Switzerland’s Next Air Fighter
By Andrew Rhys Thompson for ISN
Since 2007 the Swiss air force has been evaluating different fighter models with the aim of replacing its large but outdated fleet of F-5 Tigers. In autumn 2008,
the air force held a series of extensive testsin order to appraise in quick succession the Swedish-built Gripen, the French-built Rafale and the consortium-built Eurofighter.
Originally, a final decision in the highly competitive bidding process was predicted for this summer. In the spring, however, new Swiss defense minister Ueli Maurer postponed the final decision in order to await the release of the new security report from the Swiss government due later this year.
The report is expected to show in which context of national security and defense strategy the additional fighters would be required. Maurer’s move to delay the associated decision on the fighters and to tie it in with the new security report was therefore quickly praised by all political factions and deemed thoughtful and frugal, in order to have all the facts in one place and to provide full public accountability on how the high investment cost for more aircraft would meet national security objectives.
Public resistance to new fighters has traditionally always been high in Switzerland. This summer, the leading opposition Group for a Switzerland without an Army (GSoA) succeeded in collecting the necessary 100,000 signatures to hold a national referendum on the procurement of any kind of future fighters.
This means that the Swiss public will have a direct say on the issue at the ballot box in 2010, as the GSoA proposal calls for a 10-year moratorium and an outright ban on the purchase of any kind of additional jets until 2019. At present, many political observers believe that the GSoA proposal could win approval, though a lot can also change in two years time.
A deal too good to miss?
In July 2009 the Swiss aviation magazine Cockpit quoted unnamed defense department sources as saying that the Swiss air force was also giving consideration to the option of buying used F/A-18 Hornets from Kuwait, in lieu of new fighters.
Since 1996 the operational backbone and the most modern units in the inventory of the Swiss air force have been 33 US-built F/A-18s.
While these developments and the possible competition from the used F/A-18 are not likely to thrill the eager European bidders of Saab, Dassault or EADS in their hopes of scoring a big contract and unloading their new equipment on the Swiss market, it does represent a politically and procedurally very tactful move by the defense department.
As Swiss aviation expert and editor-in-chief of Cockpit Max Ungricht told ISN Security Watch: “The purchase of used aircraft would politically and publically be a lot less controversial in Switzerland than the procurement of new fighters. I believe the department of defense is looking for ways to make the approval of additional fighters more likely and to lessen the chances of the moratorium proposal from succeeding.”
This was also echoed by Thomas Hurter, the chair of the parliamentary sub-committee evaluating the F-5 replacement process. Hurter told Swiss TV that the synergy effects of having additional F/A-18s, and therefore the cost-saving benefits of operating an entirely unison fleet of only one type of fighter, could not be underestimated.
“There is no doubt, in case new fighters would be purchased, that for the Swiss air force the simultaneous operation and maintenance of two relatively small yet different fleets of advanced fighters would be both very expensive and very demanding and require a true show of strength,” Ungricht said.
While used F/A-18s would therefore cost less to purchase and would enable operational simplicity and bring various other financial savings, their acquisition would not be without potential drawbacks either, as the aircraft would require certain adaptations to the Swiss standard, would not bring any industrial offset spending to the national economy, and would only have a remaining life expectancy of about 15 years.
The used jets would also have to fulfill the same catalog of criteria that the air force is applying to the appraisal of all the new models.
In practical terms the potential purchase of any used F/A-18s would naturally also be contingent on the Swiss finding formal agreement with their Kuwaiti counterparts on all relevant delivery parameters, such as price and the quantity of jets. Of disadvantage to the Swiss side in this process is that it would not be able to officially complete any such transaction until late 2010 and only after public approval in the national referendum.
At present the cost of used jets is unknown, while the government has been budgeting CHF 2.2 billion for new fighters.
Since the airspace of Switzerland is rather limited, the Swiss air force has engaged in various beneficial partnerships with other European forces during the past decade, especially for training purposes beyond national borders. Just this summer Swiss jets conducted exercise maneuvers together with the German air force over the North Sea. Because all of these productive engagements with different countries and various neighbors, the prospect of having to 'play favorites' between the European partners and the circumstance of having to select one European aircraft offer over the other two, has been particularly difficult and excruciating for the Swiss defense department. As with any major arms deal, bilateral relations and not just ordinary business are at stake.
