Iraqi Kurd Poll, Signs of Maturity

Iraqi Kurds turned out to vote in large numbers on 25 July in the three Kurdish provinces governed by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) - Dohuk, Suleimany and Erbil. Some 78.5 percent out of the 2.5 million voters in the KRG cast their ballots in the second parliamentary election since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, and it was the first time the KRG president was subject to a popular vote.

As expected, preliminary results showed that President Massoud Barzani won the presidential race by a wide-margin against four contenders with 69.57 percent of the vote. His closest challenger - Kamal Mıraudly, a professor from the UK - won 25.32 percent of the votes.

Out of 24 parties competing for parliamentary representation in the 111-member legislature, the ruling coalition of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), running as the Kurdistani List, won the majority of seats in the parliament with 57.35 percent of the vote.

This led to rioting between opposition supporters and government security forces, leaving one dead and a dozen injured when early results were announced on 26 July in Erbil.

Despite the charges of election irregularities there was little doubt that the incumbent president and governing political coalition would win at the polls. The real upset was that the total number of KDP/PUK deputies reportedly fell from 78 and will be somewhere between 55 and 60.

Most of the lost seats went to supporters of the opposition set up by PUK dissident Nawshirwan Mustafa - a former member of the PUK - with his Change List gaining 23.75 percent of the Parliament’s seats. While that still left Barzani and the KDP/PUK coalition in control, it underscored the rumblings that have been increasingly voiced against the leading parties that have controlled Iraq’s Kurdish regions since 1991 and the leading political parties for the past 30 years.

Personal politics

Traditionally, the main issues confronting the Kurdish regions in Iraq since the 2003 US-led invasion have been their status vis-à-vis Baghdad; the territorial status of disputed regions such as Kirkuk, which are regarded as integral Kurdish lands and artificially separated from the Kurdish regions by Saddam Hussein’s policies of deporting Kurds and bringing in Arabs; and the issue of resource-sharing - particularly in regard to energy resources - between the KRG and Baghdad.

Deep in their heart-of-hearts, there are many Kurds who feel they deserve their own country, yet the reality of having all of the countries in the region that host a Kurdish population - Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria - vehemently hostile to the creation of a Kurdish homeland, and having no support from the international community for creating such a state has muted calls for independence from all of the parties. Instead, they all seek accommodation with Baghdad that would give the KRG maximum autonomy.

On the issue of the disputed territories stretching from the Syrian border to Iraq’s boundary with Iran, all parties have repeatedly stated those lands are historically Kurdish and were ethnically cleansed by Hussein and had their populations forcibly altered to dilute the Kurdish majority. In reality, many of those regions are under the control of the Kurdish security forces and militia, or peshmerga, and Baghdad does not have de facto control over them. Nonetheless, de jure they remain a part of Iraq’s Arab regions and their status remains in limbo as both Erbil and Baghdad have their respective forces there and are loathe to make concessions.

As for control over the region’s resources and profit sharing with Baghdad, one problem for all is that Baghdad has still not passed its energy law, and although the KRG has been busily signing contracts with foreign investors, that issue still has to be decided in Baghdad before negotiations can be seriously undertaken with the regions.

Important alliances

Despite charges that the KDP/PUK alliance was setting up obstacles towards the opposition’s campaign efforts, in reality, posters of the candidates and political parties were readily visible in the region.

Not surprisingly, Barzani figured most prominently, often seen next to Iraqi President Jafar Talabani, who is a Kurd himself and leads the PUK. As Barzani leads the KDP, the two symbolize the unity of the alliance between the two parties that had formerly been rivals and even engaged in a civil war that saw a short period of relatively fierce fighting between their guerrilla armies in 1996. Now they are best of friends, and in juxtaposition they represented a force that would work for the Kurds both in Erbil and Baghdad.

While the KDP/PUK alliance put on a strong display of unity, there were divisions within their ranks, including the defection of Mustafa from the PUK that led him to form his own opposition party and put forward the Change List in the elections.

KDP/PUK supporters dismissed his defection as disgruntlement over not being chosen to head the PUK. Yet his platform criticizing the lack of services, corruption, nepotism and clannishness, or wasta, within the ruling circles struck a chord with a good number of Kurds. This is particularly true among youth, who feel they are barred from getting ahead in business or government under the Barzani regime because of the favoritism showed toward his former peshmerga colleagues and fighters, which works to exclude those who were too young to be peshmerga in the 1980s and 1990s, and are not members of the leading politicians’ families.

Although no one expected the Change List to win a majority, a sizeable number flocked to support the party to demonstrate their frustration with the regime.

Barzani and the KDP/PUK had already been working to defuse some of the discontentment over the poor provision of social services for some time by striving to bring electricity to more homes. They also blamed Baghdad for the lack of funds to be completely successful in the endeavor by not giving the KRG its fully deserved share of oil revenues.

As for the smaller forces, the two Islamic parties lost some support by allying with two communist parties. Although they had been moderate Islamic parties, the alliance was seen as a sellout by some supporters who wondered why religious parties were tying themselves to atheist parties and felt betrayed by the political deal. As a result, they made a poor showing at the polls, garnering just 1.45 percent of the vote. Their support is considered to have benefited Mustafa’s Change List.

Signs of democracy

With Barzani still in control and the KDP/PUK the dominant political players since the 1970s, when the parties were formed, there is little real change on the surface.

That said, the fact the elections took place with opposition candidates campaigning and being able to win votes and steal parliamentary seats from the ruling coalition shows that the region had gone through a democratic exercise at the expense of the incumbents - a sign that democratic forces were able to function and citizens’ were able to make their voices heard.

Some of the opposition’s criticism of wasta and corruption also must be viewed from a regional context. Overall, the KRG operates in a relatively conservative society where clan and family are the vehicles for commercial and social success, and patronage is the norm, so that loyalty is valued over competency. Changing a society’s values from client-patron relationships to a merit-based system is a long-term project and one that would be difficult to implement quickly in the KRG since the whole current system is based on personal loyalties and patronage by the ruling elite.

The former commander of the British forces in Iraq, General Robin Brims, told ISN Security Watch that he estimated over 70 percent of the population in the KRG received their salaries or pensions from the KRG government. The government’s identity is strongly associated with Barzani - to the extent that those receiving income from the KRG often feel personally indebted to Barzani and were, as such, bound to confer their votes on their perceived patron.

In contrast, those who feel left out or disenfranchised by the system are inclined to oppose the incumbent. Tolga Turker, a professor of politics at KIMEP in Kazakhstan, who has studied the Kurds extensively, told ISN Security Watch that the election demonstrated the limits of the Barzani government’s popularity and could be used to hold the government accountable to the citizenry now that there is a viable opposition in the parliament.

It is uncertain whether the Change List opposition will be able to enforce some change despite their impressive showing, but the fact that a genuine multi-party election was held and opposition candidates were able to make gains is a positive sign. Also positive is the fact that the electoral issues were not simply a Kurdish nationalist platform, but grievances with the incumbent government.

This all points to a maturing of Kurdish politics in which politicians will be held accountable for their policies in the region. It also indicates that Erbil’s relationship with Baghdad is being resolved and is no longer the critical issue for Kurds.