Democracy, Islamism in Kyrgyzstan

“Kyrgyzstan used to be an island of democracy in a sea of tyranny,” explains Bakyt Beshimov, the vice president of the opposition Social Democratic Party, “but now that island has sunk to the bottom of the ocean.”

Beshimov is despondent about the future. “Kyrgyzstan became an authoritarian state in 2006 after the collapse of the union between [President] Bakiyev and [former prime minister Felix] Kulov. Then Bakiyev intentionally implemented a policy of limiting liberty. He liquidated democracy and the achievements of the past 15 years. Kyrgyzstan is now becoming a dictatorship.”

Soul searching has already begun in Bishkek as to why a lively and colorful opposition failed to stem the authoritarian tide. Temur Sariyev was a presidential candidate in the recent elections, gaining over 6 percent of the vote, according to the official count. He believes that the opposition’s failure stems from its disunity – its failure to agree on a single candidate.

“We failed to create a united opposition as there are many different people with different backgrounds. The question of money predominated instead of the actual conversations of who would have the highest rank. Some people wanted [Almazbek] Atambayev to be that man. He’s a very controversial figure and some of [us] wanted to go our own way.” He says they rejected Atambayev in part because of authoritarian tendencies.

Since 2006, Kumanbek Bakiyev has drawn inspiration from Russia and the other Central Asia states as he set about consolidating power. Media and security were consolidated as family driven concerns subverted the political process.

Tolekan Ismailova, of the Kyrgyz NGO Citizens against Corruption, described the situation: “I used to go to Uzbekistan and be shocked by what I saw. Now in Bishkek I see the same thing is happening to us. We live in a climate of fear here. Members of my NGO have been arrested and I am sure that the situation will get worse in the future. Normal people have been swamped by propaganda and journalists with opposing viewpoints driven out of the country.”

As one of the least developed and rural parts of the former Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan has been particularly vulnerable to the state’s domination of television sources and use of national symbolism.

“The opposition is ineffective as it blocked by the government, political analyst Mondaliev Orozbek tells ISN Security Watch. “Its access to media is limited. There are no independent TV channels in Kyrgyzstan. Even officially independent channels do not give spaces to opposition leaders due to pressure from the authorities. The patrons of these channels [...] are supporters of Bakiyev. There are some newspapers that are for the opposition but they are only in Bishkek so people are simply unaware of the opposition outside the capital. They don’t know the names, goals and the agendas of the parties.”

Tribal politics and political entrepreunership

The rollback in democracy in Kyrgyzstan cannot entirely be blamed on Bakiyev, however. There is a sense the opposition is itself corrupt, self-interested and as inveterately clannish as the leadership.

Mars Sariyev, a prominent political analyst, tells ISN Security Watch that “the opposition is weak as it has no real ideological principles.  It comes basically from old members of the government and is mixed into government. It’s fluid, so people go back and forth with the opposition [...]. Basically I do not see any clear positions.”

Sariyev is concerned that the pattern of appointing relatives and clan members drawn from politicians’ hometowns is destroying the Kyrgyz sense of national identity and could lead to violence.

“There are a lot of opposition parties and each respective leader, if they came from the south of the country, would be far more pro-south. The leaderships of the opposition parties have a tradition of being very popular in their clannish seats. When the leader is from this part and he is dominant, he takes his people from the south and puts them in power,” he says. 

Clannish politics is not the opposition’s only problem. Senior members of the western international development community lament that opposition leaders tend to view themselves as political entrepreneurs rather than agents of social change.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, one foreign NGO leader said that “politicians in this country don’t view stuffing ballots or cutting deals with an authoritarian leader as immoral. They view those decisions as business decisions.”

Kyrgyz human NGOs in Bishkek have been feeling the pinch of authoritarianism. NGO leaders lament that despite their efforts the opposition remains fractured.

Dinara Oshuranova from the EU-funded Coalition for Democracy, tells ISN Security Watch that “the opposition is not united because we have parties of one leader without genuine structures.

"Authentic party work is unknown, as are their programs or missions [...]. If I went to a village and said a name of a party they will ask me not about a party but only the leader [...] Their [opposition] ideas are generalized and not close to our real life, vague without details.” 

