Crisis in the Caribbean
By Oliver Harvey for ISN
The deal by the Colombian government to make army and naval bases available to the US in return for support in its war against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has polarized opinion throughout the continent. While the extravagantly named Bolivian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), led by Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, have denounced the agreement, Colombia and the US are more worried about the concerns voiced by moderate governments in Brazil, Argentina and Chile.
These anxieties were aired in late August at the extraordinary meeting of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), the new South American intergovernmental body led by Brazil. The summit was supposed to develop a constructive dialogue between Colombia and its neighbors over the bases, but succeeded only in external pageexacerbating already polarized opinion. While President Alvaro Uribe staunchly defended Colombia's right to pursue domestic terrorism, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet characterized the deal as "a non-South American nation installing bases on one of our territories." This criticism was echoed by Brazil and Chile, with only Peru offering support for Uribe.
Alone and afraid
The dispute shows Colombia’s growing isolation in South America. In the pursuit of a military victory against the Marxist FARC guerrillas and success in the war on cocaine production, Uribe has seen US support as the only credible solution. The US, seeking to maintain a military presence in the region, regards Colombia as its only reliable ally, further feeding perceptions that Washington continues to regard South America as part of a military and political sphere of influence dating back to the Cold War.
The perception is strongest in the government of Chavez, who sees the US presence in Colombia as a prelude to a possible invasion of Venezuela, where the US will appropriate the country's oil assets. Critics dismiss this idea as absurd, but Chavez's thinking is guided by the coup attempt against him in April 2002, in which the US gave support to his opponents – and in the end, helped to further radicalize Chavez’s socialist Bolivarian Revolution
Since August, when the story of the US base deal broke, Chavez has stepped up tensions through a series of punitive economic measures, including halting car imports and cutting off oil to Cucuta, a transport hub on the border with Venezuela. He has also threatened to cut all economic ties with Colombia. external pageHis comments that "winds of war" were blowing across the continent were dismissed as demagogic rhetoric, but unlike previous diplomatic crises between Colombia and Venezuela, Chavez has shown a willingness to follow up on his threats.
Colombia argues that the bases deal, where the US will have access to Colombia’s main air force base at Palanquero along with the option of six others, merely continues a partnership that has seen $5.5 billion in aid extended over the last decade under external pagePlan Colombia, the program designed to eradicate cocaine production and defeat its producers.
The US military presence in the country is already legally capped at 800 military personnel and 600 contractors, and the bases would not be available to launch independent operations. However, the Colombian military has recently dealt a series of external pagecrushing blows to the FARC leadership, and conflict is confined mostly to remote jungle regions. This is not lost on South American governments, who see Colombia as a staging post for external pageUS Southern Command’s operations.
A mutual bind
The bases agreement can therefore be seen in the context of Colombia’s desire to cement its military cooperation with the US. However, acquiescence to the establishment of a US security corridor running from Mexico and through Panama represents tunnel thinking by the Uribe regime in its regional policy..
While the rest of South America increasingly looks to forge economic and political relationships with developing superpowers like China and India (such as the establishment of the intergovernmental body external pageIBSA), Colombia’s reliance on the US as a consumer and military ally will limit its decision-making and economic flexibility.
Moreover, the bases agreement dramatically reduces the Obama administration’s credibility in forging new relations with its South American partners. Obama’s promise to embark on a new policy of multilateral diplomacy at the Summit of the Americas is already external pageperceived as hot air by most governments in the region. The administration has recognized that the bases deal was sold badly, forgetting that stronger military ties with Colombia would inevitably alienate the rest of the continent. The presence of US troops on South American soil still carries significant symbolic connotations given the region's history.
Brazil’s relationship with the US will be put under further strain as the domestic pressure on President Lula da Silva intensifies to cement South-South ties, rather than pursue the policies of the pro-US former president Henrique Cardoso. Depending on the result of the upcoming elections, Brazil may also be unable to continue its unofficial goal of moderating the Chavez regime and pursuing a pragmatic approach to Colombia.
As Professor Greg Grandin of NYU put it in an interview with ISN Security Watch, "The US used to treat the region cohesively, which made it largely peaceful during the 20th century. As a result of domestic politics and the decline of its influence, it is pursuing instead a policy of divide and rule, with which there are destabilizing consequences."
