Obama: Beyond Military Intervention

Smarter, more nuanced policies than mere military intervention are to be expected from the US when it comes to the Middle East. In fact, the military option is currently the least feasible choice, Patrycja Sasnal, comments for ISN Security Watch.

Referring to Halford Mackinder and Zbigniew Brzezinski, external pageKen Egli seems to argue that because of the geostrategic importance of the Middle East to the US, the rise of Russia and Iran in Central Asia, and the ambition for world domination, the Obama administration might not be willing to abandon the “interventionist practices” of the predecessor. However, it is equally possible to draw a very different conclusion from the current state of affairs in the region and the recent works of Brzezinski.

The works of Mackinder and early Brzezinski have become outdated with regard to the global developments since 9/11. In 2008, Brzezinski, a renowned interventionist, criticized US military engagement in the Middle East: “I have been increasingly worried that we will be drawn into a kind of vortex in that part of the world […] relying largely on force somehow or other to structure what cannot be structured by force” [Brzezinski, Scowcroft, 2008]. If American interests are to be protected, the US should renew its commitment to the resolution of genuine problems in the Middle East, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict.

For the most part of the Bush years, the war in Iraq dictated US Middle Eastern policy. As a result, at the end of 2008 American influence in the Middle East was at the post-Cold War lowest. Thus, after the years of tragic negligence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the new beginning in Obama’s Cairo speech heralds a redirection of US Middle East policy from the shameful conflict in Iraq to problems of real importance to the Arab world, not merely a rhetorical abandonment of the Bush doctrine of military interventionism but the necessity to revive US regional power by nonmilitary means.

Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia have grown stronger in Central Asia and the broader Middle East precisely because of failed US interventionist policies in the years 2003-2009. The US may be in a position to check their aspirations, but significant constraints emerge (e.g. it cannot antagonize both countries at the same time, relations with Israel are being remodeled and the US economy is in crisis). Military presence alone does not make an 'intervention' more probable. Given the role of China in the regional equation, with which US President Barack Obama wants to develop a closer relationship, and Russian interests (which do not include nuclear Iran), smarter, more nuanced policies than mere military intervention are to be expected. In fact, the military option is currently the least feasible choice.

In 2009, making plans for world domination in geopolitics is a sign of myopia. In the last decade it has become obvious for many foreign policy experts that the Euro-Atlantic world would soon be losing its dominance. One striking example is the NIE estimate "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.” The new strategy is therefore to adjust US policies by consorting with future powers so as to prolong, at most, the fading American supremacy. The grand changes in international politics recognized by Brzezinski (global political awakening, power shift from the Atlantic to the Far East and surfacing of global problems such as environment, poverty and injustice) at the very least restrict the use of hard power.

We might be therefore witnessing the emergence of a brand new American foreign policy, not least in the Middle East.

Historical record shows that without the US, the utmost that the regional forces are able to achieve on their own is a considerable sustainment of the status quo. The real change - meaning a permanent improvement of security situation and development of living conditions - all, to an extent, require US intelligent involvement. And most certainly Arab-Israeli peace is unattainable without the US.

It goes without saying that there are objective constraints to Obama’s plans in the Middle East. However if, in the end, it turns out that Obama’s policies are not dissimilar to those of the Bush administration, it is doubtful that it will be Mackinder’s or early Brzezinski’s geopolitical thought that will have generated them.

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