Iran Watch: A Lame Duck President?
By Kamal Nazer Yasin for ISN
August 5 was the day Ahmadinejad was officially sworn in to a second presidential term. Normally, oath-taking in the Islamic Republic is an altogether uneventful event with little surprises expected. Not so this time. From early morning hours, the parliament building was lined by thousands of security personnel who were deployed to menace and disperse potential protestors. Once demonstrators started pouring in, police officers and militiamen resorted to tear gas and batons to disperse them, causing havoc in all the surrounding areas.
Ahmadinejad, who had to be transported by helicopter, found the parliament hall practically half empty. Many luminaries who would normally occupy the first line of seats were absent this time and less important figures had to take their place. Among those boycotting the ceremony were former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani and most of the reformist parliamentary bloc.
Also absent was Ayatollah Khomeini’s grandson, Hassan Khomeini, whose presence is considered de rigueur for such occasions. But there were also a few rightwing individuals whose inexplicable absence created some legal difficulties for the incoming administration -including 3 members of the hardline Guardian Council: According to Article 121 of the Constitution, all 12 members of the Council must be present during the swearing in.
As if this wasn’t enough, the speaker of parliament used the occasion to lecture the president about his duties instead of stating the usual platitudes. Meanwhile, outside, where the police were beating and arresting protesters, the demonstrators moved en masse to the Tehran bazaar a mile and a half away, forcing a total shutdown of the historic business district for several hours on end. Unrest continued until late into the night. It has now dawned on the country’s rulers that the protest movement is here to stay and is probably gaining in strength.
More ominously for the hardliners, there are clear signs of impending fissures and splits emerging within the Right. “Ahmadinejad’s problem is not just that the protest movement wouldn’t go away,” said an Iranian political scientist to ISN Security Watch. “He now has to deal with widespread anger and mistrust coming from his own camp.
“Many of these factions and individuals are incensed that Ahmadinejad was staging a political coup at their expense while a few others who may have been involved in the planned purge are upset about what he has done subsequent to the election with the Mashai scandal,” he said.
The academic who insisted on anonymity was referring to the case of Esfadiar Rahim Mashai, a rightist ideologue, whose appointment to high office by Ahmadinejad has caused shock and dismay among conservatives. The fallout from the Mashai scandal has been so huge that some grand ayatollahs had threatened to publicly distance themselves from Khamenei if Ahmadinejad’s decision was not rescinded. Even so, ultra-hardline Ayatollah Ahmad Janati—the head of the Guardian Council and supporter of Ahmadenijad—said in Tehran’s Friday Prayer: “We have to face that we have no choice but to live with this president for the next four years whether we like it or not.”
Ill-devised coup
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. As early as last winter, all surveys - including those conducted by government research centers connected to the Ministry of Intelligence and the Presidential Office as well some university departments - showed that Ahmadinejad was an unbeatable candidate. His government had been on a spending spree thanks to the huge revenue windfall from the high oil prices. In tandem with this, his popularity was increasing among the rural dwellers, pensioners, urban lower middle classes and the traditionalist voters while the reformist opposition seemed badly divided with Khatami dragging his feet about his candidacy.
It is not clear at what precise moment in time, Khamenei and the hardliners decided to purge the polity through an election-cum-coup. Ahmadinejad himself seems to have entertained the idea during the second year of his first term in office - that’s when he started saying he would “unmask the plunderers of the people’s wealth at some opportune time.” Khamenei must have agreed to the plot sometime last fall when he had his right-hand man, Aliakbar Nateghnouri, supposedly break with Ahmadinejad by calling for a Unity government.
In hindsight, the scheme they had devised must have seemed like an ideal palace coup with very little resistance and minimum of bloodshed. Missing from the equation had been the role of an independent popular mobilization as well as the reformists’ dogged opposition. Yet, there were no precedents for either factor.
New alignments
With the partial defeat of the coup, a completely new alignment is emerging among the myriad political factions in the Islamic Republic. First, there is a major fissure opening between the new pragmatic conservatives and Khamenei-line hardliners. The former include several factions and groupings with each vying for supremacy within the larger group but at the present moment the Larijani clan seems to be leading the charge against Ahmadinejad: They are also attacking the protest movement and its leaders.
