis in the Islamic Republic's 30-year history.
This was certainly not the first time voting irregularities had been observed in the Islamic state. Four years ago, practically the same spectrum of forces that pulled off the current political coup - namely, the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij militia and the Guardian Council all backed by the Supreme Leader - used the same illegal means to bring the-then-obscure candidate Ahmadinejad into the second round of voting.
At that time, the defeated candidates decided to bury their grievances "for the good of the republic" as they put it. This time around, no such forgiveness has been proffered. Instead, the aggrieved candidate, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, has vowed to continue contesting the election until a new round of voting is undertaken. Moreover, the size and the scale of the protest movement engendered by the latest voting fraud effectively rules out the chances of a quick and easy solution to Iran's current predicament.
What makes this crisis particularly ominous politically speaking, is the direct involvement of the Supreme Leader in the ongoing controversy. On at least three separate occasions, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has thrown his considerable weight behind those who have produced the election outcome.
In one instance, on 13 June, a few hours after election results were announced, he did so in contravention of the constitutional rules governing elections. The law stipulates that other candidates have three days to contest the results of an election before the Guardian Council steps in to make known its official announcement. By congratulating Ahmadinejad before the expiration of the requisite three days, Khamenei has not necessarily violated a law – since, technically speaking, as a Supreme Leader he can overrule any law he desires if he thinks it is necessary for the good of religion and the state - but caused greater harm by tactlessly undermining the stability of the country.
Aside from this, the multiple endorsements by the ayatollah have, in the eye of the protesters at least, made him an accomplice of Ahmadinejad's, thus widening the political crisis into something potentially much bigger: a system-wide crisis of legitimacy.
Ideological abyss
As many astute observers of Iranian politics have noted in the past, the remarkable durability and resilience of the regime is as much a function of its unique system of governance as it is of its state ideology. The latter which is a combination of modern and ancient components is founded on two indispensable elements: a religious as well as a popular mandate.
The country's founder, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, was a personal embodiment of these two traits. As a widely respected political leader, he commanded the unflinching support of millions of his followers. As a highly charismatic Grand Ayatollah, he had a mesmerizing influence on legions of the Shia faithful. The two elements combined to turn him into something of an icon.
The official ideology - Velayat Faghih or the Guardianship of the Jurist - conceived and named by the ayatollah himself - was the living embodiment of these two unique qualities writ large at the level of the state.
(Moreover, the two - the ideology and the man - constantly reinforced and underpinned each other's power and status. The ruling ideology gave a theoretic and theological justification to the vast political prerogatives of the ruler. As an actual person with near-infallible capacities, the top Jurist's presence at the apex of the political hierarchy ensured that the masses had something tangible with which to connect.)
The events of the last few weeks have opened cracks in the popular and religious underpinnings of the state ideology.
First, even if only 14 million Iranians, as claimed by the government statistics, have voted for Mousavi, all these 14 million now believe that their vote was stolen from them. They are all of the opinion that the state is now a spent and illegitimate force. That is over a third of the electorate. To these must be added another 15 percent who didn't vote, plus millions of Ahmadinejad voters who have become disillusioned with what has followed.
As for the religious mandate, that too has taken a beating in the last few weeks. According to the doctrine of the Velayat Faghih, in the absence of the Hidden Imam - Shias 12th and last Imam - himself a custodian of the Prophet's writ and legacy, the Supreme Leader inherits and continues the mantle of the Hidden Imam. For the millions of the pious and the faithful, ayatollah Khamenei's political blunders don't mesh with this sacred mantle; in fact, they smack of common human errors and follies. In the long-run, this realization can strike a devastating blow at the heart of the state ideology of Velayat Faghih.
What's more, through his subsequent actions, ayatollah Khamenei is only exacerbating, not ameliorating, this perception.
For instance, on 19 June, in his famous sermon-cum-ultimatum, he ruled that the demonstrations had to stop and Mousavi should accept the results. Both injunctions were ignored while punishment or threat of punishment failed to sway either the demonstrators or Mousavi from their positions.
Again, on 6 July, he told a group of supporters that the chapter on rallies and disturbances had been closed. "Mischief concocted by the enemies has come to an end," he said. Yet, after a short respite, on 9 July, thousands of protesters took to the streets again repeating the same pattern of peaceful march and confrontation with police they had followed a while back, thus showing the Leader's impotency in the face of difficulty.
"Ayatollah Khamenei is in an unenviable position," an Iranian journalist told ISN Security Watch. "If he sanctions the right of the people to protest and demonstrate, he would have to accede to most of their demands sooner or later. That would be the end of the Velayat Faghih as we know it. If he tries to use force to silence them and fail, that would also have deleterious effects on the doctrine [Velayat Faghih]. I certainly don't want to be in his shoes right now."