Unless the defense department finds necessary cause to further push back the timeline in the decision-making process, the final selection of either a new or used fighter is foreseen for early 2010. For both proponents and opponents of additional fighter aircraft, it will be an eagerly awaited decision. Due to the ongoing technical evaluations and the surrounding political climate it is still very much up in the air whether Switzerland’s next fighter will be new, used or none at all.
Originally, a final decision in the highly competitive bidding process was predicted for this summer. In the spring, however, new Swiss defense minister Ueli Maurer postponed the final decision in order to await the release of the new security report from the Swiss government due later this year.
The report is expected to show in which context of national security and defense strategy the additional fighters would be required. Maurer’s move to delay the associated decision on the fighters and to tie it in with the new security report was therefore quickly praised by all political factions and deemed thoughtful and frugal, in order to have all the facts in one place and to provide full public accountability on how the high investment cost for more aircraft would meet national security objectives.
Public resistance to new fighters has traditionally always been high in Switzerland. This summer, the leading opposition Group for a Switzerland without an Army (GSoA) succeeded in collecting the necessary 100,000 signatures to hold a national referendum on the procurement of any kind of future fighters.
This means that the Swiss public will have a direct say on the issue at the ballot box in 2010, as the GSoA proposal calls for a 10-year moratorium and an outright ban on the purchase of any kind of additional jets until 2019. At present, many political observers believe that the GSoA proposal could win approval, though a lot can also change in two years time.
A deal too good to miss?
In July 2009 the Swiss aviation magazine Cockpit quoted unnamed defense department sources as saying that the Swiss air force was also giving consideration to the option of buying used F/A-18 Hornets from Kuwait, in lieu of new fighters.
Since 1996 the operational backbone and the most modern units in the inventory of the Swiss air force have been 33 US-built F/A-18s.
While these developments and the possible competition from the used F/A-18 are not likely to thrill the eager European bidders of Saab, Dassault or EADS in their hopes of scoring a big contract and unloading their new equipment on the Swiss market, it does represent a politically and procedurally very tactful move by the defense department.
As Swiss aviation expert and editor-in-chief of Cockpit Max Ungricht told ISN Security Watch: “The purchase of used aircraft would politically and publically be a lot less controversial in Switzerland than the procurement of new fighters. I believe the department of defense is looking for ways to make the approval of additional fighters more likely and to lessen the chances of the moratorium proposal from succeeding.”
This was also echoed by Thomas Hurter, the chair of the parliamentary sub-committee evaluating the F-5 replacement process. Hurter told Swiss TV that the synergy effects of having additional F/A-18s, and therefore the cost-saving benefits of operating an entirely unison fleet of only one type of fighter, could not be underestimated.
“There is no doubt, in case new fighters would be purchased, that for the Swiss air force the simultaneous operation and maintenance of two relatively small yet different fleets of advanced fighters would be both very expensive and very demanding and require a true show of strength,” Ungricht said.
While used F/A-18s would therefore cost less to purchase and would enable operational simplicity and bring various other financial savings, their acquisition would not be without potential drawbacks either, as the aircraft would require certain adaptations to the Swiss standard, would not bring any industrial offset spending to the national economy, and would only have a remaining life expectancy of about 15 years.
The used jets would also have to fulfill the same catalog of criteria that the air force is applying to the appraisal of all the new models.
In practical terms the potential purchase of any used F/A-18s would naturally also be contingent on the Swiss finding formal agreement with their Kuwaiti counterparts on all relevant delivery parameters, such as price and the quantity of jets. Of disadvantage to the Swiss side in this process is that it would not be able to officially complete any such transaction until late 2010 and only after public approval in the national referendum.
At present the cost of used jets is unknown, while the government has been budgeting CHF 2.2 billion for new fighters.
Since the airspace of Switzerland is rather limited, the Swiss air force has engaged in various beneficial partnerships with other European forces during the past decade, especially for training purposes beyond national borders. Just this summer Swiss jets conducted exercise maneuvers together with the German air force over the North Sea. Because all of these productive engagements with different countries and various neighbors, the prospect of having to 'play favorites' between the European partners and the circumstance of having to select one European aircraft offer over the other two, has been particularly difficult and excruciating for the Swiss defense department. As with any major arms deal, bilateral relations and not just ordinary business are at stake.
Unless the defense department finds necessary cause to further push back the timeline in the decision-making process, the final selection of either a new or used fighter is foreseen for early 2010. For both proponents and opponents of additional fighter aircraft, it will be an eagerly awaited decision. Due to the ongoing technical evaluations and the surrounding political climate it is still very much up in the air whether Switzerland’s next fighter will be new, used or none at all.