On 27 July, the Association of the Muslim Engineers, a leading group among the New Pragmatists, issued a strongly worded statement which accused Ahmadinejad of waywardness and effectively warning him that he may be ousted from power if he continued on his present path. This supra-faction has the power of the high Qum clergy. The latter are incensed at Ahmadinejad’s recklessmess amid Khamenei’s single-minded support for the president. The power of this group can be seen by the positions they have been taking against both Ahmadinejad and Khamenei in such issues of contention as the fate of the detainee and the future shape of the government.
A recent parliamentary fight shows the extent of the pragmatists’ newly gained prowess. Last week, a strong counterattack by pro-Ahmadinejad parliamentary deputies to unseat Larijani was soundly defeated by the pragmatists. The hardliners had proposed the name of Gholamali Hadad Adel - a Khamenei in-law - for the head of the rightist Osoolgaran parliamentary faction. Inexplicably, he had to quietly withdraw his candidacy. According to the website Sanyenews published by Ahmadinejad’s son and connected to intelligence circles, Larijani supporters had threatened to expose what it termed “immoral and unethical” charges against Hadad Adel’s “past associations.”
Aside from the New Pragmatists, several hardline groups are also trying to limit and circumscribe Ahmadinejad’s powers. This is motivated both out of greed and out of a genuine concern over his competency. On 1 August, Habibolah Asgaroladi, the head of the leading hitherto pro-Ahmadinejad traditionalist coalition, the Front of the Imam and the Leader Followers, issued a statement in which he distanced his group from Ahmadinejad. “The people, the political elite, and the clergy are astounded at your decision (referring to Mashai’s appointment)” he said. Observers noted this statement with interest since four years ago, Asgaroladi’s group was given exclusive rights over the control of the billion-dollar Imam Relief Committee organization.
A key signpost for observing the new balance of forces is coming up in a few days' time when Ahmadinejad will have to submit his new cabinet list to the parliament for approval. Already, all the various rightist blocs in the parliament—pro-Ahmadinejad, anti-Ahmadinejad and centrist—are jockeying for maximum advantage.
Ahmadinejad himself is bracing for a tough fight ahead. According to several MPs who attended last week's joint parliament-president session, he refused to inform the Rightist MPs the names he was considering ahead of next week's session, confining himself to stating that they would all have strong revolutionary credentials.
Usually, such evasive tactics by Ahmadinejad presage a major surprise move to confound his rivals and enemies. Among the possible surprises to expect this time: naming a first-time female candidate for a ministry position to outflank the Left and naming one or two hardline clerics for dividing the Right. Still, the fight on the parliamentary floor is expected to be particularly bruising as well as revealing of future shape of things to come.
Ahmadinejad, who had to be transported by helicopter, found the parliament hall practically half empty. Many luminaries who would normally occupy the first line of seats were absent this time and less important figures had to take their place. Among those boycotting the ceremony were former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani and most of the reformist parliamentary bloc.
Also absent was Ayatollah Khomeini’s grandson, Hassan Khomeini, whose presence is considered de rigueur for such occasions. But there were also a few rightwing individuals whose inexplicable absence created some legal difficulties for the incoming administration -including 3 members of the hardline Guardian Council: According to Article 121 of the Constitution, all 12 members of the Council must be present during the swearing in.
As if this wasn’t enough, the speaker of parliament used the occasion to lecture the president about his duties instead of stating the usual platitudes. Meanwhile, outside, where the police were beating and arresting protesters, the demonstrators moved en masse to the Tehran bazaar a mile and a half away, forcing a total shutdown of the historic business district for several hours on end. Unrest continued until late into the night. It has now dawned on the country’s rulers that the protest movement is here to stay and is probably gaining in strength.
More ominously for the hardliners, there are clear signs of impending fissures and splits emerging within the Right. “Ahmadinejad’s problem is not just that the protest movement wouldn’t go away,” said an Iranian political scientist to ISN Security Watch. “He now has to deal with widespread anger and mistrust coming from his own camp.
“Many of these factions and individuals are incensed that Ahmadinejad was staging a political coup at their expense while a few others who may have been involved in the planned purge are upset about what he has done subsequent to the election with the Mashai scandal,” he said.
The academic who insisted on anonymity was referring to the case of Esfadiar Rahim Mashai, a rightist ideologue, whose appointment to high office by Ahmadinejad has caused shock and dismay among conservatives. The fallout from the Mashai scandal has been so huge that some grand ayatollahs had threatened to publicly distance themselves from Khamenei if Ahmadinejad’s decision was not rescinded. Even so, ultra-hardline Ayatollah Ahmad Janati—the head of the Guardian Council and supporter of Ahmadenijad—said in Tehran’s Friday Prayer: “We have to face that we have no choice but to live with this president for the next four years whether we like it or not.”