This was certainly not the first time voting irregularities had been observed in the Islamic state. Four years ago, practically the same spectrum of forces that pulled off the current political coup - namely, the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij militia and the Guardian Council all backed by the Supreme Leader - used the same illegal means to bring the-then-obscure candidate Ahmadinejad into the second round of voting.
At that time, the defeated candidates decided to bury their grievances "for the good of the republic" as they put it. This time around, no such forgiveness has been proffered. Instead, the aggrieved candidate, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, has vowed to continue contesting the election until a new round of voting is undertaken. Moreover, the size and the scale of the protest movement engendered by the latest voting fraud effectively rules out the chances of a quick and easy solution to Iran's current predicament.
What makes this crisis particularly ominous politically speaking, is the direct involvement of the Supreme Leader in the ongoing controversy. On at least three separate occasions, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has thrown his considerable weight behind those who have produced the election outcome.
In one instance, on 13 June, a few hours after election results were announced, he did so in contravention of the constitutional rules governing elections. The law stipulates that other candidates have three days to contest the results of an election before the Guardian Council steps in to make known its official announcement. By congratulating Ahmadinejad before the expiration of the requisite three days, Khamenei has not necessarily violated a law – since, technically speaking, as a Supreme Leader he can overrule any law he desires if he thinks it is necessary for the good of religion and the state - but caused greater harm by tactlessly undermining the stability of the country.
Aside from this, the multiple endorsements by the ayatollah have, in the eye of the protesters at least, made him an accomplice of Ahmadinejad's, thus widening the political crisis into something potentially much bigger: a system-wide crisis of legitimacy.
Ideological abyss
As many astute observers of Iranian politics have noted in the past, the remarkable durability and resilience of the regime is as much a function of its unique system of governance as it is of its state ideology. The latter which is a combination of modern and ancient components is founded on two indispensable elements: a religious as well as a popular mandate.
The country's founder, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, was a personal embodiment of these two traits. As a widely respected political leader, he commanded the unflinching support of millions of his followers. As a highly charismatic Grand Ayatollah, he had a mesmerizing influence on legions of the Shia faithful. The two elements combined to turn him into something of an icon.
The official ideology - Velayat Faghih or the Guardianship of the Jurist - conceived and named by the ayatollah himself - was the living embodiment of these two unique qualities writ large at the level of the state.
(Moreover, the two - the ideology and the man - constantly reinforced and underpinned each other's power and status. The ruling ideology gave a theoretic and theological justification to the vast political prerogatives of the ruler. As an actual person with near-infallible capacities, the top Jurist's presence at the apex of the political hierarchy ensured that the masses had something tangible with which to connect.)
The events of the last few weeks have opened cracks in the popular and religious underpinnings of the state ideology.
First, even if only 14 million Iranians, as claimed by the government statistics, have voted for Mousavi, all these 14 million now believe that their vote was stolen from them. They are all of the opinion that the state is now a spent and illegitimate force. That is over a third of the electorate. To these must be added another 15 percent who didn't vote, plus millions of Ahmadinejad voters who have become disillusioned with what has followed.
As for the religious mandate, that too has taken a beating in the last few weeks. According to the doctrine of the Velayat Faghih, in the absence of the Hidden Imam - Shias 12th and last Imam - himself a custodian of the Prophet's writ and legacy, the Supreme Leader inherits and continues the mantle of the Hidden Imam. For the millions of the pious and the faithful, ayatollah Khamenei's political blunders don't mesh with this sacred mantle; in fact, they smack of common human errors and follies. In the long-run, this realization can strike a devastating blow at the heart of the state ideology of Velayat Faghih.
What's more, through his subsequent actions, ayatollah Khamenei is only exacerbating, not ameliorating, this perception.
For instance, on 19 June, in his famous sermon-cum-ultimatum, he ruled that the demonstrations had to stop and Mousavi should accept the results. Both injunctions were ignored while punishment or threat of punishment failed to sway either the demonstrators or Mousavi from their positions.
Again, on 6 July, he told a group of supporters that the chapter on rallies and disturbances had been closed. "Mischief concocted by the enemies has come to an end," he said. Yet, after a short respite, on 9 July, thousands of protesters took to the streets again repeating the same pattern of peaceful march and confrontation with police they had followed a while back, thus showing the Leader's impotency in the face of difficulty.
"Ayatollah Khamenei is in an unenviable position," an Iranian journalist told ISN Security Watch. "If he sanctions the right of the people to protest and demonstrate, he would have to accede to most of their demands sooner or later. That would be the end of the Velayat Faghih as we know it. If he tries to use force to silence them and fail, that would also have deleterious effects on the doctrine [Velayat Faghih]. I certainly don't want to be in his shoes right now."