China, A Great Power Like Any Other

China’s foreign policy thinkers and political establishment have long been trying to convince the world that Beijing’s rise is meant to be a peaceful one, that China has no expansionist intentions, that it will be a different kind of great power.

Of course, the very nature of power makes this largely a charade, but more surprising is that western liberals have tended to take these assertions at face value. There is an entire industry in the West that would have us believe that China is actually a different kind of a great power and that if the West could simply give China a stake in the established order, Beijing’s rise would not create any complications.

Now, one of the most prominent foreign-policy thinkers in China is advocating for the creation of overseas bases. Shen Dingli, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, asserts that “it is wrong for us [China] to believe that we have no rights to set up bases abroad.” He argues that it is not terrorism or piracy that’s the real threat to China. It’s the ability of other states to block China’s trade routes that poses the greatest threat. To prevent this from happening, China, according to Dingli, needs not only a blue-water navy but also “overseas military bases to cut the supply costs.”

Of course, Dingli also wraps this up in the widely accepted world peace diplomacy, asserting that the establishment of such military bases overseas would promote regional and global stability. It is a familiar diplomatic wrapping that other superpowers should easily recognize.

As China emerges as a major global power, it will expand its military footprint across the globe, much like other great powers throughout history.

China’s expansionist behavior has long been evident. It has been acquiring naval bases along the crucial choke-points in the Indian Ocean not only to serve its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic presence in the region. China realizes that its maritime strength will give it the strategic leverage it needs to emerge as the regional hegemon and a potential superpower.

Its growing reliance on bases across the Indian Ocean region is a response to its perceived vulnerability, given the logistical constraints it faces due to the distance of the Indian Ocean waters from its own area of operation.

China is also consolidating power over the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean with an eye on India, no longer accepting the Indian Ocean as India’s ocean. China’s growing naval presence in and around the Indian Ocean region is troubling for India as it restricts India’s freedom to manoeuvre. Of particular note is what has been termed as China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy that has significantly expanded its strategic depth in India’s backyard.

The Gwadar port in Pakistan and electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal are part of this ‘string of pearls’ strategy.

Some of the claims are exaggerated as has been the case with the purported Chinese naval presence in Burma. The Indian government, for example, had to concede in 2005 that reports of China turning the Coco Islands in Burma into a naval base were incorrect and that there were indeed no naval bases in Burma.

Still, the Chinese thrust into the Indian Ocean is gradually becoming more pronounced. The Chinese may not have a naval base in Burma but they are involved in the upgradation of infrastructure in the Coco Islands and may be providing some limited technical assistance to Burma.

Given that almost 80 percent of China’s oil passes through the Strait of Malacca, it is reluctant to rely on US naval power for unhindered access to energy and so has decided to build up its naval power at choke points along the sea routes from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea.

China is also courting other states in South Asia by building container ports in Bangladesh at Chittagong and in Sri Lanka at Hambantota as well as helping to build a naval base at Marao in the Maldives. Consolidating its access to the Indian Ocean, China has signed an agreement with Sri Lanka to finance the development of the Hambantota Development Zone, which includes a container port, a bunker system and an oil refinery.

The submarine base that China is considering at Marao Island in Maldives has the potential to challenge the US Navy in Diego Garcia, the hub of US naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

China’s presence in the Bay of Bengal via roads and ports in Burma and in the Arabian Sea via the Chinese-built port of Gwadar in Pakistan has generated concern in India. With access to crucial port facilities in Egypt, Iran and Pakistan, China is well-poised to secure its interests in the region.

China’s involvement in the construction of the deep-sea port of Gwadar has attracted a lot of attention due to its strategic location, about 70 kilometres from the Iranian border and 400 kilometers east of the Strait of Hormuz, a major oil supply route. It can used to keep an eye on Indian and American activities in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

It is possible that the construction of these ports and facilities by China can be explained away on purely economic and commercial grounds, but for regional powers like the US, Japan and India these activities seem to be aimed at them. China’s diplomatic and military efforts in the Indian Ocean seem to exhibit a desire to project power vis-à-vis competing powers in the region.

China is merely following in the footsteps of other major global powers who have established military bases abroad to secure their interests. There is only one kind of great power, and one kind of great power tradition. China is not going to be any different. The sooner the world acknowledges this, the better it will be for global stability.