Colombia’s Litmus Test
By Eliot Brockner for ISN
Two weeks after a court ruling prohibiting the candidacy of popular incumbent Alvaro Uribe for a third presidential term due to questions of constitutionality, Colombians headed to the polls on 14 March to elect senators and members of the Chamber of Representatives and Andean Parliament.
With 75 percent of the Senate votes counted late on Sunday, results showed parties closely allied to outgoing President Uribe in the lead. Partido de la U, the party of Uribe’s former defense minister and current presidential front-runner Juan Manuel Santos, has won external pagearound 24 percent of the votecall_made and could very well be in place now to take over from Uribe in 30 May presidential elections. The opposition Liberal Party had the third largest showing, and could win around 18 Senate seats.
Candidates representing dozens of political parties and hundreds of different platforms have been campaigning in Colombia in preparations for the elections. Not surprisingly, many candidates have promised to maintain the same policies that have helped transform Colombia from a place where just 10 years ago intra-city transit posed the risk of kidnapping to one where people can travel freely throughout many parts of the country.
Two key issues are at stake. One will be the success of the Partido de la U. The success of the party will determine Santos’ chances for the presidency. Indeed, opinion polls place Santos as a front-runner to succeed Uribe, and he has vowed to follow in the footsteps of the outgoing president.
The second issue is security. The safety of voters and aspiring political candidates played a prominent role on election day. Indeed, Defense Minister Gabriel Silva told local media on 12 March that “These will be the safest elections Colombia has had in 25 years.”
Improving security has been the central theme of Uribe’s presidency, and there is little reason to expect it to change during his last months in office. In response to a recent wave of rebel attacks in Cauca department, a well-publicized threat on a Senate-hopeful and other isolated threats from armed militant groups, as well as a high-profile hostage release by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) aimed at influencing elections, Uribe dispatched over 250,000 troops throughout Colombia to minimize election violence, electoral fraud and third-party influence on voters.
Uribe stationed the majority of troops in the higher risk departments of in the southwestern and eastern parts of the country, and the Defense Ministry suspended its operation to rescue kidnapping victims, one of whom has been in FARC custody since 1997, until after the elections.
Some groups did report some cases of alleged vote-buying and voter intimidation in the countryside, but there was no widespread violence, and so far, the elections seem to have been relatively peaceful.
March 14 was a test of the power of Colombia’s political parties. Because there is external pagelittle ideological cohesioncall_made amongst parties, a candidate’s appeal may be directly related to his individual supporters as well as the party he represents. Thus, if Partido de la U has a strong showing in the legislative elections in spite of the diversity of policies and candidates using its name, it may suggest not only the importance of personality in legislative elections, but also the strength of the Partido de la U political machinery and the prospect of a continuation of improved that it represents.
What makes predicting the final outcome difficult is Uribe’s popularity. His absence leaves an enormous void in the presidency of Colombia, and certainly he is a difficult act to follow, credited with attracting foreign investment and making major inroads into improving the country’s internal security by cracking down on the drug trade and related violence. Perhaps aware of his sway, Uribe has still not officially endorsed any candidate. If this changes, it may be enough to sway those still loyal to him to vote for his chosen successor. This may supersede any party loyalty.