Brazilian impotence
The agreement has certainly undermined Brazil's attempts to advance inter-regional integration. The formation of Unasur in May 2008 was seen as the external pagefirst step toward a pan-South American political organization modelled on the EU. However, the August meeting simply showcased the weaknesses of Brazilian leadership. Summit chair da Silva was visibly angry with the direction of the live broadcast talks, which showcased presidents playing to their domestic audiences, rather than attempting to reach a solution.
Unqualified to arbitrate diplomatic disputes, Unasur’s weakness is easily illustrated by Colombia’s invocation of national sovereignty, perhaps the only argument that carries weight with Venezuela. Colombia argues that military cooperation with the US is comparable to Venezuela's arms deals with Russia and Brazil's recent multi-billion dollar arms agreement with the French.
Having reached no solution, the matter is now in the hands of the South American Defense Council, a body established in conjunction with Unasur to promote regional security. A low-key meeting on 17 September attended by South American defense and foreign ministers failed to reach an agreement on the competence of Unasur to approve military agreements outside the organization. Since the Council’s preamble makes explicit the right to non-interference in internal affairs, it is unclear whether any mandate exists to resolve a matter Colombia sees as its own business.
Unasur may provide only a small step toward regional integration in Latin America; however, its ambitious goals cannot hope to achieve success with members so ideologically opposed and mutually suspicious as the Uribe and Chavez governments. US military involvement will also continue to provoke a historically sensitive continent. If relations are to be normalized between Venezuela and Colombia, the best hope lies in domestic change, rather than the actions of intergovernmental bodies.
Uribe’s success in the war against FARC has given him huge popularity in Colombia, as a external pagerecent poll by the Colombian news network Semana has shown, and his government presents publicly a united front. Privately, however, senior Colombian politicians in Uribe's government are concerned about worsening relations with Venezuela, and according to one former minister who spoke to ISN Security Watch on condition of anonymity, a "de-personalization" of the rhetorical war between Chavez and Uribe could allow progress.
Uribe’s attempts to run for a constitutionally unprecedented third term do not bode well for a solution, considering many potential candidates are unwilling to stand against their former boss.
These anxieties were aired in late August at the extraordinary meeting of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), the new South American intergovernmental body led by Brazil. The summit was supposed to develop a constructive dialogue between Colombia and its neighbors over the bases, but succeeded only in external pageexacerbating already polarized opinion. While President Alvaro Uribe staunchly defended Colombia's right to pursue domestic terrorism, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet characterized the deal as "a non-South American nation installing bases on one of our territories." This criticism was echoed by Brazil and Chile, with only Peru offering support for Uribe.
Alone and afraid
The dispute shows Colombia’s growing isolation in South America. In the pursuit of a military victory against the Marxist FARC guerrillas and success in the war on cocaine production, Uribe has seen US support as the only credible solution. The US, seeking to maintain a military presence in the region, regards Colombia as its only reliable ally, further feeding perceptions that Washington continues to regard South America as part of a military and political sphere of influence dating back to the Cold War.
The perception is strongest in the government of Chavez, who sees the US presence in Colombia as a prelude to a possible invasion of Venezuela, where the US will appropriate the country's oil assets. Critics dismiss this idea as absurd, but Chavez's thinking is guided by the coup attempt against him in April 2002, in which the US gave support to his opponents – and in the end, helped to further radicalize Chavez’s socialist Bolivarian Revolution
Since August, when the story of the US base deal broke, Chavez has stepped up tensions through a series of punitive economic measures, including halting car imports and cutting off oil to Cucuta, a transport hub on the border with Venezuela. He has also threatened to cut all economic ties with Colombia. external pageHis comments that "winds of war" were blowing across the continent were dismissed as demagogic rhetoric, but unlike previous diplomatic crises between Colombia and Venezuela, Chavez has shown a willingness to follow up on his threats.
Colombia argues that the bases deal, where the US will have access to Colombia’s main air force base at Palanquero along with the option of six others, merely continues a partnership that has seen $5.5 billion in aid extended over the last decade under external pagePlan Colombia, the program designed to eradicate cocaine production and defeat its producers.
