Armenia, Turkey: Soul Searching

In a highly anticipatory atmosphere, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey on 10 October signed a protocol to normalize relations. The signing ceremony took place in Zurich in the presence of French, Russian and US foreign ministers and only after a three-hour delay when the Armenian delegation raised objections about the statement the Turkish delegation was scheduled to read after the signing ceremony.  

The statement, which was later disclosed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, states that the normalization of relations and the opening of the border between the two countries was contingent on an Armenian withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh (an Armenian-populated enclave technically considered to be Azerbaijani territory) over which Yerevan and Baku fought a bloody war in 1988-1994 and which is currently under Armenian control.

While in the past the issue of normalizing bilateral relations was completely separated from the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish statements have led many analysts and observers to wonder whether the protocols would ever be ratified by the Turkish parliament.

In the event of re-linking of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue with the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, Yerevan could argue that Ankara has always attached preconditions to the deal and, as such, has sabotaged the process. In turn, Yerevan could use this to backtrack on the agreement.

The signing of the protocols has also highlighted another issue: separating Armenian interests from those of its diaspora.

Thus, in the week prior to the signing of the protocols, Armenia’s president went on a five-city tour (Paris, New York, Los Angeles, Beirut and Rostov-on-Don) to try to convince the diaspora (the majority of whom are not Armenian citizens) that the signing of the protocols was not only in the best interests of Armenia, but also in the best interests of the entire ‘Armenian nation.’

This whirlwind tour did not achieve its goal; rather it gave those parties opposed to the rapprochement an opportunity to express their discontent through demonstrations or during meetings with the president. The major grievance rapprochement opponents have is the inclusion of a provision agreeing to the establishment of sub-committee for the joint examination of historical differences between the two countries - a point many argue is tantamount to questioning whether the Ottoman Empire committed genocide against its Armenian citizens in 1915.

Regardless of the opposition within and outside Armenia and Turkey, the protocols have been signed, and now they must be ratified by their respective parliaments. Optimistic atmosphere aside, however, it is quite conceivable that both Ankara and Yerevan will end up postponing the ratification and putting the protocols on the backburner, citing each other’s lack of commitment to the normalization process.

The challenge facing both governments is how to present this signing as a ‘victory’ to their respective publics, without making it look as if they have conceded too much to the other side.

As far as the third largest player in this process, the Armenian diaspora, is concerned, it would be beneficial for it to use this opportunity to do some serious soul searching and to redefine its roll within the larger context of Armenia-Turkey relations. It would do best to also rethink its strategy: Beyond demanding that Turkey recognize the genocide of 1915, the diaspora should also use some of its influence to ensure that the Armenian government reflects the will of its citizens and is accountable to them.