New Horizons in Nonproliferation
By Frank O’Donnell for ISN
The US is currently seeking to persuade China to support additional sanctions against a likely Iranian nuclear weapons program. Beijing is less hostile than Washington toward the prospect of an Iranian bomb, as this outcome would facilitate the
external pageChinese aim of a more multipolar world. Chinese missile technology sales to states like Iran and Pakistan also generate revenue and assist energy imports.
However, China continues to seek American concessions in the field of space arms control. The current US space policy, articulated in 2006, asserts that Washington would “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.” The country relied upon satellites for over 90 percent of its operations in the 1991 Gulf War, for instance, and regulating state activity in space would have the greatest impact on the US.
Still, the dangers of unregulated US-China space military competition are becoming increasingly apparent. China eliminated a weather satellite using a ballistic missile in January 2007, generating 35,000 pieces of orbital debris threatening the safety of entities ranging from the International Space Station to the 15 Chinese satellites launched into orbit in 2008. external pageMore sinister anti-satellite weapons are also in development as China seeks to catch up to US space capabilities.
China frequently calls for a Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) Treaty, and introduced with Russia a draft external pageTreaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) to the UN Conference on Disarmament in 2008. This effort intends to limit US utilization of space while legitimating Chinese space programs. The draft PPWT treaty vaguely defines a “space-based weapon” as “any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function (sic) of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in its air[...].” This could include any satellite with a military function, such as those part of the nascent US-East Asian ballistic missile defense system.
Signaling a limited US flexibility toward space arms control, only in return for a more supportive Chinese stance toward sanctions against Iran, could alter China’s cost-benefit analysis regarding a Persian bomb. A first step for discussion could be a ban on testing anti-satellite weapons. The further possibility of a Sino-American understanding on the regulation of space military capabilities could serve as an objective more valuable to China than its shielding of Iran from nuclear sanctions.
Initiating arms control talks with China could entail domestic political costs for US President Barack Obama in advancing an image of speaking to China as an equal. He would have to guarantee that the US would still be able to fulfill its global commitments even within a newly regulated space environment. Red lines will also have to be set in talks, including protecting the functioning of ballistic missile defense while reiterating that it is not directed against China.
Washington should consider this idea in searching for a means to secure Beijing’s approval for new sanctions against Iran. Such a move could also reduce the building tensions in their space military activity. The first steps in this direction would not be easy or pain-free. However, the costs of misunderstanding and uncoordinated action in Sino-American arms control, as we are seeing with Iran, are much greater with inaction.
However, China continues to seek American concessions in the field of space arms control. The current US space policy, articulated in 2006, asserts that Washington would “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.” The country relied upon satellites for over 90 percent of its operations in the 1991 Gulf War, for instance, and regulating state activity in space would have the greatest impact on the US.
Still, the dangers of unregulated US-China space military competition are becoming increasingly apparent. China eliminated a weather satellite using a ballistic missile in January 2007, generating 35,000 pieces of orbital debris threatening the safety of entities ranging from the International Space Station to the 15 Chinese satellites launched into orbit in 2008. external pageMore sinister anti-satellite weapons are also in development as China seeks to catch up to US space capabilities.
China frequently calls for a Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) Treaty, and introduced with Russia a draft external pageTreaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) to the UN Conference on Disarmament in 2008. This effort intends to limit US utilization of space while legitimating Chinese space programs. The draft PPWT treaty vaguely defines a “space-based weapon” as “any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function (sic) of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in its air[...].” This could include any satellite with a military function, such as those part of the nascent US-East Asian ballistic missile defense system.
Signaling a limited US flexibility toward space arms control, only in return for a more supportive Chinese stance toward sanctions against Iran, could alter China’s cost-benefit analysis regarding a Persian bomb. A first step for discussion could be a ban on testing anti-satellite weapons. The further possibility of a Sino-American understanding on the regulation of space military capabilities could serve as an objective more valuable to China than its shielding of Iran from nuclear sanctions.
Initiating arms control talks with China could entail domestic political costs for US President Barack Obama in advancing an image of speaking to China as an equal. He would have to guarantee that the US would still be able to fulfill its global commitments even within a newly regulated space environment. Red lines will also have to be set in talks, including protecting the functioning of ballistic missile defense while reiterating that it is not directed against China.
Washington should consider this idea in searching for a means to secure Beijing’s approval for new sanctions against Iran. Such a move could also reduce the building tensions in their space military activity. The first steps in this direction would not be easy or pain-free. However, the costs of misunderstanding and uncoordinated action in Sino-American arms control, as we are seeing with Iran, are much greater with inaction.