Ignoring Iran

Iran's decision this week to external pagepursue uranium enrichmentcall_made to 20 percent for the Tehran Research Reactor is liable to backfire, placing significant pressure on the Russians to acquiesce to a further round of UN sanctions.

Iranian protestations and delays concerning a proposed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plan for the shipment of Iranian low enriched uranium (LEU) overseas for reprocessing and shaping into fuel rods are essentially political in nature.

The mishandling of this issue by both sides is particularly egregious when seen in light of the need to provide Iran with a ladder to climb down on enrichment, through a subsequent agreement.

This can only take the form of a bolstered incentives package, based on an extension of the EU-3 offer, which takes the onus off nuclear development aid and places it on economic and diplomatic cooperation agreements, bringing in all major powers, the EU and Gulf states.

The involvement of the latter (particularly Saudi Arabia) in any extended incentives scheme is crucial, given current tensions over Iraq and Yemen and the unprecedented regional arms race currently underway in the Gulf.

Here, a package that builds energy cooperation, in part, on Abu Dhabi's proven track record on renewable energy promotion and rapid Chinese solar generation development could be of benefit. Aiding Iran with the development of its anemic oil refining capacity is also a key short-term solution likely to appeal to Tehran.

Above all, there needs to be recognition that international sanctions will not bring the necessary weight to bear on Tehran to answer outstanding questions on its nuclear program.

What reason does Iran have to develop program transparency when potential revelations on past militarization work will only draw further diplomatic attention to enrichment?

The constant pressure on Iran over the nuclear issue is strengthening the hand of hardliners within the political and military structures of the Islamic Republic.

Here, the ongoing threat of military action is particularly damaging.

Israeli fears of a catastrophic Iranian nuclear attack are understandable and deep-seated, and the country's diplomatic response should not be discounted as bullish bravado.

However, the Iranians have learned the external pagelesson of Osirakcall_made and have not put all their eggs in one basket with regard both to the physical situation of key atomic facilities and their protection from air strikes.

Any attack would likely only retard program development, driving it underground, and bring a major Iranian retaliation in the Gulf – as signaled by the Revolutionary Guard's assumption of the control of Gulf naval operations. This would have a profound impact on the global economy, while making it all but certain that Iran would develop an overt nuclear weapons capacity.

As US Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged this week, the latter would place unbearable pressure on other major Middle Eastern powers to follow suit, effectively destroying the global multilateral nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime.

This cannot be allowed to happen.

Ultimately, if Iran does not choose to acquiesce to the offer of a bolstered, comprehensive incentives program, or respond appropriately to the necessary IAEA censure of illicit nuclear activities, then consideration should be given to de-escalation; changing tack to focus on wider regional conflict management and the abatement of related tensions.