Galileo: Failure to Launch
By Carolin Hilpert for ISN
The European satellite navigation system Galileo was once envisioned to make the continent independent of the US military-run GPS system, unite European states with a prestigious industry and policy project, and establish Europe as a major player in space. But faced with growing costs and expensive delays, many wonder whether Galileo will ever fulfill these high expectations.
A July report external pagepublished by the European Court of Auditors, an independent EU body, heavily criticized the project for bad governance and organization of the development phase. Moreover, it accused the European Commission of not proactively leading the program. In a condemnation of the role of the European states that have a stake in Galileo, the Court found that divergent national program expectations led to considerable cost overruns.
The plan is to put a system of 30 satellites in orbit around the earth. The European Space Agency (ESA) launched the first test satellite, GIOVE-A, in December 2005. Only one other test satellite has been launched since then. The first test run of the Galileo is set for 2010.
Who is picking up the check?
From its beginning in the 1990s there were questions of whether Galileo was to be publicly or privately funded. A consortium of eight companies was founded that was to develop the system satellites and in return make a profit from Galileo user fees.
However, the consortium, a public-private partnership (PPP), questioned whether there were any gains to be made with commercial satellite navigation and whether these would cover the initial investment. Galileo’s base signal, the so-called Open Service, is meant to be free while only the higher-precision and secure signal service (Commercial Service) is to be fee-based. The largest part of civilian demand is, however, served with the base signal.
The consortium eventually failed in May 2007 over liability issues and was taken over by the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Commission. An estimated €3.4 million ($5 million) from community funds was assigned to Galileo.
However, there were already industry estimates in 2007 that Galileo would cost at least €4.5 billion. Dr Hubert Reile from the German Aerospace Center tells ISN Security Watch that cost overruns and further delays can be expected. "First of all, new decisions about the budget have to be taken which are not only time consuming, but very complicated due to the necessary matching process with all member states.
"Secondly, there is the question how we get Galileo into space," he said. "If we, for instance, used all Ariane rockets available, we would not be able to serve the world market for a particular period of time, and this would cause large economic damage to Europe.”
The consortium's failure moved the project five years behind schedule, according to the Court : "At the end of 2008, no operational satellites have been launched and cost estimates for the development and validation phase have almost doubled from 1,1 to 2,1 billion euro," according to the report.
The body also heavily criticized management issues, stating that the program "lacked a strong strategic sponsor and supervisor: the Commission did not proactively direct the programme, leaving it without a helmsman."
But according to Prof Dr Kai-Uwe Schrogl, director of the European Space Policy Institute, since the project was the first of its kind between the ESA and the EC "there was a certain learning process to be made.
"Many problems were due to the fact that this was really a first experience,” Schrogl tells ISN Security Watch, reflecting a point also made in the ECA report.
Reile highlights the magnitude of Galileo as another reason for its delays. “It is common procedure that the EU calls for tenders when it initiates a construction projects or seeks certain IT or consultancy services. In the case of Galileo, however, the project for which private contractors were sought was so big it has to be considered industrial policy.”
The EU’s call for tenders for Galileo initiated not only a large-scale industrial project, but it also set the tone and path for European security, transport and space policy. It was much more than a common Community project that needed approval from a few bureaucratic branches: It was a joint European project that engaged its member states at the highest levels.
The military watches, and waits
One of the main rationales for Galileo is that it makes Europe independent of the US-run GPS system, stoking what some believe are irrational fears that a shutdown could have a worldwide effect.
“It is very unlikely that the US would switch off its own system, but even the smallest possibility that they may do so is too large," Schrogl says.
Even though the independence argument also touches upon core issues of national security, the military has so far remained very reluctant to participate in Galileo.
Nevertheless, as Schrogl finds: “The military will most likely not contribute any funds to the development of Galileo, but will wait and see when Galileo is finally up and running. It will come naturally over time that European militaries will rely on both GPS and Galileo and work with both systems at the same time.” From a military point of view, more satellites bring more accuracy and guarantee a higher resiliency should one or several satellites fail for technical reasons.
Reile also believes that eventually, the military could take advantage of the different signals Galileo offers.
According to an ESA spokesperson, the Agency is in the middle of accepting offers for Galileo's construction, with another stage in the procurement process to follow. The spokesperson could not say when the procurement process is scheduled to be finished.
The first test run of Galileo is set for 2010.