Iran's Nuclear Revelations

Top diplomats from the 5+1 countries — the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia and China — met with representatives from Iran on 1 October to discuss that country's controversial nuclear program. What gave special urgency to this meeting — as opposed to most of the previous ones — was first, US success under the new administration to build an international case for new punitive sanctions, and second, the revelation, in days leading up to the meeting, that Iran was operating a clandestine second facility for enriching uranium near the holy city of Qum.

Unexpectedly, and to the surprise of most experts and diplomats, this first round of meetings seems to have borne some tangible, though provisional, results for both sides. To the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 5+1, Iran made three promises. It pledged to open the gates of the hitherto-secret Qum center to IAEA inspectors; it set a date for a follow-up meeting; and, significantly, it promised to turn over nearly 75 percent of its known enriched uranium stockpile to France and Russia for supervised re-processing.

In turn, Iran managed to broaden the talks to include political and regional issues; to engage the US at the highest levels in 30 years; and, at least temporarily, to weaken the case for sanctions.

Low hopes

The meeting did not get off to an auspicious start. On 21 September, Iran reluctantly admitted to the world the existence of the secret enrichment center in Qum. According to the French newspaper Le Monde, this was necessitated only after it had become clear that the US, UK and France were about to make a public announcement on the issue at the UN General Assembly.

Apparently, the three governments had leared about the Qum complex as early as 2006 but had kept mum about it for fear that without an airtight case of Iranian duplicity, they could be accused of torpedoing the negotiations, much the same way the Bush administration was seen as acting in months prior to the Iraqi invasion. (Iran has claimed that it built the clandestine facility because it feared Israeli air strikes on its other facility.)

There are two theories as to how foreign intelligence services first found out about the center. Publicly, it is claimed that aerial photos of the area had shown air defense batteries near the vicinity of the site; a suspicion that was later corroborated by unusual construction activity nearby. This seems rather implausible since Iranians are not apt to build air defense systems during the construction period, particularly since the site happens to be located deep inside a mountain.

The more likely scenario is that information had been obtained from recent defections from Iran. Two recent such cases are Ali Rza Asgari, a brigadier Iranian general, and an Iranian nuclear physicist, Shahram Amiri, who defected recently to Saudi Arabia while supposedly making the hajj pilgrimage.

What gives further credence to this hypothesis is that last August (two months before the UN General Assembly meeting), Iran inexplicably introduced a motion at the IAEA's Non-Aligned Movement caucus to prohibit air attacks directed at nuclear facilities. The motion, which failed to pass, seems to have anticipated the possibility of information handed over to the US and its allies and the need for a plausible explanation for the Qum center once the facts were revealed.

The news of the existence of a secret nuclear center operating outside the eyes of IAEA inspectors was potentially quite damaging to Tehran. By Iran's own admission, the Qum center was too small for civilian purposes, yet it was not too small to accommodate the needs of a nuclear weapons program.

Russia and China, de facto allies of Iran and the two countries that have resisted new sanctions the most, were informed on 23 and 24 September, respectively. At this point, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had no choice but to say that sanctions were inevitable. "The construction of a new uranium enrichment plant contradicts the US Security Council's repeated demands," he was quoted as saying.

US President Barack Obama, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown made a special point of the development by jointly addressing the opening of the G20 summit on 25 September in Pittsburgh. This was done apparently when it was learned that Iran was preparing to go public with the information. (It had already by that time informed the IAEA.)

As for Iran, the government reiterated its position that it would not tolerate the introduction of harsh new sanctions and vaguely threatened to retaliate if and when they were imposed.

The way ahead

The next two important milestones are the arrival of the IAEA inspectors in Iran — and the degree to which Iran would allow freedom of activity to them — and the results of the next round of meetings in Geneva, both scheduled for later this month.

It is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty how the situation will unfold in the next few weeks.

On the one hand, both sides are anxious to avoid a breakdown of talks and to continue with the momentum thus gained. Iran is politically and economically at its worst state in decades and it could ill-afford to have new sanctions — especially on its gasoline imports and its energy sector — imposed on it. The Obama administration, which will be the undisputed leader in the anti-Iran coalition, is grappling with several domestic and foreign policy problems simultaneously, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Arab-Israeli peace and the US economy.

Yet, there are several factors that could abort this early experience in amicability. First, Iran desperate as it is to ease tensions, is determined to reach the ‘breakout’ option, apparently, with little regard for the costs incurred. (The breakout option is the ability of a country to move to nuclear weaponization in a short order of time, if it so desires.)

For example, as important and symbolic as the present agreement is, Iran has not pledged to send all its present and future stockpile of enriched uranium abroad, nor is it expected to accede to that demand later on when the Geneva talks reconvene. 

Additionally, Iran, in the next two and half weeks before IAEA inspectors reach Qum, is expected to clean up much of the activities that had been carried out in there.

Moreover, nuclear experts do not rule out that the Qum complex may be only one in a string of clandestine facilities yet to be discovered in the months and years to come.

The only way to find out about the foregoing is for Iran to allow unfettered access to its nuclear scientists, equipment and records. Iran has already indicated it considers these demands infringements on its sovereignty and would resist them strongly.

Still, the recent transfer of enriched uranium buys some time for the US and its allies by reducing Iran's stockpile, while other non-threatening measures could be contemplated. The US and Iran may also accept an interim solution before the crisis really reaches the boiling point.

Wayne White, a former top official at the US State Department, told ISN Security Watch: "Iran might throw in other limited concessions, like notching up IAEA monitoring a bit, and the US might allow some enrichment by Iran."