The US military presence in the country is already legally capped at 800 military personnel and 600 contractors, and the bases would not be available to launch independent operations. However, the Colombian military has recently dealt a series of external pagecrushing blows to the FARC leadership, and conflict is confined mostly to remote jungle regions. This is not lost on South American governments, who see Colombia as a staging post for external pageUS Southern Command’s operations.
A mutual bind
The bases agreement can therefore be seen in the context of Colombia’s desire to cement its military cooperation with the US. However, acquiescence to the establishment of a US security corridor running from Mexico and through Panama represents tunnel thinking by the Uribe regime in its regional policy..
While the rest of South America increasingly looks to forge economic and political relationships with developing superpowers like China and India (such as the establishment of the intergovernmental body external pageIBSA), Colombia’s reliance on the US as a consumer and military ally will limit its decision-making and economic flexibility.
Moreover, the bases agreement dramatically reduces the Obama administration’s credibility in forging new relations with its South American partners. Obama’s promise to embark on a new policy of multilateral diplomacy at the Summit of the Americas is already external pageperceived as hot air by most governments in the region. The administration has recognized that the bases deal was sold badly, forgetting that stronger military ties with Colombia would inevitably alienate the rest of the continent. The presence of US troops on South American soil still carries significant symbolic connotations given the region's history.
Brazil’s relationship with the US will be put under further strain as the domestic pressure on President Lula da Silva intensifies to cement South-South ties, rather than pursue the policies of the pro-US former president Henrique Cardoso. Depending on the result of the upcoming elections, Brazil may also be unable to continue its unofficial goal of moderating the Chavez regime and pursuing a pragmatic approach to Colombia.
As Professor Greg Grandin of NYU put it in an interview with ISN Security Watch, "The US used to treat the region cohesively, which made it largely peaceful during the 20th century. As a result of domestic politics and the decline of its influence, it is pursuing instead a policy of divide and rule, with which there are destabilizing consequences."
Brazilian impotence
The agreement has certainly undermined Brazil's attempts to advance inter-regional integration. The formation of Unasur in May 2008 was seen as the external pagefirst step toward a pan-South American political organization modelled on the EU. However, the August meeting simply showcased the weaknesses of Brazilian leadership. Summit chair da Silva was visibly angry with the direction of the live broadcast talks, which showcased presidents playing to their domestic audiences, rather than attempting to reach a solution.
Unqualified to arbitrate diplomatic disputes, Unasur’s weakness is easily illustrated by Colombia’s invocation of national sovereignty, perhaps the only argument that carries weight with Venezuela. Colombia argues that military cooperation with the US is comparable to Venezuela's arms deals with Russia and Brazil's recent multi-billion dollar arms agreement with the French.
Having reached no solution, the matter is now in the hands of the South American Defense Council, a body established in conjunction with Unasur to promote regional security. A low-key meeting on 17 September attended by South American defense and foreign ministers failed to reach an agreement on the competence of Unasur to approve military agreements outside the organization. Since the Council’s preamble makes explicit the right to non-interference in internal affairs, it is unclear whether any mandate exists to resolve a matter Colombia sees as its own business.
Unasur may provide only a small step toward regional integration in Latin America; however, its ambitious goals cannot hope to achieve success with members so ideologically opposed and mutually suspicious as the Uribe and Chavez governments. US military involvement will also continue to provoke a historically sensitive continent. If relations are to be normalized between Venezuela and Colombia, the best hope lies in domestic change, rather than the actions of intergovernmental bodies.
Uribe’s success in the war against FARC has given him huge popularity in Colombia, as a external pagerecent poll by the Colombian news network Semana has shown, and his government presents publicly a united front. Privately, however, senior Colombian politicians in Uribe's government are concerned about worsening relations with Venezuela, and according to one former minister who spoke to ISN Security Watch on condition of anonymity, a "de-personalization" of the rhetorical war between Chavez and Uribe could allow progress.
Uribe’s attempts to run for a constitutionally unprecedented third term do not bode well for a solution, considering many potential candidates are unwilling to stand against their former boss.