Iran: Something Must Give

The recent presidential elections in Iran have revealed a major problem for the Islamic Republic: It is, and has always been, politically fractured. To find the initial cracks, just look back to 1979. The revolutionaries and the disciples of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, sharply disagreed as to how the state should be constructed and what its objectives should be. Consensus was never really reached, but Khomeini was extremely skillful at papering over the cracks between the feuding ideological divides to keep Iran on track while managing to stand above the political fray.

Unfortunately, his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has not perfected this art form despite his 20-year tenure as Supreme Leader. Khamenei has now dragged himself directly into mainstream politics in order to save the political fortunes of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose ballot remains heavily contested, and indeed, his own political standing.

Even if Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are likely to remain in office, the fundamentals of the Islamic Republic are more heavily contested than ever. Until they are bridged through astute political management, Iran will remain in limbo.  

Political factions

Four different political factions have typically defined Iranian politics since 1979: technocrats, reformists, traditional conservatives and staunch neoconservatives. Each faction has a very different take on how Iran’s political, economic, social and foreign policy should be run – albeit derived from differing interpretations of Islam.

Clearly, neoconservatives have enjoyed the political upper hand of late under Ahmadinejad’s rule - the coattails of which Khamenei has been more than happy to ride as Supreme Leader. But as with any democracy, elections can prove problematic. The contested 2009 ballot, although not breaking the neoconservative mould, has certainly created some cracks.

The only means by which hardliners are retaining power is through blunt repression and political censure – a rerun election is not on the cards as far as Khamenei is concerned, but this could prove to be a critical mistake for the Supreme Leader whose legitimacy is in now in doubt by putting himself at the center of this political storm.

In effect, 1979 is back; the key question asked then is the same as the one being asked today: Where is the Islamic Republic heading, and who can best lead it? The Supreme Leader not only needs to provide answers, but more importantly, to do so publicly.

Pressures building, Rafsanjani a key player

The key men asking the questions are not only Ahmadinejad’s main presidential rival - the reform minded Mir Hussein Moussavi - but an old political hand in the form of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. As a technocrat, the former president upped the ante on Khamenei by not only effectively questioning the election results, but by forming a tactical partnership with the reformist camp to put pressure on the Khamenei/Ahmadinejad ticket in the short term and to potentially pave the way for a political change of guard down the line.

The logic is simple: If Khamenei is damaged goods from the 2009 turmoil, a new leader will be needed at some point to straddle the political divide.

Khamenei and Rafsanjani do of course have form. Originally political allies in the 1990s, the relationship turned sour once a battle for dominance between the president and Supreme Leader played out. Khamenei won the first bout from 1989-97, imprinting his political dominance on the Islamic Republic, but Rafsanjani clearly wants a second round. The recent turmoil provides a perfect excuse for him to once again remove the gloves, but this bout is likely to last for some time until a clear winner prevails.

Iran’s open war – everything at stake

As part of the contest, the power struggle will pull in a number of different institutions linked to the individuals concerned. Although the hard-line conservatives currently have a strong hold within the Iranian parliament (aided by the Guardian Council cherry-picking candidates at the behest of the Supreme Leader), it is the pragmatic faction of Rafsanjani that has the majority of the seats within the Assembly of Experts. For those in need of a quick constitutional reminder, this matters for Khamenei, not least because the Assembly is ultimately responsible for his appointment, drawing its legitimacy directly from the people.

The Assembly is not about to sack Khamenei (the political fallout would be too explosive), but their disquiet has been amplified by concerns from the clerical elite disgruntled with Khamenei’s crackdown.

In addition, some within the clerical elite and the public have not been happy with the fact that Khamenei is not playing the neutral arbiter role according to the constitutional concept of the velayat-e-faqih – supreme leader. Even though Khamenei still controls the army, the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij militia and some other important councils, within such institutions, the balance of power could also be tipped in favor of the reformist movement depending on how the political winds blow.

In effect this is a political system where all the main players are holding guns to each others’ heads; something will have to give. 

External threats

The problem for the hardliners is that the West is not about to throw them a free political bone as far as any external threat is concerned. Washington knows full well that this would be used to help reseal domestic cracks, explaining why more vigorous sanctions remain on hold. It’s much easier to do nothing and let Khamenei sweat it out.

If Khamenei is to survive beyond the political tenure of Ahmadinejad (which has four years to run), he will have to find ways of easing tensions within the country and balance competing demands within the political elites, both on a domestic and foreign policy basis. Finding the Khomenei touch is the only way for Khamenei to restore his political legitimacy.

The lazy option of playing the nuclear card (which although almost certain to remain a work in progress under any future government) isn’t going to wash at this stage. Finding a compromise on the nuclear question with the West would leave Khamenei badly exposed to hardliners and indeed undermine his own strong rhetoric, while international isolation would similarly win him few favors on the Persian street. Any nuclear options thus present a political dead end for now. 

Instead, Khamenei (and indeed Ahmadinejad) will need to focus on what really matters for Iranians: domestic discontent. Protests across Tehran are of course transitory, but they are symptomatic of a crippled economy, socio-cultural clashes and a growing appetite for civil liberties that the Islamic Republic has long tried to ignore but must now work to resolve. Unless Khamenei and Ahmadinejad take serious measures to get to grips with this – not via the point of a gun - but through serious political brinkmanship and well judged reform, they will remain politically open goals for Rafsanjani and Moussavi to score at will.

The regime can, of course, and most probably will, find ways of muddling through under a Khamenei/Ahmadinejad banner, but unless hardliners start to seriously consider the threat posed to them by the Iranian people, they stand a strong chance of the specter of 1979 catching up with them. This might be in 2009, it might be in 2019 or indeed 2029, but political contractions can only be maintained for so long without careful management to reseal recurrent cracks.