Intel Brief: Leverage Over Lukashenko
By Anna Dunin for ISN
The campaign of repression targeting the Polish minority in Belarus has significantly intensified in recent months, straining relations between the two countries, and forcing the hand of high-ranking Polish diplomats.
But sometimes, where there is conflict, there is opportunity, and here, skillful diplomacy exercised by Poland, supported by the EU and combined with an appealing package of economic incentives could win some concessions from the Belarusian strongman.
Targeting an influential minority
In recent months, Belarus authorities have noticeably stepped up the persecution of civil society activists. The Union of Poles in Belarus (ZPB) - an independent cultural organization set up to promote the Polish language and culture among ethnic Poles living in Belarus and representing a minority ranging between 400,000 - 900,000 people - has been the main target of this wave of attacks.
The crackdown reflects a wider problem of violations of human rights and rule of law in Belarus, with Lukashenko threatened by civil society groups which external pagedepict a potential for independence from or disloyalty to his regimecall_made. To this end, the Belarusian leader external pagehas accused Polandcall_made (and the EU) repeatedly of using the Polish union to stir up societal grievances and orchestrate a revolution.
Lukashenko appears to view the ZPB as a fairly external pagepowerful and influential organizationcall_made, while Polish officials insist that the group has no irredentist inclinations and poses no threat to the country or to Lukashenko’s authority. Moreover, Poland says it does not support any type of separatism in that area.
The most probable scenario is that Lukashenko's campaign is linked to looming local elections scheduled for April, which will be a barometer of the public's attitude prior to 2011 presidential elections. The persecution of a popular organization could serve as a deterrent for other groups opposing the regime, while lack of its efficient pacification external pagecould lead to increased activitycall_made on the part of Belarusian opposition and effectively weaken the administration’s hold on power.
Divide and conquer
The ongoing conflict with the ZPB dates back to March 2005, when Angelika Borys was elected chairwoman of the group. Minsk declared the results of the elections non-binding and ordered the Union to repeat the convention. Supporters of external pageBorys rejected this decisioncall_made and subsequently refused to recognize the newly appointed leader, effectively installed by Minsk.
The Polish government unanimously recognized Borys as the sole legitimate leader of the Polish minority. As a result, since 2005, two parallel ZPB organizations have been active – one led by Angelika Borys and deemed illegal by Minsk, and the other led by Stanislaw Siemaszko, which is legal, but unrecognized by Belarusian Poles and Warsaw. While the group led by Borys has a high membership of approximately 20,000 people, external pageonly 52 members took partcall_made in the last convention of the official ZPB.
In recent months, members of the external pageunofficial union have been accused of illegal activitiescall_made. There have been a external pagenumber of detentions and arrestscall_made, often carried out on external pagedubious groundscall_made. Incidents of physical assaults, property damage, vandalism, external pageblack propagandacall_made as well as evictions and seizures of property targeting the unofficial ZPB and its activists external pagehave become more frequentcall_made in recent weeks.
In early February, police along with the leadership of the official ZPB, took over the Polish House in Ivenets, a cultural center that had belonged to the group led by Borys. The building, whose renovation had been completely funded by the Polish Senate, was the external page14th consecutive Housecall_made nationwide external pagetaken over by the policecall_made and given to the official ZPB, which external pageleft only twocall_made of them in the hands of the Borys-led Union. The decision created outrage in Warsaw, as the Polish government had paid external pageapproximately PLN 30 millioncall_made ($10 million) for the renovation and furnishing of 16 Polish Houses in Belarus.
A few days later, police detained a group of ZPB activists en route to a court proceeding, attempting (external pageunsuccessfullycall_made) to appeal the seizure of the House. On 8 March, police detained 40 more activists and external pagepressed chargescall_made against the leadership of the persecuted ZPB - Borys, Igor Banker and Andrzej Poczobut - for taking part in an illegal demonstration.
In February, a external pagecourt imposed another finecall_made of over $42,000 on Borys' firm Polonica, having found it guilty of financial irregularities. Polonica brought in funding for educational and cultural activities for the Polish Houses. Their educational activity will be further threatened with Belarusian Education Ministry plans to introduce new laws to criminalize teaching in any language other than Russian and Belarusian. This decision, if codified, will result in the external pageclosure of two Polish schoolscall_made in Grodno and Wolkowysk.
Opportunity in compromise
While the crackdown seems to be a distant problem for Brussels, it is a very close concern for Warsaw. In late February, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski met with Lukashenko in Kiev to external pagediscuss the escalating conflictcall_made. Both politicians agreed to establish a group of experts to work toward a resolution.
Poland set down external pagetwo conditions for a compromisecall_made, including official recognition for both Polish unions and an equal split of all assets between the two.
In the response to the brewing tensions, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution on 10 March condemning acts of repression in Belarus targeting civil society and democratic opposition, based on a strategy of sticks and carrots. It threatens that further violations will lead to economic and political sanctions, and suggests a package of economic incentives from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB) or International Monetary Fund (IMF), if such a record is improved.
While Lukashenko has not bowed to such threats in the past, delicate behind-the-doors diplomacy and appropriate political pressure, supported by Brussels and international organizations, have the potential to mitigate Minsk's attitude. The EU, while ineffective with aggressive sanctions, has the ability to make it easier or harder for Belarus to receive financial assistance.
Belarus’ geopolitical situation and its dependence on Russia's economy have created room for conditionality that could be used by both Warsaw and Brussels. In the aftermath of its recent conflict with Georgia, Russia increased political pressure on its satellite neighbors. Moreover, in light of the global financial crisis, Russia has external pagestopped assistingcall_made the Belarusian economy with low-priced crude oil and natural gas, which has forced Minsk to turn to the West for loans. external pageAssistance from the IMF, EBRD or the EUcall_made would allow Lukashenko to reduce the country’s dependence on the Kremlin and avoid growing debt. Western institutions, therefore, do have leverage, but consistency is generally lacking.