Sariyev, for his part, outlined a vague strategy: “The first idea is strengthening our regional representation and focusing on not the quantity but quality of party members. We are going to be organizing regional conferences and party gatherings to discuss the most relevant issues and suggestions.”

While there has been talk recently in Bishkek about a merger of leading opposition parties, analysts are skeptical.

An Islamist opposition?

On the streets of Bishkek, the young seemed largely disinterested in the opposition, but the few that were willing to share their opinions were less than fond of the political elite.

Talk of immigrating to Russia as migrant workers was of far more pressing concern to the poor, while those from the small upper-middle class were supportive of the stability that Bakiyev’s government had delivered. As in Russia or China, contrary to the expectations of western political scientists, the propertied seemed to favor the political status quo out of fear of possible chaos.

At a mosque in central Bishkek, the young men standing outside for Ramadan prayers told ISN Security Watch how in recent years people had been turning to religion. “Communism was a Russian idea and democracy a western one, Islam is ours,” explained one.

The mosque imam was less forthcoming. “What are you looking for? Why are you trying to get me into trouble? This is a country where Allah ends with the clouds,” he said, Indicating that he did not feel free to talk, against the backdrop of a series of high-profile arrests of ‘extremists’ in recent months.

Political analyst Orozbek believes that talks of an Islamist opposition replacing the secular parties in this poor Central Asian country are exaggerated. “Faith here will play out like it has in Turkey,” he said, adding that he viewed the recent talk of Islamism with cynicism and suspicion. “The government is using Islamism and fear of Islamism for its own ends to justify harsh denial of liberties, a security regime and to suck money out of the West.”

Sariyev agreed. “Within the five years, if the authoritarianism state is increasingly constructed there is a possibility that the elites that rule the parties may start to use Islamism as an instrument to further their own goals,” he said.

Yet his colleagues in the NGO world take a different attitude. Asiya Sasykbaeva of the NGO Interbillim is worried that the social and political conditions that favor Islamism have been laid in Kyrgyzstan.

“I am scared that Islamists are becoming more influential and there is evidence of [...] more and more people joining the radical group Hizbut-Tahrir. People in reality do not trust the government.  As a nation we are building more mosques than schools for children. [...] I am scared that the country could be like Afghanistan [...].”

In the southern town of Jalalabat, there is a similar difference of opinion over the threat posed by Islamic radicalism. In recent months analysts have suggested that the Central Asian allies of the Taliban may be retreating from Afghanistan under the pressure of NATO counterstrikes. In late June, a group of young men alleged to have returned from Afghanistan were engaged by Kyrgyz security forces in a shootout in remote Osh-Khorgon.

The rise in Islam in Kyrgyzstan is largely a social phenomenon.

Dulmurad Orozov, director of the Jalalabat Centre for Islamic Studies, estimates the number of extremists in the area at over 22,000 and claims to be in dialogue with them.

“My organization would rather have a peaceful dictatorship than an unstable democracy. We want to see Islamic virtues in society and ideally an Islamic state achieved peacefully. People have been returning to faith due to an absence of government services and perceived loss of civic morality,” he told ISN Security Watch in the southern town of Batken.

Abdumalik Sharipov, a local human rights activist, told ISN Security Watch that “the problem has been growing for 20 years and stems from the fact that the government has no plan to develop the local economy.”

However, he said, “the issue of Islamists has also been manipulated by the government, which means it is very hard to distinguish between a genuine rise in religiosity and a suspected rise in underground terrorism. From my perspective, it is possible that in 10 years there could be a genuine Islamist opposition in this country. After all, that is what happened in Uzbekistan. Dictatorship de-secularized.”

Uncertain political future

The political future of Kyrgyzstan is becoming increasingly clear. The weaknesses of the political opposition in the country are what made Bakiyev’s effortless switch to authoritarianism possible.

Without programs, ideas or genuine ideals, the Kyrgyz political parties are sliding in irrelevance.

Islamism, whilst still not particularly strong, is clear on the rise. And though it is clearly being used by the government to justify its authoritarianism, the Bakiyev regime may end up conjuring up what it fears the most.

In the cramped, drab and politically lifeless world of a dictatorship, there is nothing more thrilling to angry young men than a chance to join the underground. Bakiyev has chosen to follow the Uzbek model of squeezing out politics. He may end up following Uzbekistan and replacing the gap with dangerous radicalism.