Ill-devised coup
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. As early as last winter, all surveys - including those conducted by government research centers connected to the Ministry of Intelligence and the Presidential Office as well some university departments - showed that Ahmadinejad was an unbeatable candidate. His government had been on a spending spree thanks to the huge revenue windfall from the high oil prices. In tandem with this, his popularity was increasing among the rural dwellers, pensioners, urban lower middle classes and the traditionalist voters while the reformist opposition seemed badly divided with Khatami dragging his feet about his candidacy.
It is not clear at what precise moment in time, Khamenei and the hardliners decided to purge the polity through an election-cum-coup. Ahmadinejad himself seems to have entertained the idea during the second year of his first term in office - that’s when he started saying he would “unmask the plunderers of the people’s wealth at some opportune time.” Khamenei must have agreed to the plot sometime last fall when he had his right-hand man, Aliakbar Nateghnouri, supposedly break with Ahmadinejad by calling for a Unity government.
In hindsight, the scheme they had devised must have seemed like an ideal palace coup with very little resistance and minimum of bloodshed. Missing from the equation had been the role of an independent popular mobilization as well as the reformists’ dogged opposition. Yet, there were no precedents for either factor.
New alignments
With the partial defeat of the coup, a completely new alignment is emerging among the myriad political factions in the Islamic Republic. First, there is a major fissure opening between the new pragmatic conservatives and Khamenei-line hardliners. The former include several factions and groupings with each vying for supremacy within the larger group but at the present moment the Larijani clan seems to be leading the charge against Ahmadinejad: They are also attacking the protest movement and its leaders.
On 27 July, the Association of the Muslim Engineers, a leading group among the New Pragmatists, issued a strongly worded statement which accused Ahmadinejad of waywardness and effectively warning him that he may be ousted from power if he continued on his present path. This supra-faction has the power of the high Qum clergy. The latter are incensed at Ahmadinejad’s recklessmess amid Khamenei’s single-minded support for the president. The power of this group can be seen by the positions they have been taking against both Ahmadinejad and Khamenei in such issues of contention as the fate of the detainee and the future shape of the government.
A recent parliamentary fight shows the extent of the pragmatists’ newly gained prowess. Last week, a strong counterattack by pro-Ahmadinejad parliamentary deputies to unseat Larijani was soundly defeated by the pragmatists. The hardliners had proposed the name of Gholamali Hadad Adel - a Khamenei in-law - for the head of the rightist Osoolgaran parliamentary faction. Inexplicably, he had to quietly withdraw his candidacy. According to the website Sanyenews published by Ahmadinejad’s son and connected to intelligence circles, Larijani supporters had threatened to expose what it termed “immoral and unethical” charges against Hadad Adel’s “past associations.”
Aside from the New Pragmatists, several hardline groups are also trying to limit and circumscribe Ahmadinejad’s powers. This is motivated both out of greed and out of a genuine concern over his competency. On 1 August, Habibolah Asgaroladi, the head of the leading hitherto pro-Ahmadinejad traditionalist coalition, the Front of the Imam and the Leader Followers, issued a statement in which he distanced his group from Ahmadinejad. “The people, the political elite, and the clergy are astounded at your decision (referring to Mashai’s appointment)” he said. Observers noted this statement with interest since four years ago, Asgaroladi’s group was given exclusive rights over the control of the billion-dollar Imam Relief Committee organization.
A key signpost for observing the new balance of forces is coming up in a few days' time when Ahmadinejad will have to submit his new cabinet list to the parliament for approval. Already, all the various rightist blocs in the parliament—pro-Ahmadinejad, anti-Ahmadinejad and centrist—are jockeying for maximum advantage.
Ahmadinejad himself is bracing for a tough fight ahead. According to several MPs who attended last week's joint parliament-president session, he refused to inform the Rightist MPs the names he was considering ahead of next week's session, confining himself to stating that they would all have strong revolutionary credentials.
Usually, such evasive tactics by Ahmadinejad presage a major surprise move to confound his rivals and enemies. Among the possible surprises to expect this time: naming a first-time female candidate for a ministry position to outflank the Left and naming one or two hardline clerics for dividing the Right. Still, the fight on the parliamentary floor is expected to be particularly bruising as well as revealing of future shape of things to come.